TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050048-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 48
• Publication Date: November 29, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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confidential
FBIS
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
Confidential
29 NOVEMBER 1972
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 48)
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This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
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29 NOVEMBER 1972
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention
INDOCHINA
DRV, PRG Score Call for MutuP1 Withdrawal, Press Peace Accord
. .
1
Peking Signs Aid Pact with DRV, Appeals for Settlement
6
Moscow Comment Marks Time, Notes DRV Aid Delegation's Arrival
. .
8
Hanoi Continues Routine Protests of U.S. Air Strikes in DRV .
. .
10
SALT
Polish, Czechoslovak Papers Discuss SALT II Agenda
13
CZECHOSLOVAKIA-FRG
Prague Appears to Soften Stand on Munich Pact Issue
15
ALBANIA-USSR-CHINA
Moscow Urges, Tirana Rejects Resumption of Diplomatic Ties. .
. .
18
Peking Presses Line on Soviets as Most Dangerous Enemy
20
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
UN Disarmament Debates Provide Forum for Bitter Exchanges . .
? .
22
USSR-JAPAN
Moscow-Tokyo Ties Hindered by "Northern Trmitories" Issue. .
. .
26
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Suslov Receives Exceptional Honors on 70th Birthday 49
Armerian Purge Reflects Serious Failures in Leadership 29
CHINA
Szechwan Plenum Provides Further Sign of Returning Order 31
TOPICS IN BRIEF
Soviet Submarine Saga 32
Palestinian Unity 32
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29 NOVEMBER 1972
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 20 - 26 NOVEMBER 1972
Moscow (2529
Peking (1515 itengJ
50th Anniversary of USSR
(10%)
11%
Domestice Issues
(34%)
38%
30 December
UN Session
(23%)
19%
Vietnam
(5%)
5%
[Disarmament
(10%)
5%)
Europe::: Security
(2%)
5%
[LA Nuclear-
(7%)
5%j
[Helsinki Meeting
(1%)
4%j
Free Zone
Brezhnev Meeting With
(--)
5%
Indochina
(18%)
13%
Chilean CP General
[Vietnam
(11%)
9%j
Secretary
[Cambodia
(4%)
3%1
China
(4%)
4%
PRC-Jamaica Diplomatic
(--)
5%
PDRY Delegation in USSR
(--)
4%
Relations
FRG Elections
(1%)
1%
Nepalese Prime
(9%)
3%
Minister in PRC
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item?radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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INDOCHINA
Hanoi media have characteristically all but ignored the Le Duc
Tho-Kissinger private talks on the draft Vietnam peace accord,
held daily in Paris from 20 through 26 November. VNA's inter-
national service on the 26th issued a one-sentence "communique"
saying there would be a meeting again on 4 December, but the
announcement is not known to have been carried in domestic
Vietnamese communist media. VNA also reported that Tho and
Xuan Thuy had met with the PRG delegation on the 27th "to make
assessments" following the latest DRV-U.S. private meetings but
did not mention that the talks had been suspended for a week.
Hanoi's stand at the private talks seemed reflected, however,
in two NHAN DAN articles coinciding with their suspension. Both
bore the authoritative signature "Commentator"--a label long
used for significant comment on the political settlement issue.
The articles pictured Hanoi as determined to stand firm on the
basic points of the peace accord as summarized on 26 October,
particularly on the issue of North Vietnamese troops in the South.
The second of the two articles, on the 27th, warned that only
stalemate can result if the U.S. side tries to negotiate from a
position of strength "in hope of changing the situation."
Three days after signing the annual aid agreement with the DRV,
Peking released "an important statement" on the 29th by Foreign
Minister Chi Peng-fei expressing concern over the state of the
Vietnam negotiations while voicing hope that a settlement will
be achieved. Chi's remarks were only mildly critical of the
United States and included a pro forma pledge of support for the
war effort. Peking publicized the aid agreement with minimal
fanfare, but Hanoi used the occasion to further its campaign to
associate the Chinese more closely with its cause.
Moscow propaganda has a time-marking quality, with coriventators
continuing to repeat Brezhnev's 13 November demand that American
"obstacles" to signing of the peace accord be removed. Moscow
reported on 27 November that the DRV economic delegation had
arrived to discuss the 1973 aid agreement.
DRV, PRG SCORE CALL FOR MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL, PRESS PEACE ACCORD
Hanoi's persistent argument that no changes in the pea..e accord
should be necessary was carried forward in the 25 November
NHAN DAN Commentator article, which acknowledged in greater
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detail than previously President Thieu's contentions that an
agreement should recognize that there are two separate
Vietnamese countries and should 'Provide for the withdrawal of
North Vietnamese troops from the South. Mar _ commentators
on the cve of the resumed private talks had first explicitly
mentioned Thieu's demand that North Vietnamese troops
withdraw; QUAN DOI NHAN DAN and NHAN DAN articles on the
19th and 20th had assailed Indonesian officials for supporting
Thieu's demands that all forces not native to the area below
the 17th parallel be withdrawn.* At the 16 November plenary
session of the Paris talks, DRV delegatc Xuan Thuy, as reported
in the VNA account, "categorically rejecteo the Saigon adminis-
tration's absurd claims about 'North Vietnam's invasion of
South Vietnam' and 'mutual troop withdrawal,' which in the past
has been used by the United States to justify the aggression
from Washing.:on."
The NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 25th elaborated on these
remarks when it noted that on 27 October Thieu had said: The
draft peace agreement "makes no reference to North Vietnamese
aggression or to auy North Vietnamese troop withdrawal. North
Vietnam believes that it has the right to remain in the South.
It is waiting for a complete U.S. troop withdrawal so it can
renew the offensive." Commentator went on to observe that
Thieu's representatives at Paris "have repeatedly falsely accuPed
our people of aggression against the southern part of our country,"
and it said GVN delegate Nguyen Xuan Phong at the 2 November
session had "noisily propagandized that Saigon would not accept
any cease-fire without a withdrawal of northern troops and
restoration of the DMZ." Commentator's reporting on remarks
by Phong at Paris is at complete variance with Hanoi's usual
studied avoidance of even mentioning the Saigon statements there.
Commentator indicated that Hanoi regards Thieu's arguments
about the DMZ and North Vietnamese troops as academic and the
issues settled when he declared pointedly that the United
States, in agreeing to the draft peace accord, had pledged tu
respect the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial
integrity of Vietnam and had agreed that the problem of the
Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam "shall be solved by the
two South Vietnamese sides."
* These articles are discussed in the TRENDS of 22 November 1972,
pages 3-1.
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Commentator had preceded this passage with the communistn'
standard euphemistic argument in defense of the North Vietnamese
presence in the South, saying that the U.S. "imperialists" are
the aggressors and the Vietnamese people the victims of
aggression and that the right of self-defense is sacred.*
Commentator said that in the past four years negotiations have
been deadlocked because of U.S. charges that the North has
waged aggression against the South and persistent U.S.
demands for mutual withdrawal of troops. (The 19 November
QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article assailing Indonesian officials for
supporting Thieu had observed that "the worn-out demand" for
mutual troop withdrawal "has even been set aside by the
Americans.") But Commentator did not link U.S. dropping of this
demand with the recent peace agreement. Instead he said that
the negotiations "recently emerged from deadlock because of
our side's efforts permeated with good will," and he went on to
quote, as noted above, the provisions from the peace accord on
respect for Vietnam unity and on the South Vietnamese parties'
solving the question of Vietnamese armed forces in the South.
He went on to cite the pasbages in the accord to the effect that
the problems to be dis:assed by the South Vietnamese include
measures "to reduce he troop ceiling of the two sidea' armed
forces and to demobilize the troops being reduced."
Recalling that Hanoi's 26 October summary was publicly confirmed
by "the highest echelons" on the S. side, Commentator warned
that there can be no peace if these major principles are not
recognized. Saying it is unlikely that "the Washington
authorities" do not understand this, he asked why they have
stepped up their military activity and brought up, through Th..,eu,
* Assertions by U.S. and other Western news commentators that
Hanoi does not acknowledge the presence of North Vietnamese troops
in the South ;lave oversimplified Hanoi's stance in this regard.
In 1966 and 1967 VNA did issue a series of authorized denials that
there were VPA troops in the South. But in 1968, and particularly
after the opening of the DRV-U.S. talks in May and the U.S. calls
for mutual troop withdrawal, Hanoi begged the question and shifted
to the argument that Vietnamese have a right to defend their
country wherever tile aggressor is. Most notably, DRV Premier Pham
Van Dong in a speech before the DRV National Assembly in May of
that year leclared that wherever there are enemies, "every
Vietnamese has the right to go there to fight them." He observed
that it was necessary to highlight thir point in order to reject
the "absurd arguments" that. North Vietnam has "invaded" South
Vietnam.
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basic issues already agreed to. Commentator concluded by warning
that if the United States "attempts to upset the whole game,"
the Vietnamese will have no alternative to continuation of their
struggle.
The notion that Hanoi would not agree to any major changes in
the peace accord was reinforced in the second NHAN DAN
Commentator artille on the 27th. It declared that the U.S.
refusal to sign the agreement on schedule as well as "the
subsequent overbearing allegations advanced by lackey Nguyen
Van Thieu and drummed up feverishly by the U.S. press and
ruling circles have gradually dispersed the silhouette of
peace so recently painted by many U.S. journalists."
Commentator said that the peace accord made public last month
remains the best way to end the conflict and that apparent
U.S. efforts to try to reverse the situation "can orly bring
stalemate." Ccmmentator did not in this article bring up
substantive issnes in contention but instead stressed the
alleged failure of U.S. military policy in Vietnam and warned
that the latest "re-Americanizaticr." through the massive use of
air powsr was suffering the same fate. The article concluded
that "the Vietnamese people deem it necessary to tell the U.S.
authorities once again that negotiating from a position of
strength is not a fruitful way of negotiating." It added that
if the U.S. side is intent on going back on the points agreed on,
"our people, with the sympathy and support of the fraternal
socialist countries and all mankind, are determined to fight on
until total victory."
Since the appearance of the Commentator articles Hanoi has
broadcast no siolificant comment bearing on the issues in
contention. But the Front's LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY (LrA) on
28 November carried an article by its Commentator which
echoed the NHAN DAN article of the 25th regarding Thieu's
demands on troop withdrawal and the DMZ. LPA said flatly that
the Nixon Administration is "playing a farce" in delaying the
signing of the agreement on ending the war and accused it of
having inspired Thieu's o?position. Like AN DAN, LPA noted
that Thien "colts South and North Vietnam two separate states,"
is "clamoring" for the North to withdraw its troops from the
South, and has sal.d he would not accept a cease-fire without
the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops and restoration of the
DMZ. Prior to the current articles, neither Hanoi nor the Front
had explicitly mentioned Thieu's remarks about the DMZ,
although there had been a few mentions of his opposition to
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unification and his desire to perpetuate the partition of
Vietnam. DRV press sp(*.esman Nguyen Thanh Le, when asked--at
the briefing after the Paris session on 16 November--whether
pending reunification the DRV is for or against restoration
of the DM2, said tersely: "There are clauses in the
agreement dealing with the reunification of Vietnam and with
relations between the two zones during the period prior to
reunification." In keeping with standard practice, Hanoi
media did not report the press briefing.
Use of the Commentator article as the format for the recent
discussion of substantive issues in contention appears to
invest the discussion with special importance. This long-
standing vehicle for major comment on a political settlement had
not been used since Hanoi's 26 October release of the summary
of the peace agreement. Notable substantive comment on a
settlement had appeared in the two unsigned NHAN DAN and QUAN
DOI NHAN DAN aticles attacking the Indonesidns on the 19th and
20th and in a series of four NHAN DAN editorials from 8 through
11 November which touched on such issues as political prisoners,
a cease-fire, an administrative structure in the South, and the
unity of Vietnam.* Hanoi has presumably used the NHAN DAN
Commentator format now out of concern to lend authority to a
declaration of intent to stand on the draft agreement on this
issue. Hanoi may also have wished to argue the reasonableness
of its position by calling special attention to the fact that
the 26 October summary indicated that the problems to be
discussed between the two South Vietnamese sides include
"measures to reduce the troop ceiling of the two sides' armed
forces and to demobilize the troops being reduced."
The two most recent previous NHAN DAN Commentator articles were
particularly significant: The one of 31 August was the first
clear public Hanoi signal of a resumption of serious negotiations.
The one of 25 September pressed the 11 September PRG statement's
proposal for a tripartite provisional coalition government and
argued that the United States should stop trying to "eliminate"
the PRG and recognize the reality of South Vietnam, where there
were f-wo administrations and two ardes--"realities" that were
to be stressed in Hanoi's 26 October summary of the draft peace
accord.**
* See the TRENDS of 15 November 1972, pages 3-6.
** The 31 August and 25 September articles are discussed,
respectively, in the TRENDS of 7 September 1972, pages 3-6, and
27 September 1972, pages 1-3.
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PEKING SIGNS AID PACT WITH DRV, APPEALS FOR SETTLEMENT
Three days after signing the annual aid agreement with the DRV,
Peking expressed both concern over the state of negotiations on
a Vietnam settlement and hope that an agreement will still be
reached. Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei, speaking at an
Albanian reception on 29 November, complained that the United
States not only has "backed out from the schedule" for signing
the (holt accord but has been attempting to Isne "substantive
changes" in the agreement. Observing that the communist side
has shown "the greatest flexibility" in the negotiations, Chi
declared that the Chinese "still hope" tEat the U.E. Government
"will through negctiations" sign the agreement.
NCNA disseminated a separate report on Chi's remarks on Vietnan,,
labeling them ?'an important statement" on the Vietnam-U.S.
negotiations, "which the people throughout the world are closel-;
watching." After having issued a spate of authoritative
pronouncements in the wake of Hanoi's disclosure of the draft
accord on 26 October, Peking had taken a low posture on the
Vietnam question while awalting tht results of the resumed Paris
negotiations. In now choosing to make a new appeal for a
settlement, Peking has sought to strike a balance between
mildly questioning Washington's desire for a settlement and
expressing hope that an agreement can be negotiated. Chi
remarked that people have reason to ask whether the United
States truly wants a aettlament or is trying to prolong the war
by making use of the negotiations, but he did not specify what
substantive changes nu.y be at issue and observed blandly that
people throughout the world are now watching what move Washington
will take next.
Significantly, Chi introduced the element of Chtnece interest when
he pointed out that a Vietnam settlement would be "greatly
helpful" toward a relaxation of tension in the Far East. The
Chinese have previously singled out the Vietnam conflict as the
primary source of tension in Asia at a time of growing detente,
and the Shanghai communique on President Nixon's visit linked
U.S. withdrawal from Taiwan--a central PRC interest?with the
prospects of diminishing tension "in the area."
As to be expected, Chi concluded with a pledge of colttinuing
Chinese support for the war effort should the fighting be
prolonged. Peking had given only miuimal fanfare to the signing
of the annual aid agreement on the 26th and muffled its expressions
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of support for its Vietnamese allies. In contrast, Hanoi used
the signing of the aid agreement to press its effort to
assyziate the Chinese closely with its cause, notably publiciz-
ing strong supporting remarks made by Chou En-lai after the
signing ceremony that have not been reported by Peking itself.
After having reported that new talks were in the offing, Peking
has not explicitly mentioned the new round of Kissinger-Tho
negotiations since their inception on the 20th. Chinese
pickups of foreign comment on the Vietnam questiod, typically
sanitized to soften criticism of the Nixon Administration and
its intentions concerning a settlement, have included the 25
and 27 November NHAN DAN Commentator articles on a peace settle-
ment.
AID ACCORD NCNA reported that an agreement on China's
'economic and military materials assistance" in
1973 and a protocol on the "supply of military equipment and
materials" for Vietnam in 1973 were signed on 26 November, noting
for the first time that the annual grant was "gratuitous."
(NCNAts report on the supplementary aid agreement for 1972
signed on 26 June mentioned a protocol on the supply of
"ordinary materials" and one on "military equipment and material,"
only the latter being characterized as gratuitous.) As in
past years, VNA said the agreement covered "nonrefund" aid.
The agreement was signed by DRV Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi and
his Chinese counterpart, Li Hsien-nien, both of whom had
returned to Peking the previous day after separate week-long
tours of Chinese provinces (Li having accompanied the visiting
Nepalese prime minister). Consistent with DRV Premier Dong's
attendance at signing ceremonies in Hanoi last September and
with the customary practice in Peking in previous years, Chou
witnessed the signing ceremony.
NCNA's account disclosed that after the ceremony Chou and Li
had "a very cordial and friendly conversation" with the North
Vietnamese but reported none of its substance. Last year's
NCNA account of the signing ceremony in Hanoi said the two
sides "enthusiastically proposed toasts to the new development"
of Sino-Vietnamese solidarity, ana at the time of the 1970
agreement Peking specified that the aid was to help defedt the
United States and strengthen the Vietnamese resistance.
Peking's coverage this year was also subdued in reporting the
DRV delegation's departure, failing to spell out the usual
slogans shouted by the airport chorus in behalf of Sino-Vietnamese
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solidarity. NCNA noted that the delegation was departing for
"some European countries," indirectly indicating the next
stop by noting the presence at the airport of Soviet
Ambassador Tolstikov.
As in its coverage of the beginning stage of the DRV
delegation's visit to China, Hanoi made pointed efforts to
link the Chinese with its interests on both the military and
the negotiating fronts. In particular, VNA on 28 November
disseminated a separate report on Chou's conversation with
the DRV delegation after the signing ceremony that included
the substance of remarks exchanged by the two sides.
According to VNA, Chou "reaffirmed the unswerving stand of
China to resolutely support and assist" the Vietnamese struggle
and "severely condemned the obdurate attitude of the U.S.
Government in trying to delay" the signing of the draft
accord and "scheming to revise" its provisions. In an
intriguing remark touching the sore point in Sino-Vietnamese
relations, Chou asserted that in no circumstances will Peking
allow the United States "to do harm to the friendship and
militant solidarity" between China and Vietnam. These remarks
were notably more militant than those contained in Chi
Peng-fei's "important statement" on the 29th.
VNA quoted Nghi as having stressed the "great significa-ce"
of the aid agreement, "especially now that the U.S.
imperialists are persisting in their obduracy and reversing
their attitude by stalling the ending of their war of
aggression." In addition, VNA's account of the delegation's
departure from Peking quoted slogans voiced by the Chinese
in support of Sino-Vietnamese solidarity and the Vietnamese
struggle. The customary NHAN DAN editorial on the 28th
hailing the aid agreement also highlighted Peking's support,
citing recent Chinese pledges contained in the 30 October
government statement, Li Hsien-nien's banquet speech on
16 November, and Chou's remarks during a talk with Nghi on
the 17th. NCNA's account of the editorial omitted the
passage citing those pledges. It also deleted a sentence
stressing the "great importance in the present situation"
of aid from China "and other fraternal socialist countries."
MOSCOW COMMENT MARKS TIME, NOTES DRV AID DELEGATION'S ARRIVAL
Moscow propaganda on Vietnam continues to mark time with routine
charges of U.S. procrastination in signing the DRV-U.S. peace
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agreement, accusing the United Staces of using Saigon's obduracy
as a pretext for delay while stepping up military activities in
Indochina. Moscow carried brief reports noting the private
talks between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho and mentioned them in
passing in some comment. TASS briefly reported Kissinger's
return home and his consultations with President Nixon as well
as the White House announcement that Kissinger would return to
Paris for talks to b* resumed on 4 December. TASS also reported
that Le Duc Tho conallted with Mme. Binh on tile confidential
talks with the United States.
Commentdtors continue to repeat Brezhnev's 13 November demand
that American "obstacles" to signing of the accord be removed,
one foreign-language commentary on 22 November doting that the
Washington POST had said this was the Soviet Union's 'first
big criticism of U.S. policy on the issue." While Moscow's
comment for the most part has avoided discussing the substance
of the peace agreement, the issue of a cease-fire wan raised
briefly in a 22 November domestic service commentary and by
a panelist in the 26 November domestic service roundtable
discussion; both speculated that the United States is preparing
to maintain its military presence in South Vietnam under the
guise of civi:lan advisers after a cease-fire.
A Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in English to Asia on the
22d atypically broached the issue of political power in th
South. It criticized "Washington propaganda" or trying, by
claiming that there are no "third forces" in Vietnam, to
denigrate the proposal of the "Vietnamese patriots" for a
"tripartite coalition government." The reference to a
coalition "government" rather than the term "adminf.trative
structure" used by Hanoi in its 26 October summary of the peace
accord may have been merely a translation error. On the other
hand, the commentator may have been confused because of the
11 September PRG proposal on such a "government." The
commentary went on to argue that there exists a "powerful
opposition" to the Thieu regime composed of the vast majority
of the political parties and organizations in South Vietnam
and Vietnamese expelled from the country, and it scored
"reprisals" being taken by the Saigon regime against these
"third forces."
Moscow reported on 27 November the arrival of the DRV economic
delegation led by Le Thanh Nghi to discuss the 1973 aid agree-
ment. The Soviet side is represented, as usual, by Vice Premier
Novikov, who said in a radio interview that the talks were to
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cover "technical assistance" in building and restoring industrial
installations and coeds as well as trade relations. A 28 November
report of talks said the two sides had discussed matters concern-
ing "trade and economic relations" and "assistance in the
wtrengttming of the economic and defensive capacity of the DRV."
VNA's 28 October report or the delegation's arrival in Moscow
typically said it had come for "talks on Soviet economic and
military aid to Vietnam fcr 1973."
HANOI CONTINUES ROUTINE PROTESTS OF U.S. AIR STRIKES IN DRV
U.S. air strikes against North Vietnam have continued to draw
puter~q in daily statements by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokes-
man which repeat the standard charge that such "war acts" only
reveal the Nixon Administration's desire to deceive world public
op4nion into believing peace is at hand while it continues to
pursue the Vietnamization policy and seek a position of strength.
Following up on last week's ".%,ecial communique," which condemned
U.S. air and naval action during the first 18 days of November,
the DRV War Crimes Commission issued another communique on the
24th covering U.S. "crimes" from the 20th throuah the 23d.
Claiming that U.S. planes flew some 690 sorties during this four-
day period despite bad weather, the communique charged that they
dropped 12,170 tons of "demraition and antipersoanel bombs" on
84 populated areas in the four southern provinces and the Vinh
Linh zone. The cities of Vinh and Dong Hoi were cited as
sustaining heavy damage, along with a number of districts, towns,
villages, and factories. The communique further charged that
on 22 November U.S. Marine helicopters from a "landing ship"
stationed in the South China Sea concentrated a "wanton" attack
on Ky Phuong village in Ky Anh district, Ha Tinh Province. It
claimed that the armed forces and people "punished the U.S.
aggressors" by downing six planes during the four days,
including two 8-52's and one F-111.
Other comment on the air war included a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
editorial of the 25th which argued the nend for "passive air
defense"--building adequate shelters and trenches, organizing
evacuation and dispersal activities, coordinating alerts, am;
"maintaining a wartime way of life." Stressing that this task
is as important as actually fighting the enemy, the editorial
urged proper coordination between and within party and military
organs in carrying it out.
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PLANE DOWNINGS, As of 28 November, Hanoi's claimed total of
AIR DEFENSE downed U.S. planes stood at 4,062.
Included in the latest figures were the
claimed downing of an F-111 over Quang Binh on 21 November, two
8-52's over Nghe An on the 22d, and the 300th plane over Haiphong
(an unmanned reconnaissance plane) on the 26th.
U.S. officials had announced that on 22 November a B-52 had been
downed for the first time in the war. The announcement said it
had been damaged over the DRV, probably by a SAM, and crashed
in Thailand after the crew ejected safely. VNA, in a
tabulation of alleged 8-52 downings since 17 September 1967,
claimed that the 8-52 was one of two shot down on the 22d and
that these downings brought the total to 27, of which 19 were
said to have occurred since the resumption of the air war in
April. VNA broke down the claimed total as follows: 15 8-52's
downed over the Vinh Linh zone, five over Nghe An, three over
Quang Binh, cwo over Thanh Hoa, and one each over Haiphong and
Ha Tinh.
Praise was accorded the Fourth Military Region for its achievements
in downing the 8-52'd as well as an F-111 (U.S. sources on
22 November acknowledged the loss of one of the swing-wing planes)
in a commendation by the VPA High Command on 25 November. The
order specifically praised "the cadres and combatants of the
anti-aircraft and missile units, the local forces, the militia
and self-defense forces" for the recent downings. It called on
them to continue their vigilance against U.S. air and naval
forces, as -7ell as to satisfactorily carry out the communications
and transport tasks and provide reinforcements for the frontline.
The downings were also hailed in commentaries in NHAN DAN and
QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, which declared in general terms that the
United States is doomed to defeat if it persists in prolonging
the war. It was left to Hanoi radio on the :3d to comment more
specifically on the significance of the downings; the commentary
claimed that "the boasts abour the capability of the eight-million-
dollar B-52 Stratofortress to disturb the adversary's radar and so
forth have finally been shattered by the strength of our people's
war." Declaring that no modern aircraft or new tactics "can
escape the punitive firenet of our army and people," the broadcast
praised the responsibility, vigilance, and fighting will of the
armed forces in the Fourth Military Region and Thsnh Hoa Province.
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QUAN DOI MAN DAN on 23 November reported on a conference held
by the Northwest Military Region--contiguous with the Tay Bac
Autonomous Region, including the provinces of Lai Chau, Son La,
and Nghia Lo--to improve combat operations and techniques
among the military cadres and to unite the local people in
fulfilling "the mission to down U.S. aircraft, capture aggressor
pilots, exterminate and neatly capture spy and commando teams,
adequately carry out the people's air defense, and insure
smooth communications and transportation operations." The
significance of this exhortation to step up air defense for
localities outside the area currently subject to U.S. air and
naval attack was pointed up in comment hailing the downing of the
pilotless reconnaissance plane over Haiphong--allegedly the 300th
over that city. Hanoi claims to have downed two other
reconnaissance planes above the 20th parallel since 25 October,
one over Hai Hung on 12 November and another over Vinh Phu on
the 24th. The downing over Haiphong received editorial praise in
both NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 27 November. The latter
paper called the downing "a glorious milestone marking the
outstanding, all-round victories of the heroic port city." Both
papers discussed the downing in the context of earlier, heavy
U.S. air attacks on the city and of the continuing naval
blockade, and both stressed Haiphong's ability to maintain
production, communications, and transportation, as veil as to
provide assistance "to the frontline."
HOLIDAY MAIL In a VNA transmission of 28 November, Hanoi set
FOR POW'S forth the procedures governing the sending of
Christmas and New Year's cards and packages to
U.S. prisoners of war during the 1972-73 holiday season.
Virtually identical to last year's announcement, which came some
two weeks earlier,* this year's states that the same procedures
will apply: packages weighing up to five kilograms, two
kilograms over the usual limit, are to be sent by post via
Moscow "in accordance with the procedures already laid down,"
while cards and letters can be sent direct by mail or through
the Committee of Liaison with Families of Servicemen in Vietnam,
in New York. The announcement warns that packages sent by
procedures other than those stipulated will not be accepted.
* Last year's instr4ctions are discussed in the 17 November 1971
TRENDS, pages 13-14.
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SALT
POLISH, CZECHOSLOVAK PAPERS DISCUSS SALT I! AGENDA
Recent commentaries on the resumption of tl e SALT negotiations
in three East European bloc papers have pyovided the most
extended discussion to date in Soviet or East Europenn media
of the substantive issues at stake in SALT II. These
commentators say the second round will focus on the problems of
restricting qualitative developments such as MIRV, restricting
research and development on offensive weapons systems in
general, and taking into account U.S. forward based systems
(FBS) in Plrope and on carriers. Negligible and very generalized
Soviet comment on SALT II has avoided any mention of the MIRV
and FBS problems.
Antoni Olczak in a 22 November article in the Polish army paper
ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI--the third article in that paper within
three months to discuss SALT II issues in some detail--asserted
that a permanent treaty to replace the provisional agreement
signed in Moscow "would have to cover aspects of the strategic
offensive armaments left out of the Moscow accord such as the
bombers carrying nuclear weapons and the MIRV. It would also
have to introduce restrictions on the research into and the
development and testing of new types of weapons." Referring
to the verification problems that a treaty dealing with quali-
tative developments will encounter, and to the liabilities
entailed in relying solely on national means of verification,
Olczak contended that "particular difficulties" will be
presented by FBS and "by the effort to achieve agreement on the
limitation of MIRV's, which cannot be controlled by space
satellites."
According to Karol Szyndzielorz in the 23 November Polish Govern-
ment paper ZYCIE WARSZAWY, "life itself" has also included on
the SALT II agenda the problem of freezing defensive systems not
covered by the SALT I agreements--"mainly the systems of combating
submarines and the systems of air defense." The article added
that "we will have to wait at least two years for another SALT
success, as haste is not a commendable virtue in cases like this."
An article by Milos Krejci in the 21 November Czechoslovak party
organ RUDE PRAVO, foreseeing a similar agenda, commented that a
"special artificial obstacle" to the second round had been
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created by the Jackson amendment's call for numerical equality.
In rebutting the logic of the Jackson amendnent, Krejci cited
figures on the numerical advantage in launchers granted by the
Interim Agreement to the Soviet Union, 1,618 to 1,052 in
ICBM's and 62 to 48 in submarines--the first known appearance
of any of these figures 4.n Soviet or East European bloc media.
In the first direct discussion of details of the "asymmetry"
problem, the Czechoslovak commentator argued that "it is not
the number of missiles but the number of their warheads
which determines nuclear strength," noting that to make up for
the deficiency the United States has MIRV's and FBS as well
as "certain technical advantages." Moscow media to date
have not apecifinally acknowledged the existence of the
protocol to the Interim Agreement on offensive weapons outlining
the number of submarine-launched ballistic missiles and
ballistic missile subm_rines allowed both sides.
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA-FRG
PRAGUE APPEARS TO SOFTEN STAND ON MUNICH PACT ISSUE
Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Chnorpek, in public atatements
expressing "satisfaction" with the results of the West German
elections, has reinforced indications of a softening of Prague's
stand on the 1938 Munich agreement--the principal issue holding
up a Prague-Bonn accord on normalizing relations. Prague reports
of a speech by Chnoupek on 23 November and remarks made by
Chitoupek in a radio interview on the 24th failed to repeat the
stock Czechoslovak demand that Bonn recognize the invalidity of
the Munich pact from its inception, instead calling on Bonn to
recognize the "initial .Avalidity" or simply the "invalidity" of
the agreement.
Chnoupek had used the "initial invalidity" formula once before,
introducing it in an article on Czechoslovak foreign policy in
the October issue of the monthly NOVA MYSL. And some but not all
recent Czechoslovak reiterations of the original Czechoslovak
demand for recognition of the invalidity of the accord "ab initio"
had left off the final phrase. The latest successive statements
by Chnoupek, however, take on added significance in that they
came on the heels of a series of statements by Soviet and other
East European leaders in the past three weeks which consistently
failed to explicitly support Prague's original demand.* Foreseeing
the possibility of a break in the stalemated negotiations with
Bonn, Chnoupek said the Brandt-Scheel victory had "removed the
obstacles which evidently impeded Brandt's government from
proceeding in the normalization of FRG relations with the
socialist states in the way it wished."
"INITIAL INVALIDITY" Czechoslovak media were inconsistent in
reporting the language Chnoupek used in
his speech on ths 23d, at a party aktiv meeting in Bratislava. A
Prague domestic broadcast that day reported him as saying that
Czechoslovakia now assumes Brandt "will be able to settle relations
with all member-states of the Warsaw Pact" and that "as far as
Czechoslovakia is concerned . . ., there have not been, nor are
there now, any barriers whatsoever to a normalization of relations
between Czechoslovakia and the FRG on a basis of recognizing the
* See the TRENDS of 22 November 1972, pages 30-31, for discussion
of ther, Soviet bloc statements.
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initial invalidity bocatecni neplatnost] of the so-calied
Munich agreement on the part of the Federal Republic." Later
on the 23d, citing the same passage, CTK in English quoted
Chnoupek as merely calling for "recognition of the invalidity
of the so-called Munich agreement," dropping "initial."
However, the "initial invalidity" formulation recurred in a
Bratislava PRAVDA account on the 24th of another "CTK report"
on the speech, which was accompanied by a statement that this
position "has already been repeatedly stated by the highest
Czechoslovak representatives." RUDE PRAVO's brief summary on
the 24th also retained "initial."
In the interview on Prague radio on the 24th, Chnoupek used the
"initial invalidity" formulation twice in a discussion of FRG-
CSR relations. In welcoming the reelection af the Brandt-Scheel
coalition and calling on Bonn also to demonstraLe "willingness and
good will" to reach a mutual agreement, Chnoupek's lengthy remarks
seemed unusually insistent and repetitive, as if to emphasize to
Prague's Soviet bloc allies that Czechoslovakia is ready to negotiate
its differences with the FRG.
In introducing the "initial invalidity" formula in NOVA MYSL, signed
to the press on 10 October, Chnoupek had said the FRG would have
to resolve "the question of recognition of the initial invalidity
of the Munich agreement." Noting that "matters have now matured
and clarified to such an extent that a mutually acceptable
agreement may be reached without any further delays, he went
on to say that Prague had shown "sufficient good will" to find
a mutual agreement both in the exploratory talks and in statements
by the "highest" C7echoslovak leaders. During the talks, Chnoupek
wrote, Prague had announced its willingness to search for a
"solution of consequences of the invalidity of the Munich agreement
from the very beginning which would not infringe upon the legal
security of phvsical persons, as well as other problems, and would
even provide the necessary guarantees."* But he added that it was
not enough that "willingness and good will are demonstrated by one
side only."
* See the TRENDS of 12 July 1972, pages 26-28, for a discussion
of Prague i4edia's handling oi this issue in the stalemated Prague-
Bonn talks.
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BACKGROUND Recent statements by Czechoslovak leaders and
commentaries in Prague media have been inconsistent
in dealing with the Munich issue. Where Chnoupek in his foreign
policy statement to the Federal Assembly on 31 October explicitly
demanded recognition of the invalidity of the Munich pact ab initio
in discussing relations with the FRG, a 16 November RUDE PRAVO
account of remarks made by party leader Husak at the October
Czechoslovak CP Oantral Committee plenum merely reported that
Husak "briefly informed the session of our approach to the
negotiations with the FRG and of our efforts to achieve progress
in the solution of certain open questions."
Prague has ignored reports in West German media suggesting
behind-the-scenes movement since the conclusion of the exploratory
talks at the end of June. Czechoslovak media have not mentioned
a personal letter from Premier Strougal to Brandt, reported by
the West German DPA on 5 October to have dealt with the bilateral
talks; FRG Government spokesman Ahlers announced on the 9C1 that
Brandt had replied to the letter. On 27 October, DPA reported
that a West German paper had quoted "diplomatic quarters" in
Prague as saying a possible compromise had been reached. According
to DPA, thc compromise was to consist of two steps: 1) a treaty
would be concluded in which Bonn would declare the Munich
agreement "unjust" from the outset and contrary to international
law and ethics; and 2) after the treaty signing, Prague would
state for the record that Czechoslovakia has never been a
signatory to the Munich agreement, has never legally recognized
it, and considers it invalid from the outset.
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ALBANIA-USSR-CHINA
MOSCOd URGES. TIRANA REJECTS RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC TIES
An article in the Soviet weekly NOVOYE VREMYA keyed to the
28-29 November Albanian national holidays goes beyond such
commentaries in prior years in calling outright for the
reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Tirana. Albanian
media have taken indirect cognizance of the Soviet article,
which appeared in the 17 November issue of the weekly, in an
article in the party organ URI I POPULLIT on the 27th spurning
the "trial balloon" launched by "old and new imperialists" who
are seeking "ways to enter into relations with" Albania. The
keynote anniversary speaker on the 27th underscored the Albanian
reaction, recalling a statement by Enver Hoxha last November
ruling out normalization of relations with the Soviet Union under
its present leadership.
SOVIET OVERTURE Moscow commentaries on relations with Tirana,
ruptured in 1961, have hewed until now to the
formula established at the October 1964 CPSU Central Committee
plenum a: i reiterated by Brezhnev at the 24th CPSU Congress last
year, simply asserting Soviet readiness to "normalize" relations.
The current article in the 17 November NOVOYE VREMYA (No. 47),
entitled "Yn Common Interests" and Agned by Tangalov, concludes
that "the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two
countries . . . could be an importlnt step on the path of the general
normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and the Albanian
People's Republic."
The article strengthens the thrust of the Soviet overture by repeatedly
mentioning diplomatic relations in the course of a review of bilateral
relations highlighting historical Soviet friendship and support. It
recalls a Soviet note delivered to the Albanian provisional government
on 10 November 1945 announcing that "the Soviet Government has
decided to establish diplomatic relations with Albania and exchange
envoys," and it refers again in a later passage to the Soviet
"decision on diplomatic recognition of Albania." It goes on to
regret "the abnormal situation in Soviet-Albanian relationa since
1960" that led to the "break in diplomatic relations" between the
two countries.
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On the day the NOVOYE VREMYA article appeared, the hungarian domestic
tadio called attention to the fact that "the most reputed Soviet poli-
tical weekly" urges an improvement of Soviet-Albanian relations "and
also takes up the idea of resuming diplomatic relations." The broad-
cast commented that the present "unnatural state of affairs" meets
neither Soviet nor Albaniar interests and damages the cause of
socialism. It also mentioned that the Soviet side has taken "initia-
tives to improve relations."
Radio Moscow itself has not been heard to broadcast the NOVOYY. VREMYA
article in Albanian, instead marking the November anniversaries with
routine radio talks reminding Albanian listeners of past Soviet frieci-
ship. Such comment, aired intermittently by Moscow in Lroadcasts to
Albania since the diplomatic break, has served the propaganda purpose
of projeeting Soviet good will and underscoring the notion that
Albania alone is responsiblgb fos a breach that has only hurt its own
interests.
MOICOW did, however, report in Albanian on 29 November that the Soviet-
Albanian Friendship Society had sant a message to the Albanian-Soviet
Friendship Society--an inoperative body--on the occasion of the Novem-
ber anniversaries, asserting the Soviet people's "desire for friend-
ship and cooperation" with the Albanians. A message from the same
body last year had merely expressed congratulations on the anniver-
saries, and Moscow waited until the Albanians declined to accept
that message before announcing that it had been sent: Radio Moscow
told Albanian listeners on 30 November 1971 that the Albanians had
refused to accept the message in order to prevent the Albanian people
from learning about it, than broadcast the brief, innocuous text.
Last year's message had been the first publicized one from the Soviet-
Albanian Friendship Society since the 1961 break. Messages signed
impersonally by the leading Soviet Government bodies were sent to
their Albanian counterparts on the November anniversaries in 1964,
1965, and 1969, but no Soviet messages of any kind were publicized
in other years. Government-level Soviet messages have marked the
January anniversrry of the founding of the Albanian People's
Republic on the major quinquennials--the 20th anniversary in 1966
and the 25th in 1971.
ALBANIAN REBUFF Albanian media 1137e sustained their anti-Soviet
stance over the years with varying degrees of
truculence. Moscow's exceptionally forthcoming overture this year
has mot with a notably pointed rebuff. An article in the 17
November ZERI I POPULLIT seemed to take note of the FOVOYE VREMYA
articie in scorning the "trial balloon" in which the "Old
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and new imperialists invite us to enter their 'paradise,' ao if
we had not suffered in the past the perfidies and evils they
have caused us." They also, 1. added, "make flatteries and
speculations an if Albania is trying openings in their direction,
and they want to find ways to enter into relations with it."
In rebuttal to the alleged thesis of "the Moscow social
imperialists and their lackies" about Albania's "isolation,"
the article noted that while Tirana had r.,;_plomatic relations
with 26 countries in 1960, "today it maintains diplomatic
relations with 55 countries" as well as tcade and economic
relations with "more than 40" states.
A more cryptic response to the Soviet overture was made by
Politburo member Kapo in an anniversary address on the 27th
in Vlore, attended by Hoxha, Lleshi, Shehu, and other top
leaders. Following a denunciatior e "the so-called Europcan
security" as a device to perpetuate the hegemony of "the two
imperialist superpowers," Kapo remarked that "for some timc the
Soviet social imperialists have changed their tactics toww:d
our country," and "they speak about the normalization of new
relations." Avoiding any s,acific reference to diplomatic
relations, Kapo recalled the stock rejection registered by Hoxha
at the Albanian party congress in November last year: "Genuine
normalization" can take place only when the present Soviet leaders
are replaced by "true Bolsheviks."
PEKING PRESSES LINE ON SOVIETS AS MOST DANGEROUS ENEMY
Peking used the occasion of the dual Albanian anniversaries to
reaffirm solidarity with its Albanian ally while pressing its
line on the Soviets as the most dangerous adversary today. As
usual, the top Chinese leaders sent a greetings message--this
time signed by Mao, Tung Pi-wu, Chu Te, and Chou En-lai--and
PEOPLE'S DAILY carried an editorial marking the occasion. There
were also receptions in Peking, and a rally in Nanking marking
the occasion was attended by the touring Albanian military
delegation headed by Defense Minister Balluku.
Notwithstanding the expressions of solidarity, the divergence
between the long-time allies caused by Peking's current global
strategy came through clearly in Chinese insistence on treating
Moscow as the primary enemy, with the implicit corollary that
improved relations with the United States are justified by
changing circumstances. Thus, the Chinese message lauded opposition
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to "modern revisionisw with Soviet rev.I.sionism as its center and
imperialism headed by he United States"--a reversal of the
order of adversaries that was introduced in Peking's 1 October
joint editorial on PRC National Day. That joint editorial had
also introduced the line that Soviet "social imperialism" is
more deceitful and therefore more dangerous than old-line
imperialism, and this line was pressed in the 28 November
editorial on the Albanian anniversaries.
Albanian opposition to Peking's strategy in the triangular
big-power context, already reflected in Tirana's reaction to
the Chinese invitation to Prssident Nixon, had been aired in
remarkably clear terms on the first day of Balluku's latest
visit to China.* Responding to a Chinese leader's speech at a
welcoming banquet on 6 November, Balluku took direct issue with
Peking's line by insisting in his denurciation of the United
States and the Soviet Union that each "io e.a dangerous as the
other." Balluku also stuck to the traditional formulation by
naming the United States first. Similarly, in remarks at a
Peking reception marking the Albanian anniversaries the Chinebe
speaker mentioned the USSR before the United States and the
Albanian reversed the order.
* See the TRENDS of 8 November 1972, pages 19-20.
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S INO-SOVIET RELATIONS
UN DISARMAMENT DEBATES PROVIDE FORUM FOR BITTER EXCHANGES
Offering a forum for appeals to the international community and
a subject that has long been at the heart of the Sino-Soviet
conflict, the disarmament discussions at this year's UNGA sess!_on
have set the scene for acrimonious exchanges between the two
rivals that have again underscored how intractable their conflict
is. In what could be viewed as preemptive moves to neutralize
the anticipated Chinese attacks, the Soviets used the session to
press their all for a world disarmament conference (WDC) and to
revive proposals on the nonuse of force (NUF) and permament
prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Reacting to these
initiatives as an effort by Moscow to promote its detente policies
at thc Pxpense of Chinesc interests, Peking has vigorously pounced
on the Soviet proposals to give focus to its current line that
Moscow's "social imperialism" is more deceitful and therefore more
dangerous than old-line imperialism. During this ongoing exchange
the United States has largely escaped the polemical crossfire.
NONUSE OF FORCE Having earlier centered on the WDC proposal,*
the Sino-Soviet jockeying ehif ted to the NUF
package when debate opened on these proposals in plenary sessions
on 2 November. Yakov Malik, head of the Soviet permanent UN mission,
elaborated on NUF in a speech that day along lines laid out by
Foreign Minister Gromyko in his 26 September address to the UNGA.
Malik's speech, reported only in summary form by TASS on 2 November
and PRAVDA on the 4th, was marked by a low-key approach devoid of
polemics, with only veiled references to Chinese positions. A
week later the Chinese reacted with a series of strong attacks
highlighted by a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commeatator article on 12 November
and a sharply polemical address at the UN by Vice Foreign Minister
Chiao Kuan-hua on the 13th which was disseminated in full by NCNA.
The Chinese response, punctuated with bitter ridicule of the Soviets
as hypocrites and of their NUF proposal Evi "a downright fraud" that
was cold-shouldered during the meetings, zeroed in on the So,,4et
Union as an expansionist power whose real nature has been revealed
in the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the dismemberment of Pakistan,
and military pressure along the Sino-Soviet border. Making use of
an aphorism long favored by the Chinese in the past when denigrating
* See the TRENDS of 1 November 1972, pages 30-31.
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the prospects of detente with the United States, Chiao derided
the Soviets for trying to make people believe that they have
"laid down their butcher's knives and become Buddhas."
Malik responded to the Chinese attacks in a concluding speech on
15 November which, unlike the one on 2 November, contained extensive
polemics against the Chinese. A TASS summary quoted Malik as
interpreting Peking's challenge to the Soviet proposal to mean
that Peking "favors the use of force in international relations
while its objections to the prohibition of nuclear weapons for
all time means that it actually comes out for the use of these
weapons."
BORDER ISSUE While Peking's use of the UNGA forum to deride
Moscow's detente posture was clearly designed
with an eye for the international gallery, much of the argumentation
and, in particular, the repeated references to the Sino-Soviet
border reflect Peking's concern and resentment over Soviet military
pressure along the border. A fundamental argument advanced by
Peking is that the Soviet disarmame%t proposals are contrived to
maintain the two superpowers' dominance in nuclear capability
while arresting the nuclear weapons development of countries
like China before the strategic imbalance can be meaningfully
redressed. The 12 November Commentator article, observing that
the Soviets have increased their strategic nuclear weapons more
than sixfold in the past six years, argued that the small and
medium-size countries' defense capabilities are inadequate and
that their present task "is not disarmament but to strengthen
their national defense." At the same time, Peking has reiterated
its intent to pursue its nuclear weapons program for self-defense
and has repeatedly challenged Moscow to agree to an undertaking
not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.
Peking's sharp reaction to the Soviet NUF position is particularly
relevant to the border situation in the light of Moscow's proposals
regarding a bilateral renunciation of force. In addition to
dismissing the Soviet NUF package as a sham designed to cover up
Moscow's expansionist policies, Peking has linked the Sino-Soviet
border question with its general demand that tne Soviets withdraw
their troops from foreign countries. Thus Ch4.ao in his speech
on 13 November challenged the Soviets to withdraw their troops
and dismantle their bases in Mongolia "instead of unabashedly
uttering empty words about the renunciation of tha use of all
force." Earlier, an NCNA correspondent's report from the UN on
9 November sarcastically cited "the massive troop concentration
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along the Sine-Soviet border" as an illust'ation of Moscowle
good-neighbor policy. Moscow has repeateuiy claimed that it
has made concrete proposals to the Chinese--including one on
nonuse of force--in the interest of restoring good-neighborly
relations, but Peking has made clear its resentment over the
Soviet troop concentrations near the border.
Another NCNA correspondent's dispatch, on 19 November, amplified
the Chinese charges in posing a series of questions which Malik
allegedly avoided in his 15 November speech. Among others, one
question asked rhetorically if the Soviet Union had not stationed
Han armed force of a million strong along the Sino-Soviet and the
Sino-Mongolian borders" and staged a "military occupation" of
the MPR. Contrasting Soviet behavior with that of the Chinese.
NCNA pointed out that China hug no troops or military bases abroad
and "has not :hreatened other countries with force." The dispatch
also reiterated Peking's position that it develops nuclear weapons
solely for defense and has often declared that it will not be the
first to use nuclear weapons.
Moscow has avoided publicizing the border issue as a dimension of
the disarmament exchanges. PEOPLE'S DAILY on 21 November, in an
extensive account of Malik's 15 November speech, claimed that in
attempting to becloud the fact that the Soviets had provoked
incidents along the border Malik had declared Moscow's readiness
to renounce the use rf force in settling disputes with Peking.
Malik was quoted in the account as referring to the "concrete and
constructive proposals" the Soviets have made to the Chinese.
L.A. NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE Apart from the bilateral issues imbedded
in the disarmament debates involving
Moscow and Peking, the two sides have also pitched their appeals
to the international community, especially to the third world.
Thus, Peking seized on the First Committee's discussion of the
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
as another case study of Moscow's sham disarmament posture.
Mexico and other Latin American countries have been urging nuclear
countries to sign Additional Protocol II to the treaty, thereby
undertaking not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against
parties to the treaty and to insure Latin America's nuclear-free
status. In a note to the Mexican ambassador to the PRC released
on 15 Noveruer, Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei announced Peking's
support for the nuclear-free zone while declining to sign the
protonol on the grounds that it affirms the nuclear nonproliferation
and test-ban treaties, to which "China has always been opposed."
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Peking contrastea its undertaking to respect a Latin American
nuclear-free zone wit" Moscow's failure to make a like commitment.
A PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 17 November devoted to the
issue made a point of charging that Moscow's response in this case
gave the lie to its "loud and big talk" about the nonuse of force.
Making characteristic use of the Latin American proposal, the
article asserted that "it is legitimate for small and medium-size
cuuntries to demand and prcpose the establishment of nuclear-weapon-
free zones or peace zones with a view to opposing the superpowers'
policies of aggression, expansion, and war."
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USSR-JAPAN
MOSCOW-TOKYO TIES HINDERED BY uNORTI.ERN TERRITORIES" ISSUE
In the wake of the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations in
September, Soviet spokesmen have put the Tanaka government on
notice that the USSR does not, at this time, feel pressured to
show any flexibility on meeting Japanese demands for.the
return of the northern territories--the four islands seised
by the USSR at the end of World War II--as a means of offsetting
Japan's emerging relationship with China. While Moscow has
opted for a wait-and-see policy on the territorial question, at
least until the exact dimensions of the Sino-Japanese
rapprochement are known, Peking has sought to keep the question
alive by publicizing the issue in an apparent attempt to block
any substantive progress in the normalization of Soviet-Japanese
relations.
The first major Soviet assessment of the new Sino-Japanese
relationship--a 2 November IZVESTIYA article by V. Kudryavtsev--
applauded assurances in the September Sino-Japanese joint state-
ment that the normalization of relations between the two countries
was not directed against third countries but professed "perplexity"
over the targeta of the passage in the statement which jointly
opposed any countries' hegemony in Asia. After excluding the
PRC, Japan, and the United States as possible targets,
Kudryavtsev implied that the formula was directed at the USSR.
Taking a swipe at the Japanese, he then specifically pointed
to "some of the recent speeches in the Japanese parliament, whose
authors are again advancing pointless and absurd territorial
demands with regard to the USSR" as evidence of Tokyo's
"unrealistic positions" on a "number of very important foreign
policy questions."
The new Tanaka government, which enjoyed a virtual reprieve from
hostile Soviet propaganda during its first few months in power,
was taken to task on the territorial issue in a lengthy article
by I. Latyshev in MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN, signed to press on
24 October. In reviewing former prime minister Sato's seven
and a half years in office, Latyshev argued that the "revanchist
anti-Soviet campaign for the return to Japan of the so-called
northern territories" was one of the main reasons for Sato's
resignation and warned the new leadership in Tokyo that this
"absurd campaign" did not "yield any political dividents for the
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Sato government." While stressing the need for a "new approach"
to Japan's problems, Latyshev was quick to claim that "as yet
the Tanaka government's foreign policy is not distinctive for its
innovative nature." He concludec with the assertion that
"evidently it is still not clear to some people in Japan that the
successful development of Japanese-Soviet relations demands a
sober, realistic approach to reality."
Similar criticism wan expressed by Vsevolov Ovchinnikov in a
24 November PRAVDA article which dealt in unusually candid
terms with the current campaign in Japan for the return of the
northern islands. Characterizing the campaign as "being waged
In higher tones than ever before," Ovchinnikov lashed out at
recent Japanese press articles which urged Tanaka to prsue a
course of "assertive diplomacy" in dealing with the territorial
issue in the negotiations with the USSR. Ovchinnikov complained
that some Japanese writers had "gone even further" and had
stated "unequivocally that the further development of economic
cooperation between the two countries will depend on the relaxaticn
of the USSR's position on the so-called territorial question."
Aiming his remarks at a higher level, Ovchinnikov implicated the
Tanaka government in the attempt to link the demand for return
of the islands to the recently resumed talks on a peace treaty
between the two countries. As evidence that the campaign is
"actually being inspired and directed from above," Ovchinnikov
odlteda 7November rally in Hiroshima held by emigres from the
Kurile islands. He quoted the Japanese press and--revealing Soviet
sensitivity to Chinese efforts to exploit the territorial issue--
"the Chinese NCNA"* as having reported that the rally was held
with the assistance of the prime minister's office and that
Foreign Minister Ohira had sent a message to the rally stressing
that "the solution of the question of the northern territories is
a prerequisite for the conclusion of a Japanese-Soviet treaty."
In unusually blunt terms, Ovchinnikov asserted that "it is still
not clear to somebody in Tokyo" that
the further comprehensive development of relations
between our neighboring countries--in which the
* Peking's attempt to keep the northern territories issue alive
and thereby enhance its leverage against the Soviet Union vis-a-vis
Japan was illustrated in NCNA's full report of the 7 November
Hiroshima rally. NCNA's coverage, more complete than previous
reports on similar Japanese rallies in the past, highlighted several
anti-Soviet remarks contained in the rally speeches as well as Ohira's
message to the rally.
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Japanese side is no less interested than the Soviet
side--is possible only on the basis of a sober,
realistic approach to reality. To make territorial
claims now in point of fact means to demand a review
of the results of World War II and to slide into
revanchist positions.
Turning to those Japanese leaders seeking to use the normalization
of relations with China as a lever to pry concessions from the
USSR on the territorial question, Ovchinuikov flatly declared
that "calculations that . . . foreign policy actions of recent
times will make it easier for Japan to exert pressure on the
USSR are illusory."
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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
SUSLOV RECEIVES EXCEPTIONAL HONORS ON 70TH BIRTHDAY
In addition to the conventional awards and messages of congratu-
lad.ons published in the 21 November PRAVDA, Central Committee
Secretary M. A. Suslov has received several unusual honors on his
70th birthday:
4. PRAVDA on 21 October announced the publication of a collection
of Suslov's speeches and articles and on 19 November carried a long,
enthusiastic review of it, Brezhnev is the only other Politburo
member to share this distintion.
4. Where birthday awards are not normally presented immediately
after they are announced and the presentation ceremonies
customarily get little publicity, Suslov's were presented the
day after they were announced and the ceremonies were prominently
publicized. PRAVDA on 22 November published a picture of the
awards ceremony along with the texts of Podgornyy's presentation
speech and Suslov's acceptance speech. The only uther septua-
genarian in the Politbuco, A. Ya. Pelshe, received his 70th
birthday Order of Lenin 20 days after its announcement, and the
presentation ceremony merited only a one-paragraph report in
PRAVDA on 27 February 1969. Although Brezhnev received his 60th
birthday award the day after its announcement, PRAVDA on 20
December 1966 carried no picture of the ceremony.
All the Moscow-based Politburo members except Polyanskiy attEnded the
Suelov awards ceremony, and Podgornyy's Ppeach contained warm
praise of Suslov. In reply, Suelov singled cut Brezhnev for special
recognition, expressing his "great happiness" in working in the
Central Committee and "especially...in the present Politburo--in
the remarkable cohesive and creative collective, among you, my
friends, along with the General Secretary, our dear Leonid Ilich
Brezhnev."
ARMENIAN PURGE REFLECTS SERIOUS FAILURES IN LEADERSHIP
The exposures of corruption, nationalism, and lagging in industrii:'
and agricultural production which have recently brought down the
leaders of Azerbaydzhan and Georgia may soon extend to the
neighboring Transcaucasian republic of Armenian as well. In a
two-day purge supervised by a Moscow cadre official, the Armenian
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republic witnessed the removal of its premier, B. A. Muradyan, its
Central Committee secretary for agriculture, M. S. Mslkonyan, and
its KGB chief, G. A. Badamyants. Although no public charges have
been aired against these officials and no unusual economic short-
comings or corruption have thus far been revealed, the sudden
purge clearly indicates major failings which place Armenian
First Secretary A. Ye. Kochinyan's future in jeopardy.
The Armenian changes commenced on 22 November with the removal
of 62-year-old G. A. Badamyants as KGB chief, a post he had held
for more than 18 years. The replacement of Badamyants, an Armenian,
by Arkady Pavlovich Ragozev, apparently a Russian, bodes ill for the
republic; native Armenians have long held all the top posts in
their republic, without the presence of Russian overseers usually
found in other republics. On the same day. 57-year-old Premier
Muradyan was replaced by the 53-year-old Central Committee
secretary for industry, G. A. Arzumanyan.
On 23 November an Armenian Central Committee plenum attended
by CPSU Central Committee deputy cadre section chief B. N.
Moralev met to discuss orjanizational questions, according
to a brief 24 November Yerevan broadcast. The plenum removed Me-
konyan and Muradyan from their republic party posts. Central Com-
mittee agriculture section head V. B. Galumyan aucceeded Melkonyan
and Yerevan Second Secretary K. S. Demirchyan became industry secre-
tary, filling the vacancy left by Arzumanyan.
To date, there has been no public explanation of the shakeup. In
fact, at a 31 October plenum on agriculture Kochinyan had presented
a rather favorable picture of Armenian agriculture which, though
hard hit by the harsh winter, was alleged to have yielded good
results.
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CHINA
SZECHWAN PLENUM PROVIDES FURTHER SIGN OF RETURNING ORDER
Breaking a long period in which practically no provincial leaders
appeared and no publicized meetings ware held, the Szechwan radio
un 22 November announced that the provincial revolutionary
committee held its sixth plenum from 1 to 2]. November. No
successor was formally named to replace former provincial chief
Chang Kuo-hua, who died in February, but former Kwangtung chief
Liu Hsing-yuan made a report on behalf of the provincial revolu-
tionary committee. Liu made his last appearance in Kwangtung in
early March. The only other provincial leader at the plenum who
was named was party secretary and pre-cultural revolution governor
Li Ta-chang, who gave a speech. Party second secretary and
regional military commander Liang Hsing-chu continued his year-
long absence from public view.
The Szechwan plenum, combined with the reappearance of Yunnan's
leaders earlier in the month, indicates that the problems in
Southwest China created by Lin Piao's fall are in the process of
being solved, though Kweichow and Tibet leaders have still not
reappeared. That serious obstacles to order remain, however, is
indicated in the Szechwan plenum report's call for suppression of
class enemies still "sowing discord, spreading rumors to stir up
trouble, sabotaging the campaign to criticize revisionism,
embezzling state property, and sabotaging production, communica-
tions, and social order."
Leading cadres have also been reappearing in several other
provinces. Among them is Mao Yuan-hsin, reported by the Liaoning
provincial radio on 26 November to have participated in a local
forum for intellectuals. Mao, reportedly Mao Tse-tung's nephew,
is a deputy secretary of the Liaoning party committee and was an
active "leftist" during the cultural revolution. He had not
appeared in public since the spring of 1971.
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TOPICS IN BRIEF
SOVIET SUBMARINE SAGA
Soviet media have ridiculed "hysteria" raised in the Western press
over repotts that a Soviet nuclear submarine entered Norway's
Sognefjord in early Novewber and plied the waters of the fjord
until the 24th, when the Norwegian Government allowed it to leave
in order to avoid an incident that might jeopardize the preparatory
talks on a European security conference. TASS suggested that the
story had been conjured up by Western opponcnts of detente and of
the conference. None of Moscow's several reports has explicitly
denied that the submarine was Soviet (it was so identified only
belatedly in the Western press reports), but TASS on the 28th
cited reports saying it was British. A 1.angthy commentary over
East Berlin radio on rhe 27th derisively labeled the "unidentified"
vessel "the Loch Nes. submarine."
TASS ignored but the East Berlin broadcast derided a report that
the "Soviet" submarine had entered the fjord after putting down
an attempted mutiny--an allegation attributed in the British
press to a ham operator who said he heard it in a Tirana broadcast
in English. No mention of the incident has appeared in monitored
Albanian news agency transmissions or domestic or international
broadcasts of Radio Tirana. FBIS does not regularly monitor
Tirana's voicecasts in English; they are known to carry much
the same fare as its other internationAl broadcasts, all of
which in turn draw most of their mater_al from the primary ATA
services in English and French.
PALESTINIAN UNITY
Moscow has used the occasion of the opening of the "Arab popular
conference for support of the Paleptine revolution" to again stress
the "special importance" of unity in the Palestine resistance
movement. Soviet interest in the meeting, which opened in Beirut
on 27 November after several postponements, was indicated by the
dispatch of a delegation headed by Yevgeniy Primakov, deputy
director of the Institute of World Economics and International
Relations and former PRAVDA Middle East expert. Primakov
addressed the conference in the capacity of secretaly of the
Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Commitee. According to a Moscow
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broadcast in Arabic on the 28th, he deplored differences in
the Palestine resistance movement and "disagreement among some
Arab states" over support for the Palestinians' cause. He
expressed the "Soviet people's" hope for deeper understanding
that would lead to closer solidarity with Palestine resistance
"militants," and he recalled the "very useful" visit to Moscow
last July of a Palestinian delegation led by Yasir 'Arafat.
Moscow's most recent criticism of disarray in the Palestinian
resistance movement came in a 25 October SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
article by Baryshev which ticked off the movement's undefined
political and ideological aims, lack of unity in methods of
struggle, and "motley" social compcsition. The article also
criticized extremist elements in the movement and groups advancing
"naticnalist and religious slogans."
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