TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050039-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 2, 2005
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: September 27, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
FBIS
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
Approved For Release 2005/06/08: CIA-RDP85TOO
27 SEPTEMBER 1972
~75R00 D500L8, NO. 39)
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I.:UNFI1)ENTIA.1..
This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on matarial
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
27 SEPTEMBER 1972
CONTENTS
Topics and Evento Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . i
DRV, Front Press for Agreement Not to Impose Regime in Saigon . 1
Moscow Gives PRG Proposal on Settlement Pro Forma Support . . . 5
Hanoi Derides U.S. Official Reaction to Release of POW's . . . 7
DRV Sustains Charges of Strikes at Dikes, Schools, Churches . . 9
Hanoi Commentator "Chien Thang" Agaia Lauds Southern Offensive. 14
DRV, PRG Cite Military Action in Quang Ngai Province . . . . . 15
SINO-SOVIiT RELATIONS
Moscow Says Chinese Have Failed to Accept Soviet Proposals . . 16
KOREA
Pyongyang Criticizes Pak, Warns ROK Against Impediag Talks . . 19
CHINA-JAPAN
Peking Expects Tanaka Visit to Achieve "Complete Success" . . . 22
DISARMAMENT
Gromyko Elaborates, Comment Defends Nonuse of Force Proposal . 25
MIDDLE EAST
Gromyko Supports Palestinian Cause,, Deplores "Terrorist Acts" . 27
AFRICA
Moscow Welcomes OAU, Somali Moves to Settle Uganda Conflict . . 31
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Central Controls Over Cultural Agencies Are Tightened . . . . 33
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FB I S TRENDS
27 SEPTEMBER 1972
Moscow 2703 items)
Feking (1426 items)
Supreme Soviet Session
(1%)
14%
Domestic Issues (36%)
40%
[Kirillin, Kapitonov
(--)
4%]
Iranian Empress in PRC (--)
11%
Speeches
UNGA Session (0.1%)
7%
UNGA Session
(1%)
8%
Japanese LDP Delegation (--)
6%
(Disarmament
(lx)
6%]
in PRC
Israeli Attacks on Lebanon (9%) 5%
Zambian Vice President (0.4%)
5%
& Syria
Indochina
(8%)
6%
in PRC
Indochina (12%)
4%
China
(3%)
4%
Chile National Day (--)
4%
Iraqi President al-Bakr
(4%)
3%
Mali National Day (--)
4%
in USSR
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor signifl.^.ance.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
27 SEPTEMBER 1972
INDOCHINA
Hanoi has taken steps in the past few days to dramatize the
portrayal of the Vietnamese communist stand on a settlement of the
war as serious and reasonable. Following PRG Foreign Minister
Binh's rebuttal of U.S. charges at Paris that the PRG proposal
would result in communist control of a tripartite provisional
government, a 25 September NHAN DAN Commentator article went beyond
the 11 September PRG statement to broach the issue of guarantees
of an agreement that neither side would impose a regime in the
South. On the 27th, VNA took the unprecedented step of transmitting
the text of an unsigned article in the September issue of the DRV
party theoretical journal HOC TAP which sets out the positions of
the two sides in detail. Like other propaganda, HOC TAP takes issue
with "sowing of illusions" by the United States that a solution may
be near and stresses that "the key opposing point" lies in the
question of the future administration in South Vietnam.
Gromyko's remarks at the UN General Assemb'.y followed other pro
forma expressions of Soviet support for the 11 September PRG
proposal. Routine Moscow comment continues to focus on the question
of a tripartite provisional government in the South. An apparently
harmonious exchange of views took place between the DRV ambassador
and Kosygin and Podgornyy on 25 and 26 September, respectively.
Maintaining an unusually low posture in its treatment of the PRG's
11 September statement, Peking has confined its coverage of Vietnam
developments to edited replays of Vietnamese communist statements
and low-level reportage. There are no current reports of meetings
between DRV and Chinese officials, but NCNA on the 25th announced
that the PRC ambassador had a talk with the French premier that day.
Neither Hanoi nor Peking has mentioned that the route home of the
three American pilots released by the DRV was by air through China.
Hanoi has made fairly extensive efforts to denigrate the U.S.
official attitude toward the prisoner rctease, embellishing charges
that the Administration had plotted to "intercept and brazenly
kidnap" the pilots in Laos in pursuit of war-related "schemes."
DRV, FRONT PRESS FOR AGREEMENT NOT TO IMPOSE REGIME IN SAIGON
Vietnamese communist propaganda since the 31 August NHAN DAN Commentator
article, which was the first substantial comment on negotiations since
last winter, has been notable for its serious tone and its effort to
present the communist stand as reasonable but firm. Since he release
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of the 11 September PRG statement there has been continued stress
on the demand that the United States recognize the "reality" in
South Vietnam--that is, that there are two administrations, two
armies, and other political forces--and reach an agreement that
neither side will impose a government on the other. Hanoi and the
Front have countered U.S. charges regarding the PRG's intent to
try to control a South Vietnamese government by charging that it
is the United States which has imposed the Thieu "lackey" regime
and which, through its eight-point proposal, wants to liquidate
the PRG and the PLAF. This line was pursued in the NHAN DAN
Commentator article on the 25th, which asked if the United States
"dared, together with the parties concerned, to set forth and
implement necessary measures for insuring that none of the parties
will control the political life in South Vietnam during the
transition period."
VNA's unusual release of the HOC TAP article* takes on added
interest coinciding as it does with the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho
meetings in Paris on the 26th and 27th. Consistent with its
recent practice, Hanoi has not mentioned the meetings. There is
no way of determining precisely when the article was written, but
it clearly postdates the release of the 11 September PRG statement,
to which it refers in setting out the opposing positions. The
article resembles the 31 August NHAN DAN Commentator article in
taking issue with U.S. officials, including the President and
Secretary Rogers, for suggesting that a settlement might be reached
soon. It declares that the negotiating stands of the two sides
must be analyzed "to clartfy this question."
NHAN DAN'S COMMENTATOR The NHAN DAN Commentator article of the
25th pursued the line of the 16 September
NHAN DAN editorial in contrasting the PRG's "reasonable" proposal
for a South Vietnamese tripartite provisional government of national
concord with U.S. "maintenance" of the Thieu regime. The article
set out to demonstrate that it is the United States, not the communist
side, that wants to impose a government in South Vietnam and charged
that the Paris talks have been stalemated because the United States
"demands the 1a.quidation of the adversary" and opposes the setting up
of a provisional government of three equal components. Otherwise,
the article did not mention the Paris talks and thus did not
acknowledge Ambassador Porter's charges that the communists hope in
* There has been comment in HOC TAP on the Paris talks over the past
few years, but these items have not been carried by VNA or the radio.
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fact t-, dominate the government. However, it did refer cryptically
to Kissinger's remarks at his Washington press conference on the
16th--the day after he had met privately with Le Duc Tho and Yuan
They.
Commentator said Kissinger distorted the communists' stand by
"declaring that the United States would reject any move that would
impose a particular kind of government." The article went on to
observe that judging from Kissinger's remarks, the Americans seem
to fear that the PRG proposal would result in a certain form of
government being forced upon the South. 'Calling this another
"absurdity" of the U.S. stand, Commentator argued that if the
United States wanted to negotiate seriously, "all sides would be
able to agree on effective measures to dissipate that fear." The
article then repeated the proposal that agreement be reached on
neither side imposing a government and went on to interject the
new element on guarantees:
The U.S. Government can agree with the parties
concerned on the necessary measures aimed at
insuring that no party controls political life
in South Vietnam.*
PARIS SESSION Vietnamese communist media gave the usual sketchy
account of the Paris session on the 21st, although
there was at least a brief reference to the U.S. presentation by VNA,
which had totally ignored the U.S. statement on the 14th. VNA said
the U.S. delegate on the 21st "continued to use slanderous contentions
to avoid responding positively to the fair and sensible proposals in
the PRG's 11 September statement."
Mme. Binh declared that i?.i its opposition to a provisional government,
the U.S. delegation "has put forward several sophistries and
distortions which should be rejected." She then repeated the
* This statement is similar to Pham Van Dong's remark in reply to
columnist Victor Zorza's giestion regarding provisions to insure
the implementation of an agreement not to impose a regime on the
South. Dong said: "Naturally, there should be necessary measures
firmly guaranteeing the realization of the aforementioned proposal,
and the parties concerned will agree with one another on these measures."
The Dong exchange with Zorza was transmitted in VNA's service channel
from Hanoi to Paris on 23 September but has not yet been carried in
Hanoi media.
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denial--standard for months--that the PRG'9 aim is to impose a
communist regime, and she bolstered her denial by quoting the
passage in the PRG statement on readiness to reach agreement that
neither side will impose a regime. As refutation of U.S. charges
that the formula for a government of national concord is a formula
"to seize power," she merely repeated the proposal on the
formation of the provisional government--that the PRG and Saigon
administration "without Thieu" would appoint their respective
people and that the appointment of people to the third '.,omponent
"will be made through consultations."
To counter U.S. charges that the provisional government proposal
was aimed at avoiding general elections, the PRG delegate insisted
that only a national concord government could hold "truly free and
democratic elections."* She denied demanding the dismissal of all
the leaders of the military and civilian machinery of the Saigon
administration, saying that the demand is that "Thieu resign and
the Saigon administration give up its polity of repression and
terrorism." She concluded by saying public opinion has acclaimed
the PRG's "correct 4tand and serious, practical and constructive
attitude" while it has "sternly criticized the U.S. negative and
non-constructive reaction."
*)RV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy again expressed "unreserved support"
for the PRG statement. Vy did not rehash all the points of the
11 September statement, but he echoed Mme. Binh in his portrayal of
the generosity of the proposal. He said that the PRG, "for the
sake of national concord," advocates that internal South Vietnamese
affairs should be settled on the basis of a provisional government
of three equal components even though the PRG "is the authentic
representai:ive" and the Saigon administration "is created by the
United States as an instrument of neocolonialist policy."
* VNA's summary of Binh's."refutation of U.S. sophistries" cited
only her remarks on general elections.
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MOSCOW GIVES PRG PROPOSAL ON SETTLEMENT PRO FORMA SUPPORT
Moscow's continued pro forma support of the PRG's 11 September
statement includes Gromyko's remarks in his UNGA address ca the
26th, statements by Soviet friendship committees, and an
editorial in the weekly NOVOYE VREMYA. Radio Moscow reported
briefly that PRAVDA's senior commentator Yuriy Zhukov, speaking
on Moscow television en- the 21st, had characterized the PRG
statement as an "important" docurent and reiterated Soviet
support for the Vietnamese. Comment lauding the PRG statement
has emphasized the theme that it shows t'.ie Vietnamese communists'
good will and desire for a peaceful settlement. Moscow has
observed that the proposal for an agreement that neither side
will impose a regime or_ South Vietnam should F.llay U.S. fears
of FRG intentions and remove any U.S. justification for pursuit
of the war.
An IZVESTIYA article by commentator Yevgeniy Vasilkov, summarized
by TASS on 26 September, said the PRG's positiin that a Vietnam
solution must be based on "the present actual situation in South
Vietnam" is "principled and profoundly justified" from the
viewpoint of both "international law and commonsense." Admission
of these "realities" by the United States, Vasilkov said, would
allow a start to be made on a solution of *the conflict. He
assailed "groundless" U.S. attempts to present intensification
of aggression as aimed at bringing the prisoners home, adding
that their release can be brought about "only after the end of
mill.tary operations."
.soviet media at this yr icing have carried only sketchy accounts of
Gromyko's remarks on Vietnam in his UNGA speech. A 26 September
PASS summary in Russian reported him as saying that a way out of
the war can be found, "but only through serious talks, a
constructive basis for which is given by the well-known proposals
of the PRG of 11 September and J the DRV Government on the 14th."*
TASS' summary in English quoted him as asserting that the
Vietnamese cannot be defeated "by heavier bombings, by blockades,
or by attacks against their hydroelectric installations." Neither
of the brief summaries mentioned his remarks excoriating U.S.
* TASS' summary in English rendered this passage; A solution to
the war can be found "only through serious negotiations on the
basis of constructive proposals put forward by the PRG and DRV
Government."
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"cruelty and inhumanity" and alleged efforts to "eliminate" the
PRG and preserve the Thieu regime, or his support for the
establishment of a tripartite provisional government.
LEADERS' MEETINGS A harmonious exchange of views seemed
WITH DRV AMBASSADOR indicated in brief TASS reports that
the DRV ambassador was received by
Kosygin on 25 September and by Podgornyy on the 26th for "warm"
or "cordial" and friendly talks. The meetings take on added
interest in view of the U.S. announcement on the 26th that
Kissinger was meeting again with Le Duc Tho in Paris. Katushev
had met the DRV ambassador on 15 September, presumably to brief
him on Kissinger's consultations with Brezhnev and perhaps also
to receive the 14 September DRV Government statement supporting
the PRG's 11 September proposal.
TASS' reports of the ambassador's meetings with Kosygin and
Podgornyy did not indicate any of .he substance of the talks,
but VNA gave more detail. The Vi.atnamese agency quoted Kosygin
as pledging continued Soviet support and assistance to the
Vietnamese people's struggle "against the U.S. imperialist
aggressors" until "complete victory" and the DRV ambassador as
expressing gratitude for the USSR's "great and precious
assistance." According to VNA, Podgornyy called the 11 September
PRG statement "a very fair and reasonable proposal" which the
USSR "fully supports." VNA said Podgornyy also pledged Soviet
support and assistance "until complete victory," promising that
the Soviet Union would fulfill its "international obligation."
VNA did not report the DRV ambassador's remarks to Podgornyy,
but a Hanoi domestic service broadcast noted that he thanked the
USSR for its "great and precious assistance." Neither VNA report
mentioned the atmosphere of the talks, although the Hanoi radio
report on the meeting with Podgornyy--but not on the talks with
Kosygin--echoed Moscow's description of the "cordial and friendly
atmosphere."
Moscow's description of the atmosphere of the DRV ambassador's
meetings with both Kosygin and Podgornyy contrasts sharply with
its portrayal of an atmosphere of "comradely frankness" in talks
between the ambassador and Kosygin on 11 February. Moscow's
report of that meeting, clearly indicative of strains and never
acknowledged by Hanoi, was publicized only hours before the
release of a belated Soviet Government statement supporting the
PRG's 2 February "elaboration" of its seven-point proposal. The
PRG and DRV ambassadors had informed Kosygin of the 2 February
elaboration and the DRV's support of it at a 4 February meeting
marked by "friendship and cordiality"; Moscow's subsequent delay in
coming out with an official endorsement may well have prompted the
meeting with Kosygin on the 11th.
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HANOI DERIDES U,S, OFFICIAL REACTION TO RELEASE OF POW'S
Hanoi comment on the release of Lieutenants Gartley and Charles
and Major Elias stresses the "lenient" and "humane" nature of
DRV policies toward American POW's and criticizes the U.S.
Administration's attitude toward the release. A 27 September
Hanoi broadcast reported that the prisoners had "left for home"
on the 25th but did not mention that the route was via China.
Earlier the media had suggested that there would be a problem in
sending them out on a plane which would stop in Laos. A broadcast
on the 20th cited the Western press for reports that U.S. embassy
officials in Vientiane planned to board the prisoners' plane and
subject them to a military debriefing or medical examination.
The radio labeled such a plan an "evil plot" of the Nixon
Administration to "intercept and brazenly kidnap" the pilots in
the hope of using them again to implement "vile and dirty
schemes" in pursuit of the war.
VNA on the 22d carried the text of the telegram to President
Nixon in which members of the escort delegation set forth four
conditions they wanted met "in the best interests of the remaining
pilots and their families"--letting the pilots return home in the
company of the escort delegation, granting them 30 days of leave
if they so desired, permitting them to undergo medical examinations
at hospitals of their choice, and exempting them from the need to
do anything further "to promote the American war effort in
Indochina." VNA also carried, on the 24th, the text of the
prisoners' message to the President requesting that they be allowed
to return to New York with the escort delegation and spend a few
days with their families, as well as a message from Mrs. Charles
and Mrs. Gartley assuring the President that the pilots are in
excellent health and spirits and another from Major Elias to his
wife.
A 25 September Hanoi broadcast scoring Secretary Laird's remarks
in his "Meet the Press" television interview the previous day said
the Secretary demanded that the United States reject the four
conditions proposed by the escort delegation, that he "indirectly
threatened" the pilots' families, and that he "lied" in saying
Hanoi was using the pilots as propaganda tools. Calling his remarks
"spiteful" and "insolent," the broadcast asserted that they
reflected the anger and embarrassment of "leading cliques in the
White House and Pentagon" over the release. Likening Laird's
remarks to the "vile" plans of U.S. Embassy officials in Laos,
the broadcast concluded that they constitute "proof that all of
the Nixon clique's noisy statements about its concern for the
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U.S. POW's have been deceits aimed at concealing its dark
scheme of taking advantage of the POW's as a pretext to prolong
and step up the war of aggression in Vietnam."
A 26 September QUAN DOI NHAN DAN coma~::ntary on Laird's TV
interview again brought rip the charge of efforts to "kidnap" the
pilots in Vientiane, in this context quoting Senator McGovern
as saying that the Administration is "playing politics" with
the released pilots and that "no clause of the Geneva convention
requires that these three men report to U.S. Army officers for
questioning."* The paper was at pains to rebut Laird's charge
that Hanoi was violating the Geneva conventions by "parading
around" prisoners it had promised to release but had not actually
freed. The article said that the pilots were living "freely
and comfortably" in a hotel and had walked around Hanoi on their
own on 18 September, and it observed that strolling around a
lake in Hanoi did not constitute being "paraded around." Recalling
earlier remarks by Secretary Laird about "inhumane treatment" of
POW's, the broadcast rejoined that released prisoners and visitors
to the DRV have "repeatedly affirmed that these captured U.S.
militarymen have been treated very humanely."
A Hanoi radio commentary on the 26th noted Laird's statement that
the Administration nad advised the pilots' relatives against going
to North Vietnam. This move, it charged, revealed that "the Nixon
clique does not want the wives and mothers and these POW's
themselves to witness and tell freely the truth about the savage
crimes" which the United States has committed by bombing North
Vietnam.
The 27 September Hanoi broadcast announcing the departure of the
prisoners reported that the escort delegation had "recently" been
received by Premier Pham Van Dong and that he had "talked
intimately" with them. The broadcast also noted that the
delegation had met with the Commission for the Investigation of U.S.
War Crimes in Vietnam, called on the PRG's special representation
in Hanoi, and visited victims of U.S. attacks and areas raided
by U.S. planes. Earlier, Hanoi had given selective publicity to
the activities of the delegates, the pilots, and their relatives.
* An AP report of Senator McGovern's statement was also picked up
by Hanoi radio in two short broadcasts on 25 and 26 September;
the one of the 26th also reported Ramsey Clark's statement on
24 September that "the U.S. military authorities are not allowed to
lay a hand on these pilots."
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VNA on 20 September recounted a trip made on the 19th and 20th
to Nam Ha and Ninh Binh provinces, where they reportedly viewed
the destruction caused by U.S. bombs in Nam Dinh city and in the
Phat Diem cathedral area. The report said the trip had deeply
impreoaed the visitors, especially with regard to the extent of
the bombing, the fact that the local population was antinuing
its daily activities, and the warm reception allegedly given the
visitors wherever they went. A Hanoi broadcast in English to
Southeast Asia, also on the 20th, provided a transcript of state-
ments purportedly made by the Americans concerning their trip,
expressing compassion for the suffering of the Vietnamese people
and hope that the war will end soon.
DRV SUSTAINS CHARGES OF STRIKES AT DIKES, SCH00LS. CHURCHES
In addition to continuing routine DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's
protests against U.S. bombings, a statement by the Water
Conservancy Ministry spokesman on 21 September denounced alleged
U.S. strikes at hydrn