TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060022-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: May 31, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
FBIS
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
31 MAY 1973
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CONFIDENTIAL
This urupug:uulu 1111et1%sis report I. based exclusivolp on material
tarried in Foreign br aduast and press media. It is published
by F131S without cnonliuation with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SLSCURITy INFORMATION
Urruuthurizc cl disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
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31 MAY 1973
CONTENTS
INDOCHINA
Le Duan, Pham Van Dong to Visit Peking in "Early June" . . .
1
FUNK, DRV Deny Cambodian Settlement; Peking Attacks Soviets . .
5
Hanoi Silent on Kissinger-Tho Talks, Scores Sullivan Remarks
8
DRV, PRG Urge France to Establish Relations With PRG . . . . . .
I.J.S.-USSR
9
USSR, East Europe See Favorable Condition; for Summit . . . . .
USSR-EGYPT
11
Moscow Plays Down az-Zayyat Visit, Security Council Debate . .
13
USS1 Hints at Differences in Treaty Anniversary Comment . . . .
USSR-ASIA
14
Podgornyy Promotes Asian Security System in Afghanistan . .
CHINA-EUROPE
15
Peking Reacts in Low Key to Brezhnev Visit to FRG . . . . . . .
POLAND-FRG
18
Warsaw Hedges on Brezhnev FRG Visit, Notes Unresolved Issues .
'USSR
20
Brezhnev's Controversial Agricultural Assistant Reappears . . .
21
Foreign Affairs Specialist Becomes Podgornyy's Assistant . . .
22
Agriculture Ministry Journal Raps Critics of Farm Spending . .
23
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I
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INDOCHINA
The Kissinoer-Tho talks in Paris and Brezhnev's forthcoming visit
to Washington provide a context for the 31 May announcement that
a DRV delegation headed by party chief Le Duan and Premier Pham
Van Dong will visit Peking in "early" June. Both Hanoi and Peking
have expressed concern over try effects of big-power relations
on their respective interests in Indochina, and Sihanouk's front
has adamantly insisted that a Cambodian settlement cannot be
negotiated by outside powers.
Hanoi media have said little about the Paris talks, that are to
resume next week, and have not echoed Kissinger in assessing
them as having made some progress. However, the North Vietnamese
have twice issued terse denials that the United Stated and the
DRV have reached an agreement on Cambodia.
LE DUAN, PHAM VAN DONG TO VISIT PEKING IN `'EARLY JUNE'
Against the background of the forthcoming U.S.-Soviet summit
meeting and other developments, the DRV-China summit can be
expected to deal with long-term issues in bilateral relations
and prospects for Indochina.
The impending trip to Peking by Le Duan and Dong, has been
preceded by other DRV visits, apart from the customary stop-
over by Le Duc Tho on his way to Paris. Notably, Politburo
member Hoang Van Hoan, who has long figured in Sino-Vietnamese
relations, arrived in Peking on 11 May on the same plane as Tho
but not as part of the delegation heading for Paris. Characteristically,
there has been no announcement indicating the duration of Hoan's stay
or the nature of ;:is visit. Similarly, the report that DRV Vice
Foreign Trade Minister Ly Ban had arrived in Peking on 29 May gave
no indication of the purpose of his visit, although he normally engages
in trade and aid negotiations. On 7 October Ly Ban had arrived in
Peking for the announced purpose of discussing the 1973 aid agreement,
which was signed by DRV Vice Premier Ng hi on 26 November, and on
27 December Ly Ban signed the 1973 trade agreement before finally
leaving Peking on 30 December. Hoang Van Hoan was present in Peking
at the time of Nghi's visit.
It is possible that the North Vietnamese leaders will go on to Moscow
to confer with Soviet leaders on Brezhnev's visit to the United
States in the last half of June, although high-level DRV leaders
were in Moscow within the past six months. Politburo members Truong
Chinh and foang Van Hoan attended the USSR's 50th anniversary
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celebrations In December and held talks with Suslov; Hoan
stayed on for weeks after 'l'ruong Chirih left but the only
indication of his activities was the observation in the
26 January PRAVDA report of his departure that he had been
"resting." There were Soviet--DRV consultations before and
after President Nixon's trip to Moscow last May, with CPSU
Secretary Katushev paying an unofficial visit to Hanoi in
late April and Podgornyy visiting Hanoi in mid-June. No
Sino-DRV talks attendent to the President's February trip to
China were made public, but Chou En-lai was rumored to have
visited Hanoi when he disappeared from public view for more
than a week in early March 1972 after the President's
departure.
PREVIOUS DRV The imminent visit to Peking by the DRV
VISITS TO PRC party-government delegation headed by First
Secretary Le Duan and Premier Pham Van Deng
will be the first such visit since November 1971 when Pham
V. Dong led a party-government delegation to China. The 1971
visit, which returned one by a PRC party-government delegation
headed by Chou En-lai,* gave the appearance of a reconciliation
mission in the wake of Hanoi's vocal expressions of displeasure
over the July announcement of President Nixon's scheduled visit
to China
Three months after the announcement of the President's visit, in
September 1971, Peking had tried to mollify and reassure the
DRV regarding big-power summitry by taking the unprecedented step
of dispatching a Chinese economic delegation headed by
Li listen-nien to conclude the annual aid agreement in Hanoi
rather than Peking. Emulating Peking, Moscow sent Podgornyy
to Hanoi in October 1971 to sign the Soviet aid agreement. Hanoi
media in the past two years have continued with varying degrees
of intensity to demonstrate concern over Peking's and Moscow's
accommodations with the United States, and polemical comment,
though in muted form, has continued to appear since the peace
agreement was signed last January.
Prior to November 1971, the last previous DRV party-government
visit to the PRC was one by Pham Van Dong in October 1969 to
mark the 20th anniversary of the PRC. This was during the period
* Chou's March 1971 visit was at the time of the South Vietnamese
operations in Laos, and was notable for the unusually strong
pledges of Peking support for the Indochinese.
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that Hanoi--in the wake of Ho Chi Minh's death--was seeking to
implement the appeal In Ho's last will. tend testament for
harmony between the socialist countri~-,s, and t)ong's delekatica
welt on from Peking to pay an official visit to the USSR.
Le Duan has never taken part in an official party-government
viftit to China although he had consulted with Chinese leaders
during several stopovers in Peking. He last ways there when he
stopped over en route to and from the 24th CPSU Congress in
March and May 1971.. The V1;? first secretary had similarly
stopped over in Peking in May 1970 en route home from the Lenin
centennial celebrations in Moscow. He also attendzd the
celebrations in Moscow mar'ana the 50th October Revolution
anniversary in November 1967, but the propaganda does not indicate
that he stopped over in Peking on that occasion. Le Duan did -atop
in Peking In March and April 1966, however, en route to and from the
CPSU Congress.
The first secretary paid "friendship" visits to both Moscow and
Peking in April 1965, but only the Soviet visit occasioned a
joint communique. lie stopped in Peking in January and February
1964 on his way to and from Moscow, and in December 1960 on his
way home after participating in the international communist
conference at the time of the 43d October Revolution anniversary.
DRV POLEMIC AGAINST The announcement of the June DRV visit to
BIG POWER DETENTE China comes in the wake of renewed Hanoi
criticism of big-power detente: An article
in the 25 May issue of the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN associated
the Nixon Doctrine with efforts to reach a "detente among the big
powers" and to restrain them so as to be able to "repress the
small nations." Denouncing the Nixon Doctrine as "wicked and
reactionary," the article took note of the President's efforts to
urge foreign nations to exert a moderating Influence in Indochina.
Even more noteworthy was a 7 April NIIAN DAN Commentator article
which for the first time since last August pressed the charge that
the Nixon Doctrine is aimed at creating divisions in the communist
world.
Hanoi had launched its propaganda campaign against communist detente
with the United States in July 1971, after the President's planned
visit to Peking was announced, but its diatribes were mod:'_f.ied in
September and October when the Li Hsien-nien and Podgornyy delega-
tions to Hanoi signed the Chinese and Soviet aid agreements,
respectively. In October 1971 the North Vietnamese party's
theoretical journal HOC TAP carried an article by Foreign Minister
Nguyen Duy Trinh which indicates that Hanoi had been mollified:
Trinh argued that continuing communist aid--particularly from the
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Soviet Union and China--indicated that the United States had
failed in efforts to "sow discord" between North Vietnam
and other communist nations.
In the months following President Nixon's trips to Peking and
Moscow, in February and May 1972, respectively, Hanoi media
Lgntinued to show its obvious displeasures. But concern over
the policies of the DRV's two big allies reached new heights
in August 1972 with a flurry of comment bitterly assailing
"reconciliation" and "compromise" with the United States. A
17 August NHAN DAN editorial, comirg after a round of talks
between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho and coinciding with Tho's
return home after stopovers in Moscow and Peking, read like a
strident lecture to Hanoi''i big allies against pressuring the
North Vietnamese to compromise their basic goals.
This propaganda barrage was short-lived, however, and, by the
end of August 1972, Hanoi commentators turned toward preparing
the groundwork for the draft peace proposal submitted by the
DRV at the private Paris talks on 8 October. The likelihood
that the interests of Hanoi's allies played a part in its
willingness to reach a settlement was directly suggested in a
f:OC TAP article in November 1972. The article, in contrast to
polemical comment three months earlier, argued that when it is
necessary to reach an agreement, communists do not allow
"narrow and immediate interests" to blur -wareness of "lasting
interests" of the entire mivement and "do .ot allow national
selfishness to control and undermine the common interests of
the world revolution."
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FUNK, DRV DENY CAMBODIAN SETTLEMENT; PEKING ATTACKS SOVIETS
Sihanouk and the Cambodian resistance leaders have been at pains
to stress their opposition to a compromise settlement, a
position that h-.s been backed by North Vietnamese denials that
an agreement on Cambodia has been reached in the Kissinger-Tho
talks. At the same time as the FUNK has been rejecting an
accommodation with Phnom Penh, the Chinese have voiced acute
concern over a possible arrangement that would serve Soviet
interests in Cambodia at their expense. Chinese misgivings
reflected in a 27 May NCNA attack on the Soviets for aiding a
U.S. "peace talk fraud" may have been a factor In the decision
to hold a Sino-Vietnamese summit meeting.
During his African tour Sihanouk has been emphatic in rejecting
a compromise. In a speech in Zambia on 25 May that was reported
by NCNA, the prince declared that "my government will never agree,
neither yesre:?day nor tomorrow, next year or any other year, to
negotiate or be reconciled with the Phnom Penh Lraitors." In
a speech in Morocco on the 28th he reiterated his readiness for
reconciliation with the United States provided it withdrew from
Cambodia. He returned to this theme at a press conference in
Rabat on the 119th, proposing the immediate restoration of
diplomatic rr,lations with the United States if the latter abandons
"the Phnom Penh traitors." NCNA quoted him as saying that the
North Vietnamese have not discussed Cambodia with the Americans.
NCNA noted the presence in Rabat of a RGNU "minister charged with
special missions," Chau Seng, who was in Paris during the
Kissinger-Tho talks and may have traveled to Rabat to brief
Sihanouk.
Peking-based RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth, in an appeal to the
Cambodian nation issued on 22 May and carried by Radio Peking in
Cambodian as well as by the FUNK news agency AKI, warned against
maneuvers of "peace, compromise. and concord'' and moves "in the
diplomatic field." At the same time, the Khmer Rouge elements in
the FUNK have chimed in with equally intransigent language to
denounce calls for a compromise and cease-fire. The top in-country
insurgent leader, RGNU Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister
Khieu Samphan, issued a 24 May ;;te,tement in the name of the RGNU
denouncing "the diplomatic maneu,;er of the U.S. imperialists and the
Nixon Administration aiming at collecting their partners on the
international arena by means of a Munich conference so as to force
the Cambodian nation and people to surrender and to isolate them."
The statement attacked the "new treacherous government" formed
by In Tam as a U.S. maneuver to promote "deceitful" peac'2
negotiations.
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Sihanouk's Khmer Rouge shadow, Ieng Sary, has also issued a
statement, an unusual move by him that serves to underscore
FUNK unity on the question of a settlement. Reported by NCNA,
the statement, which was issued in Mauritania on 29 May,
vigorously rejected the possibility that the insurgents would
accept a cease-fire in the wake of the January Vietnam
agreement and de-zanded that the United States end "all its
aid" to Phnom Penh. The statement also put the Cambodian
question in the context of international politics, saying
that Cambodia is only a bargaining chip for the United States
and complaining that "certain big powers" are seeking to
promote a Cambodian "third force" as a solution to the confl i:t.
The statement linked this effort with claims by the Phnom Penh
information minister that contacts have been established with
the FUNK.
Earlier, a 24 May communique by the FUNK information office in
Peking categorically denied that any member of the resistance
had been in contact wit'ti Lon Nol's government. A similar denial
was issued by Chas Seng on the 24th and carried by AKI on the
29th. His statemeni explicitly cited the Kissinger-Tho talks
in asserting that t),e Paris talks concern only Vietnam and cannot
arrange a Cambodian settlement.
HANOI Reacting to Western news reports, the North Vietnamese
have twice issued terse denials that the United States
and the DRV had reached an agreement on Cambodia. VNA issued an
"authorized" denial on 29 May, stating that the Cambodian
question must be settled by the Cambodian people, and a similar
denial by the DRV embassy in Paris on the 29th (releasc,.: by VNA
Qn the 30th) added that the DRV "firmly supports" the "just
stand" of Sihanouk and the RGNU. Likewise, a NHAN DAN article on
30 May combined a categorical denial of the reported agreement
on Cambodia with a ^eneralized expression of support for the
RGNU's stand, but there was no specific endorsement of the
insurgents' demands.
Hanoi has been less than forthcoming in responding to its
Cambodian allies' appeals for support. Hanoi's last authoritative
endorsement of Sihanouk's five-point demands came in comment
marking the Indochina summit anniversary in April, and its most
recent authoritative response to Cambodian pronouncements came in
a 19 May DRV Foreign Ministry statement seconding a RGNU statement
on U.S. bombing in Cambodia. Hanoi responded only indirectly to
the 16 May RGNU open letter appealing for international support
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against U.S. moves to isolate the Cambodian resistance, with
VNA replaying a 24 May PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article that
focused on U.S. involvement as the basic issue.
PEKING Representing Peking's first authoritative comment on
Cambodia in three weeks, the PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator
article reiterated the line that U.S. involvement is "the basic
reason why the Cambodian issue has not been settled up to now."
Commentator routinely demanded that the United States end its
bombing, cease rendering "all kinds of aid" to Phnom Penh, and
withdraw U.S. military personnel. According to the article,
the new Phnom Penh cabinet cannot rescue the regime from its crisis
and "the traitorous Lon Nol clique cannot escape the fate of total
collapse." Commentator did not name In Tam or other Phnom Penh
leaders besides Lon Nol and did not endorse t e insurgents'
demands.
Where the Commentator article followed the restrained lines taken
by Peking in recent months, a 27 May NCNA correspondent's article
denouncing the Soviet posture on Cambodia struck discordant notes
reminiscent of Peking's polemical assaults in the 1960's against
a negotiated settlement in Indochina. The article, ostensibly
criticizing PRAVDA for "recently" having deplored the Cambodian
fighting as a "fratricidal" war with pernicious consequences,
charged that the Soviets are promoting a Cambodian settlement in
coordination with "the peace talk fraud hatched by U.S. imperialism
and the Lon Nol clique." NCNA quoted a recent speech by Sihanouk
in Guinea rejecting "a deceptive peace" and pledging to continue
the fight until the enemy surrenders unconditionally.
The NCNA attack was not a random shot at a target of opportunity,
for the PRAVDA article criticized was published _,re than two
months earlier to mark the FUNK's anniversary on 23 March.
Against the background of Kissinger's talks with the Soviets
and with Le Duc Tho, old Chinese fears of a settlement in
Indochina benefiting the Soviets at Peking's expense may have
been rekindled, leading to the renewed charge of Soviet-U.S.
coordination in behalf of a "peace talk fraud." Reflecting
concern over pressures to divide part of the FUNK from the
pro-Peking elements, NCNA claimed that the Soviet move is an
effort to "split the patriotic Cambodian forces."
The Chinese last year had voiced suspicion over Soviet efforts to
promote "a third force" in Cambodia that would achieve a settle-
ment by excluding Sihanouk. This theme was sounded, for example,
by Chou En-lai in a 19 March 1972 speech on the second anniversary
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of Sihanouk's arrival in Peking after his overthrow. The
theme now appears in FUNK pronouncements, as in Ieng Sary's
29 May statement, but the Chinese themselves are not now
referring to a third force. Taken together with Peking's
avoidance of direct attacks on the other major Phnom Penh
leaders besides Lon Nol, this r~ticence suggests that the
Chinese wish to keep the door open for a Cambodian accommoda-
tion while putting top priority on big-power disengagement.
As NCNA's attack on the Soviets demonstrates, however, the
suspicion of a Soviet role in a Cambodian settlement has the
Chinese reaching for their polemical guns.
HANOI SILENT ON KISSINGER-THO TALKS, SCORES SULLIVAN REMARKS
DRV media continue to virtually ignore the 17-23 May talks in
Paris between Presidential adviser Kissinger and DRV representa-
tive Le Duc Tho. Hanoi is not known to have reported Kissinger's
23 May statement prior to his departure from Paris that the
meetings with Tho were conducted in a constructive and positive
manner and that significant progress was made. Hanoi has
similarly ignored DRV Deputy Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach's
22 May statement, reported by Western newsmen in Paris, that
the DRV could not yet say that the talks had made some progress.
By contrast, a 25 May Liberation Radio broadcast did cite
Kissinger's remarks on progress in the talks and quoted a PRG
spokesman in Saigon as observing that "the United States must
transform its words into deeds and must not say one thing and
do another."
Hanoi, however, alluded to the Paris talks in a 29 May broadcasts
scoring remarks by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Sullivan
in Bangkok on the 26th. The broadcasts critically cited Sullivan's
statement than the United States is returning to Paris to compel
the North Vietnamese to do what they agreed to when they signed
the agreement on Vietnam. Other Hanoi comment, including a
30 May NHAN DAN article, joined with the radio commentaries in
deploring Sullivan's additional remark that North Vietnam's
ambition to take over Indochina is the obstacle to a settlement.
Another article in the same issue of NHAN DAN noted that an
alleged division-size ARVN operatf.on in PRG-controlled areas
north of Saigon was launched "in the midst of the U.S.-Saigon
clamor for the speeding up of the negotiations for the
implementation of the Paris agreement."
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Continued Vietnamese communist publicity for the Watergate case
includes reports and comment on the President's 22 May statement.
A 24 May KHAN DAN article portrayed the President's statement as
"half admitting and half denying" responsibility and alleged that
he was losing the confidence of the U.S. public. On the 26th, a
lengthy Liberation Radio commentary, which cited the statement,
maintained that the President's prestige and power have never
before been so "heavily damaged" and concluded that: "The
President's position in his last term of office is that of a man
who is limping along on his Indochina-Watergate crutches." The
President's 24 May speech to U.S. POW's was characterized, in a
26 May QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article, as a further effort to "avert
public criticism" about Watergate.
DRV. PRG URGE FRANCE TO ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH PRG
In the wake of the French decision to elevate its relations with the
Saigon government to the ambassadorial level, announced on 13 April,
Vietnamese communise media have belatedly initiated a campaign to
pressure France to establish diplomatic relations with the PRG. PRG
and DRV media last week began carrying comment on the issue as well
as reports of meetings of PRG representatives with French officials
to discuss the subject of relations.
Liberation Radio on 23 May noted cryptically that on the previous
day the acting head of the special FRG representation in Hanoi had
called on the French embassy to discuss "the matter of relations."
It was not until 29 May that the Liberation Radio reported
that on the 25th PRG "Ambassador" Dinh Ba Thi--the senior PRG
representative at the PRG-GVN talks in Paris--had visited the French
Foreign Ministry to express the PRG's "disappointment" with the
French decision to establish ambassadorial relations with the GVN.
Dinh asserted that this move represented "differential treatment"
of "the two present administrations ;_n South Vietnam," a political
situation Dinh said France acknowledged when it signed the Paris
agreement on Vietnam. Dinh added that continuing postponement of
"the settlement of relations" with the PRG did "not contribute to
the correct implementation of the Paris agreement and the inter-
national treaty on Vietnam" and was "inconsistent with the long-
lasting interests of the Vietnamese and French people."
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Hanoi's NHAN DAN initiated the communist news media campaign
with an article on 25 May and PRG media quickly fillowac: suit.
VNA reported that the NHAN DAN article "criticized the French
Government" for failing to establish relations with the DRG,
a policy that if maintained would en-courage "Nguyen Van "hieu
and his junta to continue their violation of th,s Paria
agreement." A commentary carried by Liberation )radio on
the same day and LPA or. the 27th called the French decision
a "partial act" and reasserted the claim that the PRG was
"the sole authentic representative of the South Vietnamese
people," an argument not mentioned in VNA's account of the
NHAN DAN article. Both Hanoi and PRG media have also repo:ted
statements by groups in France advocating French recognition
of the PRG.
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U. S. - USSR
USSR, EAST EUROPE SEE FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR SUMMIT
Although still in low gear, Moscow's advance publicity or Brezhnev'u
visit to the Uniteu States has begun to pick up momentum. Moscow
drew attention last week to the anniversary of last year's summit
and continued to publicize r.ports of favorable opinion trends in
the United Staten. Articles or, the anniversary of the Moscow summit
gave a positive assessment of the first year of the new era in
U.S.-Soviet relations, concluding that the promises raised by the
sumxnit had been largely justified by the practical results achieved
since t'nen. The picture of U.S. opinion trends given to Soviet
readers has stressed the rapid change in attitudes toward tha USSR
occurring in all strata of U.S. society.
Commentary directly addressed to the visit has remained limited.
Moscow has avoided raising hopes that any new major agreements
are likely to emerge and has emphasized instead that the purpose
will be to further the main goal, set by the April plenum, of
making "irreversible" the gains achieved as a result of last year's
summit. Moscow radio's Washington correspondent Soltan was a
little more specific, quoting "official circles" in Washington as
predicting that the visit will focus on facilitating further
agreement on limiting strategic weapons and expanding ec)nomlc
cooperation. Reporting on reaction from the United States, not
unexpectedly, has highlighted public interest in the visit and has
suggested that opponents of better U.S.-Soviet relations are isolated.
WATERGATE Mcscow itself has not broached even indirectly the
IMPACT issue of a possible impact of the Watergate affair
i'n the summit. While the East European prees has
also been reticent on the issue, several commentaries have disputed
Western speculation about the lir.:.age. They have denied that the
Watergate affair will influence Moscow's approach to Brezhnev's visit
and have accused opponents of U.S.-Soviet detente of attempting to
capitalize on Watergate to impede a further improvement in relations.
An article by Peter Sereny in the 15 May issue of the Hungarian
party daily NEPSZABADSAG discounted the import of Watergate and
concluded that the stakes of the summit meeting were too high
for the Soviet leadership to permit: itself to be distracted by
what was only "the latest upheaval in U.S. domestic political life."
The Washington correspondents of the Czech party daily RUDE PRAVO
and the Hungarian popular front organ MAGYAR NEMZET filed articles
86 v
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noting, and discounting, Western speculation that Brezhnev would
attempt to extract concessions from a "weakened" Nixon. The
two articles asserted that Moscow would take a broader view of
the situation and observed that international negotiations would
come to a standstill if questions of timing and tactics were
predicated on internal events of individual countries. The
MAGYAR NEMZET article, which was published on 27 May, said
that Moscow wou),d hardly risk the improvement in bilateral
relations"-achieved after years of effort--for "short-term
and doubtful tactical advantages."
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()NI I DI;N'I' I Al, FH L'; 'I'ItI:Nb;;
'11 MAY 197')
USSR-EGYP1'
MOSCOW PLAYS DOWN AZ-ZAYYAT V'S[i, SECURITY COUNCIL. CEBATE
Moscow, In I fit(, with I!s 11mlted attention to the Arch-IttraeI i
dispute, gave meager publicity to th. 27-29 May visit to tilt,
USSR of I:r,yptlan !Foreign Miniut.er 41Z-Zayyat, who met with
Cromyko oil the 2Hth to consult on the imminent Security Council
debate un tilt, IHtlue. The visit also name ;tgninst the background
of the Soviet-American summit in June; as-Soda, himself went
to Moscow for talk,; last April. fn advance of President Nixon's
visit to the USSR, and in lilt; May Day speech this year as-Sadat:
indicated his displeasure with the results of last May's
summit. meeting and apprehension that the Sovivtti would fail
to stand up to the Americans in t118cussing the Middle E;tst
next month. Oil the day r.-'layyat arrived in Moscow, the
MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY released an as-Sadat interview with
the Yugoslav daily VJESNIK, reported by TANJI.IG the previous
day, In which he showed his displeasure with the Soviets. The
Egyptian president rejected the idea that. the "all-out
confrontatton" with Israel should depend on the June summit,
remarking that some people proposed "waiting until Brezhnev
and Nixon meet, but we always view such developments In light
of our interests." lie added that the May meeting last year
brought no results, and lie rebuked "our friend" the Soviet
Union for falling to heed his warning two years ago about
the Middle Eat;t situation.
The Egyptian foreign minister apparently met only with his
counterpart Gromyko, and Moscow gave no indic:ation of the
substance of tht-, "friendly speecheJ" exchanged at Gromyko's
luncheon on the 25th. The joint statement on the visit reflrscted
Moscow's evident lack of enthusiasm for the Security Council
debate, being held at Egypt's request. The propaganda has
given little advance publicity to the session, and the
statement, while attc.clhing "Important significance" to the
meeting, merely expressed hope that the discussion would
contribute to a just settlement. The sides appealed to
Security Council members to assist in the unconditional and
complete implementation of the relevant UN decisions on the
Middle East and to condemn those hindering implementation of
these decisions and threatening peace anc' security. The
statement noted the sides' "unchanged pobitions" on questions
of a Middle East settlement--perhaps reflecting. Moscow's
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COONV II)ENTIAl, I'll IS '['RI'NDS
11 MAY 1973
advucncy of n peatr.etul Hett.lcmenI, at pOHltlon repeatedly
criticized by nn-Sadat in hit' May hay speech. And the sides
again HtrvHned the need for IHrael.l withdrnwal from 1111
occupied territory and for tnMurf.ng the legitimnte rights
of the 11n1eitlninn people.
In a Htatcmcnt on Iii 14 return to Cairo, crz-Zayynt put hit;
M~,..c.,:r t; lk~t In the context of several consultations prior
to the Secur,?t.ty Council. debate, noting that he hnd met in
Mw;cuw with the French secretary of state for foreign affairs,
al no v:gL.t tag the USSR, at; well as Ambassador Jarring, art(]
that he hoped to have similar talks with other representatives
of UN member states in London and New York.
USSR HINTS AT DIFFERENCES IN TREATY ANNIVERSARY CMIENT
Moscow observed the second anniversary of the Soviet-Egyptian
friendship and cooperation treaty with the usual _,eremonies
and a message to as-Sadat from the Soviet leaders pointing out
that the Soviet Union has invariably given Egypt extensive
assistance and support. While az-Zayyat's Moscow visit
coincided with the treaty anniversary, the occasion was not
mentioned in the joint statement on the visit, which merely
affirmed the sides' determination to develop ties on the I.;asis
of the treaty. Propaganda on the anniversary, although
extolling the treaty, suggested continuing Soviet-Egyptian
differences. Thus Kudryavtsev in a 27 May IZVES"IYA art'.cle
conceded that the complex situation in the Mcddl. East
engendered complicated problems which "inevit,ebI.y also
affect the complete implementation" of the treaty's clausse.
lie found reasuurance in fact that the treaty itself ze: s
forth opportunities "for overcomt&g the difficulties."
A NEW TIMES artic.ic on the snniversarv, broad :ast iii Arabic on
the 26th, complainec thpt "certain Egyptian atc Arab journalists"
invented fabri.:atior.a out Soviet policy and .he Soviet-Egyptian
treaty, and in par=icJlar assailed an unidentified editor of "a
famous Cairo illuatrrAt;ed magazine" for representing the treaty
as a one-tim'2 commercial deal based on "temporary an.A' incidental
considerations" and for equating Moscow's Middle East policy
with that of imperialist states.
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CON V I DEN 1' I A1. n l l S TRI-:NUS
31 MAY 1973
U S S R - A S I A
PODGORNYY PROMOTES ASIAN SECURITY SYSTEM IN AFGHANISTAN
Soviet. Erctildr.nt Podgornyy used his 21-24 May visit to Afghanistan
to lobby publicly In behall of Moscow's proposaI for an Asian
CI) l lcct the ser.urtty syr??Lem, a project. that has been pursued wIth
renewed vigor since the' signing of the Vietnam ;agreement In
January Podgornyy may have hoped to duplicate Premier KosygI.n's
during, his mid-March visit to I r:an, I obtaining, it more
explicit Iranian endorsement of the Soviet proposal than had
appeared in the joint. communique on the Shah's October 1972
Moscow visit. If this w;ix Ira? intent. ion, however, the joint
Soviet.-Afghan communique on E'odgornyy's visit showed little
It any give in Kabul's noncommittal stance, and surrounding
Soviet comment has acknowledged the difficulties besetting
Moscow's project in Asia.
Podgornyy's speech on the first day of his visit was notable
both for the length at which he dwelt on an Asian security
system and for his thinly veiled denunciation of the Chinese
for seeking hegemony on the continent. Having referred to
it "pressing" need for an Asian security system, Podgornyy
deplored the obstructionist efforts of unnamed "imperialist
powers" seeking tc. revitalize military blocs and of "certain
adventur.ist circ?.yes" which, prompted by their "hegemonistic
aspirations," seek to play a dominant role in Asia and hampe7
efforts to n.,rmalize the situation. Though routine-level
Soviet comment has more directly linked the China question with
the pro;aosal on Asian collective security, Podgoinyy's anti-
Cninese jab reprer,~,its "he furthest Moscow ha: gone on an elite
level to acknowlc '3,, that one purpose of the F.oject is the
containment of China.
Podgornyy also acknowledged the "diff,,:ulttes and obstacles"
facing the project, and he duly offered the assurance that it
would conform with the UN Charter and would "not be directed
agate..:tt any states." In a maj(-- 4,1 December speech before a
large audience of :oreign leaders, Brezhnev had been more
forcefully explicit in dismissing as "totally gr-)undless" the
allegation that the proposed Asian security systf.m was designed
to "contain or encircle" China.
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CONK I DENT I Al. Fill!) TRENDS
)1 MAY 19 7 ')
Judging from the Soviet-Afghan communique, the neuIrallnt 1108t14
were not Inc11ned Lo follow the Shah's example to moving town rd
Lite Soviet propoHaI.* The two sides repented the formulation
from their communique on the Afghan Premier's March 1.972 visit to
Moscow in iHHerting that Lite achievement of Asian security
"requlreH the joint efforts of all countries of this area,"
but In the n_.-w communique they cited only the principles of
peaceful coexistence as the meanH for achieving it lasting
peace in Asia. The March 1972 communique had cited the basic
principles of Lite Soviet proposal for Asian collective security
as a meanH to this end. In his 21 May speech Podgornyy
enumerated these principies, which include renunciation of
force, inviolability of borders, and nonintervention. Tile
Soviets did manage to get Afghan endorsement in the communique
of their proposals for renunciation of force and n ban on the
use of nuclear weapons as embodied in resolutions adopted by
the UNGA. These proposals had been the focus of heated Sino-
Soviet polemics.
A dispatch from Kabul carried in PRAVDA on 26 May sought to
portray sentiment in Afghanistan as recognizing the need for
an Asian security system, but it frankly conceded that this "is
clearly a complex problem." The dispatch went on to criticize
unnamed forces that seek to undermine other states' relations
with Moscow and engage in "false slogans and clamorous demagogy."
DACCA CONFERENCE Podgornyy's visit to Kabul coincided with
a Dacca conference of Asian countries in
preparation for the forthcoming World Congress of Peace Forces
to be held In Moscow next October. The conference provided
another forum for airing the proposal for Asian collective security
as well as for mobilizing anti-Chinese forces. In a message to
the session Kosygin urged "all-round coo;'rarton" and "collective
security," and the chief Soviet delegate observed that "now that
the war in Vietnam has ended at is possible to achieve a basic
turn toward peace by establishing a collective security system."
TASS on 25 May reported that a resolution was unanimously passed
defining a policy of peace as based on the key principles of the
* The March Soviet-Iranian communique registered the two sides'
"inteation to help in the realization of the idea of creating an
Asian collective security system." Their previous joint communique,
in October, called for "joint efforts and cooperation" by Asian
countries to insure peace. See the TRENDS of 21 March 1973,
pages 10-12.
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CON I'II)I;N'I'IA1, F13 IS TRENDS
31 MAY 1,973
Soviet proposal for collective security, and Htatl.ng that
MoHCow'H bilateral Ireatlet with India and Ir:iq and the
Indian-Bangladesh treaty "serve as it model." of cooperation.
The con!.'rence a1Ho passed a resolution condemning Peking's
position on Bangladesh, and the Mongolian delegate was quoted
by 'LASS on the 24th as saying hiH country is "seriously concerned
about the continuing nuclear weapon tests in CIiJna." A commentary
broadcast by Moscow in English to South AHin on 23 May used the
occasion of the Dacca conference to recall the speech by a
Chinese delegate at a sesaion of the IIN Economic Commission for
Asia and the Far East in 12 April as an example of Peking's
attempt to "slander" the idea of a collective security system.
The Chinese delegate had in fact delivered a stinging attack on
Moscow's proposal as designed "to control and divide Asian
countries at.d incorporate them gradually into its sphere of
influence."
Peking has reacted to Podgornyy's trip to Afghanistan by carrying
c,lticel Pakistani comment (NCNA, 28 May) deriding his enunciation
of the principles of the proposed collective security system. One
commentary was quoted as saying Podgornyy had accused China of
aspiring to become a dominant power.
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CON 'II)EN'I'IAL IBIS 'T'RENDS
"31 MAY 1973
C H I NA - EUROPE
PEKING REACTS IN LOW KEY TO BREZ-INEV VISIT TO FRG
Consistent with Its current practice--and in contrast to past
fulminations ;lgoinst Soviet policy on Germany--Peking reacted
In a low key to Brezhnev's FRG visit, avoiding polemics while
continuing; its own cultivation of the West Germans. A lone
NCNA divpatch dated the 23d was carefully contrived to indicate
that Brezhnev urgently sought West German economic cooperation
and that the 1'RG was :standing firm on its commitments to the
EEC and NATO. Also on the 23d, NCNA announced the arrival in
Peking of a Wirt German economic delegation that was accorded
high-level Chinese attention. Peking has thus conveyed the
impression that it t taking the Soviet-FRG relationship in
stride while developing its own ties with West Germnny.
In addition to reporting that Brezhnev "repeatedly stressed"
a desire for extensive economic cooperation with the FRG and
"appealed" to West German business to sign contracts, the NCNA
account of Brezhnev's visit made a point of indicating that
Bonn's interests have been served to the Soviet-FRG relationship.
Thus, in noting he background of the visit, NCNA cited the
September 1971 four-power agreement on West Berlin as having
for the first time recognized Bonn's ties with West Berlin.
NCNA also quctod the joint statement on the visit as saying
the two sides had "a detailed exchange of views" on the four-
power agreement and called for "strict observance" of the
agreement as essential for tmproving Soviet-FRG relations.
In the past the Chinese had sharply denounced iloscow's moves
on the German question, as in the charge in the 1972 New Year's
Day joint editorial that by signing the West Berlin agreement
the Soviets were guilty of "selling out the sovereignty" of
the CUR.
In keeping with Peking's effort to foster Atlantic and West
European unity, the NCNA account closed by noting that in his
Bundestag speech on the 23d Brandt "stressed" the consensus of
views between Bonn and its NATO allies. In effect expressing
Chinese confidence that FRG membership in the Atlantic alliance
has not been eroded, NCNA quoted Brandt as declaring that
"nobody should speculate that we would let ourselves be thrown
into unrealistic thinking."
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CONFLDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
31 MAY 1973
'T'he West German economic delegation, which arrived In Peking
the day after Brezhnev'u visit to the FRG concluded, was headed
by it businessman who had been among those seeing Brezhnev in
Bonn. Though it was r; private delegation hosted by the China
Council for the Promotion of InternaLlonal Trade, an agency
handling nongovernmental relations, the West German group was
received by Premier. Chou I.,n-lai* and was honored by a banquet
given by it vice foreign trarle m.tnister as well as one given by
an official of the host council.
T',rcANA In contrast to the changes in Peking's position on the
German question, Tirana has remained adamant in
denouncing any and all. improvements in Bonn-Moscow relations.
Consistent with its longstanding hostility toward what it
calls a "Washington-Moscow-Bonn axis" and echoing the former
fulminations of its Chinese allies, Tirana has vehenr.2ntly
denounced the "new unscrupulous concessions" which Brezhnev
allegedly made in Bonn in exchange for credits and West German
technology to the detriment of the "sovereignty and dignity of
the GDR" and to "the detri.ment of the German nation and peace
in Europe." Tirana has also repeatedly noted in its crmmentary
on the Brezhnev visit that Moscow, moving in tandem with
Brandt's Ostpolitik, has attempted to settle the postwar
problems without a peace treaty--a theme which Peking has not
publicly commented on since the visit to the PRC by FRG
Foreig.. Minister Scheel in October of last year.
* As reported by a West German correspondent, Chou's conversa-
tion with the group was marked by his characteristic subtlety
and anti-Soviet thrusts. He said he knew o-.'_y "Koenigsberg and
not Kaliningrad," and he remarked that he lived a year in
Berlin on Kantstrasse--a street named after the sage of
Koenigsberg.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
31 MAY 1973
P0LAI'JD-FR6
WARSAW HEDGES ON BREZHNEV FRG VISIT, NOTES UNRESOLVED ISSUES
Sounding a discordant note in the otherwise unanimous chorus
of East European praise for Brezhnev's FRG visit, Warsaw has
qualified its endorsement of the event with discreet reminders
of ita own unsettled claims against West Germany. While
professing adherence to the "full concordance of views" a;nong
the socialist states on relations with Bonn, Warsaw hp5
repeatedly recalled Gierek's 22 March roznan speech in which
Polish claims for indemnification for Germany's World War II
crimes were outlined.
Taking phis speech as a text, Polish media have argued that
the Polish government "cannot put aside such as important
issue as the suffering of concentraticn and forced labor
camp prisoners." Authoritative Polish commentators have
stressed that the Polish-FRG treaty is not the "final goal"
of the normalization process between Warsaw and Bonn but
only the beginning of a long and difficult process of
resolving outstanding bilateral differences. Elaborating
on a suggestion by Gierek on the desirability of a personal
meeting with Brandt in the near future to resolve outstanding
problems, the Polish press has stated that "there is no
question that such a meeting is necessary and that the results
can only facilitate the solution of the difficult problems
connected with the heritage of the past."*
There has been no Polish commentary as yet on the recent
agreement between Tito and Brandt which appears to ha?-e
settled Yugoslavia's indemnification claims in a way that
might be applicable to the P,:lish case. According to the
comm+Inique follc:wing Brandt's 16-19 April visit to Yugoslavia,
the agreement was reached on the basie of "ling-term cooperation
in economic and other spheres." A similar solution of the
Polish indemnification claims may be viewed favorably by Warsaw,
since Gierek had also complained in his Poznan speech about Bonn's
slowness in implementing measures of economic cooperation.
* TASS and PRAVDA, in summarizir.g Gierek's March speech, noted
his remark about the persistence of "important problems" in Warsaw-
Bonn relations, but failed to report his elaboration of those
problems.
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CONFIDENTIAL FLT S TRENDS
31 MAY 1973
USSR
BREZHNEV'S CONTROVERSIAL AGRICULTURAL ASSISTANT REAPI " '
Brezhnev's longtime agricultural aide V. A. Golikov, whose status
has been under a cloud in recent years, was among those who met
Brezhnev on his return from West Germany on 22 May. PRAVDA the
following day reported Golikov's presence at the Moscow home-
coming and identified him as Brezhnev's "assistant." Although
other Brezhnev aides--G. E. Tsukanov, A. M. Aleksandrov,
K. V. Rusakov, and A. I. B1'tov--have accompanied him on
va:ious occasions and have been publicly identified as his
assistants, Golikov had never prAviously appeared on such an
occasion, and had not been identified as a Brezhnev assistant
since 1966.
Golikov is unique among the members of Brezhnev's personal staff
both for the rarity of his public appearances and for the out-
spokenness if his views on controversial matters. The only
Brezhnev aide known to have expressed himself publicly, Golikov
has authored articles on agriculture which have taken contro-
versial stands--on free marketing, kolkhoz unions, and resource
allocation--similar to those adopted by Politburo member Polyanskiy.
His involvement in controversial issues may explain why he was not
elected. to any Central Committee posts by the 24th CPSU Congress
in 1971, even though other members of Brezhnev's staff lacking his
seniority were so honored. Whatever the reasons for his apparent
fall from grace, his recent reappearance indicates that he now
enjoys high political standing.
CLOSE TIES Golikov's ties with Brezhnev date back to the
WITH BREZHNIEV early 1950's, when he served as head of a
sector of the Moldavian Central Committee
during Brezhnev's tenure as republic party boss. He became an
assistant to Brezhnev in the mid-1950's while the latter served
as a Central Committee secretary. Golikov's close relationship
with Brezhnev was described in a book on the virgin lands, which
recalled a visit to that area made by Brezhnev and his "assistant"
in 1957. By contrast, Tsukanov joined Brezhnev's staff in 1958,
and Aleksandrov followed suit in the early 1960's. The other
identified Brezhnev aides, bloc affairs specialists Rusakov and
Blatov, were added to Brezhnev's staff last year in connection
with the party leader's growing preoccupation with foreign affairs.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
31 MAY 1973
Golikov distinguished himself as a conservative, if not a
neo-Stalinist, by his February 1969 KOMMUNIST article criticizing
the rehabilitation of a Stalin purge victim and by his April
1972 QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY article absolving Stalin of any
wrongdoing in the collectivization of agriculture and polemtciz-
ing with "revisionist" Khrushchev-era histories.* Golikov's
stand on collectivization coincided with positions taken by
S.P. Trapeznikov, head of the Central Committee science and
educational institutions section, with whom Golikov had worked
in the Moldavian central party apparatus. According to a
report in the underground samizdat publication, "Political
Diary," Golikov teamed up with Trapeznikov in early 1970 to
attack a supposedly "revisionist" passage in Brezhnev's
April 1970 Lenin anniversary speech prepared by A.M. Aleksandrov,
V.V. Zagladin, P.N. Fedoseyev and A.Ye. Bovin, but this
effort was said to have failed.
In any case, Golikov's career appeared to be in eclipse following
his failure to be elected to any Central Committee posts by
the 24th CPSU Congress. By contrast, his colleague Tsukanov
became a Central Committee member, while Aleksandrov was elected
to membership on the Central Auditing Commission. Since that
time Tsukanov and Aleksandrov have appeared frequently in public,
accompanying Brezhnev in his talks with foreign leaders or
greeting him at his airport arrivals and departures. Golikov's
only public activity in this period involved authorship of
several journal articles on controversial agricultural issues.
In the May 1971 KOMMUNIST he praised Moldavian First Secretary
Bodyul's various agricultural innovations, and in the July 1972
QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY he complained that agriculture was
still not receiving sufficient resources. On his election to
the RSFSR Supreme Soviet in June 1971, he was identified merely
as a "responsible official of the Cettral Committee." Doubts
about Golikov's status were further heightened by the shake-up
in the agricultural hierarchy and the demotion of Polyanskiy and
were not dispelled until his latest public appearance.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS SPECIALIST BECOMES PODGORNYYIS ASSISTANT
Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman Podgornyy appears to be following
Brezhnev's example in reorienting his staff toward foreign affairs.
* For background on these articles, see the SURVEY for 13 March
1969, pages 5-6 and the TRENDS of 26 April 1972, pages 52-53.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
31 MAY 1973
Just as Brezhnev selected bloc affairs specialists K.V. Rusakov
and A.I. Blatov as new additions to his personal staff, so
Podgornyy has chosen international affairs specialist
V.V. Kortunov as a new assistant, apparently to replace his
longtime top aide, L.M. Shevchenko, who died in July 1972. This
was revealed by PRAVDA's 26 May identification of Kortunov as
an "assistant to the chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium"
and a member of Podgornyy's delegation to Afghanistan.
Shevchenko, a former metallurgical engineer and local party
official, had assisted Podgornyy while he was Ukrainian First
Secretary, Central Committee Secretary and then Supreme Soviet
Presidium Chairman. Kortunov was a lecturer on foreign affairs
in the late 1950's and a high official of agitprop until the
mid-1960's, when he became deputy head of the Central Committee's
new information section. The section appears to have been
abolished by 1968, although local "information and foreign
relations" sections still exist in some republic central
committees.
The 1971 Diplomatic Dictionary identified Kortunov as an
ambassador and listed him in "responsible work in the central
apparatus of the foreign ministry" since 1968. He evidently
jointed Podgornyy's staff quite recently, since he was not
among the numerous Podgornyy assistants who signed the
16 January 1972 obituary of Podgornyy aide M.N. Tsuranov and
the 13 July .1972 obituary of Shevchenko. Like Rusakov and
Blatov, Kortunov has no career ties with his new boss.
AGRICULTURE MINISTRY JOURNAL RAPS CRITICS OF FARM SPENDING
An editorial in the April issue of the Agriculture Ministry's
journal ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE has launched an attack on
those who oppose greater allocations to agriculture on grounds
that what is needed is more efficient operations. Though
ostensibly addressed to the writings of an obscure agricultural
economist, the editorial espouses views believed to have been
advocated by Polyanskiy and challenged by Voronov at the
highest levels of the regime. Since the journal carrying the
editorial was prepared for publication shortly after Polyanskiy's
appointment as agriculture minister in early February, it is
conceivable that the editorial reflects Polyanskiy's determination
to continue to press for more agricultural investment.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
31 MAY 197:?
The editorial criticized a book by V. P. Yefimov published in
1971 for allegedly maintaining that agricultural intensification
can be achieved withoa.t additional investments and that this
goal can be reached by more efficient use of land and capital.
In reply the editorial bluntly defined intensification of
agriculture as greaL_::r investment and cited quotations from
Marx and Lenin to -phold this view. The editorial complained
that "adherents of V. P. Yefimov's views" question whether
.additional expenditures in agriculture are necessary on grounds
that "sometimes it is not the increase in the means of production
which is important but the improvement in their use."
The editorial also complained that Yefimov's book had re..eived a
favorable review in the JanLary issue of QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS.
The review by Saratov and Tbilisi economi-its V. Lumelskiy and
D. Chachua had praised Yefimov for viewi?ag agricultural
intensification basically as a qualitative problem involving
more eff'cient use of resource:; rather than large outlays.
Aid the review contrasted Yefimov's views with those of "a
number of economists who consider intensification as increasing
the investments of labor and funds,"
The editorial in the ministry's journal represents the latest
episode in a longstanding dispute over agricultural policy.
Indeed, under the impetus of recurrent agricultural crises
and increasingly complex demands on the e:onomy, the
agricultural dispute has acquired a life of its own seemingly
unrelated to such momentous events as Polyanskiy's sudden
demotion to ministerial status and Voronov's protracted
descent. into forced retirement.
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FIi I S 'I'RENg)S
31 MAY 1.973
A P P E N D I X
MOSCOW, I'EKLNG BROADCAST' S'I'A'I'IS'1'ICS 2.1 - 27 MAY 1973
Moscow (2893 1 tens '
Peking L276 LteiimH)
Brezhnev
Ln FRG (25%)
33%
Domestic issues
(44Z)
41"
Pudgornyy
in Al:ghan.Lstv.',. (--)
7%
Cambodia
(11%)
14;
C I I ina
(4%)
5%
[Sihanouk 'l'our
(10X)
X
OAU .LOth Anniversary, (1%)
African Liberation
4%
of Africa,
Europe
Day
OAU 10th Anniversary,
(12)
1.4%
Afghanistan Independence (--)
3%
African Liberation
Anniversary
Day
Dacca Preparatory Meeting (--)
for Mosco' Conference
3%
World Health Organiza-
Lion Session
(1%)
47
on Peace and Security
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio se! vices. The term "commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commec'aries.
Figures In parentheses Indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention it terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered In prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060022-5