LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01184R000201090001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 26, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
ALA LAR 84-019
26 October 1984
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Review
Despite the mutual benefits derived from the Cuban-Soviet
relationship, several issues have caused friction in the past year and,
as has happened in the past, cooperation has been temporarily
strained
One immediate purpose of Cuba's efforts to strengthen ties with
Caribbean leftists and South American Communists is to encourage
both groups to unite in strong opposition to escalating US pressures
in Central America and against Cuba.
Panama is becoming an increasingly important commercial link for
Cuba, and Panamanian Defense Forces Chief Noriega is steering
the relationship toward a restoration of the mutually beneficial ties
that existed in the late 1970s.
Leaders of the ruling party, nervous over recent gains by the center-
right National Action Party, have become more aggressive in efforts
to undercut the growing popularity of this opposition group.
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ALA LAR 84-019
26 October 1984
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developing Cuban technology, exports, and tourism
Since early this year, the Castro regime has been making a
determined effort to improve trade with Japan, asking for help in
to the ruling Antigua Labor Party.
The leftist Antigua Caribbean Liberation Movement is planning to
soften its radical image in hopes of presenting a stronger opposition
Haiti: Cabinet Shuffle
Venezuela: Price Hikes Test L
Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis{
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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief
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3ecrea
Discordant Notes
Soviet-Cuban differences over the past year represent
a trough in a longstanding pattern of fluctuating
relations. In the past, for example, serious differences
over revolutionary strategy in Latin America
climaxed in 1967 with Moscow using its oil leverage
and Cuba arresting a "microfaction" because of its
dealings with Soviet Embassy officials. More recently,
there have been less significant disagreements such as
the friction over the Afghanistan intervention.
Nonetheless, the ups and downs always remain within
certain parameters and, since the 1970s, have not
threatened the overall relationship. In our opinion,
disagreements over the past year are symptomatic of
the patron-client relationship between Moscow and
Havana, wherein both seek to maximize their gains
from the bilateral ties.
The patron-client relationship has not undergone any
significant changes during the past year. Indeed, the
prevailing trend toward closer cooperation is likely to
continue, as Cuba--suffering economic difficulties at
home-remains dependent on the more than $4
billion in economic aid provided annually by Moscow.
Castro realizes that there is no alternative source for
the massive Soviet aid that keeps his economy afloat.
Moreover, the Cuban military depends almost entirely
on the Soviets for its weapons, equipment, and
training.
Despite the mutual benefits derived from the
relationship, several issues have caused friction
between the two countries and, as has happened in the
past, have temporarily strained Soviet-Cuban rapport.
Over the past year, issues ranging from the loss of
Grenada and Soviet policy in the Third World, to
Cuba's economic development and its role in CEMA
have generated differences between Moscow and
Havana. Even the longstanding question of the Soviet
commitment to Cuba has risen again in the wake of
Grenada-at least in Havana's eyes.
Soviet Support for Cuba
Statements by Cuban leaders over the last several
months, including those of Fidel Castro, indicate that
Havana is increasingly worried that if President
Reagan is reelected, the United States will intervene
militarily in Central America and perhaps even attack
Cuba.' Given Cuba's perception of the present
situation, Moscow's coolness toward Havana since the
Grenada episode almost certainly has heightened
Castro's sense of vulnerability.
The Cuban leader clearly was frustrated by Moscow's
weak response to the US intervention in Grenada. In
his speech at the funeral of the Cubans killed in
Grenada, he placed the blame squarely on pro-Soviet
Grenadian Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard,
arguing that his actions set in motion the events which
gave the United States a pretext to intervene.
Conversely, the official Soviet line, elaborated in a
TASS commentary, placed blame for the Grenada
episode on the United States, whose "special set vices"
were alleged to have penetrated Grenadian circles and
created a pretext for the US intervention. The TASS
replay of the Castro speech pointedly omitted the
paragraphs in the speech that discussed Coard's
culpability. So far Cuba has not adopted the Soviet
line alleging US intelligence involvement in the
Bishop-Coard dispute.
Secret
ALA LAR 84-019
26 October 1984
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media made no mention of such talks.
Moscow's low-key approach this year to Cuba's two
most important holidays-the 1 January anniversary
of the Cuban revolution and the 26 July anniversary
of the storming of Moncada barracks-probably
increased Cuban anxieties over Soviet support and
solidarity. Moscow's failure to send a delegation to
the 1 January holiday is particularly noteworthy
because this year was the 25th anniversary of the
Cuban revolution. Soviet Minister of Culture
Demichev, however, visited Havana during the first
week of January to unveil a statue of Lenin. Pravda
noted that Demichev met with Castro, but the Cuban
America.
In his 26 July speech, Castro made little mention of
the Soviets' contribution to the Cuban revolution or to
the economic development of Cuba. Although a low-
level Soviet delegation attended the 26 July event,
neither the Soviet or Cuban media acknowledged its
presence. Moreover, the Soviet congratulatory
message to Havana made no mention of the US threat
to Cuba, or of revolutionary developments in Central
with the United States in the region.
The Soviets traditionally use these occasions to
highlight bilateral ties and to make statements of
solidarity with the Cuban revolution. Moscow's
failure to do so is not totally out of keeping, however,
with its current tack toward Central America and the
Caribbean. As evidenced by their policy in
Nicaragua, the Soviets are playing down their
involvement in the region, presumably to avoid
inflaming US sensitivities. At the same time, however,
they are delivering large amounts of military
assistance to give Managua and Havana the means to
defend themselves. The material aid only partially
eases Castro's worries, however, because this
increased assistance underscores Soviet policy that
Cuba would stand alone in any military confrontation
seriously threatened.
Soviet Third World Policies
The Cubans are frustrated with the Soviets'
preoccupation with the situation in Europe, especially
INF, at a time when Havana believes it is more
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Castro to acknowledge some of the human costs of his
Angolan adventure to the population at home.
Arguing for a
more forceful Soviet role, the Cubans cite
Mozambique as an example of a situation where lack
of Soviet support prompted the Machel regime to
negotiate the Nkomati nonaggression accord with
South Africa last spring. This perception of waning
Soviet interest in the Third World, together with
growing US pressure, may have led Castro to begin
bilateral talks with Washington on the refugee
problem. Moscow's view of such moves is unclear; to
date the Soviet media have not acknowledged the US-
Cuban talks.
Over the next year Soviet-Cuban relations could once
again become strained by developments in Africa,
particularly by the issue of a Cuban troop withdrawal
from Angola. Castro clearly was angered by the
Angolan and Mozambican negotiations with South
Africa earlier this year and apparently believes that
Cuba's interests, as well as those of its allies in the
ANC and SWAPO, have been compromised. His cool
treatment of Angolan President dos Santos during the
African leader's visit to Cuba last March suggests
Castro may be wary in the future of a continued open-
The Soviets would view the withdrawal of Cuban
troops from Angola as a serious setback in Africa,
however, and probably will resist any settlement that
could undermine their influence with the dos Santos
regime. For his part, Castro would ultimately accede
to Moscow's wishes, but probably would resist Soviet
pressure to increase Cuban involvement in the
fighting in Angola. Although the data are incomplete,
Cuban casualties in Angola appear to have increased
over the last year and the Huambo incident-where
some 80 Cubans were killed or wounded-forced
Soviet Involvement in Cuba's Economy
Havana and Moscow are also at odds over the
fundamental "development strategy" assigned to
Cuba and its specific role in the long-term CEMA
master plan. An East European diplomat told the US
Interests Section in Havana that Cuba, during the
planning talks for the CEMA summit held in Moscow
last June, sought to adjust its economic role to
emphasize accelerated industrial development. The
Cubans evidently were rebuffed because summit
documents note that Cuba will continue instead to
focus on agriculture, a role that is analogous to that of
a primary goods producer for a "colonial" power.
Castro, aware that his proposals had been rejected,
probably stayed away from the heads-of-state
summit-the only leader to do so-to avoid being
associated with humiliating resolutions that
underscored Cuba's client status.
Castro's letter to Soviet leader Chernenko on the eve
of the summit-ostensibly to make amends for his
absence-focused largely on political-military issues
and the US threat to peace. It made little mention of
the CEMA meeting and failed to acknowledge Soviet
economic assistance to Cuba. By expressing gratitude
to the USSR and Eastern Europe for making it
possible for Cuban men and women to have weapons,
Castro underscored his unhappiness over the outcome
of those talks. Moscow, apparently displeased by the
tone and substance of Castro's letter, has yet to
acknowledge it anywhere in the Soviet media. The
sparring by the two countries over this issue also was
inferred in a Pravda article on 26 June by Cuban
Political Bureau member Jorge Risquet. The
introduction-provided by Pravda-focuses
exclusively on CEMA and its impact on Cuban
economic development. It describes the CEMA
summit as a "very important event in the history of
world socialism and the international communist and
workers movement." In contrast, Risquet's text fails
to mention the CEMA summit even once-despite the
fact that the article deals exclusively with Cuba's
economic development, including its successes, tasks,
and problems.
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Castro's absence from the summit and the subsequent
exchanges of pique may have prompted the Soviets to
increase pressure on Havana to cooperate even more
closely with CEMA.
a high-level Soviet economic planning
delegation that visited Havana in July strongly
chastised the Cubans for making hard currency
purchases from the West and squandering scarce
foreign exchange. A Soviet official reportedly
cautioned that capitalist countries should only be
turned to as a last resort and that future expenditures
by Havana for Western goods should be made only
after coordination with Moscow.
last spring the Soviets unexpectedly
canceled a shipment o sugar industry equipment, an
action in response to Cuba's
earlier purchase of Australian cane cutters.
Moscow also is increasingly unhappy with what it
views as Cuban inefficiency and economic
mismanagement. Soviet officials,
have told the Cubans
that they are investing too heavily in the sugar
industry, particularly when sugar substitutes will
increasingly cut into the world sugar market. They
added that Havana must increase its production of
foodstuffs to eliminate its longstanding food rationing
program. Moscow admonished Havana that the
rationing program presents a poor image to other
Latin American countries. The Soviets reportedly
advised Castro of their intention to assume greater
control over Moscow's investment in the Cuban
economy.
Outlook for Relations
The recent frictions stem from differing perspectives
on some issues largely the result of the USSR's
broader responsibilities as a global power-several
diplomatic setbacks over the past year, and Castro's
heightened sense of vulnerability and need for Soviet
assurances of support. Despite these policy
disagreements, however, Moscow has maintained the
high level of military deliveries to Cuba that have
characterized the past few years. This is consistent
with past Soviet behavior, even during times of
bilateral friction. In 1967, for example, Soviet
military deliveries to Cuba surged when the Moscow-
Havana relationship was at its lowest point. We
believe Moscow will continue to deliver more and
better military equipment, in part to assuage Castro
and to improve Cuban defensive capabilities, despite
continuing frictions that mar their otherwise close
strategic relationship.
From the Soviet perspective, Cuba remains the most
important symbol of Moscow's commitment to
"socialist" change in the Third World. The Soviets
still derive important political, geostrategic, and
military benefits from the relationship. Cuba provides
strong support for Moscow's policies in Third World
forums where the USSR has limited access. Cuba also
gives the Soviets access to facilities in the Western
Hemisphere from which they can discreetly promote
their objectives and funnel support to leftist groups
operating outside of Moscow's sphere of influence.
Moreover, Cuba's geographic location enables
Moscow to conduct intelligence and reconnaissance
activities against the United States.
Havana probably will continue pressing the Soviets
for increased military and economic assistance, as
well as for broad political statements of support that
emphasize Cuba's role as an integral part of the
socialist community. Concerned with the US threat
and their isolation from Soviet Bloc allies, Cuban
leaders probably will seek high-level visits from the
Soviet Bloc-such as the Polish Foreign Minister's
recent trip to Havana-as visible signs of Moscow's
support. A CEMA heads-of-state meeting in Havana
later this month may partly assuage Castro's desire
for expressions of socialist solidarity, but it also may
raise tensions again between Havana and Moscow
over economic aid and development. Castro may use
the occasion to ask for more assistance, but he is likely
to receive more Soviet strictures on economic
management.
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Cuba: Dealing With Regional
Leftists and Communists
Havana's actions at recent regional meetings suggest
it is using them as vehicles to strengthen ties with
Caribbean leftists and South American Communists.
One immediate purpose is to encourage both groups to
unite in strong opposition to escalating US pressures
in Central America and against Cuba. In addition, we
believe that Havana's careful management of a
meeting in June with Caribbean leftists is an effort to
overcome Cuba's isolation and loss of prestige after
the Grenada debacle by unifying the region's leftists.
Similarly, Havana's low-key approach to an
unprecedented public meeting in July of South
American Communist parties probably was designed
to avoid undermining its campaign to improve
bilateral relations with governments in the area. At
the same time, Havana saw the meeting as a way to
revitalize its somewhat strained ties with the
Communists and to help the parties make tactical
adjustments to increasing political liberalization in
several countries.
Despite its more cautious posture, Havana continues
to support insurgent groups outside of Central
America, although more selectively and generally on
a smaller scale than in the past. On balance, we
expect that, while the fence-mending activities in the
Caribbean and South America will not greatly
enhance Cuba's image in the short run, Havana will
persist in its current tactics so long as it remains on
the defensive in the face of US pressures.
Doctrinal Adjustments
Since 1959, Fidel Castro has consistently advocated
revolution in Latin America and has supported or
directed revolutionaries in numerous countries.
Nonetheless, he has frequently been forced to shift
tactics in his dealings with the hemisphere's
Communist parties, radical leftists and insurgents,
and with Moscow. In conferences on revolutionary
strategy held with such groups over the past two
decades, Castro has shown considerable flexibility in
adjusting to changing Latin American conditions,
Cuba's own standing, and external pressures,
especially from the Soviets. Doctrinal disputes most
often revolved around whether "armed struggle" was
the best tactic to adopt for specific countries, whether
Communist parties or insurgent groups should be the
"revolutionary vanguard," and over the uneven
responsiveness of the region's leftists to Havana's
guidance. Castro's recognition of the need for new
approaches to Caribbean leftists and South American
Communists was most recently demonstrated in the
regional meetings in June and July 1984.
Cultivating Caribbean Leftists
The first Consultative Meeting of Anti-Imperialist
Organizations of the Caribbean, held in Havana on
11-13 June, was a significant step forward in Cuban
efforts to heal the ideological rifts within the
Caribbean left caused by the Grenada debacle.
Previously, Havana had been unable even to bring the
two main factions of the Caribbean left together.
delegations
from some 30 leftist and Marxist parties from most
Caribbean and several Central American countries
attended the conference, which was organized by the
America Department of the Cuban Communist Party.
The gathering established a permanent bureau to
disseminate "anti-imperialist" information and to
.support the activities of leftist organizations in the
Caribbean. George Odlum, leader of the St. Lucia
Progressive Labor Party, reportedly was picked as
regional coordinator of the bureau, and the Cubans
agreed to fund its operations.
In addition to a general propaganda effort
condemning US policies in Central America and the
Caribbean, the Cubans tried to overcome squabbling
among factions in several key countries.
Secret
ALA LAR 84-019
26 October 1984
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the America
Department organized a secret session of selected
leftists from the English-speaking Caribbean to
encourage them to put aside disputes over Grenada
and to work energetically to form a united leftist
front. The Cubans reportedly promised to establish
and fund two secretariats for the front, one in the
offices of Odium's party and the other in Guyana,
probably in Cheddi Jagan's People's Progressive
Party. Havana pledged to channel some $380,000
through the secretariats to leftwing parties in the
English-speaking Caribbean, but stipulated that the
money be used exclusively to aid the parties in gaining
power through elections. In return, Havana demanded
continued support for Cuba, the Soviet Union, and the
"liberation struggle" in Latin America.
In the secret session, the Cubans also pushed for
unification of leftist forces within individual countries.
To avoid a doctrinal split, however, Havana agreed
that there can be more than one formula to develop a
united front in a given country, because domestic
political conditions differ greatly throughout the
Caribbean. Despite this concession, doctrinal
disagreement persisted. More moderate parties, such
as the St. Vincent Movement for National Unity,
argued for a "liberation struggle" led by a "mass
party" that need not be Marxist. Orthodox
Communist parties, such as Cheddi Jagan's, insisted
that the "vanguard" role could be played only by the
Marxist-Leninists. The upshot was that several
parties refused to endorse the Conference's final
declaration without further study.
some parties complained that the final
declaration failed to recognize the importance of
"progressive nationalist movements" in the
Caribbean. The Trinidadian National Joint Action
Committee reportedly was so dissatisfied with the
declaration that it insisted on making it a matter of
record that it is not a Marxist-Leninist party.
Nevertheless, Havana evidently was sufficiently
encouraged by the secret session's discussion that it
has persisted in pressing leftist parties in several
countries to unite, in some cases threatening to
Havana pushed the three main opposition parties in
Dominica to form a so-called United Labor
Movement, or face loss of Cuban aid.
some parties in the region-for instance, to Odium's
party-and that it continues in other ways to cultivate
leftists from numerous regional countries. The
America Department reportedly is planning to host a
followup meeting in Havana and hopes to play a
leading role in a meeting in December of regional
leftists in Guadeloupe.
Meeting With South American Communists
Havana took advantage of the Conference of South
American Communist parties in Buenos Aires from 5
to 7 July, the first such public meeting in decades, to
improve its flagging relations with several of these
parties and to elicit pledges of support for Cuba's
"struggle" against the United States. Senior party
members from all South American countries, plus
Guyana and Panama, attended, as did observers from
Cuba, the Soviet Communist Party, the Sandinista
National Liberation Front, the Office of Communist
parties in Prague, and the World Federation of Trade
Unions.
one of the
Conference's main topics was how to adjust
Communist strategy to exploit the trend toward
democracy in South America. The delegates
reportedly agreed that in contrast to Central
America-where guerrilla warfare is the appropriate
route to achieve power-the preferred tactic in South
America is to concentrate on nonviolent, legal
political actions. In several press interviews and the
Conference's final declaration, the participants
welcomed the new "bourgeois democracies" in South
America and emphasized a determination to foster
united fronts with "all democratic forces" in order to
topple the continent's remaining military regimes.
They also called for greater efforts at mass
mobilization in every country, with the worker class in
the "vanguard role." They proposed a systematic
campaign for Communist party representation in
government coalitions, as is currently the case in
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Bolivia. Once these objectives are achieved, according
to the final declaration, the Communist parties can
guarantee the "revolutionary transformation" of all of
South America.
The second key area of discussion was the need to
mobilize Latin America against "Yankee
Imperialism." The participants expressed full
solidarity with the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions
and called for coordinated actions to defend both
against predicted US military actions.
the
delegates agreed that a "massive" Latin American
front comprised of socialist and Marxist parties
should be formed. to help forestall US military
The conferees asserted that all Latin American
Communist parties must come to Cuba's defense and
that their efforts should be coordinated with
Communist parties worldwide. They agreed that
Communist parties should press selected Latin
American governments to renew or expand bilateral
relations with Cuba, thereby helping to lessen its
hemispheric isolation. Also, it was agreed that
periodic meetings must be held between the Cuban
and South American Communist parties, followed by
a worldwide meeting of Communist parties focusing
on the US threat.
Cuban Unobtrusiveness
The Cubans assumed a very low profile at the Buenos
Aires meeting, and evidently neither played a leading
role in the discussions nor made statements to the
local media. Even Granma, the Cuban Communist
Party daily, gave scant coverage to the event, making
no mention of a Cuban presence and noting only that
the Conference called for increased solidarity with
Cuba and Nicaragua in the face of the "growing US
aggression" and that the participants condemned
Washington's policies in Central America. Also, the
head of the Cuban observer delegation to the meeting,
Santiago Diaz Paz, the then director of a Cuban
"think tank" that studies the United States,
previously has not been known to deal with Latin
American Communists or to play a role in the
America Department's planning for the region.
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Despite this ostensible downgrading of the
Conference, Havana participated in advance planning
for the meeting. The Cubans wanted to ensure that
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and to have a say in the discussion of tactical shifts by
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conditions in South America.
Continuing Support for Insurgents
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ties with the South American Communist parties,
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insurgent movements throughout the hemisphere.
Outside of Central America, it generally has kept its
support to such groups at relatively moderate levels.
Nevertheless, Havana has
targeted several countries for increased levels of
training, financial aid, and policy guidance during the
past year or so. Havana apparently has varying
objectives for this selectively expanded role. In Chile,
Havana hopes to stimulate intensified insurgent
operations against the Pinochet regime, while in
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Ecuador it wants to reassure radical groups Cuba still
stands behind them in troubled times. In the
Dominican Republic, Havana has encouraged leftists
to try to exploit popular unrest there since last April.
In Colombia, on the other hand, it has urged tactical
shifts and greater caution on its allies due to the
recent government-guerrilla truce.
Outlook
Havana will continue basically on the defensive in its
tactics toward the Caribbean and South America as
long as it fears a looming confrontation with the
United States over Central America and even an
attack against Cuba itself. We expect Cuban planners
to continue efforts to improve bilateral relations in
South America in order to strengthen regional flanks
against the United States. We also believe that as
long as prospects remain favorable for progress on the
diplomatic front Cuba will be discreet in its dealings
with South American Communist parties to avoid
increasing the suspicion of local governments. In the
Caribbean, where there is little hope of early
diplomatic gains, the Cubans will continue to pursue a
long-term building-block approach. Cuban planners
probably calculate regional governments, which
remain highly critical of Havana, will more likely
tolerate cultivation of the Caribbean left than
aggressive subversion techniques. In any event,
Havana undoubtedly believes that relations with
several key Caribbean countries will remain poor as
long as their current governments are in power.
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Panama is becoming an increasingly important
commercial link for Cuba, and Panamanian Defense
Forces Chief Noriega is steering the relationship
toward a restoration of the mutually beneficial ties
that existed in the 1970s. The largest increase has
been in business-related activity, particularly in the
shipment of goods from Cuban-owned firms in
Panama to Cuba. At the same time, General Noriega
has cultivated the Cubans
to enhance his domestic political
power an regiona influence. Although ties between
the two countries probably will continue to grow in
the near term, we believe expansion will be
constrained by limited economic opportunities,
lingering mutual suspicions, and Panama's stronger
bonds to the United States.
Surge in Trade Activity
Cuban commercial operations in Panama have been
expanding, particularly during the past 12 months.
the Cuban
CIMEX import-export firm in Panama has sharply
increased its trade activities and related operations,
especially imports to Cuba of goods embargoed by the
United States. Precise figures on the value of CIMEX
operations in Panama are unavailable, but
total assets for CIMEX an-d--its
$106 million in 1
1983. Moreover,
the CIMEX branch may be buying some
$2-3 million worth of goods monthly for
transshipment to Cuba.
Other CIMEX-related activities in Panama point to
an upswing in commerce.
Havana has purchased a new building in a high-
income district in Panama City to house CIMEX's
Panamanian operations.
CIMEX officials in Cuba
revolving accounts they maintain in Panama to $1.2
million per month and opened a new $300,000
account to cover rising operating expenses.
CIMEX has taken advantage of Panama's flexible
commercial laws to create new Panamanian front
companies to conduct business in other countries in
the hemisphere, including Venezuela and Mexico. In
addition, CIMEX's 25X1 (1
headquarters in Cuba has begun sending midlevel 25X1
managers to a three-month training course in Panama
at a cost of $15,000 per student as part of an effort to
improve the company's efficiency.
The CUBANA Airlines office in Panama is one of the
most important branch offices in Latin America, 25X1
serving as a convenient connecting point for moving
passengers and cargo between Cuba and countries not
served by CUBANA. This year, for example,
CUBANA reportedly has already surpassed last
year's tonnage of cargo flown from Panama to Cuba, 25X1
rising from some 700 tons in 1983 to more than 1,000
tons as of September. 25X1
the increased tonnage, which consists 25X1
primarily of consumer goods for Cuban officials or for
resale in Cuban tourist shops, has forced Havana to 9.r,X1
schedule additional CUBANA flights and to use 25X1
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Government Visits
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Cuban-Panamanian Government exchanges have
grown in recent months, particularly since the
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resignations in August 1983 of anti-Communist
Defense Chief Gen. Ruben Paredes and in February
1984 of conservative President De la Espriella. In
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reportedly accepted Havana's invitation to all
9 (I
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26 October 1984
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members of the Panamanian Legislative Council to
visit the Cuban National Assembly with expenses
paid by the Cubans. Cuban Minister of Culture Hart
visited Panama in August at the invitation of leftist
President Illueca to discuss exchanges in the cultural
and educational fields. Cuban Council of State Vice
President Carlos Rodriguez attended President
Nicolas Barletta's inauguration on 1 l October.
In addition
Mission in Panama is second in size only to that of the
United States and is one of Cuba's largest in Latin
America.
several hundred others
serve in the fishing fleet and as cultural and
commercial representatives in Prensa Latina and
CUBANA offices in Panama.
Noriega's Primary Role
General Noriega, who took command of the
Panamanian Defense Forces in August 1983, has
been behind Panama's closer ties to Havana.
Noriega responded-at least in part-to
warnings from President Castro in September 1983
not to continue General Paredes's close alignment
with the United States, and replaced Paredes
supporters in the de la Espriella cabinet with left-
leaning officials.
Noriega has conveyed tote Cubans, of
directly and through several loyal leftist advisers, his
purported desire to return Panama to the
independent, nonaligned course pursued under the
late strongman Omar Torrijos. In addition, Noriega
himself has visited Havana at least twice this year,
most recently in July, to reaffirm his intention to
maintain warm relations, according to press reports.
We believe, however, that Noriega has sought better
relations with Cuba more for personal reasons than
because of ideological commitments. In our view, his
chief interest is to protect and enhance his numerous
business dealings with the Cubans in Panama, which
he has established over the years.
Noriega uses friends and relatives
to secure major shares in joint Panamanian-Cuban
ventures. For example, through his brother-in-law,
Noriega owns controlling interest in a Panamanian
import-export firm that fronts for Cuban Embassy
purchases of US-embargoed goods, handles Cuban
cargo vessels passing through the Panama Canal, and
services the Cuban fishing fleet at the port of
Vacamonte.
Ithe Defense Chief also is linked to
Cuban operations in a variety of nefarious activities
such as arms smuggling and drug trafficking,
although direct ties are difficult to establish.
In addition, we believe Noriega has sought to use the
link with Havana to further his domestic and regional
political objectives and has already enjoyed some
moderate success. After offering temporary asylum to
over a dozen terrorists of the Basque ETA
organization earlier this year to portray himself as a
regional power broker, Noriega reportedly got Castro
to take half of them off his hands in May. In addition,
during the Panamanian elections last May, he
reportedly obtained secret Cuban campaign support
to help ensure victories for relatives and
progovernment candidates. Apparently in return,
Noriega recently lifted a suspension on the issuance of
temporary Panamanian visas for Cuban immigrants
en route to the United States. This relieves Havana of
the burden of an additional 400 refugees by allowing
them to join some 4,000 Cubans currently in Panama
awaiting resettlement in the United States.
Constraints on Further Growth
While the warming trend in relations probably will
continue over the near term, Cuban commercial
operations in Panama, in our view, will be constrained
by Havana's limited ability to produce the hard
currency needed to fund new ventures. Moreover,
opportunities for new Cuban commercial ventures in
neighboring countries are hampered by the region's
diminished potential for growth and hard currency
returns, especially in investment areas preferred by
the Cubans, such as tourism-related enterprises.
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closer ties. Reports from US Embassy
indicate that Noriega is wary of Cuban
intentions both in Panama and the region, and that on
occasion he reflects the Panamanian military's
traditional anti-Communist concerns. Moreover, his
good relations with Havana probably are also
intended to promote Panama's Third World
credentials, bolster his influence with local leftists,
and discourage Havana from sponsoring domestic
unrest. The Cubans, for their part, reportedly do not
trust Noriega but feel they can deal with him and use
him to advance their interests in several areas.
As a result, Noriega can be expected to continue to
cooperate with the Cubans in mutually profitable
enterprises, but he will not hesitate to side with the
United States on matters that are contrary to
Havana's political interests. In the past, Torrijos and
Noriega were careful to try to gain maximum political
mileage and personal profit from their Cuban
contacts, while stopping short of a relationship that
would damage more important bilateral ties with
Washington.
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Mexico: Opposition on
the Right
Mexico's political environment is heating up as the
ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party and
opposition forces prepare for important national,
state, and local elections next year. Leaders of the
ruling party, nervous over recent gains by the center-
right National Action Party (PAN), have become
more aggressive in efforts to undercut the PAN's
growing popularity. They are playing on the
nationalistic sentiments of Mexicans, charging that
the PAN is a tool of US interests. Nonetheless, the
government's control over the electoral process, as
well as the PAN's organizational and factional
problems, will keep the PAN from threatening the
ruling party's hold on power in the near term.
Recent Developments
In the past month or two, the government-dominated
Mexican press has roundly criticized the PAN for
sending observers to attend this summer's Republican
Convention in Dallas. In addition, a number of state
governors have demanded an investigation into
alleged links between the PAN and the Republican
Party. Ruling party President Lugo Verduzco and
labor chief Fidel Velazquez have gone further,
suggesting that the PAN should be barred from
competing in the elections. While President de la
Madrid's government probably will not take such
drastic action, the adverse publicity the PAN has
received may temporarily stem its increasing
popularity.
PAN officials, for their part, are sensitive to charges
of foreign influence within the party, and they deny
that they receive funds from abroad. At the same
time, they point out with pride that the PAN is
Mexico's only major political party that does not
accept a government subsidy, an action they maintain
could compromise the party's independence.
According to the organization's leaders, the PAN
derives 90 percent of its income from contributions of
federal congressmen, who are asked to turn over 30
percent of their salaries to the party, and the
remaining 10 percent from small personal deductions.
The PAN Threat
Although formed in 1939, the PAN has recently
demonstrated growing strength with the electorate. In
September 1982, it won mayoral contests in the state
capitals of Sonora and, in alliance with another
conservative party, in San Luis Potosi. In July 1983,
the PAN won mayoralties in Durango, the capital of
the state of the same name, and in Chihuahua state,
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Secret
where it captured the three largest cities, including
PAN leader
Pablo Madero
the state's capital.
At present, the PAN controls 51 of the 400 seats in
the lower house of the federal congress, 57 seats in
state legislatures, and 33 mayoralties.' PAN officials
charge, they would hold
additional offices were it not for fraud the governing
party has practiced in past elections.F_~
Despite having to contend with such electoral
obstacles, the PAN is organized at the district,
regional, and national levels. It is strongest in the
northeastern states of Coahuila and Nuevo Leon, the
northwestern states of Sonora and Baja California
Norte, the central state of Puebla, the Federal
District, and the southern state of Yucatan.
to view the PAN as representing the interests of the
country's northern states, while the ruling party is
identified with those of Mexico City and the central
states.
Although PAN officials assert that they represent no
special class or economic interests, support for the
party has traditionally been strongest among the
middle and upper classes, particularly within the
business community. The party's support is weakest
among workers and peasants. In recent years, the
PAN has benefited from the protest votes of many
Mexicans who, while not enamored with the PAN's
policies, have sought to register their displeasure with
the ruling party.
Leadership and Policies
The current national leader of the PAN and its
presidential standard bearer in the 1982 national
elections is Pablo Emilio Madero. Madero, who is
independently wealthy and has lived in Monterrey for
many years, is a former federal congressman. He is
' The PAN occupies 50 of the 100 seats reserved for the opposition
in the lower house of the federal congress and one of the 300 seats
in the same chamber open to members of all parties. Members are
elected in general elections held every three years. The 100
opposition members are selected under a regional system of
proportional representation; the other 300 are chosen from single-
Mexican Revolution.
The PAN's political ideology favors less government
involvement in the economy and is supportive of free
enterprise. Madero has been critical of the ruling
party's nationalization of Mexican banks in 1982, for
example, but he asserts that his party is just as
committed to defending Mexico's sovereignty as the
ruling party. To a greater extent than the ruling
party, the PAN takes prochurch positions, opposing
abortion and favoring church education.
The PAN supports a foreign policy line more
sympathetic toward the United States than the ruling
party. PAN leaders earlier this year refused to
support a resolution in the Mexican congress
denouncing Washington for its alleged mining of
Nicaraguan ports. More generally, they maintain that
they do not want Central America to become an arena
of East-West tension but, unlike the ruling party,
accept the need for US military aid to the region.
Constraints
The PAN is unable to attract greater public support
largely because it cannot match the organizational
and financial resources the government extends to the
ruling party. The PAN does not enjoy the backing of
organized labor or peasant organizations, which are
officially linked to the ruling party.
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Moreover, the PAN has long been hobbled by internal
divisions between the party's activist and traditionalist
wings. The activists assert that the party needs a
younger, more dynamic leadership. They dismiss as
futile the party's continuing attempts to gain power
through elections, at times urging civil disobedience.
The traditionalists, such as Madero, counsel patience
and favor continued participation by the PAN in the
electoral process. Although Madero and other party
leaders now seek to downplay such differences, as
recently as 1976 the schism proved so divisive that the
PAN was unable to nominate a candidate for
president.
The ruling party's resort to electoral fraud and voter
intimidation have also hurt the PAN, as have other
actions the ruling party has taken that have less
directly detracted from PAN's electoral prospects.
For example, PAN leaders assert that charges have
been trumped up against a popular former mayor in
the northern state of Sonora to prevent him from
running on the PAN ticket for governor. In addition,
the government recently changed its military zone
commander in Sonora, as well as in Yucatan,
replacing both with military officers known to be
ruling party loyalists.
Future Prospects
Although the controversy over the PAN's attendance
at the Republican Convention is likely to wane soon,
ruling party politicians will continue to show
sensitivity toward any US actions that appear to lend
support to the PAN. They know that the
government's austerity measures will reduce support
for the ruling party at the polls, and they want to
minimize inevitable losses to the PAN.
Nonetheless, the PAN's electoral gains probably will
be quite limited. There has not been a governor who
has not belonged to the ruling party in the post-
revolutionary period that began in 1929, and the de la
Madrid government almost certainly will take
whatever measures are needed
to ensure the record continues unbroken. At the same
time, so long as the PAN does not make significant
new gains, the government will permit it to control
some local offices and a large share of the seats in the
federal congress reserved for the opposition. To do so,
particularly in races where the PAN has won
overwhelming victories, enables the government to
make a stronger claim that Mexico is a pluralist
democracy.
PAN leaders almost certainly will not endorse violent
means to protest electoral irregularities, particularly
so long as Madero and other traditionalists remain in
control of the party. They are more likely to adopt
nonviolent means, such as protest marches and
occupation of municipal buildings, to publicize their
grievances. At the same time, there remains a 25X1
potential for spontaneous civil disturbances if rigged
elections deprive PAN supporters of victories they
believe they have won.F_~ 25X1
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Cuba: Pursuing Japanese
Trade
Since early this year, the Castro regime has been
making a determined effort to improve trade with
Japan. The campaign began with the Japan-Cuba
Economic Council meeting last February. At that
session, Cuba asked for help in developing Cuban
technology, exports, and tourism. Havana also wanted
the Japanese to resume longer term financing and
export insurance and to participate in Cuba's next
five-year investment plan.
Cuba has assigned a new commercial attache
import enterprise arrived in July.
To show the importance it places on ties with Tokyo,
Havana appointed a Vice Minister of Foreign Trade
as its new ambassador in September. The ambassador
will be able to benefit from his experience as the
former head of the Cuban commercial office in
Tokyo.
Cuban Council of State Vice President
Juan Almeida Bosque was to hold talks in Tokyo last
month with the chairman of the Japanese Federation
of Economic Organizations and members of the
Japan-Cuba Diet Association.
The Japanese response to date has been limited to the
renewal of short-term export credit and export
insurance. Cuba hopes to reverse the steady decline in
trade between the two countries since 1980, which has
been caused by lower prices for Cuban sugar,
restrictions on nickel exports, and Cuba's debt
rescheduling. The Japanese trade link is valuable to
Havana as a source of hard currency and imports not
available from the Soviet Bloc. Havana also views its
trade with an important US ally as an act of defiance
against the US trade embargo.
Japanese firms that have established a foothold in the
Cuban market would benefit from an expanded trade
relationship, as would members of the Japan-Cuba
Diet Association who have received campaign
contributions from these companies. However,
Havana's limited capacity to import because of a
depressed sugar market as well as Tokyo's sensitivity 25X1
to US concerns probably will prevent any significant
increase in trade between the two countries.
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Antigua: Leftists Alter Image
the Antigua
Caribbean Liberation Movement is planning to soften
its radical image in hopes of presenting a stronger
opposition to the ruling Antigua Labor Party. The
Movement's challenge to the government has been so
weak that its leader, Tim Hector, was forced to
boycott the general election in April, rather than risk
a poor showing. The next election is not due to be held
until 1989. With the other two opposition parties
undergoing internal woes, however, Hector believes
that his group has an opportunity to become the
foremost opposition party in Antigua.
The party's intended shift to a more moderate image
indicates more a change in strategy than a serious
altering of policy. Established by Hector as a Black
Power advocacy group in the early 1970s, the
Liberation Movement evolved into a leftist-nationalist
party favoring fundamental change of the political
structure to accommodate a socialist economic
system.
Deputy leader Harold Lovell claims that subscriptions
to the party's popular weekly newspaper, The Outlet,
are increasing, giving rise to hopes for more popular
support. the
party plans a low-key propaganda effort :among
youths who will be first-time voters in the next
election and intends to propose a merger with one of
the moderate, established opposition parties,
preferably the United People's Movement.
Hector already has
started to change his image. His past dealings with
Libya and Cuba and close association with the
radicals in the region had earned Hector the distrust
of the conservative, pro-Western Antiguan populace.
Recognizing this, he declined an invitation to travel to
Libya with other Caribbean leftist leaders earlier this
year and has apparently begun to disassociate himself
Tim Hector, leader outlet
of the Antigua Caribbean
Liberation Movement.
from regional leftists. In addition, despite pressure
from several Caribbean radicals, Hector refused to
involve the Liberation Movement in planning violent
activities to mark the first anniversary of the death of
Grenadian Prime Minister Bishop and of the US-led
intervention in Grenada. Instead, Hector organized a
peaceful cultural presentation designed to attract a
wide cross section of Antiguans.
The party has enough time to build a base of voter
support that could enable it to gain a foothold in
parliament in the next election. A merger with one of
the moderate parties would improve its electoral
chances. It is unlikely, however, that the Movement
will be a serious electoral threat to the Antigua Labor
Party. In spite of Movement efforts to distance itself 25X1
from its previous leftist stance, most Antiguans would
be reluctant to vote for a formerly radical party. We 25X1
believe, nonetheless, that the Liberation Movement,
under Hector's leadership, will remain committed to
seeking power by peaceful and constitutional means.
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Latin America
Briefs
further.
Despite the large number of recent high-level visits between Cuba and other
CEMA members, President Castro seems unlikely to obtain significant new
economic aid from the Soviet Bloc during the CEMA head-of-state summit in
Havana this month. Moscow's earlier reprimand and its uncompromising position
on Cuban industrial development prior to the CEMA meeting last June probably
were intended to warn Castro that he is approaching the limits of Soviet largess.
The USSR probably will continue to urge Cuba to cut oil imports and may attach
stricter terms to other trade and development assistance. The Soviets probably will
also insist on tightening their control over Havana's economic planning and
administration, curtailing Castro's personal role in economic management even
higher costs to consumers.
Labor and business have strongly criticized increases in selected controlled prices,
testing President Lusinchi's ability to implement austerity measures through a
"social pact" with unions and the private sector. To strengthen public finances and
encourage domestic production, Caracas authorized milk prices to double, beef to
rise by 50 percent, and steel by 30 percent. Price hikes for other staples and public
services will follow soon, according to the US Embassy. In response, labor leaders
have called for higher wages to preserve workers' living standards. Private
manufacturers are strongly criticizing the increase in the price of steel, which will
substantially raise their input costs. Because of continued government controls on
their own prices, the private manufacturers are unable to pass on quickly these
increases for all producers to protect profits.
We judge that Lusinchi realizes he must act carefully to maintain a consensus
with labor and business on ways to resolve Venezuela's economic problems. He
addressed the nation last month to reassure labor with promises of jobs and to urge
business to accept its share of necessary economic sacrifices. Labor leaders remain
solid supporters of the administration and have accepted the recent price increases,
but the US Embassy believes that worker dissatisfaction is growing and will result
in increased demands for protection against inflation. Business leaders probably
will resist higher wages and press Lusinchi to ensure prompt compensatory price
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sacked the Justice Minister, who is a close associate of Achille
The decision early this month by President Duvalier to restructure his cabinet
underscores the highly personalistic and fluid nature of Haitian politics. The
Minister of Social Affairs, Theodore Achille, was the most prominent casualty.
Achille was a member of the small inner cabinet, the so-called super ministers, and
reportedly a close adviser of the President. He apparently lost favor with Duvalier
because of his failure to keep a lid on public unrest last spring. Duvalier also
created an ill-defined new post, Secretary of State for Social Affairs, raising
cabinet membership to 35. In a subsequent move, the US Embassy says Duvalier
Minister Lafontant and Finance Minister Merceron-is likely to grow.
help improve strained relations with Washington. We agree with the US
Embassy's view that, while the impact of Achille's removal on the cabinet's
internal workings is as yet unclear, the stature of his chief competitors-Defense
The shuffle, the sixth in the last 14 months, probably does not signal a significant
shift in Haiti's domestic and international policies. Cabinet realignments, often the
result of behind-the-scenes palace intrigue, allow Duvalier to help keep the
country's political elite dependent on his continued good will. The departure of
Achille, one of the most nationalistic members of the cabinet could, nevertheless,
the way for President de la Madrid's planned trip to China in 1985.
Mexican Foreign Minister Sepulveda's official visit to Beijing this month
reciprocates his Chinese counterpart's visit to Mexico City last August. Talks are
likely to focus on selected political issues and means to revive the two countries'
flagging bilateral trade. In addition, Sepulveda's visit probably is intended to pave
establish a new international economic order.
Sepulveda is likely to receive Beijing's strong support for the Contadora group's
efforts to bring peace to Central America. China, which in the past year or two has
shown greater interest in Latin America, professes to oppose "superpower
intervention" in the region and supports a political solution to its problems.
Officials of the two countries also probably will issue perfunctory statements
denouncing the international arms buildup and endorsing global negotiations to
The visit should strengthen bilateral trade and other economic ties.
trade between the two last year amounted to $58
greatest concentration of ethnic Chinese.
million. Largely because of Mexico's economic difficulties, it was down
significantly from a total of $143 million in 1982. Mexico's exports to China,
which last year were worth $46.3 million, included copper and zinc, chemical
products, and fertilizers. China's sales to Mexico in 1983 were valued at $11.7
million and included heavy machinery, rice, silk, textiles, and paraffin. Officials of
the two countries are likely to explore modest joint investment ventures and to
discuss China's plans to open a consulate in Tijuana, the Mexican city with the
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Cuba Chronology
Defense Minister Raul Castro sends a message to Nicaraguan Defense Minister
Humberto Ortega on the fifth anniversary of the establishment of the Sandinista
People's Army telling it to rise up against threats of US imperialism.
3 September Minister of Interior Ramiro Valdes heads delegation to Ethiopia to attend
festivities commemorating the 10th anniversary of Ethiopia's revolution.
7 September
8 September
9 September
In a press conference in Cuba, Bulgarian road workers discuss their activities in
Cuba, including the national highway, the Granma publishing house, and the Jose
Marti steel plant.
Trade between East Germany and Cuba is praised at a meeting in Leipzig between
Werner Jarowinsky, member of the SED Central Committee, and Cuba's Foreign
Trade Minister, Ricardo Cabrizas.
Tegucigalpa press reports that 23 Cuban and Libyan mercenaries were killed at a
military training base in Santa Clara in an attack by the Nicaraguan Democratic
Force on 1 September.
Some 990 Cuban internationalist construction workers from the Communist Party
of Cuba and the Union of Young Communists are building 1,042 houses in
Tobruk, Libya.
Juan Almeida arrives in Sofia to attend 40 anniversary celebrations of Bulgaria's
revolution and to visit Cuban construction workers at the Kozloduy nuclear power
plant.
Ethiopian leader Mengistu meets with Minister of Interior Ramiro Valdes in
Addis Ababa. Valdes heads the Cuban delegation to the 10th anniversary of the
Ethiopian revolution.
Cape Verdean Foreign Minister Luz arrives in Havana and is greeted at Jose
Marti International Airport by Foreign Minister Malmierca and Vice Foreign
Minister Mazola.
In a speech in Ethiopia, Valdes says that the United States has intensified the
warmongering campaign against the Cuban revolution and that this campaign
includes the possibility of a direct attack.
UPI reports that at least four Cuban military advisers were killed in the
1 September air attack by Nicaraguan rebels on a military training camp at
Santa Clara.
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10 September Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez tells US newsmen in Havana that
President Reagan's reelection would not be an obstacle to bilateral relations, but
neither would it improve relations between the two countries.
Division Gen. Rosales del Toro, Chief of the General Staff, heads a delegation to
Czechoslovakia to observe "Shield-84" exercises.
Secretary Armando Manresa says a defense exercise caring for the wounded,
firefighting, and repelling a simulated land attack and infiltration has taken place
on the Isle of Youth.
11 September Czechoslovak Premier Strougal and Central Committee member Flavio Bravo
discuss bilateral relations and the international situation; condemn US policy of
adventurism, and stress the need to avoid nuclear war.
Angolan President dos Santos, while visiting Paris, states that Luanda and Havana
are ready to begin a withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez receives the credentials of Ambassador Nanzad of
Mongolia.
Castro receives Cape Verdean Foreign Minister to discuss the international
situation and bilateral relations.
12 September Burkina (formerly Upper Volta) officials announced that Cubans will work on
Bobo-Dioulasso Airport to enable DC-8s, DC-10s, and Boeing 747s to land there.
Granma reports that a recent decision by the United States to further tighten
restrictions on travel to Cuba proves the Reagan administration does not want
Americans to discover the truth about Cuba.
Soviet delegation headed by I. V. Kapitonov, Supreme Soviet Deputy and
Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, stops in Cuba on its way to Mexico.
Fidel Castro, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Jesus Montane, and Isidoro Malmierca
welcome Guyanese officials Forbes Burnham, Hamilton Green, and Richard van
West-Charles at Jose Marti Airport.
In a New York court, Omega 7 leader Eduardo Arocena admits that in 1980 he
participated in an operation to introduce dengue fever into Cuba. He also admits
links to a US intelligence service.
13 September Spanish Deputy Foreign Minister Puente arrives in Havana at the invitation of the
Cuban Government.
Granma announces that Javier Ardizones Ceballos has been appointed
Ambassador to Italy.
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Oscar Fernandez Mell and East German Central Committee member Erhard
Krack sign an agreement on East German participation in reconstruction projects
in Havana.
14 September Iraq's Deputy Minister of Trade arrives in Havana to attend the fifth session of the
intergovernmental Committee on Scientific-Technical Cooperation.
Foreign Trade Minister Cabrizas meets with Edgard Camacho Omiste,
coordinator of the Andean Group, in Havana. Camacho Omiste is interested in
Cuba's foreign trade structure and achievements.
15 September Polish Foreign Minister Olszowski arrives in Havana and is greeted by Foreign
Minister Malmierca. Vice Foreign Minister Bolanos accompanies Olszowski on his
visits to historical sites.
In a statement for Prensa Latina, Mexican President de la Madrid says that
Mexican and Cuban relations are excellent and that Mexico is firmly committed
to strengthening ties.
16 September Guyanese President Burnham departs Cuba. During his visit, he and President
Castro discussed bilateral relations and the international situation and visited
economic and research centers.
17 September Venezuelan Democratic Action party member Camache Mata says that improving
relations with Cuba should not be seen solely as in Venezuela's interest, but in the
interest of all of Latin America.
Cuba is selected by the group of Latin American nations at the United Nations to
occupy one of the vice presidency seats at the UN's 39th General Assembly.
18 September Polish Foreign Minister Olszowski and Foreign Minister Malmierca issue a
communique in Havana condemning US aggression and supporting Nicaragua
and the efforts of the Contadora group.
19 September Havana press announces the signing of accords for supplying Cuban chrome and
nickel to Czechoslovak enterprises.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service in Miami announces that Carlos
Saavedra, a deserter from the Cuban military, paddled an inner tube from a beach
near Havana to Florida.
Minister of Interior Ramiro Valdes arrives in Harare, Zimbabwe on an official
visit.
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez opens CEMA's third executive committee meeting in
Moscow, in his capacity as president.
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20 September Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and Commander of the USSR Council of Ministers
Nikolay Tikhonov discuss international problems of mutual interest and bilateral
relations during a meeting in Moscow.
Ethiopia's Minister of Labor and Social Affairs Rayeh Berhanu meets with Cuban
labor official Enrique Gutierrez visiting Addis Ababa to discuss cooperation in
labor unions, and bilateral relations.
Foreign Minister Malmierca and Kampuchean Vice Foreign Minister Kong Korm
discuss the international situation, particularly Central America, the Caribbean,
and Southeast Asia during a meeting in Havana.
Ramiro Valdes tells the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation that Cuba and
Zimbabwe would like cooperation between the two countries to include defense.
21 September An accord for refinancing Cuba's foreign debt is signed in Madrid between the
Cuban Government and Spain's Company of Credit Insurance. Both sides support
increasing economic and trade relations.
The Council of State appoints Amadeo Blanco Valdes-Fauly as Cuba's
Ambassador to Japan.
Granma charges the United States of intensively militarizing Grenada, saying that
the Grenadian Royal Police are receiving special training for incorporation into
antisubversive paramilitary units.
Isidoro Malmierca and Spain's Deputy Foreign Minister Puente discuss
international issues and the status of Spanish-Cuban relations during a meeting in
Havana.
Ten deputy chiefs of government sign the protocol on agreements reached during
the third meeting of the CEMA executive committee in Moscow. Carlos Rafael
Rodriguez examines the documents.
22 September A US Federal grand jury convicts Cuban exile Arocena of murdering a diplomat
and masterminding a 10-year bombing spree as the commander in chief of the
anti-Castro Omega 7 terrorist group.
24 September During a press conference in Harare, Ramiro Valdes expresses the firm conviction
that his visit to Zimbabwe has strengthened and consolidated relations between
the countries.
Joel Domenech meets with Josef Haman, Secretary of the Central Committee of
the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, to discuss increasing cooperation in
energy, geological exploration, and others.
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25 September Trade talks are held between an Argentine trade mission from Cordoba Province
and Cuba's Chamber of Commerce in Havana. Nearly 50 directors representing
38 Argentine firms are included.
President Sankara of Burkina arrives in Havana and is greeted by Fidel Castro.
26 September Fidel Castro and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez meet in Havana with former British
Prime Minister Heath to discuss international problems, especially Central
American and the Caribbean.
Fidel Castro awards the Order of Jose Marti to Burkinan President Sankara.
Minister of Public Health Sergio del Valle accompanies Sankara on a visit to the
Ernesto Guevara Central Pineers Palace.
Isidoro Malmierca receives Armino Santos Cruz who presented his credentials
accrediting him as new Charge d'Affaires of Cape Verde.
Cuba and Algeria sign a protocol on bilateral cooperation agreement effective
through 1985. Cooperation in economic, cultural, scientific, and technical sectors
is stated.
27 September Fidel Castro receives Javad Larijani, special envoy of Iranian President Khamenei,
who delivers a letter describing Iran's position on some of the problems to be
debated at the UN meeting in New York.
Isidoro Malmierca and Javad Larijani meet to discuss Iran's stance against Israel
and the necessity of its expulsion from the United Nations and other international
organizations.
28 September Isidoro Malmierca arrives in New York to participate in the UN General
Assembly debates.
Granma-84 defense exercises are held in Granma Province as part of a nationwide
effort to prepare the people to defend the fatherland.
President Sankara and his delegation arrive at the Isle of Youth and visit the
former model prison, the urbanized area of Nueva Gerona, and other places of
economic, political, and social interest.
Peruvian Air Force Lt. Gen. Cesar Enrico Praeli and his delegation depart for
Peru. During his visit to Cuba, Praeli was received at FAR headquarters by Raul
Castro.
Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati meets with Isidoro Malmierca in New York to
discuss expanding mutual relations. Velayati pledges support for the Latin
American countries against US imperialism.
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