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Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied Iq STAT STAT STAT STAT Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 VOL. 4 APRIL, MAY, JUNE 1944 JEDBURGHS Operations, Team Frederick Team Frederick (153a) Jedburgh team Frederick was the third'Jedburgh team to. be dispatched to France from the U.K. Members of Team The.members of team Frederick were: CMa,jor A.. W. Wise)(Br.itish), code name:. KINROS (nd Lieutenant-P. Aguirec)(French), code name: VIRE M/Sgt. R. R. Kehoe (154(U.S.), code name: PESETA Area to Which Dispatched Team Frederick was dispatched on the night of 9/10 June-to the Guincamp area in Brittany, France. Background of Resistance in the Area There is, no knowledge of established maquis. groups in this area but the spirit of resistance is strong throughout Brittany and the support of the majority of the population could probably be relied upon.' It was the task.of the team to contact such forces and individuals.as would be useful in establishing and protecting the SAS base known,as Samwest. The Gendarmerie throughout Brittany are generally sympa- thetic and a French source estimated a total of 3,000.men. organized in the Brittany area.- There is no specific Informa- tion as to the location of camps. A French officer, sent from England in 1943,.had previously established a circuit in this area, but when he was arrested a few months later his organization-scattered.. Purpose of Mission The prime purpose of team Frederick was to assist SAS in establishing their base, which was to be used as a place where other SAS parties might withdraw and be re-supplied. In particular, the team was to arrange for the assistance of (1533a.) Operations after 1 Jul 44 p.103? (154) War Diary Vol 11 p. 6.24 * Deciossific!' `'ol U was no 'is^ s d, rife STAT Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 VOL. 4' APRIL, MAY, JUNE 1944 JEDBURGHS Operations, Team Frederick (Cont'd) resistance elements in establishment of the base, and to-be prepared to arrange for the' reception of such additional arms and stores as would be needed by the resistance gathered together. Method of Dropping and Reception Committee Team Frederick was dropped at a pre-arranged point to a reception committee organized by the SAS base party. Equipment The. team was to take no Jedburgh containers with them. Each member of the team took one rucksack and the team took organized in this area. To, accomplish this information re garding additional dropping ground was to be furnished SFHQ. Communications SFHQ would attempt ? to supply the -resistance' groups 2 W/T sets with them. Scale of Air Support Likely The team was dropped with 2 W/T sets,'with instructions to establish communication with.the Home Station as soon as possible., 'The SAS W/T operator was to have independent contact with the SAS Home Station. Finance Each officer of the teamtook 100,000 French f ranes and 50 American dollars. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs and 50 American dollars. Relations with Other Allied Units ' Special Airborne Services. The team was, to assist SAS in establishing their base and was to be under the command of the officer in charge of the SAS party in the Field, but was to report independently to SFHQ on the state of resis- tance in terms of personnel, leadership, arms and potentiali- ties. Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 VOL. 4 APRIL, MAY, JUNE 1944 JEDBURGHS Operations, Team Frederick (Cont'd Other Jedburgh Teams. If it was felt that the supply and organization of resistance demanded it, request could be made for up to three additional Jedburgh teams. In.this case the team was to arrange for the reception : of. the addi- tional teams at a suitable dropping point in the locality where the teams would be used. Allied Forces, If Overrun. If overrun by Allied Forces the team was to report to the headquarters of the nearest Allied unit and ask for the intelligence officer., No de- tails of the work were to. be, given, but they were simply to ask to be forwarded through this officer to the nearest SF staff.- This staff -would identify them and pass them back to SFHQ. Action Upon Arrival in the Field. On arriving in the`f ield the team was to be met by the SAS group and would immediately set about carrying out their missions of arranging such assis- tance from resistance groups as would be required in-establish ing the SAS base. If Withdrawal Should Become Necessary. If it became necessary for the group to withdraw SAS would handle all the arrangements. Information Provided to the Team. The following information was provided to the team prior to its departure for the field (156): a. The enemy order of battle in the area. b. Information regarding Gestapo and counter-espionage units. c. Orders restricting movement in the area.. d. Topography of the area, (155) Jedburgh Operation Instruction #6 MI R-7 F-431/3 Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 36 VOL. 4 APRIL, MAY, JUNE 1944 JEDBURGHS Operations, Team Frederick (Cont'd) First Word from the Field In a W/T message (15E) dated 11 June Frederick reported: "Arrived safely with all-containers and equipment. ' Have con- tacted local groups. Great possibilities Cotes du Nord.area.. Send Jed team and arms for them. Advise soonest possible dropping ground." Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged 18 June From Frederick (15' "SAS attacked Monday. and dispersed. Guarding 3 ? of their wounded here. Jeds okay. Have contacted guerilla leaders. Paris Brest underground-cable cut.by us. All railway lines in area cut. No traffic received-. .as yet." 18 June From Frederick (15E "Send arms and ammunition soonest possible-for 500 men." 19 June SFHQ to Frederick (159) "Confirm grounds you give.- Congratulations Peseta on promotion to 1st Sgt." 20 June From Frederick (16C) "Want Stens, carbines, grenades. Bonfires will be lighted." 21. June SFHQ to Frederick (161) "Propose to send 4 aircraft 22 June. What clothes and money required?" 21 June From Frederick (16~ "Our position 1 km from Plumelin Quinton. Recep- tion Committee for dropping will consist of Maquis.". 21 June SFHQ to Frederick (160} "Confirm.you are ready to receive night 22 June." 22 June From Frederick (164 "Cannot receive night 22. arrangements night 23." Repeat dropping same 0-4126/2'7 dated 11 Jun 44 (-61) C-3312 21 Jun 44 C-4312/31 18 Jun 44 (162) C-4384/91'21 Jun 44 0-4327/20 dated 18 Jun 44 (L63) C-3314 21 'Jun 44 0-3276 19 Jun 44 (364) C-4416/27'22 Jun 44 (16C) C-4370/48 20 Jun 44 . , Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 VOL. 4 APRIL, MAY,.JUNE 1944 JEDBURGHS Operations, Team Frederick (Cont'd) 23 June From Frederick (1601 "Confirm dropping arrange tonight 23." 23 June SFHQ to Frederick.' (1661 . "Is your ground: suitable for Jeds. - If so can you obtain. necessary contacts.for them." 24 June From Frederick. (167) "Region humming with enemy activity. Successfully carried out attack on communications. Boche communica- tions in Brittany in chaos. Will try. again after ammunition dump. Our morale terrific." 24 June From Frederick (in reply to query from::SFHQ on 23rd) (L68) "My ground ..not suitable for Jeds.. Am arranging ground.'and contacts. Details later." 24 June SFHQ, to Frederick. L69) "Do you require more arms on your ground'. 25 June From Frederick (170) "Send battle-dress and cigarettes,. soap, tobacco, pipe and ration for two weeks for Jed team also batteries for receivers. All Resistance Chiefs in Brittany now contacted. Dropping on my ground great success. Thanks.." 26 June SFHQ to Frederick (L71) "Will send same load tomorrow your new ground near Plesidy. Bonfires if possible. Will send requirements in package marked 'Pour Frederick". 27 June From Frederick L?2) . "Okay to go ahead with plan as arranged for today 27 on Ground Yves. If impossible for you-today okay for tomorrow 28.with BBC message as given.. Bonfires will be lit. Big Boche convoy near Carhaix." 28 June From Frederick _(173) . "Details for Finisterre team. Ground'MMn 58 Pli 5 at 54mm. East of 0720 and 45mm. Northof.5340 between -Stangkerloulas and Chelledxs Trois Fontaines. Safe house and reception must be arranged and team met by chiefs Finisterre region. Require minimum 2 days warning of drop. Boche very troublesome in this area. Request team bring one million French francs for use of Frederick team." . (165) C-4438/88 23 Jun 44 (L70) C-4509/73 25 Jun 44 (1.66) C--3370 23 Jun 44 (171) C-3436 26 June 44 1.67) C-4448/22 24 Jun 44 (1.72) C-4535/3 27:. Jun 44 (168) C-4453/65 24 Jun 44 (173) 0-4562/92 28.: Jun 44 x.69) C-3;01 24 Jun 44 Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 VOL. 4 APRIL, MAY, JUNE 1944 JEDBURGHS Operations, Team Frederick (Cont'd) 29 June SFHC, to Frederick x.74) "Four Halifaxes and two Hudsons will visit you tonight. Captain Leblanc on his way to contact you. Please arrange send him home with Hamilton if-possible. .Thanks for rendezvous Finisterre, will advise you later." 30 June From Frederick, (L75) "Last night great success. Thanks again.." (174) C-3528 29 Jun 44 (175) 0-4614/43 30 Jun 44 Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 VOL. 4 JULY, AUGUST 13? SEPTEMBER 1944 - ?JEDBURGHS Onerations, Team Frederick TEAM 'FREDERICK (437) Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged ...1 July From SFHQ, to Frederick -(438) "Can we send t eaourgn to nergoulas :_..: llo you want repeat on Alain 2 'July From SFHQ to:.'Frederick ( 439). "Development your area now matter of utmost urgency. Arms deliveries can. be made as rapidly as you can absorb. Wish you to concentrate . on. west of Cotes du Nord. Are preparing further Jed for east of.this Department.whom we wish you to receive as soon as possible. Submit .maximum. number ,rounds::stating in each case maximum container capacity per op and whether fit for'-bodies. Wish you to be on ground when next Jed arrives. They will.bring you full orders and new directives.".: "Can you,drop these, arms on.Wednesday June. 5.. Ground MMN 58. at 05MM east 0620 and45 north-,5400 south west Runan. Arms desired 150 Sten guns, 1OO rifles- 10 Bren, grenades,.explosives and ten 2-inch mortars""., 3 July From SFHQ to. Frederick (441) "Will send three. aircraf t Wednesday weather ?permi tt- ing on ground Runan..:Air Force very pleased your recep- 3 July From Frederick (442 ) "For HQ, SAS can now arm 3 battalions. as f oll.ows dropping grounds-at Plevin, St Trephine, St.. Mart-in. Request planes night 4/5. Training cadres are-:.now-with each battalion." 3 July From Frederick ( 443) "Must postpone drop Wednesday near Runan due to, enemy activity against.that.maquis." 4 July From SFHQ' t-o Frederick (444) "Sorry bad weather Alain last night..; Will try tomorrow Wednesday. Postponing Pierre near Runan. Will do Yves tomorrow 5th with 4 aircraft..".. 4July From Frederick (445) "Can we have drop "on ground at Runan Friday July Please drop Frederick package Wednesday on Yves.". (437) See p.33 1st Qtr this Vol ( 438) C-3610 1 -Jul 44 (439) C-5879 2 Jul 44 ( 440) C-4656/25 2 Jul 44 (441) C-3641 3 Jul 44 ( 442) C-4570/66 3 Jul 44 (443) C 4687 33 3 J l 44 444) C 3662 4 - / u - (.445) C-.4703/84 4 Jul 44 D8ckassi, r J { 7~ ire Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 }VOL. 4 JULY, AUGUST, SEPTEMBER 1944 JEDBURGHS 138 Operations, Team Frederick- (Cont'd) 4 July From SFHQ to.-.Frederick (446) "Please advise if- LeBlanc has arrived," 5 July From Frederick. (447) "Do not drop Finisterre'team tonight. Drop them Friday July 7,,same message and letter. Boche. were. -in.. area Monday. Okay'for.Yves tonight. LeBlanc-.'Contacted.": Should return England., next sea operation.'{. 1"- 1 6 July From Frederick; (448) "Desire drop arms 300 grenades and some explosive on Ground MMn 59 . Pli 5_22 MM e4st 0520 and 12 : MPI"., north_*, 5380 northeast Jugon. Also boots for 100.men.:..1Maquis area Guingamp attacked by Boche Sunday. 70 Boche'kil1er1 10 maquis." 7 July From SFHQ to..Frederick?.(449) "Must know very: urgent if you can arrange for reception of a Jedburgh team for Cotes'du Nord, Inform .us what ground.we could use from night Saturday 8th, ?,July 'From SFHQ, to Frederick (450) "Jedburgh.Giles to.Alain tonight with money. Will repeat Alain on. advice from you four aircraft. :,Acknowledge and confirm." 7 July From Frederick (451) "Okay for Saturday on ground Caramel near Jugen. Can you increase arms from 200 to 400 ground near Henon on Sunday." 8 July, From Frederick' (452) "For information of RAF 2300 Boche in villages of Plounevez Moedec. General Ho and command post 1-km southeast of village MMN 58 P1148 MM east 06607 M14 north of 6380 infantry. and". artillery. . High tension line between Brest. and Gouyec blown yesterday. Convoy 20 Boche lorries destroyed near Rostreneri by maquis. working with us." 8 July From.SFHQ to Frederick (453) "Regret Alain postponed bad weather but will try. again tonight. Will also do Caracec tonight'with~-Jed-. burgh team Felix. Will also do Yves and Pierre." (446) C-3678 4 Jul 44 (448) C-4761/97 6 Jul `44 (450) C-3739 7 Jul 44:. (452)1-,C-4833/46 8 Jul 44 . (447) C-4750/2 5 Jul ;44 (449) C-3737 7. Jul. 44, _ (451) C_49l3/15 ; 7 .Jul` 44 (453) C-3756 8. Jul 44 Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 VOL. 4 JULY, AUGUST,. SEPTEMBER 1944. JEDBURGHS 139 Operations, Team Frederick (Cont'd) 20 July on ground 5847. Require most urgently 10 million francs," "Regret death..Chief Cadoudal. All our sympathy. Ground Kerfot refused by Air Ministry too near' balloon barrage. Can you give fresh point." 10 July From ,Frederick (458) "One Jed team and material dropped on-,Caramel all okay. Report not in'yet on Alain." 11 July From SFHQ to Frederick (459) "Please inform Aguirec he is already promoted acting Captain and temporary Lieutenant and convey our congratulations.." 20 July From Frederick. . (460) "Desire drop arms for 500 men night of Thursday' 10 July r. From SFHQ to Frederick ( 457) last. night on Cadoudal. Maquis chief killed. Denounced by traitor. Moncontour region out.of action. for moment."., concerning command of any FFI of Cotes du Nord.. Battle Major Region.. Complete. agreement reached on?points "Contact made.July 9 with Demagny, .Delegue-..Etat: preparation." 10 July From Frederick. (456) job. Drops arranged.by Smith failed. Believed: too hasty' good for morale of maquis. Thanks to'RAF.for a grand demand decorations for outstanding cases. Suggest: Many cases of-great bravery here. Is it possible-to captain and adjutant killed. No maquis casualties.,. Boche attack 5 hours before drop at Pierre. Roche "Twin drops known to_have.been success last night. 9 July From Frederick (455) possible. Desire Smith does not overlap our_work.'i handled by us. Droppings being arranged as fast as joint Hq with resistance and all military operations-. captain. In contact and working in complete agreement' with chief of all resistance in Cotes du Nord. Have . for security.. Recommend promotion Aguirec to rank :of- 9 July From_Frederick'.(454) "We have changed Hubas.e to Canihuel near-St.;Nicholas ( 454) C-4857/4 9 Jul 44 ( 455) (456) C-4886/52 10'. Jul 44 = - (40'() (458) C-4905/15 10 Jul 44 (459) .(460) (Via Wash 181035) .20 Jul 44 C-4879/38'.1i 9 : Jul'_ 44; : C-3821 l0. Jul``44' C-3843 11 Jul .44 Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 140 .VOL. 4 JULY, AUGUST' SEPTEMBER 1944 JEDBURGHS as Boche patrol searching,for us 3 yards away,".-Mille Operations, Team Frederick (Contra)- 20 July From Wash' 18115 (461) "Frederick encircled by.600 Boche last Tuesday. Managed to break out but lost everything except arms and` cipher.. Do not use any terrain or message already used once by Frederick as Boche may know position. Will commence parachuting soon as radio received. Morale tops r,ois uamoronne, came in..panuy., 20 July From.. SFHQ to Frederick (462) Give us names under which we can contact.them."... We are sending a radio this evening on Mossy. We are glad about the good relations with the Avecchre FFI.. from the Germans and successful attack against.-there. "Our congratulations for having succeeded in escaping 21 Julyy?.. From SFHQ to. Felix. (For Frederick) them as soon as possible. Try to send us such -inf orme. proposed, text of the citation very short.'` We will award'` .."Regarding decorations, send us the name,. decorati'on tion as the real name,-rank, and date of, birth." "Request-2. drops arms for 250 each-for Wednesday..' 31 July From Frederick- (464' ) 'and casualties as in previous message. Thei:morale: Germans report best armed and disciplined,maquis.:yet. contacted. Maquis reformed with loss of only one.Bren "Results Plesidy battle much .better than'first .report? 500 Boche out of action, killed or:-.wounded. 31 July. From- Frederick (465) excellent.'! Morlaix, Saint Brieuc, Lamballe. You will prevent enemy carrying out demolition of road bridges, culverts, etc on this road and on secondary roads in this.area. Re- port if you require assistance and your, prospects of success in this task.", maquis killed." 2 August Fr.om -SFHQ to Frederick (461 "Allied advance will probably be rapid in your direction. Task is now. preservation not destruction. Greatest importance attached to preservation of road Maquis near Pleven was attacked by,large number of Boche Saturday during a 15 hour fight.. They. held their . position. Germans withdrew- with large casualties. Two "Our base is now about 6 kms southwest .of Bourbriac. 31 July . From Frederick- ( 466) 461) 18115 20 Jul 44 (463) C-5969 21 Jul 44 (465) C-710/79 31 Jul 44 (467) C-4486 2 Aug 44 ( 46~ C--5967 20'. Jul .44 (464) C--709/82 31 Jul 44 (466) C-741/8. 31 Jul 44 Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 VOL. 4 JULY, AUGUST, SEPTEMBER 1944 141 VJEDBURGHS Operations, Team Frederick (ContId) 2 August From Frederick. (468) "Have 2000 men now ' being- concentrated on:: and near route Morlaix, St Brieuc; Lamballe. Tasks being allotted Can use aid parachute troops later. Have further 2000 available in department for secondary tasks.. Prospects of success good. All drops ordered now of utmost import.- 3 August From Frederick (469) "Roche reported to, have evacuatedI Lamballe. Believe 200 remain at St Brieuc, 300 at Guingamp.. Reliably reported to be evacuating Cotes du Nord." 3 August From Frederick (470) "Can receive Jed team Friday night -okay. :Chief -of FF1 Cotes, du Nord with us now as always-.-' Send our. money and rations with team. 3 August From SFHQ to Frederick (471) "Here are two orders from General Koeni- ;to -all commanders in Brittany. First, in order to avo.id:poss- ibility of battles between resistance and advancing troops in confusion of battle you-must prepare-to send forward a small unarmed party including one officer., . or NCO to make contact with Allied troops. They should" be briefed to supply exact information on-disposition your troops. Warn them above all in no- circumstances to start running-as this will inevitably draw.fire." 3 August From SFHQ to, Frederick :..( 472) "Second, until Colonel Eonots mission 1as-had time, to take. charge of general situation you must order your " men as soon as they. are overrun by Allied troops -to assemble in predetermined spots under their own offic`ers. They should have their. arms with them but must deposit- them under guard in order that there may be no risk of their being taken for snipers. Urgent this instruction. be strictly observed. -Providing these instructions are observed the Allied armies have been requested not to take possession of :these depots of. weapons. i Copies these instructions have been given to armies concerned." 4 August From Sr HQ to Frederick (473) "They will: be enlisted on arrival and:will'act as guides to forward units. They should ask the -first soldier,. they see for the nearest division. G-.2. On arriva at divisional headquarters they must ask for-G-2 branch. Until Divisional Headquarters specifically ask for it they must not mention the password. When asked -for they will give password Angouleme." (468) C-856/81 2 Aug 44 ( 469) (470) C-938/97 3 Aug, 44 ( 471) ( 472) C-140 3 Aug 44 ( 473) C-905/30 3 Aug.; 44 C-139- 3 Aug 44. , . C-186 4 ' Aug 44 Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 , 142 'VOL. 4 JULY, AUGUST, SEPTEMBER 1944 JEDBURGHS operations, Team Frederick`-(Contld) 4 August From Frederick (474) tacts made with.FFI.. Americans reported at Ca11~ac this -."Drop of mission last night complete- sucdess. Con-' maquis groups. 5 Aup-ust From Frederick.; ( 475) Orders from General Koenig understood and dispatched to "Okay for drop tonight of men on ground Bonaparte. 7 August From Frederick.. (476) :mation on maquis passed on to Mikison and Americans con-: on all important points and can deal 'with.'same._: Infor-. "Odd parties of Boche still at large. but::.'maquis. sider our role almost completed." 7 August_ From SFHQ to Frederick (477) elements. This protection should be given. only by. sion and cavalry who are greatly in advance of-the other Guingamp, Morlaix road after passage of motorized divi- "Army Command. . requests. protection' of St Brieux,. "Vire promoted Lieutenant first June this-,year :." 9 August From Frederick Lezadricux with artillery and strong defense position including Paimpol. Impossible task for maquis 'attack. be burned by toriight?by Boche if materials for them are not providedby.populace., Boche in strength -'100 area "Situation at Pleuhian grave.- Whole villlage will 11 August From :Frederick (480) now near Brieuc."' ... "Boche activity in Paimpol Pluebian serious. Essential American. help is-given quickly. Boche com- mitting atrocities in Pleubian. Maquis strong, enough to contain enemy but not to attack at. moment. We are 10 August From F.rederick ( 479) ( 478) "Desire, confirmation of promotion of. Vire." 11 August From SFHQ to Frederick ?(481) German atrocities in region appalling." , "Have requested. urgently air support for FFI area 11 August From SFHQ to Frederick (482) raimpol.. ' (474) C-996/71 4 Aug, 44 476 C-1211/21 7 Aug44 478) C-1306/11 9 Aug 44 . (480) C-1451/33 11 Aug 44. (482) C-6203 11 Aug 44 (475)'.0-1038/99' ':5-Aug 44 477 C-475 7 Aug 44 479) C-1373/29 TO Aug 44 (481) C-6200. . ll. Aug. 44 Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 143 t VOL. 4 JULY, AUGUST, SEPTEMBER 1944 JEDBURGHSI Operations, Team Frederick (C.ont1d) 20 August From Yalelock to Watermark (483) "The following agents - Max alias Esguihoux,. Differentiale, Ale, First escort refer Uppermost.'-.,Leave'. .air strip T 2 to Northolt.scheduled..departure.1600.today. For Carleton Smith -- Jed team Frederick unescorted same f light..' Report on Team Upon Return from ' Field . 9 June:-to' 20 `August 1944 The Mission. The Mission given to the.team...was with a party of SAS into the Cotes du Nord and to_.assist in'establishing a base by providing liaison and Briefing. It was stated that little resistance ::movement' materials for the local patriots. was known in Brittany and gave the names''of,the,agents?who- dead or unheard of.. In our opinion it would. have '.been 'better strong underground movement and the three agents were either;- might be useful to us. In actuality we found a.n in the - Cotes .du Nord, , say, one of the most important in France. two weeks before D-day, as this area was to turn. out.!'to: be which we did, not consider very wise as the Boche:,were.in'a Drooping. We jumped in the middle.of a stick of SAS in bright moonlight. In the air we heard a number of explosions .on..the ground and thought.we were dropping into a battle. It .turned out to be an unfortunate SAS paratrooper who had packed his detonators in with.his plastic HE with fatal results. The Reception Committee was assisted by an enormous crowd of onlookers .of both sexes, most of whom were smoking, Action on arrival. Before leaving I had been placed town only seven kms away. base on arrival. The base was well hidden in the `Fore under the orders of Captain Le Blond who formed the (483) C-2216/98 20 Aug 44 Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 144. VOL. 4 JULY, AUGUST, SEPTEMBER 1944 JEDBURGHS Operations, Team Frederick(Contrd) Doualt and section pos.ts...f or: the defence 'of the HQ -were .- organized soon after arrival. Events in Samwest base.The. day. after the arrival -of. -thee SAS, numbers of representatives of the various partisan groups. at the base. In view, of the fact, that the man was beaten Nord. and Brittany areas..until.much later, the Cotes were also held as spies . and. after nuestioning.one the man were shot and daggered.respectively. Unfortunately,' however, the SAS held these prisoners in full view-of the.various people who came to have every ten minutes or so the-.-,results to his..f ace -were--not Without our knowledge'some of the young patriots-were armed with weapons which had,,been dropped the. previous night. to the SAS A.nd they congregated that evening in `a,.farm"about ;, 200 yards from the base =:'.none of them being trained. to handle. a. weapon like a. sten,' gun. As chance would have. it, _ a car.-- containing two Boche.'Officers'.stopped at the .'farm. fo'"--a's the way .to Carhaix. One officer entered the room where these 'young patriots were having supper and asked,quite politely for directions. The answer he received was about. five slugs it his belly... ,Holding his stomach in place with one hand'he?:regained the car and a grenade was thrown .at .the patriots. The base. stood to but nothing happened that'night.,' The following. morning, however, a: lorry 40. Boche of ,the 2nd Paratroop Division armed .to burn the.. farm and-shoot the, occupants. As the farm was within range of one or two SAS Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 145- VOL. 4 JULY, AUGUST, SEPTEMBER 1944 JEDBURGHS. Operations, Team Frederick (Conttd) posts a first.class battle started. Later in the -morning, ,however, the Boche, who had a radio, 'called up re-inf.orcements and by the middle of the. afternoon there must have' :been. about 400 Boche at least attacking the position. Withdrawal. Captain Le Blond gave the order to'withdraw.- in. small groups to the'.base.named Dingson our team with Squadron Leader Smith of the SAS broke ':out. of the forest and moved' ,itn an easterly direction, losing.'-nearly all our kit in the process During the withdrawal, :we had a piece of. providential ,good luck when a motor cycle patrol which was in hot pursuit was machine gunned from the ,air by a Beaufighter -and decided that there was no future. in, continuing. After a very cold and miserable night hidden iri some gorse. we arrived near Tremargat and lay up in the woods. We contacted the local schoolmistress Simone Legoeffic. who undoubtedly saved our lives, as we.were very hunry?and chilled to the bone. She arranged guides for us to assist us to the southern base and we marched that night 'to Kergrist where we 'failed to contact the guide for the, next stage. We lay up'in'.~a:-wood and waited for daylight. The next day Simone came with news that th erne were'two SAS officers and a corporal very gravely wounded:in a deserted farm not far from' the Foret of I Doualt . Return to Peumerit de Quintin. I decided to return with the team to this farm and see what we could do. On arrival we found Sergeant Robert of the SAS':looking after these officers who were '.nearly .dying. We arranged, for a doctor to .come from Guingamp,"'. who arrived and performed Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 146 VOL..4 JULY, AUGUST, SEPTEMBER 1944 JEDBURGHS .Operations, Team Frederick.(ContTd) wonderful operation.on Lieutenant La Serre?and Lieutenant Bottella undoubtedly saving both men's lives. These men were looked after and.nursed back to health by the courage and fortitude' of Madame Le Moigne and Madame Quiennec of Peumerit de Quin tin and they are now back to. duty. In view of the fact:: that the Boche frequently:passed 500 yards away during'thetwo months they were there, this i a remarkable achievement. Work at Peumerit De Quintin. When.the wounded "were properly established we made- contact with Marceau?, ' chief of the FFI of the Cotes Du .Nord and Francois of the FN. He stated that funds were needed badly and we supplied them, with i about 50,000 .francs on the spot, also leaving money, with the wounded. I decided to establish a base in the region about 10- kms.from the Forest-of Doualt and carry on.alone with'the'team with. the original intention :of arming the patriots. We arranged two parachutings for Maquis not faraway. Both succeeded without incident-and we arranged-for.a.ficadre" of FFI leaders to watch them' in order to learn. the procedure of a Reception Committee. Move to Canihuel. After about 2 weeks at.Peumerit de Quintin I decided that a move to another region was.'necessary for security reasons; the area was thick with Boche. and we had. . had three ambushes on the road just behind our base in one week. We had organized a number of expeditions against Boche petrol installations, transformers and cables and an attack .on a convoy of 20 lorries near Rostrenen, which had succeeded perfectly. . We moved to a deserted farm house in the woods,above Canihuel near St Nicolas du Pelem and established radio Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 VOL. 4 JULY, AUGUST, ,SEPTEMBER.: 1944 JEDBURGHS Operations, Team Frederick (Cont'd) communications and contacts with all Maquis in-our'-area by means of two bogus gendarmes on a motor cycle and'five girl convoyeuses on bicycles:-these being the, only people. who .could get through Bocheand.Gestapo inspections without much trouble. A lot of work was, done at Canihuel as our.radi o worked perfectly and Marceau assisted us greatly by bringing.'in.- several contacts and by,introducing us to Thiery,and;Domigny. chief of region M. A number of parachutings were arranged and :worked,.success- fully, including reception 'committee's for teams Giles; and Felix (485). Attack at Ca.nihuel. `After, about five'days 'at,,the:farm we were working a schedule with London in. the morning when we had a report that Boche and, Russian cavalry were looking., for Maquis in the woods. We did. not pay-much attention `except to post- a. sentry: this. sort:: of story was very common minutes later machine gun fire opened up very close to us and Boche approached the.-farm. on horse back together with infantry. As we were five in.number and there were eighthundred encircl- ing the region we quit the farm just'having time crystals and cypher. The German Coy'commander noticed our aerial between two trees and dispatched a section to see what was._in the farm. We hid up in the wood about 150 yards from the farm. hoping to return later and collect some of our kit. After a time, all seemed quiet and Captain Aguirec thought he heard French voices and..went to see what was happening. He almost fell on to a German sentry who luckily did not see him and in the meanwhile a villager came to me and said :the ( 4841, See pp 323 this Vol ( 485') See pp 361 this Vol Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 148 VOL. 4 JULY, AUGUST, SEPTEMBER 1944' JEDBURGHS Operations, Team Frederick (Cont'd) farm was stiff with Boche., I decided.to try and break out of the the cordon which was closing in around us and get away during the night. When Captain Aguirec returned we moved as a patrol over about three fields which did not.provide much cover-and as the Boche were close-I decided to take cover with the-',team in' a small patch. of gorse about 30 yards souare. and about half an hour later 'a patrol talking in., German.. passe three yards from our-heads.,; It was impossible to throw a: grenade at them as there was .a Coy of 150 just down the path. At long last, darkness came.and we moved out down which' the Boche had just left., had a meal and- got a `guide for the next move. Cime of Kercheren. We moved to this area after --the,,-'. Canihuel party and lay up for two days as the Gestapo, now had our details and were after us - in no small .wa, We ordered another radio through Captain, de Moduit of the. SAS and a set was dropped to Felix but unfortunately the only: chute to fail for. a while. was the. one with our set and this put us back We arranged several drops for our Macuis through.D. Moduit, however, which was good cooperation on his:.part considering his set was already over-worked. We moved about 10 kms further north after five days, and. later moved again to a region about 7 kms from Etang. Neuf, not far from Plesidy. Action against Macuis at Plesidy. We carried out an official inspection of the Macuis at Etang Neuf,'"which consisted of 3 Coys all armed and clothed in uniform and with extremely. good discipline, the best being under the command of. Sous Lieutenant Robert SAS. Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 149 VOL. 4 JULY, AUGUST, SEPTEMBER 1944 JEDBURGHS Operations, Team Frederick .(Conttd) The _ day after our 'inspection the .Boche attacked` this Maauis in strength. All.ranks were on PT except the sentry on the gate with a Bren.gun.who.opened fire and killed 30 Boche in their lorries before he was killed at his post:like a'good. soldier. The Maauis stood to and the results of a,.ser.ies.::o on all three Coys:were.27,-Maquis killed or missing killed and wounded. The Germans stated'after.this action that it was best disciplined and armed M.agtzis they had yet :contacted. The Maouis moved their position:after this action and aost'only one bren gun, that of the sentry'on the gate.' Attack 'against our HQ.. The afternoon of the_,Plesidy. battle, Boche:patrols approached our HQ and opened up with Machine Guns in the next'field to our tent.- to a.' region about 7 kms., SW 'Of Bourbri ac .' We f ound;. here our. ,best PC well concealed':'in gorse on the top of a, hill; :we had learned enough lessons by this time to chose. a. good one.. Orders from London. After some parachutings had been carried out from this region we received orders:to protect the road Lamballe - Guingamp Morlaix and to 'stop the' Boche blowing bridges and installations. This was done the same afternoon and over 2000 armed men were concentrated on.the sector with the result that the American task force had a completely clear run through to Morlaix without abridge being destroyed. The American commander and his.'officers paid great tribute to the.Maquis for a fine job of work. Mission Aloes.' (486).,1 received orders about this time to prepare to receive the-above mission. Arrangements were made for a farm to, accommodate the personnel - two- cars for the use of Colonel Eono and . a Hq in the school at -'Kerrien. (486) War Diary Vol ' 3 p Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 VOL. 4 JULY, AUGUST, SEPTEMBER 1944 JEDBURGHS Operations Team Frederick (font?d) The. drop succeeded without accident except that for some reason the Jed team dropped about 15 miles away. The next day the mission moved down to Kerrien and the resistance collected the arms dropped. The" mission "HQ at Kerrien-was of no -small- interest to` the villagers as it bore' a. strong resemblance to-,amad house;. I was also a little disconcerted when on entering the school Colonel Eono asked me who-.I was and what I wanted;;:: In view the fact that our team :had made the entire arrangem.ents"for. his welfare and I had introduced myself to him the night be- f:ore, this was a little staggering. The next day-the village was attacked by German parachutists who were driven;-off.by troops of .the la.quis '.aided''by.some .of the mission., Contact with the" US. Army. About this time,-'advance units. the US Army were beginning to overrun ?our position and colonel Passy gave . Captain Aguirec ?and myself liaison -duti'es.:with .General Ernest of the US task force, myself ..with the,. Americans and Captain Aguirec with 'the French. Our normal?,Jed role ceased at this point as there were no more.parachutings, The Paimpol Peninsula Battles. The only effective resis ance remaining in.the Cotes du Nord was force 'of abQut.3000-' Germans and 'Russians, who occupied the towns of Tregui.er., Lezadrieux, Plunez and Paimpol. These-towns'were attacked and held by Americans and patriots in three days in-.the above order.. The Maquis casualties were very slight indeed and they.: had previously done an excellent job in bottling up the Germans in this peninsula and preventing them from breaking out and attacking the US Supply lines.' The only point of, note here is that in the attack on Paimpol the French patriot attack went in at 0630 and the Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 151 VOL. 4 JULY, AUGUST, SEPTEMBER 1944 JEDBURGHS Operations, Team Frederick (Cont'd) .American on the same-axis of advance at 0730 due to bad:co_ ordination on the part of the staff responsible for the French attack - the plans,-of the French attack for the - next .day: only reaching General Ernest at 0230 in the morning. when';It was 'too late for him to alter his fire. plan. He instructed me to report on this and it, was _.o.nly through pure chance ,,.and the .grace of God that the patriots were not shot by-American guns. It isa lesson for future: combined. attacks. Liaison Work. It is .:felt that a Jedburgh officer:':can be of invaluable assistance to an Allied commander. coming into the area for the first time as he has the 'dispositions strengths and capabilities of the Maquis at his. fingertips. Captain Aguirec did extremely good work at this" junctiire by organizing the Maquis Coys to bottle up 'the B.oche. .Return.. We had received orders seven days' before. by SF .representative Lieutenant-Colonel Walsh to return .to~England: but-we waited until the Paimpol peninsula. was clear beefore returning; it was our.area and. , we controlled the' Maquisi. in it. Points arising from the Work. 1. The Jed set is first class and never 'let us `down. 2. Home operators must never give QSA3 when they-=are hearing the out-station reasonably well as was sometimes done. The Out operator may have, the Boche in the next .field as we frequently did duringa sched. 3. Home operators must send messages blind'w Station:does not come upon the sched. 4. The aerial should consist of one fixed end: and the other end on a pole which can be raised and lowered.Avoid a fixed aerial for the reasons quoted under a previous,heading. Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 . Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 . ;*.,VOL. 4 JULY, AUGUST, SEPTEMBER 1944 JEDBURGHS Operations, Team Frederick' (Cont'a) 5. Teams going into the field should make sure they. have a No 1 coil. We started without one and . we found, it, invaluable when one was dropped to us by parachute. SAS Co-oDeration. We found at first that it-:was very.: difficult towork with the SAS'.as they had Ideas-about .-armin the partisans and rather intruded: on our job. We donot mind the maximun number'of men being-armed naturally, hasty preparations are made and the parachutings.fail the:ef fect is bad on the Maquis. SAS and Jed parachutings must not overlap. Morale of Maguis. We found that for the most.'part- the men we had to deal with were very brave - inclined.to be far too rash - very fond of petty shootings which'broughtthe whole weight of the Boche.down on them - and very good com- rades. in a scrap. They show. little pity for the.Boche with ample reason and none at`all for" the Milice whom they consider 100 per..cent worse than the, `Roche. I personally ;witnessed the ill treatment and-execution-of five Milice and, none of us felt the least pity for them. The fighting morale of the Maquis is, really good.!.. Volunteers were never lacking f or ' the most dangerous missions and their one idea is., to kill Boche. There is excellent material for the future ;army of,:France in their ranks provided they are instructed in the' right- , _way for the greater part the' younger men had never done military service. The SAS did good work as instructors and occasionally`, as leaders of sabotage groups. Work done by the Team. It was estimated before leaving. France, working in conjunction with Marceau, that-we have'armed in the region of 4200 men'in our area of the Cotes du Nord, either directly by parachute. or by the organized distribution Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 153 VOL. 4 JULY,. AUGUST, SEPTEMBER 1944, JEDBURGHS Operations, Team Frederick (Cont'd) of captured German arms. Details of arms parachuted to.?various Maquis are given in the detailed list. Operations carried out under our orders.. 1. The guarding of,the.Morlaix -- GuingampSt Brieuc Lamballe which allowed the US forces free passage.` 2. Blowing all rail, .;cable, telephone communications in the Cotes du Nord during June and July.. ` in dumps or stores. 3. Attacking petrol . either most important being the blowing of 60', 000 gallons' of at St Brieuc'when the Germans had urgent need of:_i 4. Attacks on,enemy convoys which occurred'every week the most important being that near Rostrenen of 20 lorries. which was 'completely wiped`'.out. 5. Maauis resistance to the Boche. Every time',one.of our Maquis coup was attacked, the Boche lost far.more'?;men than they could afford.' The?..best?_ case occurred `to ', the._Maauis .:at.Plevin which had been armed by -us two days before. Boche, surrounded the Maquis for three days, suffered very high losses and then withdrew, which was a.- great. moral .'and physical blow to the Boche as it was one 'of the,; first occasions;_` `, the Maquis had stood' their ground when attacked by -the .Boche in strength. 6. Several towns were occupied before the US advance the chief being - Guingamp - St Brieuc -- Lannion and.Morlaix. 7. The battle in the north in the Paimpol peninsula showed that the patriots can be used in certain cases as normal infantry. They followed the American tanks in and held the towns of Lezadrieux, Treguier, and Plunez during the- nights of the battle on their own. 8. The above are general points - the detailed`a.ctions Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 154 VOL. 4 JULY, AUGUST, SEPTEMBER 1944 JEDBURGHS Operations, Team Frederick'.(Conttd) of each Maquis are given in elsewhere. The FFT. We have received in all our work very'.fine'co- operation from Thiery and Marceau and all minor officials of this organization. The Aloes mission should have full details of all heads of departments of the area. Conclusion. We. have found real. pleasure in:.assisting the French patriots `in the liberation of their country, and_their splendid. spirit of defiance to.the Boche.has-repaid our work a hundredfold. We feel that our mission has been in .some way. A.. success, and the sight, when driving up to the Cherbourg peninsula along the main road which our men had guarded,.of,all';bridges.: intact and all roads clear gave us no little satisfaction. do not forget either the little team of five very courageous .women and the two gendarmes who did our. liaison work--in the face of the.Gestapo :and. who never failed us. when needed them. Financial Statement Money issued.-to team ----------- --------- 250,000 Frs Expenses Major Wise ---------------------------- 8,000 Captain Aguirrec -- ---- ----- ------- - 76, 000 Sergeant Kehoe ------------------------ .. 17#465 101,465 Frs Money returned Major Wise ---------------------------- 100,120 including franc equivalent of 40. pound Captain sterling) Aguirrec ---------------------- 24,000 'Sergeant Kehoe ------------------ ----- 32,535. :156, 655 Frs 8,120 Francs in excess was handed in by this team. 120 Francs was excess by Major Wise and it is believed that Sergeant Kehoe handed in only 24,535 - the other,8,000 having been handed in by other teams and been placed by mistake with Kehoe's money - thus accounting for the extra 8,000..,--. Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 VOL. 4 JULY, . AUGUST, SEPTMIBER.1944 of XX Corps to operate in territory well 'known...,'When'~' released by Division. will. be' infiltrated to Colonel :.' Felix." . 9 August. From Watermark to Underfoot. (504 ) "To Powell from Haskell, It .i s desired. in .general.. .that Jedburgh teams be ` returned to UK as quickly ,as ' : . possible after their, operational role is--completed,..In'- to attach him "to. XX'Corps.approval is granted herewith. 10 August From Underfoot.-to.Watermark (505) "Jed team George; safe,' Erard and Cyr both here returning Chateaubriant.'today. , Through with written, statement and intelligence lower units. Would not object to operations. Their contact London difficult because set in bad state. .All.info not sent to Water- mark has been relayed:, to Army. units with whom they are. in perfect liaison. Report of Team Upon Return MISSION Our mission was to ',.drop.-with:::a party of SAS and.to_.assist them in establishing a base west ofl Redon by calling :: to action all, resistance elements who`,could.-be put to use and by -pro- viciing liaison, arms and materials.. for the local patriots, Team George was under-the command of the. OC, SAS party in the field but were to report .,independently to SFHQ.on..the state , of~resistance in terms--,of personnel, leadership,:; and potentialities. FROM LONDON TO BALEINE At the SAS Camp, Fairford' Jedburgh team George left ,London on 7 ,June with- Major_:- Horton, as conducting officer,, and Jedburgh team Frederick ,-:(506 )- for . the SAS camp. There we contacted Commandant Bourgoinvw was to UV our CO. Our first impression was not 'good.. There strained feeling between Jedburghs and SAS, the seem to recognize our value to. them and rather impliedt (504) C-726/727 9 Aug 44 (506) p 33 this volume Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP86M00886R000700010003-4 The: 'original SAS?:team' accompanied by'Fernan sent