EAST ASIA BRIEF 158-75.4

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010060-3
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
26
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 14, 2005
Sequence Number: 
60
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 10, 1975
Content Type: 
CABLE
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PDF icon CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010060-3.pdf774.44 KB
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25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000 Secret l Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010060-3 2rixa Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010060-3 LAOS: ALL SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS IN LAOS ARE NOW MADE BY A SMALL GROUP OF REVOLUTIONARIES WHO REMAIN SE- CLUDED NEAR SAM NEUA, DEEP IN THE MOUNTAINS OF N(. '4- EAST LAOS--ALTHOUGH THE LAO COMMUNISTS CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN FOR APPEARANCES SAKE THAT PRINCE SOUPHANOUVONG IS THEIR PUBLIC LEADER AND SOUVANNA PHOUMA IS THE HEAD OF GOVERNMENT' IN VIENTIANE. THE SAM NEUA REVOLU- TIONARIES ARE-THE REAL LEADERS OF THE LAO PEOPLE'S REV- OLUTIONARY PARTY, THE COMMUNIST. PARTY OF LAOS, WHICH FOR YEARS HAD BEEN SO SECRETIVE THAT FEW LAO EVEN KNEW OF ITS EXISTENCE.' THE COMMUNISTS IN 1956 FORMALLY DISCARDED THE NAME PATHET LAO, WHICH LITERALLY MEANS LAO LAND. THEIR OVERT POLITICAL ORGANIZATION WAS NAMED THE LAO PATRIOTIC FRONT AND THE LAO PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY WAS THE DESIGNATION GIVEN THEIR MILITARY ARM. WESTERN OBSERVERS AND MANY LAO, HOWEVER, CONTINUED DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: ,f,oved For Release 2005/06/22 CIA RDP86T00608R000300010 M060 3' O'11ICO1 e1.A1$IrnCA P4 REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010060-3 TO USE PATHET LAO OR SIMPLY THE INITIALS "PL" TO RE- FER TO THE COMMUNISTS AND THEIR ORGAWIZATIONS?Y WHATEVER ITS OVERT FORM, THE DRIVING FORCE OF THE LAO LEFT IS THE LAO COMMUNIST PARTY, FORMED AS THE LAO PEOPLE'S PARTY AFTER THE INDOCHINESE COMMU- '`MIST PARTY WAS DISBANDED IN THE EARLY 1950S. FROM AN INITIAL MEMBERSHIP OF 600 IN 19551 THE PARTY HAS GROWN TO AN ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF 15,000-20,0001.Y IN CLASSIC COMMUNIST FASHION, THE PARTY'S CHAIN OF COMMAND IS INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM THAT OF THE FRONT. PARTY MEMBES OCCUPY VIRTUALLY ALL KEY POSI- TIONS IN THE FRONT, THE ARMY, AND IN THE PHALANX OF AFFILITATED SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS. THEIR POSITIONS AND RANKS IN THESE GROUPS, HOWEVER,OFTEN DO NOT RE- FLECT THEIR ACTUAL POSITIONS IN PARTY CIRCLES. THE COMPOSITION AND RANKING OF THE TOP PARTY -LEADERSHIP ARE CAREFULLY GUARDED SECRETS. IT IS GENERALLY BELIEVED THAT PRINCE SOUPHANOUVONG, CHAIR- UHIb: UNIT: EXT: N9L,A91N& pj1'jpved For Release 200 p,6,(2 g;A,gDP86T00608R00030OQ34( ,Q;, ,,oprlevw CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET cl RV Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010060-3 MAN OF THE LAO PATRIOTIC FRONT AND CHAIRMAN OF THE COALITION JOINT NATIONAL POLITICAL COUNCIL IS A REL- ATIVELY LOW RANKING MEMBER OF THE PARTY CENTRAL COM- MITTEE, IF HE IS A MEMBER AT ALL. PHOUMI VONGVICHIT, THE SOPHISTICATED AND RELATIVELY WESTERNIZED COMMU- NIST WHO HOLDS THE TITLE OF COALITION DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, ALMOST CERTAINLY OUTRANKS SOUPHANOUVONG ON THE CENTRAL CO'MMITTEE.Y THE TOP POST IN TH,E PARTY--SECRETARY-GENERAL --IS HELD BY KAYSONE PHOMIVIHAN., WHO HAS NOT VISITED VIENTIANE FOR 25 YEARS, BUT WHO APPARENTLY SPENDS CONSIDERABLE TIME IN HANOI AS WELL AS SAM NEUA. NOUHAK PHOUMSAVAN, WHO SERVED It! THE SECOND COALITION IN THE EARLY 1960S AND HAS TRAVELED SEVERAL TIMES TO MOSCOW AND PEKING, SERVES AS KAYSONE'S DEPUTY?Y OTHER KEY MEMBERS OF THE PARTY CENTRAL COMMIT- TEE INCLUDE'GENERAL KHAMPTAY SIPHANDONE, COMMANDER OF THE L.AO PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY; SAMANBOUNGRAKET, DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: ?QM&V&fg4 f or Release 2005/06/2 ;,,QA? UT00608R00030001006QA,, ,,,,,,,,,Q,,,,c,,, C(A$IIPIEA/ION REPRODUCTION BY O;'HER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET CL RY- Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010060-3 ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS; PHOUNE SIPRASEUTH,, CURRENTLY ACTING DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER IN VIENT.ANE; SANAN SOUTHICHAK, A HIGHLY SKILLED AGITPROP SPECIALIST; SISANA SISANE, PROPAGANDA CHIEF FOR BOTH THE FRONT AND THE PARTY; APHEUI KEOBOUNHEUANG, A LOGISTICS SPECIALIST; SALY VONGKHAMSAO; AND POSSIBLY FOUR OR FIVE OTHERS ? Y ALTHOUGH: ALL OF THE MEMBERS OF THE PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE HAVE BEEN ACTIVE IN THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT SINCE AT LEAST THE EARLY 1,9505,. MOST HAVE REMAINED DEEP IN THE COMMUNIST ZONE AND FEW OF THEM WOULD BE RECOGNIZED BY NAME--EVEN IN LAOS. DESPITE THEIR LONG SERVICE, THE MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE ARE RELATIVELY YOUNG AS A GROUP: KAYSONE IS ABOUT 50, KHAMPTAY IS 49, AND THE REST ARE IN THEIR FIFTIES OR EARLY'SIXTIES.Y THE MOST IMPORTANT COMMUNIST LEADERS WITH VERY FEW EXCEPTIOUS ARE LOWLAND LAO EVEN THOUGH THE RANK U1tiu: UNIT: EXT: N,L,4agg pXVd For Release 2005/0g, ,w,, 86T00608R000300010L60A..orne.w CusainC*noN REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING /)FFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET &". nv. Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010060-3 AND FILE OF THE FRONT AND ARMY ARE DRAWN FROM THE HIGHLAND MINORITY TRIBES OF EASTERN LAOS WHO CAME UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL EARLY IN THE MOVEMENT. WITH THE NOTABLE EXCEPTIONS OF SOUPHANOUVONG AND PHOUMI VONGIVCHITi THE SENIOR MEMBERS ARE NOT FROM THE TRADITIONAL LAO RULING ELITE. THESE PEOPLE WERE COM- MUNISTS--HEAVILY INFLUENCED BY THE VIETNAMESE FROM THE VERY BEGINNING.Y THE SENIOR COMMUNIST LEADERS HAVE LITTLE FORMAL EDUCATION. OF THE KNOIJN CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS, ONLY SOUPHANOUVONG HAS A UNIVERSITY DEGREE AND MANY OF THE OTHERS DID NOT EVEN ATTEND THE FRENCH LYCEES ? IN INDOCHINA?Y IN CONTRAST TO THEIR COMRADES IN CAMBODIA, THE LAO COMMUNISTS HAVE BEEN DEPENDENT ON THE NORTH VIETNAMESE FOR THE SUCCESS OF THEIR MOVEMENT. IT WAS UNDER THE AEGIS OF HO CHI MINH'S VIET MINH THAT SOME 150 ANTI-FRENCH LAO MET IN AUGUST 1.950 TO UNITE DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: ~.LApproved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0003000100,1ggi,,,~?T,,,,,,,C?, COORDINATING OPPICU,1S Cuss1PICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET I RV 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010060-3 TO FORM THE "PATHET LAO" MOVEMENT. ALL THE PARTICI- PANTS AT THIS MEETING HAD CLOSE TIES WITH THE VIET- NAMESE. ONE MAJOR GROUP CONSISTED OF COMMONERS., IN- CLUDING KAYSONE AND NOUHAK, WHO SINCE 1946 HAD BEEN 5X6 ORGANIZING RESISTANCE BANDS IN THE HILLS OF EASTERN LAOS. A SECOND GROUP CONSISTED OF A SMALL SPLINTER FROM THE LAO ISSARA, THE ORIGINAL LAO INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT. THESE ARISTOCRATS, LED BY PRINCE SOUPHAOU- VONG, DECIDED TO COOPERATE WITH THE VIETNAMESE AND CONTINUE THE RESISTANCE RATHER THAN FOLLOW SOUVANNA PHOUMA AND OTHERS INTO A FRENCH-SPONSORED GOVERNMENT IN VIENTIANE.' VIET MINH TROOPS IN THE EARLY 1950S INVADED LAOS AND PROVIDED THE LAO COMMUNISTS WITH THEIR FIRST TER- RITORIAL BASE IN THE BORDER PROVINCE OFSAM NEUA. THE VIETNAMESE HAVE TRAINED AND ADVISED THE LAO PEOPLE'S LIBERATION 'ARMY FROM THAT TIME ON AND, 25X6 DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: anL1AApprro~ed For Release 2005/06//22N: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010OQ T,,o.nc.,, C SInewIOP REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBIYED E 2 IMPDET NI. QV. Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010060-3 NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY THAT DID THE FIGHTING FOR THE LAO COMMUNISTS IN NEARLY ALL MAJOR BATTLES- HANOI, THROUGH ITS ADVISERS IN SAM NEUA AND THROUGH CONTACTS WITH SENIOR LAO LEADERS, STILL PROVIDES THE LAO AD- VICE, DIRECTION, AND COHESION.'' MANY IN THE LAO COMMUNIST INNER CIRCLE HAVE 5X1 DEVELOPED CLOSE TIES WITH SENIOR VIETNAMESE LEADERS, AND MANY SPEND CONSIDERABLE TIME IN HANOI. SEVERAL OF THE SENIOR LAO HAVE,VIETNAMESE FAMILY RELATION- SHIPS. KAYSONE'S FATHER IS VIETNAMESE. A NUMBER OF THE LAO COMMUNISTS HAVE VIETNAMESE WIVES. {SOU- PHANOUVONG IS SAID TO HAVE MARRIED A SECRETARY OF HO CHI MINH.} KAYSONE, SISANE, SOUPHANOUVONG, AND POS- SIBLY SEVERAL OTHERS RECEIVED SOME FORMAL EDCUATION IN VIETNAM.'' -SOME OBSERVERS OF THE LAO POLITICAL SCENE A FACTION WITHIN THE SAM NEUA LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: 25X1 N!llAflN Approved ved For Release 2005/06/22 : 0P'ICEN euS$IPIC nON REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET . wv_ Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010060-3 UNHAPPY WITH THE CONTINUED DEPENDENCE ON THE VIETNA- MESE. THIS "NATIONALIST" FACTION-IS SUPPOSEDLY LED BY SOUPHANOUVONG AND PHOUMI VONGVICHIT AND ALLEGEDLY .INCLUDES LESSER FIGURES WHO WERE EDUCATED IN FRENCH INDOCHINA LYCEES, HAVE SOME FAMILY TIES TO THE TRA- DITIONAL LAO LEADERSHIP, AND WHO HAVE OVER THE YEARS MAINTAINED LESS INTIMATE CONTACT WITH THE VIETNAMESE. MEMBERS OF THIS FACTION ARE SAID TO BE LESS LIKELY TO FOLLOW NORTH VIETNAMESE DIRECTIONS AND ARE UNLIKELY TO IMPOSE A RIGID COMMUNIST SYSTEM IN LAOS?Y WHILE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOME COMMUNIST LEADERS FIND THE VIETNAMESE CONNECTION HARD TO SWALLOW, THIS DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE EVER BEEN A SERIOUSLY DIVISIVE ISSUE. SINCE THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT WAS LAUNCHED FORMALLY IN THE EARLY 195OS, NO SENIOR LAO COMMUNIST HAS EVER DEFECTED (THERE HAS NEVER BEEN A PURGE OF THE TOP RANKS. SOUPHANOUVONG AND OTHERS MAY AT TIMES HAVE AR- DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: 25X1 A,eroved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010060-3 11[L! / a OP%IGIN COJIOINATINa opFIccN? AUTHENTICATING O/PIE1. CuI IPICATIaN REPPODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET w2 w_ 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010060-3 GUED FOR A LINE MORE INDEPENDENT OF HANOI AND FOR LESS STRINGENT COMMUNIST POLICIES. THEY CLEARLY REALIZE, HOWEVER, THAT AS A PRACTICAL MATTER THEY CAN GO ONLY SO FAR IN DEVELOPING AN INDEPENDENT LINE WITHOUT PROVOKING THEIR POWERFUL VIETNAMESE BENEFACTORS. IN ANY CASE, IAYSONE, NOUHAK, KHAMPTAY AND THE OTHERS, WHO OWE THEIR POSITIONS TO THE VIETNAMESE AND WHO FOR 30 YEARS HAVE *HAD INTIMATE TIES IN HANOL, CALL THE SHOTS FOR THE L".0 COMMUNISTS. THE LAO COMMUNISTS MAY EVEN- TUALLY SEE ADVANTAGES IN CULTIVATING THE SOVIETS, CHI- NESE, AND EVEN WESTERN STATES YN ORDER TO MOVE TO A MORE INDEPDENDENT POSITION. BUT FOR THE TIME BEING, THE PRESENT CAST OF LEADERSHIP WOULD BE EXTREMELY UNLIKELY TO DO ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT OFFEND THEIR VIETNAMESE COMRADES.Y .THE COMMUNISTS' BASIC OBJECTIVE IS TO IMPOSE A MARXIST-LENINIST SYSTEM ON LAO SOCIETY, ONE THAT IS PRESUMABLY CLOSE TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE MODEL. DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: ,,`jftp,Rr,q,y,q;1 For Release 2005/06t0; ,g)& , j6T00608R00030001000;,, ~,c,,,,,,o,,,,C60 Cu,sIPCAnow REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET r_I Rv. 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010060-3 FOLLOWING THE VIETNAMESE PATTERN, FOR EXAMPLE, THE LAO ARE MOVING MORE SLOWLY THAN THEIR CAMBODIAN COM- RADES TOWARD TRADITIONAL COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES.M AS A FIRST STEP, THE LAO HAVE BEGUN TO IMPOSF A VARIETY OF CONTROLS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. WHILE FAIRLY STANDARD IN THE COMMUNIST CONTEXT, THESE CON- TROLS ARE WHOLLY NEW TO THE LAO, WHO ARE USED TO GOV- ERNMENT NEGLEET. THE COMMUNISTS PRESUMABLY WILL ALSO EXTEND PROGRAMS DEVELOPED OVER THE YEARS IN THE SO- CALLED LIBERATED ZONE. THESE HAVE LESS TO DO WITH THEORETICAL COMMUNIST SOCIAL REFORMS THAN THEY DO WITH MORE PRACTICAL MATTERS SUCH AS INCREASING AGRI- CULTURAL PRODUCTION, PROVIDING BASIC SERVICES IN HEALTH AND EDUCATION, AND ENCOURAGING COMMUNAL PAR- TICIPATION IN ROAD MAINTENANCE AND SIMILAR ACTIVITIES.' 'COMMUNIST PROGRAMS MAY HAVE MORE IMPACT IN VIENTIANE,'THE ONLY SIGNIFICANT CITY IN LAOS. MANY LAO SUSPECT THAT THE COMMUNISTS SOON WILL SOLVE THE DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: Aor,roved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010060-3 N1L9ASl O ~pIcI COON INAVINO Op/ICU" AUTNANYICATINO OUPICUM CWfINICATION REPRODUCTION by OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010060-3 xi CAPITAL'S PERSISTENT UNEMPLOYMENT PROGRAM BY MOVING NON-PRODUCTIVE PEOPLE TO THE COUNTRYSIDE TO ASSIST IN MEETING THE COMMUNISTS' OFT STATED GOAL OF "GAIN- ING NATIONAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN RICE." MOST IF NOT ALL OF THE CAPITAL'S REFUGEE POPULATION PROBABLY WILL ALSO PE MOVED BACK TO THEIR HOMES.Y THE COMMUNISTS OVER THE YEARS HAVE PROVIDED FEW HINTS ON PLANS FOR ANY RADICAL REORGANIZATION OF SOCIETY OR THE ECONOMY. THEY PAY. LIP SERVICE TO RESPECT FOR PRIVATE PROPERTY, BUT HAVE BEGUN TO NA- TIONALIZE LAOS' FEW MANUFACTURING AND PROCESSING INDUSTRIES AND ARE LAYING THE GROUNDWORK-FOR SIMILAR MOVES AGAINST THE PRIVATELY OWNED BANKS. THESE MOVES WILL HAVE LITTLE IMPACT ON LAOS' PRIMITIVE ECONOMY. DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: ""UppPoVM For Release 2005/06P22?':4'C.`1'W-1 P86T00608R000300010(?tiff'-'3""""? ?""'" CLASSI/ICAT ON REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET CL BY: 5X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010060-3 ARGENTINA: PRESIDENT PEROH APPARENTLY IS DETERMIUED TO RESUME HER DUTnS NEXT NECK, DESIITE STRONG PRESSURE ON HER TO EXTEND HER LEAVE OR EVEN RESIGN. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ANNOUNCED SHE WILL RETURN TO THE CAPITAL ON OCTOBER 16 AND ATTEND AN IMPORTANT PERONIST RALLY THE NEXT DAY?Y THE US EMBASSY REPORTS THAT 90TH ACTING PRESIDENT LUDEF AND INTERIOR MINISTER RORLEDO FLEt1 TO THE PRESIDENTIAL RETREAT ON OCTOBER 7 TO CONFER WITH PERON? LUDER ALMOST CERTAINLY URGED HER TO REMAIN OUT OF THE PICTURE. ROBLED6. SAID TO DIFFER WITH LUDER 0;,! THE ISSUE ALL ALON( MAY WELL HAVE URGED HER TO COME BACK ?Y WHEN THE TWO MEN REACHED BUENOS AIRES LATE ON OCTOBER 7, THEY REFUSED TO REVEAL THE RESULTS OF THEIR TALKS. RORLEDO SAID ONLY YHAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE AT THE RALLY AND THAT ALL ELSE WAS SPECULATION?Y MEANWHILE. OPINION IN POLITICAL, PRESS. AND MILITARY CIRCLES CONTINUES TO HARDEN AGAINST PERON. ACCORDING TO A PRESS ACCOUNT, THE COMMANDER OF T!IE AIR FORCE ALSO VISITED THE PRESIDENT TO TELL 14ER Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010060-3 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010060-3 215X1 T!JAT THE MILITARY M ANTED NER TO PROLONG HER. VACATION ?" THE OFFICERS REGARD THE CONTROVERSY OVER HER ROLE AND HEK DEMONSTRATED INABILITY TO LEAD AS DETRIMENTAL TO THE PUTSUIT OF THEIR PRINCIPAL GOALS THE SUPPRESSION: OF TERRORISM- IN RECENT DAYS T-H ADMINISTRATION WAS CREATED TWO NEW BODIES DESIGNED TO STREAMLI14E THE ANTI-GUCRRILLA EFFORT AND GIVE THE IIEITARY A STROr4GCR HAND IN THE FIGHT?V 25X1 THE GONERALS AND LL:DER WWLL ALMOST CERTAINLY STEP UP TREIR 5X1 EFFORTS TO PREVAIL ON PERON TO STAY AWAY- Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010060-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010060-3 1. MOROCCO: KING HASSAN, IN REMARKS TO THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS IN RABAT ON OCTOBER 8, REITERATED A PROMISE HE MADE IN AUGUST TO AWAIT THE FORTHCOMING ADVISORY OPINION BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE BEFORE RESORTING TO FORCE IN SPANISH SAHARA.Y HASSAN SAID HE WOULD INFORM HIS COUNTRYMEN OF THE COURSE OF ACTION MOROCCO WILL TAKE ONCE THE COURT'S OPINION-WHICH MAY BE RELEASED SOON .CIS KNOWN. HASSAN ADDED THAT HE EXPECTED SUPPORT FROM OTHER ARAB STATES IN RETURN FOR WHAT MOROCCO PROVIDED DURING THE OCTOBER WAR AND IN SUBSEQUENT PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. HE ALSO APPEALED TO AFRICAN STATES, REMINDING THEM THAT TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND NATIONAL LIBERATION WERE IMPORTANT CONCEPU'S IN THEIR PASTY THE KING'S REMARKS HAVE EASED SOMEWHAT THE ATMOSPHERE OF TENSION, BUT HE HAS NOT ABANDONED HIS YEAR-END DEADLINE OR HIS THREAT TO USE 'FORCE IF NECESSARY. IF THE COURT'S OPINION IS AMBIGUOUS OR 25X1 5X1? UNFAVORABLE TO MOROCCO, HASSAN PROBABLY WILL INITIATE SOME FORM OF MILITARY ACTION IN SPANISH SAHARA-1 I .2L...44 ,&wed For Release 2005/Q 2.i? O64W RQP86T00608R00030001 gAQffa,,N, o,,,c.,, Cw.IPCAY ON REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET CL RV! 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010060-3 U iP.ua IN A PARALLEL SPEECH TO THE UN CENERAL ASSEMBLY, MOROCCAN 5X1X 5X1 FOREIGN MINISTER LARAKI ALSO APPEALED FOR INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT. HE ARGUED THAT THE ASSEMb!.Y, IN RECOMMENDING PROPOSALS FOR THE DECOLONIZATION OF SPANISH SAHARA, MUST RESPECT THE "FUNDAMENTAL LAW" OF' THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF MOROCCO AND MAURITANIA. HE ALSO CRITICIZED SPAIN REPEATEDLY AND REAFFIRMED MOROCCO'S CLAIM TO THE SPANISH ENCLAVES OF CEUTA AND MELILLA IN NORTHERN MOROCCO. HE CALLED ON SPAIN TO NEGOTIATE THEIR RETURN, DRAWING A PARALLEL BETWEEN HIS COUNTRY'S CLAIM TO THE ENCLAVES AND SPAIN'S TO GIBRALTAR.Y BY REVIVING ITS CLAIMS TO THE NORTHERN ENCLAVES AND LINKING THEM TO MADRID'S CLAIM TO GIBRALTAR, MOROCCO MAY BE HINTING TRAT25X1 IT WILL SUPPORT SPAIN ON GIBRALTAR IN RETURN FOR AN OVERALL SETTLE- MENT ON THE SAHARA AND THE NORTHERN ENCLAVES DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: "41AVPF6 rtd For Release 2005/06M? (Dlt oRDK6T00608R000300010(?e"&1CATIN60PFlC[: CLADI PICAnON REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET CL BY: Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010060-3 1. PORTUGAL: THE PORTUGUESE CABINET .ISSUED A TOUGH STATEMENT THURSDAY NIGHT WARNING THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE ACTION AGAINST ANY GROUPS USING VIOLENCE AND CALLING FOR A JOINT MEETING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL TO MAP OUT MEASURES THAT WOULD GUARANTEE STABILITY. THE STATEMENT ENDORSED THE RECENT ACTIONS OF THE POPULAR DEMOCRATS AND THE SOCIALISTS IN SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT AND INDIRECTLY CONDEMNED THE COMMUNISTS FOR SUPPORTING THE CONTINUING WAVE OF MILITARY, POLITICAL, AND INDUSTRIAL AGITA TION.Y MUTINIES BY EXTREME LEFTIST SOLDIERS HAVE POLARIZED PORTUGAL'S FACTIONS, AND AS ROOM FOR COMPRvMISE BECOMES PROGRESSIVELY NARROWED, VIOLENCE IS BECOMING MORE LIKELY ?Y SOCIALIST PARTY LEADER MARIO SOARES, ADDRESSING A SOCIALIST-SPONSORED PRO-GOVERNMENT RALLY IN COIMBRA ON WEDNESDAY, .WARNED THAT UNLESS A MINIMUM OF ORDER AND STABILITY IS CREATED 'WITHIN A MONTH, PORTUGAL WILL FACE GREAT ECONOMIC HARDSHIPS. HE SAID THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS CANNOT BE SOLVED BY DISORDER OR DEMONSTRATIONS LIKE THOSE RECENTLY INSTIGATED BY THE FtLEFT DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010060-3 NlLIA$ING OFFICUN COOIIOINATtNO OFFICSNS AUTHNTICATING OFFIC[I. CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET w^ \V_ 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010060-3 AND APPLAUDED BY THE COMMUNISTS. SOARES WAS RESPONDING TO A RECENT COMMUNIST PARTY STATEMENT THAT THE SEIZURES OF MILITARY UNITS BY THE FAR LEFT WERE LEGITIMATE ACTS AND "A LIVELY EXPRESSION OF THE STRUGGLE OF THE WORKING PEOPLE."Y SOARES SAID THAT AFTER 18 MONTHS OF' REVOLUTION, THE PEOPLE ARE TIRED OF DISORDER. HE SAID THE AZEVEDO GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN FORMED TO CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE OF CALM IN WHICH THE COUNTRY'S PROBLEMS COULD BE SOLVED.' AFTER THE RALLY, THE SOCIALIST DEMONSTRATORS MARCHED TO THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE CENTRAL MILITARY REGION TO REITERATE THEIR SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT.' THE COMMUNISTS HAVE DENOUNCED AS A "COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY PROVOCATION" A PRO-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATION?BY THE POPULAR DEMOCRATS ON WEDNESDAY EVENING IN PORTO, WHICH WAS CLIMAXED BY .A FREE-FOR-ALL WITH ROCK-THROWING LEFTISTS. ABOUT 5,000 POPULAR .'..DEMOCRATIC PARTY SUPPORTERS CLASHED WITH DEFENDERS OF AN ARTILLERY POST SEIZED BY DISSIDENT SOLDIERS ON TUESDAY. THE COMMUNISTS" APPEALED TO PRESIDENT COSTA GOMES-TO TAKE "ENERGETIC DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: ,,L,A,IIA ZYed For Release 2005//a?I&&i1NcI-P86T00608R00030001RPM3Ri-l,,.op.1cgN Eu?I~N;ATION REPROI')UCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET f`1 DV. 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010060-3 5X1 BLOODSHED AND POSSIBLY WIDENING THE AREA OF CONFLICT. RESTORE ORDER WITHOUT RESORTING TO EXCESSIVE FORCE AND THUS RISKING a Ir.IL{7f ACTION" AGAINST THE POPULAR DEMOCRATS, WHOM IT ACCUSED OF TRYING TO STORM THE POST BY FORCE.' EXTREME LEFT ELEMENTS OCCUPYING THE ARTILLERY POST REACHED A STANDOFF WITH LOYALIST FORCES ON THURSDAY AS THE NORTHERN REGION COMMANDER, GENERAL VELOSO, AGAIN BACKED AWAY FROM THE USE OF FORCE TO QUELL THE MUTINY. VELOSO'S EARLIER EFFORTS TO ENFORCE DISCIPLINE HAVE MADE HIM THE PRINCIPAL TARGET FOR LEFTIST ATTACKS.' VELOSO IS BELIEVED TO HAVE ENOUGH LOYAL TROOPS TO REASSERT CONTROL IN PORTO IF HE IS ORDERED TO DO SO, BUT SUCH ORDERS HAVE APPARENTLY NOT BEEN ISSUED. THE. HOPE APPARENTLY IS THAT VELOSO CAN5X1 2. CZECHOSLOVAKIA: A PLENUM OF THE PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE .EARLY THIS WEEK RELEASED OLDRICH SVETSKA FROM HIS POST ON THE SECRETARIAT AND APPOINTED HIM EDITOR-IN-CHIEF OF THE PARTY DAILY, RUDE PRAVO?1 A POST HE HELD FROM ?1958 TO 1968. JOSEF HAVLIN, CURRENTLY THE CZECH DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: ,,,LAA Br yid For Release 2005/Oa//aN;,- QV86T00608R000300010, ,Q;,,4A?NO,,.,c,m CLA!56/ICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET r1 av. Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010060-3 MINISTER OF EDUCATION, WAS ELECTED TO REPLACE SVETSKA AS PARTY SECRETARY ?Y THESE SHIFTS PRESAGE A TOUGHER IDEOLOGICAL LINE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. BOTH MEN ARE VETERAN HARD LINERS. HAVLIN, WHO STAUNCHLY SUPPORTED OUSTED PARTY BOSS NOVOTNY AND ADOPTED A PARTICULARLY TOUGH LINE TOWARD RESTIVE STUDENTS IN 1967, WAS DROPPED FROM ALL OF- FICES DURING THE DUBCEK ERA. LIKE SVETSKA, HE HAS HAD PREVIOUS PRESS EXPERIENCE, AND WILL NOT HESITATE TO CRACK THE IDEOLOGICAL WHIP IN THE REGIME'S DRIVE TO HAVE THE MEDIA MORE CLOSELY REFLECT THE VIEW FROM THE KREMLIN. THE HUSAK LEADERSHIP HAS--SINCE MID- SUMMER--CRITICIZED "NUMEROUS PROBLEMS AND SHORT- COMINGS" IN THE COUNTRY'S PRINTED MEDIA AND PRAGUE RECENTLY RELIEVED THE MORE MODERATE MIROSLAV MOC FROM HIS POST 'OF EDITOR-IN-CHIEF OF THE PARTY DAILY.'s' THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE APPROVED A LETTER TO PARTY ORGANIZATIONS ON PREPARATIONS FOR THE 15TH PARTY CON- DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010060-3 II/6$A{ING OPFICIIR COORDINATING OPPICINP AIRNUMICAYINO OFFICIR CL*3$InCATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET nA nv. 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010060-3 GRESS NEXT APRIL. PARTY CHIEF HUSAK DESCRIBED THE NO"C AS "AN IMPORTANT IDEOLOGICAL-P