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September 6, 1973
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i >< '>}' GApproved FoT R leL 1 :'~CtIA R~~~00& aF ~ Ag~~l ~!/._ < ~( Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CI DF~8~T00875R0 0300 ~6 038-$ ~on~ic~ent~al FBIS~ TREND in Co~nr~unist Rropa~anda STATSPEC Con#idential 6 SEPT6~BER 1973 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000~b00~~b3~-8 36~ Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8 CONI{'II~I?JI~'I'IAIJ 'Chic propuJCuncla analysis report is bused exclusively on nutterinl cnrriecl iu forci~;u broaclcust and press utecli;t. It is published by F[3IS without coordin;ttion with other L1,5. Covr.rr ment components. STATSPEC NATIONAL SI~:CURITY INFOHM.ITIO~I Unac:fltorfxed disclosure sub;cct to rriminul sanctions Approved For Release 1999/~ABI~~IP85T00875R000300060038-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8 CONFIDENTrAL LBIS TRENDS 6 SEPTEMBER 1973 COfdTEfJTS CCP's Tenth Congress Sanctions Party Restoration Era. 1 Chou Portrays Geopolitical Setting of Triangular Relations. 8 Hanoi Plarks National Day; Defense Minister Giap S till Absent. 11 Peking Downgrades Observance of North Vietnamese Anniversary. 15 Anti-Sakharov Campaign Lifts Official Veil on His Views 17 Georgia Endorses Controversial Moldavian Kolkhoz Councils 19 Kissinger Appointment; Moscow on Disarmament. 20 Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics i Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8 CON)! IDLN'1IAL IBIS TRLNDS 6 SEPTEMBER 1973 CNIIJA CCP~S TENlI-1 CONGRESS SANCTIONS PARTY RESTORATION ERA 1'he CCI''s tenth congress held from 24 to 28 August, a milestone marking a party restoration era, formalized Lin Piao's downfall and certified a power structure in which Chou En-lai's part}?- oriente6 coalition occupies the commanding heights beneath only Mao Himself. 'I'lie congress also provided dramatic testimony to the intense animosity that a Chinese leadership headed by Mao and Chou harbors toward the Soviets. In addition to a denunciation of Lin's "antiparty clique"--for waning to capitulate to the Soviets, among other charges--the political report Chou delivered to the congress featured a bitter excoriation of the "Brezhnev reciegacie clique" and even warned explicitly against a Soviet surprise attack. On the surface the leadership certified by the congress might appear to be a balance of contending forces, moderate and radical, civLlian and military. But ir. fact the new constellation possesses a strong center of gravity, a convergence of vested interests in the patty as an institution that has been regaj:cing the hegemony destroyed during the cultural revolutio~.t and challenged in the Lin Piao affair. The meteoric rise of young Shanghai leader Wang ;lung-wen, wlio del.{vexed the report on the revised party constLtution, symbolizes these vested interests in the party. Wang's Shanghai Cotton Mill I~(o, 17 formed the first party cununittee (20 June 1969) to be rebuilt after the ninth congress in April that year put party reconstruction on the agenda. The parry leas also waxed quantitatively, the congress revealing a member.stiip figure of 28 million as comp,~red with the official Figure of 17 million before the de.:imations of the cultural revolut.iun. '1'lte teeth congress was unusual '~oth for its brevity and the absence of a prior announcement or preceding plenum. Mao's health--he presided at the congress but did clot speak, as he had at the ninth congress--and Psking's trend toward streamlining affairs may Dave been contributing factors, but the brevity of the proceedings may also reflect how those in charge viewed the business at hand. Borh Clcou and Wang in their reports were at pains to indicate an underlying continuity between the ninth congress and tl~e present. Thus the tenth congress has formally rectified rile deviation of Lin and his associates from the course 4lready charted at the ninth congress, and there was nu need to elaborate Approved For Release 199'~I?~~#!~c-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8 CONCTDLN'1'IAL I?BI5 TltLNDS 6 SEPTEMBER 1973 on policy lines. 'lice next step will be the convocation of- the .'National People's C~.~ngress, an event that was delayed by the Lin Plao affair but which Chou has now promised will come "soon." LEADERSHIP The composition of the new Politburo and Central Committee confirms Chou's ascendancy in the wake of the Lin affa r and litghlights Wang flung-wen's rise to the formal position of third-ranking member of a collective leadership under P1ao. It also registers the enhanced authority of aparty-centered coalition at the expense of professional military leaders and the two militant "radicals" whose interests were closely identified with the cultural arena during tl-e cultural revolution. Tlie first plenucu of the Tenth Central Committee, field on 30 August, revived the collective ln~titution of party vice chairmen, naming in apparent rank order Chou, Wang, ailing incumbent standing committee member Kang Sheng (folio may have been rswarded for loyalty during the Lin affair), party-military leader and close Chou asr~ociate Yeh Chien-yang, and Li Te-sheng, dead of the PLA General Political Department (GPD) wl:o has been elevated from Politburo alternate. Whether or not the rank order implies the line of succession i.s not indicated in the new Party constitution, in contrast to the previous constitution's imprudent designation of Lin as sole vice chairman and successor to Mao. With respect to party supremacy over the military, it is significant not only that the two mili.tar.y men among the vice chairmen are ranked behind the others but also that they represent party interests in the mili.t.ary: Yeh as the key figure in the party's Military Committee, and Lt as GPI) chief . '1'iie new standing committee includes, in add~tiott to Mao and alt party vice chairmen, Shangha.t chief Chang Chun-chiao and octogenarians Chu 'I'e and Tung Pi-wu, the later two having mainly honorary status. At this stage Chang's status seems perplexing, but he may be destined tc stand in the front rank of leader, as Party secretary general or, after the NPC, as chief of state or some other top title. 'Though there has been no reference to revival or a secretariat, Cliang served as secretary general of the congress. The secretary general of the eighth congress in 1956, 'l:eng Hsiao-ping, became party secretary general but not a vice chairman, a possible precedent for now. Should Chang not be awarde4 one of the top positions in the formal hierarch- but instead be upstaged by his former Shanghai protege, the stability of thF~ new leadership might be questionable with the addition of another significant source of dissatisfaction over. the current lineup. Approved For Release 19~~f~~~vr:~1A-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8 CONrTULN'CLAL b'L;IS TRRNDS ~~ SFPTGM131JR 1973 While al.l the Politburo members not purged with Lin have retained their posts and all active alternates have been promoted t~ full membership, some of the incumbents, notably Chiang Ching and Yao Wen-yuan, must surely he dissatisfied with their current status. They directed the cultural and ideological attacks that keynoted the cultural revolution, and Chiang in particular has lost ground by failir_g to make the standing committee after having previously ranked dust below standing committee members. The new list elevates additional leaders above her and Yap. Similarly, the two regional military leaders in the Politburo, Hsu Shih-yu and Cheng lisi-lien, have suffered a relative 1o~s i.n c~iew of the newly elevated leaders above them and the addition of other, nonmilitary provtncial leaders to full Politburo status. No new regional. military leaders were elected to the Politburo. Some of the promotions to the Politburo had been previously Gignaled in central leadership rankings: Wang Hung-wen, Hunan chief Huau Kuo-feng, and Pelting municipal chief Wu Te had been accorded positions in central leadership lists which implied future Politburo status. All are civilians, as are the other two new full members of the Politburo, Kwangsi chief Wei Kuo-ching anti leader of the model Tachai production brigade Chen Yung-kuei. Politburo :alternate members seem to have been selected with a view to rounding out representation from various groups: Wu Kuei-hsien From Shensi is a woman wlia was a full member of the ninth committee; Ni Ciiih-fu is a model worker; Su Chen-hua, former navy political commissar whose successor Li Tso-peng fell with Lin, seems to represent the rehabilitated cadres and is the only one to achieve Politburo status; and Saifudin, like Wei Kuo-ching, ~?.s a member of a national m3.nority. Unlike the other a~ternate members, Saifudin has a power base in his own right as Sinkiang party chief. CEV"fRAL COf~M1ITTEE Thouf;h the total number of Central Commitr_ee full and alterna*.e members rose from 294 to 319, nearly a third of. the Ninth Central Consnittee members was dropped from the new committee, mostl;~ military leaders who fell after i,in's demise or "revolutionary" leaders from the provinces. On the other. hand, the new Centra? Committee includes some 20 members of the Eighth Central Committee who were not retained at Ninth Congress in 1969. Two ~f the most prominent returnees, former Politburo members Tan Che-i-lin ar:d Ulanfu, made public appearances on 26 August cchile the congress was in session, and another former Politburo member elected to the Central Committee, Li Ching-ch~.ian, appeared publicly on 29 August. Other newly Approved For Release 1999~~~S~~li~~'-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8 C0:1FIDrNTIAL FBIS TRENDS 6 SEPTEMBER 1973 rehabi? .:led leaders elected full members include former member of the party secretariat Wang Chia~?lisiang, former Anh,aei chief L+. Pao--h~ia, former senior deputy chief of staff Chang Tsung-hsun, .end f.urmcr capital construction chief Ku Mu. Returnees elected C~~titral C~m~nittee alternates include Former minister of commerce Xao T-lin and former provincial first secretaries Yeh Fei, Chiang Wet-thing, and Chiang Hua. U.f. the 27 activr--_ provincial first secretaries, 23 were elected full members of the new Central Committee; the others were made alternates. As in the Ninth Central Committee, the leaders of ~;hina.'s two smallest provinces, Ningsia and Tibet, were not elected to Full membership. The other exceptions are Wang Chia-tao of. Heilungkiang, who was out of public view for nearly two years before reappearing in his province in, and Shansi first secretary Hsieh Cheng-hu3, who is overshadowed in his province by Tachai leader Chen Yung-kuei, now a full. member of the Politburo. NE;J CONSTITUTION, Chou En?-].ai's political. report and Wang POLITICAL REPORT Hung-we:i's report on the new party constitution represe~lt determined efforts to link present policies with the line adopted at the ninth congress, presenting the Lin Piao's group ais a. defeated minority even at the ninth congress. Both Chou and. Wang reaffi?~ned that "the political llr.e and organizational line of the ninth congress are correct," and Chou pointed out that thr: political report delivered by Lin at that congress was "drawl up under Chai.rma.z Mao's personal guidance." The thrust of both Chou's and Wang`s reports was thus tt-at business will be =ari~erl on largely as it has been fc~r the past tour years and that cadres need not expect line changes or detailed new programs. As Wang noted in his report on the party c~r~stitution, "there are not many changes in the articles" and these changes were drawn up according to "Chairman Mao's specific proposals." Wang's report is closely tied to an explication of the constitution, but both he :end Chou stress Lhe same major points--the supremacy of the party, t11P_ inevitability of future revolutions like the cultural revolution, and the difficult. role of the cadre who must be willing to sacrifice everything in opposing erroneous trends. Wang delved deeper into the rights of the masses to supe:.~~~;;e the party than did Chou, but he did so in explaining the addition to the constir..ution of the warning that "it is absolutely impermissible to :suppress criticism and to retaliate." Approved For Release 199~OH1~Srx~lA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8 CONFID::NTIAL ~~87S TRENB3 6 SEPTEMBER 1973 The two major changes in the constitution are the omission of the provision naming Lin as Mao's successor and a revised tr.eatmen.t of Mao's thought, an instrument that had been used by Lin and cultural revolution forces in the assault on the party. The new constitution omits the claims that Mao's thought is Marxism- Leninism of the present era and that he his brought Marxism- Leninism to "a higher and completely new stage." Tn the political report Cliou in effect explained this deflation of the Maoist universalism that had had suct-. a disastrous effect on Peking's foreign relations during the cultural revolution. After fixst citing Mao himself as affirming that this is still the era of imperialism, Chou quoted Stalin as saying "Leninism is Marxism of the era of imperialism" and then drew the logical conclusion that "the era has not changed" and that. "the fundamental principles of Leninism are not outdated." Cl:ou added that these principles remain "the theoretical basis guiding our thinking today," but elsewhere in the report he paid due deference to Mao's personal contributions. The new constitution posits "Marxism-Leninism- Mao Tsetung Thought''' as the theoretical basis guiding tnr_ CCP's thinking. There are no provisions in the constitution for succession to the party chairmanship, other than that a Central Committee plenum elects the chairman. There is no mention of a secretariat, as there had been in the constitution drawn up by the eighth congresb, but "a number of necessary organs...shall be set up to attend to the day-to-day c?~rk of the party." An identical provision appeared in the 1969 constitution, but no secretariat emerged after the ninth congress. Chows claim that the political report given by Lin at the ninth congress was a Mao document and not what Lin really preferred was a necessary prelude to the denunciation of Lin; most of what Lin said in the report is still applicable today. Chows economic attack on Lin and Chen Po-ta, who was also denounced at the congress, may relate to actual divergences over resource allocation, but it was couched in almost precis~J?~ r:~e same terms used by Lin in his attack on Liu Shao-chi for "grasping production" and for stating that the question of whether capitalism or socialism wins out "is already solved." CONFIDEN'iTAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8 CONFIDENTIAL F~3IS TR);NDS 6 SEPTEMPER 1973 A principal tactic used in Cltou's report is to vilify Lin as a Soviet agent, and in the course of doing so the report puts o:~ public record such details a;~ Lin's alleged attempt to assassinate Mao and his death in a plane crash :Cn Mongolia while trying to flee to the Soviet Union. In a notably evasive remark, Chou begged off going into detail about the anti-Lin struggle, observing that it is already well ki-own and "there is no need to dwell on it here." Such a formula--almost a signal of sensitive and contentious issues--has been used on at least two previous occasions, by Lo Jui-ching in regard to Lin's strategy of people's war in Sr.rtember 1965, and in the 1 July 1971 party anniversary editorial in regard to the cultural revolution. Chows caution fits with the gingerly way in which the congress treated the Lin affair, particularly its implications for faders other than those already purged. Thus Chou observed that the Lin clique was "only a tiny group which was extremely isolated." The congress communique, while announcing the expulsion from the party of Lin and Cheri Po-ta, was unrevealing about the fate of "the other principal members" of the Lin clique. The communique merely noted that the congress supported unspecified decisions and "all the corresponding measures" taken with regaru to these unnamed figures. Some of Chou's remarks, like those of Wang on the constitution, were less than reassuring to wary cadres, who were warned that "unhealthy tendencies" still exist and that "quite a few party committees are engrossed in daily routine and minor matters, paying no attention to major issues." If they do not change, Chou warned, they will "inevitably step onto the road of revisionism." This admonition, along with Wang's injunction against "going in by the back door," may be aimed at the type of error that has recently 'o~:en aired concerning educational policy. The emphasis at the congress on individual cadre's responsibility for standing firm against an erroneous tide may be designed to extol those like the rusticated youth in Liaoning who insisted. on a matter of principle in questioning how tYie new college admissions policy was being implemented. His case served as a national example during the precongress deliberations in Ju?.y and August. WAI'G HUNG-WEN Notwithstanding his cultural revolution origins, Wang should feel quite comfortable in the upper echelon at a time of party restoration. He appears to have made the spectacular leap from factory worker in Shanghai's No. 17 Cotton Mill to second position next to Chou among the party vice Approved For Release 1 ~~~~~I~,CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 6 SEPTEMBER 1973 chairmen by p.l.aying an active role in ending factionalism among Shanghai student rebels in 1967 and then hitching his star to early efforts to rebuild the party. As head of the Shanghai Workers' Revolutionary General Headquarters, a workers group organized to quell factional strife among feuding groups, Wang played a major role in seeing that central directives calling for an end to violent struggle were carried out in his home base, The Shanghai radio in August 1967, for example, ,raised Wang's group for urging "misled" revolutionaries in a local shipyard to forget their factional disputes and to adhere to Mao's correct line. Leading members of Wang's organization blasted two rival groups for "hoodwinking young people" and seeking "to stir up a second chaos in the yard." Similarly, in a rally speech that same month, Wang himself hit out at "bad elements" for taking "to rumormongering and inciting" as a means to take advantage of the masses. Wang charged these groups with carrying out perverted forms of armed struggle and attack against organizations and individuals holding opinions which differ from theirs, causing armed struggles...and embroiling themselves in violence. 'Chis is incorrect and in contradiction to the present general orientation of the struggle. It is damaging to the effort to unite the majority and isolate and attack the few. Wang won a spot on the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee in 1967 and was later elected a member of the new Central Committee at tl-e ninth party congress, where he delivered a speech. In June 1969, just two months after the party congress ended, Wang's cotton mill became the first to establish a party committee at the primary level in Shanghai. Editorials in the Shanghai press praised the new committee for providing an inspiration to all other units in Shanghai. In recent years, Wang has moved rapidly *_o the top rungs of Shanghai's power elite. He was ideni:ified as a vice chairman of the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee in 1970 and emerged as a secretary on Shanghai's new party committee in 1971. Since the turn of the year, Wang has functioned as Shanghai's chief when the Politburo duties of Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan kept them in Peking. Under Wang's guidance, Shanghai became the first province-level unit to establish a new Communist Youth League (CYL) committee last February. The Shanghai model set Approved For Release 1999/09~4~'I~~DP85T00875R000300060038-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 6 SEPTEMBER 1973 the pattern for rebuilding the CYL into a tightly disciplined organization to funnel youthful energies toward gals set by the central party apparatus. Wang's keynote address at the Shanghai CYL congress firmly called upon party organizations at all levels to stren3then their leadership over youth work. In April of this year Wa~~g appeared in Shanghai, after one of his stays among the upper reaches in Peking, as head of the reconFtructed Shanghai Trade Union Council. CNOU PORTRAYS GEOPOLITICAL SETTING OF TRIANGULAR RELATIONS If the discussion of domestic affairs stressed continuities between the ninth and tenth congresses, the treatment of foreign affairs reflected the transformed triangular relationship and Peking's trend in recent ~~ears toward geopolitical and diplomatic approaches to foreign policy. Chows report to the congress pressed the familiar line of forming "the broadest united front" against the "hegemonism of the two :;uperpowers," but it did so in a way that clearly sanctioned the moves toward Sicio-U.S. detente in the interest of counterbalancing Soviet influence. Chows report also served as an authoritative rebuttal of the recent Soviet polemical offensive against Peking. Observing that "the Brezhnev renegade clique" has recently "talked a lot of nonsense" about Sino-Soviet relations, Chou retorted that Moscow has been playing up to monopoly capitalists by accusing Peking of apposing detente and refusing to improve Sino-Soviet relations. Chou notably sharpened the formula of great-power rivalry that has served as the major premise of Peking's forei;n policy in recent yaar:~. While noting that the superpowers "contend as well as collude" with each other, Chou advanced a clear-cut formulation of where the balance lies: "Their collusion serves the purpose of more intensified contention. Contention is absolute and protracted, whereas collusion is relati~le and tem?~orary." In the late 1960s, at a time when Sino-U.S. relations were frozen in hostility, Peking had stressed the convergence of interests between the Soviet Union and the United States, even to the point of accusing them of forming a military alliance against China. In the context of analyzing superpower cont.~ntion, Chou cited Europe as "strategically?the key point" in their rivalry. According to Chou's analysis, the West always seeks to divert the Soviet "peril" toward China, and the Soviets frr their part Approved For Release 1999~rt~t,E~RDP85T00875R000300060038-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 6 SEPTEP4BER 1973 are now feinting to the east while thrusting coward the west. The 1 October 1972 PRC National Day editorial had said Moscoc?~ regarded Europe as the main area of its contention with the United States, a:.d in the past year the Chinese have issued a stream of reports contrived to question Moscow's detente posture in Europe and to promote Western vigilance and concern. Consistent with the emphasis on geopolitical considerations, Chou all but ignored revoiutianary movements and armed struggles. In contrast, Lin Piao's ninth congress report gave pride of place to this subject in i.ts discussion of foreign affairs. Typifying Peking's current approach, Chou's report hailed the awakening, of the 'Third World as "a major event in contemporary international relations," and Chinese efforts to cultivate West Europe and Japan were reflected in Chou's reference to resentment in these areas toward superpower dominance. SING-SOVIET RELATIONS Chou's report pulled few punches in its attack on the Soviets, likening Brezhnev to Hitler and all but writing off any hope for an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. Chou recited a familiar litany of charges, accusing the Kremlin of enforcing a fascist dictatorship at home and practicing "social imperialism" across the globe. He reiterated Peking's position that the dispute over "matters of principte" should not hinder normalization of state relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence, and that the border question should be settled peacefully through negotiations "free from any threat"--a formulation reflecting Peking's demand for a mutual troop withdrawal. But that he made these points merely for the record seemed indicated bq his sarcastic rhetorical question: "I?fust China give away all the territory north of the Great Wall to the Soviet revisionists" in order to demonstrate a willingness to improve Sino-Soviet relation? Chou made a passing ref erence to Soviet troops massed along the Chinese border, but the most direct portrayal of a threat to China's security came in the course of an appeal for vigilance against "any war of aggression that imperialism may launch and particularly againsc surprise attack on our country by Soviet revisionist social imperialism."* The warning against surprise * Wang's report on the constitution referred to surpris~ attack by "imperialism and social imperialism," but this was presumably a function of format rather than a reflectior. of divergent lines. Wang's brief discussion of foreign affairs encapsulated the references to both "any war' of aggression" and surprise attack. Approved For Release 1999/OJP~v~~~~~'DP85T00875R000300060038-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8 CONrIllGN'I'IAL FBIS 'I'RL'NDS 6 SEP'1'LMBGR 1973 attack, which is r.ew, also appeared in the congress communique. 'Taken as a whole, however, the congress' discussion of foreign affairs did not evoke a sense of imminent threat, and Chou's report put a gloss un Mao's 20 May 1970 dictum on the danger of n new world war by asserting that it is possible "to prevent such a war." SINO~'J.S. RELATIONS Chou's report contained a directly positive assessment of the Sino-U.S. detente, In the coarse of listing Peking's, successes in foreign affairs, Chou observed that "Sino-U.S. relations have bEen improved to some extent." The National Day editorial last October had said that rresiden? Nlxon's visit to Peking had e.~ded two decades of suspended relations and had opened the ~'~ur to friendly c~^.ta~ts between tite peopl? of the two countries. The upturn j^. these relations carp be measured against Lin's nir_t : congress report, which had called the United States "the most ferocirus enemy" of ttie world's reople and had criticized the President for playing "counterrevolutionary dual tactics." In a notable passage, Chou's report justified Peking's moves to improve Sino-U.S. relations while denigrating Soviet-U.S. detente. Distinguishing "necessary compromises between revolutionary ruuntries and imperialist countries" from "collusion and compromise" between Moscow and Washington, Chou cited Leninist scripture for the observation that "there are compromises and compromises." Ctiou Hammered his point home by invoking Lenin's conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and r,ntrasting it with "thp doings of Khrushchev and B~ezhnev" as "betrayers of Lenin." In another justification for Sino-U.S, ??etente, ('hou said the United States has "openly admitted that it is increasingly on the decline" and that it "could not but pull out of Vietnam." This portrayal of receding U.S. power contrasted with Chou's catalog of the "evil anu foul things" perpetrated by an expansionist Soviet Union. Chows report failed to repeat. the recent call for "peaceful unification" of the motherland, but Peking's conciliatory approach during the past year was reflected in Chou's appeal to compatriots o,~t the mainland and in Taiwan to "strive together" to liberate Taiwan and unify the country. Approved For Release 19~~~~~~vTI~1A-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8 C~NFII)lN'1']^I., FBI5 '1'RtiNllS 6 SLP'11t1ELR 1973 IPIDOC~lIf~l~ i-WNOI MARKS NATIONAL nAY: DEFENSE MINISTER GIAP STILL ABSENT North Vietnam ceJ.ebrated the 2 September DRV National Day with tradltl.onal observances the preceding day: Hanoi leaders ~ittended a wreath-laying ceremony at a military cemetery, a grand rally was held at 13a Dinh Square, and Prem~~er Pliam Van Dong hosted an evening reception. The appearance of most Vietnam Workers Party (V47P) Politburo members at these events, or at the 31 August ceremony welcoming First Secretary Le Duan back from the USSR, called attention to the continued unexplained absence of Defense Plini.ster Vo Nguyen Giap, who has not appeared in public since early July. lloang Van Hoan, the only other active Politburo member who was not present on these occasions, is currently in Peking on an undisclosed assignment. NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho, who was in Hanoi on leis way to the nonalined conference in Algiers, also participated in the major national day events and spoke at the rally. Hanoi did not hold its usual commemorative ceremony to mark the anniversary of the death of Ho Chi Minh on 3 September 1969, an event which previously had also prompted a turnout of the Politburo, The omission of the :.eremony is consistent with thA trend of diminished attention to this anniversary: Last year 1-Ianoi held the ceremony but did not continuF she previous two years' practice of giving major press attention to the anniversary. G~tAP ABSENCE Vo Nguyen Giap's failure to appear at national day ceremonies, or at Politburo gatherings greeting '.he return to Hanoi of Pham Van Dong ~n 17 August and Le Duan on 31 August, Further underscores the unusual nature of his recent absence from public view. Since 1965, Giap on at leas; three occasions made no public appearances over even longer periods, but he had not missed a national day ceremony for more than 10 years. During his most exte*-ded absence--from mid-November 1967 to 5 February 1968--he similarly failed to make a traditional appearance at the time of the 22. December llR". army anni~?ersary.~ During this earlier absence, Giap may well have been visiting somewhere outside the DRV: A Moscow broadcast on c0 November 1967 reported that Giap * Giap also was out of public view for periods of more than 50 days from 5 May to 27 July 1972 and from 23 February to 1 Mriy 1968. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8 Approved For Release 19~~~~~,~ t~~A-RDP85Tlq~$7,~~~~~0300060038-8 ti SI.P'1'LPidLll 1973 was among members o1 a URV delegat-.~on to October Revolution anniversary celebrations which had departed frrm Moscow on an unspecifLed date. however., he may not have a~c.,mpanied that deiegatl.on back to the DRV, since an 18 Nov~..aber l,n :oi report on the group's return did not list its members. Giap's last, definJte public appearance was on 8 Jul; when he was listed among those who saw the Le Dua~'I-Pham ~~an llong delegation oEf to the Soviet Union. 'lhe fir. st tradil'lonal public function which he missed was the 31. July PRC embasuy receptiol~ marking Chinese Army llay. Although 1lanoi media in mia-July continued to describe Clan's activities, they did not specify precise dates. T',~us, Elanoi r~Idio on 17 July revealed that he chaired a "recent" conference convened by the Standing Committee of the Central Military Party Couaui.ttee. Again on 19 and 27 July Elanoi reported that "on the occasion of wounded soldiers and fallen heroes' day," which falls on 27 July, Giap llad accompanied President Ton Duc Thang on a visit to Army E(ospital 108 in Elanoi to see wounded and sick armymen. 'Thu reports of the visit did not say when it occurred. Appropriate messages from Giap have continued t~ appear since he dropped from view: On 26 July Elanoi radio broac:cast a message signed by Giap tc: Raul Castro on the anniversary of the Cuban uprising; and on 6 August VNA transmitted Giap's con~'.olen:es on Ulbricht's death. There has been no occasion for further Giap messages since that date; he would next be expected to sign messages on the Bulgarian and Hungarian army days, ?3 and 29 September respectively. PRAM VAN DONG Pham Van Dong's traditional address to the RALLY ADDRESS national day rally predictably lauded the "great victory" achieved in the anti-U.S. resistance war and pledged that the DRV and PRG would str{.ctly respect and implement the Paris peace agreement. He routinely accused the United States and Saigon of violating the Paris accord; but, in line with EIanoi's current circumsrect comment, his complaints against the United States were kept at a :pow key. He decried U.S. "neocolonialism" in the South slid alleged that U.S. reconnaissance planes had continued flights over the DRV and that Washington was delaying ''concrete realization of its coms.itment" to "healing the wounds ~f war and to postwar reconstruction of the DRV." However, he did not specifically raise the question of resuming the U.S.-DRV ,joint economic talks in Paris and did not repeat complaints, voiced in a 6 August Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement, about U.S. mine-clearing efforts. Dong charged both Washington and Saigon with violating the provisions of the peace Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8 cc)rll~ 1 ur:N~r rn-, r(l;.s ~rlil;NUs G 51;P'I'I:Miil;lt 1973 nF;rec~ments un Cambodia and Laos, an(I 1.1.NCCCI HCVCCL11 n.l.legecl hl'h. v c~~.ations oil' the accord's provlHiot,s for a settlement l.n South VLet:num. Ilowcwcr, in hls routine of the Snl.gon admLllstrati.on he d.ld not speclCically press C.or j.~cceptancc cf the PRG's six-point- proposal for n poli.ticul so.luticm Ln th~~ South. Pham Van Uong's remarks nn Nort`~ Vietnamese military needs were carelu.liy placed in the context of requirement~~ Cor deterese and the preservation of peace--an npp.on^h which may have been cal.culuted to app2rl to fot~c~ign allies anxious to avoid a resumption of conf.l.ict i.n Vietnam. Uong linked ttie Vietnamese struggle against the United States and Saigon with the defense of the Paris agreement, and claimed that it net only aimed at achieving the national rlghts of the Vietnamese but also contributed to "tl~e maintenance and consolidation of peace in this region and in the world." lle contended that the DRV's defense preparedness was a significant factor in insuring the implementati~~n of the Paris accord imd that the maintenance of peace required the strerar.hening of the DRV armed forces and defense potential, The premier offered a conventional pledge of DRV support for tt~e South and reaffirmed the standard thesis that the Nortli is "the firm base of the Nationwide revolution." No North Viernameso commentator has echoed the mili.r_ant position, pressed last month in articles under the pseudonym "Chien Thang" {Victor), that the ^ommunist forces in South Vietnam are in a position to resume military action and that the North has an important role to p'ay in shifting the military balance in the South.* The premier paid routine tribute co the "wholehearted and extremely valuable support and assistance by the Soviet Union, China, and the other frateri:al s.:::ialist countries." He recalled that DRV party-government delegations had already visited ~:everal communist nations, in compliance with Ho's will, to expreGs ~~ratitude for wartime assistance. The visits to communist nations would continue, according to Dong, and "other friendly countries" would also receive delegations. He did not repeat the strong pledge, voiced during his tour of East Europe in July and August, that llanoi would continue to endeavor to restore international communist unity. however, he c'id raise the question of restoring unity when he * The Chien Tlcang articles, published in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 18 and 25 August, are discussed in the 29 August 1973 TRENDS, pab~s 7-9. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8 Approved For Release 199;9/~g,9~i~,5~,I~t~IIA-RDP85TQ0$7,~~~IOp300060038-8 G SP;I''I'F,MUI?It 1973 cooune~nted shot Yalnrt In the i~~ter~~~rt zonal movement In frc.~l.ldarlty with Vletn+un "have inspired perslsLent efforts rtlrned at: restoring and c:ont3ollclatln}~, w~lty rttnuny, the tntGrnatl.onul nuwe-nent. n.; the bass I H cif Mnr. x I s.n-l,en In: em and prol rtnr. lan intcrnationalLKm, In k.v~p1nN with reason and sentiment." Don}~'s cliscu~rsion of thc~ North Vietnamese seemF~d to lr,clicate that Ilruwl. .is adherlnK to the generaa p,~th fc,r rest.or:.-tLon and development which ~`rc pren~lcr had adva, in hl.s report ka the UI;V National. Assembly in i~ebruary t~.hia ,y~nr. '['he i:ocus on neacetlme development which had been apparent in February wus malntrrined in Uong's current address and wns accentuated In some passages, including one which rec111ed Ilo Chi ~Ilnh's prophesy In his wall that after the defeat of t'ne United States "we will rebuild our land ~:~~ tim.~s more beautiful." Dons rr'viewed the tasks of diffe.r.ent sectors of the economy and the progress made in several fields this year, clcritning the "initial ;~storation" of the communications network and the retuen to prewar levels of power capacity and outpu'c. He :c:iterated his National Assembly call for the speedy rehabilitation and development of the national economy on a large scale and far the transition to large-scale socialist production in all branciZes, "f!.rst of all in agriculture." Expanding upon the inunedlate tasks he had enun .fisted in his February repor. t , ~ I,~? t~r~~mier noted that from 1913 to 175 the DRV should "basically comple~e the restoration of a developed North, while pondering,, and determining the buildin~? .~f thn material. and technical foundatio:~ of socialism according to the Lung-term plan--L916-19ri1--in the following period.' The goals for the first three postwar years and the apparent decision to launch a f Lve-year in 1976 may be contained in a VW:' CEnt:ral C:ommt.ttee Politburo dir?cove which has been mentioned in propaganda in the pant month, but has nut been released. A spePCh by 'JRV trade union chief Eluang Quoc Viet, reported by Hanoi radio on 28 August, specifically noted that the Politb~iro directive had dealt wJth the need to restore and deve]op Che economy in the 1973-1975 period, adding that an attempt would be made to raise production to prewar levels by the end of 1975. Hanoi`s last five-year plan, extending from 1961 through 1965, was ~_aunched at the Third VWP Congress in September 1960; the war aborted DRV plans to launch a new five-year plan in 1966. Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-8 CIUNI~ I I)I~;N'I' ICI, t~ 141:; 'I'RI~;"ll),; (t 51~.i' I'1:1?l~tl