TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070049-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: November 27, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
Confidential
27 NOVEMBER ]974
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COWI1)ENT!AL
This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on nuiterial
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
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CONTENTS
U?S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
Vladivostok Summit Seen as Major Step Toward Arms Accord . , , , , , ?
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
1
Moscow Says PRC Offers No Basis for an Understanding . . , , ? , ? ?
KOREA
5
Pyongyang Condemns Ford "War Junket" to Sough Korea. . . . . . . . . .
ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE
7
USSR Hails PLO "Victory" at UNGA, Arafat Visit to Moscow
ROMANIAN PARTY CONGRESS
9
Ceausescu Remains Mindful of Moscow in Asserting Independence. . . . ,
PORTUGAL
12
Portuguese Communist Party Begins Program on Lisbon Radio. . . ?
VIETNAM
Hanoi, Front Denounce South Vietnam Antigovernment Leader
14
.
Soviet Support Pledged During Le Du
?
Th
S
?
15
. .
c
o
topover in Moscow. ,
Correction to Article on Le Duc Th
. . ? ?
D
17
o
eparture From Hanoi . . .
?
ASIAN SECURITY
17
Soviet Leaders, Commentators Promote Collective Security Plan. . . . ,
OAS CONFERENCE
18
USSR, Cuba See Quito Results as Defeat for U.S., OAS System. . . . .
USSR
KONMUNIST, PRAVDA Differ in Assessing Past Decade,
Y
20
3
2
evtushenko Attacks Censorship and Writers' Conformity
. . . . . . . .
NOTES
Kissinger in Peking; Pyongyang on DMZ Tunnel Incident;
R
i
25
5
eact
on to Tanaka Resignation; Peru Expels "Subversives". ,
27
APPENDIX
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- 1 -
U. S. -SOVIET RELAT I OPTS
VLADIVOSTOK SUMMIT SEEN AS MAJOR STEP TOWARD ARMS ACCORD
The agreement on the principles of a new accord to limit strategic
offensive weapons registered in the U.S.-Soviet Joint Statement
of 24 November has been the keynote of heavy Soviet publicity
devoted to the recently concluded Soviet-American summit at
Vladivostok. Although the publicity has been longer on atmnspherics
than on substance, it has clearly conveyed the impression'that the
decisions reached at Vladivostok have laid the basis for further
progress in the strategic arms limitation talks and imparted a
strong forward thrust to U.S.-Soviet relations generally.
PUBLICITY FOR SUMMIT Although President Ford's visit to
~~ Vladivostok was billed as a "working
meeting" and thus not due the full protocolary fanfare of the three
formal summits since May 1972, Soviet media have treated it as a
first-class international event. Press and radio coverage has
stressed the international significance of the meeting, and reports
of foreign reaction have been extensively replayed to foreign and
domestic audiences. Dramatic images of the bustle in the press
center have been liberally used to reinforce this impression of
international interest. Live coverage of the proceedings was
apparently restricted because of the time difference between
Vladivostok and Moscow, but Moscow radio and TV provided documentary
cover e of some of the events. PRAVDA and other central newspapers
carried front-page features on the summit from the 23d through the
25th, including a biography and portrait of President Ford in their
issues of the 23d.
SUBST,"NTIVE ISSUES It was apparent in the preliminary buildup
for Vladivostok that the issue of a new
agreement to supplement the May 1972 "interim agreement" on
strategic offensive weapons would be a main item on the agenda.
Since the issuance on the 24th of the joint statement, which
outlines the procedures and timetable to be follower: in reaching
a new accord, this success has been hailed as the main achievement
of the meeting.
A PRAVDA dispatch on the 25th described it as "important evidence
of the good will of both sides and of their sincere aspiration to
achieve the implementation of the objective they had set--to curb
the arms race and preclude the possibility of a military confronta-
tion between our countries." It went o- to predict that the new
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accord that had been projected would constitute "an important
turning point in limiting the arms race." IZVESTIYA on the
26th described it as an "essential step forward." It stressed
the importance of the role the two leaders had played in
reaching an agreement. They had been able, it said, to
"untie the knots that had developed at lower-level meetings."
Aside from this elliptical reference to earlier unresolved
issues, the media have largely ignored the technical aspects of
the agreement. There has been no reference to the issue of
American "forward-based systems"--the issue which the Soviets had
heretofore insisted was a major stumbling block to an accord.
Nor has there been any reference to the significance of the new
agreement in resolving the MIRV issue, a point that had been of
particular concern to the United States. Even the principles of
the new agreement announced in the joint statement have been
barely mentioned in Soviet media. What Moscow has stressed,
rather, is the political significance of the new agreement,
which it interprets a- indicating that a new chapter has been
opened in the SALT talks.
On other substantive issues the Soviet media have stuck rather
close to the points mentioned by Brezhnev in his speech at a
dinner for President Ford on the 24th. In addition to the
generalities about Soviet-American relations and strategic issues,
they included a particular stress on the need for cooperative
efforts to settle acute international problems, and the
desirability of increased trade to establish a "material base"
for detente.
GENERAL ASSESSMENT Monitored Soviet media as of 26 November
had not ventured beyond the framework of
authoritative statements to offer self-initiated comment on the
summit. The only general assessment to date is Brezhnev's brief
comment on the results of the summit in his speech in Ulan Bator
on the 26th. It contained two points of note: (1) a particularly
forceful expression of confidence in the prospects for successful
progress at SALT; and (2) a foreshortening of the time span agreed
on for reaching an accord on the limitation of strategic offensive
weapons. Whereas the joint statement had specified that this work
should be completed "in 1975," Brezhnev said that the agreement
provided that the negotiations should be completed "in the nearest
months."
Moscow has not yet commented on President Ford's briefing of
congressional leaders on the 26th detailing the specifics of the
arms limitation agreement. TASS has reported, however, that the
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briefing took place, and it has quoted congressional sources as
being highly pleased with the results. It has not mentioned
the speculation that has followed in th a U.S. pre,s concerning
the numerical. ceilin+cs that will purportedly be applied to the
delivery systems of both sides and to their MIRV vehicles.
EAST EUROPEAN Cautiously favorable assessments of th'
COMMUNIST REACTION Vladivostok summit by Moscow's orthodox
East European allies and Yugoslavi. viewed
the event as a fitting continuation of the two-year-long detente
process and an augury of good things to come in the personal
relationship between Brezhnev and President Ford. Most uniformly
singled out for praise was the two leaders' agreement on signing
a strategic arms limitation accord next year to cover the period
through 1985. Thus, a Prague radio talk on the 24th stressed that,
as distinct from. the previous Soviet-U.S. summit in Moscow last
June, the Vladivostok meeting "has brought forward concrete
fundamental principles" in the form of the 1975 "deadline" and the
January starting date for ronewed arms limitation talks. The
Belgrade radio on the 25th, in welcoming the summit's contribution
to detente, predicted at the same time that the signing of a
strategic arms agreement next year would be "a significant political
point" scored by President Ford in his campaign for reelection.
Another Yugoslav comment on the 24th also uniquely raised the issue
of China, citing Secretary Kissinger's trip to Peking immediately
after the summit as evidence that the United States was not
pursuing detente with Moscow at the PRC's expense.
In noting the mutual "good will" prevailing at the summit talks,
the East Berlin radio on the 25th cited remarks by the President
on his return to Washington to the effect that his Vladivostok visit
had been "the beginning of a productive personal relationship" with
the Soviet leader. In the only critical allusion to former President
Nixon by Moscow's East European allies, a Budapest radio commentator
the same day noted a public prediction by Secretary Kissinger of a
more cordial relationship between Brezhnev and President Ford than
had been possible with the allegedly more reticent "previous
American President."
As with the previous U.S.-Soviet summits, Romanian media have only
briefly reported the Vladivostok talks, without comment. The
Albanian party daily ZERI I POPULLIT on the 22d typically denounced
in advance the upcoming talks between "the chieftains of U.S.
imperialism and Soviet social imperialism."
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ASIAN COMMUNIST Mongolia, Moscow's closest Asian ally, also
MEDIA REACTION has hailed the results of the meeting,. A
25 November MONTSAME account of Brezhnev's
arrival in Ulan Bator from the Vladivostok conference expressed
the MPR's confidence that the talks would "help the cause of
international detente." A 26 November TASS account of Tsedenbal's
speech at the MPR's 50th anniversary celebrations that day quoted
him as saying the Vladivostok meeting was another "important step"
in improving Soviet-American relations and bringing about
international relaxation.
Peking has briefly reported the Vladivostok meeting, but has not
mentioned the U.S.-Soviet statement on arms control. NCNA on
24 November noted that President Ford had met Brezhnev in
Vladivostok on 23 and 24 November, citing U.S. and Soviet news
agencies.
The Vietnamese communist response to President Ford's trip to the
Soviet Union has been limited to a brief Hanoi radio report on
24 November, citing TASS, that the President had arrived in
Vladivostok on the 23d for summit talks with Brezhnev, and
another cr_ the 25th noting that the talks had conclude:l on the
24th and . join: communique signed concerning "relations between
the two countries, the questions of limiting strategic nuclear
weapons, the conference on European security and cooperation, and
a number of other international issues." The report of the 24th
also noted Ford's invitation to Brezhnev to visit the United States
in 1975.
Although monitored North Korean media have dealt with the Japan
and Korea visits, they have not yet specifically mentioned the
President's continuation of his journey Dn to Vladivostok, though
there have been some barbed comments obliquely alluding to the
U.S.-Soviet talks. A 24 November NODONG SINMUN editorial article
stated: "It is a delusion to expect the U.S. imperialists to
bring about peace, ant? begging the U.S. imperialists for peace is
as ridiculous as looking for fish is. a tree top."
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- 5 -
SINO - SOVIET RELATIONS
MOSCOW SAYS PRC MESSAGE OFFERS NO BASIS FOR AN UNDERSTANDING
In what appears to be a carefully orchestrated move, Moscow on
26 November broke its three week silence on the purportedly
new Chinese position on border negotiations, a position unveiled
in Peking's 6 November greetings message on the anniversary of
the October Revolution.* The Chinese stance was rejected in a
Soviet telegram, released on the 26th, replying to the Chinese
message and in remarks by Brezhnev in his speech in Ulan Bator
the same day. Without directly referring to the new PRC position,
Brezhnev said that "at first glance it would seem that the leaders
of the PRC also come out for normalizing relations," but he added:
"their words are divorced from their deeds."
The official Soviet reply, in the telegram from the Presidium of
the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers to their Chinese
counterparts, expressed "thanks" for the congratulations but noted
that talks must be held without any "preliminary conditions" and
'laimed that the Chinese proposal was merely a "repetition of the
former position of the leadership of the PRC." Brezhnev, speaking
on the 50th anniversary of the proclamation of the Mongolian
People's Republic, reiterated Soviet opposition to any preliminary
negotiations and recalled the Soviet offer to conclude nonaggression
and nonuse of force pacts on that basis. He termed the Chinese
demands for Soviet recognition of the existence of disputed areas
"unacceptable" and announced "we reject it."
Although the Soviets have dismissed the significance of thv Chinese
offer, Soviet media continue to show extraordinary sensitivity over
the issue--monitored Soviet media have still not mentioned the new
Chinese border stance to domestic audiences. The Soviet reply
telegram thus far has been transmitced only in TASS English. While
last year PRAVDA had published the full text of the Chinese greetings,
this year the paper did not, glossing over the passage dealing with
the border in report;ng the PRC greetings. The only Soviet media
mention of the border provision prior to 26 November was a 20 November
Moscow Radio Peace and Progress broadcast to Asia, which cited
world press comment playing down the significance of the message.
The initial Soviet disapproval had been communicated indirectly in
a recent series of reports by Moscow's allies that publicized
* The PRC message is discussed in the TRENDS of 13 November, page 3.
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refutation of the Chinese position by unnamed Soviet officials.*
Continuing to explicate the Soviet position, the GDR radio on
26 November linked the Soviet telegram and Brezhnev's speech as
a reaffirmation of Soviet readiness to negotiate, which it said
at the same time rejected the Chinese leadership's "intentions of
attaching strings."
BACKGROUND Peking's October anniversary message had claimed that
a "mutual understanding" reached at the September 1969
Chou-Kosygin meeting in Peking provided for mutual nonaggression and
nonuse of force as Hart of a preliminary package accord to be
reached before starting overall border negotiations. The message
claimed that the "understanding" linked the nonaggression and nonuse
of force provisions with the longstanding, Chinese demand that the
Soviets agree to withdraw forces from disputed areas along the
border. The Soviets have always rejected any such preconditions,
and Moscow has claimed that it initially offered Peking a draft
treaty on the nonuse of force on 15 January 1971 and a draft
nonaggression treaty on 14 June 1973, but was rebuffed on both
occasions.
The Chinese message marked the first PRC media claim that an
understanding had been reached during the Chou-Kosygin talks,
although the Hong Kong communist daily TA KUNG PAO in January 1970,
and subsequent Chinese remarks to Western newsmen--including Chou
En-lai's 26 October 1973 inter77i.ew with the New York TIMES--have
referred to a Chou-Kosygi.n agreement. Neither these reports nor
official Chinese statements had claimed that the agreement mentioned
nonaggression or nonuse of force.
* The bloc media response is discussed in the TRENDS of 20 November,
page 13.
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K 0 R E A
PYONGYANG CONDEMNS FORD "WAR JUNKET" TO SOUTH KOREA
North Korea harshly criticized President Ford's 22-23 November
visit to South Korea, characterizing it as an attempt to prop up
the government o ROK President Pak Chong-hui in order to retain
the South as a U.S. military base for aggression in Asia. A
23 November DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement, Pyongyang's
most authoritative comment on the visit, called the trip a "war
junket" which "fully disclosed the powder-reeking bellicose nature"
of the President and likened his offer of aid to Seoul to "jumping
with gasoline i.zto a blazing fire." Pyongyang media generally
stopped short, however, of portraying the visit as a pr;!lude to
a new Korean war.*
The Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement noted that in the U.S.-ROK
joint communique released in Seoul, President Ford pledged he "has no
plans" to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea, but it did not
specifically condemn that stand or call for such a withdrawal in the
name of the DPRK government. It also failed to note that the
Ford-Pak communique directly linked the question of troops to the
pledge of "prompt and effective assistance to repel armed attack"
against the ROK "in accordar,e with the Mutual Defense Treaty."
The DPRK spokesman's statement did quote the promise of "prompt and
effective assistance," but it inaccurately said that such assistance
would be forthcoming "in case war breaks out," rather than using the
communique's phrase "assistance to repel armed attack." Both the
spokesman's statement and a 24 November NODONG SINMUN editorial
article reviewing the visit and the communique fail^d to mention the
defense treaty, but a 21 November NODONG SINMUN editorial commenting
on the U.S. claim that its troops are in South Korea under that
treaty blasted the agreement, calling it "illegal" and "aggressive."
in reviewing the communique, the Foreign Ministry spokesman's
statement made no mention at all of current Korean issues before
the United Nations, thereby ignoring communique references to the
UN General Ass^mbly debate on the UN presence in the South. Other
North Korean reaction to the Ford visit, however, did raise the UN
issue, Editorials in NODONG SINMUN on 21 and 24 November and a
commentary in MINJU CHOSEN on the 22d all claimed the President's
* This theme had been heavily emphasized during President Johnson's
November 1966 visit to Korea.
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trip evidenced Washington's "predicament" in facing opposition to
its position in the United Nations on the Korean question. It
was not made clear, however, how the visit to Seoul could
improve the U.S. position at the United Nations.
Pyongyang pictured the President's stop in Japan as an effort to
strengthen a U.S.-Japan-ROK alliance and to facilitate Japanese
economic penetration of the Routh.
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ARAB- ISRAELI ISSUE
FBIS TRE'N)S
27 ?OVE:1BEi: 1974
USSR HAILS PLO "VICTORY" AT UNGA. ARAFAT VISIT TO MOSCOW
[chile continuing to express Soviet support for the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO), Moscow has dealt chiefly in
generalities in comment hailing the results of the 13-22 November
UNGA debate on the Palestine question as a "great victory" for
the PLO and in treating the current visit to Moscow of a PLO
delegation as proof of Soviet-Palestinian solidarity- Comment
on the 22 November UNGA resolution, which affirmed a series of
Palestinian rights and granted the PLO permanent UNGA observer
status, has avoided points of controversial interpretation, such
as the meaning of the term "Palestine" and its relation to
present-day Israel. Rather, in line with e::panded Soviet public
support of the PLO in recent months, Moscow has sought to depict
that organization as responsible and reasonable and has stressed
that the UNGA deliberations demonstrated broad international support
for the Palestinians' "just cause." Israeli policy has been
represented not only as being unreasonably opposed to any positive
changes on the Palestinian csestion but also as bent on maintaining
a state of dangerous tension in the Mideast.
Typifying much of the comment, Sovi.'t Middle Last expert and former
PRAVDA editor Igor Belyayev, on the 24 November Moscow radio
observers' roundtable, claimed the UNGA debate had successfully
initiated a "new stage" in the Palestinian movement and was a
"great achievement" for those who want a just Mideast settlement.
Belyayev denounced Israel's "negative position" toward the PLO
and toward "early renewal" of the Geneva conference as evidence
that Tel Aviv "is still an opponent of a truly political settlement."
Belyayev made no further connection between the Palestinian issue
and the Geneva conference, but other comment Sias continued to
press for speedy resumption of the conference with PLO participation,
A Timoshkin radio commentary on the 23d, for instance, declared
that the PLO should be represented at Geneva with "rights equal"
to the other participants. TASS in a dispatch from New York
on the 26th reported that the Arab League had called for early
resumption of the conference with the PLO attending "as an equal
side." TASS reported without comment an Arab official's statement
that the PLO, "in conformity with the UNGA resolution, is the only
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people at the Geneva
conference."
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BI E7_IHNEV REi'N\RI:S, Speaking in Ulan Bator on the 26th,
U.S.-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE en route home from the Vlac;ivostok
summit conference, Brezhnev again
stressed the importance of "earliest resumption" of the Geneva
conference, but he did not use the occasion to reiterate Soviet
support for Palestinian representation at Geneva. The U.S.-
Soviet joint communique on the 23-24 November Ford-Brezhnev talks
said only that the sides believed the Geneva conference should
play an important part in the establishment of a just and lasting
peace in the Middle East and should "resume its work as soon as
possible." The 3 July joint U.S.-Soviet communique on former
President Nixon's talks in Moscow had said that "the question of
other participants: from the Middle East" should be discussed "at
the conference."
The current communique, like that in July, called for a settlement
which should take into account the "legitimate interests" of
all peoples of the area, including the Palestinian people, and
respect for the right of all states in the area to independent
existence. In hts Ulan Bator speech Brezhnev repeated the
Soviet view of a settlemen? based on liberation of all Arab lands
occupied in 1967, realization of the Palestinians' right to
"create their own statehood, to self-determination," as well
as "reliable and authoritative guarantees" of the security and
independence of aJ'L countries in the conflict.
PLO DELEGATION In the light of Moscow's persistent urgings
IN MOSCOW for a renewed Geneva conference, the PLO
position on this issue is likely to be high on
the agenda during current talks between Soviet leaders and the
PLO delegation, led by Yasir `Arafat, now in Moscow. According
to the Beirut DAILY STAR on 22 November, the head of the PLO
delegation to the UNGA, Faruq al-Qaddumi, had said on the 21st
that the PLO would not go to Geneva on the basis of UN Security
Council resolutions 242 and 338, "since they ignore the national
rights of the Palestinians," but that any invitation would be
decided anon by the Palestine National Council (rLC'. Both
al-Qaddumi and the PNC chairman are members of the PLO delegation
now in Moscow. ^ Moscow commentary in Arabic on the 26th pegged to the
delegation's visit called it "perhaps the most representative
PLO delegation ever to go abroad," noting that it included 'Arafat,
PNC chairman al-Fahum, and "other leading figures" of the Palestinian
resistance movement.
Soviet media have already given the delegation more than the usual
publicity accorded to Palestinian visitors, but still with some
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restraint. Thus, TASS on the 25th, in reporting the delegation's
arrival, avoided any mention of the source of the invitation to
the Palestinians. Until the visit of a PLO delegation last
summer, such visits had been sponsored by the Afro-Asian Solidarity
Organization. The communique on the early August visit noted
'Arefat's talks with CPSU officials Ponomarev and Ulyanovskiy and
sad the PLO leader had also been received by First Deputy Foreign
MilLiscer Kuznetsov.
The present visit further upgrades the PLO's status: TASS on the
27th reported that the delegation met with Kosygin as well as
Ponomarev "in an atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding.
And, according to a prediction of the Beirut daily AN-PIAHAP, on the
22d, the visit may be marked by the first acknowledged meeting
between Brezhr.ev and 'Arafat. Soviet comment has noted that the
PLO delegation arrived in Moscow "under special circumstances"--
with the recent PLO diplomatic successes at the UN and, as a
Moscow radio broadcast on the 26th asserted, "frantic efforts
by the Israeli aggressors and their protectors to foil a Mideast
settlement." Possibly forecasting an announcement of increased
public support of the PLO, Moscow media have stressed that Soviet
support of the Palestinian cause will continue, and that the PLO
delegation visit "should be viewed in this light."
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ROMANIAN PARTY CONGRESS
FBIS TRENDS
27 NOVEMBER 1974
CEAUSESCU REMAINS MINDFUL OF MOSCOW IN ASSERTING INDEPENDENCE
Romanian Communist Party chief Ceausescu's 25 November opening
speech to the 11th party congress reasserted his decade-long
espousal of Romanian independence within the socialist camps
thus indicating his confidence that Moscow would continue to
tolerate, within limits, Romania's maverick position. Ceausescu
acknowledged those limits by calling for continued cooperation
within the Warsaw Pact and pledging to continue close relations
with Moscow, referring in particular to Romania's economic
dependence on the Soviet Union. Seemingly less defensive than
in his speech to the 10th congress in 1969, Ceausescu lowered
his tone of self self-justification for Romania's independent stance
and muted his criticism of the concept of a "guiding center" for
the communist movement, shifting instead to a more confident call
for a "new type of unity" among communist and socialist parties
and a "new international economic and political order" to close
the gap between rich and poor nations. Romanian self-justification
and criticism of monolithic communism, however, were amply present
in the first Party Program submitted to the congress for adoption.
Moscow's willingness to endure Ceausescu's utterances of independence
and criticism of Moscow's orthodox line was reflected in the level
of the delegation sent to the congress. CPSU Politburo member
Andrey Kirilenko, who led a delegation to the Yugoslav congress
earlier this year, headed the Soviet delegation to Bucharest, and
all other Pact members' delegations were headed by Politburo
members. In 1969, Moscow and the other Pacc members had sent only
Secretariat-level delegations to convey displeasure with Romania's
wayward position on a number of issues. Moscow made it clear,
however, that the upgrading of this year's delegation did not
signal any trend toward endorsement of Bucharest's party line,
stressing heavily in its CPSU greetings message, carried in
PRAVDA and broacast to Romania on the opening day of the congress,
the need for "unity and cohesion" of the communist movement as
well as "close coordination" in international affairs.
Ceausescu was careful in his remarks to pay due respect to the
Soviet Union, as he had in 1969, and he again took pains to
balance his remarks with like regard for the PRC, which as Belgrade's
TANJUG pointed out, maintained its policy of not attending congresses
of other communist parties. While praising Moscow's "very significant
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role" in initiating the current trend toward detente, Ceausescu
at the same time pointed out that the PRC's international role
"has also grown." And although he stressed "with great satisfaction"
the development of Romania's relations with the Soviet Union,
Ceausescu effusively noted "with great joy the ascending trend
of cooperation relations" with the PRC. While Ceausescu generally
balanced his pro-Moscow and pro-Peking remarks, he judiciously
underlined that in international exchanges and economic cooperation
the Soviet Union is Romania's "major partner" and acknowledged
Bucharest's "determination . . . to act with all resolution" to
continue developing relations with Moscow.
Ceausescu also gave a positive assessment of Romania's relations
with the orthodox regimes of East Europe, but h:s fulsome praise
singling out Yugoslav relations as "a model of cooo9 ration based
on fully equal rights between two socialist, neighborly and
friendly countries" implied criticism of other Pact countries'
dealings with Romania.
Predictably, Ceausescu's remarks reaffirmed his antipathy toward
supranational bodies; CEMA was not even mentioned. Although he
called for continued development of "cooperation" among the states
and armies of the Warsaw Pact "in view of the contemporary situation,"
Ceausescu linked that cooperation to the need to develop "each
national army" and the defense of "each people," as opposed to
developing a unified command structure. In line with his emphasis
on detente, Ceausescu reiterated his call for strengthening the
"political aspect" of the Pact and, unlike his 1969 speech,
eschewed any reference to U.S., NATO or imperialist "aggressiveness."
In a single reference to the United States, which in 1969 he had
heavily criticized--especially for its role in Vietnam, Ceausescu
described U.S.-Romanian relations as "greatly developed,"
particularly as a result of his summit talks, and stated that
"conditions exist" for continued development of "economic,
scientific-technical and cultural cooperation."
The congress has also served to focus attention on party acclaim
for Ceausescu's personal direction of foreign and domestic policies.
One proposal for his reelection as secretary general asked that he
be named to that post for life--ar, honor which he declined while
pledging "to serve the party and people as long as I am able under
good conditions."
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PORTUGAL
PORTUGUESE COMMUNIST PARTY BEGINS PROGRAM ON LISBON RADIO
A month after the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) clandestine
"Radio Free Portugal" announced a cessation of its broadcasting,
one of the Lisbon radio star;.c^s began a regular weekly feature
on the party. Radio Clube Portugues on 25 November carried an
announcement at 2105 Gil'l' (2205 local) following the hourly news
summary that "in the political hour today we are broadcasting
a program of the Portuguese Communist Party." Then after several
items on PCP activities both abroad and in Portugal, a closing
announcement at 2130 CMT said:
You have been listening to the voice of the
Portuguese Communist Party, a program broadcast
every Monday at 2200 hours (local time) by the
Lisbon mediumwave transmitter of Radio Clube
Portugues. The Portuguese Communist Party will
reply to your questions. Cooperate with us. Write
to the working center of the PCP, 26 Avenida Antonio
Serpa, Lisbon. Give us your views and opinions
of this program.
Radio Clube Portugues was commercially operated before the 25 April
military coup and reportedly was the first radio station to be
occupied during the coup.
Radio Free Portugal was first heard in March 1962 with Portuguese
language programs directed at Portugal, presumably transmitted
from Romania. The final days of this radio were devoted to the
textual broadcasting of the documents and speeches from the
20 October PCP 20th congress, the first legally held PCP congress
since 1926. Following the lengthy broadcasts of the congress
materials, the radio announced on a 26 October morning program that
it was closing down because of the ''new conditions created" by the
25 April coup. The radio observed that it was suspending operations
bet.~uise, as the PCP "has repeated" in its documents and through its
leaders, "once a truly democratic order was set up it would be the
first to respect the law and to demand that others also respect it."
After briefly reviewing its 12 years of struggle against "fascism"
and the colonial war, the radio concluded that its mission was now
"accomplished" and became silent. It has not been heard to transmit
any programs since the 26 October announcement.
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V I ETNAI
HANOI, FRONT DENOUNCE SOUTH VIETNAM ANTIGOVERNMENT LEADER
Hanoi and PRG media have publicly denounced Father Tran Iluu Thanh,
the leader of the People's Anticorrupti)n Movement (PACM) in South
Vietnam, for not advocating Thieu's ov rthrow and for including
Thieu and GVN Prime Minister Tran Th.i, ; Khiem in an advisory
guidance council which Thanh has pr .I 'sed establishing to set
government policy. The Catholic-or! nted PACM--along with other
antigovernment coalitions that havs sprung up since early September
in South Vietnam--has consistent]- received prominent publicity in
Vietnamese communist media for it-4 anti-Thieu activities. However,
Hanoi and PRG propaganda are not known to have identified Father
Thanh's role in the PACM prior to the current attacks on him,
instead referring to the leader of the movement in the past simply
as "a priest."
Commun46t dissatisfaction with Tran Huu Thanh was first noted in
a 20 November Liberation Radio broadcast commenting on the "urban
stri' gle" in the South and on remarks made by Thanh in a speech
on the 17th. According to the broadcast, Thanh "waved the
struggle banner in the opposite direction and checked the people's
advance" by fsiling to recognize the existence of two administrations
in the South and by not dealing with the role of the third force.
While conceding that Thanh had asked for implementation of the Paris
agreement, Liberation Radio apparently felt this was scant recompense
and decried his failure to demand the overthrow of Thieu as a stand
"completely contrary to the urban compatriots' desires."
A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary on the 21st, picking up on the same
theme, accused Thanh of being a "U.S. lackey" who is "sidetracking
the urbanites' struggle" and described Thanh's proposed advisory
council as a "maneuver" to protect and maintain Thieu. In an attempt
to disparage Thanh's motives and paint him as an agent of the United
States, the commentary claimed that he had been an "intimate" adviser
of former President Ngo Dinh Diem, that he had trained psywar
officers for the ARVN, and that he had "acclaimed" the large-scale
introduction of U.S. troops into Vietnam.
A 22 November NHAN DAN commentary repeated the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
charges, adding that Father Thanh had all along been attempting to
subvert the movements opposing the South Vietnamese government and
claiming that, "for months now, Father Tran Huu Thanh . . . has been
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actively interfering In other anti-Thieu movements." His proposals
made on the 17th, NHAN DAN said, :-iea3.ed his "true colors."
While the NHAN DAN commentary specifically named Father Thanh
as the PACM leader, Hanoi and Front propaganda have not yet been
noted criticizing the PACM itself.
While the communists' denunciation of Thanh represents their first
open break with a prominent antigovernment leader, their media
treatment of the movement has revealed a (lstrust for certain of
those involved since its inception in early September.* For
example, a 14 September NHAN DAN editorial on the demonstrations
in Hue on the 8th suggested that the United States was covertly
orchestrating the actions of the opposition, declaring: "The
United States is keeping a finger in the current anti-Thieu struggle
movement in the cities of South Vietnam in order to lead this move-
ment in a direction favorable to it, while at the same time readying
new horses. Supported by the CIA and other international reactionary
powers, a number of people are taking advantage of the current
situation to accumulate political capital."
In sharp contrast to the ambivalent stance marking their initial
treatment of Father Thanh, Fanoi and Front propaganda had responded
with an immediate negative reaction when South Vietnam labor leader
Tran Quoc Buu voiced criticism of the Thieu regime in remarks on
29 October. Liberation Radio on the 30th and a signed NHAN DAN
article on 1 November unequivocally labeled Buu a "U.S. lackey" in
the pay of the CIA and characterized his criticisms of Thieu as
nothing but a "new farce staged by the United States."
* For a discussion of -early communist reaction to antigovernment
demonstrations, see the TRENDS of 18 September 1974, page 2.
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SOVIET SUPPORT PLEDGED DURING LE DUC THO STOPOVER IN MOSCOW
The Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) delegation headed by Politburo
member Le Duc Tho and Secretariat member Xuan Thuy made a
20-25 November stopover in Moscow while en route to Paris for
a visit at the invitation of the French Communist Party. On
22 November the Vietnamese held talks with Politburo member
Suslov and Secretariat member Katushev. Hanoi reports did
not indicate the content of the discussions, but a 24 November
IZVESTIYA report on the meeting noted that the Soviet side
"highly assessed" the work of the VWP in building North Vietnam
and achieving peace, and stressed the Soviet intention to continue
rendering "comprehensive assistance and effective support." The
Saigon administration was "resolutely condemned" by the Soviets
for undermining the Paris peace agreement and frustrating
a political settlement, while typically the United States was
criticized only in a reference to "outside imperialist forces."
On his previous trip to Paris, in December 1973 to hold talks
with Secretary Kissinger, Le Duc Tho had met only with Katushev.
However, on his return from Paris, Tho held talks on 29 December
with Politburo members Suslov and Ponomarev, as well as with
Katushev.
The article in the 20 November 1974 TRENDS on the departure for
Paris of the North Vietnamese delegation led by Le Duc Tho, at
the end of the third paragraph in the report on officials who saw
off the delegation, erroneously identified Politburo member Le Thanh
Nghi as the DRV Foreign Minister. North Vietnamese Foreign Minister
Nguyen Duy Trinh was not present at the departure.
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ASIAN SECURITY
SOVIET LEADERS, COMMENTATORS PROMOTE COLLECTIVE SECURITY PLAN
Soviet leaders utilized the recent visits to Moscow by Sri Lanka
Prime Minister Bandaranaike and Iranian Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi
to press the 1969 Soviet proposal for an Asian collective security
system. This question was also referred to by Brezhnev, in his
26 November Ulaan Bataar address commemorating Mongolian National
Day, in which he drew attention to the "quests of many states"
for security in Aria and the need for "practical steps" to achieve
Asian security through collective efforts. In addition, Soviet
media have portrayed a conference on establishing a zone of peace
in the Indian Ocean, held in New Delhi on 14-16 November, as an
indication that the collective security proposal was gaining wider
public acceptance.
Soviet Premier Kosygin and President Podgornyy advocated Asian
collective security in speeches given, respectively, at banquets
on the 11th for the Sri Lanka Prime Minister and on the 18th for
the Shah of Iran. Kosygin noted that the Soviet Union viewed
"with respect" the "political initiatives" of Asian countries,
such as proposals for a zone of peace. in the Indian Ocean and the
neutralization of Southeast Asia, and urged that all Asian states
contribute to securing collective security in Asia. Prime Minister
Bandaranaike made no mention of Asian security in her speech and
continued to withhold endorsement of the Soviet collective security
concept in the final communique on her visit. The 17 November joint
communique noted that the Sri Lanka side outlined its view on the
Indian Ocean peace zone proposal and that the Soviet side "supported
the idea."
Podgornyy's reiteration of the collective security proposal at the
banquet for the Shah drew no Iranian endorsement, although Iran
previously had explicitly stated intention to help realize a system
of Asian collective security, in joint Soviet-Iranian communiques on
Kosygin's March 1973 visit to Teheran and Iranian Prime Minister
Hoveyda's August 1973 trip to Moscow. The joint statement on the
current visit noted only that "particular attention was paid to the
advisability of intensifying efforts to set up an Asian security
system based on joint efforts of all Asian states"--a general
reference resembling the language of the joint communique on the
Shah's last visit to Moscow in October 1972.
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Soviet propaganda coverage of the New Delhi "international conference
for liquidation of foreign military bases in the ;-.:dian Ocean and
for turning it into a zone of peace" related the "zone of peace"
proposal to the Soviet collective security plan, obscuring the
differences between the two ideas. Moscow radio commentator
Antonov, in a 12 November broadcast to South Asia, asserted that
the South Asian "public" was "linking the setting " of such a
zone with the idea of insuring security in Asia on a collective
basis." PRAVDA correspondent Skalkin, in a 21 November article,
commented that the Sri Lanka proposal for a zone of peace and
the Malaysian scheme for neutralization of Southeast Asia confirm
the "pertinence and timeliness" of the Soviet proposal for ensuring
security in Southeast Asia by collective efforts. Soviet press
reports on the conference publicized the arrival of a U.S. Navy
task force in the Indian Ocean and quoted Indian External Affairs
Minister Chavan as saying "the Soviet Union has no military bases
in the Indian Ocean." The Delhi ISI's apparent text of Chavan's
14 November speech at the conference included no such reference
to Soviet bases, but reiterated Indian "anxiety" over the American
base at Diego Garcia and the possibility that it might increase
"great power rivalry" in the Indian Ocean basin.
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OAS CONFERENCE
USSR, CUBA SEE QUITO RESULTS AS DEFEAT FOR U,S,, OAS SYSTEM
Following the failure of the OAS foreign ministers' meeting in
Quito on 8-12 November to lift the sanctions imposed against Cuba
10 years ago, Moscow has called the conference a "self-exposure"
of the enemies of detente and a defeat for the United States and
the inter-American defense system maintained through the Rio Pact.
Havana, which usually disclaims interest in OAS policies, has been
slow to comment directly on the conference and instead has empha-
sized the growing opportunities for bilateral relations. In
his only speech since the Quito meeting, Castro on 22 November
remarked in passing that Cuba might "some day" establish diplomatic
relations with the United States, but he made no mention of the
OAS. Other than Cuban reportage on the meeting, the OAS conference
has been dealt with in only two "Letter from Freddy" features on
Havana's domestic service, one of which predicted that "the 'Cuba
problem' will not ba resolved in the OAS . . . but rather in the
U.S. Senate."
MOSCOW COMMENT Since 22 August, when Panama re-established
diplomatic relations with Cuba and precipitated
the move toward an OAS review of the 1964 sanctions that drew a
cordon sanitaire around Cuba, Moscow has maintained a steady campaign
in favor of ending the sanctions and normalizing relations between
Cuba and other Western Hemisphere nations, especially the United
States. The re-integration of Cuba into the Americas has been
described as an inevitable outgrowth of detente and of the failure
of "U.S. imperialist circles" to "suffocate" Cuba with an economic
blockade and diplomatic boycott. Thus, in his 6 November Kremlin
speech, Foreign Minister Gromyko declared that "We are confident
that, just as the imperialist policy of nonrecognition of the GDR.
has failed, so will fail the blockade of another socialist country,
fraternal Cuba."
PRAVDA commentator Geyvandov had observed on 26 September that the
isolation of Cuba was an "anachronism," a "vestige of the cold
war" in an age of "irrepressibly growing dasire" for independent
policies in Latin America. While thus appealing to Latins' sensitiv-
ities by reminding them that "U.S. diktat" should not govern the
hemisphere, Moscow at the same time, with an eye to the United States
and the countries which generally follow the U.S. lead, portrayed
Castro as a reasonable leader who had established extensive ties
with capitalist countries and who was "ready to start talks" with
the United States.
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Since the Qu:it(-, conference 1r co '),Is Claim' d that, although the
pro-Cuba resolution had been defeated by the 'outmoded procedure"
of the OAS and the "intensive psychological struggle" waged by
the Unit-1 States, the conference outcome was nevertheless a
victory for. "ideological pluralism" in the hemisphere because
the majority had supported the :-csolut:Lon. PRAVDA's Listov
commented on the 14th that the conference represented the end
of the United States' "complete sway" in the organization
and a "landmark signifying the defeat''' of supporters of the
blockade. In the 17 November Moscow radio observers' roundtable,
IIVESTIYA's Mikhaylov agreed that the United States had "suffered
a defeat in Quito" because most Latin countries had proved their
unwillingness to "follow in Washington' footsteps.'' lfikhaylov
added that a "Fresh wind" was blowing in Latin America and that
the "spirit of detente" could be detected in the region.
HAVAII/\ TREATMENT In the months proceeding the foreign ,ministers'
meeting, llavana media attempted to maintain a
balance between Castro's stated commitment to Marxist principles
and third world solidarity and the image--?-developed in the last
few years--of the Cuban regime as mature and willing to deal with,
rather than subvert, noncommunist governments that followed ''anti--
imperialist" policies. Thus Cuba praised the "progressive" regimes
of such noncommunist states as Peru and Panama in recent months, while
at the same time Castro strongly reaffirmed his Marxism-Leninism
and castigated the "illegal., dirty and criminal" U.S. policies in
attempting to control events in Chile, Cuba and other third world
nations. The OAS has generally been branded a "bastard daughter
of imperialism" and unworthy of Cuba's concern, but ?,astro has
not always concealed an interest in OAS policies. In an interview
published in L'IiUMAIdITE on 24 October, for example, the Cuban
premier admitted that the OAS blockade "has in fact caused us
great harm" and, without mentioning Quito, predicted that "the
Latin American countries are going to end Cuba's isolation within
the OAS itself."
Castro made no reference to the OAS in his 22 November address to
the Revolutionary Armed Forces, in which he promised that "our
defense will never depend on uhe good faith of the imperialists"
even if diplomatic relations should "some day" be restored with
the United States. The most open Cuban comments on the conference
results are found, not unexpectedly, in two "Letter from Freddy"
features, broadcast by Havana on 20 and 26 November. In his first
letter Freddy wrote that Cuba was unconcerned with the official
actions taken in Quito, but encouraged by the fact that "the more
worthy countries alined with Cuba." Freddy stated flatly that
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"they can keep their OAS" because Cuba was interested
only in the prospects of forming an all-Latin organization.
Freddy's second letter indicated that the U.S. Senate might be
forced to take the lead in solving the "Cuba problem" because
of the U.S. need for Cuban sugar and Venezuelan oil. Freddy
noted that "those who sought to break the world and pollute
the atmosphere hurt themselves," and he predicted that the U.S.
need for "black gold and white gold" might now determine U.S.
policy toward Cuba.
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l
27 i::iVl:itlil:R :1974
USS
A November I:OHMUNIS7: editorial reviewing the decade s:inr_ the
October 1964 plenwii which put Brezhnev and Kosvgi.n in power has
deviated sharply from PRAVDA and other central newspapers in
characterizing the achievements of the era. Whereas PRAVDA and
the others had downplayed the ach:i.eveme.nts associated with Kosygin
and stressed the ach:i.evenlents associated with Brezhnev, KOhiDlJN'S'i
did just the opposite. It stressed the role of collectivity in
the leadership, the 1965 economic reform, tile importance of a
"scientili.c," rattier than a "party," approach to running the
ecolloilly, and so on. J t may be relevant to note that V.G. Afanasyev,
a prolific writer oil the themes of scientifi.c management of the
economy and the economic reform, was recently named chief editor
o t KUi'INUi\ S'l .
PRO-BREZHNEV ARTICLES The observance of the anniversary of the
October. 1964 plenum had been initiated
by PRAVDA with a long 13 October editorial article bearing a sharp
pro-Brezhnev slant. It cited Brezhnev as heading the Politburo,
barely mentioned the fact that the principle of collectivity was
r.restablislled by Lhe October 1964 plenum, and stressed the :larch 1965
lcenum and its agricultural reforms, which are associated with
,._ ;:loft ~? h i le Ccotal ly ignoring the Sept ember 196'. plenum and tic'
economic reform associated with Kosygin.-,':
Phr''V1hA's St, 'l was treated as anthnr-i tative, being reprinted
ill most republic papers. A few other ne~~spapecs--I VI:S'1IVA, SC~VII:'1'
RUSSIA and RURAL LIFE:--carried their own articles, but they followed
PRAVDA's pro-Bi-ezhnev slant. IZVES'l'IYA's 1.5 October editorial
appeared to be written from the same outline as PRAVDA's, repeating
all major points, except for the identification of Brezhnev as head
of the Politburo. Tlie. 14 October SOVIET RUSSIA article, written by
Ryazan First Secretary N.S. Priyezzhev, was even closer to the
PRAVDA model, since it did include the Brezhnev identification along
with all. the other points The anniversary article in the 15 October
RURAL LIFE, written by conservative V. Stepanov, also followed the
PI,AVDA model in playing up the March 1965 agricultural reforms anti
in downgrading the September 1965 economic reform. The March plenum
got a 32-line paragraph; the September plenum one brief sentence,
with no mention of its having enacted a reform. The RURAL LIFE
* See the TRENDS of 17 October. 1974, page 6.
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27 NOVEMBER 1974
article did, however, mention the restoration of collectivity
by the October 1964 plenum, and it did not identify Brezhnev
as head of the Politburo.
Stepanov also wrote PARTY LIFE's article on the October 1964
anniversary, closely following the pattern of his RURAL LIFE
article. As chief editor of KOMMUNIST in May 1965, Stepanov had
attacked the stress on material needs and incentives, at a time
when Kosygin was developing his economic reform proposals. Stepanov
was demoted j_n December 1965 from chief editor to member of
KOtll'1UNIST's editorial board, a post he still holds.
KOMMUNIST EDITORIAL In contrast to the preceding at..icles, the
KOMMUNIST ediLorial stressed collectivity in
leadership and scientific management of the economy. Although it
acknowledged Brezhnev's primacy by including the Politburo "headed
by" Brezhnev formula, it discussed collectivity in detail and stressed
that it applied at all levels. Its main concentration, however, wac
on a?theme which seemed to challenge Brezhnev's drive for more par'
control over the economy. It stressed the idea that economic decisions
must be made on strictly scit.itific bases, by economic specialists.
It cited Lenin's warning against economically untrained leaders who
think they can substitute zeal for economic knowledge and "dilettantes"
who seek to solve all problems by "communist decree-mongering." It
stressed the importance of specialists, stating that it is "mainly
specialists, with the proper training, who are filling the ranks of
our lead-ng cadres
The article praised the September 1965 plenum decisions for asserting
a "scientific approach to leadership of industry" and declared that
the economic reform had been adopted only after long experiments and
careful study of results. Apparently reflecting the present debate
over a new reorganization of the economic mechanism, it argued that
it is "extremely important" to base any changes in the administrative
structure on the rceulLa of experimentation and conclusions of modern
management science. Implicitly acknowledging the political sensitivities
of this argument, the articles. went on to try to square it with Brezhnev's
known positions on the "party style" of economic management. It said:
"Of course, the introduction of scientific principles and methods in
planned administration of the socialist economy does not mean giving it
features of organizational autonomy or apolitical technocratism; state
administration of the economy fully retains a political, party character."
Brezhnev had attacked "technocratism" at the December 1973 plenum and
had called for reasserting a "party approach" throughout the economy.
The editorial also took up Brezhnev's call for a "party style," but
it defined this innocuously as the showing of initiative, a sense
of responsibility, and intolerance toward shortcomings.
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A flint of political independence had also appeared in the preceding
issue of KOPlhlJN1.S'1. In an editorial review of a newly published
collection of Kosygin speeches, the jo,.rral declared that "attempts
at self-isolation by any state. and the ignoring of other countries'
achievements in science and culture turn into failures in economics,
impoverishment of spiritual life, and loss of a feeling of reality
in politics."
YEVTUSHENi