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T E e.... /09: ......85T00875,03.30,100,-5 tiVOYE,NNA.YA.? . NO 11 111 1,9 6 6 FDD 111ANS1 NO Approved For Rele PY FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION TRANSLATI ON Nurdrier 953 8 March 1966 SEIECTZD TRANSLICIONS nom "WriENNIVA MIMI,' NO 11, 1965 077ICE Or CENTRAL REFERENCE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 2430 E Street N. W. Approved For Release 200010mscgqlektRle85T00875R000300090010-5 pprove ore ease SELECTED TRANSLATIONS FRCH VOYENNAYA MYSLy, Issue No 11, November 1D-65 TABLE OF CONTENTS The Construction and Use of Nomograms for Operational-Tactical Computations On the Nature of Armed Sruggle in Local Wars On the Question of the In Nuclear Warfare On the Moral Forces of Modern Warfare The Unity of Legal and the MEM USSR Armed Notes on Source Role of Economics Soviet Troops in Moral Standards in Forces 12 25 50 :nyennaya Mysl (Military Thought) is a month*y organ of the USSR Ministry of Defense, printed by the ministry's Military Publishing Rouse, Moscow. The articles translated herein are from Issue No 11, NoveMber 1965 which was signed for the press 27 October 1965. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090010-5 pprove or e ease THE CONSTRUCTION AND USE OF NOMOGRAMS FOR OPERATIONAL-TACTICAL COMPUTATIONS by Col V. RYABCHUK CPYRGHT On the pages of the magazine Voyennaya Mysli (Military Thought) there are a number of articles on the theory of analysis of operations. The dis- cussion permitted a clarification of the points o4.' view on the subject) con- tent and problems of this theory, a convergence to a certain degree of the various opinions, end a development of the overall views on the bases of this now and burgeoning ellience. In regard to the ever growing use of mathematical methods of analysis of operations it is reasonable to devote more attention to the specific forms cif their use in the practical work of commanders and their staffs. The increase in quantity and complexity of operational-tactical com- putations has required that electronic computing and keyboard calculating machines and other complex computing equipment be placed in the hands of the troops. With this equipment it has become possible to us o mathematical meth- ods in analyzing military operations in order to obtain quantitative bases for decision-making in combat and during an operation. In addition each officer can successfully use the simplest calculating devices, including graphs and nomograms. They can be used under combat con- ditions to solve quite complex operational-tactical problems simply and with ease. A commander should always have at hand (on the command map-plotting board) the graphs, tables, rulers and nomograms which facilitate calculations regarding the use of nuclear weapons, the radiation levels; ttnd the time element in the employment of forces and resources in pombat and during an operation. Using them, the commander can quickly find the necessary quanti- tative characteristics according to specific input data 'nd immediately use them in his decision. Nomograms and graphs can be quite accurate, complex and constructed according to EVM computations, or they may be approximate and simple (/irote7s The linear dimensions of the nomograms are somewhat reduced in thio article). Graphs and nomogram? have long been used in military training estab- lishments and by staffs and troops for the solution of the most varied problems. Approved For Release 2000/081'09 : CIA-IpP85T00875R000300090010-5 - irsTsifil:1101:1/101rzezial:1:1311111:ViAnsIsisicisisiegiiiib 115. In a number of instances however they are prepared by individual officers who are more knnwlodgenble in mathematics. The need for a wider introduction of nomograms into headquarters at all levels and into the troops in hindered by the absonc, of a simple procedure for their construction and use which is ap- plicable to every officer. In addition the skill of all staff officers to independently figure out and compose (construct) the necessary tables, graphs . and nomograms plays a large role in the rapid preparation of sufficiently pyR$HTaccurate quantitativo basc!! for decision-making, the more so since their prep- aration is simple and does not require the expenditure of special effortsand resources. ? The ease of obtaining the necessary data by using nomograms permits, in preparing operational-tactical decisions, a rapid evaluation of a large number of calculated quantities characterizing different variations of combat operations, and a selection from among them of the one which best answers the combat problem and the specific conditions. Therefore the use of nomograms for operational-tactical calculations can be considered one of the ways of practical realization of the results of the application of the theory of anal- ysis of operations in the control of troops. We will attempt to show by using specific examples the procedure in constructing and using nomograms. FUnctional scales and grids are the necessary elements of any nomogram. A functional scale is a line on which one set of values is plotted from an initial point, but in place of these values are written others related to the first ones by a definite mathematical dependence (in other words the func- tion in plotted, but its argument is inscribed). The slide rule is a typical example of the use of such scales. On the scales of the slide rule, as is known, are inscribed numbers, but what is plotted is in reality the logarithm corresponding to a number. Thus by adding the logarithms one obtains the products of the numbers inscribed in place of them. Logarithmic scales and the instruments constructed with their help find a wide use in military affairs. Very many operational-tactical, artillery, engineer, rear servioe and other calculations are rather easily solved on slide rules. For example, the troops have found a steady use for the artil- lery elide rule, on which is solved a wide circle of artillery fire problems. Circular logarithmic scales arc used in the form of various computers for adjustment of fire, for procesEr;mg data on target location by intersection, for topographic tying in and for calculating fire possibilities. Another example of functinnal scales used in military affairs, espe- cially in operational-tactical .!emputations, are the title scales on which numbers are plotted in a apecifit: eeale and the corresponding operational- tactical concepts are inscribed. An example of are scales on which are plotted the radii of the zones of destruction of a nuclear device of a cer- tain gain, while the nature of the objects affected within the limits of this radiuo is inscribed (exposed live force, etc.). Of the very same type are scales on which are plotted the amounts of time necessary for given means of destruction to prepare for firing, while the name of these means is inscribed. A so-called double scale is often used for operational-tactical com- putations. It is constructed like an ordinary functional scale, but the in- scriptions are made on both sides: on one side are inscribed the values of the argument and on the other -- the corresponding values of the function, Approved For Release 2000/08/09 ?CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090010-5 Van I I I 111 I EN =I 11 NI ? PYRG AnAppaytedoPOIdifilsaaVilanONOMPrioC4,14PIN1STS1 of a nuclear explosion in relation to the gain of the weapon. Nomograms are strictly determined combinations of different functional scales. Both the elements of scale construction and their mutual disposition T are described in nomography by a series of complex mathematical relations. These relations/ore expressed by an entire system of formulas. The use of such formulas in a combat situation is difficult. It is much simpler and more convenient to use functional scales and to construct their combinations accord- ing to simple models which will be shown below, and also according to mnemonic rules or even by the method.of selection. We will show this by specific eramples. There are those operational-tactical problems which require a summation of several variable quantities. We will examine the rules for construction o.!: nomograms for this case in an example of determining the overall time needed to prepare a strike by destructive means (Fig. 1). Inasmuch as we will devote special attention later to the rules for constructing nomograms with wore than three variables, we will limit ourselves for simplicity to the examination of three parameters i two inputs and one result. Time in Overall time Degree of readiness system of control for preparation of means of destruction of strike 114 TH 180 (40) 711 Lan ? 60 (301 50 ... ...." ' " ' 7ri61)'''. .... .... .... ?(20) ... . -- .. ... .. a. ..? ..- ? .... 30 W 70 10) M -V V 0) Fig. 1. Nomogram for addition of two variables. In constructing nomograms for solution of problems involving the addi- tion of two variables, construct two similar uniform scales at an arbitrary distance from each other and construct exactly between them a third scale with a module (scale) two times less than the other two. The initial points of all three scales must lie on one straight line, but this straight line does not have to be perpendicular to the vertical scales. It can pass at a certain angle to them and can even be fully or partially outside the bound- aries of the nomogram. , If the quantities to be added are to be plotted on the outer scales and their sum obtained on the middle scale, then the direction of increase in numbers wil: be the same for all three scales (in Fig. 1 -- from bottom up). Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : 1A-RDP85T00875R000300090010-5 Soma ti ii61912+19vPil Iter& Veg.18a4A 26R,W4.4431We ? irtifflturrilb WutitcP EVVIIIRMII 1 tiital 1 y on the right one). Such a case could occur if one or the addends will be changin,, within much wider limits than the other. Plot thin addend on the middle scale, which, since it contains a smaller scale, contains more numbers pyR61:491 the outer ones. In ouch a case the increase in numbers on the middle and outer right sunning scales will have the same direction, while on the left ecale it will have the opposite direction. The alignment line for the scales under these conditions could peas through zero on the left scale and through any two identical numbers accordingly on the middle and right scales.. Having examined the general techniques for constructing nomograma of this type, we will return to the example in Fig. 1, The overall time for preparation for carrying out a strike with destruc- tive means TH is summed up from the time ty expended in the system of control, i.e. the time it takes to receive reconnaissance data, to make the decision to destroy the objective,. and to prepare and transmit the order, and the time tror, needed for the means of destruction to be prepared for launch (firing) from the various degrees of readiness. Having set the limits of change of the variables ty and troy. from 0 to 40 minutes and having selected the dimensions of the nomogram we erect at equal distances from each other three vertical parallel uni- form scales. We intersect the beginnings of the vertical scales with a hori- zontal straight line and note the zero readings at the intersections. On the left scale we plot the time spent in the system of control at a scale, for example, of one centimeter to five minutes. On the right-hand scale we plot the time it takes to ready the means of destruction from different degrees of readiness, using the same scale. Opposite the corresponding values of readi- ness time can be marked the gradations along with the name of the means of destruction and the ,legree of its readiness. On the middle vertical scale we mark the overall time for preparation of the strike, but in a scale of one centimeter to 10 minOes. It is extremely simple to use the nomogram. To find the overall time for preparation of a strike we lay a straight-edge with one end on the time tpent in the system of control, on the left scale, and with the other end on the hachure on the right scale with the name of the means of destruction in the appropriate degree of readiness. We read off the over- all time for preparation of the strike on the center scale. We can use this same nomogram to solve several variations of the prob- lem and to aelect the most acceptable of them. The described principle for constructing a nomogram can be used not only to solve addition and subtraction problems, but also for more complicated problems. In particular, if the uniform scales of the nomogram are replaced by logarithmic ones we can add and subtract not the numbers marked on the scales, but their logarithms. But since the sum of logarithms of numbers gives the logarithm of their product, then a nomogram similar to the one depicted in Fig. 1 but with logarithmic scales will permit us to multiply and divide the variables marked on the scales. The rules for constructing such nomograms for the multiplication and division of variables can be shown by an example of the del;termination of dis- tances between vehicles according to the formula do . 44, suggested by K. Lapshin and Ye. Galitskiy in the article "On the questiorinof calculating the troop march while overcoming ruins and obstacles along the %fey.' Approvea i-or Reiease 2uuu/u8/uu : U1A-KUI-q3b I UUti ibKUUU3UUUVUU1U-b YRGHT Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : GIA-RUP85T00815R000300090010-5 The nomogram for the solution of this problem (Fig. 2) (masts in ae- lecting such distances (do) between vehicles and the march speed (V0) no an not to create bottlenecks and a dangerous accumulation of vehicles in front of obstacles, the overcoming of which is possible with speed VIII and a distance between vehicles CI, and also not to allow an exceasive elongation and lag in the columns4 We construct three parallel vortical scales at equal distance one from another. The scales must be logarithmic. Here the scale of the center scale must be two times less than the outer scales. We recommend doing thin by using logarithmic rulers of different sizes the center scale e'Aould be marked off using the 12.5 centimeter rule and the outer ones with the 25 cen- timeter one, or the outer ones should be marked off with the basic scale and the center one with a scale of the squares of the numbers. This then will give the necessary relationship of scale for the center and outer logarithmic scales. In Fig. 2 the logarithmic scale.) have been marked from the 12.5 centi- meter ruler using a gauges the outer ones from the basic scale of numbers and the center one from the scale of squares. Laying the ruler on the value for dip on the -Vn dn middle scale and on VII on the left, we obtain the de (fin 11'n) quantity 4:1 opposite the intersection of the ruler rOmprivac with the right scale. Without changing the point Nn. of intersection of the ruler with the right scale, 209,4 45) we pivot the ruler to the value Vo on the left rso., 40) scale, that is, we multiply ?1;:lt by Vo. Then we read 4,0,1mmv 05) ; off the unknown do at the intersection of the ruler rapalsoc _ Jor with the center scale. 'VON 23) The advantage oT such a nomogram lies in the opportunity, without carrying out any calculations, .? not only to obtain the unknown quantity, but also 120s ? . to evaluate a large number of variations of combi- nations of speed of movement Vo and distance do 20' 1,5r4 for every specific obstaehe along the route and on the basis of this to make the most reasonable de- cision in the given circumstances. some, ..2c The type of nomogram just described is called the "parallel scale nomogram." Fig. 2. Nomogram with So-called "reticular nomograms" are another parallel scales for mul- widely used type in operational-tactical calcula- tiplication and division tions. of variables. Left scale With them any arithmetic operation can be in kilometers per hour. expressed which is producible with three variable parameters (addition, subtraction, division, their combinations etc.). Here one of the parameters is plotted along the horizon- tal axis, another along the vertical, and the third is determined by a family of curves between these axes. Each such curve expresses a mutual dependence of the first two variable parameters with one constant value of the third parameter. And the whole family of curves expresses the mutual dependence of the three variable parameters and is a reticular nomogram with which, given any two parameters, we can find the third. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090010-5 5 Ft(3FfT APREWAtPer PigneouPPigu}$buiPmii (OVetkrY,Fi'PtiluaLirls flOgYguruaguijr depicted in Fig. 3. S, 200- 180 160 - This nomogram expresses the rola- ') 9 8 2 6 tionahip between the parameters of troop maneuvers tm. where tm -- time to complete the moneuver in hours; S -- dis- tance (in kilometers) over which the maneuver is accomplished; V -- average speed of movement in km/hr. . On the horizontal axis of thin nomogram are marked (at a scale of one centimeter to five km/hr) the possible average speedy of troop movement. On the vertical axis is markeu the size of the maneuver in kilometers (scale of one centimeter to 20 kilometers). We set various times of maneuver with the allow- able intervals between them (the time intervals depend on which troop control term will be using the nomogram and for what purpose). ?For any two values of speed and size of maneuver we calculate the time, and after plotting it on the graph we draw a straight line (since in the given instance the relationship is liner). Inasmuch as all plots of time pass through the origin of the coordinates, even one point is sufficient for construction. For example, in order to plot a straight line corresponding to two hours of movement it is enough to use the origin of coordinates and a point answering a distance of 100 km and a speed of 30 km/hr. We construct in an analogous manner the straight lines for the maneuver time 0.5; 1.5; 3; 4; ... 10 hours. Using this noplogram it is possible not only to determine the time of maneuver, but also to solve other problems regarding the given three parameters. The above reticular nomogram in sometimes called a radian nomogram of division. We can infer certain general rules for the construction and use of similar nomograms depending on whether it is necessary to multiply or divide the values of the variable parameters. These rules reduce to the following (Fig. 4). If we must construct a nomogram of multiplication y x.z, then we plot in the selected scale along the horizontal axis the possible values of x, 5 y1a and along the vertical axis those of y. 4 a 3 We net some value of the variable (for 2 2 example z 0.5) and opposite one of the largest values of x (for example x 4) we plot on the graph a point correspond- ing to the x and y coordinates (y.400.5.2). A straight line is drawn through the origin and this point and is tagged with the given value z 0.5. In the same way are constructed straight lines for all remaining necessary values z. 110 100 . 80 - 60 - 40 20 I 5,0,5 20 25 JO 35 40 45 Fig. 5. Reticular nomograM of' division, a - hours; b - km/hr. a) multiplication of x by z (arrow of increase z and course of problem solution in one direction) b) division of x by z (arrow of increase z end course of problem solution in opposite din) Fig. 4. Rules for construction and use of radian IIQM grams A rovod ?riitoi6so 2000/08/09 ? CIA RDP85T00875R000300090010 5 6 CPYRGI- ft ApproWedIFWAeaSsitaieN08106oWArgrARP51T0187?E9039tilannT-,1Px-?ept that the point on the graph for construction of the llio of a given z is plotted according to the coordinates x and y In vder not to err in the nature of tho calculations performed on the nomogram, we recommend a mnemonic rules T if the path for finding the solution to the problem coincides with the direc- tion of increape of the values of z, then we have multiplication; if not, then divinion. Until now we have examined nomograms connecting according to specific laws two-three variable parameters. However in the practice of operational- tactical calculations it frequently is necessary to consider the influence of a much greater number of conditions in the combat situation, and consequently to construct and use nomograme with more than three parameters. As a rule, they will be composite ones. Lot us examine the rules for constructing such nomograms. In using nomograme with parallel scales, the solution of a problem with many variables is accomplished by using intermediate scales. Fig. 5 shows an example of the construction of a composite nomogram of addition. Using such a nomogram it in possible to add numbers of the I, II and IV scales and find their sum on scale V. Scale III is used an an in- termediate, to fix the sum of the numbers of scales I and II. After construe- tion of the nomogram the numbers are removed from the intermediate scale. The scale of. the scales and the order of increase of the numbers on them is very simple to determine by a selection depending on the nature of the problems to be solved although, as has already been noted, there does exist a strict mathematical description of the parameters of theee scales. Using such a nomogram we can solve V 9- 6- 2- 7- 3 5,"? 4 2 y- X OW 7- 11- 2 - x4102-w .7- 72- (8)-5- (7)4 6- 7 - M- 8- (5) 3- 3- Z W problems not only of addition, but also sub- traction, and by using logarithmic scales -- multiplication and division. The number of variable parameters also can be increased without limit by introducing additional 'intermediate scales. The scales) themselves can be not only uniform and logarithmic, but also any other fUnctional ones (number or name). Fig. 5. Scheme of construction Generalizing the experience of con- end use of a composite nomogram struction of composite nomograms with paral- with parallel scales. lel scales, we can recommend a number of mnemonic rules which substantially simplify the order of construction for use among the, troops. Thus, for the consecutive addition er subtraction (and with logarithmic scales -- multiplication or division) of n variable quantities construct (2n - 1) parallel scales (for example, for multiplying four quantities we construct seven scales). The scale of all the odd scales is identical ard the scale of all even scales is two times leas than that of the odd. The increese in quantities on the odd scales should always go in mutually opposite directions. Thus if on scale I the numbers increase from bottom to top, then on scale III they should. increase from top to bottom, on scale V -- again from bottom to top etc. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090010-5 7 Apprilivitd,eFordideleaSee20)00408/093teCIAORDR8531)0871513001/30009900-411U0 ,,,jppendo on the nature of the producible operations. In sequential addition L'Flair multiplication of numbers the direction of increase of values of the even scales must be opposite to the direction of the preceding odd scale. If how- ever we subtract or divide the numbers, then the directions of the even and and preceding odd scales should coincide. This order of construction ensures the solution of a problem with a sequential transition from scale to scale from left to right. The transition from right to left corresponds to the inverse mathematical operations. If, for example, the nomogram is construc- ted so that by laying the straight-edge on the numbers of the 111 and IV scales we obtain their sum (Fig. 5), then by laying the straight-edge on the numbers of the V and IV scales we will obtain their difference on the III scale. The origin:: each pair of neighboring odd scales and the even scale between them must lie on one straight line. Thus the origins of I, II, III must lie on one straight line, and those of III, IV, V on another. However in practice the aligning of origins of scales is best done by a selection of elementary examples solved in one's head (Fig. 5) Not only the nomograms with parallel scales, but also the reticular ones can be composite, Reticular composite nomograms are also constructed by using intermedi- ate scales. Just as composite nomograms with parallel scales, they represent in the simplest case two ordinary reticular nomograms having a common inter- mediate scale, which is the end of one and simultaneously the beginning of the other nomogram. Let us examine a specific example of the construction and use of a composite reticular nomogram. Let us assume that it is necessary for us to construct a nomogram to determine the time of passage of troop columns over the line of departure, a bridge, a pass, etc. This time may be determined by the formulas N + 1) t V ? where t -- time of pfLseage of the column by a given point; N -- number of transport units (for example, motor vehicles) in the column; 4 interval between vehicles; V average speed of movement of the column; 1 -- length of the transport uni)t. If the length of the transport unit is taken as constant ( we will con- sider it to be equal to seven meters), then the nomogram must be constructed for four variables. By introducing an additional variable L -- overall col,. umn length, we can break the initial equation down into two parts of three variables each: L n N(J + 1); t i=. For each of these equations it is possible to construct a reticular (radian) nomogr-r, according to the rules shown in Fig. 4. Inasmuch as one variable L is common to them, these nomograms can be joined Bo that the axis L belongs simultaneoualy to both nomograms. Per this it is necessary only to select for both nomograms an identical scale for the L scale. Construction is carried out in the following order (Fig. 6). On a sheet of paper (best is millimeter paper) lay off a horizontal axis, and erect a perpendicular from its center. This perpendicular is the common vertical axis for the nomograms lying to the left and right of it. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : RIA-RDP85T00875R000300090010-5 YFiGH TkPlOrkittedoranReteateei2Q00i08a9VectilteRPFalgTAW?NMPAPIMen /Lathe common origin of the coordinates of the composite nomogram. To the right of it along the horizontal axis we plot the scale N to a ncule of one centimeter to 20 vohiclea, and in the opposite direction along the very name axis scale t to a acale of one centimeter to ton minu:Les. On the vortical nxis we plot nettle L to/a scale of one centimeter to one kilometer. To the right of the vertical axis we construct a nomogram of multiplication for the function L? N(J + 1), netting particular values. of N and J with constant 1. For exam- ple, for N ? 100 motor vehicles and J ? 25 meters .L 100.(25 + 7) . 3.2 kilometers. (d) N0070.0M (o6) 6) (e)mutlYm 60 60 40 JO 20 10 0 ZO 40 60 80 1CO 120 140wmyff Fig. 6. Cdmposite reticular nomogram for march calgulations. a km/hr; b km; c;'.. meters; d - hours; e - minutes; f - items. We plot on th4 graph a point corresponding to coordinates N . 100 items and L . 3.2 km. We pass a straight line through the origin of: coordinates and thin point End ascribe to it the nurber 25. Now using this straight line as a plot, we can deterine according to the number of vehicles 1\0.he column length with interval p between vehicles of 25 meters. Here the sum of the lengths of the transport means themselves is automatically considered. In the same way we plot the curves for the other possible values of intervals between vehicles. To the left of the vertical axis we construct a nomogram of division for function t .4.., setting various values of V. For convenience of construction, we plot on the horizontal axis the time not only in minutes, but also in hours. The rules for use of the ordinary and the composite reticular nomogram do not differ. For example, to determine the time for passage of a mountain pass for a column of 70 vehicles moving with intervals of 100 meters and with speed of 15 km/hr, we must (Fig. 6)1 -- from the 70 mark (number of vehicles) on the N scale lay out a von. tical line to the interdection with the oblique line corresponding to a 100 meter interval; -- find at this height in the left portion of the nomogram the inter- section with the oblique line corresponding to the speed of movement of 15 1am/1111 -- drop a line vertically down and read off the time -- 30 minutes -- on the t scale. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090010-5 9 OrovetinFot)Reltase3261100/68109d GlAdR07`851-408.715KINNAN041 Q4i . thin the limit,' of tho given vorinblea noeerding to tho nomogrom oacribed we can perform ninny other calculationn connected with the march. For example, going in the opposite direction in rolntion to the loot example, we can determine how ninny vehicles (tanks, weaponn) can pans over a bridge (defile, pana),1n a limited segment of time with given intervals between vehiclen and a known speed of movement. In order to solve operationnl-toctical computation problems with an even greater quantity of different variable quantities, we cnn conntruct composite nomogram from three or four ordinary reticular nomogremo (Fig. 7) An which the adjacent coordinate axon play the port of intermediate scales. In general composite nomogrnmn to it tile Me ill le fob') are not only constructed of monotypic Y, V elements. It in posaible, for example, to construct a compopite nomogram from 0$4, with parallel scales or even from nov- a reticular nomogram and a nomogram /I w?1(111441) f, . oral types of both. The only thing required here in the uniform scale of CtatoSt41 construction of the intermediate scales of the adjacent nomograms. Fig, 7. Composite reticular nomograms Experience has shown that in for the solution of problemo with five constructing nomograms it is convenient and six variables, to use millimeter paper (ordinary or logarithmic). But sfter construction it is often convenient to redraw it on tracing paper no that the nomogram has no extra lines. The majority of specific examples of nomograms given have related to the field of calculations of troop movement and have a very elementary nature. However it is not difficult to see that, using the method given, it is possible to construct in the very same way nomograma for any other operational-tactical calculations. Experience has shown that nomograms can have their widest use in cal- culationo to detemine the required gain of nuclear warheads to destroy ob- jectives with the necessary degree of loss; to evaluate the radiation levels and determine the expected radiation dopes of the personnel; to determine the time needed to force water barriers; to evaluate the time factor to ensure the timely delivery of nuclear strikes; and to conduct operational-tactical calculations. In addition nomograms can be used to oolve more particular problems such as determination of the height of a nuclear air burst, calcu- lation of the necessary periodicity of reconnaissance of the enemy's nuclear delivery means, determination of the nafe distance of troops from their own nuclear bursts and a whole series of others. Specifieally which nomograms should be used to solve particular opera- tional-tactical problems? This depends on the mathematical form of expression of the problem and on the number of variable quantities included. To solve computational operational-tactical problems, the mathematical expression of which includes only two variables, it is useful to employ a double functional 8.:ale or an ordinary graph of the relationship of the two variables. The nature of the functional rilationship itself does not influence the selection Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090010-5 10 CPYRGH Actiffol'60eti FbrikelleaSer2000110819190,GIA-RlaRaficTOPMRPPMPS1949)1gAotruot a graph than a double functional ocelot but the latter oecupieo lean room nnd in oomowhat aimpler to 'ape. If throe variablen are encountered in the calculations it in convenient to uoe for their oolution either nomograms with parallel scales or roticulto. once. The latter are more preferable in the prooenco of a omplox functional relationship between variablen. Problems with more than three variables require the construction of composite nomo- grams for their solution. Thus the use of nomogram is possible in any field connected with operational-tactical calculations. Practice hoe shown that under present-day conditions it is extremely important for officers of all levels to know how to use them. For this is neceasery a confidence in the necessity and the offoctivonoos of the simplest menna of calculation and training in the pro- cedures for their preparation and use. Therefore it would be extremely uso- Pul on tho bnaio of the scientific direction oxiuting in mathematics, uaually called nomography, to develop the foundations of military nomography as an applied instrument of operational skill and tactics. A knowledge of the foundations of nomography allows each officer not only to construct now nomogram, but also to use effectively those already existing and issued in a centralized manner. The time spent on the construc- tion of nomograma while preparing for combat operations in paid for with interest in a combat situation characterized by extreme transience of events, And the possibility to save time in performing operational calculations and thus facilitate tho,anticipation of the enemy is difficult to overestimate. Therefore in our ?Onion one should not balk at the prior preparation of nomograms, eapecially in peacetime, even if the work at first seems labor- ious and long drawn'';'out. We must alsoiboware of the other extremes the "overproduction" of nomograms in staffd, their unnecessary production when it is 'easy without them to perform cal!culations. It in useful also to update nopograms in a timely manner, destroying those which are outmoded. Mastery Of the procedures' of their construct4on will be of great help in this. The question could arise whether nomograms are needed when we have electronic computers. Primarily nomograms and EVM do not exclude, but sup- plement each other. Many operational-tactical calculations can be performed in advance on fixed EVM and on their results nomograms can be constructed for use in combat operations. Even in headquarters equipped with EVM it is necoasary to have a selection of nomograms for performing operational-tactical calculations, even in the simplest form, in case the EVM go out of order. Moreover it may become necessary in the course of combat operations to con- struct nomograms to solve unforeseen problems which were not programmed for processing by EVM. All this gives a basis to state that the need to use nomograms has not decreased even with EVM in the hands of the troops. There is every reason to believe that the study of the bases of military nomography as one of the forms of application of mathematical methods of analysis in operational skill and tactics will lead to an even greater effi- ciency in the work of commanders and their staffe, will increase their general and military culture and in the end will play a positive role in ensuring success in combat operations. :Ariproved for Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090010-5 11 Approved Fosiiralm1/99/91/09,:_A-RDP85T00875R000300090010-5 MtLeAVGilLE TY 1XAL, WARS by e:.ol 5. MALYANAIKOV CPYRGHT In reeent year a number of plblieatione eoncerning various as- peets of local ware have appeared in our prase. In them the greatest attention has been devoted to queetions of militarypolttieal nature and to the course of *yenta in certain ware. In thie article I will attempt to generalize the experienee of losal Wan& whieh have taken place since World War II and to thow the. condition which gave rise to them, the goals pursued in them, the effect of the influenee of special feature e of the artae in which the wars were condueted on the coMbat operations of troops, the role of the hranehes ef arned forces; and the peeuliaritiem of their employment in them, and the nature of armed ? . struggle under different eenditione of conducting lecal ware. In the 20 yeare mince the end of World War II there has hardly been time when the imperialiete have net carried out aggressive acts and unleashed local liars in some part of the glotee. The thunder of World War II had nct yet died away when in 194 Patch colonialists perpetrated aggresson against Ladoreeia; in 195 French imperialists unleashed a war in Laos and, in 1946, against the Demeeratie Republic of Vietnam. Their euceelsoors mere the t imperialiste who are now conducting a mar in Vietnam. In 1950 the United States'. of America and their accomplices provoked a war against the Korean People's De- mocratic Repalic; in 1954 French coloni lists began a war against the people of Algerial and in 1956 there was the Englivh-Frenche Israeli intervention against Egypt. In 1957 Great Britain unleashed military operations against Oman and Yemen in the wouthern part of the Arabian peninsula, and in 1958 US and later British troops landed in Lebanon and Jordan. In 1960, with the help of Belgian, US, and British colonialists, a hot bed of military actions sprang up in the Congo. 1961 was marked by such events as the attack on the Republic of Cuba by counterrevolutionary bandit organized by the United States of America, the aggression of France against Tunisia, and the war un- leashed by Portuguese colonialists against the people of Angola. In most cases, these local wars were of a prolonged nature. Even now the heroic struggle against imperialism for freedom and independence is being waged by freedom loving peoples in various parts of the world. The aggression of US imperialists in Southeast Asia has taken on a particularly dangerous and wide scope. The local wars of the post war period may conditionally be divided into three groups. In first place (by number) are wars of imperialists against weak countries recently freed from colonial dependence. Ap- proximately the same number of wars are unleashed against colonial and dependent countries which are fighting for their independence. There have been wars or attempts of imperialists to carry out aggression Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090010-5 PYRGHT APRighvratl-26YLVRMALIWATIVNi.eff;IfitittPresienfrillaik31aintUPa1;?UC deers- lopment. All these wars were reactionary and predatory on theTart of the imperialists. The eommon objectives of imperialist countries in lo- cal wars unleashed by them are the prevention of the disintegration of the colonial eystem and the appearance of national liberation move- ments in colonial and dependent countries and the strengthening of their own influence there, the support of reactionary regimes inthis or that country for strengthening their own domination, the holding or seizure of important economic and stratigic areas, and the creation of bases around countries of the socialist camp for preparation of world nuclear war. Imperialist countries use local wars, eupecially large ones, as laboratories for testing a number of military theories and the combat capabilities of means of armed struggle. All these objectives, which speak eloquently of the imperialistic direction of local wars, give only an over-all impression of the inter- nal political efforts of the aggressive ruling circles of the leading countries of the Went. Each war has its own pelitical objectives. The most reactionary objectives and those most dangerous for peace are puseued by imperialists in local wars directed against a socialist country. They are created to destroy the socialist structure in a given country and to restore the former regime favorable to the imperialists, thereby weakening the socialist camp and the national liberation move- ment and strengthening the position of the imperialists. These were the goals of the imperialists in unleashing the war in Korea, in organizing the aggression of Cuban counterrevolutionaries against the Republic of Cuba, and, at present, iv expanding aggression against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The experience of local wars against certain has shown how unsound are the aggressive plans Of these wars the aggressors have not achieved their lost their military and pOlitical prestige. socialist countries the imperialists. In objectives and have By perpetrattng aggression against countries recently freed from colonial dependence and on their way toward independent development, imperialists attempted to establish domination over them, to derive profits from the exploitation of national resources, to hold important strategic areas, and to suppress developing national liberation move- ments in other areas by the armed defeat of a country Which has gained its freedom. The imperialists pursued these goals in ears against Egypt, Tunisia, Laos, Indonesia, Malaya, and the Congo. For example, during the British-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt in 1956, the British and French imperialists attempted to derive profits from the exploitation of the Suez Canal and to gain control over this Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CI6-RDP85T00875R000300090010-5 inNART&ReC6Fetilk: RfetaAct3PNIA849a4cArAPFUT99#74511M3CAP2PilatPion. .- that the mationalitation of the Suez Canal might be a signal for an upribingeof other enslaved peoples, eepeeially in the Near East, where capitalist nomopolieu make enormous prefite from the exploitation of pe- troleum resources. In the war unleashed by French imperialists in Tunie ale the primary objeetive was to retain on the territoryeofethat inde- pendent country a military base in Bizerte, used as an important outpost in North Africa. In wars conducted in colonies and ependent countries the imperi- alists tried to eupprees the national liberation movement and retain the domination of the imperialist bourgeoisie, who derive huge profits from the exploitation of the national eeeourcee of thee* countriee. Here we must first of all talk about the bloody wars of the French Aoniallsts against the people of Algeria, of the British imperialists in the south- ern part of the Arabian peninsula, and of the Portuguese colonialists, who are still spilling the blood of the people of Angola. However, the experience of colonial wars shows that under modern conditions imperiale ism can no longer stop the disintegration of the colonial system and re- tain its domination in colonial and dependent countries through the -ee force of arms. With weapons in their hands, the peoples of the countries suffering from aggression have taken up the struggle against the imperialists for liberation from colonial seriritude and in defense of national indepen- dence and revolutionary achievements. And this struggle always has the support of the progres ive forces of the world. The experience of the most important local wars, wheih are especially directed against the countries of the socialist camp, shows that the imperialists did not try to achieve their aggressive objectives alone, but created a coal- ition of countries unified in their hatred of the socialist camp. In this way they expected to quickly destroy the armed forces of the enemy and achieve their objectives through their combined efforts. At the sane time they hoped to give sucr, an appeoach the appearance of a 'law- ful act' under the falg of the United Nations, to deceive peace-loving peoples and to pose as defenders of freedom, justice, and as the eee champions of peace. Most often the main organizer of crusades against socialistecountries and other freedom loving peoples is US imperialism. This was best nhown in the war in Korea. Soyedineniya and chasti of 16 countries took part in that war in a coalition oh the side of the USA. The military-political defeat of the aggressors in Korea and the failure of the adventurist politics. of the USA in Ciba testified to the failure of the political and military plans of the imperialists in regard to socialt6tecountries. Another example of the creation of coal- itions of imperialist countries in local wars is the British-French- Israeli-aggression against Egypt in 1956. Here the plans of the im- perialists failed because of the decisive resistance of the Egyptian people and the firm position taken by the Soviet Union0 ppruved Fur ReIedst 2000/08/09 . CIA-RD 0090010-5 CPYRGHT Approved FilecIfiMetiniMegRenC*1gPAPIPTAWNErri'loh5 a coal- ition of states for waging a local war in Vietnam. Failing to achieve the desired results in the struggle against the Vietnamese, the USA has expanded aggression, increasing forces and bringing its allies and satel- lites into the war. However, the United States has not been able to create a "united front" of imperialist aggression. The participation in the war of a certain number of troops from Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea have not brought the desired results. This once again testifies to the fact that the Vietnam adventure of the USA is not po- pular even among its allies. The question of the regions of local mars deserve attention. In the majority of cases they arose and were conducted in peripheral re- gions far from thl aggressor countries: inihe Near East and Middle East, in Southeast Asia, and Lath America. Many of them took place in regions surrounded by seas (Korea, Vietnam, Algeria, Tunisia, Indonesia, Lebanon, and others). The unleashing and conduct of these wars involved the ne- cessity of transporting forces and meteriel great distances by sea snd air, and also the ,.employment of considerable naval forces. The latter gave large advantages to the aggressor who possessed superiority on the sea. The regions of local wars were dissimilar in physical-geographic and climatic conditions and these factors had different effects on the conduct of combat operations -- some of these facilitated and others hindered troop actions. Concerning the territorial scope of the local wars, it should be noted that military operations were conducted in re- latively small regions and usually were limited to the territory of the country being subjected to aggression, but in certain cases ftluded the territory of neighboring states. The mars against socialist states were the largest in scope. Thus the war in Korea covered the entire Korean peninsula, which is 800 kilometers long and 250 kilometers wide. The use of ground troops in this area was limited by its operational capa- city. The more limited objectives of local wars also accounted for their small territorial scope. Thus, for example, French imperialists began aggressive actions in Tunisia in 1961 to maintain their strategic po- sitions in that part of Africa. Accordingly the combat operations were limited to the area of Bizerte, where the French had naval and air bases and a garrison of 5,000 men. It should be noted that the limited territorial scope of local wars sometimes takes on a purely conditional character. The experience of a number or mars, including the one in Vietnam, shows that the bor- ders of neighboring states are provocatively violated by the aggressors. Local mars, especially those affecting the interests of countries of the socialist camp, carry with them the threat of expansion beyond their in- Itial territorial boundaries. This should seriously warn peace-loving peoples to mobilize for the struggle to block the aggressive plans of the imperialists. Approvea ror elease zuuwutsiuu : CIA-KL)latIO I ODo OKUUUJUUUUUU1 U-0 CPYR A pplOYINie?9 rag I ihiStiantQWEI.19%.;AIAAPPOTRAIKrainga9?114141 number and their combat makesap !sere raually dictated by the objectives (3FfEf the imperialists in thie or that warp by the expected forces of the country being subAected to aggression, their degree of resistance, and the physical-geographical features of the area of combat operations. Ac- cordingly, for conducting some ware only individual chasti and soyedin- eniya were used, and for others large forces in the form of operational ob'yedineniya were used. Experience shows that the moee reactionary the objectives of im- perialists in a war, the more forces and materiel they ueeto conduct it. For example, in the attempt to eliminate the socialist structure in the Korean People's Demoeratic Republic, comprising over 90 percent of the ground troops, 99 pereent of the air force, and 94 percent of the naval forces. Onefremage L. Ye., Behind the Cloak of "Limited" Wars, Voyenizdat, 1960, page 52). Aceording to figures in the US press, the US used 1,200,000 men, 1,600 airplamte, up to 1,000 tanks, and the :ce.. greater part of the 7th fleet in the VEION Although the aggressors had great technical superiority, they were unable to achieve their object- ives. They suffered heseiy losses of the 1,900,000 "UN troops" killed, wounded, or captured, more than. 390,000 were Americans, as was an even larger amount of equipment. The History of International Relations and the Foreign Policy of the USSR, 1870-1957, a publicotion of the Higher Party School, 1957, page 446). These US losses are even more significant if, for example, one keeps in mind that during the entire Second World War in the Pacific theater they lost only a little more than 170,000 men (G. M. Gelvfond. The History of the War in Korea in 1950-1953, a publication of the Higher Naval School tmeni M. V. Frunze, 1964, page 240). The war against the Korean People's Democratic Republic clearly shows that imperialists have nothing to gain in aggression against so- cialist countries. In the final analysis these adventures always ended In military-political defeat. Unquestionably, such a fate awaits them in Vietnam. The imperialists also used considerable forces and means in a num- ber of other local wars. For example, the better part of a division of the French army was needed to conduct the bloody and prolonged war in Algeria. Altogether the French forces in Algeria totaled, 800,000 men, nearly 1,500 aircraft, ane 250 helicopters against the 130,000-man Al- gerian National Liberation Army and partisans. (Problems of Peace and Socialism, 1965, No 1, pages 53-54). During the British-French-Israeli aggression in Egypt in 1956 the invasion forces of Great Britain and France alone numbered over 80;000 ground troops (La Revue Maritime, November, 1958), over 1,000 aircraft, and nearly 185 combat ships (Questions of History, 1963, No 9, page 75). Approved For Release 2000/08/1959 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090010-5 PYRGHT A 3p rertigdegimaekatfte2qqmson4 sa-w?suppjaygomg92456aving just been formed. On the main axes the British and French troops out- nuMbsred the Egyptian forces by it to 5 times. In their Indochina adventure, US imperialists long ago discarded the mask or "advisor," and have openly participated in the war against the Vietnazese people. By October 1965 up to 140;000 Anerican soldiers and officers and a large amount of various types of combat equipment were involved in military operations against the partisans and troops of the National Liberation Front. Speaking of the forces and means used in local wars it should be noted that military actions in them were conducted by the very latest means of armed struggle, with the 'exception of nuclear weapons. Already In the first, most important, local wars of the pct ear period (Korea, Egypt), jet aircraft, helicopters?including those based on aircraft carriers -- and also guided aerodynamid missile (created on the basis of the Hellcat fighter) were used and tested under combat conditions. In many wars ( in Korea, Algeria, Vietnam) imperialists used means of mass destructiOn in the form of napalm bombs not only on the fields of battle, but also against the peaceful opulation. Recently the world witnessed monstrous new criminal acts when the American aggressors used poisinous chemical substances and phosphorous bombs against the people of South Vietnam. Using modern means of anred struggle in combat situ- ations, they used lo:al wars as an experimental laboratory for testing and improving equipment and armament. Thus, despite the fact that the local wars took place on relatively small territories, the aggressors used large forces and modern means of armed struggle to conduct them, giving them great numerical superiority over the enemy in men and combat equipment. However, whereas the wars of the 50's were conducted with the help of conventional means of destruction, the situation has changed some- what today. The use in Vietnam of poisonous chemical substances goes beyond the limits of conventional means of armed struggle. As is knovn; the chemical weapon -Jsf capitalist countries are regarded as means of mass destruction and the fact of their use in a local war indicates an extremely dangerous tendency. Of unquestionable interest is the question concerning the partici- pation in local operatio ,. It is noteworthy that the forces andiensee 'teed by the-aggressortrin.most?local wars represented all branches of the armed forces: military actions were corsAtacted with the participation of ground troops, air forces and the navy. The ratio of the branches of the armed forces was determined by the conditions of the unleashing of the war, the features of the theater of military operations?,and the A Jpr uvwd Fur RtIctbG 9 . CIA17 - -5 CPYR isivinyozprogiewitagogicovq%:.,,,p1:4-13pFmTpisFAmpoo090010-5 Because the military operatione in all local wars were conducted _primarily on land theaters, the main eele belonged to the ground troops. GH 'For example in Korea the United States had nearly 20 divisions (G. M Gel'fond. The History of the War in Korea, page 240. This figure is conaiderably increaeed if one eounte the troupe of South Korea and.. other participants in the aggression. Eere it ahold be noted that nearly all the countries which were yubjeeted to aggression had, for the most part, ground troops in the form of a young regular army or partisan detachmente. The main mission of the ground troops of the aggressors in the final analyvis vaa the deatruction of the army of the enemy and the mastery of hiu territory. The feilfillment of this mission by the ground troops in essence determined the success or failure of the coMbat operations of the war in general. Organizationally the ground troops in a nuMber of wars were made up of mobile units -- motorized, armored, and airborne aoyedineniya, often combined under corps (Algeria) or army (Korea) commands. Here of course, we are talking about the most important local wars. In smaller wars, for the most part in colonies, the employment of ground troops was limited to the operations of individual codbined-arms soyedineniya and chasti. In local wars in general the soyedineniya and obnyedineniya of the ground troops were of the same organization a those which were intended for conducting a world war. In local wars the operations of airborne troops played an impor- tant role. In some of them the aggression actually began with air drops to capture air fields and road centers and to create conditions for strengthening the efforts of interventions. Airborne troops were also used widely in wars conducted in areas having special conditions and where there were a limited number of roads. For example, in the Viet- nam jungles the French colonialists air-dropped troops to capture im- portant positions, depots, and supply bases, and also for joint opera- tions with mobile troops against partisans. The ize of an airborne landing varied from one to three -- and sometimes more -- battalions. Before the air drop the drop zone was subjected to an intense bomb- bardment. After the landing the airborne troops consolidated their position or, haying carried out their mission? returned to their own base. Airborne troops are also being widely used by American interven- tionists in the war which they are now conducting in Vietnam. Airborne forces up to a regiment in strength were used by the US in Korea to capture road centers and withdrawal routes of North Korean troops. Airborne troops were not used widely in this war, however. Air and naval forces also played an important role in local wars. It was these forces which most often began combat operations. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090010-5 Approved FeRg wwcNogigica,ipA4Rpcipm?;c20871R000100.90010-5 rai s aga nsenemy troops, for transporting troops? and for providing support for ground troops. CPYRGHT Many of the operations of the enemy's aviation involved strikes against objectives in the rear of a country which often had no military impor- tance. Even strategic aviation was used for this purpose. Thus, in an attempt to wear down the resistance of the Vietnamese people, US aviation bombs bridges, roads, hydroelectric installations, and ordinary popula- tion centers and rice fields. Aviation played an important role in the initial periods of wars, when they delivered the first contingents of troops to the area where aggression was being unleashed and carried out lavaeion operations. Striving to Achieve a decisive success at the very beginning of a war, the aggressors used aviation for delivering mas- sive strikes against alr fields, air defense means, large population center., and also against enemy troops in the drop zones of their own airborne troops. For example, in Korea and in Egypt from 500 to 1500 sortiee were made in a single day. In invasion operations transport &elation was widely used for landing airborne forces and for tran por- ting materiel. In the course of military operations, for example in Korea, avi- ation carried out mission in the interest of ground troops, to a cer- tain degree making up for the lack of artillery, especially in neutral- izing targets and objectives in the depth of ea enemy position. Tact- ical aviation was usually used for this. For operations against ob- jectives located deep in enemy territory medium and heavy bombers were also used. Helicopters were widely used for making tactical troop landings, observation of the battlefield, and for communications and the delivery of cargoes. In ears where the front line was not clearly drawn, armed struggle took on the form of guerrilla warfare. For ex- ample, in the jungles of Vietnam helicopters are widely used for com- batting guerrillas as well as for elr strikes against objectives of the rear. Thus, in lecal wars all types of aviation form helicoptere to stra- tegic bombers were employed, and the physical-geographic features of the theatees of military operations largely determined the diversity of the missions which they fulfilled. The oceal and sea expanses separating the territory of the aggres- sor states from the countries where they unleashed local wars demanded the wide use of naval forces. Thus the 7th US Fleet, made up of ships of all classes, including aircraft carriers; and part of the naval for- ces of Great beitain, Australia, and So':'tb Korea also participated in the Korean war. Ships of the 7th US Fleet are now drawn up along the shores of Indochina for participation in tieVietnam adventure. A sig- nificant part of the British and French navies participated in the ag- gression against Egypt. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA.fDP85T00875R000300090010-5 CPYRGH ApprWtdIcidit RWireatkie 21000/987890f,G1AIRDP1135T-00875R0001308090040*- -F 8 istance beeause the eountriee being enutejected to aggression lacked the neeeseary combat means. Therefore? the boastful statements of the repreaentativeis of US naval forces concerning the a.ifficult operations of the navy in local wars are? to eay the least, tendentious. A large part of the operations of the navy were connected with landinge. A rather large, landing was made in Korea, near Inchon; over 250 different Ships and .1,100 aircraft took part in this operation. The landing force wake made up et a marine division, an infantry division, and separate^ support unite. It mission was to capture Seoul, cut off the troops of the People E Army from their rear and then, to- gether with other forces of the 8th us army, launch an offensive to the north. A marine division wee landed in the first etehelon and it in turn. established a coufbat formation in two echelons. Uri itE3 of an infantry di- vision were landed in the second echelon. An artillery and aerial bomb- archnent were conducted for several days prior to the landing. Groups of air support, artillery support, secoseity? and. cover were established for the landing. In the air support group there were aircraft carriers with their escort veesele? and. in the artillery support group ? gun ? boats. During the landing their fire webs directed against the podraz. deleniya defending Inchon, and. it prceeided cover for the flanks of the landing force. The carrier based aviation of one group supported the landing, and the other delivered strikes against units of the People's Army. The landing of the first echelon (an infantry division) was carried out in a period of two days. The landing was made on an almost un- defended shore. It was this fact which, to a large extent, determined the success of the operation. During the aggression against Egypt the invasion of British and French troops began with airborne landings in support of the naval landing. Airborne landings made in the area of Port Said and Port ?dad on the eve of the naval landing operation for the purpose of capturing air fields, bridges and road centers. Four airborne battalions were brought in from the island of Cyprus by transport aircraft. The naval forces supporting the amphibious landing consisted of over 100 ships, including 5 aircraft carriers. Special landing craft combined . into se- veral landing detachments were used to land infantry and combat equip- ment. The landing of a marine force up to brigade in strength was pre- ceded by a 30-minute bombardment of Port Said and the area around Port Fuad. by aviation and shipboard. artillery. The landing at both points was made in two echelons the first echelon consisted of two marine ;)attalions with tanks and separate podrazdeleniya; the second echelon was landed by helicopters from two aircraft carriers. In carrying out missions in interest of the ground troops the naval fleets operated in Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090010-5 20 6PYRGHT ApprpogrgAtIkleAs%12000/08/09 ? CIA-FDP85T00875R000300090010-5 s ,on, upporting troops of coastal groupings with the fire Of shipboard artillery. Groups of ships often condLAed fire for several hours. Carrier-based aircraft were usually used to deliver strikes against troops and objectives in the rear of the country being subjected to aggression. An analysis of the missions and nature of the operations of the navy of the imperialist aggressors shows that their military leadership gives an important role to naval forces in local wars. They used, for the most part, surface ships of various classes: aircraft carriers, cruieers? destroyers, minesweepers, landing crafts, and battleships. The nature of military operations in local wars is determined by their objectives, the combat make-up and numerical strength of the armed forces of both sides; and the special features of the theater. In certain of the molOimportant wars contact was made between the two sides and a front line was drawn at the very outset of military oper- ations. This was rather clearly demnstrated j: the wars in Korea and Egypt. In these cases the methods of armed struggle had much in com- mon with those of operations of World War II. Combat operations were characterized by maneuvers. The main mode of combat operations was an offensive of well .equipped aggressor troops; beginning with the penetration of the enemy defense; which was preceded by an artillery and aerial bombardment. American troops in Koren; des- pite their considerable superiority in forces and means, literally had to chew their way through the defense of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese volunteers. In the sectors of penetration between 80 and 100 artillery pieces were concentrated along one kilometer of the front. The penetration of the defense was accomplished at a rate of 1.5-2 kilometers in a 24 hour period, and the pursuit was made at a rate of 10 - 17 kilometers in a 24 hour period. The infantry advanced together with tanks, which under conditions of a mountainous theather operated at company and battalion levels up to regiment and division strength with the support of artillery and aviation. The US command was able to conduct offensive operations with de- disive objectives only in the second period of the war, since this re- quired the creation of a large superiority in forces and means. An of- fensive was usually conducted during the day because the US troops were poorly prepared for night operations. To avoid excessive losses, the North Korean and Chinese troops attacked at night in chasti and soyed. ineniya. The experience of local wars gives examples of the creation of both position and maneuver defenses. For example, in the Korean war, when the forces of the sides were equal, the defense took on a positional character. It was based on the use of mountain terrain features and on Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :RA-RDP85T00875R000300090010-5 PYRG rIT 4347fiogmFoopompo,gR-5 e frequent occurrences in of a maneuver type and were positions with the wide use theApprovwdealgRaleafaitaawiceino: Wag?? position forma of condeeting tattle wee not local wars. Defense operetions were ueually based on the successive holding of defensive of counterthrusts and counterattacks. All these methods of conducting combat opsrations were characteris- tic for those local wars in which armed struggle wale conducted under conditions of established fronto and where both sides used soyedineniya and ob"yedineniya which were intended for waging a large, modern war. It should be noted that the US infantry division, having many rear ser- vice units and a considerable amount of equipment, proved to be too cum- bersome and insufficiently mobile in mountainous and forrested terrain. The infantry soyedineniya of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese volunteers *were better prepared for operation a under these conditions. They posseesed greater stablility than US divisions. In wars where the armeA fors of the imperialists faced young, poorly equipped armies and an armed popularee defending their freedom and independence, they used other forms of combat. These peoples used guerrilla warfare against the technical superiority of the aggressors and proved the latter to be unsuitable for a prolonged struggle under difficult physical-geographical and climatic conditions. The freedom loving people of Vietnam used these methods of strong resistance against the French colonialiets in 1946-1954 and are now successfully fighting against US aggressors. The patriots made skillful use of familiar terrain features and climate. The tropical forest, the large number of rivers, the rice fields, and the limited number of roads greatly hinder troops opera- tions, make it difficult to maneuver, and reduce the combat potential of equipment and its employment. The high temperature and humidity have an exhausting effect on people who are unaccustomed to this kind of climate. All this seriously complicates troop operations of the ag- gressors. The nature of military operations under these conditions differs from the positions covered in the regulations by which the regular troops of the aggressors learn to fight. This was one of the reasons for the failure of troop operations of the French colonialists. Here there were no clearly drawn front lines or clearly defined groupings against which it was possible to inflict massive air strikes. Combat operations were conducted everywhere, wherever there were aggressor troops. If the enemy was weak, the patriots attacked it; where it was strong, they avoided contact. Ambushes along roads, paths, and in ravines, attacks on garrisons and airfields, and organized diver- sion were the moat widespread methods of operation of army units and partisan detachments. Conducting small but successful battles they Approved For Release 2000/0y9 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090010-5 CPYR A nvegfortFeLeas PF 2000./n0/09 CIARDP85T006rib Gren streitn or te enemy, at the same time increasing their HT own strength and acquiring experience in warfare. As the ;mople's armies acquired combat experience and increased in strength the armed struggle began to be conducted by larger forces. The offensive opera- tions of both sides were carried out along separate axes, along roads and riverbeds. Making skillful use of terrain features, small guerril- la forces inflicted destruction on enemy troops drawn out in columns. Strikes against the enemy were often unexpected. The command of the French troops, for example, had to disperse its forces and create a system of strong points and posts, and the Vietnamese army took advan- tage of this to destroy the enemy piece meal. 111?11 1 The ccAuct of military operations in jungles is greatly depend. ent on lines of communications, The regular troops of the colonial- ists with their large amounts of equipment were especially dependent on them. Roads did not have this significance for the local peoples army, which did not have heavy equipment and armament, therefore they destroyed them to hinder the movement of the enemy. This forced the aggressors to make wide use of tar transport and waterways for trans- porting troops and materiel. In the people's army carriers were en- listed from the local inhabitants, who often carried ammunition and supplies over distances of several hundred kilometers. The experience of war in jungle conditions showed the unsound- ness of the military art of the French army in the struggle against the Vietnamese people who were defending their freedom. This is a serious warning to the US imperialists, who are waging a predatory war in Vietnam, The Vietnamese people are putting up strong resistance against the US imperialists. Despite the steady increase of forcers, the in- ability of the US militarists to change the course of the war in Viet- nam in their favor is becoming more and more obvious. The forms of waging armed struggle worked out by the US command for conventional conditions have proven unsuitable for jungles. Having a numerical superiority in men and materiel, the US and South Vietnamese troops can not capture the initiative, and their operations do not bring the desired results. The strikes of the interventionists often do not ac- complish their objectives, The troops of the National Liberation Front and partisans, operating in separate mobile units and making wide use of the dark hours, make surprise attacks against the enemy and his airfields and military bases. Operating from ambush, the patriots remain unseen by the enemy. This method, together with the difficult terrain, prevents the aggressor from making effective use of the power of his equipment. The colonialists encountered great difficulties in the war in Al- geria. Here also the operations of regular troops were opposed by the Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : IA-RDP85T00875R000300090010-5 YRGI-IT DP85TD0875R000300090010_- tah4AWYNC6F@felikeilfiew1NAMPa4;aeover tne entire country. French divisions of the NATO forces which were thrown against the Algerian patriots were well armed but were unable to gain a victory over the Algerian army, which uSed guerilla 'forme of warfare. The inadequate preparation of regular troops of the armies of imperialist states for warfare against the forces of patriots using guerrilla forms of conducting a war and for operations in theaters having difficult terrain (in jungles, in deserts, in mountainous and forested areas) was demonstrated in many local wars. The US command, analysing the experience of these wars, took a number of steps to re- organize ground troop soyedineniya: pentomic divisions were abolished and divisions having a single three-element organization were established, and measures were taken to increase their combat capabilities for cona ducting limited wars with the use of conventional means of destruction and tactical nuclear weapons. Accord4g to the US press, two airborne divisions have been reorganized to adapt them for operations, for the most part, in Southeast Asia. The US has created a so-called mobile division of 20,000 men equipped with 428 helicopters. Unita of this division are now conducting combat operations in South Vietnam. In the US great attentInn is given to training special forces for operations in the rear of the enemy and for combat against guer- rillas. Special combat means for operations against guerrillas in jungle conditions are being created and are now used in Vietnam. These include cluster bombs and rapid-firing grenade launchers mounted on helicopters, metal pins scattered in forests, aad others. However, it is becoming clear that no attempts of the imperial- ists to break the determination of therpeoples to establish their free- dom will be successful. The criminal actions of the imperialist aggres- sors increase hatred toward them and strengthen the courage and stead- fastness of the peoples. The experience of local wars is of definite interest. Although this experience cannot have a large influence on the development of military art ia general, its study will be useful for certain areas of military affairs. Approved For Release 2000/08/02 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090010-5 ' ' '1,i Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T0087 RO ON THE QUESTION OF TIM ROLE OF ECONOMICS IN NUCLEAR WAPFARE Commentary by Lt Col G. Mii.fti=t: CPYRGHT In several issues of the periodical Voyennaya Mysl' there have been published during the current year some artteles devoted to the achievement of military-technological superiority and to the clarification of the role of economics in modern warfare. In answer to these articles we would like to express some observations concerning the special characteristics of mo- bilization of economic resources in nuclear warfare. "Every war puts direct and immediate force in the place of law" (V. I. Lenin, Complete Works, Volume 30, page 69). As F. Engels emphasized, "the victory of fOrce is based upon the production of arms, and the produc- tion of arms in its turn, is based upon production in General: (K. Marx end F. Engels, Works, Volume 20, page 170). This is one of the most important Marxist principles on the necessity of tha mobilization of resources of economy in the interests of military operations and on its role in the pro- gress and outcome of armed conflict. However, in its contents and form the mobilization of economic re- sources of countries to meet the requirements of armed forces has been unequal in the course of its historical development. During the lifetime of F. Engels and right up to the time of the First World War, arms were produced by the regular military industry, nr by a military economy con- stituting a small proportion of the entire economy. This economy provided the army and the navy with that amount of arms and ammunition which was sufficient for coping with local wars. In the wars of the 19th century, military needs (which included meeting other needs of the army) of a coun- try (on the average) took from 8 to 14 percent of its natione. income. The picture underwent a readical change when imperialsim brought forth world wars. The military economy of this or that country is now characterized principally by the fact that the necessary level of mili- tary power for the conduct of armed conflict on a world-wide scale has been achieved through current production during the course of the war. Military economy came into being on the basis of a mass application of conventional arms as the main means of armed conflict, accompanied by an objective contradiction between the growth of economic potential of the countries and the still more rapid growth of military requirements. Thus, according to the average annual indices, the average annual gross national product of the US in the years 1940 to 1945 came to $326,200,000,000 as against $220,700,000,000 in 1939, constituting an increase of approximately 1.5 times. During the same period the expenditures of the US federal govern- ment on purchases of goods and services for military needs (in 1962 prices) increased from 3,400,000,000 dollars in 1939 to $103,300,000,000 in the period 1940_through_1945 Approved For Heieage zuuoi08/09 ? CIA-RDPR5T00875R000300090010-5 (cont'd) 25 Approved i-or Release zotTUTOISRB . CAAL-HIM785T PYRG HT In accordance with the above considerations, before the commencement of military operations, countries could and actually did support their mili- tary capacity only to that level which assured the development of tae main forces and the military restructuring of the entire national economy. This consitutued the essence of the preparation of the national economy for a world war. Military economy constituted merely a form of economic provision for the waging of armed conflict. Such are the main features of military economy. Its significance went far beyond the limit of one of the sides of the objective ties of a world war with the national economy, and it became the alpha and the ?maga of the 'military-economic theory, which even tho this day is known as the problems of military economy. All other problems of armed conflict, such as human resources, material and financial expenditures of military organization in- crease of strategic efforts eta., were considered only on the basis of and within the framework of this logical development. Even the role of pro- duct7Lon relations was reduced to a determination of social differences be- tween the socialist and capitalist military economy. Since the clarification of the peculiarities of military economy, such as the forms of manifestation of the determining role of the national economy in a conventional world war, or in a speeial mobilization of econo- mic resources, it has been easier for us to talk about the specific charac- ter of meeting military needs of the state in nuclear warfare. Nuclear War, if it should be unleashed by the imperialists, will take on a worldwide character. Conventional arms will also retain their signi- ficance in combat operations. All of this, at first glance, confirms the concept that military economics is a form of the mobilization of resources of the national economy in the interests of satisfying the needs of the armed forces. From the point of view of nuclear warfare the question, it would seem, would apply only to some change in the volume of mobilization, or the strengthening of the role of pre-war preparations of the economy, and so forth. In our opinion, however, such an assertion cannot be re- conciled with the radical changes in the material and technical base of the war, with the level of military preparations of countries, and with the character of nuclear warfare. The author of the article under discussion emphasizes with complete justification the fact that a revolution in mili- tary affairs has taken place, which apparently, has affected not only the means of waging war, but also the ways of meeting the armed forces re- quirements for material and technical means Thus, in clarifying the contents and form of the mobilization of resources of the economy from the point of view of modern war, it is nec- essary to proceed on the assumption of a decisive fact: in an armed con- flict of today, the principal means of inflicting defeat has become nuclear weapons; the economy of the nuclear powers has already provided the armed forces with weapons of such power, as their economies could not have pro- vided either before the war nor during past war. Furthermore, one must not Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090010-5 (cont'd) 26 CPYRGHT A RUPtib I GUIS Pa KUUU.SLIUUVUU1 - P P rMCrleiHn2jnVet th eaegal times more conventional weapons in the world now than there unre on the eve of the Second World War. Thus, the NATO countries have more than 16,000 tanks, that is, three times more than the Hitlerites sent against the USSR in 1941. In 1562, the aggressive blocs of the imperialist had more than 3,000 warships and five times more mili- tary airplanes than the Germans had at their disposal when launching thn war against our country in 1941. All of. these quartitative comparisons still do not take into account the qualitative changes in armaments, which today have taken on a decisive significance. The figures cited, of course, are only illustrative, and their accuracy cannot be vouched for; but they bear witness to the threat which imperialism present. There is no doubt, however, that c)ur country and. the entire socialist camp now has at its disposal such treat power as to be completely sufficieat to defend successfully the great achievements of socialism from the encroachments of the imperialist aggressors. ..radical changes in the material and technical base of war and the incase of economic opportunities is being used by US imperialism for the continuing intensification of its military potential. Thus, during the years 1959 to 1956, the US government spent for military purposes an average of 6.5 billion dollars more per year than during the period 1941 through 1945. The national product of the US during the period under com- parison, indreased at least by a factor Of 1.5. In order to understand the indicated specific fact, peculiar to the current military development, one must consider that in the production and combat use of nuclear-rocket weapons cons.derably fewer materials and labor resources are required than for the production of conventional wea- pons of an equal destructive capacity. It is common knowledge that in the United States, in England, and partly in France, nuclear arms constitute the main striking foree of the army and the navy; However, in the fiscal year 1963-1964 only 30 percent of US military appropriations was expended on nuclear forces, while this figures amounted to 12 percent for France and 10 percnet for England. Consequently, the overwhelming part of mili- tary expenditures was directed toward the production of conventional arms. As far as labor resources are concerned, it is not coincidence that the progressive American journalist Victor Perlo emphasized that today each dollar of military expenditure provides less work than it did formerly. The share of military expenditures in the national income and in the total product of countries is a concentrated expression of expenditures on military affairs. For this one must compare the corresponding indicators of the period of world wars (there already was a military economy) with the Comtemporary period, when the needs of the armed forces are met differently than they were in the last war. In theperiod under comparison the military might of the countries is maintained on a level sufficient to provide for the conduct of armed conflict. It is common knowledge that the Second Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : GIA-KIJP8bTOU3 t bK00030009001 0-5 27 (cont'd) PYRG lease2000/,08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R00030009001 s -5 woliFfincitEROtemore an ov percent. O.L the national income of the warring countries. In the capitalist countries today, from 15 to 20 per- cent of the national income goes into armaments. ' The concrete forms of intensified militarization of the economy in di-the capitalist countries and the increasing burden oE the arms race can- not be invariable. It is know that at the end of the 19th century the share of military expenditures in the national income (and even more so their volume) was lower than it is now. Nevertheless, F. Engels.' was completely justifued in writing g "The army has become the principal aim of the state, it has become tth end 1i. itself g the people exist only to provide and feed soldiers. Militaricu holds sway over Europe and devours it" (K. Marx and F. Engels, Works, Volume 20, page 175). How- ever, all this was only the beginning. World wars gave rise to an intensi- fication of militarization of the national economy in the form of the capi- talistic military economy. The CPSU program and the documents of international conferences of communist and workers parties give an analysis of the process of the fur- ther development of militarization, its burden and social consequences for che peoples. This analysis amounts to a demonstration of the fact that production for wartime needs has today become a permanent element of the economy. The level of military expenditures in the capitalist coun- tries is several times higher in comparison with the prewar 'period: in the US it is higher than average yearly indicators for the period 1940 through 1945. The life of the peoples is poisoned by a specific issue of contemporary imperialism -- "the cold war", which is a characteristic of the so-called nuclear age. Over the world, like the sword of Damocles, hangs the threat of nuclear war. The creation of the military machine of capitalism calls for a great expenditure solely for its support and improvement. As has been emphasized by the Central Committee of the CPSU, "nuclear- rocket weapons, created in the middle of our century, have changed the former concepts of war". It can be logically assumed that there must be a change in the point of view regarding the effect of war on the ways of providing for its needs. The possibility of a sudden unleashing of nu- clear war by the imperialist, the special role of its initial period (when the main problems of the war could be decided), as well as the unprecedented destructive consequences of nuclear strikes, and so forth, agree only with the objective trend radical changes in the forms of economic mobilization reflecting our opinion, the observed trend also reflects the following peculiarities of nuclear warfare. It stands before mankind in two aspects i.e., of the necessity of its prevention and the possibility of its being waged. The modern aggressor, as is known, attempts to gain his end by conducting politics from "a position of strength" and plans to wage nuclear warfare on the basis of mobilized forces and resources. "In order to dis- courage an aggressor from ciminally playing with fire, -- it is pointed out in a declaration of the Soviet government, -- he must be made to know and Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R?2g2.010d990010-5 28 Approved For Release 2000108109 CIA RDP85T00875R000300090010 to see that in the world there is a force ready with all its arms to re- CPYRGHT pel any design on the independence and security of peace-loving states." Thus, the mobilization of economic resources in the interests of meeting military needs has taken on a specific form. Modern military economics is called upon to assure during a long period of time the maintenance of the military capacity of the countries at that level Which is required for coping with the basic problems of a possible world war. Its production is aimed at covering the current expenditures of the armed forces, and further increases in armament stockpiles, and principally, at the renewal of the material and techni- cal base of an armed conflict by means of improving new equipment and re- placing the new equipment with newer equipment. All that has been said about the peculiarities of the mobilizon of resources may be characterized as a new objective trend of economic provision for armed conflict with the use of weapons of mass destruction However, among the different classes the attitude toward this trend is extrmemly varied not only regarding the goals of its use (in the interests of pursuing an aggressive course or a struggle against it) but in regard to the magnitude of its realization. It is generally known that in the imperialist countrids, especially in the US, there is a deliberate ex- pansion of military expenditures, and an intensification of the arms race. Thus, the US Defense Department using as a pretext the necessity of de- veloping the means for delivering nuclear warheads, has increased the number of intercontinental ballistic rockets to 500, and plans by 1966 to bring the number to 1,700 units. The atomic submarine fleet will by 1967 haw: 81 submarines instead of the 26 Which are now in commission. For the reinforcement of the US Navy it is planned by 1973 to build 500 new vessels to replace old ones. Formulating the question of the influence of economics on the course and outcome of a nuclear war within the framework of the development of a war economy, is, in our opinion incorrect. Proceeding from the Marxist- Leninist concept of the soCial material and technical essence of the mod- ern from of the mobilization of resources, one should talk about the development of a military economy within the framework of the economic pro- visions for a retaliatory strikes against the aggressor, which reflects the actual situation more fully making it possible to resolve the gap between theory and practice. All this is of great significance, since it assumes the concentration of attention of the researcher and of those Uoing practi- cal work on the main issue -- the most efficient utilization of assigned forces and resources for the economic support of crushing blows against the aggressor. An analysis of all the other sides of the correlation between nuclear warfare and the economy, can be fruitful only if it is subordinated to this 1j1jruvwc.1 Fyi Rkct 09 . CIA- (cont'd) 29 ba Plara49. d 614116P kals ?ERAloiceM gd,% a': on -see ses?ss -.ecess y o mass, arm es for the conduct of a possible nuclear war lose their value if they are examined against the standards of past world wars, when arties of Many millions were also necessary. Taking into account the constant threat of attack from the imperialist, we are obliged to "hold to the principle of maintaining a regular army, which by virtue of its composition, its numerical strength, and its training could at the commencement of a war immediately repel an attack and crush the aggressor". But this requires a scientifically based approach and r. solution of problem of the mass army in modern warfare. CPYRGHT Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090010-5 30 aPYRGH Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090010-5 Commentary by Col V. Vasin: The problem of the role of economics in a possible world war undoubt- edly deserves close consideration. The deStructive nature of modern war confronts us, with all its acuteness and urgency, with the task of not only insuring the timely economic support of the war, but also insuring the vitality of military and strategic branches of econdmi. Naturally, this compels the government of large states to pose the question concerning the role and. significance of the economic factors in a different way. The treacherous aggressive politics conducted by the governing circles of NATO countries, headed by thel'US, makes it necessary not only to prepare the armed forces. for nuclear warefare, but also to prepare the economics, state apparatus, and population of the socialist countries. The growing significance of the economic factor in the course and outcome of a possible world war have resulted in the fact that the atomic, rocket, aviation, tank, and artillery plants, and all radioelectronics, chemical, metallurgicalli machine-building, andy elettric power enterprises have become strategic targets, which at the very beginning of military operations will be subjected to nuclear strikes. For this reason, the defense of the rear area of a country and of the groupings of armed forces from enemy strikes with weapons of mass destruction, will be one of the ,decisive types of military operations in a future war; this would unre- liable without a well organized anti-aircraft and anti-rocket defense. Past experience shows that with each war the quality of military equipment is perfected more and more and its quantity increases. The principal countries taking part in the First World War had produced 190,000 airplanes, over 9,000 tanks, 140,000 artillery guns, and 43.7 billion cartridges l5 This production fncreased even more in the Second World War. During the course of the war, the USSR, US, England, and Germany alone prddused over 652,000 airplanes, ablaut 2864900 tanks, over 1,681,000 guns and mortars, and 85.3 billion cartridges. In modern wars, the amount of combat equipment has sharply increased, its production has become more complicated, and its cost has increased. Thus, for example, about 200.7000 man-hours were expended on the construc- tion of the strategic bomber 11-171 and several years later 9,340,000 man- hours were expended on the B-58. From this example it is obtious that a great deal more time is required for building a modern airplane than was required in the Second World War. A colossal increase in budget allocations for military expenditures is observed, which comprise not 8-14 percent of the national income as it was in the 19th century, but up to 50-60 percent as was the experience of the last two world wars ,l7 In military expenditures themselves, as a rule, 65-70 percent of all these expenditures are for combat equipment -- Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090016c9nt id) 31 Approyed, For Kelease 2000/08/09 : C1A-KuP851008-tbK00u30u09u01u-o tanIts, a rpLanes, guns, bombs, and submarines. According to certain NATO calculations, compiled, by its staff and app1icab1e, to its armies, air- force casualties, for example, during the first 15 days of a mOdern wax could amount to 60-85 percent and ground forces casualties to 30-40 per- dicent.? In view of this, it is clear that losses of arms and combat equip- ment could be approximately 6-8 times greater than in the Second World War.18 In connection with the scientific-technical revolution, army require- ments for combat equipment have sharply increased even in. peace time. During the Second World War, the US Armrdaily expended about 12 kilograms of various nititary materials for each soldier. Now, during.peace'time, it expends 38-49 kilograms of various materials, spare parts, food, ammu- nition etc. It is not difficult to imagine how much these figuresccould increase in a new wo.rid war, which is being prepared by the imperialIsts and in ,a which numerous and complex equipment will be used. This circumstances alone sharply increases the role of economics. Historical experience teaches that only that country can successfully conduct a modern war whose material-technical and scientific-research base is capable of producing modern arms, machine tools, equipment for their production., and also the needed facilities for manufacturing the machine tools, Therefore, the expanded production of combat equipment, and the ensuring of constant superiority in scientific-technical progress is a most important condition for achieving victory. 91e use of combat equipment on the battleffield in the past world wars made' huge requirements on the entire national economy of the coun- tries fighting in the war. The regular military plants along, producing arms and equipment, were unable to cope with the increasing requirements for the active fronts. In order to continuously provide the army with new equipment and ammunition, the mobilization of all economic resources and of the production apparatus of the country was required, thereforei. basically the entire economy was converted to military production. The appearance of rockets and nuclear weapons brought qualitative changes in the relationship between economics and war. According to the opinion of some bourgeois military economists, in an all-out nuclear war the military-economic potential is significant only in that degree to which it was effectively utilized for producing military products before the outbreak of war. Or, in other words, it is important that the armed forces-be provided with everything required for conducting a war before the outbreak of war, and not with the potential resources of the econoMY for producing products during the time of war. The economists go on the assumption that the war will be of short duration. The military dcono- mists of the West reason that because of this the countries fighting will Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300R91cM 32 PYRGHT pioved For Release 2000108109 . neither have the time nor the real potentialities for expanding and inten- sifying military production. They state: " appears that only thoce reserves which are mobilized in good time will be effective. During the course of military action the indubtrial potential cannot influence the outcome of the war fast enough. "19 This concept of the aggressive imperialistic circles of the US aims at justifying the mad armaments race, which has developed in the postwar period. The fact that direct military expenditures alone in NATO coun- tries during 16 postwar years (1969-1964) amounted to over 902 billion dollars, over 674 billion dollars of which belonged to the US, speaks of the gigantic scope of this race. How is the role of economics in a ftt.Ore war to be evaluated? Eco- nomics will Wthe basis of military power. Moreover, the economy of the socialist countries must be prepared in time of peace for replacing the great losses in combat equipment and for the economic providion of all requirements of the armed forces during the course of a war, by making use of their-current military production. In order to accurately determine the role of economics in a future war it is necessary to have an emset idea of the probable duration of the war. Mar SUR. Ya. Malinovskiy Stated: "At the present time, to one can deny the possibility of a short-lived war.... However, it is quite obvious that depending on the donditions of origin of the war, the armed struggle to the finish will not be limited only to attacks with nuclear weapons It may be dragged out and may require long and maximum effort of all forces of the army and of the country as a whole" .21 Going on this assumption, Soviet military science believes that economics has to play a large role even during the fleourse of a modern nuclear war. The potentialities of the economy of =V country, its 'nobility, vitality, and relative invulnerdbility are capable of fulfill- ing this role even in the final phase of a war. The destructive objective necessity, raising its vitality the possibility of a difficult conditions this connection, the peace. nature of a nuclear war poses the questi.on, with of preliminary preparations of industry And of during the course of a war. One must ao consider sudden outbreak of war, which may result in very for the intensification ,of military industry. In necessary measures have to be taken in time of Economics is a direct, active participant in a war and it determines the over-all strategic capabilities of the armed forces Of any country. (cont'd) Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090010-5 33 in a RGHT r Release_2.000/08/09 ? CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090010-5 BRIgraglarlDZiOn 03: tile pro olein concerning the role of economics possible nuclear world war auk:. ,sto many conclusions. 1. The dependence of a modern war on economics will continue to increase 2. In the event of a probable world war, countries in the world system of socialism will have to face opponents who are strong in a military-economic and scientific-technical sense. Therefore, one should not underestimate the capabilities of our potential opponents. 3. The Soviet military doctrine of preparing the country for war requires that early preparations be made in the entire economy of the country. 4. It must be emphasized that the socialist economy, in view of its planned character and the absence of antagonistic contradictions, has great advantages over the capitalist economy in speed, depth, and thorough mobilization of their resources to meet the needs of war, which was brilliantly confirmed by the experience of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. 5. The strengthening of the economic power of Our socialist country together with that of all countries of the Warsaw Pact, is the founda- tion upon which the defense capacity of the country should be strength- ened, because the sources of the military strength of any state are found first of all in its economy. V. I. Lenin warned the party and the Soviet people that mass enthusiasm alone is not sufficient for conducting a successful war, but that it is necessary to thoroughly develop the economy so that it is capable of producing all facilities for an armed struggle. He said, it is necessary to prepare for war for a long time and seriously, starting with the economic upsurge in the country. This principle of Lenin's sounds especially valid in our times. In our opinion, Col A. GUROV, the author of the article under review, accurately presented the problem concerning the role and significance of economics in modern warfare, we only wished to supplement it and to define some of the economic problems raised, which are connected with requirements resulting from the nature of modern warfare. Commentary by Col M. Siednev: In his article entitled "Economics and War," Col A. GUROV posed a number of interesting problems regarding the material supply of armed forces in,modern war. We shall attempt to supplement the efforts of the author by discuss- ing the role of transportation in wartime. (cont 'd) Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090010-5 34 CPYRG Approvcd ror Rcicase 2000/08100 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300000010-5 In characterizing the economy of a country, K. Marx wrote: "In'addi- tion to extractive industry, agriculture, and manufacturing industry, there is a fourth factor in the sphere of production, namely, the trans- portation industry." (K. Marx and F. Engels, Works, Vol. 26, Part Page 422) Transportation is the connecting link between the producer and his many consumers in the country. The importance of transportation increases in wartime. The task of materiel supply in modern war cannot be carried out if the materiel needed for waging combat operations by all branches of military forces is not delivered. Let us recall recent experience. In World War II, especially in the conduct of high-speed offensives and pursuit of the enemy, transportation played a decisive role in supplying the military personnel with all kinds of materiel needed for successfully carrying out the offensive operations. The German- Fascist command regarded the paralysis of our railroad . system as its moat important task. In the first 2 years of the war alone, more than 400,000 large hoMbs,were dropped on important rail centers of the Soviet Union. However, the enemy failed to knock out our railroad system. Our railroad workers worked heroically and quickly restored the facilities wrecked by the fascist bombers. Our motor transport, which loaded materiel at railroad stations and delivered it to the fighting forces worked equally successfully. Moreover, the trucks supported the railroads by delivering materiel over great dis- tances from bases and arsenals directly to the front. In World War II, motor transport of the fronts (districts) and centrally subordinated trans- port (Staffs of the Supreme High Command) hauled 145 million tons of materiel. It is known that the total mileage run by truck transport An 1943 was three times that of 1942 and in 1944 there was a further 2-fold increase. The heroic work of the military truck drivers was equal to that of the railroad workers. Skillful utilization of rail and truck transport assured delivery of all kinds of materiel to our fighting forces on the fronts of World War II. By contrast, the German-Fascist army was unable to solve its trans- portation problem in World War II, especially on the Eastern Front. Describing transportation problems in World War II, German Colonel G. Teske wrote: "The German transport service was never able to prepare for such tremendous tasks. And one might say that, in the final analysis, the whole course of war was determined by the manner in which transport carried out its tasks." Emphasizing the scormful attitude of the German command toward the performance of its transport, he noted that "the fate of trans- port in this war was truly tragic."22 And it is true that neither rail nor truck transport of the Germans was able to meet the needs of their fighting forces on the Soviet-German front. The German-Fascist forces ceeteeded Approvod For Roloaso 2000/08/09 : CIA RDP85T00875R000300090m 1C (cont'd) with ARPNEwcgifferuMPSPraCtql984-ggy: giaiggi5oTPM5a9r?.?"5 operations near Moscow, materiel deliveries lagged far behind actual _needs. Throughout the war, the German-Fascist command never fully (3E1olved the task of materiel transportation. We should also mentioi the US Army. In the European theater of military operationsl_the Afpericans had concentrated more than_7000000 motor vehicles by 1945. This was 11 times as many as in World War (1918) and represented a 58-fold increase in hauling capacity of all trucks. The US command thought that this nubber should meet all needs of US forces in this theater. However, it turned out that truck trans- port was able to cope with its tasks only up to the time when US forces began their rapid Ovances eastward through France. The US commana failed to pay adequate attention to restoring the French railroads. Thus, the railroads were able to play only a secondary role and truchs continued to be the main means of transportation. For the transportation of liquid ftel? pipelines were widely used. Air transport of the Americans, even though they had sone 2,000 . transport aircraft, played only a secondary role. Such are the main facts to which attention should be paid, since4t is of the essence in waging modern war that the transport facilities of a country must be adequate to supply its armed forces in time of war. Bringing about this essential condition proceeds differently under various government and social systems. Under a socialist system, there is the advantage that all transport: is in the hands of the state. This makes mobilization easy and also facilitates the uce of all kinds of transport for the needs of the armed forces. At the sane time, it is easier to organize repair and service facilities. In a modern nuclear war, the role of transport is enhanced. When it is possible that large rail centers and stretches of rail lines may go out of operation, transport flexibility (substitution of one kind Of trans- portation for another) grows in importance. Under the new canditions of waging war, the most flexible means of transportation are truck and air transport, including both helicopters and aircraft capable of landing on unequipped airstrips. According to foreign press reports, experiments in the use of rockets for transport purposes are being carried out. In modern warfare, it is highly important to increase the capabilities of trucks in traversing terrain and to make other improvements. Modern trucks are subject to manznew requirements in fulfilling, their functions of transporting materiel and moving military personnel. Pipeline transport plays an important role in modern lwarfare as a means of transporting all kinds of liquid fuel. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300CM61V5 36 GHT ApprovedFor Re edbe 2000 . CIA- T0087 3 . Th- development of transportation in peacetime, with a steady growth in the movement of goods and passengers, by motor Vehicle and by aii-i will help solve transporcation problems in times of war. A few words should be said about the organs that deal with supply of an existing any, air force, and navy. This function is performed in all armies by the rear services. Unfortunately, Col GUROV did not touch on this subject in his article. Engels pointed outthat the entire organization and combat method of an army (in other words, the methods of waging combat operations) depend on the quantity and quality of people and equipment. Therefore, the organization of armed forces, their taw4cs, operational skill, and stratea depend on the equipment which they have. Organization of the rear services of armed forces must, therefore, be adequate to meet the demands of modern equipment and also conform to the nature of a war, opera- tion, or battle. Analysis of the organization and operation of the rear services of armed forces in World War I and World War 11 indicates that organization of the rear Gt.:I-vices in some cases lagged behind. the requirements of rapidly developing military skill. The rear services of the German-Fas- cist forces in World War II operated poorly, for example, with consequent ill effects on operations and, in the final analysis, contributing heavily to their ultimate defeat. There were also supply problems in our troops. However, our rear service organs were based on the growing military produc- tion of the country and they were able to supply with materiel of all the important operations of the Soviet troops that finally resulted in a victorious outcome of the war. Therefore, the rear services must not lag behind the requirements of military art in either organization or technical equipment. Proper orga- nization of the rear services is one of the decisive factors for success in carrying out operations and campaigns. In other words, organization of the operationaland military rear and technical equipment of rear units must correspond to the organization of military units and also to the nature of a modern war, of an operation, or a battle. The problems of materiel supplr of aryed forces in a modern war are growing more complex, and require a careful examination of the organiza- tion and operation of rear services, and their constant improvement. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090010-5 PY NotesAPProved For Kelease 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDr85T008(5K00030009u010-5 .GH31-? Comments on an article by Col A. Gurov, ''Economics and War" (Voyennaya myol', No 7, 1965) 0 Militarizm. Razoruzheniye.2,Spravochnik. (Militarism; Disarmament. A Handbook), Gospolitizdat, 1963, p. 14. 3. Computed by the author from the Economic Report of the President, January, 1963, pp. 172-173. 4. Computed by the author from Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1963, p. 256. 5. Computed by the author from Economic Report of the President, January, 1963, pp. 172-173. 6. Interavia, 1963, April, p. 454. 7. Militarizm. Razoruzheniye (militarism; Disarmament), p. 14. 8. Materials of the 22d CPSU Congress, Gospolitizdat, 1962, p. 131. 9. Materials of the 22d CPSU Congress, p. 340. 10. Open letter of the Central Committee of CPSU to party organizations ' and to all Communists of the Soviet Union. 'Pravda" Publishing House, 1963, p. 17. 11. Pravda, 31 August 1961. 12. Ar-Na? i _a_v.-A_rForceJ22.E.Ial and Register, 1963, Vol 101, No 2, 23 November, p. 2. 13. Jane's Fighting Ships, 1962, P. V-VI. 14. R. Ya. Malinovskiy, "The CPSU Program and the Problem of Strengthening the USSR Armed ForcesluXonmunist, No 7, 1962, p. 20. 15. Mirovaya Voyna v Shifrakh (The World War in Figures), Voyenizdat, 1934, p. 33. 16. A. Lagovskiy, Strategiya I Ekonomika (Strategy and Economy), Voyenizdat, 1961, p. 195. (cont 'd) Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090010-5 38 1.7. A. M. Alekseyev, yermye Linancy kapitalisticheskikh g,osuderstv (Military Finances of CapitalistCoun r(es), 1952, pp. 11-IS.. 18. Voyennaya Strategiya (Military Strategy), Voyenizdat, 1963, p. 428. 19. Charles Hitch and Roland Mackin, Voyennaya Ekonomika v YaderwY Vek (Military Economy in the Nuclear Age), Voyenizdat, 19647 p. O. 20. Computed by the author from data in The Cormonvealth Survey, 2 February 1965, p. 112. 21. R. Ya. Malinovskiy, Bditeltno stoyat! na strazhe mire, (Vigilantly Watch the Peace), Voyenizclat, 1962, p. 26. 22. "tog' Vtoroy Mirovoy VO ? Sbornik Statey (Results of World War II; Collection of Articles), Voyeniddat, 1957, pp. 398-399. CPYRGHT Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090010-5 '49 Approvtg 1%,itnaRB/9;ors9GiafticifP8S5/2 Wignagir10-5 CPYRGHT Major D. VOLKOGONOV The solution of problems arising with the appearance and use of new weapons is mainly connected with the thorough fundamental evaluation of the new opportunities which they open up and the new requirements which they present to men. The military-technical revolution introduces substantial qualitative and quantitative changes in the relationship of man to equipment. Man more and more carries out his functions with the use of equipment. Nuclear ener y and the various newest means of control and communications, of ob- taining and processing information, extraordinarily increase the powers of man but do not replace him. The revolution in military affairs in un- doubtedly leading to an increase in the effect of one of the fundamental laws of warfare, according to which the course and outcome of war depends on the moral-politiOal condition of the people and the moral forces of the army. Therefore along with an increase in the significance of the material factor in warfare, and accordingly in the military-technical training of troops, the ideological and moral-psychological preparation of troops for operations under conditions of the use of present-day weapons plays an exceptionally important part. The demands are increasing on the moral forces of troops. Dynamism in the development of combat equipment must be accompanied by a spiritual growth in man. It was F. Engels who revealed the most important law of warfare according to which the means for armed conflict depend on elements organically tied together: the human material and the new weapons. Equip- ment without man is dead, but even the moral forces of troops do not play their part autonomously, but through the process of armed conflict, i.e. through equipment. An understanding of these most important elements in the dialectic unity permits us to see the entire complexity of the process taking place. Or.. ( le central problems of troop training in our army has always been the .'s moral vigour, which is based on a high ideal conviction. V. I. Len. ;ssed more than once that we are strong chiefly through "our moral strength" (Polnoye sobraniye sochineEly (Complete Collection of Works), *ol. 43, page 135). In writing about the powers of the struggling workers, Lenin included a very specific content in the understanding of moral strength: "...this broad layer has proletarian instincts, proletarian understanding and an awareness of duty" (Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy, vol. 38, page 252). A man without firm ideal convictions could at critical moments suc- cumb to a torrent of spontaneous feelings: confusion and fright, with re- sultant consequences. On the other hand, strong willpower which is not hallowed by high ideals is blind. Thus moral? ? re ara 'o? ? II jj 1.1.11 ILO (cont'd) di-YRGHT 00 r Arrirmia nr Polaaca 9nnoinginci ? CIA,RDP85T00875R000300090010-5 be contrasted with psychological preparation: it can only be moral- psychological. The moral forces Which cement into a common Whole all the spiritual and p?:ersical resources of soldiers are one of the most important compo- nents of combat power. They give man the possibility of handling himself in the most trying circumstances and determine his capability to endure the extremely difficult trials of modern warfare without losing the will to fignt and be victorious. The status of moral forces finds it concrete manifeenatlen L2 the moral-combat qualities of soldiers. Mass heroism, ceomge, iron endurance and discipline, and a readiness for self-sacri- fice fen tne sake of victory show up where the moral strengths of soldiers are firm. te c:e.ef source for the fortress of moral strengths of Soviet soldiers is a ol.eal one: the social structure, communist conceptions, and the just goaln and nature of war wtich derive from this. This is the fundamental sources. The training of the officers' corps, the technical outfitting of troops, the degree of mastery of the equipment and the readiness for com- bat operations have an enormous influence on the fortress of moral strengths. Characteristic of this modern military-technical revoLution is the harmonic union of new equipment and new men, which appears as the leading mechanism in the qualitative jump in military affairs. It '1.0 known' that the military-technical revolution has also taken place ft.n tLe principal capitalist countries. Does this mechanism appear there? The fact is that the revolutionary jump in the field of military affairs which is taking place in the West is similar to ours only in the technical sense. It is ce,ck:xring in a different social medium, is guided by, different goals and is having chiefly a quantitative effect on the "human material" in the sphere of equipment preparedness. Oar military-technical revclution took place ender socialism and ccincided with the beginning of communist constrnetfon, when one of the most important tasks -- the formation of a new man -- was 'being so1ved. What; then. are the trWts of the moral countenance of the present-day Soviet sc:dfer? There is ne doubt that the main mass-Of Soviet soldiers has "oee_ elel,ated to a higher level of spiritual maturity, based or. dedica- tion c ideals of communism. The moral changes are felt chiefly in the cc.f.ce..:.4:;.o,s vole,ntany fulfillment of legal standards in the obser- vance of the principles of communist morality. The growth in spiritual maturiny appears fn specific matters. For example, almost every other sol- dier fe the strategic rocket forces is outstanding in training, and every third man in the air forces has cross-trained in another specialty and has earned two or three decorations for military valor. In the past three years Apprnved For Release 2000108109 . CI - (cent 'id) 41 Approved For Release 2UUWW/U9 : U1A-KL)1413b I ULM ibKUUUJUUU9UU - over five thousand Soviet soldiers have been given governmental awards. The conclusion can be drawn through observations that the present-day Soviet operations leads to an earlier and more rapid moral maturity of our troops. This is also facilitated by the fact that tbe military-technical revolution directly unites many soldiers with weapons of strategic desig- nation, Which increases their moral responsibility to an unprecedented level. This clear new feature in the countenance of the Soviet, soldier appears in the enormous drive for mastery of the knowledge of modern science and the new technical specialties. This tendency has now already become a moral standard of the majority of servicemen. Two intertwining directions can be seen here: the need for interchangeability breeds universalism, but the complexity of new equipment demand further specialization. A new feature is the widesproad desire by troops for self-education; by means of' which a person can himself take steps toward the collective and become an inalienable part of it. A mangs relation to time, as to a value of the first degree, takes on a moral tone. The tempo of present-day life is precipitate. The rapid tempo of technical progress imperiously lays new requirements on the soldier to do more and do it better in the same framewrok of time; for example, to be able to hit a target with the first shot; to master a specialty ahead of schedule, to reduce standards of time, etc. The skill of making wise use of the time available disciplines the serviceman., alloys his to succesfully accomplish his duties, facilitates the broadening cT lais outlook and the satisfaction of intellectual needs; and this without doubt is also a new feature in the personality of the modern Soviet soldier. New equipment and weapons introduce noticeable changes in the relation of the soldier to the military collective. The role of the individual Is increased and at the same time he becomes more dependent on the entire col- lective. The role of the individual soldier is great, but nevertheless he is only a part of the collective which mans a specific systme or complex. And his role will be highly regarded if this entire collective functions well. In this can be observed an essential feature: while 20-30 years ago one or more activists stood out in the collective and spurred on and educated the others, now as rule the entire collective focuses attention on the edu- cation of several induviduals. The further adoption of crcw-served weapons will facilitate this under army conditions. In attentively studying the new qualitative changes in the development of our society one cannot help but notice one other important feature: to- day the soldier with an elementary education is rare; a soldier giving a lecture is not uncommon; a serviceman Who has mastered a number of special- ties is a COMMOD oeeurrence. This process is the expression of the elimina- tion of differences Letween the worker and the peasant and between physical and mental labor which have carried over to us from the past. An objective 1j1jiuvd Fyi RIctbw 2000/08/09 . CIA-RDP 090010-5 11.2 (conted) CPYRGHT az ? ? ?? process of acceleration of t"ee spiritual development of all Soviet soldiers is taking place. If we consider the growth in mental development and sharpness of vision the drive for knowledge by thn troops, their intolerance for routine and that which is dying out (such characteristic qualities in the present-day Seviet man.), then it becomes still more evident that the changes in. the man manenin:i" are substantial med that they are continuing, having in their tem. a eeveletionizing effect on military-technical development. qualitative advances in the spiritual sphere attest to the cone, sidereele increase in the moral ooportunities for personnel of the Soviet Arme Forces. Moreover the demands on the moral strengths of soldiers cona.V4 inerease. And. im. peacetime the problem of full retention of those: strengths in. a situation of continually high combat readiness stands out I? . its complex1ty0 wten over a long period of time, day in and day out, a man mast strain his thought, will and senses in order to be always on guard. .For the solution of this complicated problem one must consider a whole series of principally new features of the psychologic effect of modern warfare on the tderal forces of man. One can arbitrarily break them into two groups and eonsider as the first group those connected with weapons and equipment0 lrhe broad adoption of automation and telemechanics has fostered the need in military work for unique methods of control of a lultitude of corn- pie; c mechanisms, instrnments and Installation. The process of control it- self has become more complicated: a soldier must simultaneously perceive, evaluate and correctly react to the date from amny measuring instruments. The berden on intellect and sense ,9 has considerably increased. The constant combat readiness and capability of troops depends in large part on the clarity and reliability of the acticns of numerous cate- gories cf seremeng oneratrs radio men., acoustic techncians etc. Their work demads dailj atte,ctio and an ability to concentrate and not give way to ecanfnsion, since one husdred sure steps can be wiped out tb.rola one unsure one. It has been scientifically confirmed that a per- so's prcloK:ged capability for productive work depends on his moral-psycho- logiclre lia?l w-it the fandamental moral-psychclogical pre- parc,tit this reqnres a fLrtLer increase in professional mastery. It is 2.1%ax:e that, the coLceps "courageous", "volitional" are inscpay. co=e:...tca in L::" time with the concepts of "skilled" and "know- Lcg". eLLi:Leerimg: psycLc_loGi to assist us here, recommending how heon ie tA:? soldLer. BO; tbe determining factor will rel,ecss always he the moral sta.' chnes of man. In conjunctlon with the ;:pt.t.mal wc)rk procedures the reasoned interchangeability and the spac Yest periods it is aamays capable of ensuring his precise actions second grc').p of spectfi!::. features of the effect on the moral forces of sc1iers is connected the.03ure of nuclear warfare. The conditions ApYrocadf'6?'fifetieriscePkiiiiidt06r&tig-krOW616067siktooOttfonciotmoznber of (contvd) 4:3 CPY completely new circumstances. F. Engels stressed that new equipment" GI-i1 completelydifferent character and a different course to conflict... And we wst more and more contend with similar quantities net subject to consi- deration under the conditions of this constant revolutionizing of the tech- nical basis of the conduct of war" (K. Marx and P. Engels. SochinenIza (Works), Vol. 22, page 394). It is most probable that troops will not have time for a gradual tran- sition from peacetime condition to combat. The unexpectedness and power of the first nuclear blows along with the material destruction will have an enormous moral-psychological effect on personnel. The speed of the processes of modern warfare is tremendous. In the face of transient combat operations there will be demanded of soldiers an exceptional moral mobilization and en- durance., and the capability for a rapid "liberation" from temporary shocks. In. nuclear warfare a considerable portion of the personnel (and in the initial period -- the absolute majority) will not directly see the enemy, but the feeling of danger will spread to all. For many soldiers, especially those of the rocket forces, the enemy will be perceived in a certain sense "abstractly". A prolongpd nervous tension will require that commanders and political workers seek opportunities to give the soldiers necessary rest. The autonomous operations of units and podrazdeleniyes, individual submarines, missile ships; etc.; acquire special meaning in modern warfare. Their activity could take place in complete isolation from the main forces and control points, without sufficient information and communications. The role of various emergencies and ,numerous opposing tendencies will in- crease. Combat operation will frequently begin and develop under condi- tions of poor visibility (night; smoke, dust), This could cause persons to have the feeling of isolation, uncertainty, and confusion, which have an extremely depressing effect. This mental condition of the troops will be intensified by the constant threat of mortal danger from radioactive, bacteriological and chemical contamination. Therefore they must know well and skillfully carry out the entire complex of measures which ensure pro- tection from these means. Of undoubtedly enormous moral-psychological effect on the combatants will be the picture of combat itself in a nuclear war: they will become eye-witnesses to mass losses, gigantic destruction and fires: they will sense the strong effect of light and sound, of sharp drops in pressure, and may happen to be in a vast zone Of inundation. M. V. Frunze wrote on the psychic influence of any new weapon: "The amount of this psychic damage cannot be calculated; and under certain con- ditions it could exceed by many times over the material loss caused by these weapons of' destruction. (NL V. Frunze, Izbrannyye proizvedeniya, Voyenizdat, 1951, p. 413) The possibilities of such a damage have now increased a hundredfold. It is therefore extremely important for commanders to also fore- see the moral consequences of the effect of weapons of mass destruction in order to be always prepared to abate its influence on the psychology of the troops. 11.4 cont 'd CPYRG p c o d F R Ic\acc ? CIA RDP85TOO875R0003000eOO1O 6 How then can we preserve combat capability, avoid or reduce the moral - psychological shock and ensure that each soldier fulfills his duty and the tasks placed before him under themost complex conditions of modern war- fare? The most important and most difficult thing is to preserve combat capa- te:li'lv after the first enemy blows at the beginning of combat operations. 1.41 unavoidably prolonged state of tension intensifies the processes of in- .neb'f-ton and increases the danger of negative emotions and involuntary re- au;eens which overwhelm one's will. Under such conditions the attention be- comes abruptly dulled, the memory is weakened and a person begins to make mftstakes. The appearance of mental impotence in individuals is just as dangerous as an enemy force. Even isolated instances of a soldier losing self-control in present-day warfare are fraught with serious consequences. Ai; (2:.q.tica1 moments, expecially immediately following a nuclear blast, a maa .pecds a sharp jolt from without in order to free himself from a moment- ary shock: the confident order of a commander or the inspiring word and personal example of a political worker, a party member or an agitator. This stability and frimness of control must be evidenced from top to bottom, right down to the crews, squads and teams. The essence of the active and continual influence of commanders and political workers on the consciousness and senses of the soldiers lies in the fact that every member of a crew, team or podrazdeleniye must be capa- ble of unswervingly carying out his military duty. The words of NL V. Frunze sound with special force today? He said that political work "as before will be a new and supplementary form of weapon, terrible for any of cee enemies" (M. V. Frunze, rzbrannyye proizvedeniya, Voyenizdat, 1951 p. 243). The experience of the past, contemporary military teaching and tests cof:!rm that the ideally vigorous person can summon his will to carry out the specific functions mastered by him under any complex and difficult situ- ation. It has been shown that the feeling of fright occurs especially strongly in those persons who are undisciplined and have ahd a weak mill- tary-tea,tnical training. The more uncertain a soldier is with his equip- ment and the weaker is his combat mastery, the greater it is that various emergencies, dangers and alarms influence him. However excellent soldier- speeialists, even masters of their field, if they do not have an ideal- political vigor and are not prepared in the psychological sense, are capa- ble of displaying vacillation and uncertainty and are subject to panic when in the presence of a strong emotional influence under difficult con- ditions. Such person need timely moral support. Then the feeling of fright and uncertainty gradually passes in them and is replaced by marital excitement, moral lift and a combat recklessness. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090010-5 45 (cont'd) AptiliFteiPRWMOgina20110/01NOSn CI /URORBST11087?03Angq,9sai (k a r% =Oa ive effect on the psychological condition of the troops. Therefore the problem of the timely restroation of the combat capability of troops PYRGHT is immeasurably more difficult than formerly. Success will be on the side of he can most quickly regain the normal combat and psychological state of the troops and by decisive actions accomplish the rout of the enemy. Commanders constantly concern themselves with lowering the vulnerability in order to permanently preserve the moral stability of the units: they try as much as possible to disperse them, increase speed of movement, pro- vide duplicate systems of control, have a maximum reduction of the time necessary to prepare for battle, and exploit success as quickly as possible. The actions of commanders and political workers in supporting the moral and psychological stability of troops in modern warefare must not be reduced merely to ensuring that the troops can "endure" in the initial period of the war. This is not an end in itself, but only a prerequisite for the creation of a high aggressive passion, i.e. such a state when there is an inner mobilization of all spiritual powers and capabilities, and a moral-psychological adjustment of every soldier toward the destruc- tion of the enemy. It is extrememly important to create and systematically cultivate this enthusiasm and to support it with all ways and means, using all the levers of control by the command and political element on the troops. In such a situation there is an unprecedented increase in the meaning of heroism and the readiness of the troops for self-sacrifice. The decisive, unusual, outstanding apct of individual soldiers and crews at a very criti- cal moment can play an enormously inspiring role. Everyone is familiar with the deeds of Soviet soldiers who threw themselves under enemy tanks with grenades and covered deadly gur ports with their breasts. In this regard the nuclear war will in no less a degree require deep intentional self- sacrifice from many soldiers. It will probably be necessary not only to overcome portions of terrain contaminated by a high level of radiation, but also to wage battle on them. Many soldiers will have to carry out orders with risk to their lives even more frequently than in past wars. This de- mands from officers and enlisted men alike displays of corage, decisiveness and readiness to attain the goal and inflict destruction on the enemy at any cost. There is not doubt that under conditions of nuclear warfare the very concept of "heroism" will take on new content. A deed cannot be re- garded merely as a bright splash or a brief burst of the best qualities of one man. And although individual heroic deeds will also be sidespread in modern warfare, heroism now has acquired the character of a collective action of entire crews, groups and detachments Who are constantly and reliably work- ing under the most trying conditions of battle. Elements of this heroism can even be seen today in the intense work of soldiers While on duty with vehicles, installations and instruments. The practice of combat and poli- tical preparation for the conduct of armed conflict in a nuclear war is the Appruved I-en-Release 2000108/09 CIA RDP6GT0087GR000300090010-5 46(cont'd) CPYRe ?i HT A ,p4itiM'eftFtorRereggst:2800108/09 velikiRDEtaliE00876ROWN.Q.9.9919r5our Armed The problem of "man in a nuclear war" is now being persistently studied 'ey boergeois military science from the most diverse sides. Knowing the class naneliability of their "hatan material", the ideologists of imperialism dm-lAn cf finding an eppertunity to replace man by a machine, a robot. But life reparliated these attempts and, inasmuch as they appeared impractical, tee seeTtionary circles of imperialism in recent years have intensified the their soldier and officers, striving to have them reliably and ea'eaierre:y carry oat their desien. The direction of this work is based on ear principles 3f psychology and on the newest achievements of science aed ee?,naolegy, and also by calling on nationalistic, corporate, religious, eourse on base feelings and instincts characteristic of many people cf caaitalist soetety. Offieial heads Cf military departments place great hope on the tech- of the technocratic aspect, stressing the psychological development of peremnela Jerome Frank in the article "Psychological Problems of the Naalear Age" writes: "War permits the development of heroism, enterprise and "ieldaess. But hey can these qualities be obtained in peacetime? Only modern science and technology are capable of ensuring the development of such moral eqoivalents," (Break throtia..121s2., New York, 1962). Ameriaan engineers and psychologists, for example, are testing special training chambers in which soldiers are to "develop" the capability to with- stand a whele complex of the strongest experiences: a struggle with the fear of death and unexpected dangers. In the test chamber the person is placed in an extremely difficult situation from which he must "extricate" himacf independently, making an instataneous decision and acting at his 04M reek. Ta tne scientific centers of the USA there are also being con- dan.,ed tests of a means of a biological nature vbect ca: a excite or inhibit proceree end make a person indifferent to danaer, phlegmatic, apas'actir, laboratcries are developing six:cafic recommendations ad a .aultittne of instructions on the psychological preparation of troops. reis direesion, fer example, is widely reflected 30 field regulations of the teeericaa arv a- a section ersitled "Intangible Faer_ors of Combat", by wi:rieh is meant t'ne moral-psychological factors, Tee ellitarist arsenal of moral-ideologieal corraption. of soldiers is continuel]y being replenished ne and modern means capable of crippling the Leycl-e of people and ternieg teem into damb 7ae moral snpremany of the Soviet Armed Forces is indisputable and, etfdent. fie the spriitual preponderance which gives a number of specie fie, decisive advantages, permitting the command to place before personnel. tc.s'ss ef the highest complexity and guaranteeing wieh firm assurance that all effertE will be applied for their accomplishment. Thanks to a preponderance I::'. monal stability, Soviet soldiers are to a lesser degree subject to ideo- lcaasaI diversions in peacetime and to "psychological attacks" on the part of -'se enemy in the ccuree of war. Finally, a s.iritual .re a. ce per- ? ? NA ? a A ? ? ? ? ? (cent' d) CPYR ? n mitApprotegf rfReloaigal2600/018109q CIAARDIRSEATE088M5R11001)010?t0 Welk= of modern armed conflict. Our moral supremacy Is determine by the object- Hive nature of the socio-political and ideal sources, and by the entire Soviet way of life. But it also depends on subjective factors: the state of combat training and of political and military education. An enormous role in till-, matter belongs to the commanders., party organs, party and Komsomol organizations. A constant cuiacern abrxxt the msotery by Coviet soldiers of Marxist-Leninist theory and military knowledne and on their edu- cation in high party and moral-political qualitiee, is the direct responsi- bility and primary task of all commnders and political workers of the army and navy. The continual improvement of moral-psychological preparation is the most important condition for t1'..e further strengthening of the moral forces of Soviet soldiers and the cultivation of our moral supremacy. The basic direction of this work lies in the system of combat and political training, and. in the ideological and military education of Soviet soldiers. It provides for the solution of a dual problem: not only to develop and strengthen needed qualities, but also the expose the specific weaknesses of each soldier -- sluggishness, timidity, susceptibility, im- patience -- and by means of a considerate selection of individual tasks, to assist him in overcoming them. If these deficiencies remain unnoticed in peacetime, then it will be immeasurably more difficult to eliminate them in the course of a war. This is why those qualities which are vitally ne- cessary to a soldier are worked out or developed first. Keenness and flexibility in thinking on the part of military com- manders will acquire exceptional significance in a nuclear war. The scale of things and the need to instantaneously comprehend various information and to make decisions place before him the requirement to fully master the most important techniques and methods of dialectical logic. The training of our command cadres is based primarily on a deep undortanding of general principles and methods, and not on rote learning of specific solutions and diagrams. Flexible thinking based on firm knowledge and exercises of the mind strengthens the moral forces of a commander, since it permits him to make an exceedingly rapid evaluation of what has taken place and to pick the most reasonable and logically sound solution. Modern warfare demands from every serviceman a high state of discip- line and self-discipline. Every Soviet soldier must learn to carry out his duties not only on the basis of an order, but according to the dictates of his reason and his heart. The more deeply he realizes the necessity for un- questioning discipline, the easier it is for him to accept military ser- vice. The essence of discipline is the fulfillment of therequirement'of regulations and obedience to orders, instruction, rules and laws. But fre- quently the soldier must himself decide how to act. Self-discipline helps him in Fuch instances. It affords the opportunity to fully control one's feelings, master them, and suppress temporary outbreaks of weakness. Self- discipline also plays a tremendous role in the peacetime training of troops. The fighter pilot, radar operator, sentry, driver and tank crew, and soldiers Approved ror Release 2000/00/00 . CIA-ROPO5T00075R000300000010-5 (c 'd) ? CPYRGI- T00875RQ00300090010-5 ApprOVed-.,FictrrRi*??0,9PP/RPM6xCi ri-Mocus- or tame atone with the clemeneo, alone witt themselves. And only their own conscience, their sense of dAv and ticb. stnte of self-discipline guide them in this period, issning from the nature and demands of modern warfare, of paramount sin.lf'cance is the training of a commander who is ready for actionr which ctocio?ve to the point of audacity, and who has a high and firm moral cedexanee, by which is understood the capability of a person to endure long pv;;t::, 1 and psynl:Lo burdens aJleanjon in moral-combat qualities enriches the personality of a ol.d:Less and immesssurably strengthens his moral powers. Therefore it is reaoo..ianle to create in the course of training .such a situation as has an eic.eff risk eontrollable by the commander). The serviceman must be- come Lnoustmed to meet danger face to face, because the element of war is danZer. When dangerons situations arise quite frequently the soldier develops stable reactions: be reacts more calmly to unexpected situations and over- comes them more cold-bloodedly. Parachute jumps, operations at night, in bad weather or heavy smoke, on unfamiliar terrain, forcing water barriers, wor2; irith starp light or sound pulses adapt the psyche of the soldier to nervons overloads, harden will power and strengthen moral forces. Man Grdnally becomes accustomed to danger as an unavoidable companion of com- bat activity. Ii ligtt of the peculiarities of modern warfare there is being developed a system for the professional selection of soldiers for certain specialties demanding high responsibility under conditions of extremely limited time and strong emotional tension. During the selection consideration must be made for the physical and psychological features of the person, his inclinations, character, temiserament qeickness of reaction, attention, composure and otter ci:;a1itieE, This assists commanders to determine the capabilities of Ecldier more seessfo.11y and with Greatest benefits in accordance with the type of s7/stem he has and his mental and physical. resources. There ese now eaklog place major qoalitative advances in the spiritual coantenacce ce Soviet people: in their education and professicnal prepared- neaa, aga therr, arc ebLages in the motives for acts, in interests and needs. Co1Feciaee+-7 hc fart'ner development of new methods for the moral-psycholog- ieal peepano,Lon rf trocps is completely justified. Sociological research is be'sn tc is :lad, permitting the development of scientifically based pnoesleal recomlnedation for the training and education of personnel. Manno miletary 4'ecory and practice is more successful in solving many poeblems in military affairs. 2te eontinsaal work of commanders and political workers in forming in Soviet soldiers a communist world-outlook and an ideal conviction is based on the reqnirements of the moral code of a builder of communism. On this basis is bail% the eWR,V,AiWiqn?, c hitmApte/R)- wAIIPIVVIKLFPr Fee* RYW./19ffiYd'iYgeafT1? an ilt5piloic o withstanding and cnnqunrieg tne enemy is. modern warfare. ApprovekticavRed easeMODitatiOR0APAIREMEOH7fsta0g090090010-5 ARMED FORCES CPYRGHT Lt. Col L. ALEKSETa The organization of ow' Armed Forces is inseparable from communist morality and Soviet law, which have been approved in socialist society. As is known, service regulations directly control life in the army and navy. Reflected in them are the legal and moral standards which play a major role in education of personnel, strengthening of military disci- pline and increasing the combat readiness of units. Soviet military science is called upon to devote much attention to these questions. Unfortunately our military theoreticians are not very active in the study of this important problem. Only three special works have e- merged in recent years. Certain questions of legal and moral standards have received partial attention in works devoted to other subjects. The given article suggests a new aspect of the problem: the dialectic nature of the connection between morals and law and its appearance in military fact. Legal and moral standards in the Soviet Armed Forces have a num- ber of peculiarities. The first of them is that the basic principle of communist morality are deeply and completely embodied in military laws: devotion to communism, love of the socialist Motherland, pro- letarian internationalism, conscientious work for the good of society, collectivism and others. The principle of devotion to communism which is contained in the basic documents of Soviet military legislation the military oath of enlistment and regulations -- joins the legal standards active in the Soviet Army with the standards of communist morality, at the foundation of which, as V. I. Lenin said, lies the struggle for strengthening and completing communism (Polnoye sobran- iye sochineniy (Complete Collection of Tiorks), vol. 41, page 31377 The idea of the devotion of soldiers to communism as laid out in Soviet military regulations determines the specific political meaning and communist direction of all the requirements of the remaining law- making documents. In this lies the basic difference from similar do- cuments of any army of nonsocialist states. The presence of identical terms in our regulations and those of imperalist armies in no way signifies a similarity of meaning in the ideal and moral sense. Thus for example in the West German "soldier's code" enacted in 1956 are included demands for loyalty, integrit,y, courage, maintaining strict military secrecy, and ';,27.1owing orders to the letter. In bourgeois military reglli1at4ons these r&idirements serve as camouflage for the grasping goals which are foreign to the working masses, whose representatives form the majority of the personnel of capitalist armies. ase 50 CPYRGH ? ApprovecthoreldeUtas.gbatif4uMUtieuiARIVItt?P ItINAPt411,91411,YRIY9Mithbed in military laws is the broad and many-aided use of the categories of duty, honor, worth and justice which are inspired by communist morality. The requirement for soldiers to "conduct themselves with dignity and honor when outside the unit, to restrain themselves and others from violating public order and assist in every way to defend the honor and dignity of citizens" is written into our Code of Disciplinary Punishment. These same caGego-ries of morality found a place in our Interior Service Re- .i atio Vhe serviceman yalues the honor and combat glory of the Armed Forces of the USSR, of his unit and the honor of his military rank," ee4d. use in our regulations of the categories of morality under - the honorableness and eminence of service in the Soviet Army and plays an essential role in the exact, unwavering fulfillment of the de-, mands if dAscipline by seVicemen. ne third feature of Soviet military laws is that many moral stand.ards, in them have been invested with juridicial form. For example, Ar- ticle 40 of the Interior Service Regulations demands that all servicemeh in add:cessing each other polite and dignified and use the term 'You" fT:anslator Note): polite form as opposed to the personal form of address), and Article 44 obliges the Soviet soldier to salute his chief or supeior and in public places in the absense of free seats to give .up his cwn. Many articles could be cited from Soviet military regulations which atteet convincingly to tne fact that in military legislation there is not one juridicial requirement devoid of moral force, that here it is difficult to find a moral standard which has no legal status, and that in the life and activities of the Soviet Army legal and moral standards are closely inter-related. But no matter how large is the number of examples confirming this conclusion, they show only the outer manifes- tation of the unity of morality and law. A statement of the facts does not help in revealing the internal essential ties of legal and moral standards and tne regulafity of their development. V. I. Lenin stres- sed tLe inadequacy of the bare conception of "interaction" in analyzing (,omplex social phenomena. "Interaction ? alone is a void, 4 he wrote in the' margins et' hegel's book The Science of Logic. "The requirement for a ,me&nt l'of communication, this is what we mean in using the relation of c.e:.4eality" .FJolnoye_scbranie sochineniy, vol. 29, pages 146-147). Toe unity of legal and moral standards in the Soviet Armed Forces is determined above all by the nature of the economic, socio-political and ideological attitudes of socialist society. From the point of view of internal conditions, the Soviet Union needs no army. But inasmuch as there remains a military danger stemming from the imperialist camp, the existence of an army is necessary. As regards the foundations of mili- tary discipline and the regulation of relations between servicemen, these are determined by internal conditions. Inherent to socialism are public Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090010-5 PYRG ovsipproimobf dtRelease (20 Q01069/109toCjA%R IBRI61.40 875R40 0301/09041 04 of Emman by man, an inviolable union of the working class and the peasants, the firm friendship of nations and peoples, and the predominance of Marxist-Leninst ideology. These have a decisive influence on the life of the Armed Forces, on the attitudes of Soviet soldiers toward service and on the formation within them of high moral military qualities. In view of this, Soviet military discipline is distinguished by its aware- ness and by the voluntary fulfillment of regulation requirements by ser- vicemen. Discipline in our army is based on tne firm ideal conviction of the Soviet people, on their undoubting cenfidence in the right of their cause, and on the inevitable creativity of sommunism in the whole world. Not coercion, not fear of punishment, but a deep understanding by troops of thdt patriotic duty and international problems, and a supreme fidelity to the socialist Motherland, the Communist Party and one's own people -- this is what characterizes Soviet military discipline and forms the foun- dation of its durability. It is characteristic for our troops to have an efficient organiza4 tion, strict regulation order and a unity of actions in solving problems put before them. Moreover in a nuclear war the responsibility of each soldier for his actions sharply increases. The requirements have in- creased for the combat readiness of troops and for a discipline which can be irreproachably observed by a serviceman who has firm ideals and who is stricltly guided by the requirements of communist morality, by regulations and by the oath of enlistment. The ,unity of legal and moral standards in the Soviet Armed Forces is determined by the socialist public and state system and the necessity for the conscientious and voluntary fulfillmehtsof the prescribed order by servicemen. If the unity of standards of communist morality and Soviet law in relation to the public and state system appears as a con- sequence, then in relation to military discipline and a high combat readiness of troops it is one of the most important immediate conditions. The standards of communist morality in our regulations reflect a process taking place now within the Soviet Armed Forces of an ever firmer adoption of them in the practice of military life and existence of the troops. The presence of many moral standards in the regulations of the Soviet Army bear witness that they are simultaneously legal standards, the observance of which is not only voluntary (on the basis of personal conviction), but is also enforced by the authority of the military com- mander as given to him by the state. The close, unbreakable interrelationship, deep interpenetration of legal and moral standards and the extremely important role of moral or- igins in the fulfillment of regulation requirements are somettoes examined from one side only. For example military duty is seen only as a moral obligation. Thus, in the opinion of Colonel V. Msrozov, "Soviet military dut,7 stems from the conditions of life of Soviet society and is the moral Approved For Release 2000/08/0542: CIA-RDP85T00875R00030009ROARA) APngtkefi WEL*1#q?4.P9191WPS &P9A1ned Force e, to defend the conquests of socialism and the peaceful labor of the peaeLle from aggression on the part of the imperialists." This state- ment ie true. Bat military duty cannot be reduced to only a moral stand- aed. It ia also a legal obligation which is expressed in the categoric demands of the laws to observe strict discipline and the order established In te Scviet Aamy, and with weapon in hand to defend the Motherland. If a paxeai.cular lerviceman for some reason does not fulfill this obli- thatoa, then in addition to measure of moral influence there are ap- plied melleures of legal influence in the form of disciplinary punish- meeta or aeiminal puniehment. The exietence of a legal and a moral side to Soviet military duty and the diffeeence between juridicial and moral evaluations of the actions of aervicemen attests that the unity of legal and moral standards in the Seviet Armed Forces does not mean that they are uidentical. It, like any other unity of interrelated sides, is relative and incomplete. "A complete correspondence," as V% I. Lenin pointed out, "does not occur even in the simplest forms of nature. ..Unity (correspondence, identity, equivalence) of opposites is conditional, temporary, ephemeral, relative" Cfolaoye EL2..blnlsochineniz, vol. 26, pages 152453 and vol. 29, page 31.7). The relegation of Soviet military duty only to a moral Obligation leads teachers to an idealization of the nmytives for the conduct of Ger- vicemen and caueee serioag errors in the practice of educational work. When it is necessary to make use of the authority granted them, they use persaaeion. Thie especially concerns those intolerable cages of drunken nes occurring in the army which frequently lead to serious incidents. But the otherextreme may bring no less damage. We are speaking here about relegating military duty only to a legal obligation. Those who favor this point of view underestimate the enormous force of commu- nigt moral eeaching, eubetitute for it bare administration and abuse diseiplinary lawe. They believe the surest means of strengthening dis- cipline to be tereate and the application of strict punishment measurea. But punishment alone :lannot ensure the proper conduct of a serviceman, epeeially in a ceMost situation. Eere a conecientious, voluntary obe- dience is extremely neceseary. Soviet military duty is at the same time both moral and a legal ob- ligation. They are aetermined on the one hand by the diverge origin of jaridicial and morel standard and the diseimilar degree of their indepen- deaee eelative to the economic foundation and its political superatructure, on the other hand; by the variance of controlled social attitudes, the difference in regelation, detail, determination of their requirements, authorizations and prohibitione, and finally on the diverse relationship and role of conviction and coercion. These differences lead inevitably to contradictions, in the solution of which legal standards are renewed in a timely manner and are cited in accordance with the moral criterion aaaieey. at t:ee. Approvpri For RPIPASP 9nnninginq ? ciA_Rnpgs-rnmaspnnnannnqnnin_s (cont'd) Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T008 5R000300090010-5 In our active service regulations the basic demands of communist CPYRGHIoral standards have found the greatest reflection. Everything in them that was outmoded has been eliminated, the enormous importance of mea- sures of encouragement in troop training has been stressed, and also there have been introduced many new statements answering the daily requirements of the time and the program -equiremente of the party in educating a buil- der of communism, a man of high awareneen -- a soldier and reliable pro- tector of his Motherland. As a result, there have been intensified inter- relationships, interaction and interpenetration of administrative-legal and moral standards which answer the requirements of the time -- the period of developed building of communism in our country. The decisions of the 22nd Party Congress and the Program of the CPSU accepted there have created new premises for the best transformation into life of the requirements of combined arms regulations. The Program of the CPSU points out In the process of transition to communism the role of moral origins is increasing more and more in the life of so- ciety, the sphere of influence of the moral factor is brow3cning and accordingly the significance of administrative regulation of the inter- relationships between people is decreasing." This most important con- clusion of the Program of our party has also a great meaning for our Soviet Armed Forces. As there is an increase in the comprehensive de- velopment of spiritual and moral qualities in the Soviet people entering the army, the significance of coercion in the education of troops will decrease. The interrelations of Soviet soldiers are based on the principle of the moral code of a builder of communising one man !.s to another a friend, comrade and brother. Based on the program requirements of the moral code of a builder of communism, our regulations receive a richer moral content which is perceived still more clearly and strongly by the consciousness of servicemen. But this is not the only thing. Much de- pends on their practical fulfillment, in other words, on the accumulating disciplinary practice in the troop units and the actions of the service- men themselves. It is known that the acts and deeds of soldiers can correspond to or contradict the legal and moral standards, and on the force of this can be correct of incorrect. Therefore the category of justice includes a legal and a moral side. If the legal evaluation of acts is performed on the basis of legislation in effect and acknowledges them as lawful or unlawful (juridicially significant or indifferent), then the moral evaluation implies a recognition of good or evil in a particular act, and censure or praise of it. On the force of this the moral and legal sides, as a rule, coincide, and comprise a united (common) evaluation of a serviceman's acts. Approved For Release 2000/08/9i CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090010-5 Ap CPYRGHT ?? mr roved WeRelm%Res0010i8gOre9 ? CIA-RDPA8T00875R000300090010-5 ver, wnen tnese evaluations do not coincide. The objective source of their divergence is that in the military regu- lations it is impossible to foresee all the diversity of situations which could practically arise in life and in the cotbat activities of troops. Regulation statutes cannot pretend to be an absolutely exact reproduction of the necessary order in all components and details, al- though the legislator strives for this to the maximum. Therefore the siscisation of an act, based only on regulation standards, will not al- sa, Ss sxhaustive. The moral evaluation is freer, reacts more flexi- b).y c the smallest changes in the situation, and better and more ct:siders personal motives in view of its lesser formalization. Therefore the more purposeful is the objective unity of regulation ad moral standards, the more effective are these standards and the grester benefit they bring in the combat and political training of troops. Experience has shown that in disciplinary practice as in other forms of service activity, when giving orders it is obligatory to give a thorough consideration to the relations of the legal and moral elements. Only under this condition will any disciplinary punishment, encouragement, or requirements of orders and instructions of commanders and supervisors be accepted by subordinates as just from all points of view and subject to incontrovertible fulfillment, and it will have the strongest moral influence on the soldiers. One-man command is a political phenomenon inasmuch as its content reflects the policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet government as carried out in the Armed Forces. In addition it is also a legal plir,c)m-Jnon, since the rights and obligations of commanders are secured ln .3,cev1et laws, the oath of enlistment, regulations, manuals, instruc- t-Lons and orders. .tit at the same time one-man management is also a mor':,1 phenomenon. Inasmuch as the activity of commanders touches the mor.E.,J relations between servicemen along with the service relationships, SO the personal merits and actions of one-man managers also play an im- % poft?nt part in the education of subordinates. The essence of the torrl. slde of one,man command in the Soviet Armed Forces was clearly define(' h) Lty: Minister of Defence, Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Malinovkiy! The one-man-command should so exert his influence on subordinates that it rebpect, and love him" rhe moral side of one-man command acquires an especially important meaing under present-day conditions, when the moral origins have been renewed in the life of all our society, when the Soviet Armed Forces are being transformed into an army of highly conscientious builders of communism and as a result of the revolution in military affairs the role of the moral-combat qualities of a man in war has increased. The renewed significance of the moral side in the activities of commanders demands that they be extremely exactisg and at the same time display a more hu Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-ITP85T00875R00030009001RA ad) YRGHT subor ina es. The constant tie of a commander with his subordinates and his con- cern for them was always an important factor in the successful activities of one-man managers in our army and navy, but they are especially neces- sary in present-day conditions. The Soviet commander has always sought the most reasonable methods and best ways to fight human faults and er- rors, and has weighed his decision to make sure it did not cause unneces- sary mental pain and useless moral suffering to the subordinate. Hs actions raised those who stumbled, and caused them to carry out any or- der without hesitation. All this has an especially important meaning under present-day conditions. In deciding the fate of soldiers, the (--) commander will not act thus: he determined the weight of the s.ct, con- sidered how many times this error has been committed by the suoordinate, and the decision is ready -- receive your punishment. Unfortunately some commanders, without thinking of the consequences of their decision, concern themselves only with not overstepping the rights given them by the military regulations. Such a one-sided approach causes great harm to disciplinary practice and does not facilitate the prevention of vio- lations of order by servicemen, but on the contrary, leads to a repeti- tion of the violations of discipline and the regulation requirements on the part of some of the soldiers. Consequently only a thorough approach to a soldier can produce positive results in the practice of training and education of subordinates by superiors. The most important condition of the effectiveness of educational measures is the authority of the superior in the eyes of the subordinates and his high commander's official qualities: military mastery, military- technical knowledge and habits. Each commander must know military affairs well, must carry out his service obligations in exemplary fashion, and also must serve as a positive example for subordinatesAn observing the standards of communist morality. How he conducts himself, how he is on and off the job -- on this to a large degree depends his success in the leadership sand education of subordinates. Subordinates love a superior who is exacting, but just; direct and honest, and they sincerely emulate him. A commander who is himself not faultless, even though he be demand- ing, does not enjoy authority over his subordinates and his formal punish- ments do not give the desired positive results. Unlawful orders and nonregulation measures of influence on subordi- nates on thepart of certain commanders cause an especially great harm to the education of subordinates. Such instances in the practice of some officers are explained on the one hand by their low level of legal know- ledge, unfamiliarity with the laws and regulations, and on the other hand by a formal approach to the observance and execution of legal standards. But the most reasonable ways and means of active education of subordinates appear in Soviet military legislation and in military regulations. The correct use of regulation standards and the skillful use of their enormous Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090010-5 56 (cont'd) CIA FI)D FCTI'D T RAN c; I ATI 0 NS FROM FDD trvOyFNNAyA , , , P ANS 'N PYRGHT 0-5 ApprOvedeForiReleaser200/Mit6 icilAIRAM5 T,M WO 9 *9/Pe9 - 001no corrobo- ration of the standards of communist morality in the consciousness and conduct of Soviet troops. It should be stressed that the inability of cerrain commanders and political workers to organically combine in edu- cational work the moral and legal standards is partiallly explained also by the absence in omstrictprs pf sufficient knowledge in the field of Marxist-Leninist theory and socialist law, pedagogy and psychology. is is ssxremely necessary to overcome this deficiency. For this, s_os otner measures, we must intensify the legal training both of ',,,sc9.ds. experienced officers and of young officers, and give the %he foundations of knowledge of Soviet legislation in military &S:,00ls. At present, unfortunately, the future commanders do not ss- Ce'J.'sS minimum of juridicial knowledge necessary to them fcr practi- cal work among the troops. Arriving at a unit after completion of school, the young officers by far do not everywhere and always have op- portuni-sies to supplement their knowledge. Therefore the suggestions expressed in our military publications about the creation of juridicial facslties in evening universities of Marxism-Leninism and about the in- clusion into plans for officer training the foundations of Soviet legis- las.2.on deeerve thorough support. These are anme of the recommendations which come out of an analysis of tse .snity of legal and moral standards in the Soviet Armed Forces at the present stage. The theoretical development of this problem will undoubtedly be of use to the practice of combat and political training and the matter of training and education of the troops of our Armed Forces. Notes: 1. Skripilev. "Morals, Right, and Military Duty." Kommunistiches- kaya moral i voinekiy.121g (Communist Morality and Military -TUT' 'vovenizdat, :. F. PozbezhLsics., aria ). N. Artamonov. Deuvs-Voinsisvod._212s2111 :sskh praro. oacrii povedenza_l_dgpilel'ncsti voyenno-sluzhashchikh yAi?ossy legulations: A Code of Moral and Legal Rules of Cal:KC-rend -scon for Vii1taTy Servicemen). Textbook, Higher Pedagogical Aca- aemy f.meni Lenin, 1962. Skryl'nik. "Moral Standards and Requirements of Regulations." communist 7.22T2:412222121 Sill No 18, 1963. 2. A. S. Milovidov. Moral'qmhaeks i nravstvenno e vospitTlim voinov (Morality Code and the Moral Training of Soldiers); Voyenizdat, 1964. Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : crA-RDP85T00875R0003000900Wo?t,d) YRGHT AggE?oRtrY 1964. 0= V.? Mill id, :ox rx s cs .14-Au-v2141 4.7.J 961d10?00iten5n tal g er 'e?agog cal academy imeni Lenin, Soldaten esetz (Soldiers' Code). Munich and Berlin, 1957. Chapters 1-18. Ditstplinarnyy ustav Vooruzhennykh Sil S.2yuza SSR (Disciplinary Re- gulations of the USSR Armed Forces), 1960, p.3. Ustav vloIlasu_Elatx2.22E12112217kh Sil Soyuza SSR (Regulations bf,theInternaltServide of the:ITSCRIrved:)Forces), 1960, p.3. Ivlaterialy XXII s'exda KPSS (Materials of the 22nd Congress), Gospolitizdat, 1961, p. 464. Sbornik trudov akademii No 64 (Collection of Works of Academy No 64), a publication of the Military Academy of the General Staff, 1960, p. 189. Avtoritet komandira (The Authority of the Commander). Voyenizdat, 1963, p. 13. Approved For Release 2000108109: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090010-5 58