TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060041-4
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
C
Document Page Count:
21
Document Creation Date:
November 9, 2016
Document Release Date:
April 7, 1999
Sequence Number:
41
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 26, 1973
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060041-4.pdf | 993.73 KB |
Body:
Approved ForRe4Aa?19f5 414-T008'(50 0
i j -
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060041-4
Confidential
FBIS
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
HIGHLIGHTS:
Brezhnev on vino-Soviet Relations - page 1
Soviet Detente-Defense Dispute - page 3
Hanoi Concern Over Relations with Allies - page 9
STATSPEC
Confidential
26 SEPTEMBER 1973
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R00 O0OSlb41Q4 39)
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060041-4
CONFIDENTIAL.
This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried it, foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
Approved For Release 1999D QP85T00875R000300060041-4
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060041-4
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
26 SEPTEMBER 1973
CONTENTS
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
Brezhnev Indicates Prospects for Reconciliation Remain Bleak. . 1
USSR
Soviet Controversy Over Detente-Defense Issue Continues . . . . 3
EUROPE
Moscow Takes Tougher Line Regarding Exchange Issue at CSCE. . . 5
INDOCHINA
DRV, PRG Reject Allied Protests, Laud Strength of PRG Forces. 7
HOC TAP Urges DRV Independence, Proletarian Internationalism. 9
Lin Piao Exposed as Direct Target of Attacks on Confucius . . 12
College Entrance Exams Remain in Force Despite Controversy. . 13
Soviet Disarmament Proposal; Brezhnev Visit to Sofia;
USSR-Chile Relations; Chiang Ching's Status . . . . . . . . . 15
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060041-4
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060041-4
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
26 SEPTEMBER 1973
- 1 -
S 1140-SOVIET R E L A T I ONS
BREZHNEV INDICATES PROSPECTS FOR RECONCILIATION REMAIN BLEAK
Brezhnev in his wide-ranging speech in Tashkent on 24 September
clearly indicated that Moscow sees little, if any, chance of
improving relations with Peking in the foreseeable future. This
conclusion was conveyed by Brezhnev's pessimistic, almost
plaintive discussion of the China problem and, more particularly,
by his disclosure that the Soviet Union had in mid-June offered
China another nonaggression pact which, in his words, "China did
not even deign to answer." The recall of the chief Soviet
negotiator in Peking in mid-July--a month after the abortive
Soviet offer--and the subsequent escalation of Soviet polemics
on China, under the authoritative pseudonym of "l. Aleksandrov,""
served to underscore the pessimistic judgment apparently reached
in Moscow on relations with Peking.
Brezhnev, providing the first official assessment of the 10th
CCP Congress, found in its "shameless anti-Sovietism" justifica-
tion for the view that the Chinese leaders are currently in an
unreasoning mood. Though as before leaving, the door open for an
improvement in relations--even, as the Chinese insist, on the
basis of the peaceful coexistence formula reserved for the
capitalist world--Brezhnev gave no indication that a favorable
response from Peking was anticipated,. Indeed, he seemed more
intent on placing the onus on the Chinese for the lack of
progress in bilateral relations..
Although Brezhnev's remarks reflect Soviet resignation to Chinese
hostility for the indefinite future as well as Soviet determination
to isolate Peking politically from the rest of the socialist world,
they also reveal the continuity in Moscow's approach to the China
problem since March 1972, when Brezhnev first revealed that the
Chinese had turned a cold shoulder to a series of Soviet
initiatives.* In December 1972, at the USS'