MINIMUM PERSONNEL SECURITY STANDARD AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING ELIGIBILITY FOR ACCESS TO SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B01034R000500010011-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 11
• Content Type: REPORT

be deemed necessary and appropriate to ensure that effective security is
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE-DIRECTIVE NO. 1/141
MINIMUM PERSONNEL SECURITY STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES
GOVERNING ELIGIBILITY FOR ACCESS TO
SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION.
Intelligence Community -- those United States Government
activities identified in Executive Order 12333 or
1.. Definitions..
successor orders as making up such Community.
.b. Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). --.all
indicating restricted handling within present and future Community
information and materials requiring special Community controls
intelligence collection programs and their end products. These
special. Community controls are formal systems of restricted access
directive supersedes DCID 1/14 approved 13 May 1976.
departments and agencies may establish such additional security steps as may
for all United States Government civilian and military personnel, consultants,
contractors, employees of contractors and other individuals who require access
to Sensitive Compartmented Information (hereinafter referred to as SCI). The
standards, procedures and programs established herein are minimum and the
standards, procedures and continuing security programs are hereby established
Directive on the Security Committee, the'following minimum personnel security
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(Effective . .. )
Pursuant.to the provisions of Executive Order 12333, Section 102 of the
National Security Act of 1947 and the Director of Central Intelligence
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established to protect the sensitive aspects of sources and methods
and analytical procedures of foreign intelligence programs. The
term does not include Restricted Data as defined in Section II,
Public Law 585, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community (SOICs)
for-the purposes of,this directive, SOICs are defined as the heads
of organizations within the Intelligence Community, as defined by
their designated representatives
Purpose. The purpose of this Directive is to enhance
Individuals who do not meet the minimum
The granting of access to SCI shall be controlled under. the strictest
persons'(other than elected officials. of the United States Government, federal
procedures and continuing security programs, and to facilitate the security
certification process among Government departments and agencies.
3. Applicabil.ity. The provisions of this Directive shall apply to all
protection of SCI through the application of minimum security standards,
judges
DCI makes a specific, exception)
without'regard to civilian or military status, form of employment, official
rank or:position,or length or service.
General.
security criteria contained
to SCI shall not, solely, for
this-reason, be considered ineligible 'for-access
to .other classified.informa-
tion.. Individuals whose access to SCI-has been authorized as an exception
reason, be considered eligible for access to other classified information.
granted in accordance with paragraph 7 below, shall not, solely for that
application of the "need-to-know" principle, and in accordance with the
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personnel security standards and procedures set forth in this Directive. In
accordance with National Security Decision `? Directive Number 84 and the DCI
.Security Policy Manual for SCI Systems, signature of a nondisclosure agreement
which includes a provision for prepublication review is a condition of access
to SCI.
6. Personnel Security Standards. Criteria for security approval of an
individual on a need-to-know basis for access to SCI are:
a. The individual shall be stable, trustworthy; reliable of
excellent character, judgment and discretion and of unquestioned
loyalty to the United States.
b. Except where there is a compelling need, and a determina
ti on has been made by competent authority as described in paragraph
7 below that every reasonable assurance has been obtained that
under the circumstances
(1)
the security risk is negligible:
Both the individual and the members of his or her
immediate family shall be U.S. citizens. For.these
purposes, "immediate family" includes the individual's
spouse, parents, brothers,.` sisters and children.*
(2) The members of the individual's immediate family
-and persons to whom'he or she is '.bound by, affection or
obligation** should neither be subject to physical;
mental or other forms of duress by a foreign power, nor
advocate the use of force or violence to overthrow the
The requirement for U. S.-citizenship in this DCID also
applies to a cohabitant..
,including aconabitant.
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Government of the United States or the alteration of the
form of Government of the United States by unconstitu-
tional means.
7. Exceptions..to.P.ersonnel Security Standards. The exceptions to
the Intelligence Community (SOIC) organization or his designee unless such
paragraph 6.b.(I) or (2) above may be granted only by the Senior Official of
zation as set forth in interdepartmental agreements. All exceptions granted
will be common sense determinations based on all available information, and
authority has been specifically delegated to the. head of an office or organi
review of the information therein, must be made before an exception is
of his life, a thorough assessment of the adequacy of the investigation in
terms of fulfillment of the minimum investigative requirements, and judicious
shall be recorded by-the-agency making the exception. In those cases in which
the individual has lived outside of the United States for a substantial period
considered.
Investigative Requirements.
The. investigation conducted on an individual under consideration for
access to SCI will
9. The investigation shall be accomplished through record checks and
be thoroughand shall be designed todevelop information
as to-whether-the individual
Standards.
of identity to include birth, residences, education, employment and military.-
order to establish affirmatively to the adjudicating agency complete continuity
personal interviews of various sources by trained investigative personnel in
service.. Where the--circumstances of a"case indicate, the investigation shall
exceed the basic requirements set out below to ensure that those responsible
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 11. Minimum standards for the investigation are as follows:
Verification of date and place of birth and citizenship.
Check of the subversive and criminal files of the Federal
charts, and such other National agencies as are appropriate to the
Bureau of Investigation, including submission of fingerprint
individual's background.
of the individual's immediate family who are United States citizens
An. additional check of Immigration and
Naturalization Service records shall be conducted on those members
check of appropriate police records covering all areas
the individual's residence, employment and education in the U.S
throughout the most
Verification of the individual's financial
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and a signed release, as necessary, authorizing custodians of police, credit,
education and medical records, to provide record information to the investi
for adjudicating access eligibility have in their possession all the relevant
facts available.
10. The individual shall furnish a signed personal history statement,
fingerprints of a quality acceptable to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
gative agency. Photographs of the individual shall also be obtained where
additional corroboration of identity is required.
credit habits through checks of appropriate.. credit institutions or,,
knowledgeable sources covering all areas of.employment, residence
if such checks are not productive, through interviews with
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e. Interviews with neighbors in the vicinity of all the
individual's residences in excess of six (6) months throughout the
most recent five (5) year period. This coverage shall be expanded
where the investigation suggests the existence of some questionable
behavioral pattern.
with supervisors and coworkers at places of employment covering the
in any event the,most recent two (2) years. Personal interviews
Confirmation of all employment during the past fifteen (15)
years or since age eighteen, whichever is the shorter period, but
past ten (10) years shall be accomplished.
tions of higher learning within the past fifteen
(15) years.
the individual did not attend an institution of higher learning,
verification of graduation or attendance at last secondary school
within' the past ten (10) years.
sources-(a minimum,.of three developed during the course of
investigation) as
practicable
When employment,
foreign countries (except for periods of less than one year for
check of the records will be made at the Department
personnel on U.S. Government assignment and less than ninety days
for other purposes) . during the past
Verification of graduation or attendance at all institu -
Review of appropriate military records.
Interviews with a sufficient number of knowledgeable
the past fifteen (15')'years.
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or residence and to attempt to determine if any lasting foreign
contacts or connections were established during this period.
However, in all cases where an individual has worked or lived
outside of the U.S. continuously for over one year, the investi-
State and/or other appropriate agencies. Efforts shall be made to
develop sources, generally in the United States, who knew the indi-
vidual overseas in order to cover significant employment, education
gation will be expanded
foreign country(ies) in which the individual resided.
record sources as may be available to the U.S. Government in the
to cover fully this period in his or her
life through the use of such investigative assets and checks of
k. When the individual has immediate family members or other
in any of the situations described in subparagraph 6.b.(2) above,
persons to whom the individual is bound by affection or obligation
ascertain the facts as they may relate to the individual's access
.trained security, investigative or counterintelligence personnel to
the investigation will include an interview of the individua
eligibility.
of the Federal Bureau of Investigati-bn?-and other National agencies
the individual's spouse or cohabitant shall
at a minimum be checked through the subversive and criminal files
a determination by the adjudicating agency that the provisions of
bound by affection or obligation) to the.extent necessary to permit
as appropriate. When conditions indicate, additional investigation
shall. be conducted on the spouse of the individual and members of.
the immediate family (or other persons to whom the individual is
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In exceptional cases, the SOIC or his designee may determine
paragraph 6 (Personnel Security Standards) above are met (See Annex
A).
to ensure full investigative coverage. A personal interview will
m. A personal interview of the individual may be conducted, by
trained security, investigative or counterintelligence personnel,
be conducted when necessary to resolve
information and/or:inconsistencies developed during the
investigation. 'In departments or agencies with policies
sanctioning the use of the polygraph for personnel security
purposes, the personal interview may. include
a polygraph
examination, conducted by a' qualified polygraph examiner.
Exceptions . to..I nvest.i_gatime. Requirements.
.thatit is.necessary'or advisable in-the National interest to authorize
checks
such casesshall include explicit :notification of the exception.
to CI prior.to completion of the fully prescribed investigation
In this situation, such-investigative
as are immediately possible shall be made atonce and shall,
interview of the individual by trained security,
be strictly controlled and the fully prescribed investigation and
eval uation shall be completed at the earliest'practicable moment.
Certification to other organizations of individuals authorized access in
13. Where a previous
investigation has been conducted within the
past. five (5) years-which substantially-meets-the above minimum
standards, it may serve as a
basis for granting access approval provided
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a review of the personnel and security files does not reveal substantive
changes in the individual's security eligibility. If a previous inves-
tigation does not substantially meet the minimum standards or if it is
more than five (5) years old, a current investigation shall be required
but may be limited to that necessary to bring the individual's file
.:up-to-date in accordance with the investigative requirements set. forth
in paragraph 11 above. Should new information be developed during the
current. investigation which bears unfavorably upon the individual's
activities covered by the previous investigation, the current inquiries
shall be expanded as necess ry to develop full details of this
information.
Periodic Reinvestigations.
14. Programs shall be instituted requiring the periodic reinves-
tigation,of personnel provided access to SCI. These reinvestigations
shall be conducted on a five (5) year recurrent basis, but on a more
frequent basis where the individual has shown some questionable
pattern,,_
behavioral pattern,his or-her activities are otherwise suspect, or when
deemed necessary by the SOIC concerned.
15. Thescope of reinvestigations shall be determined by the SOIC
concerned based on such considerations as the:. potential damage that
might result from the individual's defection--or'willful compromise of
SCI and the availability and probable effectiveness of other means to
continually evaluate factors related to the individual's suitability for
continued access. The individual shall furnish an up-to-date, signed
personal history statement and signed releases-as necessary. In all
cases, the - reinvestigation shall include, as a minimum, appropriate
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national agency checks, local agency checks, (including overseas checks
where appropriate), credit checks and a personal interview with the
individual by trained investigative, security or counterintelligence
personnel when necessary to resolve significant adverse information
and/or inconsistencies. When conditions so indicate, additional
investigation may be conducted as determined by the SOIC
designee.
or his
16. Determination of Access Eligibility. The evaluation ofthe`
information developed by investigation on an individual's loyalty and
suitability shall be accomplished under the cognizance of the SOIC"
concerned by analysts of broad knowledge, good judgment and wide
experience in personnel security and/or counterintelligence. When all
other information developed on an individual is favorable, a minor
investigative requirement which has not been met should not preclude
favorable adjudication. In all evaluations the protection of the
'National interest is paramount. Any doubt concerning personnel having
access to SCI s
hould be resolved.in favor of the National security'and.
the access should be denied
or revoked. The ultimate determination
of
whether the granting. of access is clearly consistent with the interest,
of National security shall be an overall; common sense determination
based on all available information.
17. Appeals Procedures. Annex B prescribes common appeals
procedures to be followed when an individual's SCI.. access has been
denied. or revoked.
C.onti.nui ncg . S.ecuri.ty Programs .
18. In'orderto facilitate attainment of the highest standard
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departments and agencies shall institute continuing security programs
personnel security and to augment both the access approval criteria and
the investigative requirements established by this Directive, member
for all individuals having access to SCI. In addition to security
indoctrinations (See Annex C, "Minimum Standards for SCI Security
Awareness Programs in the U.S.. Intelligence, Community"), these programs
shall be tailored to create mutually supporting procedures under which
will escape notice or.be left unresolved which brings into
question an individual's.loyal,ty and integrity or suggests the
.possibility of his or her beifng subject to undue influence or duress
supervision of.that individual throughout the period of his assignment.
program to which the individual is assigned shall assume security
access to SCI, the SOIL for the department, agency, or Government
individual is assigned to 'perform sensitive compartmented work requiring
through foreign relationships or exploitable personal conduct. When an
19. The continuing security programs shall include:
Individuals are required to inform the department or.'
agency which"granted their SCI access about any personal
problem or situation which may have a possible bearing on their
:eligibility for continued access,to SCI and to seek appropriate
guidance and assistance. Security counseling should be made
available. This counseling should be conducted by. i ndi vi dual s
having extensive background and experience regarding the nature
and special vulnerabilities of the particular type of
compartmented-information involved.
b. SCI security education programs of the member
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departments and agencies shall be established and maintained
pursuant to the requirements of Annex C.
c. Security supervisory programs shall be established and,
maintained to ensure that supervisory personnel recognize and
.individual concerned to neutralize his or her vulnerability.
States as well as to provide all necessary help to the
Specific instructions concerning reporting procedures shall be
disseminated to enable the appropriate authority to take timely
corrective action to safeguard the security of the United
indicators which may signal matters of security concern.
discharge their special responsibility to safeguard SCI,
including the need to assess continued eligibility for SCI
access. These programs shall provide practical guidance on
;.Security Review Programs to ensure that appropriate
security authorities always receive and exchange, in a timely:
manner, all information bearing on the security posture of.
shall be.kept
history information
Whenever adverse or derogatory,.,informati.on
inconsistencies arise which could impact upon an individual's security
status,-appropriate investigation shall be conducted on a timely
basis. The. investigation shall be of sufficient scope necessary to
resolve the specific adverse or derogatory. information, or inconsist-
ency, in question so that.a determination can be Made as to whether the
individual's continued utilization in activities requiring SCI is
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clearly consistent with the interest of the National security.
21. Implementation. Existing directives, regulations, agreements
and other guidance governing access to SCI as defined. herein shall be
revised accordingly.
William J. 'Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
.(DRAFT)
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DCID 1/14 ADJUDICATION GUIDELINES
This annex is designed to ensure that a common approach is followed by
Intelligence Community Departments and Agencies in applying the standards of
apply to the adjudication of cases involving
persons being considered for first time access to
Information (SCI) as well as those cases of persons being readjudicated for
continued
ADJUDICATIVE PROCESS
The adjudicative process
"whole person" concept. The recency of occurrence of any adverse incident,
adjudication is the careful weighing of a number of variables known as
not likely to later become an unacceptable security risk. SCI access
entails the examination of a sufficient period
of a person's life to make a determination that the person is not now or is
uniform evaluation.
central to a fair and
violations were committed as well as any repetition or continuation of such
conduct. Each case must be judged on its own merits and final . determination
remains the responsibility of the individual SOIC.
Any doubt concerning
ultimate determination of whether the'granting of SCI access is
the interests of national security shall be an overall
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common sense determination based on all available information. In arriving at
a decision consistent with the foregoing, the adjudicator must give careful
scrutiny to the following matters:
. Loyalty
Close relatives and associates
Homosexual conduct and sexual perversion
Cohabitation
., Financial irresponsibility
Alcohol abuse
? .Illegal drugs and drug abuse
i Emotional and mental disorders
j. Record of law violations
k. Security violations
Adjudicative actions concerning the foregoing items are examined.in
greater detail below.
LOYALTY
DCID D. establishes the. categorical requirement that, to be eligible
for SCI access, an individual must be of` unquestioned loyalty to the United
States.
CLOSE.RELATIVES AND ASSOCIATES
DCID 1/14 requires close examination by the SCI adjudicator when members
loyalty or affection is to a foreign power, or they are subject to . anyform o
affection or obligation are not citizens of the United States, or their
of.-an individual's immediate family and persons to whom he/she is bound by
duress by a foreign pbWer,_or they advocate the violent overthrow or
unconstitutional alteration of the Government of the United States..
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The adjudicator must assess carefully the degree of actual and potential
influence that such persons may exercise on the individual based on an
examination of the frequency and nature of personal contact and correspondence
with and the political sophistication and general maturity of the individual.
A recommendation for access disapproval isappropriate if there is an
When there is a "compelling need" for SCI access for an individual whose
family member is a non-U.S. citizen and the background investigation
indicates
that the security risk is negligible, an exception to paragraph 6b(l) or
of DCID 1/14. may be recommended.
In some circumstances, marriage of an individual holding SCI access
.approval could present an unacceptable security risk. Such individuals are
required to file intent-to-marry statements. It is the responsibility of the
SOIC to advise
the individuals of the possible. security consequences. If the
individual marries a non-U.S. citizen, SCI. access will be suspended until the
case is readjudicated unless an appropriate investigation of the spouse, as
required by Paragraph 11L of DCID,1/14, was conducted with favorable
results., In readjudi`cating such cases, the'same judgments and criteria as are
reflected in. this section apply.
HOMOSEXUAL'CONDUCT AND SEXUAL PERVERSION
DCID 1/14 requires that, to be eligible for SCI. access, individuals must
be stable,. of. excellent character and discretion,'and.not subject to undue
influence or duress through exploitable personal conduct..
Sexual conduct.can;_be arelevant consideration in circumstances in which
the conduct indicates.a personality disorder or could result in exposing the
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individual to direct or indirect pressure because of susceptibility-to black-
mail or coercion as a result of the deviant sexual behavior. Such behavior
includes: bestiality, fetishism, exhibitionism, necrophilia, nymphomania or
satyriasis, masochism, sadism, pedophilia, transvestism, and voyeurism.
Homosexual conduct is also to be considered as a factor, in determining an.
individual's stability and susceptibility to undue influence or duress.
conduct or sexual
perversion, it is relevant to consider the age of the person, the
voluntariness, and the frequenc* of such activities, the public nature and the
recency of the conduct, as well~as any other circumstances which may serve to
aggravate the nature of character-of the conduct.
A recommendation for
disapproval is appropriate when, in view of all available evidence concerning
the individual's history of sexual behavior, it appears that access to SCI
could pose a ,risk to the national security.
.A.
COHABITATION
Cohabitation in and of itself does not preclude SCI access approval.
The identity of a'cohabitant-must be ascertained and a determination
made
if such association constitutes an unacceptable security risk based on the
same criteria as in the section dealing with..Close Relatives and Associates.
Cohabitation with an alien, for example, requires the same' scrutiny as
marriage toan alien. Extra-marital sexual relations are also of legitimate
concern to the SCI adjudicator when the potential for undue influence or,
duress exists.
UNDESIRABLE CHARACTER TRAITS
It is emphasized that an individual's lifestyle is examined only .in an
effort to determine whether a pattern of behavior exists.which indicates that
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granting SCI access could pose a risk to national security. In cases where
allegations have been reported which reflect unfavorably"on the reputation of
an individual, it is incumbent upon the SCI adjudicator to distinguish fact
from opinion and to determine which negative characteristics are real and
pertinent to an evaluation of the individual's character and which are
unsubstantiated or irrelevant. Relevant negative characteristics are those
which, in the adjudicator's informed opinion, indicate that an individual is
not willing, able, or likely to protect SCI information. The adjudicator's
personal likes or dislikes must not be permitted to affect the determination.
Examples of specific concern in .determinin
gwhether an individual has
undesirable character traits are any substantive, credible,
derogatory
comments by associates, employers, neighborsand other acquaintances; any
litigation instituted against, the individual by such persons as a result o
the individual's actions; or allegations of-violations of law A
recommendation for disapproval would be appropriate for an individual who
cannot be relied upon to obey rules and regulations.
In'examinin9the circumstances of cases involving incidents of
untruthfulness, the adjudicator must weigh all factors with particular
emphasis on establishing the intent of the individual. individual.'-Where an individual
.... ... a .. 4
has tried to obscure pertinent or si gni fi cant facts by falsifying data, i , e.
on the Personal History Statement by either omission or false entry, such
action.. should be weighed heavily against recommending access. Failure to
disclose derogatory personal information, such as a court martial or serious
crime, would.appearr to be intentional and, consequently, would warrant a
recommendation for disapproval...
FINANCIAL IRRESPONSIBILITY
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Financial irresponsibility represents a serious concern to the SCI
adjudicator. Persons who have?engaged in espionage for monetary gain
demonstrate the hazard of granting SCI access to an individual with overly
expensive tastes and habits or living under the pressure of serious debt.,
A.recommenda?tion for disapproval
is appropriate-when there is a pattern
of financial irresponsibility and it appears that. an individual has not made. a
conscientious effort to satisfy creditors. In such cases, the adjudicator
should'determine.whether the individual had been notified about the debts and
--. -- -r ._ o }fie
whether they :,'were' legally valid or ultimately satisfied.
When. the financial irresponsibility alone is not of such magnitude to ,
warrant'disapproval, it may contribute to recommendation.fordenial of SCI
access when there is other evidence of irresponsibility.
ALCOHOL: ABUSE
The SCI adjudicator should examine any information developed relative to
.an individual.'s use of alcoholic beverages to determine the extent to which
such use would adversely affect the ability of the individual to exercise the
care; judgment, and discretion necessary to protect SCI.- 5 s~
information The
adjudicator should determine whether a pattern of. impropriety exists, although
one incident caus'ed.,.byalcohol abuse may be of such magnitude to warrant a
recommendation'fordisapproval
In determining the security impact of a person's pattern of alcohol use,
the adjudicator should consider the circumstances, amount and rate of
consumption,,-the time.and place of consumption, and the physiological and
behavioral effect such drinking has on the individual. For example, does the
individual's+dri.nking-result in absences.from-work?or careless work habits?
Does the'indi.vidual become talkative, abusive or manifest other undesirable
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characteristics? Does the individual drink until intoxicated? Has the
individual been arrested for any acts resulting from the influence of alcohol?
In the absence of conclusive evidence, additional insight may be
available from appropriate medical authorities. If the individual acknowl-
edges having an alcohol.abuse problem and is seeking help,' it may be
appropriate to defer access determination and monitor the individual's
progress for a year or so. >;.
If, after considering the nature -and-sources of the information, the
adjudicator determines that an individual's drinking is not serious enough to
warrant a recommendation for disapproval of SCI access, it may be appropriate
appropriate period of time has passed.
recommend a reinvestigation of the, individual's use of alcohol after, an
incidents of alcohol abuse,may result in SCI denial. The adjudicator may also
to recommend approval with a warning at the time of indoctrination that future
ILLEGAL DRUGS AND DRUG ABUSE
The SCI
adjudicator should examine all. allegations of an individual'
.use,transport,'transfer, sale,
hallucinogens,
cultivation, processing and manufacturing of
narcotics,`drugs.and other materials and chemical
identified and listed
Consequently an
the Controlled Substance Act of 1970,
compounds
as amended.
individual's involvemgnt.i.n any of these activities is of
to the SCI adjudicator in order..to determine the individual's-
capability to exercise the care, discretion, and judgment required to protect
SCI information. The use of these substances may lead to varying degrees of
physical or psychological dependence as well as having a deleterious effect on-
an individual's mental- state and ability to function.
Personsinvolved in drug trafficking,;i.e., the commercial cultivation,
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 key elements. For example, has the individual used "hard" drugs or
processing,. manufacturing, purchase or sale of such substances should normally
habitual. The frequency, recency and circumstances surrounding said use are
be recommended for disapproval.
In cases involving the use of drugs, the adjudicator must consider the
nature of the substance used and whether the use is experimental or
cocaine or LSD? Has the individual used drugs
regularly or only on occasion? Does the individual currently use drugs? Does
the individual regularly purchase drugs or participate merely when offered
drugs by others? Has the individual's behavior been affected by the use of
Once the judgment is made that an individual is a habitual user of any
controlled substance (multiple use beyond the point of mere experimentation),
a recommendation for disapproval is appropriate. Moreover, even experimental,
use of hard drugs or hallucinogens, such as LSD, could warrant a
recommendation for disapproval.
EMOTIONAL AND MENTAL DISORDERS
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. DCID1/1.4
requires that persons considered for access to SCI be'stable,
trustworthy, reliable, and of excellent character, judgment and discretion.
determining whether an. individual is able or willing to protect SCl'infor
of reality or reliability are of serious concern to the SCI adjudicator.in
Emotional and mental. disorders which interfere with an individual's perception
mation.
is essential to obtain as much information as possible when an
interviewed to obtain additional detail.` When appropriate, government
allegation.has been made in this area. If feasible, the individual should be
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 advisable to recommend postponing final action and rechecking the situation at
psychological and psychiatric personnel should be consulted so that
psychiatric or psychological data may be properly evaluated.
If a current emotional instability appears to be a temporary condition,
for example, caused by a death, illness or marital breakup, it may be
tests when so directed by competent authority should not be recommended for.
later.date.
Military and civilian personnel who decline to take medical/psychiatric
-SCI
character, judgment and discretion as required by DCID 1/14 for access to SCI,
In determining.whether an individual is stable, trustworthy, of excellent
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access.:
RECORD OF LAW VIOLATIONS
.the adjudicator must. weigh
when cured, would have no security implications.
carefully any record of law violations by the
individual. Although a pattern of repeated minor traffic 'violations could be
significant, the adjudicator is principally concerned with more serious
criminal violations or court actions reflecting adversely upon the
individual'S reliabili.ty.or.trustworthiness.
Each.case involving convictions, for criminal offenses must be considered
from. the. standpoint. of the nature and seriousness of the offense, the cir-
cumstances under
which i t occurred, how .l orig ago
it occurred, whetherit was
an isolated offense or.a repeated violation of the law, the offender's age at
the time, social conditions which may.have a bearing on the individual
actions, and any evidence of . rehabilitation.
Any conviction for a felony'will normally support a. recommendation for
disapproval. If the offense was committed many years prior, the individual
This precludes a security disapproval for what may be a
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has shown evidence of rehabilitation, and the investigation shows no other
derogatory information, an approval may he considered. A large number of
minor offenses, however, could indicate irresponsibility and may support an
adverse recommendation,
SECURITY VIOLATIONS
Most security violations are caused by carelessness or ignorance with no
intention of compromising security. However, the record of an individual
responsible: for multiple violations should be scrutinized The individual"s
current attitude toward security should be confirmed with his/her
supervisor A pattern of Zviolations may be sufficient ground for a
recommendation for disapproval.
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ANNEX B
DCID 1/14 APPEALS
POLICY
1..; This annex establishes common appeals procedures for the denial or
revocation of access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) by entities
of the Intelligence Communi-ty after adjudication pursuant to' theprovisions.o
DCID 1/14. This annex is promulgated pursuant to Executive Order 12333,
Executive Order 12356 and Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947.
For the. purpose of this annex, all references to DCID 1/14 include the basic
document and all of its annexes.
Any person who has'been considered for ini-
ti al or continued access to SCI pursuant to the provisions of DCID 1/14 shall,
to the extent provided below, be afforded an opportunity to appeal 'the denial
.or revocation of such-access.-'.-This annex supersedes any and all other
practices. and procedures for the appeal of the denial, or 'revocation of SCI
,access. This annex shall. not be construed to require .,the disclosure of
classified information or information concerning intelligence sources and
methods, nor shall: it be construed to afford an opportunity to appeal prior to
the actual"denial'or'revocation of SCI access In addition, the provisions of
DCID 1/14, this annex, or any other document or provision of-law shall not b
construed to. create a property interest of any kind in the access of any
person to SCL. Further,`since the denial or revocation of access to SCI
cannot by the terms of DCID 1/14 render a person ineligible for access to
other classified information solely for that reason, the denial or revocation
of SCI access pursuant .to the provisions of DCID 1/14 and this annex shall not
24
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be construed -to create a liberty interest of, any kind.
APPLICABILITY
This annex applies to all United States Government civilian and
military personnel,`as well as any other individuals, including contractors
and employees of contractors, who are considered for initial or continued
access to,
,SCI
This annex does not apply to decisions regarding employment
and shall not be construed to affect or impair Public Law 88-290 or the
authority of any entity to effect applicant or personnel actions pursuant to
Public Law,88-290:.Public Lawf86-36, or other applicable law.
SCI ACCESS DETERMINATION AUTHORITY
3. Adjudications for access to SCI shall be made in accordance with DCID
1/14 by a Determination Authority designated.by the Senior Official of the
Intelligence' Community (SOIC) of each entity. Access to SCI shall be denied
or revoked whenever it'is determined that,a person does not meet the security
standards. provided forin DCID 1/14.
4a. ; Persons shall be:
(1) notified of the denial or revocation of SCI access,
2)"notified that they may request to be provided the
reasons _.for such denial or revocation,: and/o.r
(3) afforded an opportunity to appeal,
whenever the Determination Authority of any entity, in the exercise of his or,.,
her discretion, deems such action in any given case to be clearly consistent
with the interests of the national security.
b. Any person who is given notification and afforded an opportunity to
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 Approved For Release 2005/08/15 : CIA-RDP87BO1034R000500010011-8
appeal pursuant to subparagraph a. above may, within 45 days of the date on
which such person is notified of the reasons for denial or revocation of SCI
access, submit a written appeal of that denial or revocation to the Determina-
tion Authority.`. The. written material submitted for consideration may include
any information which the person believes will assist the Determination.
Authority in reviewing the case.
After-a.'-further review of the case in the light of the written
appeal, the person will be notified of the decision of the Determination
Authority.
review of the case.,:;?In that event,'the SOIC, or his or her'designee, shall
notified of the Determination Authority's reaffirmation, request a final
:.If the. Determination Authority reaffirms a denial or revocation o
access, the person may, within 30 days of the date on which such'person is
personally review the case and exercise his or her discretion pursuant to the
provisions of DCID 1/14, and shall inform the person of his or her decision,
which shall be final and unreviewable.
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ANNEX C
MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR SCI SECURITY AWARENESS
PROGRAMS IN THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Minimum standards are'hereby established for the SCI security education
programs.designed to enhance the security awareness of U.S. Government
private contractors
the U.S. Intelligence Community.
Existing security awareness programs shall
.be modified to conform with these standards. Departments/Agencies will
establish a documented program,'to ensure that training has been presented to
.all personnel.
The security awareness requirements set forth herein are divided into
three phases. Phase I. concerns the initial indoctrination of the employee
which is normally administered prior to access to SCI. Phase II concerns the
continuing security ' awareness. program required to maintain and increase
security' awareness throughout the period of access. Phase.IIIsets forth the
'final`'guidelines.and.instructions when access to SCI. is terminated.
. yin'- iy ..4 .:` ~ ~... :.r : . _, _ 9.: . ...; ,~ '?
I.A. Initial Indoctrination--As soon as,practicable after being approved
for access to. SCI, employees shall receive an-initial security indoctrination
which shall include:
A. The need for and purpose of SCI, and the adverse effect
on the national security that could result from 'unauthorized
disclosure.
B. .The intelligence mission of the Department/Agency to
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include the reasons why intelligence information is sensitive.
C. The administrative, personnel, physical and other
procedural security requirements of the Department/Agency, and
those requirements peculiar to specific duty assignments.
D. Individual
- ", 1. i 11 41
classification management responsibilities
set ;forth in appropriate directives and regulations to include
classification/declassification guidelines and marking require-
meats. hr
E. The definitions and criminal penalties for espionage,
including harboring or concealing persons; gathering, transmittin
.or losing defense information; gathering or delivering defense
information.to aid foreign governments; photographing and sketching
defense installations; unauthorized disclosure of classified infor-
mation (Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 792 through 795, 797 and 798),
the Internal Security Act of 1950 (Title 50, U.S.C., Section 783),
and,. when
227).
appropriat.e~;:the Atomic Energy Act, Sections 224
through
The administrative sanctions for violation or disregard
security procedures:.:
G. '..A review-,'of the techniques'. en.pi oyed .by ' fmrei gn -' i ntel -
ligence organizations. in attempting-to obtain national security
information.
H Individual security responsibilities including
1.~ ~~;,The
prohibition against.discussing SCI in.a nonsecure
area,, over a nonsecure telephone orin any other manner that
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permits access by unauthorized persons.
2. The need to determine, prior to disseminating SCI,
that the prospective recipient has the proper security access
approval., that the SCI is needed in order to perform official
duties and that the recipient can properly protect the
information.
reporting r
3." ve%
travel, contacts with foreign natio
ized individuals to bta i n national
nals, attempts by unauthor-
security information,
physical security deficiencies and. loss or possible compromise
of SCI material.,
4.. Obligation
to report to proper authorities any
information which could reflect on the trustworthiness of.an
individual who has access to SCI, such as:
Willful violation of security regulations.
unexplained affluence.or'excessive
indebtedness..-
Serious .unlawful.acts
Apparent mental or emotional problems.
Coercion.. ' orharassnient attempts.
Blackmail
equirements such.as'foreign
attempts.
Identification of the elements in the Depart-.
merit/Agency to which matters of security interest are to
II. -Periodic Employee 'Awareness Enhancement - Each Department/Agency
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shall establish a continuing security awareness program which will provide for
frequent exposure of personnel to security awareness material. Implementation
of a continuing program may include live briefings, audio-visual presentations
(e.g., video tapes, films and slide/tape programs), printed material (e.g.,
,posters, memoranda,pamphlets, fliers) or a combination, thereof. It is
essential'thatcurrent information and materials be utilized. Programs-,should
'
i >t
s _:.Y t ,aSAr
'ui t~^i4r,,ii 1Y '`~f1>'f x[er t ..~.~:, ?s ..'~ ,_.~:- - ,. `,..~ ..,::SJ" _. ~:,. ~,`.`:Y.t .;'xM .~ ., %#.ked"ts
Individual security responsibilities n
A review of"otherappropriate_Depa,rtment/Agency
~ a
requiremen
ts.
B Special security briefings/-debriefings are required to
supplement the existing security awareness programs in the
fol l owi ng' si tuati ons ... fi .~^ ...'
When an' empl ogee 'is -designated as a courier.
When an employee travels, officially or
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unofficially, to or through communist countries, or
areas of high risk.
3. When an employee has, or anticipates, contact
with representatives of communist controlled countries.
When an employee is granted access to SCI or
cryptographic .'material ..
41, Ili
Y Y ,5
.t~ } "tJk7~-Ak~1 S
When any other`.situation arises for which ..a
specialbriefing/debriefing is required by the
Department/Agency.
~sMrl*'
III. Debriefing` When a-Department/Agency has determined that access t
SCI is no longer re.quired, final instructions and guidelines will be. provided
to the em pi oyee Asa minimum A these shall include-
A.,: A, requirement that the individual' read appropriate. sections
of Titles ': 18" and 50U.S Code, and that the intent and criminal
;sanctions of these laws relative to espionage and unauthorized
~'~ ~-? ~; k ! t a k w
`disclosure: be clarified
The co:nttnuing obligation never to divulge, publish, or
Freveal bywriting, word,`?conduct or otherwise, to any, unauthorized;
f,.
persons any Swithout the written consent..of appropriate
Department/Agency officials.
C. An acknowledgementthat the-individual will report without
delay to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or the Department/
Agency, any attempt by an unauthorized person to solicit national
security information. 4, ,.
D A.declaration that the individual no longer possesses a
y
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W -
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certain hazardous activities as defined in DCID 1/20, and
documents or material containing SCI.
E. A reminder of the risks associated with foreign travel and
Department/Agency reporting requirements as applicable.
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