STAFF NOTES: SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110010-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2005
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: November 14, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

25X1
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110010-6
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R00049
27&~P ROVE
25X1
Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
Secret
`. 71
November 14, 1975
No. 0774/75
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110010-6
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110010-6
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110010-6
 Approved For Release 2005/06/ ,+,CR.UP86T00608R000400110010-6
25X1
CONTENTS
November 14, 1975
CPSU Politburo Members at
Foreign Party Congresses. . . . .
Yugoslavs to Take More
Active Role in Europe . 4
Yugoslavia-Bulgaria: Mladenciv Visit
Improves Tone of Relations. . . . . .
ANNEX: Soviet Relations with Western
Europe, October to mid-November. . . . . 7
Approved For Release 2005/06/EQ&86T00608R000400110010-6
 Approved For Release 2005/06/SE4 CR-RQP86T00608R000400110010-6
CPSU Politburo Members at Foreign Party Congresses
According to an official at the Soviet embassy
in Warsaw, party boss Brezhnev will attend the next
congress of the Polish Communist Party which is
scheduled to begin on December 8. Assuming he goes,
it will be the 13th foreign party congress to his
credit. He heads the list of full members of the
Politburo performing this chore.
Since, becoming General Secretary in 1961,
Brezhnev has concentrated on the six East European
members in more or less good standing of the
"socialist commonwealth", leaving "less important"
congresses to other members of the Politburo. He
att-nded the Romanian Congress in 1965, but in 1974
left the job of representing the CPSU in Bucharest
to Kirilenko. That same year, Kirilenko also at-
tended the Yugoslav Congress, thus ending the long-
standing Soviet practice of boycotting congresses
of the Yugoslav party. Kirilenko and Pelshe each
has six congresses under his belt.
Full members of the Politburo with highly
visible government positions do not attend the
congresses of foreign parities. Andropov, Grechko,
Gromyko, Kosygin, Mazurov, and Podgorny have not
attended a foreign party congress in the last 10
years. (Andropov and Mazurov each attended one
congress during this period, but neither at the
time was a full member of the CPSU Politburo.)
Kulakov and Polyansky have also attended no foreign
party congresses.
A list of Politburo members attending the
congresses of foreign parties since October 1964
follows:
November 14, 1975
Approved For Release 2005/06/$EP86T00608R000400110010-6
 Approved For Release 2005/06/2Sr86T00608R000400110010-6
Andropov--1965-Romania
(became full member Politburo 1973)
Brezhnev--3.965--Romania
1966--Czechoslovakia
Bulgaria
Hungary
1967--East Germany
1968--Rb land
1970--Hungary
1971--Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
Poland
East Germany
1975--Hungary
Grishin--1968--Poland (with Brezhnev)
1972--Italy
Gromyko--None
Kirilenko--1965--Chile
1970--France
1971--Mongolian People's Republic
1974--Romania
Yugoslavia
1975--Italy
Kosygin--None
Kulakov--None
Kunayev--1971--India
Mazurov--1964--Belgium
(became full member Politburo 1965)
Pelshe 1965--Denmark
November 14, 1975
Approved For Release 2005/06iE(WP86T00608R000400110010-6
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22g~Mf16T00608R000400110010-6
1967--France
1968--India
1969--Finland
1972--Finland
1975--Finland
Podgorny--None
Polyansky--None
Shcherbitsky--].971--Bulgaria
Suslov--1966--Italy
November 14, 1975
25X1
25X1A
Approved For Release 2005/06/ 8w.Qp86TOO608R000400110010-6
 Approved For Release 2005/06/ Z '. re"E P86T00608R000400110010-6
Yucosiavs to Take More Active
Role in Europe
Belgrade is preparing to take advantage of its
position as host for the follow-up CSCE meeting in
1977 to press its views on post-Helsinki Europe.
25X1X
25X1X g s via
5X1
emphasizing the Basket III agreements. 25X1
is s owing a "restrictive tendency" regarding con-
fidence-building measures, while the West is over-
intends to assume a very active role in following
the implementation of the Helsinki accords 25X1
Belgrade's preliminary view is that the East
5X1 Yugoslavia sees this as a perpetuation
of the bT_o_c_-_Eo-bloc mentality in Europe which is
the greatest danger to the Helsinki agreement.
Belgrade has long envisioned itself as a spokes-
man for the interests of sm ries
against bloc interests. If tugo- 25X1
slavia assumes an activist role in USCE imp ementa-
tion, it might cause some waves in Western Europe.
These would be small, however, compared to the
potential Soviet reaction if Yugoslavia pressed its
case for CSCE im 1,,-Imentation in Moscow's eastern
5X1 buffer area.
25X1A
November 14, 1975.
Approved For Release 2005/06/ M-.RT86T00608R000400110010-6
 Approved For Release 2005/06/2W86T00608R000400110010-6
Yugoslavia-Bulgaria: Mladenov Visit
improves Tone of Relations
Sofia and Belgrade have apparently decided to
try to come to grips with the seemingly omnipresent
problems in their bilateral relations Quick solu-
tions are not likely, but, provided both sides abide
by the new spirit of reasonableness, there could be
a hiatus in the squabbling between the two Balkan
rivals.
The new attitude emerged during Bulgarian For-
eign Minister Petur Mladenov's visit to Belgrade
from November 11 to 13. In talks with his Yugoslav
counterpart Milos Minic, Mladenov apparently ad-
dressed major bilateral issues, including the sen-
sitive Macedonian problem. Press announcements re-
ferred to the discussions as "friendly" and "frank,"
and described the atmosphere as one of "full open-
ness and readiness" to discuss their difficulties.
Minic and Mladenov agreed on An eventual meet-
ing of Presidents Tito ar: Zhivkov to discuss "ways
and means" for resolving their disputes. The sum-
mit is, however, clearly dependent on an effort by
the two sides to limit polemi-cs.
During toasts at official dinners in Belgrade,
both men recited their differences, but said the
problems should not rule out future close coopera-
tion in all spheres. The communique summarizing
the talks accentuated a mutual desire to improve
relations based on the principles of "equality, in-
dependence, respect for territorial integrity...
and noninterference in internal affairs."
The communique attached "exceptional impor-
tance" to mutual efforts to harness "information
activities" as a means of building an atmoshpere
of trust. This presumably means that v?;>ciferous
November 14, 1975
Approved For Release 2005/06/`CO'P86T00608R000400110010-6
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22'':LIRDP86T00608R000400110010-6
Yugoslav press polemics and the occasional inflam-
matory publications appearing in Bulgaria will be
held in check for a time.
Agreeing to discuss their differences is the
most progress toward improving Yugoslav-Bulgarian
relations in several years. A number of factors
could still undermine these good intentions. The
most immediate threat is the Bulgarian census sched-
uled for December, which will, Belgrade fears, omit
a category for Macedonians. Jointly claimed cul-
tural heroes, the role of the Bulgarian military in
"liberating" Yugoslavia during World War II, and
Belgrade's wariness of Sofia as a stand-in for So-
viet interests all offer hotheads on both sides of
the border opportunities to scotch any progress.
On Balkan cooperation and the proposed Cara-
manlis conference, the two seem to be moving closer
together. Stressing the importance of bilateral
cooperation, Minic and Mladenov supported multilat-
eral efforts "only in those fields that are really
acceptable and of interest to the Balkan countries."
Sofia has declared it is against any multilateral
activity of a political nature, and Belgrade has
emphasized that it is prematu consider
ambitious inter-Balkan ties.
November 14, 1975
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/06/j 014 LW86T00608R000400110010-6
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22g*PP
116T00608R000400110010-6
Soviet Relations with Western Europe,
-'"-" October to mid- ove er
CSCE/NATO
Controversy over CSCE implementation centered
on the military-related "confidence-building meas-
ures" (CBMs) that NATO and the neutrals had succeeded
in incorporating in the conference final act against
the strenuous effort by the Warsaw Pact to curtail
its application.
The initial. reaction of the Soviets and their
allies to CBMs, notably Brezhnev's speech at Helsinki,
was at least superficially positive. In subsequent
weeks, however, the Soviets seemed to be disconcerted
by the scale of both the NATO exercises and the no-
tifications preceding them. The NATO members had
determined to adhere scrupulously to the text of the
Helsinki accord and provided full advance notifica-
tion not only of exercises meeting the numerical
threshold (25,000 troops), but also some smaller
ones.
Meanwhile, the Soviets launched an unusually
voluminous and vehement propaganda attack on NATO's
series of fall exercises, which it claimed were
unprecedented in scope. Soviet media asserted that
these exercises violated the spirit of Helsinki and,
by reviving the specter of a Soviet threat, con-
stituted a lame effort by Western militarists to
neutralize the achievements of the conference. The
NATO exercises may have seemed larger than usual to
the Soviets because a number of exercises were inte-
grated into a single program (Autumn Forge).
November l4, 1975
Approved For Release 2005/06/22~.tl*-JR 86T00608R000400110010-6
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 PK-R&T6T00608R000400110010-6
Initially, CBMs were spared from criticism, but
beginning on September 15 several articles charged
that the advance notification of maneuvers was
irrelevent and that notification did not obviate the
deleterious effect of the maneuvers on detente.
Soviet criticism of CBMs tapered off in October
and was not formalized by leadership endorsements.
Nevertheless, the Soviets have not yet officially
acknowledged Western notification of exercises, sent
observers, or provided notification of their ex-
ercises. Using the argument that the presence of
Warsaw Pact observers would undermine the position
that the NATO exercises were inconsistent with
detente, the Soviets reportedly advised their allies
that they, too, should neither acknowledge receipt
of notifications nor send observers to the exercises.
All the Warsaw Pact members, including the Romanians,
took the advice.
The Soviets are obviously uncomfortable with
CBMd and their unresponsiveness to NATO notifica-
tions seems designed to make it easier for the
Warsaw Pact not to invite observers to its exercises.
The Soviets may also hope that their policy will
encourage NATO to see the agreement as less stringent.
There has been no evidence to date to confirm specula-
tion that the Warsaw Pact has either failed to pro-
vide notification of an exercise meeting the param-
eters for notification, or revised its exercise for-
mat to keep from meeting the parameters.
Technically, the Soviets are on solid ground
since, at their insistence, the Helsinki text cover-
ing the CEM's stipulates that they should be under-
taken voluntarily. Still, if the Soviets flagrantly
disregard the CBM provision, they will be held to
account when the day of reckoning comes in Belgrade
two years hence.
November 14, 1975
Approved For Release 2005/06/9.q&- '&'86T00608R000400110010-6
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110010-6
Next 6 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110010-6