(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B01034R000700080029-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 8, 2007
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: February 7, 1984
• Content Type: REGULATION

Approved For Release 2007/09/08: CIA-RDP87BO1034R000700080029-0
C O N F I D E N T I A L
07 February 1984
CHANGE CONSEQUENCES
General General Expand scope to include Raises questions of
all automated informa- feasibility of managing
tion processing systems. consolidated effort.
Within the Agency, OC is
responsible for telecom-
munications and the auto-
mated systems used in
support of telecommunica-
tions. ODP and 0S/ISSG
are responsible for the
security of the remainder
of the automated informa-
tion processing systems.
2.c,7b 2,c$d Adds provision for the The propriety of this
Government to formulate goal, and its pursuit by a
strategies and measures military agency, are legal
for providing protection issues which should be ex-
.for "systems which plored by the Attorney
handle nongovernment in- General.
formation the loss of
which could adversely
affect the national
interest or the rights
of U.S. persons..."
Explicit responsibilities
and mechanisms to imple-
ment this policy are not
provided, but would de-
volve to Director, NSA.
4.a(4) No Ref Empowers Steering Group Restructures budget review
to approve consolidated process for these areas,
resource program and with significant impact on
budget proposals for DCI role for NFIP and on
national telecommunica- department and agency head
tions and information authorities to set
systems security. priorities.
NSC review
C O N F I D E N T I A L
WARMING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED
Approved For Release 2007/09/08: CIA-RDP87B01034R000700080029-0
 Approved For Release 2007/09/08: CIA-RDP87BOl034R000700080029-0
C O N F I D E N T I A L
CHANGE CONSEQUENCES
7-g No Ref
5.(b)(3)
Assigns to Director, NSA Delegates to NSA the
the responsibility to
"Review annually the
systems security pro-
gram and resources re-
quirements of the de-
partments and agencies
of the government, and
prepare consolidated
National Telecommunica-
tions and Information
Systems Security Pro-
gram Budget recommenda-
tions.
authority to review the
Agency program and re-
source requirements and
critique/approve our plan-
ning. NSA has requested
information from the
Agency and the Department
NTISSC to "approve the ODP recommended that
sensitive systems managed be changed to
security information, "sponsored" so that the
techniques and materials DCI could release material
to foreign governments that might be in the
or international organi- Agency's interest even if
zations (except in in- a project is not under the
telligence activities direct control of the DCI.
managed by the Director This was not changed.
of Central Intelligence).
This provision superseded
the DCI's E.O. 12333
authorities to prescribe
policies for and coordin-
ate foreign intelligence
relationships (except for
DDO operations).
Makes Sec Def Executive Considering the rapid
Agent for automated expansion of word process-
systems security as well ing, makes Sec Def
as for Telecommunica- Executive Agent for all
tions Security. Expands Government information
his executive agent role processing.
to cover all electronic
information, not just
"national security" in-
formation as before.
C O N F I D E N T I A L
Approved For Release 2007/09/08: CIA-RDP87BOl034R000700080029-0
 Approved For Release 2007/09/08: CIA-RDP87BO1034R000700080029-0
C O N F I D E N T I A L
CHANGE
7 No Ref
Under~he NCSC,
chaired by the Asst Sec
Def for Communications
Command, Control and
Intell; was established
priorities. Systems Security should be
as a national ComSec
framework for the con-
duct of ComSec activi-
ties within the
Government. NSA was a
voting member of the
NCSC and the charter
functions of NSA were
clearly defined. NSA
CONSEQUENCES
The Director, NSA is
designated as the National
Manager for Telecommunica-
tions and Information
Systems Security and is
responsible for carrying
out the responsibilities
of the Sec of as
Executive Agent.
Under the proposed NSDD
the Dir, ctor, NSA will
have a predominant role in
determining the future of
was a coequal with nine telecommunications and
other regular members automated information
of the NCSC. With the systems utilization within
chairmanship of the NCSC the Government. The
at the Asst Sec Def designation of hirector,
level NSA could not NSA as the National
unduly influence Manager for Telecommuni-
national standards or cations and Information
stricken from the proposed
NSDD.
6,7g No Ref Empowers Sec Def to Department and agency
"procure for and pro- heads with delegated
vide to government authority, would lose the
agencies, and where right to procure computers
appropriate, to private and word processors.
institutions (including Centralized procurement
Government contractors) would make it very diffi-
and foreign governments, cult to meet schedules and
equipment and other individual agencies re-
materials." quirements. NSA will have
oversight and budget
approval/disapproval
authority.
7.b No Ref Empowers Director, NSA Entire Government must use
to develop and approve Director, NSA specified
"all standards, tech- standards, techniques,
niques, systems and systems and equipment.
C O N F I D E N T I A L
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 Approved For Release 2007/09/08: CIA-RDP87BO1034R000700080029-0
C O N F I D E N T I A L
CHANGE CONSEQUENCES
equipment related to
cryptography, ComSec and
trusted computer and auto-
mated information systems.
7.e No Ref Empowers Director, NSA Eliminated such roles for
to perform all Govern- CIA (ISSG, OC and ORD),
ment sponsored R&D for DOE, Bureau of Standards,
telecommunications and GSA and others.
and information systems.
7b,8a 4g Removes_authority In CIA, for example, this
of heads of departments removes OC/COMSEC and OS/
and agencies to organize ISSG missions.
and conduct their com-
munications security
and emanations security
activities as they see
fit, and vests this
responsibility with
.Director, NSA.
7.b No Ref Empowers DIRNSA to Impacts formal and
conduct liaison with informal roles of DCI,
foreign governments and State Department and
international organiza- Commerce Department in
tions. many relationships.
7.d No Ref Empowers Director, NSA Remove analysis missions
to assess and dissemi- from CIA and DIA such as
nate information on technology transfer and
hostile threats to Soviet technology.
telecommunications and
automated information
systems.
7.d,8.c Oblique The proposed NSDD is The exceptions under
3.f very specific on threat paragraphs 9a and 10.b are
assessments and tasks not adequate to resist
heads of departments Director, NSA tasking to
C O N F I D E N T I A L
Approved For Release 2007/09/08: CIA-RDP87BO1034R000700080029-0
 Approved For Release 2007/09/08: CIA-RDP87BO1034R000700080029-0
C O N F I D E N T I A L
CHANGE _ -CONSEQUENCES
and agencies to provide provide sources and
any information request- methods information neces-
ed by Director, NSA to sary to conduct: the threat
determine the vulner- assessment.
ability of telecommuni-
cations and automated
information systems.
No Ref Requires the DCI to This Is in direct conflict
coordinate with the with the statutory author-
Steering Group, NTISSC ity of the DCI to protect
and the Director, NSA, sources and methods
as appropriate, concern- information.
ing unique requirements
pertaining to the pro-
tection of intelligence
sources and methods.
to deny real estate
acquisitions through
provided for per rma-
nent interagency group
under the chairmanship
of Sec State...to
review and if necessary
The original
USSR and other Communist afield of the original
The very important mission 25X1
and function of this in-
teragency group/committee
is relegated to an
advisory function and will
in effect become
ineffective. This is a
classic example of how the
lease or purchase by the NSDD has strayed far
a potential serious
threat to U.S. telecom-
munications security.
All foreign government
leased or owned facili-
ties in this country
should be evaluated as
to their possible use
for intercept operation
countries that present objectives
The revised NSDD
stipulates an inter-
agency polilcy coordina-
tion committee under Sec
C O N F I D E N T I A L
Approved For Release 2007/09/08: CIA-RDP87B01034R000700080029-0 .___
 Approved For Release 2007/09/08: CIA-RDP87BO1034R000700080029-0
C O N F I D E N T I A L
CHANGE __ CONSEQUENCES
State..."It shall provide
policy guidance for
implementation by the
Office of Foreign
Missions... on proposals
for foreign real estate
acquisitions, by lease
or purchase, that present
a security threat to U.S.
telecommuniations and
automated information
systems or are of
counterintelligence
interest."
C O N F I D E N T I A L
Approved For Release 2007/09/08: CIA-RDP87BO1034R000700080029-0
 Approved For Release 2007/09/08: CIA-RDP87BO1034R000700080029-0
ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SUP Do"
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REMARKS
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Approved For Release 2007/09/08: CIA-RDP87BO1034R000700080029-0