COMMUNIST CHINA: FOREIGN TRADE 1967 AND PROSPECTS FOR 1968

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010004-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 1, 2009
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 1, 1968
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENG,E
Intelligence Memorandum
Communist China: Foreign Trade
1967 and.Prospects for 1968
DOCUMENT LIBRARY
RLE COPY
DD NOT DESTROY
25X1
Secret
Secret
ER IM 68-54
MAY 1968
COPY NO. 62
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended,
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law,
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The data for 1967 in this memorandum are
preliminary estimates and subject to modification
as additional information becomes available.
Because of rounding, compcnents may not add to the
totals shown in the -cables and tabulations. Ton-
nages are in metric tons.
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Communist China: Foreign Trade
1967 and Prospects for 1968
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
May 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SECRET
S nary
The steady recovery of Communist China's
foreign trade, which began in 1963, came to an
abrupt halt in 1967. Preliminary estimates place
total turnover for 1967 at $4.2 billion, 3 per-
cent below the total of $4.3 billion in 1966.
Imports increased slightly as a result of larger
COMMUNIST CHINA: FOREIGN TRADE
1959 AND 1963-67
4,265
1959 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research.
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purchases from Western Europe, but exports went
down moderately because of the disturbances of the
Cultural Revolution and strained relations with Hong
Kong and the USSR. Given the self-imposed problems
confronting China in 1967, the trade performance was
a remarkably successful one. Foreign trade in 1968
probably will show a more pronounced decline.
China's trade with Communist countries dropped
8 percent, resulting in a further increase in the
Free World share of Chinese trade, to 75 percent.
Trade with the USSR continued its decline, reflect-
ing political differences; trade with other Communist
areas fell off by small amounts. With respect to
the Free World, the higher turnover with Western
Europe and Australia almost offset reductions in
trade with the less developed countries, Hong Kong,
Japan, and Canada. Sino-Japanese trade declined
for the first time since 1959 because of Chinese
export problems and a shift of some Chinese import
business to Western Europe.
Grain imports fell 20 percent in 1967 because
China's requirements were lower in the second half
of the year as a result of an excellent harvest.
Machinery and equipment purchases moved down mod-
erately following a decline in contracts for whole
plants, but took over from foodstuffs as the lead-
ing commodity group imported. Steel and fertilizer
imports increased considerably. Imports of machinery
and equipment most closely related to the defense
effort appear to have continued on a priority basis.
China's exports declined generally, but textiles and
foodstuffs were particularly hard hit.
Preliminary calculations lead to an estimate
that China's balance of payments with the Free World
showed a deficit of $55 million in 1967 compared
with a surplus of $155 million in 1966. Neverthe-
less, Chinese reserves of gold and foreign exchange
at the end of 1967 were at least $600 million, a
level considered adequate for emergency requirements.
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1. The steady recovery in Communist China's
foreign trade, which began in 1963, came to an abrupt
halt in 1967. Preliminary estimates place total
turnover in 1967 at roueyhly $4.2 billion, 3 percent
below the total of $4.3 billion in 1966. Imports
are believed to have increased 1 percent to about
$2.1 billion, and exports declined 6 percent (see
Tables 1, 2, and 3). The following tabulation gives
trade turnover in the past five years as well as
for 1959, the peak year prior to the collapse of the
Leap Forward:
Million US $
1959
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
Turnover
4,265
2, 770
3,220
3,850
4,295
4, 1 80
Imports
2,065
1,200
1,470
1,855
2,045
2,075
Exports
2,205
1,575
1,750
1,995
2,245
2,110
Imports
2. China's imports edged up by about $30 mil-
lion in 1967 because of a rapid rise in purchases
from Western Europe, as shown in the following
tabulation:
Million US $
1966
1967
Total imports
2,045
2,075
Western Europe
510
695
Canada, Australia,
and Argentina
405
320
Japan
331
302
USSR
175
130
Other
624
628
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3. Imports from Western Europe increased 36
percent, or $185 million. Larger imports of steel
and fertilizer highlighted this rise. Purchases
from Western Europe would have risen even further
but for the closure of the Suez Canal, which created
a backlog of several months in fertilizer shipments
and caused a two-week break in the delivery of
China's other imports. Shipping delays were aggra-
vated by congestion in Chinese ports and by harass-
ment of crews of foreign ships during intense periods
of the Cultural Revolution.
4. Lower purchases from other major areas offset
most of the rise in imports from Western Europe.
Grain imports from Canada, Australia, and Argentina
fell by about $85 million in 1967. This reduction
reflected the excellent Chinese harvest of 1967.
Japan's exports to China declined by $29 million
because a Western European cartel gave China sub-
stantial price concessions on fertilizer and
because China insists that trade with Japan remain
balanced. Finally, Sino-Soviet trade suffered
further from heightened political hostilities;
Chinese imports from the Soviet Union declined by
about $45 million. China's imports from other areas
were a mixture of small increases and decreases.
Exports
5. After four years of uninterrupted recovery,
Chinese exports declined by an estimated $135 mil-
lion in 1967. The only bright spot was exports to
Malaysia and Singapore, as shown in the following
tabulation:
Million US $
Total exports
2,245
2,110
Western Europe
365
335
Japan
291
256
Hong Kong
a/
377
320
Malaysia
and Singapore
142
185
USSR
145
130
Other
925
884
a. Net of entrepot trade with third countries.
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6. Export performance during the year was
strongly influenced by both internal and foreign
developments. By 1967 much of the domestic industrial
capacity idled by the Leap Forward was back in opera-
tion and the traditional markets had been recovered.
But overall exports were hurt when the disruptions
of the Cultural Revolution curtailed the production
of some export goods and hampered the internal trans-
portation of others. Also, China's exports to Japan
and Western Europe, which had expanded rapidly from
1963 until 1966, declined by $65 million in 1967
primarily because of reduced foreign demand. Finally,
the direct political confrontation with Hong Kong and
the USSR, which arose out of the Cultural Revolution,
caused a combined loss of $72 million in exports to
these two areas.
7. Despite these problems, China was able to
keep the decline in exports well controlled. During
the final quarter of the year the Cultural Revolution
moderated, exports to Hong Kong revived, and the
Canton Trade Fair was completed successfully follow-
ing a month's delay. Moreover, export losses were
partially offset by export gains in some less de-
veloped countries, notably Malaysia and Singapore.*
Direction of Trade
8. Preliminary estimates of Communist China's
trade in 1967 indicate a decline of about 1 percent
with the Free World and roughly 8 percent with the
Communist countries. The Free World share of China's
trade rose slightly, to 75 percent, as follows:
it Because presently available information on
China's trade with the Zess developed countries in
1967 is so fragmentary, it is possible that later
information will show a larger than estimated in-
crease in exports to these countries.
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1966
1967
Million
US $
Percent
Million
US $
Percent
Total trade
4,295
100
4,180
100
Free World
3,160
74
3,140
75
Developed
countries
1,845
43
1,975
47
Less developed
countries
910
21
825
20
Hong Kong and
Macao a/
400
9
340
8
Communist
1,135
26
1,040
75
USSR
320
7
255
6
Other
815
19
785
19
a. Net of entrepot trade with third countries.
9. The slight drop of $20 million in China's
trade with the Free World in 1967 was the net re-
sult of increases with the developed countries and
reductions with the less developed countries and
Hong Kong. The more marked decline of $95 million
with the Communist countries resulted from a sharp
drop in trade with the USSR and small reductions
with other Communist areas. Thus trade with the
developed countries in 1967 was the only major
source of growth in China's trade, which became
still more oriented toward these countries.
10. Trade developments in 1967 changed the
ranking of China's ten major trading partners, as
follows:
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Percent Percent
Million of Total Million of Total
US -$ World
Total ten major
countries 2,600
Japan 622
Hong Kong a/ 380
USSR 320
West Germany 217
Canada 214
Malaysia and
Singapore 190
United Kingdom 177
Cuba 170
France 160
North Korea 150
US $ World
Total ten major
61 countries 2, 519 60
14 Japan 558 13
9 Hong Kong a/ 321 8
7 West Germany 292 7
5 USSR 255 6
5 Australia 231 6
Malaysia and
4 Singapore 228 5
4 United Kingdom 201 5
4 France 146 3
4 Cuba 144 3
3 Italy 143 3
a. Net of entrepot trade with third countries.
Free World
11. Japan remained China's leading trading
partner in 1967 despite a 10-percent drop in their
trade. China's imports of Japanese fertilizer and
steel declined in the face of increased competition
from Western Europe, and Chinese exports of rice
fell by almost one-half because of a bumper harvest
in Japan. Exports of fish also showed a considera-
ble decline, probably because of Cultural Revolution
disturbances. Many other exports, however, showed
moderate increases.
12. Western Europe, led by West Germany, Italy,
and the United Kingdom, registered substantial growth
in trade with China. Marked increases in Chinese
purchases of steel and fertilizer were highlights.
Imports from West Germany increased 64 percent over-
all, with steel purchases nearly five times the
1966 level. China's exports to West Germany and
most other major countries in the area declined,
primarily because of the slowdown in Western Europe's
growth rate. Both imports aad exports increased
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in trade with Italy, however, raising this turnover
by 27 percent despite some shipments of spoiled
Chinese pork and a few delays in unloading caused
by Chinese infractions of Italian port regulations.
13. China's trade with the United Kingdom was
buffeted during the last quarter of 1967 by the
Hong Kong disturbances and the sacking of the British
Embassy in Peking. Both imports and exports were
hurt in Chinese trade with the United Kingdom. Im-
ports, however, had been growing earlier in the year,
and China's trade with the United Kingdom increased
by 14 percent for the year as a whole. Sino-French
trade fell off 9 percent, principally because the
large sales of French trucks in 1966 were not re-
peated in 1967.
14. Canada and Australia swapped places in 1967
as China's primary and secondary grain suppliers.
Chinese imports from Canada slumped 45 percent and
purchases from Australia soared 114 percent. Ex-
ports to these countries have been pushed by the
Chinese as a small counterbalance to huge grain
purchases, and in 1967 exports rose by 39 percent,
to $25 million, with Canada and by 8 percent, to
$26 million, with Australia.
15. China's trade with the less developed
countries of the Free World declined by about $85
million in 1967 because Argentina did not maintain
the large grain sales of 1964-66: Sino-Argentine
trade plummeted by $107 million, or 94 percent.
On the other hand, Chinese exports to Malaysia and
Singapore evinced only minor effects of the Cultural
Revolution and advanced by 30 percent for the year.
Trade with Pakistan rose to an estimated $100
million, an increase of 54 percent. Finally, trade
with the United Arab Republic and Syria declined
substantially as a result of the June war and the
closure of the Suez Canal. Trade with other less
developed countries probably showed only minor
changes. These estimates of trade with the less
developed countries of the Free World are based on
fragmentary data.
i6. Political confrontation and Cultural Revo-
lution disturbances had a serious impact on China's
exports to Hong Kong in 1967. Despite the
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importance of Hong Kong to China as a source of
hard currency earnings, the Chinese regime permit-
ted disruptions which cut exports by about 20
percent during the second quarter and by about 60
percent during the third quarter of the year. Ex-
ports revived in the fourth quarter, but trade for
the year fell an estimated $59 million.
Communist Countries
17. Sino-Soviet trade also felt the effects of
China's political belligerence and internal turmoil
in 1967. Chinese vituperation and intransigence
delayed until July the signing of a trade agreement
with the USSR, thus reportedly reducing the quantity
of timber the Soviets could deliver and reducing
the value of the trade agreement by 16 percent from
the level of 1966. Following the signing of the
agreement a number of problems, such as the inci-
dent with the Soviet ship, Sversk, at Dairen in
August 1967, hampered the fulfillment of trade con-
tracts. Thus Sino-Soviet trade in 1967 declined by
roughly 20 percent, to $255 million.
18. Most trade agreements with Eastern European
Communist countries called for an increase in trade,
but China's exports to these countries suffered the
same problems encountered by exports to Western
Europe, and two-way trade probably fell slightly.
Trade with North Korea and Mongolia probably de-
clined because of differences with China over the
Cultural Revolution and because of further polari-
zation in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Estimated trade
with North Vietnam increased in 1967 because of
Chinese aid deliveries in support of the war. Trade
with Albania probably increased slightly -- also
because of Chinese aid. Finally, Sino-Cuban trade
fell off an estimated 15 percent, reflecting the
continued cool relations between the two countries.
Commodity Composition
19. The composition of Communist China's trade
in 1967 changed markedly as a result of the Cultural
Revolution, the improved agricultural picture, and
probably some change in import priorities, as shown
in the following tabulation:
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Million US $
Imports
Exports
1966
1967
1966
1967
Total trade
2,045
23075
2,245
2,110
Foodstuffs
Of which:
510
410
630
590
Grain
400
315
155
125
Crude materials
350
385
485
465
Chemicals
Of which:
250
300
90
85
Fertilizer
150
180
0
0
Manufactures
Of which:
905
950
925
870
Textiles
35
40
480
440
Iron and steel
Machinery and
225
275
90
80
equipment
455
435
N.A.
N.A.
Unspecified
25
30
115
100
20. China's commodity imposts in 1967 featured
reduced imports of grain and machinery and equip-
ment and increased purchases of steel and fertilizer.
Grain imports were maintained in the first half of
the year, but the Chinese failed to contract for
Canadian deliveries in the second half, possibly in
anticipation of an excellent domestic harvest.
Australia was the only major supplier in the second
half of 1967. Thus grain imports fell sharply from
5.8 million tons ($400 million) in 1966 to 4.5 mil-
lion tons ($315 million) in 1967.
21. Imports of machinery and equipment from
Japan and Western Europe fell off moderately in 1967
after a rapid rise each year from 1963 to 1966.
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This reduction may reflect confusion and disruption
in Chinese long-range planning as a result of the
Cultural Revolution. China has not ordered any
major Industrial plants from the Free World since
early 1966; its purchases of machine tools, how-
ever, were a notable exception to the general decline
in machinery imports in 1967. Imports of machine
tools from Japan and Western Europe.tripled in the
first six months of 1967. These imports are play-
ing an important role in China's.modern weapons
program and the development of its general military-
industrial base.
22. Chinese purchases of steel and fertilizer
accelerated in 1967. Imports of steel from Japan
and Western Europe increased 49 percent in the first
half of 1967. Purchases from the USSR, however, may
have declined in 1967 as in 1966. Fertilizer imports
in 1967 were about 60 percent higher in terms of
quantity than in 1966. Primarily as a result of
hard bargaining, which whipsawed Western European
and Japanese producers, China paid only about 20
percent more than the $150 million expended for
fertilizer in 1966.
23. Among Chinese commodity exports, textiles
and foodstuffs probably declined substantially,
and other categories may have showed some small
reductions. Textile exports to Hong Kong fell
abruptly in 1967, and exports to other countries in
Asia and Africa may have declined. Food exports
to Japan and Hong Kong fell by 25 percent in 1967.
Free World
24. Communist China's balance of payments with
the Free World deteriorated during 1967 because of
a reversal in the commodity trade balance and a
reduction in credit receipts. These developments
ended the balance-of-payments surplus China had
maintained since 1964 and probably caused a deficit
of about $55 million, as follows :
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Million US $
Balance of payments with
the Free World
155
-55
Commodity trade balance
105
-80
Overseas remittances
70
70
Net credits from the
Free
World
45
25
Foreign
World
aid to Free
countries
-50
-55
Other transactions
-15
-15
25. The estimated commodity trade balance of
China changed radically from a surplus of $105
million in 1966 to a deficit of $80 million in 1967
because of the curtailment of exports and the slight
rise in imports described above. Overseas remittances
leveled off at $70 million in 1967, after a $20
million decline in 1966.
26. Credit receipts from the Free World declined
by about $20 million in 1967 because China elected
to pay cash for some Australian grain and because
drawings on credits for whole plants have probably
tapered off. Although China's credit drawings ex-
ceeded repayments by an estimated $25 million in
1967, this increment to its indebtedness was offset
by the devaluation of the pound. China netted a
$30 million windfall at the time of the devaluation
because the majority of its debts in the Free World
were denominated in pounds sterling with no value
guarantee. Thus China's estimated indebtedness to
the Free World actually showed a small decline,
from $310 million in 1966 to $305 million in 1967.
27. Chinese aid in the form of cash and
commodities to lees developed countries of the Free
World increased by about 10 percent in 1967 to an
estimated $55 million. The two major recipients
were the United Arab Republic, which was granted
$11 million in wheat (1.50,000 tons) and $10 mil-
lion in hard currency following the June war, and
Pakistan, which drew about $12 million on commodity
credits.
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Communist Countries*
28. In 1967 as in 1966, China's balance of
payments with the Communist countries probably
showed moderate changes. Chinese exports to Com-
munist countries probably fell short of planned
levels in 1967 for the same reasons .that exports to
the Free World declined, and China-probably drew on
clearing credits to finance the trade..deficits. The
export surplus in China's trade with North Vietnam
and Albania probably increased moderately along with
larger aid deliveries.
Reserve Position
29. Despite an unfavorable balance of payments
with the Free World, Chin ,e reserves remained ade-
quate through 1967 and included sufficient Western
currency for China to purchase about $50 million
worth of gold following the British devaluation in
November 1967. Moreover, as a partial offset to
the balance of payments deficit, China produced
roughly $25 million in gold during 1967. Thus the
country's total reserves of gold and foreign ex-
change probably declined by only about $30 million
to an estimated $600 million, as shown in the
following tabulation:
China's trade and paymento relations with
Communist countries are bilateral. Since any trade
imbalances that occur are usually matched by
credits or settled through trade the following year,
these accounts have little effect on Chinese re-
serves of gold and foreign exchange,
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r-1i'1J.ion US
1.966
1967
Total
Gold
Foreign
Exchange
Total
Gold
Foreign
Exchange
Beginning reserves
450
308
142
630
370
260
Changes:
Balance of payments
with the Free World
155
0
155
-55
0
-55
Gold purchases
0
37
-37
0
50
-50
Gold production
25
25
0
25
25
Year-end reserves
630
3/0
760
600
445
155
Prospects for 1968
30. Communist China's foreign trade probably will
show a more pronounced decline in 1968 than in 1967.
imports should fall off because of reduced export
earnings and because investment planning was serious-
ly disrupted during 1967. Exports probably will
decline because of continuing disruptions in industry,
transportation, and economic administration. Many of
the economic dislocations of 1967 will have their
major impact on trade in 1968. The decline in trade
should not exceed 10 percent unless the Cultural
Revolution intensifies. Domestic disturbances have
continued through the first four months of 1968, and
major ports are still experiencing cargo-handling
problems. On the positive side, transportation has
gradually improved since 1967, and China's external
trade relations are not now suffering from intense
political influences such as the confrontation with
Hong Kong in 1967.
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31. Import contracts for. 1968 are running later
and arc generally smaller than in 1967. Unsettled
domestic conditions, confused planning, and the
devaluation of the British pound have delayed many
cf China's annual import contracts some by three
months and longer. The 1967 Fall. Canton Trade Fair
was held one month late because of violence in
Cantor, and some import contracts were held up long-
er because the pound devalued just after the fair
got under way. The Sino-Japane3e trade agreement
was not signed until March 1968, more than three
months later than usual. (China has signed a semi-
official trade agreement with Japan each year since
1962. Transactions under this agreement accounted
for about one-third of Sino-Japane o trade in 1967.)
Commodity contracts under the agreement were held
up another month by fears of a second pound devalua-
tion. In late April, contracting began after the
French franc was chosen as a new settlement currency.
32. Negotiations for fertilizer imports from
Nitrex, a Western European cartel, have been delayed
more than four months because of a dispute over
payment of extra shipping costs on the 1967 contract.
Last year Nitrex sold China $100 million worth of
fertilizer..
33. Grain imports scheduled thus far are $60
million short of the $315 million delivered in 1967.
The 1968 grain harvest in China probably will be less
than last year's excellent harvest. It is -inlikely
that weather conditions will be as favorable as in
1967, and the regime is having problems supplying
such agricultural inputs as chemical fertilizer and
agricultural tools to rural areas. Thus China may
make additional contracts for grain in the second
half of the year, which could push grain imports
to t.te 1966 level of $400 million.
34. Machinery and equipment orders in 1967 were
much lower than in previous years, and no major
whole plants have been contracted since early 1966.
As a result, China's purchases of machinery and
equipment will probably show a substantial decline
in 1968. Steel contracts in licate imports of this
commodity will probably continue to increase at
least through the first half of 1968.
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35. China's exports appear to be in short supply
for 1968. At the 1^>67 Fall Canton Fair, purchasers
from Japan and Western Europe were unable to obtain
some traditional commodities, and the Chinese offered
unusually long delivery dates on many others. Total
exports contracted under the Sino-Japanese trade
agreement in March were substantially lower because
China could not offer any coal and Japan would not
take more than 100,000 tons of rice. More recently,
early reports from the Spring Canton Fair (scheduled
for 15 April to 15 May 1968) complain that Chinese
exports are generally higher priced and of poorer
quality.
36. Reduced trade and delayed contracting are
showing up in early trade statistics reported by
a few major trading partners, as shown in the follow-
ing tabulation:
M. llion US $
January-February January-February
1967 - 1968
Turnover Imports Exl.~.ts Turnover Imports Exports
19. s' 1 5 P. 3 17 3 , 5 62.6 110.9
Japan 66.9 24.3 42.6 57.8 27.4 30.4
Hong Kong a/ 85.8 Negl. 85,7 60.6 Negl. 60.5
lost Germany 38.1 30.3 7.8 32.4 25.1 7. 3
United Kingdom :9.0 12.66 16.2 22.7 10.0 12.7
a. Including ;'Minc'e c?xparto reexported to third countries.
37. Sino-Japanese trade should fall again in
1968 because of China's declining export capability
and because of another drop in Japanese demand for
Chinese rice. Japanese steel se.les have recovered
after losing ground to Western Europe in 1967, but
prospects for machinery and equipment sales appear
less bright.
38. Trade with Western Europe probably will
decline in 1968 because of higher freight costs and
because China is no longer able to finance its
SECRET
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 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010004-6
SECRET
large trade deficit with this area out of current
export earnings. Imports will include grain from
France worth $40 million, but these purchases may
be more than offset by a decline in purchases of
fertilizer, machinery, and equipment. Chinese ex-
ports to Western Europe are likely to fall more
rapidly than in 1967 as a result of faltering
supply.
39. China's trade with the less developed
countries will probably show little change over
1967, unless a grain contract is signed with
Argentina for the second half of 1968. Trade with
Malaysia and Singapore should continue to increase,
but at a slower rate since the Hong Kong confron-
tation added unusual. stimulus to this trade in
1967.
40. Fxports to Hong Kong in the first two months
of 1968 were down considerably from the same period
in 1967, but a small improvement in 1908 over 1967
may occur unless Chinese supplies become extremely
tight or political constraints recur. Trade with
Hong Kong is still feeling some of the adverse effects
of the confrontation in 1967.
41. Trade with the Communist countries is unlikely
to increase and may decline further in 1968. Trade
relations with the USSR are still marred by incidents
such as the recent detention of a Soviet captain at
the port of Whampoa. Of three trade agreements
signed thus far with Eastern European countries,
only one calls for increased trade.
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Communist China: Trade with the Developed Countries
of the Free World a/
1966-67
Million US $
1966
1967
Turnover
Imports
Exports
Turnover
Imports
Exports
Total world
4,295
2,045
2,245
4,180
2,075
2,110
Total Free World
3,160
1,525
1,630
3,140
1,610
1,530
Of which:
Developed countries
1,845
1,140
705
1,975
1,325
650
c I
n ~
East Asia and the
Pacific
755
435
320
810
520
290
co
C)
Of which:
?Janan
622
331
291
558
302
256
Australia
120
96
24
231
205
26
Western Europe
875
510
365
1,030
695
335
Of which:
West Germany
217
135
81
292
222
70
United Kingdom
177
96
82
201
131
70
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Communist China: Trade with the Developed Countries
of the Free World a/
1966-67
(Continued)
Million US $
1966
1967
Turnover
Imports
Exports
Turnover
Imports
Exports
Western Europe
(Continued)
France
160
111
48
146
101
45
Italy
113
61
52
143
88
55
Un
'
Netherlands
44
16
28
43
16
27
M
n
~
North America
215
195
20
135
110
25
Of which:
trJ
--?
Canada
214
195
18
133
108
25
a. Area data are rounded to the nearest $5 million.
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Communist China: Trade with Less Developed Countries
of the Free World and with Hor.g Kong and Macao a/
1966-67
Million US $
1966
1967
Turnover
Imports
Exports
Turnover
Imports
Exports
Total world
4,295
2,045
2,245
4,180
2,075
2,110
Total Free World
3,160
1,525
1,630
3,140
1,610
1,530
Of which:
Less developed
countries
910
385
525
825
285
540
vD
lJ
N
o
Southeast Asia
325
80
245
345
85
260
li7
Of which:
Malaysia and
Singapore
190
47
142
228
43
185
Indonesia
59
9
50
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
Near East and
South Asia
325
135
185
335
150
185
Ceylon
80
35
45
83
38
45
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Communist China: Trade with Less Developed Countries
of the Free World and with Hong Kong and Macao a/
1966-67
(Continued)
Million US $
Turnover Imports Exports Turnover Imparts Exports
Near East and
South Asia
(Continued)
United Arab
N
Republic
P
ki
76
37
39
N.A.
N
A
N
A
f~7
a
stan
65
38
27
100
.
.
60
.
.
40
Latin America
Of which :
120
120
b/
10
10
b/
Argentina
114
114
C/
7
7
c/
Africa
140
50
90
135
40
95
Hong Kong and Macao
400
5
400
340
b/
340
Of which:
Hong Kong d,'
380
3
377
321
1
320
a.
b
Area
data
are rounded to the nearest $5 miZZion
.
Less
than
.
$2.5 million.
C.
Less
than
$500,000.
d.
Net
of entrepot trade with third countries.
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 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010004-6
Communist China: Trade with Communist Countries a/
1966-67
Million US $
Turnover Imports Exports Turnover Imports Exports
Total world 4,295 2,045 2,245 4,180 2;075 2,110
Total Communist
countries 1,135 520 610 1,040 465 580
USSR 370 175 145 255 130 130
Far East 270 95 170 260 90 170
North Korea 150 75 75 140 70 70 C)
North Vietnam 115 20 95 120 20 100
Eastern Europe 270 140 130 255 145 110
East Germany 68 3F 32 N.A. N.A. N.A.
Rumania 66 34 32 N.A. N.A. N.A.
Poland 52 30 23 45 30 15
Czechoslovakia 46 22 24 33 18 15
Hungary 32 16 16 N.A. N.A. N.A.
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 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010004-6
Communist China: Trade with Communist Countries a/
1966-67
(Continued)
Million US $
1966 1967
Turnover Imports Exports Turnover Imports Exports
Total Communist
countries (Continued)
Cn Cuba 170 85 85 144 72 72
Albania 105 25 80 110 25 85 tz1
a. Data are based on the official stat-:stics of the Communist countries, where
available. Data for the individual coun,.r,-es of Eastern Europe are rounded to
the nearest $1 million; all other data are rounded to the nearest $5 million.
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