EAST ASIA BRIEF 158-75.4
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010060-3
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
26
Document Creation Date:
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date:
June 14, 2005
Sequence Number:
60
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 10, 1975
Content Type:
CABLE
File:
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CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010060-3.pdf | 774.44 KB |
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LAOS: ALL SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS IN LAOS ARE NOW MADE
BY A SMALL GROUP OF REVOLUTIONARIES WHO REMAIN SE-
CLUDED NEAR SAM NEUA, DEEP IN THE MOUNTAINS OF N(. '4-
EAST LAOS--ALTHOUGH THE LAO COMMUNISTS CONTINUE TO
MAINTAIN FOR APPEARANCES SAKE THAT PRINCE SOUPHANOUVONG
IS THEIR PUBLIC LEADER AND SOUVANNA PHOUMA IS THE HEAD
OF GOVERNMENT' IN VIENTIANE. THE SAM NEUA REVOLU-
TIONARIES ARE-THE REAL LEADERS OF THE LAO PEOPLE'S REV-
OLUTIONARY PARTY, THE COMMUNIST. PARTY OF LAOS, WHICH
FOR YEARS HAD BEEN SO SECRETIVE THAT FEW LAO EVEN
KNEW OF ITS EXISTENCE.'
THE COMMUNISTS IN 1956 FORMALLY DISCARDED THE
NAME PATHET LAO, WHICH LITERALLY MEANS LAO LAND.
THEIR OVERT POLITICAL ORGANIZATION WAS NAMED THE
LAO PATRIOTIC FRONT AND THE LAO PEOPLE'S LIBERATION
ARMY WAS THE DESIGNATION GIVEN THEIR MILITARY ARM.
WESTERN OBSERVERS AND MANY LAO, HOWEVER, CONTINUED
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TO USE PATHET LAO OR SIMPLY THE INITIALS "PL" TO RE-
FER TO THE COMMUNISTS AND THEIR ORGAWIZATIONS?Y
WHATEVER ITS OVERT FORM, THE DRIVING FORCE OF
THE LAO LEFT IS THE LAO COMMUNIST PARTY, FORMED AS
THE LAO PEOPLE'S PARTY AFTER THE INDOCHINESE COMMU-
'`MIST PARTY WAS DISBANDED IN THE EARLY 1950S. FROM
AN INITIAL MEMBERSHIP OF 600 IN 19551 THE PARTY HAS
GROWN TO AN ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF 15,000-20,0001.Y
IN CLASSIC COMMUNIST FASHION, THE PARTY'S CHAIN
OF COMMAND IS INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM THAT OF THE
FRONT. PARTY MEMBES OCCUPY VIRTUALLY ALL KEY POSI-
TIONS IN THE FRONT, THE ARMY, AND IN THE PHALANX OF
AFFILITATED SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS. THEIR POSITIONS
AND RANKS IN THESE GROUPS, HOWEVER,OFTEN DO NOT RE-
FLECT THEIR ACTUAL POSITIONS IN PARTY CIRCLES.
THE COMPOSITION AND RANKING OF THE TOP PARTY
-LEADERSHIP ARE CAREFULLY GUARDED SECRETS. IT IS
GENERALLY BELIEVED THAT PRINCE SOUPHANOUVONG, CHAIR-
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MAN OF THE LAO PATRIOTIC FRONT AND CHAIRMAN OF THE
COALITION JOINT NATIONAL POLITICAL COUNCIL IS A REL-
ATIVELY LOW RANKING MEMBER OF THE PARTY CENTRAL COM-
MITTEE, IF HE IS A MEMBER AT ALL. PHOUMI VONGVICHIT,
THE SOPHISTICATED AND RELATIVELY WESTERNIZED COMMU-
NIST WHO HOLDS THE TITLE OF COALITION DEPUTY PRIME
MINISTER, ALMOST CERTAINLY OUTRANKS SOUPHANOUVONG ON
THE CENTRAL CO'MMITTEE.Y
THE TOP POST IN TH,E PARTY--SECRETARY-GENERAL
--IS HELD BY KAYSONE PHOMIVIHAN., WHO HAS NOT VISITED
VIENTIANE FOR 25 YEARS, BUT WHO APPARENTLY SPENDS
CONSIDERABLE TIME IN HANOI AS WELL AS SAM NEUA. NOUHAK
PHOUMSAVAN, WHO SERVED It! THE SECOND COALITION IN THE
EARLY 1960S AND HAS TRAVELED SEVERAL TIMES TO MOSCOW
AND PEKING, SERVES AS KAYSONE'S DEPUTY?Y
OTHER KEY MEMBERS OF THE PARTY CENTRAL COMMIT-
TEE INCLUDE'GENERAL KHAMPTAY SIPHANDONE, COMMANDER
OF THE L.AO PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY; SAMANBOUNGRAKET,
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ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS; PHOUNE
SIPRASEUTH,, CURRENTLY ACTING DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER IN
VIENT.ANE; SANAN SOUTHICHAK, A HIGHLY SKILLED AGITPROP
SPECIALIST; SISANA SISANE, PROPAGANDA CHIEF FOR BOTH
THE FRONT AND THE PARTY; APHEUI KEOBOUNHEUANG, A
LOGISTICS SPECIALIST; SALY VONGKHAMSAO; AND POSSIBLY
FOUR OR FIVE OTHERS ? Y
ALTHOUGH: ALL OF THE MEMBERS OF THE PARTY CENTRAL
COMMITTEE HAVE BEEN ACTIVE IN THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT
SINCE AT LEAST THE EARLY 1,9505,. MOST HAVE REMAINED
DEEP IN THE COMMUNIST ZONE AND FEW OF THEM WOULD BE
RECOGNIZED BY NAME--EVEN IN LAOS. DESPITE THEIR LONG
SERVICE, THE MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE ARE
RELATIVELY YOUNG AS A GROUP: KAYSONE IS ABOUT 50,
KHAMPTAY IS 49, AND THE REST ARE IN THEIR FIFTIES OR
EARLY'SIXTIES.Y
THE MOST IMPORTANT COMMUNIST LEADERS WITH VERY
FEW EXCEPTIOUS ARE LOWLAND LAO EVEN THOUGH THE RANK
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AND FILE OF THE FRONT AND ARMY ARE DRAWN FROM THE
HIGHLAND MINORITY TRIBES OF EASTERN LAOS WHO CAME
UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL EARLY IN THE MOVEMENT. WITH
THE NOTABLE EXCEPTIONS OF SOUPHANOUVONG AND PHOUMI
VONGIVCHITi THE SENIOR MEMBERS ARE NOT FROM THE
TRADITIONAL LAO RULING ELITE. THESE PEOPLE WERE COM-
MUNISTS--HEAVILY INFLUENCED BY THE VIETNAMESE FROM
THE VERY BEGINNING.Y
THE SENIOR COMMUNIST LEADERS HAVE LITTLE FORMAL
EDUCATION. OF THE KNOIJN CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS,
ONLY SOUPHANOUVONG HAS A UNIVERSITY DEGREE AND MANY
OF THE OTHERS DID NOT EVEN ATTEND THE FRENCH LYCEES ?
IN INDOCHINA?Y
IN CONTRAST TO THEIR COMRADES IN CAMBODIA, THE
LAO COMMUNISTS HAVE BEEN DEPENDENT ON THE NORTH
VIETNAMESE FOR THE SUCCESS OF THEIR MOVEMENT. IT
WAS UNDER THE AEGIS OF HO CHI MINH'S VIET MINH THAT
SOME 150 ANTI-FRENCH LAO MET IN AUGUST 1.950 TO UNITE
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TO FORM THE "PATHET LAO" MOVEMENT. ALL THE PARTICI-
PANTS AT THIS MEETING HAD CLOSE TIES WITH THE VIET-
NAMESE. ONE MAJOR GROUP CONSISTED OF COMMONERS., IN-
CLUDING KAYSONE AND NOUHAK, WHO SINCE 1946 HAD BEEN
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ORGANIZING RESISTANCE BANDS IN THE HILLS OF EASTERN
LAOS. A SECOND GROUP CONSISTED OF A SMALL SPLINTER
FROM THE LAO ISSARA, THE ORIGINAL LAO INDEPENDENCE
MOVEMENT. THESE ARISTOCRATS, LED BY PRINCE SOUPHAOU-
VONG, DECIDED TO COOPERATE WITH THE VIETNAMESE AND
CONTINUE THE RESISTANCE RATHER THAN FOLLOW SOUVANNA
PHOUMA AND OTHERS INTO A FRENCH-SPONSORED GOVERNMENT
IN VIENTIANE.'
VIET MINH TROOPS IN THE EARLY 1950S INVADED LAOS
AND PROVIDED THE LAO COMMUNISTS WITH THEIR FIRST TER-
RITORIAL BASE IN THE BORDER PROVINCE OFSAM NEUA. THE
VIETNAMESE HAVE TRAINED AND ADVISED THE LAO PEOPLE'S
LIBERATION 'ARMY FROM THAT TIME ON AND,
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NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY THAT DID THE FIGHTING FOR THE
LAO COMMUNISTS IN NEARLY ALL MAJOR BATTLES- HANOI,
THROUGH ITS ADVISERS IN SAM NEUA AND THROUGH CONTACTS
WITH SENIOR LAO LEADERS, STILL PROVIDES THE LAO AD-
VICE, DIRECTION, AND COHESION.''
MANY IN THE LAO COMMUNIST INNER CIRCLE HAVE
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DEVELOPED CLOSE TIES WITH SENIOR VIETNAMESE LEADERS,
AND MANY SPEND CONSIDERABLE TIME IN HANOI. SEVERAL
OF THE SENIOR LAO HAVE,VIETNAMESE FAMILY RELATION-
SHIPS. KAYSONE'S FATHER IS VIETNAMESE. A NUMBER
OF THE LAO COMMUNISTS HAVE VIETNAMESE WIVES. {SOU-
PHANOUVONG IS SAID TO HAVE MARRIED A SECRETARY OF HO
CHI MINH.} KAYSONE, SISANE, SOUPHANOUVONG, AND POS-
SIBLY SEVERAL OTHERS RECEIVED SOME FORMAL EDCUATION
IN VIETNAM.''
-SOME OBSERVERS OF THE LAO POLITICAL SCENE
A FACTION WITHIN THE SAM NEUA LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN
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UNHAPPY WITH THE CONTINUED DEPENDENCE ON THE VIETNA-
MESE. THIS "NATIONALIST" FACTION-IS SUPPOSEDLY LED
BY SOUPHANOUVONG AND PHOUMI VONGVICHIT AND ALLEGEDLY
.INCLUDES LESSER FIGURES WHO WERE EDUCATED IN FRENCH
INDOCHINA LYCEES, HAVE SOME FAMILY TIES TO THE TRA-
DITIONAL LAO LEADERSHIP, AND WHO HAVE OVER THE YEARS
MAINTAINED LESS INTIMATE CONTACT WITH THE VIETNAMESE.
MEMBERS OF THIS FACTION ARE SAID TO BE LESS LIKELY TO
FOLLOW NORTH VIETNAMESE DIRECTIONS AND ARE UNLIKELY
TO IMPOSE A RIGID COMMUNIST SYSTEM IN LAOS?Y
WHILE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOME COMMUNIST LEADERS
FIND THE VIETNAMESE CONNECTION HARD TO SWALLOW, THIS
DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE EVER BEEN A SERIOUSLY DIVISIVE
ISSUE. SINCE THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT WAS LAUNCHED
FORMALLY IN THE EARLY 195OS, NO SENIOR LAO COMMUNIST
HAS EVER DEFECTED
(THERE HAS NEVER BEEN A PURGE OF THE TOP RANKS.
SOUPHANOUVONG AND OTHERS MAY AT TIMES HAVE AR-
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GUED FOR A LINE MORE INDEPENDENT OF HANOI AND FOR
LESS STRINGENT COMMUNIST POLICIES. THEY CLEARLY
REALIZE, HOWEVER, THAT AS A PRACTICAL MATTER THEY CAN
GO ONLY SO FAR IN DEVELOPING AN INDEPENDENT LINE
WITHOUT PROVOKING THEIR POWERFUL VIETNAMESE BENEFACTORS.
IN ANY CASE, IAYSONE, NOUHAK, KHAMPTAY AND THE OTHERS,
WHO OWE THEIR POSITIONS TO THE VIETNAMESE AND WHO FOR
30 YEARS HAVE *HAD INTIMATE TIES IN HANOL, CALL THE SHOTS
FOR THE L".0 COMMUNISTS. THE LAO COMMUNISTS MAY EVEN-
TUALLY SEE ADVANTAGES IN CULTIVATING THE SOVIETS, CHI-
NESE, AND EVEN WESTERN STATES YN ORDER TO MOVE TO A
MORE INDEPDENDENT POSITION. BUT FOR THE TIME BEING,
THE PRESENT CAST OF LEADERSHIP WOULD BE EXTREMELY
UNLIKELY TO DO ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT OFFEND THEIR
VIETNAMESE COMRADES.Y
.THE COMMUNISTS' BASIC OBJECTIVE IS TO IMPOSE
A MARXIST-LENINIST SYSTEM ON LAO SOCIETY, ONE THAT
IS PRESUMABLY CLOSE TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE MODEL.
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FOLLOWING THE VIETNAMESE PATTERN, FOR EXAMPLE, THE
LAO ARE MOVING MORE SLOWLY THAN THEIR CAMBODIAN COM-
RADES TOWARD TRADITIONAL COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES.M
AS A FIRST STEP, THE LAO HAVE BEGUN TO IMPOSF
A VARIETY OF CONTROLS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. WHILE
FAIRLY STANDARD IN THE COMMUNIST CONTEXT, THESE CON-
TROLS ARE WHOLLY NEW TO THE LAO, WHO ARE USED TO GOV-
ERNMENT NEGLEET. THE COMMUNISTS PRESUMABLY WILL ALSO
EXTEND PROGRAMS DEVELOPED OVER THE YEARS IN THE SO-
CALLED LIBERATED ZONE. THESE HAVE LESS TO DO WITH
THEORETICAL COMMUNIST SOCIAL REFORMS THAN THEY DO
WITH MORE PRACTICAL MATTERS SUCH AS INCREASING AGRI-
CULTURAL PRODUCTION, PROVIDING BASIC SERVICES IN
HEALTH AND EDUCATION, AND ENCOURAGING COMMUNAL PAR-
TICIPATION IN ROAD MAINTENANCE AND SIMILAR ACTIVITIES.'
'COMMUNIST PROGRAMS MAY HAVE MORE IMPACT IN
VIENTIANE,'THE ONLY SIGNIFICANT CITY IN LAOS. MANY
LAO SUSPECT THAT THE COMMUNISTS SOON WILL SOLVE THE
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CAPITAL'S PERSISTENT UNEMPLOYMENT PROGRAM BY MOVING
NON-PRODUCTIVE PEOPLE TO THE COUNTRYSIDE TO ASSIST
IN MEETING THE COMMUNISTS' OFT STATED GOAL OF "GAIN-
ING NATIONAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN RICE." MOST IF NOT
ALL OF THE CAPITAL'S REFUGEE POPULATION PROBABLY WILL
ALSO PE MOVED BACK TO THEIR HOMES.Y
THE COMMUNISTS OVER THE YEARS HAVE PROVIDED FEW
HINTS ON PLANS FOR ANY RADICAL REORGANIZATION OF
SOCIETY OR THE ECONOMY. THEY PAY. LIP SERVICE TO
RESPECT FOR PRIVATE PROPERTY, BUT HAVE BEGUN TO NA-
TIONALIZE LAOS' FEW MANUFACTURING AND PROCESSING
INDUSTRIES AND ARE LAYING THE GROUNDWORK-FOR SIMILAR
MOVES AGAINST THE PRIVATELY OWNED BANKS. THESE MOVES
WILL HAVE LITTLE IMPACT ON LAOS' PRIMITIVE ECONOMY.
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ARGENTINA: PRESIDENT PEROH APPARENTLY IS DETERMIUED TO
RESUME HER DUTnS NEXT NECK, DESIITE STRONG PRESSURE ON HER TO EXTEND
HER LEAVE OR EVEN RESIGN. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ANNOUNCED SHE WILL
RETURN TO THE CAPITAL ON OCTOBER 16 AND ATTEND AN IMPORTANT PERONIST
RALLY THE NEXT DAY?Y
THE US EMBASSY REPORTS THAT 90TH ACTING PRESIDENT LUDEF
AND INTERIOR MINISTER RORLEDO FLEt1 TO THE PRESIDENTIAL RETREAT ON
OCTOBER 7 TO CONFER WITH PERON? LUDER ALMOST CERTAINLY URGED HER TO
REMAIN OUT OF THE PICTURE. ROBLED6. SAID TO DIFFER WITH LUDER 0;,! THE
ISSUE ALL ALON( MAY WELL HAVE URGED HER TO COME BACK ?Y
WHEN THE TWO MEN REACHED BUENOS AIRES LATE ON OCTOBER 7,
THEY REFUSED TO REVEAL THE RESULTS OF THEIR TALKS. RORLEDO SAID ONLY
YHAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE AT THE RALLY AND THAT ALL ELSE WAS
SPECULATION?Y
MEANWHILE. OPINION IN POLITICAL, PRESS. AND MILITARY CIRCLES
CONTINUES TO HARDEN AGAINST PERON. ACCORDING TO A PRESS ACCOUNT,
THE COMMANDER OF T!IE AIR FORCE ALSO VISITED THE PRESIDENT TO TELL 14ER
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T!JAT THE MILITARY M ANTED NER TO PROLONG HER. VACATION ?"
THE OFFICERS REGARD THE CONTROVERSY OVER HER ROLE AND HEK
DEMONSTRATED INABILITY TO LEAD AS DETRIMENTAL TO THE PUTSUIT OF THEIR
PRINCIPAL GOALS THE SUPPRESSION: OF TERRORISM- IN RECENT DAYS T-H
ADMINISTRATION WAS CREATED TWO NEW BODIES DESIGNED TO STREAMLI14E THE
ANTI-GUCRRILLA EFFORT AND GIVE THE IIEITARY A STROr4GCR HAND IN THE
FIGHT?V
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THE GONERALS AND LL:DER WWLL ALMOST CERTAINLY STEP UP TREIR
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EFFORTS TO PREVAIL ON PERON TO STAY AWAY-
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1. MOROCCO: KING HASSAN, IN REMARKS TO THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS
IN RABAT ON OCTOBER 8, REITERATED A PROMISE HE MADE IN AUGUST
TO AWAIT THE FORTHCOMING ADVISORY OPINION BY THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE BEFORE RESORTING TO FORCE IN SPANISH SAHARA.Y
HASSAN SAID HE WOULD INFORM HIS COUNTRYMEN OF THE COURSE OF
ACTION MOROCCO WILL TAKE ONCE THE COURT'S OPINION-WHICH MAY BE
RELEASED SOON .CIS KNOWN. HASSAN ADDED THAT HE EXPECTED SUPPORT FROM
OTHER ARAB STATES IN RETURN FOR WHAT MOROCCO PROVIDED DURING THE
OCTOBER WAR AND IN SUBSEQUENT PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. HE ALSO APPEALED TO
AFRICAN STATES, REMINDING THEM THAT TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND
NATIONAL LIBERATION WERE IMPORTANT CONCEPU'S IN THEIR PASTY
THE KING'S REMARKS HAVE EASED SOMEWHAT THE ATMOSPHERE OF TENSION,
BUT HE HAS NOT ABANDONED HIS YEAR-END DEADLINE OR HIS THREAT TO USE
'FORCE IF NECESSARY. IF THE COURT'S OPINION IS AMBIGUOUS OR
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MILITARY ACTION IN SPANISH SAHARA-1 I
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IN A PARALLEL SPEECH TO THE UN CENERAL ASSEMBLY, MOROCCAN
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FOREIGN MINISTER LARAKI ALSO APPEALED FOR INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT.
HE ARGUED THAT THE ASSEMb!.Y, IN RECOMMENDING PROPOSALS FOR THE
DECOLONIZATION OF SPANISH SAHARA, MUST RESPECT THE "FUNDAMENTAL
LAW" OF' THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF MOROCCO AND MAURITANIA. HE
ALSO CRITICIZED SPAIN REPEATEDLY AND REAFFIRMED MOROCCO'S CLAIM
TO THE SPANISH ENCLAVES OF CEUTA AND MELILLA IN NORTHERN MOROCCO.
HE CALLED ON SPAIN TO NEGOTIATE THEIR RETURN, DRAWING A PARALLEL
BETWEEN HIS COUNTRY'S CLAIM TO THE ENCLAVES AND SPAIN'S TO
GIBRALTAR.Y
BY REVIVING ITS CLAIMS TO THE NORTHERN ENCLAVES AND LINKING
THEM TO MADRID'S CLAIM TO GIBRALTAR, MOROCCO MAY BE HINTING TRAT25X1
IT WILL SUPPORT SPAIN ON GIBRALTAR IN RETURN FOR AN OVERALL SETTLE-
MENT ON THE SAHARA AND THE NORTHERN ENCLAVES
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1. PORTUGAL: THE PORTUGUESE CABINET .ISSUED A TOUGH STATEMENT
THURSDAY NIGHT WARNING THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE ACTION AGAINST
ANY GROUPS USING VIOLENCE AND CALLING FOR A JOINT MEETING BETWEEN THE
GOVERNMENT AND THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL TO MAP OUT MEASURES THAT
WOULD GUARANTEE STABILITY. THE STATEMENT ENDORSED THE RECENT ACTIONS
OF THE POPULAR DEMOCRATS AND THE SOCIALISTS IN SUPPORT OF THE
GOVERNMENT AND INDIRECTLY CONDEMNED THE COMMUNISTS FOR SUPPORTING
THE CONTINUING WAVE OF MILITARY, POLITICAL, AND INDUSTRIAL AGITA TION.Y
MUTINIES BY EXTREME LEFTIST SOLDIERS HAVE POLARIZED PORTUGAL'S
FACTIONS, AND AS ROOM FOR COMPRvMISE BECOMES PROGRESSIVELY NARROWED,
VIOLENCE IS BECOMING MORE LIKELY ?Y
SOCIALIST PARTY LEADER MARIO SOARES, ADDRESSING A
SOCIALIST-SPONSORED PRO-GOVERNMENT RALLY IN COIMBRA ON WEDNESDAY,
.WARNED THAT UNLESS A MINIMUM OF ORDER AND STABILITY IS CREATED
'WITHIN A MONTH, PORTUGAL WILL FACE GREAT ECONOMIC HARDSHIPS. HE
SAID THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS CANNOT BE SOLVED BY DISORDER OR
DEMONSTRATIONS LIKE THOSE RECENTLY INSTIGATED BY THE FtLEFT
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AND APPLAUDED BY THE COMMUNISTS. SOARES WAS RESPONDING TO A RECENT
COMMUNIST PARTY STATEMENT THAT THE SEIZURES OF MILITARY UNITS BY
THE FAR LEFT WERE LEGITIMATE ACTS AND "A LIVELY EXPRESSION OF THE
STRUGGLE OF THE WORKING PEOPLE."Y
SOARES SAID THAT AFTER 18 MONTHS OF' REVOLUTION, THE PEOPLE
ARE TIRED OF DISORDER. HE SAID THE AZEVEDO GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN
FORMED TO CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE OF CALM IN WHICH THE COUNTRY'S
PROBLEMS COULD BE SOLVED.'
AFTER THE RALLY, THE SOCIALIST DEMONSTRATORS MARCHED TO THE
HEADQUARTERS OF THE CENTRAL MILITARY REGION TO REITERATE THEIR
SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT.'
THE COMMUNISTS HAVE DENOUNCED AS A "COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY
PROVOCATION" A PRO-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATION?BY THE POPULAR
DEMOCRATS ON WEDNESDAY EVENING IN PORTO, WHICH WAS CLIMAXED BY
.A FREE-FOR-ALL WITH ROCK-THROWING LEFTISTS. ABOUT 5,000 POPULAR
.'..DEMOCRATIC PARTY SUPPORTERS CLASHED WITH DEFENDERS OF AN
ARTILLERY POST SEIZED BY DISSIDENT SOLDIERS ON TUESDAY. THE
COMMUNISTS" APPEALED TO PRESIDENT COSTA GOMES-TO TAKE "ENERGETIC
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BLOODSHED AND POSSIBLY WIDENING THE AREA OF CONFLICT.
RESTORE ORDER WITHOUT RESORTING TO EXCESSIVE FORCE AND THUS RISKING
a Ir.IL{7f
ACTION" AGAINST THE POPULAR DEMOCRATS, WHOM IT ACCUSED OF TRYING
TO STORM THE POST BY FORCE.'
EXTREME LEFT ELEMENTS OCCUPYING THE ARTILLERY POST REACHED
A STANDOFF WITH LOYALIST FORCES ON THURSDAY AS THE NORTHERN REGION
COMMANDER, GENERAL VELOSO, AGAIN BACKED AWAY FROM THE USE OF
FORCE TO QUELL THE MUTINY. VELOSO'S EARLIER EFFORTS TO ENFORCE
DISCIPLINE HAVE MADE HIM THE PRINCIPAL TARGET FOR LEFTIST ATTACKS.'
VELOSO IS BELIEVED TO HAVE ENOUGH LOYAL TROOPS TO REASSERT
CONTROL IN PORTO IF HE IS ORDERED TO DO SO, BUT SUCH ORDERS HAVE
APPARENTLY NOT BEEN ISSUED. THE. HOPE APPARENTLY IS THAT VELOSO CAN5X1
2. CZECHOSLOVAKIA: A PLENUM OF THE PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE
.EARLY THIS WEEK RELEASED OLDRICH SVETSKA FROM HIS POST ON
THE SECRETARIAT AND APPOINTED HIM EDITOR-IN-CHIEF OF
THE PARTY DAILY, RUDE PRAVO?1 A POST HE HELD FROM
?1958 TO 1968. JOSEF HAVLIN, CURRENTLY THE CZECH
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MINISTER OF EDUCATION, WAS ELECTED TO REPLACE SVETSKA
AS PARTY SECRETARY ?Y
THESE SHIFTS PRESAGE A TOUGHER IDEOLOGICAL LINE
IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. BOTH MEN ARE VETERAN HARD LINERS.
HAVLIN, WHO STAUNCHLY SUPPORTED OUSTED PARTY BOSS
NOVOTNY AND ADOPTED A PARTICULARLY TOUGH LINE TOWARD
RESTIVE STUDENTS IN 1967, WAS DROPPED FROM ALL OF-
FICES DURING THE DUBCEK ERA. LIKE SVETSKA, HE HAS
HAD PREVIOUS PRESS EXPERIENCE, AND WILL NOT HESITATE
TO CRACK THE IDEOLOGICAL WHIP IN THE REGIME'S DRIVE
TO HAVE THE MEDIA MORE CLOSELY REFLECT THE VIEW FROM
THE KREMLIN. THE HUSAK LEADERSHIP HAS--SINCE MID-
SUMMER--CRITICIZED "NUMEROUS PROBLEMS AND SHORT-
COMINGS" IN THE COUNTRY'S PRINTED MEDIA AND PRAGUE RECENTLY
RELIEVED THE MORE MODERATE MIROSLAV MOC FROM HIS POST
'OF EDITOR-IN-CHIEF OF THE PARTY DAILY.'s'
THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE APPROVED A LETTER TO PARTY
ORGANIZATIONS ON PREPARATIONS FOR THE 15TH PARTY CON-
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GRESS NEXT APRIL. PARTY CHIEF HUSAK DESCRIBED THE
NO"C AS "AN IMPORTANT IDEOLOGICAL-P