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January 22, 1975
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~` Ap rovQd :`TCP.3-7 ~: For Release^1J59IU9l26 ;CIA-RDPB~T0060`8R000200170004-9 ,,. trends in Commur~stV ~Prs~pag,and ;, .. . ~ ,. . _. _ .. ..: Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170004-9 Confidential I~FBiS TRENDS In Communist Propaganda Confidential 22 JANUARY 1975 (VOL. XXVI, N0. 3) Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170004-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/~~j~~l~, ~~6T00608R000200170004-9 'I'bis propuRandi~ nnnlysis report ix based rrxclusively on nwteriul curried in forei(grr broadcast uncl press media. It is published by IBIS without coordinatirn with other U.S. Covcrnmer,: components. Classified by 00007 Subject tc. General Declesslfication Schedule of @,O. 11652, Automatically Declassified Two Yean From Oate of Issue National Security Information Unauthori-ed disclosure sub(sct to crtmina) sanctions 7 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170004-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170004-9 CONFIDENTIAL FDIS TRENDS 22 JANUARY 1975 CONTENTS i(oscow Jua~ifies Trade Rupture, Ptinimizes Effect on Detente. 1 East Europe Echoes Soviet Themes on Trade-Detente issue. CHINA 3 PRC Congress Normalizes State Apparatus. Elects Officials 5 Chou En-lai Notes Danger of War But Sees No Threat to PRC 11 rtIDDLE EAST Ptoscow Assails Allon Visits U.S.-Israeli "Pressure" on Arabs 15 CYPRUS USSR Cites Greek Protests Against Turkish Refugee Evacuation 18 INDOCIi INA DRV, PRG Level Criticism at U.S. Observance of Paris Agreement 19 PRG Cr,uncil of Plinisters Communique Reveals Biannual Meeting 21 Moscow Defe~ids Communist Attacks on GVN, Scores U.S. Aid 21 Sihanouk, Penn Neuth Announce Formal Transfer of RGNU Posts. 23 CiJBA Castro Expresses Solidarity With Latins, Pr~3is2s Cuban CP. 25 idOTES Mao-Strauss Meeting; Albanian Unrest in Yugoslavia; PRAVDA on CSCE Resumption. APPEND I~ 27 ;Ioscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics. i ~ CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170004-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170004-9 C0NFIDEN'1'.IAL l.~BIS 'T'RENDS 'l2 ,JANUARY 1975 l _. U,S,-SOVIET RELATIONS MOSCOW JUS1"IFIES TRADE RUPTURES MINIMIZES EFFECT ON DETENTE Moscow, in extensive comment: over the past week, has sought to just' :fy its renunciation of the 1972 trade: agreement with the United Statec3 as an appropriate response to the U.S. trade. legislation. At the same time,Sovlet media have denl.ed tl?~at the action Implies any cha.zge in the Soviet commitment to detente. 't'hree themes have dominated this comment: (1) the contention that the blame for the. episode rests with tl~e opponents of detente in tl~e LI.S. Congress, and that the Soviet act_;on was a justl.fiable response to an intolerable affront to national dignity; (2) a denial that the action implies a Soviet retreat from the goals of detente; and ~;3) an implied warning tl~iat a U.S. fai].ur.e to revise tl~ie trade legislation will result is a sh~.ft of Soviet trade to such U.S, competitors as West Germany, Great Britain, France, and Japan. TRADE CONDITIONS The basis of the Soviet Union's self-justifying propaganda is the contention that the conditions that would have been imposed by the U.S. trade legislation amounted to an interference in soviet internal affairs. The charac*_erizations of the conditions clearly imply that the complaints are directed at the provisions affecting Jewish emigration; specific refer?Ences to tYie credit limitations have been few. Alelcsandr Bovin, ii.i an article in IZVESTIYA on 19 January, which appears to have been a keynote piece in this propaganda, described the conditions pis "economically discriminating," "politically Impermissible," and "insulting." The U.S. Congressional action was the more indefensible, other commentators have asserted, in that the Sovie;: Union gave repeated warnings that it would not accept such conditions, and these warnings were reinforced by the U.S. Administration. Vitaliy Kobysh, in a New Yorlc-datelined TASS dispatch in IZVESTIYA on 18 January, observed sarcastically in this regard that only the American people were surprised by the Soviet action. "The papers kept telling their readers that the Russians would agree to any concessions." Commentators have also quoted extensively from U.S. public figures to support their contention that the Soviet action was justified. President Furd, Secretary Kissinger, and two members of the U.S.-Soviet Tradt and Economic Council, John Connor and David KFUdall, have been cited as having expressed varying degress of crir_icism of the U.S. action. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170004-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170004-9 TBI5 TRENDS 22 JANUARY 1975 DETENTE Moscow has sought to limit the impact of its action by insisting that the overal], conditions favoring detente still prevail and that its own policy remains committed to the encouragement of mutually beneficial relations with the United States. Nevertheless, it i~as introduced a tentative note into its assurances on this score by stressing the activities of detente opponents in the West, and by noting that future progress depends on the degree of cooperation shown by the United States, Bovin, for example, noted that the U.S. Congressional action poses again the question of the "19.mits of confidence," of the "minimum of mutual understanding" without Wlilcll progress is impossible. Both Bovin and oilier commentators, however, have insisted that the Soviet commitment to detente remains unqualified. Anatoliy Krasikov, in a TASS "International Revieeu" on 16 January ridiculing Western speculation about a "sensational change" in Soviet foreign policy, asserted that "no change has taken place. and none could take place." The Soviet Union is still committed to detente, he said, and is still committed to making it "irreversible." Aleksandr Dr?uzhinin, in a Moscow domestic service broadcast on 20 January, affirmed that the cancellation of the trade agreement carried no broader implications, even in the sphere of trade itself. "The Soviet Union is ready to cooperate with the United States in all spheres," he said, providing only that it be on the basis of equality. OTHER PARTNERS A recurrent theme in Moscow's comment has been the implied warning that a failure of the United States to remove the restrictive conditions in its trade legislation would result in a shifting of Soviet trade to U.S. competitors in Europe and .Japan. This point was driven home by an article in the London daily THE EVl;NIP1G HEWS on 15 January contributed by Victor Louis, the reported agent for many of Moscow's more sensitive foreign policy maneuvers. Louis, purportedly reporting opinion held in Dioscow,wrote that anything the Soviet Union was going to get from the United States could be obtained elsewhere. Noting that Japan, France, and West Germany already were doing good business with the USSR, including "the supply of America equipment produced under license in their own countries," Louis a ,rted that it was pointed cut in Moscow that Britain could suppl? ie USSR with sophisticated equipment. Referring to the upcu,. ~g visit of British Prime Minister Wilson to Moscow, Louis said it would be possible to negotiate increased British trade with the USSR. He added that Soviet trade organizations would have time "t~ reassess the situation and draw up a list of orders that would have gone to Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170004-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170004-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS '!'RENDS 22 JANUARY 1975 the United States" which, lie observed, could set off a "trade boom" with Britain. 1-linting access to high Soviet officials, Louie claimed that "it was stressed" to him that the USSR's "technical dependence on Amer:Lca has been 'greatly overestimated' in the United States." This very point that West Europe should now take advantage or the "propitious moment" to play its card and intensify its economic cooperation with the Soviet Union has been the thrust of much of- the Soviet comment on the cancellation of the U.S. trade agreement, including the TZVESTIYA article by A. Bovin. EAST EUROPE ECHOES SOVIET THEMES ON TRADE-DETENTE ISSUE Moscow's orthodox East European allies and Yugoslavia, in the wake of Secretary Kissinger's 14 January press conference, have defended with varying degrees of vigor Moscow's renunciation of the 1972 U.S.-Soviet trade agreement. At the same time, there is a tendency, particularly on the part of Budapest and Belgrade, to downplay the seriousness of the impasse and to keep the door open for possible reinstatement of the agreement on mutually acceptable terms. There has been no comment so far from Poland--which, with Yugoslavia, already enjoys most-favored-nation-treatment in trade with the United states--or from Romania. Emphasizing tl-at it was not the USSR which was hardening its stance or acting contrary to the spirit of detente, a Raabe commentary in the East Berlin domestic service on the 17th declared that Congress had violated the Soviet-U.S. summit agreements by attempting to interfere in the USSR's internal affairs. He cited the TASS commentary by Krasilcov on the 16th which had pointed out that the Soviet side would never consider posing preconditions regarding U.S, internal affairs. Raabe stressed teat it was in America's own national and commercial interest to have a workable trade agreement with the Soviet Union, citing Jolin Connor, head of the Moscow office of the U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council for the view that "the final word" on the trade issue had not yet been spoken in the United States. Similarly, an authoritative Dolezal article in the Prague party daily RUDE PRAVO on the 16th took a hard line in denouncing "unacceptable" features of the U.S. trade bill while predicting at the samr. rime that "realism" would ultimately prevail in U.S, trade policy toward t;te USS R and other socialist countries. The article mentioned only in passing the "special discriminatory amendment" in the U.S. trade bill which made implementation of the 5 July 1974 Prague-Washington agreement on return Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170004-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170004-9 CONFIllEN'I'IAL FB15 '1'12ENDS 22 JANUARX 1975 of Czechoslovak gold conditional upon Prague's payment of 100 cents on the dollar to settle U.S, citizens' property claims against Czechoslovakia. The same issue of. itUUE PRAVO a:Lso reported tl;e foreign committees of the two chambers of the Federal Assembly as merely "regretting" the terms of tl~e amendment affecting Czechoslovakia. Budapest media's notably voluminous comment on Secretary Kissinger's press conference showed characteristic concern both to support Moscow and to keep East-West channels of communication open. Thus, while llungarian Deputy Premier liuszar declared in a Budapest radio interview on the 16th that the U.S. trade bill "does not suit our conceptions ei~her," a Moscow correspondent's comment carried by Budapest radio on the 19th was predominantly optimistic: Discounting any "permanent" damage to detente, the correspondent saw no signs of any change in plans for Brezhnev to visit the United States this year and sign there a nuclear arms limitation agreement. lie added that Soviet-U.S. trade could still develop to some extent "even in the present conditions." The same correspondent. in a 15 January broadcast, had concluded that the fact that the Soviet stand was made public through an announcement by Secretary Kissinger meant that the Soviet Union "does not wish to dramatize the situation." On the 21st, MTI featured President Ford's state- ment at his press conference that day to the effect that he expected detente to continue and expand despite Poscow's cancellation of the trade agreement. Yugoslav comment similarly combined stern denunciation of alleged "interference" features of the U.S. trade bill with assessments that the overall progress of detente had not suffered any decisive setback, Uniquely, the Ljubljana DELO on the 16th foresaw ar_ the same time possible "serious internal political consequences" in the USSR if the trade deadlock should be construed as a failure of the peace policy spelled out by Brezhnev at the 24th CPSU Congress. Tirana, in an 18 .1a^.:~ary ATA commentary, attributed Moscow's cancellation of the 1172 trade agreement to chagrin over the public exposure of an alleged U.S.-Soviet secret deal to exchange most- favored-nation. status for the emigration of Soviet Jews. Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170004-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170004-9 CONFIDENTIAL FI3IS 'T'RENDS 22 JANUARY 1975 CHIiVA PRC CONGRESS NORMALIZES STATE APPARATUS, ELECTS OFFICIALS 'L'he T'RC's 4th National People's Congress (NPC), held from 13-17 January, has formalized state reforms produced by the cultural revolution and generally confirmed as state leaders men who have had much experience in the PRC bureaucracy. The leadership of the State Council has been greatly strengthened by the naming of 12 vice premiers, including eight active Politburo members and alternates. The new organs make only a token bow to youthful activists, though the new constitution reiterates the principle of leadership by "the old, the middle-aged, and the young." Mao appeared neither at the Congress nor at the preceding party plenum, held from 8-10 January. While actions taken by these sessions formally enhance Mao's power:., they seem clearly designed to insure an orderly succession when he ceases to be politically active. As with the revised party constitution adopted in August 1973, all references to Mao in the new state constitution have beet dropped other than references to Mao Tse-tung Thought. The action of the party plenum in promoting Teng Hsiao-ping to party vice chairman and of the NPC in naming Chang Chun-Chian a vice premier seers designed to insure orderly civilian succession to Mao and Chou. While neither man is necessarily in line for the top spot himself, the party and state power wielded by the two clearly overshadows that held by any other leaders under Mao and Chou except for Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying, who as a military leader is not thought to be eligible for the top party post. Yeh was named defense minister by the NPC but was not made a vice premier, presumably to signal the limits of his state control. Like the 10th Party Congress in August 1973, the NPC was brief and held in secret. Following completely the recommendations made by the party plenum, tl:P NPC unanimously adopted all resolu- tions on 17 January. On its first day, the session Beard a report on the work of the government by Premier Chou ~n-laj, a report on the constitution by Chang Chun-chiao (delivered on behalf of the party), and received copies of the draft constitution. None of the reports or documents indicated any changes from current, moderate policy lines. Chang' was closely tied to constitu- tional provisions. Chows report hailed the victory of the cultural Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170004-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170004-9 CONI? :CULN'1'IAL F3IS 'TI~NDS 22 JAPIUAI;Y 1975 revolution as the most Important event of t:lie Pa;;t 10 years, but concentrated on elucidating }:he close relationship between revolu!-1on and economic production. lle referred repeatedly to P1ao's role in formulating poltcy and noted that the "primary task" is to deepen the anti-Lin and Coni'ucius novement; however, he did not indicate that mass movements would be revived, rather stressing the need for sturdy and cat?re labor on a regular basis as the tools for insuring proletariar, rule. He noted that the masses must "deal steady, accurate and Bard blows at the handful of class," c~~refully reiterating that "the emphasis" must be on "accuracy" in a clear attempt to reduce indiscriminate attacks on :Leaders. Cllou indicated that the 1974 grain Harvest was in the neighbor- hood of 2G0 million tons, but he did not supply any hard figures in enumerating PRC economic achievements. Chou stated that the economic plan would proceed on lines ordered by I~1ao prior to the 3d NPC 10 years ago: the economy will be developed in two stages with the first stage due for completion by ].980 and the second stage--putting China among the front ranks of developed countries--completed by the end of the century. Chou claimed that the current five-year plan would be successfully completed this year and stated that the State Council would draw up a 10-year plan, five-year plans and annual plans to promote ful- filling Iiao's goal. STATE LEADERSHIP P..11 members of the Politburo except for Mao, his chief bodyguard Wang 'lung-hsing, and Chi Teng-hues appeared at the NPC session. Chi has made no public appearances since early December and may also be with Itao; he was once of the eight Politburo members made vice premiers. NCNA's 18 January list of state leaders listed the vice premiers in apparent party rank, with Teng first and Chang second, followed by Li i-Isien-nien, who has alternated with Teng in performing Chou's protocol duties while Chou has been in the hospital. Peking PLA commander Chen Hsi-lien, the only active military leader among the vice premiers, was listed next above Chi. Hua Kuo-?feng, ~vho was also named minister of public security, was ma~'e a vice premier, as was Chen 'Lung-kuei, the model peasant who led the Tachai production brigade. Alternate Politburo member Wu iruei-hhien, a former model worker from Shensi, was named China's first woman vice premier. Non-Politburo members named as vice premiers were two ministers, Yu Clriu-li and Ku I4u, former minister [fang Chen, and Sun Chien, probably named as a bow to youth, who rose from u.nlcnowr_ origins to become an alternate member of the Central Com- mittee in 1973. Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170004-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170004-9 CONFIllENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 22 JANUARY 1975 PIINISTERS: Of the 29 ministers appointed by the P1PC, over half were already serving in their positions and three held the identical positions prior to the cultural revolution. At least seven were vice ministers of the same ministry or a predecessor ministry before the cultural revolution and one Beaded anothe1~ ministry at that Three ministers identified since the cultural revolution were replaced by the NPC. Une, Minister of Sports Wang Meng, had not been identified by title since last February, though he appeared as a -~:esponsible person of the ministry in. September. Former Dlinister of Communications Yang Chien, who was replaced by cultural revolution casualty Yeh Fei, appeared as minister in December. Former Watar Conservancy and Power Minister Chang Wen-pi was last identified in his post in November. All had military baclcgrounds, though Yang Chien had served in a civilian post in Kwangtung before coming to Peking, and their departures may reflect continuing moves to reduce PLA power in civil affairs. Not all of- the military men brought into ministries during the cultural revolution tJere removed, however. It is possible that they have chosen to resibn from the PLA rather than leave their posts. In areas which have been especially contentious since the cultural revolution--culture and education--a Chiang Ching supporter Yu Hui-yung was named minister of culture and an old Chou En-lai subordinate Chou Jung-hsin was given the ministry of education. Yu leas been on the cultural croup under the state council and was named a deputy chief of the group, headed by Wu Te, last year. Yu is the composer of two model operas and has frequently praised Chiang Ching. In a speech reprinted in RED FLAG in aay 1967, he noted Chiang's personal l~zder~hip over culture and stated that in the model works, "Every word and sentence, every tune and beat, is permeated with heart blood of Comrade Chiang Ching." Chou served as secretary-;eneral of the State Council prior to the cultural revolution and also held other party and state posts. Only two critical mi.nistries.are headed by Politburo members. Yeh Chien-ying formally assumed control of the defense ministry, which he has headed in fact since Lin's demise, and Hua Kuo-feng was named minister of public security. Hua came up through the bureaucracy~in Iiur_an and became the top official there in 1970. He has spent most of his time in Peking in recent years and was elected to the Politburo at the 10th Party Congress in 1973. Hua was concurrently elected a vice premier by tre NPC, but Yeh was not-- apparently another sign of Peking's sensitivity about giving civil power to military leaders. Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170004-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170004-9 colvrlDLrrI~InL rBls TI~NDs 72 JANUARY 1975 NPC LZ;All);RSIiIP, LOCAL IL:PIt);SLNTn'"TVLS : Most of the NPC leadership consists of aging, semi-retired Politburo members and former members plus a sprinkling of minority nationality and women representatives. NPC Chairman Chu Te and six of the vice chairman are Politburo members or altcrnatest four of these leaders are known to be in very poor health; two are members o:E minority nationalities; the other is Peking chief 1.7u Te wllo is frequently called upon to entertain foreign guests and may have been named to the post to ease p1?otocol problems. Wu was also secretary- general of the session, but follo~?aing the congress the NPC Standing Committee named Cliff Peng-fee, former Chinese minister of L-oreign affairs until last November, to the post. fix former members of the Politburo were also made NPC vice chairman as were other perennials, including Sure Yat-sen's widow Soong Ching-ling, Li ru-chun's widow Tsai Chang, and Lu Hsun's brother Chou Chien-j en. The only possible concession to the principle ~~ of old, middle-aged and young may leave been the naming of a Shensi trade union official as a new vice chairman. Among the members of the standing committee, youth was represented by Chang Tieh-sheng from Liaoning, noted for "going against the tide" on educational policy in the summer of 1973 and Lu Yu-?lan. from I-lopeh, a young woman noted as a revolutionary rural leader. There was some increase in the number of women named to the standing committee, including the wife of purged Politburo member Tao Clue, who did not himself reappear for the occasion. Leery military region leader was elected a member of the presidium of the NPC, as were most provincial first secretaries. Not reported at the session were Ileilunglci.ang first secretary ldang Chia-tao and Shansi first secretary Hsieh Chen-hua, c~ho have apparently beets under attack in their provinces and have made no pubJ.ic appearances since early last year other than in Pekiiib on National Day. Tlie only other first secretary not elected to the presidium, Tsingliai chief Liu IIsien-chuan, has been occupied with other duties in Peking for years and may leave previously lost his post; he made relatively few public appearances last year and was identified only as a Central Committee member or as a PLA official. Tsing~,ai second secretary and military district commander Chang Chiang-lin was also not elected to the presidium. CONSTITUTIONAL Although the new constitution conta=.ns no direct CHANGES reference to "Chairman i~iao," it formalizes his control over the military by placing the office of the chairman of the CCP in command of the armed Forces, a power which the previot~.s constitution, adopted in 1954, had given to the now abolished post of head of state. By focusing on the institutional Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170004-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86TOO6O8ROOO2OO17OOO4-9 CONI'IllENTh~,L rP.IS TPTNDS 22 JANUGftY 1975 role of the office of the chairman of: the pa;:~y, rather than on Iiao himself, the constitution appears aimed at providing the frame;vorlc necessary for a smooth organi.zationaJ transition whin I1ao eventually leaves the political scene. '1'he new constitution drops all of the personal references to Iiao which were contained in the 1970 draft constitution, a document presumably bearing the imprint of Lin Piao, who has been charged with building a cult of personality around 1-tao in order to advance his own standing within tl~~e party and army. Placing more stress on the ptt. ty's role in guiding state affairs, the new constitution omits the draft's reference to I1ao as "head of the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat" as well as the draft's characterization of Iiao as L-l~e "supreme commander" of the PLA. The constitution also fails to include the draft's statement that it is one of the duties of PRC citizens tc "support Chairman I~lao," substituting instead the need to "support the leadership of the CCP." The conetitution~iiowever, enshrines Iiao's Thought, noting that the party is tiie core of leadership of the whole Chinese people and that ""?Tarxism-L~eninism- Ilao Tse-tung Tlwught is the theoretical basis guiding the thinking of our nation." llISSENT: Aside from the low-keyed treatment given to 'tao personally, the only other major difference in tine new constitution compared with the 1970 ciraft version is a passage noting that citizens have the right to lodge written or oral complaints to organs of state at any level regarding "transgressions of law or neglect of duty on the part of any person working in an organ of. state" and that no one will be allowed to "Binder or obstruct the making of such com- plaints or retaliate." The righr_ to file complaints without fear of retaliation with hither level authorities was written into the party constitution at the 10th party congress in August 1973 and a similar statement was also included in the list of rights given PRC citizens in the 1954 constitution. Like the 1970 draft version, the new constitution contains 30 articles compared with the 106 articles of the 1954 constitution. NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS: The section in the 1954 constitution devoted to the office of the chief of state has been eliminated in the new constitution. The former duties of Liu Shao-cliff, the P1tC's las*_ chief of staE.e, remain within the NPC and presumably will be exercised by Cliu 'I'e as IQPC chairman. By making the chairman of the party the commander of the armed fences and by eliminating the office of head of state, a post. Liu Shao-chi Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86TOO6O8ROOO2OO17OOO4-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170004-9 CONL~ 1a IsN'1'.I:AI. I:~'131.5 'I'IZI.NUS lZ ,1l1Nl1Al;Y :L975 allegedly used as a ;-evil power center L-o the party, tl~e new constitution atrenl;thcns the party's conL-ro.l ove~~ the government rind wealcent; N1.'C powers. The NI?C may now, Cor exnrnnle, remove llie prem:Ler only "on the propo~3a1 of. the C:entr.a]. Committee of the CCI'." 'L'he PII?C also lppears to have .Lost its former power to declare war and there is no mention of the Natl.ona]. i)efense (;Ol1I1C:L.L, a mi1Lt-ary adv:Lsory group whi.cll had previously reported to the NPC. NPC members ::r.e also no 1.on},er immune from arrest and li;~ve lost the power to grant ann:esty, The 1JPC does, however., retain its power to "appr.ove" the state budget and it :ts sti:~l character9.zec1 as the supreme state organ; although the new constitution carefully notes that thc~ NPC functions under the "leadership of- the CCP." The length of cF:f~ce for each A'PC leas boon increased from four to five years which "may be extended under special circumstances." NPC sessions are to be held each year, but may be "advanced or postponed" if necessary. Under the 1954 constitution, Llie Pltl: vas described as a multiparty "people's democratic" state witl- power belonginb to the people as represented by the IVPC" and loci; assemblies. Under the new constitution the PRC has officially advanced to L-he stage of "a socialist state of the dictatorship of the proletariat" with the working class exercising leadership over the state "l-lirouhh its vanguard, the CCP." ECUNOhIIC PROVISIONS: The constitution does not call for any radical change in thn r'cono;nic policies which leave been in force for the past several years. '~'he production r,am remains the basir_ accounting unit within L-he commune, and the farming of small plot: for personal needs as well as a ].imiL-ed amount of 'iouseliold side- line production will be continued. S:Lnce the PRC is now a "socialist state," the new constitution has dropped the 1954 guaL~ntees of handicraft rights and the right of. inheritance. Tlie new constitution also recognizes only two kinds of ownership, socialist ownership by the whole people and socialist collective o~,mership by the working people. The 1954 constitution had granted the right of ownership by individual working people and capitalist ownership. REVOLUTIONARY COPII~IT'i'TLF5: The revolutionary committee system, which was set up during the cultural revolution, will form the basis of anew system ~f local government, devolutionary committees, which are usually headed l;y party leade.~s, are to function as the Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170004-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170004-9 CONKIU>;N'1'IAL F1iIS '1'1tENl)S 22 JANUARY 1975 standing committees f:or the yet to be elected 'local people's congresses and pis local government organs. Revolutionary committees members cuila be "elected and subject to recall" by the local people's congresses. The committees and their members are also accountable to the state organ at the ne:a 1-igher level. Local people's congresses and revolutlonary conmrittees are to Mork together to approve local economic plans, :+afeguard the r.:i.gltts of: citizens and "maintain revolutionary order." JUSTICE, ]2IGHTS Or CITIZENS: The Western concept of due process under the iaw is given short shrift in the new constitution which places local fudges under the authority of people's congresses and revolutionary committees. The "mass line" is to be followed in trying cases and the previously specified right of the accused to legal d. fence leas been ot~,it::~d in the new constitution. PRC citizens apprently have lose the right of "equality before the law" as guaranteed in the 1954 constitution, but leave gained the "freedom to strike," a provision Chang Chun-?chiao specifically noted in his report on the constitution to the NPC as having been "proposed" by Ilao liimselt. Citizens also now enjoy freedom to believe or not to believe in religion as well as the freedom to "propagate atheism." All nationalities leave the freedom to use "t:heir own spoken and written languages," but the new consti- tution fails to reaffirm the right of mi~iorities to "develop" their. langr.~ages and it dropped a passage from the 1954 constitution granting minorities the right to "preserve" their Habits and customs. Autonomous regions will, However, be allowed to continue as organs of self-government for minority rationalities and to "exer_ise autonomy within the limits of their authnr.ity as prescribed by law." CHOU EN-LAI NOTES DANGER OF WAR BUT SEES NO THREAT TO PRC Chou En-lai's report to the NPC reflected an evolution of the lie had presented in his report at t11e 10th party congress i.ri August 1973--iris last comprehensive discussion of foreign affairs. His NPC report was particularly notable for its image of a world situation markedly favorable to China. Chou did give more credence to the possibility that contention between the superpowers could lead to world war, but leis remarks were couched 3.n a theoretical framework and did not picture China as threatened. He assessed Sino-U.S. relations in positive terms, but lie bluntly characterized Sino-Soviet relations as at a standstill. Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170004-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170004-9 CONI~ZllEN'1'lAL IBIS ']'RI~NllS 22 JANl1AKY 1975 WORLD VIEW Chou departed in two respects from the PRC line on world war ,.incl revolution that has been standard 1'or almost five years. ile said that the "fierce contention" between the Un:l.tecl States and the Soviet Union "i.s bound to lead to world war some clay," and he was equ].voenl as to whether war or revolution was more likely, saying th;.tt "the factors for both revolut].on and war ar..~ increasing." lly contrast, C1-ou at the 1Otlt party congress had quoted the passage in Mao 'Tse-lung's 20 May 197(1 statement that while "the danger of new world war still exists," revolution a~inst .imperialism is the "main trend" in tite world today. '1.'he Mao formulation has been f.reyuently quoted in authoritative Chinese comment up Lo the present. Reflecting his balrtnced view of war and revol.utj.on, Chou appeared sanguine about the strength of the 7.'hird World, and he declared that "whether war paves rise to revolution or revolution prevents war, in either case the int-e.inational. situation will develop in a direction favorrtble to the people ." This assertion is similar to Lin Piuo's remark at the 9th CCP Congress in April 1969 when he cited a Ma.; quotation to the effect that either world war wi.11 give rise ro revolution or r.evolul?lon will prevent war. Chov's remark on the inevitability at some future time of a military confrontation between the two superpowers seemed aimed primarily at disparaging the notion of possible U.S.-Soviet relaxation of tensions under the cover of detente. At the same time, he voiced continued support for Peking's flexible foreign policy appru~ch under the banner of Mao's "revolutionary line in foreign affairs," and he gave attention to improving ties with the developed countries of the so-called Second World. Thus, he offered Peking's highest level endorsement for West European unity against superpower threats and bullying;, and voiced Chinese readiness to p-omote friendly relations with Japan on the basis of the 1p72 Sino-Japanese statements. Chou reaffirmed China's intention never to he a superpower, its solidarity with the Third World, and its intention to uphold proletarian internationalism. He also promised to enltanr_e ties with "socialise- ccuntries." SINO-U.S. RELATIONS Chou echoed Iris assessment at the party congress that Sino-U.S. relations "Dave improved to some extent" over the past three years. However, he added a phrase giving credit to the United States as well as to ~e ror recent background on this subject, see the TRENDS of 1.5~ January 1975, pages 17-18. CONrIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170004-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170004-9 CONFTI)I'sN'i'I:AI. 1~13IS 'i'IZLNll5 22 JANUARY 1975 the PRC, stat?ing L?hat improvement had been achieved through ";joint efforts of both sides,'' Though Chou notcxl that "there exist fundaments]. differences between C1-ina and the United States," he expressed confidence +~~~at bilateral relations Drill continue to improve so long as the two countries carry out ":In earnest" the principles of the Shanghai communi~;ue. Chows assurance stands in contrast to his def:ensJVe 1973 assessment of PRC ties with Washington, when he had gone to great lengths to rationalize the need for "necessary compromises between revolutionary countries and imperialist countries." SuggestinE that at that time he was having some difficulty ;justifying Sino-U.S. detente to more rigid ideologies at home or abroad, Chou at the party congress had cited Leninist scripture to distinguish Peking's new policy from Soviet collaboration with Washington. Observing that "there are compromises and compromises," Chou had hammered leis point home by invoking Lenin's conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and contrasted it with the "doings of Khrushchev and Brez`anev" as "betrayers of Lenin." Chou in his much shorter NPC report did not repeat his 1973 references to U.S, "defeats" in Korea and Vietnam and to the "decline" of U.S. power over the past generation. And, although he continued to list the United States ahead of the Soviet Union in commenting on the ~uperl~owers, he dropped x:11 reference to "U.S. imperialism," which lead been cited frequently in leis 1973 report. The premier gave only routine atter.t.ion to Taiwan, reaffirming determination to "liberate" the island while calling on "fellow countrymen" on Taiwan to join in the liberation struggle. SING-SOVIET REiATIONS Though his discussion of the USSR was shorter and less polemical than his anti-Soviet diatribe at the 1973 party congress, Chou characterized Sino-Soviet relations as at a standstill, openly attacked Soviet "deception" on the border issue, and challenged Moscow to meet Chinese demands concerning the frontier. Chou accused the "Soviet leading clique" or ha-~ing betrayed Marxism-Leninism and of having taken a series of actions--including subversion and provoking of armed clashes along the frontier--to worsen state relations with China. In his first public dis~ussior~ of the Sino-Soviet border talks since they began in October 1969, Chou repeated charges Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170004-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170004-9 CONFIllf.VTIAL IBIS TItENll5 22 JANUARY 1975 which were contained in the Chinese message to tl;e USSR on the 6 November October Revolution anniversary and in an article: in the December issue of the Chinese journal HISTORICAL 5TUDIL.S.* Chou claimed that Moscow is totally responsible for the lack of progress because it has refused to adhere to the PRC-USSR underst:,~nding reached during the September 1q~9 Peking meeting between Chou and Kosygin that led to the start of the formal border talks. He said that the understanding included an accord on mutual non-aggression and non-use of force, as well as agreement to withdraw forces from disputed border areas.** Chou said that Moscow has refused to do anything about with- drawing from disputed areas, and has even denied the existence of disputed border areas. He accused the Russ:.ans of talking profusely about "empty treaties" on non-use of force and non- aggression in order to deceive Soviet and world opinion, and advised Moscow to stop its "deceitful tricks," negotiate honestly and. "do something" to solve "a bit" of the border problem. * The charges in these pronouncements are discussed in the TRENDS SUPPLEMENT of 10 January 1975 "Peking Ends Silence on Border Talks, Assails Moscow's Stance." i This marks the first time Chinese willingness to consider a non-use of force and non-aggression pact with the USSR under terms of the alleged Chou-Kosygin understanding has been reported to the Chinese people. It had been publicized earlier by Peking in the 6 November 1974 PRi; message to the USSR, but that message was never publicized for tl-e Chinese domestic audience. Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170004-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00~0.~~~t,~1~J~g0170004-9 CUNI.~ illliNl'lAL N~IllULE kA~~f ll JANUARY :1.975 ~' M'JSCUVJ ASSAILS Al_LON VISIT, U,S~-ISRAELI "PRESSURE" ON ARABS COlmllellt on Tsraell foreign Minister. A].:1on's :lS-17 January talks in Washington has disiaissecl any idea that- the discussions might contribute to improved prospects for new Israeli-Egyptian and/or Israeli-Jordanian negotial-ions. Rather, hl~scow typically has viewed the All.on talks as the latest- ~a a tong series of Israeli requests for increased financial and military assistance. In this context, Soviet- media have denounced an alleged U.~.-Israeli joint strategy of "comprehensive intimidation" designed to impose disadvantageous bilateral arran;aments on individual Arab states by exertinb a var.icty of psychological and military pressures on them. As in other comment i.n past months, Moscow has also continu..~d to convey resentment at being left on the diplomatic sidelines, accusing Washington and "1'el Aviv of seeking through "partial solutions" to postpone, if nut prevent altogether, a comprehensive Mideast settlement at a reconvened Geneva conference. PARTIAL AGREEMENTS Soviet comment on the Allon. visit has continued to expound on t-ht dangers to Arab unity posed by ill-intentionc~i proposals for "interim" solutions, indicating that Egypt was the primary--and perhaps receptiv~a--target of such approaches. I'LVL'STIYA's Koryavin, in a Beirut dispatch on the 14th, pointed out that Arab press coverage of A11on's visit emphasized the danger to the pan-Arab c~~tuse presented by "a so-called 'stage-by-stage' or 'interim settlement."' And a Moscow domestic servic^_ commentary on the 17th, dismissing as "publicity fuss" various Western media reports of new Israeli negotiating flexibility, cited file Syrian AL-BA'Tll as charging that Tel Aviv's po?icy aimed at creating "the appearance of movement toward peace" by means of partial withdrawal, a plan the paper assessed as "unacceptable in principle." PRAVDA's i~tternational review on the 19th, reported that day by Moscow radio's Arabic service, noted "comers swirling around" that Allows visit might be followed soon by a U.S. announcement along the lines that "Israel has agreed to withdraw a few kilometers further from the Sinai and Jordan River in exchange for political concesr,ions from Cairo and Amman." PRAVDA deno~inced this idea for its om~~.ssion of Syrian and Palestinian interests and f.or its aim of dividing t-he Arab confrontation states by offering them "individual deals." A hiayevskiy article in PRAVDA on tl~e 18th, along the same lines, charged that *_he United #tates was striving to "neutralize" CUNFID);NTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170004-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170004-9 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 22 JANUARY 1975 Egypt by offering it certain concessions from Israel and isolating it from united acr_ion witl- Syria and ether. Arab countries. SADAT INTERVIEW Moscow's handling of a recent interview by President as-Sadat served to reinforce Soviet criticism of the "U.S.-Israeli step-by-step approach," citing the president as rejecting unilateral agreements, but p7.aying down his indication of- willingness to consider a new set of negotiations on Sinai. I;1tAVDA's Cairo correspondent Glukhov, in a dispatch in the paper on the 18th, asserted that as-Sadat had "reiterated that Egypt rejects a unilateral agreement. with Israel on the Sinai peninsula" and that Cairo insists on such a withdrawal taking place in the next three months "accompanied by simultaneous withdrawal from occupied Syrian and Jordanian territories." liowever, in the interview, published In the 16 January Beirut AN-NAIlAI2, as-Sadat was quoted as saying that although the next withdrawal must be on all three fronts within three months, "Egypt considers it tre~ison to refuse, for any reason, any occupied Arab land which the enemy returns to us." While seemingly disinclined to acknowledge this statement, Glukhov did cite an 18 January Cairo AL-AHRAM editorial which, he said, "explained the Egyptian position." Glukhov reported AL-AHRAM as saying that Egypt did not reject the principle of a phased solution or "any opportunity for getting back the Arab territories." liowever, according to Glukhov, the editorial declared that Cairo "categorically opposes a partial or. separate settlement with just one of the Arab states" and firnily asserted that Egypt "will not tolerate maneuvers that undermine the main objective." KISSINGCR VISIT, 1`Ioscow has given bare,;t acknowledgment of the FORD STATEMENTS possibility of anew Kissinger visit to the rli.ddle East. A TASS dispatch on the 18th, reporting the conclusion of Allon's Washington talks, noted that the Israeli foreign minister had said that Secretary Kissinger "accepted 'in principle' an invitation to visit Israel after he manages to coordinate a new 'interim' agreement with ~:gypt." TASS added that Allon had emphasized that there had beEn no U.S. pressure "whatsoever with the aim of persuading Israel into starting earnest negotiations or taking some def;.nite attitude" on them. Reporting President Ford's interview j.n the 20 January issue of TIP~E magazine, a TASS English dispatch on ~'~e 13th noted that in answering a question on the t`lideast situation and the U.~. and Soviet roles, the President responded t?:at the USSR wants "to refer CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170004-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170004-9 CONFIDENTIAL FIIIS TRENDS 22 JANUARY 1975 these matters to the consideration" of the Geneva conference (the President actually said the USSR "wants t o throw all of these issues into Geneva"). TASS quoted the President as saying that "we do not rule out Geneva at a point, but we feel that in the interim before we go to Geneva we ought to try and malts some other additional progress on a step-by-step basis." A TASS English report on President Ford's 21 January press conference cited hits as saying that the danger of war in the area was "very serious" and in order to avoid that "we are maximizing our diplomatic efforts." TASS summarized part of the President's remarks on U.S. arms deliveries to Mideast countries, observing that he "upheld the pc~'.icy of intensifying deliveries of U.S. armament to the Middle )vast," primarily to Israel, "justifying" that by the need to maintain the internal security of the various countries as well as to "maintain military equilibrium."* * TASS on the 21st reported a New York TIMES item on the Allon aid discussions, highlighting the reportedly three-fold increase in the military-economic aid request ar.d noting that the new two-billion-dollar total had been exceeded only once before in the history of U.S.-Israeli relations. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170004-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170004-9 CONI'IlllsPJ'I'IAL 1~BI5 '1'ItLNllS 22 JANUARY 1975 CYPRUS USSR CITES GREED PROTESTS AGAINST TURI