NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY MONDAY 4 APRIL 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010062-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 2, 2008
• Sequence Number: 62
• Publication Date: April 4, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

DIA review
completed.
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Director of
Central
Intelligence
Top Secret
CY# 281
National
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Top Secret
Contents
Vietnam-Kampuchea: Border Fighting Continues ................ 2
USSR-UN-Chad: Soviets Block Compromise ........................ 5
Morocco: Shakeup of Military Officers .................................... 6
Senegal: New Government ...................................................... 7
Special Analysis
USSR-Afghanistan: Uncertain Military Prospects .................. 8
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4 April 1983
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area of
main map
ptichea
100 200
Kilometers
Mafthana
Nakhon
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4 April 1983
F/ \ Phnom Chat //
/ Phumio
/ Pmi Pak
Democratic l(ampuchean base
overrun by Vietnamese
- - \ //
,..`
k-'"..
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Top Secret
VIETNAM-KAMPUCHEA: Border Fighting Continues
Vietnamese forces have overwhelmed Democratic Kampuchean
guerrillas at Phnom Chat and reportedly have launched a strong
attack against Prince Sihanouk's resistance headquarters at
Sihanoukburi.
the Vietnamese now control
all important Democratic Kampuchean strongholds in the Phnom
Chat area along the Thai-Kampuchean border. Although the
Communist guerrillas abandoned most of their positions in the region
by Friday, Vietnamese and Thai artillery units continued to exchange
fire across the border throughout the weekend.
The Vietnamese also launched heavy artillery and ground attacks
on Saturday against the non-Communist guerrilla base at
Sihanoukburi, according to unconfirmed press reports. The lightly
defended base had a population of approximately 30,000
Kampuchean refugees.
Comment: The Vietnamese are likely to destroy most of the
facilities at the Phnom Chat camp-and perhaps plant booby traps-
to prevent the Communist guerrillas from resuming operations there.
A major Vietnamese assault against Sihanoukburi risks an increase in
fighting with Thai forces, who earlier promised resistance leaders
there artillery support if they came under Vietnamese attack.
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USSR-UN-CHAD: Soviets Block Compromise
The UN Security Council may vote early this week on Chad's
resolution referring its complaint of Libyan occu ation of the Aozou
Stri to the OAU.
The USSR thus far has blocked all attempts b 25X1
Nonaligned members of the Council to achieve a compromise.) Y 25X1
Comment: Nonaligned unity may crack under intense Libyan
pressure. A majority of Nonaligned votes for Chad would force the
USSR reluctantly to consider using its veto, despite overwhelming
support in the UN for action by the Council.
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5 4 April 1983
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Top Secret
MOROCCO: Shakeup of Military Officers
King Hassan has begun a shakeup among key command and staff
officers who were close associates of General Dlimi, his chief adviser,
who died early this year in a car crash. The US defense attache
reports the operations officer of the armed forces has been moved to
a less sensitive position, and a major troop commander and several
other officers in Western Sahara recently were arrested.
Comment: Dlimi had a strong following in the officer corps and
intelligence services, and his associates appear to have been badly
shaken by his death. As a result, Hassan may have to deal with
serious morale problems and perhaps a security threat. In the past,
however, the King has successfully handled such problems and is
likely to do so once again.
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6 4 April 1983
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President Diouf yesterday announced a new cabinet and
proposed abolishing the office of prime minister.
25X1
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party
and press reports indicate many
Half of the cabinet is new
,
stalwarts have been replaced by younger technocrats
25X1
Comment: In the wake of his election in late February, Diouf is
moving to assert presidential power, counter the opposition, and
check the old guard in his party. These moves probably are a prelude
to the imposition of more IMF-mandated austerity measures that
could prove unpopular.
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7 4 April 1983
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Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
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4 April 1983
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Special Analysis
USSR-AFGHANISTAN: Uncertain Military Prospects
Top Secret
The Soviets face tough fighting this spring in Afghanistan. Despite
Moscow's efforts to engage the insurgents in local cease-fires, the
insurgents were more aggressive during the past winter than in any
previous winter season since the invasion in 1979. As a result of their
attacks on urban targets and airfields, the guerrillas have expanded
the scope of the war and increased pressure on the Soviets and the
regime in Kabul. Insurgent attacks in the spring and summer will force
Moscow to continue to pay a high but not prohibitive price.
The Afghan Army's poor performance continues to undermine
Soviet counterinsurgency efforts.
Conscription efforts apparently have failed to make up for losses
in manpower, and most units still have only around 40 percent of their
required personnel.
Shortages of food and fuel in January also curtailed Afahan Army
operations throughout the coun r
Insurgents Widen the War
Resistance groups increased their attacks on bases and facilities
near cities during the winter, while continuing to raid garrisons and
convoys.
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4 April 1983
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Soviet Gains
Moscow, however, can point to some small progress in
Top Secret
Over the long term, Moscow probably hopes economic
reorientation, demographic shifts, and the indoctrination of a new
generation of Afghans will strengthen its position in Afghanistan. The
Soviets, partly to gain time for these processes have pursued
extensive negotiations with the uerrill
insurgent-controlled areas, where civilian morale has declined.
Soviet and Afghan attacks against the Panjsher Valley and other
The insurgents have a number of reasons for accepting
temporary cease-fires. They almost certainly welcome a reduction of
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9 4 April 1983
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Short-Term Outlook
The Soviets probably will continue to try to negotiate truces with
prominent insurgent leaders in order to divide the resistance
movement and prevent coordinated insurgent military activity. They
are likely to take advantage of truces in some areas to redeploy and
concentrate their forces for counterinsurgency operations in other
regions.
The USSR evidently believes its best prospect for consolidating
its hold on Afghanistan lies in a combination of apparent diplomatic
flexibility, local negotiations, and continued military pressure.
Although insurgent leaders probably believe cease-fires and
negotiations could secure tactical advantages for them, the Soviets
would be likely to benefit the most. They will launch multibattalion
operations this spring in some areas to keep military pressure on the
insurgents and disrupt resistance activities.
Any Soviet gains, however, probably will be marginal or
temporary. Cease-fires will likely break down when insurgents rearm
and launch new attacks this spring.
Increased insurgent attacks on convoys, garrisons, and urban
targets in the next few months seem likely. Such actions will further
unsettle the security of major cities and probably will cause an
increase in Soviet equipment losses and casualties.
This may cause the Soviets to consider modifications in their
tactics, new diplomatic moves, or troop increases. Although the
current situation rules out an early achievement of the USSR's long-
term efforts to consolidate a pro-Soviet Marxist regime, Moscow
seems determined to pursue this objective.
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10 4 April 1983
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