TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060041-4
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
C
Document Page Count: 
21
Document Creation Date: 
November 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 7, 1999
Sequence Number: 
41
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 26, 1973
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060041-4.pdf993.73 KB
Body: 
Approved ForRe4Aa?19f5 414-T008'(50 0 i j - Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060041-4 Confidential FBIS TRENDS in Communist Propaganda HIGHLIGHTS: Brezhnev on vino-Soviet Relations - page 1 Soviet Detente-Defense Dispute - page 3 Hanoi Concern Over Relations with Allies - page 9 STATSPEC Confidential 26 SEPTEMBER 1973 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R00 O0OSlb41Q4 39) Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060041-4 CONFIDENTIAL. This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried it, foreign broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components. STATSPEC NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized disclosure subject to criminal sanctions Approved For Release 1999D QP85T00875R000300060041-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060041-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 26 SEPTEMBER 1973 CONTENTS SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS Brezhnev Indicates Prospects for Reconciliation Remain Bleak. . 1 USSR Soviet Controversy Over Detente-Defense Issue Continues . . . . 3 EUROPE Moscow Takes Tougher Line Regarding Exchange Issue at CSCE. . . 5 INDOCHINA DRV, PRG Reject Allied Protests, Laud Strength of PRG Forces. 7 HOC TAP Urges DRV Independence, Proletarian Internationalism. 9 Lin Piao Exposed as Direct Target of Attacks on Confucius . . 12 College Entrance Exams Remain in Force Despite Controversy. . 13 Soviet Disarmament Proposal; Brezhnev Visit to Sofia; USSR-Chile Relations; Chiang Ching's Status . . . . . . . . . 15 Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . i Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060041-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060041-4 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 26 SEPTEMBER 1973 - 1 - S 1140-SOVIET R E L A T I ONS BREZHNEV INDICATES PROSPECTS FOR RECONCILIATION REMAIN BLEAK Brezhnev in his wide-ranging speech in Tashkent on 24 September clearly indicated that Moscow sees little, if any, chance of improving relations with Peking in the foreseeable future. This conclusion was conveyed by Brezhnev's pessimistic, almost plaintive discussion of the China problem and, more particularly, by his disclosure that the Soviet Union had in mid-June offered China another nonaggression pact which, in his words, "China did not even deign to answer." The recall of the chief Soviet negotiator in Peking in mid-July--a month after the abortive Soviet offer--and the subsequent escalation of Soviet polemics on China, under the authoritative pseudonym of "l. Aleksandrov,"" served to underscore the pessimistic judgment apparently reached in Moscow on relations with Peking. Brezhnev, providing the first official assessment of the 10th CCP Congress, found in its "shameless anti-Sovietism" justifica- tion for the view that the Chinese leaders are currently in an unreasoning mood. Though as before leaving, the door open for an improvement in relations--even, as the Chinese insist, on the basis of the peaceful coexistence formula reserved for the capitalist world--Brezhnev gave no indication that a favorable response from Peking was anticipated,. Indeed, he seemed more intent on placing the onus on the Chinese for the lack of progress in bilateral relations.. Although Brezhnev's remarks reflect Soviet resignation to Chinese hostility for the indefinite future as well as Soviet determination to isolate Peking politically from the rest of the socialist world, they also reveal the continuity in Moscow's approach to the China problem since March 1972, when Brezhnev first revealed that the Chinese had turned a cold shoulder to a series of Soviet initiatives.* In December 1972, at the USS'