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December 19, 2016
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June 15, 2005
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November 14, 1975
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25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110010-6 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R00049 27&~P ROVE 25X1 Soviet Union Eastern Europe Secret `. 71 November 14, 1975 No. 0774/75 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110010-6 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110010-6 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110010-6 Approved For Release 2005/06/ ,+,CR.UP86T00608R000400110010-6 25X1 CONTENTS November 14, 1975 CPSU Politburo Members at Foreign Party Congresses. . . . . Yugoslavs to Take More Active Role in Europe . 4 Yugoslavia-Bulgaria: Mladenciv Visit Improves Tone of Relations. . . . . . ANNEX: Soviet Relations with Western Europe, October to mid-November. . . . . 7 Approved For Release 2005/06/EQ&86T00608R000400110010-6 Approved For Release 2005/06/SE4 CR-RQP86T00608R000400110010-6 CPSU Politburo Members at Foreign Party Congresses According to an official at the Soviet embassy in Warsaw, party boss Brezhnev will attend the next congress of the Polish Communist Party which is scheduled to begin on December 8. Assuming he goes, it will be the 13th foreign party congress to his credit. He heads the list of full members of the Politburo performing this chore. Since, becoming General Secretary in 1961, Brezhnev has concentrated on the six East European members in more or less good standing of the "socialist commonwealth", leaving "less important" congresses to other members of the Politburo. He att-nded the Romanian Congress in 1965, but in 1974 left the job of representing the CPSU in Bucharest to Kirilenko. That same year, Kirilenko also at- tended the Yugoslav Congress, thus ending the long- standing Soviet practice of boycotting congresses of the Yugoslav party. Kirilenko and Pelshe each has six congresses under his belt. Full members of the Politburo with highly visible government positions do not attend the congresses of foreign parities. Andropov, Grechko, Gromyko, Kosygin, Mazurov, and Podgorny have not attended a foreign party congress in the last 10 years. (Andropov and Mazurov each attended one congress during this period, but neither at the time was a full member of the CPSU Politburo.) Kulakov and Polyansky have also attended no foreign party congresses. A list of Politburo members attending the congresses of foreign parties since October 1964 follows: November 14, 1975 Approved For Release 2005/06/$EP86T00608R000400110010-6 Approved For Release 2005/06/2Sr86T00608R000400110010-6 Andropov--1965-Romania (became full member Politburo 1973) Brezhnev--3.965--Romania 1966--Czechoslovakia Bulgaria Hungary 1967--East Germany 1968--Rb land 1970--Hungary 1971--Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Poland East Germany 1975--Hungary Grishin--1968--Poland (with Brezhnev) 1972--Italy Gromyko--None Kirilenko--1965--Chile 1970--France 1971--Mongolian People's Republic 1974--Romania Yugoslavia 1975--Italy Kosygin--None Kulakov--None Kunayev--1971--India Mazurov--1964--Belgium (became full member Politburo 1965) Pelshe 1965--Denmark November 14, 1975 Approved For Release 2005/06iE(WP86T00608R000400110010-6 Approved For Release 2005/06/22g~Mf16T00608R000400110010-6 1967--France 1968--India 1969--Finland 1972--Finland 1975--Finland Podgorny--None Polyansky--None Shcherbitsky--].971--Bulgaria Suslov--1966--Italy November 14, 1975 25X1 25X1A Approved For Release 2005/06/ 8w.Qp86TOO608R000400110010-6 Approved For Release 2005/06/ Z '. re"E P86T00608R000400110010-6 Yucosiavs to Take More Active Role in Europe Belgrade is preparing to take advantage of its position as host for the follow-up CSCE meeting in 1977 to press its views on post-Helsinki Europe. 25X1X 25X1X g s via 5X1 emphasizing the Basket III agreements. 25X1 is s owing a "restrictive tendency" regarding con- fidence-building measures, while the West is over- intends to assume a very active role in following the implementation of the Helsinki accords 25X1 Belgrade's preliminary view is that the East 5X1 Yugoslavia sees this as a perpetuation of the bT_o_c_-_Eo-bloc mentality in Europe which is the greatest danger to the Helsinki agreement. Belgrade has long envisioned itself as a spokes- man for the interests of sm ries against bloc interests. If tugo- 25X1 slavia assumes an activist role in USCE imp ementa- tion, it might cause some waves in Western Europe. These would be small, however, compared to the potential Soviet reaction if Yugoslavia pressed its case for CSCE im 1,,-Imentation in Moscow's eastern 5X1 buffer area. 25X1A November 14, 1975. Approved For Release 2005/06/ M-.RT86T00608R000400110010-6 Approved For Release 2005/06/2W86T00608R000400110010-6 Yugoslavia-Bulgaria: Mladenov Visit improves Tone of Relations Sofia and Belgrade have apparently decided to try to come to grips with the seemingly omnipresent problems in their bilateral relations Quick solu- tions are not likely, but, provided both sides abide by the new spirit of reasonableness, there could be a hiatus in the squabbling between the two Balkan rivals. The new attitude emerged during Bulgarian For- eign Minister Petur Mladenov's visit to Belgrade from November 11 to 13. In talks with his Yugoslav counterpart Milos Minic, Mladenov apparently ad- dressed major bilateral issues, including the sen- sitive Macedonian problem. Press announcements re- ferred to the discussions as "friendly" and "frank," and described the atmosphere as one of "full open- ness and readiness" to discuss their difficulties. Minic and Mladenov agreed on An eventual meet- ing of Presidents Tito ar: Zhivkov to discuss "ways and means" for resolving their disputes. The sum- mit is, however, clearly dependent on an effort by the two sides to limit polemi-cs. During toasts at official dinners in Belgrade, both men recited their differences, but said the problems should not rule out future close coopera- tion in all spheres. The communique summarizing the talks accentuated a mutual desire to improve relations based on the principles of "equality, in- dependence, respect for territorial integrity... and noninterference in internal affairs." The communique attached "exceptional impor- tance" to mutual efforts to harness "information activities" as a means of building an atmoshpere of trust. This presumably means that v?;>ciferous November 14, 1975 Approved For Release 2005/06/`CO'P86T00608R000400110010-6 Approved For Release 2005/06/22'':LIRDP86T00608R000400110010-6 Yugoslav press polemics and the occasional inflam- matory publications appearing in Bulgaria will be held in check for a time. Agreeing to discuss their differences is the most progress toward improving Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations in several years. A number of factors could still undermine these good intentions. The most immediate threat is the Bulgarian census sched- uled for December, which will, Belgrade fears, omit a category for Macedonians. Jointly claimed cul- tural heroes, the role of the Bulgarian military in "liberating" Yugoslavia during World War II, and Belgrade's wariness of Sofia as a stand-in for So- viet interests all offer hotheads on both sides of the border opportunities to scotch any progress. On Balkan cooperation and the proposed Cara- manlis conference, the two seem to be moving closer together. Stressing the importance of bilateral cooperation, Minic and Mladenov supported multilat- eral efforts "only in those fields that are really acceptable and of interest to the Balkan countries." Sofia has declared it is against any multilateral activity of a political nature, and Belgrade has emphasized that it is prematu consider ambitious inter-Balkan ties. November 14, 1975 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/j 014 LW86T00608R000400110010-6 Approved For Release 2005/06/22g*PP 116T00608R000400110010-6 Soviet Relations with Western Europe, -'"-" October to mid- ove er CSCE/NATO Controversy over CSCE implementation centered on the military-related "confidence-building meas- ures" (CBMs) that NATO and the neutrals had succeeded in incorporating in the conference final act against the strenuous effort by the Warsaw Pact to curtail its application. The initial. reaction of the Soviets and their allies to CBMs, notably Brezhnev's speech at Helsinki, was at least superficially positive. In subsequent weeks, however, the Soviets seemed to be disconcerted by the scale of both the NATO exercises and the no- tifications preceding them. The NATO members had determined to adhere scrupulously to the text of the Helsinki accord and provided full advance notifica- tion not only of exercises meeting the numerical threshold (25,000 troops), but also some smaller ones. Meanwhile, the Soviets launched an unusually voluminous and vehement propaganda attack on NATO's series of fall exercises, which it claimed were unprecedented in scope. Soviet media asserted that these exercises violated the spirit of Helsinki and, by reviving the specter of a Soviet threat, con- stituted a lame effort by Western militarists to neutralize the achievements of the conference. The NATO exercises may have seemed larger than usual to the Soviets because a number of exercises were inte- grated into a single program (Autumn Forge). November l4, 1975 Approved For Release 2005/06/*-JR 86T00608R000400110010-6 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 PK-R&T6T00608R000400110010-6 Initially, CBMs were spared from criticism, but beginning on September 15 several articles charged that the advance notification of maneuvers was irrelevent and that notification did not obviate the deleterious effect of the maneuvers on detente. Soviet criticism of CBMs tapered off in October and was not formalized by leadership endorsements. Nevertheless, the Soviets have not yet officially acknowledged Western notification of exercises, sent observers, or provided notification of their ex- ercises. Using the argument that the presence of Warsaw Pact observers would undermine the position that the NATO exercises were inconsistent with detente, the Soviets reportedly advised their allies that they, too, should neither acknowledge receipt of notifications nor send observers to the exercises. All the Warsaw Pact members, including the Romanians, took the advice. The Soviets are obviously uncomfortable with CBMd and their unresponsiveness to NATO notifica- tions seems designed to make it easier for the Warsaw Pact not to invite observers to its exercises. The Soviets may also hope that their policy will encourage NATO to see the agreement as less stringent. There has been no evidence to date to confirm specula- tion that the Warsaw Pact has either failed to pro- vide notification of an exercise meeting the param- eters for notification, or revised its exercise for- mat to keep from meeting the parameters. Technically, the Soviets are on solid ground since, at their insistence, the Helsinki text cover- ing the CEM's stipulates that they should be under- taken voluntarily. Still, if the Soviets flagrantly disregard the CBM provision, they will be held to account when the day of reckoning comes in Belgrade two years hence. November 14, 1975 Approved For Release 2005/06/9.q&- '&'86T00608R000400110010-6 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110010-6 Next 6 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110010-6