TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: September 6, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

i >< '>}' GApproved FoT R leL 1 :'~CtIA R~~~00& aF ~ Ag~~l
 ~!/._ < ~(
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CI DF~8~T00875R0 0300 ~6 038-$
~on~ic~ent~al
FBIS~
TREND
in Co~nr~unist Rropa~anda
STATSPEC
Con#idential
6 SEPT6~BER 1973
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000~b00~~b3~-8 36~
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8
CONI{'II~I?JI~'I'IAIJ
'Chic propuJCuncla analysis report is bused exclusively on nutterinl
cnrriecl iu forci~;u broaclcust and press utecli;t. It is published
by F[3IS without coordin;ttion with other L1,5. Covr.rr ment
components.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SI~:CURITY INFOHM.ITIO~I
Unac:fltorfxed disclosure sub;cct to
rriminul sanctions
Approved For Release 1999/~ABI~~IP85T00875R000300060038-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8
CONFIDENTrAL LBIS TRENDS
6 SEPTEMBER 1973
COfdTEfJTS
CCP's Tenth Congress Sanctions Party Restoration
Era.
1
Chou Portrays Geopolitical Setting of Triangular
Relations.
8
Hanoi Plarks National Day; Defense Minister Giap S
till Absent.
11
Peking Downgrades Observance of North Vietnamese
Anniversary.
15
Anti-Sakharov Campaign Lifts Official Veil on His
Views
17
Georgia Endorses Controversial Moldavian Kolkhoz
Councils
19
Kissinger Appointment; Moscow on Disarmament.
20
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics
i
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8
CON)! IDLN'1IAL IBIS TRLNDS
6 SEPTEMBER 1973
CNIIJA
CCP~S TENlI-1 CONGRESS SANCTIONS PARTY RESTORATION ERA
1'he CCI''s tenth congress held from 24 to 28 August, a milestone
marking a party restoration era, formalized Lin Piao's downfall
and certified a power structure in which Chou En-lai's part}?-
oriente6 coalition occupies the commanding heights beneath only
Mao Himself. 'I'lie congress also provided dramatic testimony to
the intense animosity that a Chinese leadership headed by Mao
and Chou harbors toward the Soviets. In addition to a denunciation
of Lin's "antiparty clique"--for waning to capitulate to the
Soviets, among other charges--the political report Chou delivered
to the congress featured a bitter excoriation of the "Brezhnev
reciegacie clique" and even warned explicitly against a Soviet
surprise attack.
On the surface the leadership certified by the congress might
appear to be a balance of contending forces, moderate and radical,
civLlian and military. But ir. fact the new constellation possesses
a strong center of gravity, a convergence of vested interests
in the patty as an institution that has been regaj:cing the hegemony
destroyed during the cultural revolutio~.t and challenged in the
Lin Piao affair. The meteoric rise of young Shanghai leader
Wang ;lung-wen, wlio del.{vexed the report on the revised party
constLtution, symbolizes these vested interests in the party.
Wang's Shanghai Cotton Mill I~(o, 17 formed the first party
cununittee (20 June 1969) to be rebuilt after the ninth congress
in April that year put party reconstruction on the agenda. The
parry leas also waxed quantitatively, the congress revealing a
member.stiip figure of 28 million as comp,~red with the official
Figure of 17 million before the de.:imations of the cultural
revolut.iun.
'1'lte teeth congress was unusual '~oth for its brevity and the absence
of a prior announcement or preceding plenum. Mao's health--he
presided at the congress but did clot speak, as he had at the ninth
congress--and Psking's trend toward streamlining affairs may
Dave been contributing factors, but the brevity of the proceedings
may also reflect how those in charge viewed the business at
hand. Borh Clcou and Wang in their reports were at pains to
indicate an underlying continuity between the ninth congress
and tl~e present. Thus the tenth congress has formally rectified
rile deviation of Lin and his associates from the course 4lready
charted at the ninth congress, and there was nu need to elaborate
Approved For Release 199'~I?~~#!~c-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8
CONCTDLN'1'IAL I?BI5 TltLNDS
6 SEPTEMBER 1973
on policy lines. 'lice next step will be the convocation of- the
.'National People's C~.~ngress, an event that was delayed by the
Lin Plao affair but which Chou has now promised will come "soon."
LEADERSHIP The composition of the new Politburo and Central
Committee confirms Chou's ascendancy in the wake of
the Lin affa r and litghlights Wang flung-wen's rise to the formal
position of third-ranking member of a collective leadership under
P1ao. It also registers the enhanced authority of aparty-centered
coalition at the expense of professional military leaders and
the two militant "radicals" whose interests were closely identified
with the cultural arena during tl-e cultural revolution.
Tlie first plenucu of the Tenth Central Committee, field on 30
August, revived the collective ln~titution of party vice chairmen,
naming in apparent rank order Chou, Wang, ailing incumbent
standing committee member Kang Sheng (folio may have been rswarded
for loyalty during the Lin affair), party-military leader and
close Chou asr~ociate Yeh Chien-yang, and Li Te-sheng, dead of the
PLA General Political Department (GPD) wl:o has been elevated from
Politburo alternate. Whether or not the rank order implies the
line of succession i.s not indicated in the new Party constitution,
in contrast to the previous constitution's imprudent designation
of Lin as sole vice chairman and successor to Mao. With respect
to party supremacy over the military, it is significant not only
that the two mili.tar.y men among the vice chairmen are ranked
behind the others but also that they represent party interests in
the mili.t.ary: Yeh as the key figure in the party's Military
Committee, and Lt as GPI) chief .
'1'iie new standing committee includes, in add~tiott to Mao and alt
party vice chairmen, Shangha.t chief Chang Chun-chiao and
octogenarians Chu 'I'e and Tung Pi-wu, the later two having mainly
honorary status. At this stage Chang's status seems perplexing,
but he may be destined tc stand in the front rank of leader, as
Party secretary general or, after the NPC, as chief of state or
some other top title. 'Though there has been no reference to
revival or a secretariat, Cliang served as secretary general of
the congress. The secretary general of the eighth congress in
1956, 'l:eng Hsiao-ping, became party secretary general but not a
vice chairman, a possible precedent for now. Should Chang not
be awarde4 one of the top positions in the formal hierarch- but
instead be upstaged by his former Shanghai protege, the stability
of thF~ new leadership might be questionable with the addition of
another significant source of dissatisfaction over. the current
lineup.
Approved For Release 19~~f~~~vr:~1A-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8
CONrTULN'CLAL b'L;IS TRRNDS
~~ SFPTGM131JR 1973
While al.l the Politburo members not purged with Lin have retained
their posts and all active alternates have been promoted t~ full
membership, some of the incumbents, notably Chiang Ching and
Yao Wen-yuan, must surely he dissatisfied with their current
status. They directed the cultural and ideological attacks that
keynoted the cultural revolution, and Chiang in particular has
lost ground by failir_g to make the standing committee after having
previously ranked dust below standing committee members. The
new list elevates additional leaders above her and Yap. Similarly,
the two regional military leaders in the Politburo, Hsu Shih-yu
and Cheng lisi-lien, have suffered a relative 1o~s i.n c~iew of
the newly elevated leaders above them and the addition of other,
nonmilitary provtncial leaders to full Politburo status. No
new regional. military leaders were elected to the Politburo.
Some of the promotions to the Politburo had been previously
Gignaled in central leadership rankings: Wang Hung-wen, Hunan
chief Huau Kuo-feng, and Pelting municipal chief Wu Te had been
accorded positions in central leadership lists which implied
future Politburo status. All are civilians, as are the other
two new full members of the Politburo, Kwangsi chief Wei Kuo-ching
anti leader of the model Tachai production brigade Chen Yung-kuei.
Politburo :alternate members seem to have been selected with a view
to rounding out representation from various groups: Wu Kuei-hsien
From Shensi is a woman wlia was a full member of the ninth committee;
Ni Ciiih-fu is a model worker; Su Chen-hua, former navy political
commissar whose successor Li Tso-peng fell with Lin, seems to
represent the rehabilitated cadres and is the only one to achieve
Politburo status; and Saifudin, like Wei Kuo-ching, ~?.s a
member of a national m3.nority. Unlike the other a~ternate
members, Saifudin has a power base in his own right as Sinkiang
party chief.
CEV"fRAL COf~M1ITTEE Thouf;h the total number of Central Commitr_ee
full and alterna*.e members rose from 294
to 319, nearly a third of. the Ninth Central Consnittee members was
dropped from the new committee, mostl;~ military leaders who fell
after i,in's demise or "revolutionary" leaders from the provinces.
On the other. hand, the new Centra? Committee includes some 20
members of the Eighth Central Committee who were not retained at
Ninth Congress in 1969. Two ~f the most prominent returnees,
former Politburo members Tan Che-i-lin ar:d Ulanfu, made public
appearances on 26 August cchile the congress was in session, and
another former Politburo member elected to the Central Committee,
Li Ching-ch~.ian, appeared publicly on 29 August. Other newly
Approved For Release 1999~~~S~~li~~'-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8
C0:1FIDrNTIAL FBIS TRENDS
6 SEPTEMBER 1973
rehabi? .:led leaders elected full members include former member
of the party secretariat Wang Chia~?lisiang, former Anh,aei chief
L+. Pao--h~ia, former senior deputy chief of staff Chang Tsung-hsun,
.end f.urmcr capital construction chief Ku Mu. Returnees elected
C~~titral C~m~nittee alternates include Former minister of commerce
Xao T-lin and former provincial first secretaries Yeh Fei, Chiang
Wet-thing, and Chiang Hua.
U.f. the 27 activr--_ provincial first secretaries, 23 were elected
full members of the new Central Committee; the others were made
alternates. As in the Ninth Central Committee, the leaders of
~;hina.'s two smallest provinces, Ningsia and Tibet, were not elected
to Full membership. The other exceptions are Wang Chia-tao of.
Heilungkiang, who was out of public view for nearly two years
before reappearing in his province in Jt+.ne, and Shansi first
secretary Hsieh Cheng-hu3, who is overshadowed in his province
by Tachai leader Chen Yung-kuei, now a full. member of the Politburo.
NE;J CONSTITUTION, Chou En?-].ai's political. report and Wang
POLITICAL REPORT Hung-we:i's report on the new party constitution
represe~lt determined efforts to link present
policies with the line adopted at the ninth congress, presenting
the Lin Piao's group ais a. defeated minority even at the ninth
congress. Both Chou and. Wang reaffi?~ned that "the political llr.e
and organizational line of the ninth congress are correct," and
Chou pointed out that thr: political report delivered by Lin at
that congress was "drawl up under Chai.rma.z Mao's personal guidance."
The thrust of both Chou's and Wang`s reports was thus tt-at business
will be =ari~erl on largely as it has been fc~r the past tour years
and that cadres need not expect line changes or detailed new
programs.
As Wang noted in his report on the party c~r~stitution, "there
are not many changes in the articles" and these changes were
drawn up according to "Chairman Mao's specific proposals."
Wang's report is closely tied to an explication of the constitution,
but both he :end Chou stress Lhe same major points--the supremacy
of the party, t11P_ inevitability of future revolutions like the
cultural revolution, and the difficult. role of the cadre who must
be willing to sacrifice everything in opposing erroneous trends.
Wang delved deeper into the rights of the masses to supe:.~~~;;e the
party than did Chou, but he did so in explaining the addition
to the constir..ution of the warning that "it is absolutely
impermissible to :suppress criticism and to retaliate."
Approved For Release 199~OH1~Srx~lA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8
CONFID::NTIAL ~~87S TRENB3
6 SEPTEMBER 1973
The two major changes in the constitution are the omission of
the provision naming Lin as Mao's successor and a revised tr.eatmen.t
of Mao's thought, an instrument that had been used by Lin and
cultural revolution forces in the assault on the party. The
new constitution omits the claims that Mao's thought is Marxism-
Leninism of the present era and that he his brought Marxism-
Leninism to "a higher and completely new stage." Tn the political
report Cliou in effect explained this deflation of the Maoist
universalism that had had suct-. a disastrous effect on Peking's
foreign relations during the cultural revolution. After fixst
citing Mao himself as affirming that this is still the era of
imperialism, Chou quoted Stalin as saying "Leninism is Marxism
of the era of imperialism" and then drew the logical conclusion
that "the era has not changed" and that. "the fundamental principles
of Leninism are not outdated." Cl:ou added that these principles
remain "the theoretical basis guiding our thinking today," but
elsewhere in the report he paid due deference to Mao's personal
contributions. The new constitution posits "Marxism-Leninism-
Mao Tsetung Thought''' as the theoretical basis guiding tnr_ CCP's
thinking.
There are no provisions in the constitution for succession to the
party chairmanship, other than that a Central Committee plenum
elects the chairman. There is no mention of a secretariat, as
there had been in the constitution drawn up by the eighth congresb,
but "a number of necessary organs...shall be set up to attend to
the day-to-day c?~rk of the party." An identical provision appeared
in the 1969 constitution, but no secretariat emerged after the
ninth congress.
Chows claim that the political report given by Lin at the ninth
congress was a Mao document and not what Lin really preferred
was a necessary prelude to the denunciation of Lin; most of what
Lin said in the report is still applicable today. Chows economic
attack on Lin and Chen Po-ta, who was also denounced at the
congress, may relate to actual divergences over resource allocation,
but it was couched in almost precis~J?~ r:~e same terms used by
Lin in his attack on Liu Shao-chi for "grasping production" and
for stating that the question of whether capitalism or socialism
wins out "is already solved."
CONFIDEN'iTAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8
CONFIDENTIAL F~3IS TR);NDS
6 SEPTEMPER 1973
A principal tactic used in Cltou's report is to vilify Lin as
a Soviet agent, and in the course of doing so the report puts o:~
public record such details a;~ Lin's alleged attempt to assassinate
Mao and his death in a plane crash :Cn Mongolia while trying to
flee to the Soviet Union. In a notably evasive remark, Chou
begged off going into detail about the anti-Lin struggle, observing
that it is already well ki-own and "there is no need to dwell on
it here." Such a formula--almost a signal of sensitive and
contentious issues--has been used on at least two previous
occasions, by Lo Jui-ching in regard to Lin's strategy of people's
war in Sr.rtember 1965, and in the 1 July 1971 party anniversary
editorial in regard to the cultural revolution.
Chows caution fits with the gingerly way in which the congress
treated the Lin affair, particularly its implications for faders
other than those already purged. Thus Chou observed that the
Lin clique was "only a tiny group which was extremely isolated."
The congress communique, while announcing the expulsion from the
party of Lin and Cheri Po-ta, was unrevealing about the fate of
"the other principal members" of the Lin clique. The communique
merely noted that the congress supported unspecified decisions
and "all the corresponding measures" taken with regaru to these
unnamed figures.
Some of Chou's remarks, like those of Wang on the constitution,
were less than reassuring to wary cadres, who were warned that
"unhealthy tendencies" still exist and that "quite a few party
committees are engrossed in daily routine and minor matters,
paying no attention to major issues." If they do not change,
Chou warned, they will "inevitably step onto the road of
revisionism." This admonition, along with Wang's injunction
against "going in by the back door," may be aimed at the type
of error that has recently 'o~:en aired concerning educational
policy. The emphasis at the congress on individual cadre's
responsibility for standing firm against an erroneous tide may
be designed to extol those like the rusticated youth in Liaoning
who insisted. on a matter of principle in questioning how tYie
new college admissions policy was being implemented. His case
served as a national example during the precongress deliberations
in Ju?.y and August.
WAI'G HUNG-WEN Notwithstanding his cultural revolution origins,
Wang should feel quite comfortable in the upper
echelon at a time of party restoration. He appears to have made
the spectacular leap from factory worker in Shanghai's No. 17
Cotton Mill to second position next to Chou among the party vice
Approved For Release 1 ~~~~~I~,CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
6 SEPTEMBER 1973
chairmen by p.l.aying an active role in ending factionalism among
Shanghai student rebels in 1967 and then hitching his star to
early efforts to rebuild the party. As head of the Shanghai
Workers' Revolutionary General Headquarters, a workers group
organized to quell factional strife among feuding groups, Wang
played a major role in seeing that central directives calling
for an end to violent struggle were carried out in his home
base,
The Shanghai radio in August 1967, for example, ,raised Wang's
group for urging "misled" revolutionaries in a local shipyard to
forget their factional disputes and to adhere to Mao's correct
line. Leading members of Wang's organization blasted two rival
groups for "hoodwinking young people" and seeking "to stir
up a second chaos in the yard." Similarly, in a rally speech
that same month, Wang himself hit out at "bad elements" for
taking "to rumormongering and inciting" as a means to take
advantage of the masses. Wang charged these groups with
carrying out perverted forms of armed struggle
and attack against organizations and individuals
holding opinions which differ from theirs, causing
armed struggles...and embroiling themselves in
violence. 'Chis is incorrect and in contradiction
to the present general orientation of the struggle.
It is damaging to the effort to unite the majority
and isolate and attack the few.
Wang won a spot on the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee
in 1967 and was later elected a member of the new Central Committee
at tl-e ninth party congress, where he delivered a speech. In
June 1969, just two months after the party congress ended, Wang's
cotton mill became the first to establish a party committee at the
primary level in Shanghai. Editorials in the Shanghai press
praised the new committee for providing an inspiration to all
other units in Shanghai.
In recent years, Wang has moved rapidly *_o the top rungs of
Shanghai's power elite. He was ideni:ified as a vice chairman
of the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee in 1970 and emerged as
a secretary on Shanghai's new party committee in 1971. Since
the turn of the year, Wang has functioned as Shanghai's chief
when the Politburo duties of Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan
kept them in Peking. Under Wang's guidance, Shanghai became the
first province-level unit to establish a new Communist Youth
League (CYL) committee last February. The Shanghai model set
Approved For Release 1999/09~4~'I~~DP85T00875R000300060038-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
6 SEPTEMBER 1973
the pattern for rebuilding the CYL into a tightly disciplined
organization to funnel youthful energies toward gals set by the
central party apparatus. Wang's keynote address at the Shanghai
CYL congress firmly called upon party organizations at all levels
to stren3then their leadership over youth work. In April of this
year Wa~~g appeared in Shanghai, after one of his stays among the
upper reaches in Peking, as head of the reconFtructed Shanghai
Trade Union Council.
CNOU PORTRAYS GEOPOLITICAL SETTING OF TRIANGULAR RELATIONS
If the discussion of domestic affairs stressed continuities
between the ninth and tenth congresses, the treatment of foreign
affairs reflected the transformed triangular relationship and
Peking's trend in recent ~~ears toward geopolitical and diplomatic
approaches to foreign policy. Chows report to the congress
pressed the familiar line of forming "the broadest united front"
against the "hegemonism of the two :;uperpowers," but it did so
in a way that clearly sanctioned the moves toward Sicio-U.S.
detente in the interest of counterbalancing Soviet influence.
Chows report also served as an authoritative rebuttal of the
recent Soviet polemical offensive against Peking. Observing
that "the Brezhnev renegade clique" has recently "talked a lot
of nonsense" about Sino-Soviet relations, Chou retorted that
Moscow has been playing up to monopoly capitalists by accusing
Peking of apposing detente and refusing to improve Sino-Soviet
relations.
Chou notably sharpened the formula of great-power rivalry that
has served as the major premise of Peking's forei;n policy in
recent yaar:~. While noting that the superpowers "contend as well
as collude" with each other, Chou advanced a clear-cut formulation
of where the balance lies: "Their collusion serves the purpose
of more intensified contention. Contention is absolute and
protracted, whereas collusion is relati~le and tem?~orary." In
the late 1960s, at a time when Sino-U.S. relations were frozen
in hostility, Peking had stressed the convergence of interests
between the Soviet Union and the United States, even to the
point of accusing them of forming a military alliance against
China.
In the context of analyzing superpower cont.~ntion, Chou cited
Europe as "strategically?the key point" in their rivalry.
According to Chou's analysis, the West always seeks to divert
the Soviet "peril" toward China, and the Soviets frr their part
Approved For Release 1999~rt~t,E~RDP85T00875R000300060038-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
6 SEPTEP4BER 1973
are now feinting to the east while thrusting coward the west.
The 1 October 1972 PRC National Day editorial had said Moscoc?~
regarded Europe as the main area of its contention with the
United States, a:.d in the past year the Chinese have issued a
stream of reports contrived to question Moscow's detente posture
in Europe and to promote Western vigilance and concern.
Consistent with the emphasis on geopolitical considerations,
Chou all but ignored revoiutianary movements and armed struggles.
In contrast, Lin Piao's ninth congress report gave pride of place
to this subject in i.ts discussion of foreign affairs. Typifying
Peking's current approach, Chou's report hailed the awakening, of
the 'Third World as "a major event in contemporary international
relations," and Chinese efforts to cultivate West Europe and
Japan were reflected in Chou's reference to resentment in these
areas toward superpower dominance.
SING-SOVIET RELATIONS Chou's report pulled few punches in its
attack on the Soviets, likening Brezhnev
to Hitler and all but writing off any hope for an improvement in
Sino-Soviet relations. Chou recited a familiar litany of charges,
accusing the Kremlin of enforcing a fascist dictatorship at home
and practicing "social imperialism" across the globe. He reiterated
Peking's position that the dispute over "matters of principte"
should not hinder normalization of state relations on the basis
of peaceful coexistence, and that the border question should be
settled peacefully through negotiations "free from any threat"--a
formulation reflecting Peking's demand for a mutual troop withdrawal.
But that he made these points merely for the record seemed indicated
bq his sarcastic rhetorical question: "I?fust China give away
all the territory north of the Great Wall to the Soviet revisionists"
in order to demonstrate a willingness to improve Sino-Soviet
relation?
Chou made a passing ref erence to Soviet troops massed along the
Chinese border, but the most direct portrayal of a threat to
China's security came in the course of an appeal for vigilance
against "any war of aggression that imperialism may launch and
particularly againsc surprise attack on our country by Soviet
revisionist social imperialism."* The warning against surprise
* Wang's report on the constitution referred to surpris~ attack
by "imperialism and social imperialism," but this was presumably
a function of format rather than a reflectior. of divergent lines.
Wang's brief discussion of foreign affairs encapsulated the
references to both "any war' of aggression" and surprise attack.
Approved For Release 1999/OJP~v~~~~~'DP85T00875R000300060038-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8
CONrIllGN'I'IAL FBIS 'I'RL'NDS
6 SEP'1'LMBGR 1973
attack, which is r.ew, also appeared in the congress communique.
'Taken as a whole, however, the congress' discussion of foreign
affairs did not evoke a sense of imminent threat, and Chou's
report put a gloss un Mao's 20 May 1970 dictum on the danger of
n new world war by asserting that it is possible "to prevent
such a war."
SINO~'J.S. RELATIONS Chou's report contained a directly positive
assessment of the Sino-U.S. detente, In
the coarse of listing Peking's, successes in foreign affairs, Chou
observed that "Sino-U.S. relations have bEen improved to some
extent." The National Day editorial last October had said that
rresiden? Nlxon's visit to Peking had e.~ded two decades of
suspended relations and had opened the ~'~ur to friendly c~^.ta~ts
between tite peopl? of the two countries. The upturn j^. these
relations carp be measured against Lin's nir_t : congress report,
which had called the United States "the most ferocirus enemy"
of ttie world's reople and had criticized the President for
playing "counterrevolutionary dual tactics."
In a notable passage, Chou's report justified Peking's moves to
improve Sino-U.S. relations while denigrating Soviet-U.S. detente.
Distinguishing "necessary compromises between revolutionary
ruuntries and imperialist countries" from "collusion and compromise"
between Moscow and Washington, Chou cited Leninist scripture
for the observation that "there are compromises and compromises."
Ctiou Hammered his point home by invoking Lenin's conclusion of
the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and r,ntrasting it with "thp doings of
Khrushchev and B~ezhnev" as "betrayers of Lenin."
In another justification for Sino-U.S, ??etente, ('hou said the
United States has "openly admitted that it is increasingly on
the decline" and that it "could not but pull out of Vietnam."
This portrayal of receding U.S. power contrasted with Chou's
catalog of the "evil anu foul things" perpetrated by an
expansionist Soviet Union.
Chows report failed to repeat. the recent call for "peaceful
unification" of the motherland, but Peking's conciliatory approach
during the past year was reflected in Chou's appeal to compatriots
o,~t the mainland and in Taiwan to "strive together" to liberate
Taiwan and unify the country.
Approved For Release 19~~~~~~vTI~1A-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8
C~NFII)lN'1']^I., FBI5 '1'RtiNllS
6 SLP'11t1ELR 1973
IPIDOC~lIf~l~
i-WNOI MARKS NATIONAL nAY: DEFENSE MINISTER GIAP STILL ABSENT
North Vietnam ceJ.ebrated the 2 September DRV National Day with
tradltl.onal observances the preceding day: Hanoi leaders
~ittended a wreath-laying ceremony at a military cemetery, a grand
rally was held at 13a Dinh Square, and Prem~~er Pliam Van Dong hosted
an evening reception. The appearance of most Vietnam Workers Party
(V47P) Politburo members at these events, or at the 31 August
ceremony welcoming First Secretary Le Duan back from the USSR,
called attention to the continued unexplained absence of Defense
Plini.ster Vo Nguyen Giap, who has not appeared in public since
early July. lloang Van Hoan, the only other active Politburo member
who was not present on these occasions, is currently in Peking on
an undisclosed assignment. NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho, who was
in Hanoi on leis way to the nonalined conference in Algiers, also
participated in the major national day events and spoke at the
rally.
Hanoi did not hold its usual commemorative ceremony to mark the
anniversary of the death of Ho Chi Minh on 3 September 1969,
an event which previously had also prompted a turnout of the
Politburo, The omission of the :.eremony is consistent with thA
trend of diminished attention to this anniversary: Last year
1-Ianoi held the ceremony but did not continuF she previous two
years' practice of giving major press attention to the anniversary.
G~tAP ABSENCE Vo Nguyen Giap's failure to appear at national day
ceremonies, or at Politburo gatherings greeting
'.he return to Hanoi of Pham Van Dong ~n 17 August and Le Duan on
31 August, Further underscores the unusual nature of his recent
absence from public view. Since 1965, Giap on at leas; three
occasions made no public appearances over even longer periods,
but he had not missed a national day ceremony for more than 10 years.
During his most exte*-ded absence--from mid-November 1967 to
5 February 1968--he similarly failed to make a traditional appearance
at the time of the 22. December llR". army anni~?ersary.~ During this
earlier absence, Giap may well have been visiting somewhere outside
the DRV: A Moscow broadcast on c0 November 1967 reported that Giap
* Giap also was out of public view for periods of more than 50 days
from 5 May to 27 July 1972 and from 23 February to 1 Mriy 1968.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8
 Approved For Release 19~~~~~,~ t~~A-RDP85Tlq~$7,~~~~~0300060038-8
ti SI.P'1'LPidLll 1973
was among members o1 a URV delegat-.~on to October Revolution
anniversary celebrations which had departed frrm Moscow on an
unspecifLed date. however., he may not have a~c.,mpanied that
deiegatl.on back to the DRV, since an 18 Nov~..aber l,n :oi report
on the group's return did not list its members.
Giap's last, definJte public appearance was on 8 Jul; when he
was listed among those who saw the Le Dua~'I-Pham ~~an llong delegation
oEf to the Soviet Union. 'lhe fir. st tradil'lonal public function
which he missed was the 31. July PRC embasuy receptiol~ marking
Chinese Army llay. Although 1lanoi media in mia-July continued to
describe Clan's activities, they did not specify precise dates.
T',~us, Elanoi r~Idio on 17 July revealed that he chaired a "recent"
conference convened by the Standing Committee of the Central
Military Party Couaui.ttee. Again on 19 and 27 July Elanoi reported
that "on the occasion of wounded soldiers and fallen heroes' day,"
which falls on 27 July, Giap llad accompanied President Ton Duc Thang
on a visit to Army E(ospital 108 in Elanoi to see wounded and sick
armymen. 'Thu reports of the visit did not say when it occurred.
Appropriate messages from Giap have continued t~ appear since he
dropped from view: On 26 July Elanoi radio broac:cast a message
signed by Giap tc: Raul Castro on the anniversary of the Cuban
uprising; and on 6 August VNA transmitted Giap's con~'.olen:es on
Ulbricht's death. There has been no occasion for further Giap
messages since that date; he would next be expected to sign
messages on the Bulgarian and Hungarian army days, ?3 and 29
September respectively.
PRAM VAN DONG Pham Van Dong's traditional address to the
RALLY ADDRESS national day rally predictably lauded the
"great victory" achieved in the anti-U.S.
resistance war and pledged that the DRV and PRG would str{.ctly
respect and implement the Paris peace agreement. He routinely
accused the United States and Saigon of violating the Paris
accord; but, in line with EIanoi's current circumsrect comment, his
complaints against the United States were kept at a :pow key. He
decried U.S. "neocolonialism" in the South slid alleged that U.S.
reconnaissance planes had continued flights over the DRV and that
Washington was delaying ''concrete realization of its coms.itment"
to "healing the wounds ~f war and to postwar reconstruction of the
DRV." However, he did not specifically raise the question of
resuming the U.S.-DRV ,joint economic talks in Paris and did not
repeat complaints, voiced in a 6 August Foreign Ministry spokesman's
statement, about U.S. mine-clearing efforts. Dong charged both
Washington and Saigon with violating the provisions of the peace
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8
cc)rll~ 1 ur:N~r rn-, r(l;.s ~rlil;NUs
G 51;P'I'I:Miil;lt 1973
nF;rec~ments un Cambodia and Laos, an(I 1.1.NCCCI HCVCCL11 n.l.legecl
hl'h. v c~~.ations oil' the accord's provlHiot,s for a settlement l.n
South VLet:num. Ilowcwcr, in hls routine .:rlticl.sm of the
Snl.gon admLllstrati.on he d.ld not speclCically press C.or
j.~cceptancc cf the PRG's six-point- proposal for n poli.ticul
so.luticm Ln th~~ South.
Pham Van Uong's remarks nn Nort`~ Vietnamese military needs were
carelu.liy placed in the context of requirement~~ Cor deterese
and the preservation of peace--an npp.on^h which may have been
cal.culuted to app2rl to fot~c~ign allies anxious to avoid a
resumption of conf.l.ict i.n Vietnam. Uong linked ttie Vietnamese
struggle against the United States and Saigon with the defense
of the Paris agreement, and claimed that it net only aimed at
achieving the national rlghts of the Vietnamese but also
contributed to "tl~e maintenance and consolidation of peace in
this region and in the world." lle contended that the DRV's
defense preparedness was a significant factor in insuring the
implementati~~n of the Paris accord imd that the maintenance
of peace required the strerar.hening of the DRV armed forces
and defense potential, The premier offered a conventional pledge
of DRV support for tt~e South and reaffirmed the standard thesis
that the Nortli is "the firm base of the Nationwide revolution."
No North Viernameso commentator has echoed the mili.r_ant position,
pressed last month in articles under the pseudonym "Chien Thang"
{Victor), that the ^ommunist forces in South Vietnam are in a
position to resume military action and that the North has an
important role to p'ay in shifting the military balance in the
South.*
The premier paid routine tribute co the "wholehearted and extremely
valuable support and assistance by the Soviet Union, China, and
the other frateri:al s.:::ialist countries." He recalled that DRV
party-government delegations had already visited ~:everal communist
nations, in compliance with Ho's will, to expreGs ~~ratitude for
wartime assistance. The visits to communist nations would continue,
according to Dong, and "other friendly countries" would also receive
delegations. He did not repeat the strong pledge, voiced during
his tour of East Europe in July and August, that llanoi would
continue to endeavor to restore international communist unity.
however, he c'id raise the question of restoring unity when he
* The Chien Tlcang articles, published in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on
18 and 25 August, are discussed in the 29 August 1973 TRENDS,
pab~s 7-9.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8
 Approved For Release 199;9/~g,9~i~,5~,I~t~IIA-RDP85TQ0$7,~~~IOp300060038-8
G SP;I''I'F,MUI?It 1973
cooune~nted shot Yalnrt In the i~~ter~~~rt zonal movement In frc.~l.ldarlty
with Vletn+un "have inspired perslsLent efforts rtlrned at: restoring
and c:ont3ollclatln}~, w~lty rttnuny, the tntGrnatl.onul conunun.tr~t
nuwe-nent. n.; the bass I H cif Mnr. x I s.n-l,en In: em and prol rtnr. lan
intcrnationalLKm, In k.v~p1nN with reason and sentiment."
Don}~'s cliscu~rsion of thc~ North Vietnamese ecunc.nr.y seemF~d to
lr,clicate that Ilruwl. .is adherlnK to the generaa p,~th fc,r
rest.or:.-tLon and development which ~`rc pren~lcr had adva,tic.ec in
hl.s report ka the UI;V National. Assembly in i~ebruary t~.hia ,y~nr.
'['he i:ocus on neacetlme development which had been apparent in
February wus malntrrined in Uong's current address and wns
accentuated In some passages, including one which rec111ed Ilo Chi
~Ilnh's prophesy In his wall that after the defeat of t'ne United
States "we will rebuild our land ~:~~ tim.~s more beautiful."
Dons rr'viewed the tasks of diffe.r.ent sectors of the economy and
the progress made in several fields this year, clcritning the
"initial ;~storation" of the communications network and the
retuen to prewar levels of power capacity and outpu'c. He
:c:iterated his National Assembly call for the speedy rehabilitation
and development of the national economy on a large scale and far
the transition to large-scale socialist production in all branciZes,
"f!.rst of all in agriculture."
Expanding upon the inunedlate tasks he had enun .fisted in his
February repor. t , ~ I,~? t~r~~mier noted that from 1913 to 175 the DRV
should "basically comple~e the restoration of a developed North,
while pondering, gtudyi.ng, and determining the buildin~? .~f thn
material. and technical foundatio:~ of socialism according to the
Lung-term plan--L916-19ri1--in the following period.' The goals
for the first three postwar years and the apparent decision to
launch a f Lve-year pJ.an in 1976 may be contained in a VW:' CEnt:ral
C:ommt.ttee Politburo dir?cove which has been mentioned in propaganda
in the pant month, but has nut been released. A spePCh by 'JRV
trade union chief Eluang Quoc Viet, reported by Hanoi radio on
28 August, specifically noted that the Politb~iro directive had dealt
wJth the need to restore and deve]op Che economy in the 1973-1975
period, adding that an attempt would be made to raise production
to prewar levels by the end of 1975. Hanoi`s last five-year plan,
extending from 1961 through 1965, was ~_aunched at the Third VWP
Congress in September 1960; the war aborted DRV plans to launch a
new five-year plan in 1966.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8
CIUNI~ I I)I~;N'I' ICI, t~ 141:; 'I'RI~;"ll),;
(t 51~.i' I'1:1?l~tl