NICARAGUA: TELLING IT LIKE IT IS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R001802780009-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 72
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 4, 2013
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: November 12, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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TOP SECRET
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Ambassador Otto Reich
Coordinator for Public Diplomacy for Latin America
and the Caribbean
Department of State
Assistant National Intelligence urTicer ror
Latin America
SUBJECT: Nicaragua: Telling It Like It Is c' 2
REFERENCE: Memorandum from Robert McFarlane,
dated 11 November 1985, Same Subject
Attached is the unclassified information requested for the
preparation of the publication, plus classified "back-up" material to
support it. I hope that in our efforts to put something together
quickly, we have not left out anything important.
NIC 05626-85
12 November 1985
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TOPSECR[T
Y
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SUSPENSE 13 Nov 85
Date
Remarks To 16: Please have NIO/LA take the lead,
working with ALA and CATF innmeeting this request.
Ensure copy of "declassified" info and "backup"
material is provided DCI/DDCI. (Note: Advance
copies of this tasking provided ALA and CATFupon
JA7~e~/S~ tx"tive Secretary
/C9? )~v , Nov 85
Date
3637 (iaei)
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
X
2
DDCI
X
3
EXDIR
X
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
X
6
DDA
7
DDO
X
8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NIC
10
GC
X
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/OLL
X
14
D/PAO
X
15
D/PERS
16
VC/NIC
X
17
NI0/LA
X
1s
X
19
C/ LA/ DO
X
20
C/CATF/L
/DO
X
,21
1,221
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SECRET
WASHINGTON
November 11, 1985
The Secretary of
The Secretary of D
THE HONORABLE WILLI
-7-J 'CASE
1
The Director of Cent //Intelligence
ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR.
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
SUBJECT: Nicaragua: Telling It Like It Is (C)
SYSTEM II
91155
4GU veTRIs ry
4388
Next week the Congress is scheduled to take up the FY-86
Intelligence Authorization Bill. The House and Senate Intelli-
gence Committee conferees have included language in their
conference report that offers the opportunity for increased
support to the democratic resistance. We can expect that this
legislation will become known to the Sandinistas and their
supporters and that they will, as in the past, launch a propa-
ganda offensive against the proposals set forth in the bill. (S)
It is, therefore, critically important that we urgently and
responsibly educate and inform our public on the nature of what
is happening in Nicaragua. We should also highlight other
attacks on the President's recently announced proposal for
resolving regional conflicts. To this end, the following tasks
should be expeditiously undertaken:
The Department of State, in coordination with the Department
of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, should
prepare an unclassified publication on the following
activities being undertaken by the Sandinistas and their
supporters:
the renewed military buildup occurring in Nicaragua
and Cuba;
the increased repression of the FSLN against the
people, church, and political institutions of
Nicaragua;
the intensified military offensive directed against the
Nicaraguan democratic resistance forces;
SECRET
Declassify: OADR
SECRET
LOCI
F. C
C-IF7
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SECRET
SECRET 2
the current propaganda, disinformation, and censorship
campaign being waged in support of the Sandinistas; and
Sandinista intransigence in dealing with their
neighbors. (S)
-- The Director of Central Intelligence should undertake
immediate review of all available information on the five
elements depicted above and declassify as much as possible
in order to support preparation of the State Department's
publication. The DCI should also prepare detailed,
classified "back-up" material to substantiate the
publication indicated above. This material should also be
used to brief the relevant committees of the Congress as
corroboration for the unclassified publication. (S)
-- The Department of Defense should support this activity with
renewed assistance to the State Department's Office of
Public Diplomacy and by expeditious handling of relevant
intelligence collected by military systems. (S)
We should aim to have the State Department's publication, copies
of pertinent censored material, the classified "back-up"
information, and duplicates of the President's recent 90-day
"Report on U.S. Policy Toward and Events in Nicaragua" available
not later than Wednesday, November 13, 1985. It is intended
that we will use this material for a White House press release
followed by a press background session on November 13, 1985. (S)
SECRET
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UNCLASSIFIED
Talking Points
SUBJECT: Talking Points for Department of State
The re-imposition of the state of emergency by the
Sandinista Government has ushered in a major offense by that
government designed to eliminate all opposition to the regime.
--The Church: The most effective and outspoken democratic
0
opponent to the regime, the Church is now under attack:
? The government has closed down its radio station,
Radio Catolica, because it refused to submit its
broadcasts to prior censorship.
? In early October the Church's newsmagazine La
Iglesia was prohibited from being printed and
circulated.
? Foreign priests are expelled and religious students
are drafted in the Sandinista Army if they dare
criticize the government.
? Church leaders are fighting back. Cardinal Miguel
Obando y Bravo has publicly spoken out on the
government's attacks against the church, a church
spokesman presented the government with a written
report, which was later circulated to a number of
embassies in Managua, outlining the government's
duplicious nature in its dealings with the church.
--The Internal Democratic Opposition: The Sandinista regime
has been harsh and cruel in its treatment with the internal
democratic opposition:
? While the public position of the government is to
negotiate with the democratic opposition, top UNCLASSIFIED
Sandinista leaders have privately affirmed they Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP87M00539R001802780009-4
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UNULASSIFIED
will never talk with the private business sector.
? Former leader of the private sector, Jorge Salazar,
was murdered on orders from Minister of Interior Tomas
Borge because he became a thorn in the side of the
government. Others have been threatened by Sandinista
security chief, Lenin Cerda.
? Internal opposition political parties as the Social
Christian Party and the Independent Liberal Party are
now prohibited from engaging in any political acts,
completely disenfrancished from the political process.
? During late October the government raided the
headquarters of the democratic labor confederation,
arresting three of its leaders, who remain in
detention.
? The major independent newspaper La Prensa is so
heavily censored that it has ceased to become an
effective vehicle of news.
--Arms Buildup: The Sandinista government in purchasing
weapons at a record pace, far in excess of the country's
internal needs.
? During Daniel Ortega's last trip to the Soviet Bloc
in April 1985 he received commitments of 17 million
dollars in military related aid.
? Nicaragua is importing sophisticated military
equipment to include Soviet made tanks, helicopter
gunships, and artillery.
? The Sandinistas continue to refuse to seriously
discuss with their Central American neighbors
verification procedures regarding arms inventories.
-- The Armed Resistance: The Sandinista People's Army (EPS)
UNCLASSIFIED
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is engaged in a major offensive against the Nicaraguan
resistance:
? The EPS is making greater use of combined
operations, in particular providing close air support
with MI-2S helicopter gunships.
? In general Sandinista troops have become aggressive
in conducting patrols and ambushes. Cuban advisors
.are urging the EPS to allow the FDN to infiltrate,
then cut off escape routes and set up ambushes.
? Special clandestine units have been created to
engage in sabotage and political assassination.
? The Sandinistas are not content to limit their
aggressive activities in Nicaragua as EPS units
regularly violate Honduran and Costa Rican territory.
--Sandinista International Propaganda Effort: Nicaraguan
diplomats are involved in an effort to portray the country as
"pluralistic", citing the newly drafted FSLN constitution as
proof that the country is democratic:
? In fact the constitution was drafted solely by the
Sandinistas, opposition sectors were not allowed to
provide input.
? The Nicaraguan people have not been consulted on
the constitution and it appears that it will be forced
upon them.
a The world is starting to realize that Nicaragua is
anything but a democracy. Ecuador recently broke
relations, citing Nicaragua's repressive political
system as a key factor leading to the break.
? Certain South American countries have made quiet
demarches to the Nicaraguan government complaining
about the re-imposition of emergency measures. UNCLASS!F IFD
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
u
National Intelligence Council
5 November
Lt. Colonel Oliver North
Political-Military Affairs
National Security Council
FROM: Robert D. Vickers, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT: Update of Information on Nicaragua
REFERENCE: Memorandum from Robert McFarlane,
dated 13 February 1985, Subject: Increased
Collection, Analysis and Reporting on Activities
in Nicaragua
MEMORANDUM FOR :
Attached for your retention is the tenth submission of selected data
deliveries to Nicaragua and the Sandinista military buildup.
Robert D. Vickers, Jr.
`'cvl
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PR S-LAP-85-002-L
E November 1985
SPECIAL TRANSLATION
CENSORED ARTICLES
FROM
MANAGUA LA PRENSA
FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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NOTICE
This special translation, "Censored Articles
From Managua LA FRFNSA," is a new FBIS report:.
It is being distributed to all U.S. Government
consumers of the FBIS Latin America DAILY REI'()PT.
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JPRS-LAP-85-002-L
6 November 1985
SPECIAL TRANSLATION
CENSORED ARTICLES FROM MANAGUA LA PRENSA
[These selected articles are from Managua LA PRENSA as
re ared for ublication but deleted b overnment censors
L
CDN Communique Responds to H. Ortega Interview -
(15 Oct 85) ............................................... 1
Repercussions of Current Paper Shortage Cited
(15 Oct 85) ............................................... 5
Flour Quotas for Hotels, Bakeries Reduced
(15 Oct 85) ............................................... 6
PSD's Rivas Comments on 1984 Elections
(15 Oct 85) ............................................... 7
Labor Ministry Declares Slaughterhouse Strike Illegal
(15 Oct 85) ............................................... 8
PSC National Head on Break With Ecuador
(15 Oct 85) ............................................... 9
PSD Leader Discusses Need for Peace
(15 Oct 85) ............................................... 11
CGT(i) Sends Delegation to National Assembly
(15 Oct 85) ...............................................
Cubans Accused of Disruptive Behavior
(16 Oct 85) ...............................................
Unnamed Commandante Rebuked in Obando Homily
(16 Oct 85) ...............................................
Bar Association, Lawyers' Problems Discussed
(16 Oct 85) ...............................................
Managua Chamber of?,Commerce on Business Situation
(16 Oct 85) ...............................................
STAT
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CUS Leaders Criticize Newspaper Confiscation
(16 Oct 85) ............................................ 18
CCT Protests Police Action Against COPROSA
(16 Oct 85) ............................................ 20
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CDN COMMUNIQUE RESPONDS TO H. ORTEGA INTERVIEW
Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 15 Oct 85
[Article: "CDN Answers Humberto Ortega"]
[Text] We have received the following communique:
The Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinating Body (CDN), aware of the political and
socioeconomic deterioration that the country is undergoing, comments on the
interview granted by the Sandinist defense minister, and national chief of the
Sandinist People's Militias and the Sandinist Compulsory Military Service [SMO],
Commander of the Revolution Humberto Ortega Saavedra.
CDN has the following opinion of the statements made by the subject of the
interview:
If the civic opposition has apparently evinced political inconsistency, it is
due to the lack of political pluralism, the repression carried out by the state
and the total control over the press, radio and television. Noteworthy, among
other things, are:
The Nandaime case in 1982; the repression and harassment during the electoral
process, against CDN, in the towns of Boaco, Leon, Masaya and Chinandega; the
ban on the transmission of Holy Mass; the attack by the "turbas" [pro-Sandinist
demonstrators] upon the demonstration held on May Day 1985, against the trade
unions and working people; the ban, with death threats, against COSEP [Higher
Council of Private Enterprise], which prevented the General Assembly of 7
September of this year; the "turbas "' attack during the Holy Father's visit;
etc.....
The aforementioned incidents prove that the expression "ideological inconsistency"
used by Comdr Ortega is totally dissociated from the truth, when this repression
and these acts of the government have been committed because of the political
and ideological stability of the civic opposition, organized in CDN.
As for Comdr Ortega's remark concerning Compulsory Military Service, we wish to
explain that there are notable differences between the SMO of the democratic
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systems and that of totalitarian regimes such as ours, because the latter
use it for the defense of a partisan ideology and for the interests of a
new class (nomenklatura).
Evidence of this is the fact that all the military organizations have been
christened "Sandinist" by Decree No 67 (Sandinist Army, Sandinist Air Force,
Sandinist Police, Sandinist People's Militias, etc.); does not serve the interests of the entire nation, butpis,~irather, the exclusive
property of the party, FSLN. Moreover, this service is used to indoctrinate
the youth in the political standards of Marxism-Leninism.
The implementation of this decree on SMO was condemned at the time by CDN,
because it considered this a sacrifice of young blood, instead of using the
regular army, despite the massive nature of the latter.
CDN asks Comdr Ortega: What brought about the counterrevolution?
It is well known that, at the outset, all sectors of national life decidedly
supported the replacement of. the Somoza dictatorship, with the resultant
backing for the Sandinist revolution of a nationalist type, for the establish-
ment of an authentic democratic government, not a people's democracy, which is
nothing but a Marxist-Leninist system in disguise.
The myth of the Somoza National Guard as a belligerent force in the counterre-
volution, preached by the present government, is unreal, for the following
reasons:
a. Somoza had a regular army of approximately 15,000 guardsmen and paramilitary
during the final phase of his government.
b. Of that number, according to official statistics from government spokesmen,
about 4,500 soldiers in the insurrectional guard force died, between 4,000 and
4,500 are in prison, and 3,000 or more are scattered abroad. This makes a
total balance of approximately 12,500 National Guardsmen,.with a balance of
2,500 left who"could have actively joined the counterrevolution.
Furthermore, based on official government information, nearly 5,000 guardsmen
have been killed in the current war. Nevertheless, according to official
spokesmen, mention is made of the presence of 20,000 armed men, with a tendency
to increase to 30,000 forces, based on the remarks by the commander himself.
So, we ask: What is the origin of those up in arms against the Sandinist
regime?
Could they be merely national guardsmen who have already died, or could they
be Nicaraguans who did not and do not accept the Marxist-Leninist regime in
their country?
In the view of CDN, they are Nicaraguans who, having been denied the right to
fight patriotically, in an effective manner, within the national territory,
have chosen armed struggle as the only means for establishing an authentic
democracy.
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Could the Nicaraguan people approve of this sacrifice to which the present
regime is subjecting them? We think not. To prove our assertion, we demand
that the Front government call for a national referendum to be supervised by
institutions dissociated from the conflict, which might be the Contadora
Group and the supporting countries: Brazil, Argentina, Peru and Uruguay.
Comdr Ortega speaks of nationalism,and Marxism-Leninism, whose doctrine he
professes, does not recognize nationalism. He speaks of a mixed economy,
and Marxism-Leninism, by its very nature, recognizes only the planned economy
(state capitalism).
In the view of Comdr Ortega, any individual or institution that does not
subject its thinking to Marxist standards is a diversionist or counterrevo-
lutionary. Moreover, how could a genuine mixed economy be developed in
Nicaragua when the government itself is responsible for causing the loss of
its credibility owing to the constant confiscations that it makes and the.
pressure that it brings to bear on the private sector? Similarly, when Mr
Ortega aludes to leaders of the private sector, describing them as not
followers of the revolution and "dangerous," it is because they have persistent-
ly demanded the fulfillment of the original government program endorsed by
the Andean Group and the OAS (consultation organ) at the 17th Assembly of that
organization, the fulfillment and continuity of which CDN demands.
The commander indicates that the real democracies cannot solve the people's
socioeconomic problems.
It is obvious that, up until the present, it has been difficult to find perfect
socioeconomic systems that can solve all problems; but, within the historical
context, Marxism has been the least capable of solving these problems, with the
aggravating factor of the loss of the inalienable rights of humans, such as
their freedom. Examples of this are: Poland, Cuba, China, Ethiopia and all the
countries of a Marxist-Leninist type.
He criticizes the American "gorilla" type regimes of Chile, Paraguay and
Argentina (during the time of the military), etc., where the denial of funda-
mental human rights has been obvious, but he forgets to include among them the
Cuban totalitarian regime which, with 26 years of dictatorship, has become the
biggest "gorilla" in America.
Comdr Ortega attributes the revolution's victory to the ideological features
of the FSLN. Nothing could be more untrue. The victory was due to the parti-
cipation of all Nicaraguan sectors, guided by a democratic platform, but we
were despicably deceived; to the massive aid from international solidarity,
both military, and economic.; and to the international pressure; and, finally,
to the dissatisfaction toward Somoza's dynastic regime. Those countries which
offered us all their assistance, such as Venezuela, Panama, Costa Rica, other
Andean Group countries and even the United States, are now considered bourgeois-
reactionary governments by the FSLN.
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regaru to the Central American problem mentioned by Comdr Ortega, it has
existed, but it has become worse with the advent of Sandinism. In the
r_:z~t, the ;problems were social and economic, but now they have been aggravated
'.~y the political problems, and by the war, a result of the dissatisfaction of
ica:aguan's who do not accept the Marxist-Leninist system of government.
srtherm~re, he claims that this crisis has become exacerbated by an oppressive
fcreisn debt. In this connection, we observe that, during the 6 years of
government, the foreign debt has risen from $1.6 million to $4.9
::J Ilion, according to official statistics; and the effects of this new debt
not been translated into an increase in production, or of exports, or a
s-~bstitution of imports. Hence, we suspect that these funds are being channeled
for unproductive activities which, consequently, have heightened the national
crisis.
He also maintains that, to resolve this crisis, it will be necessary to resolve
the violence first; yet up until now the FSLN has not sought the real solution
to that problem, such as national dialogue among all Nicaraguans, which CDN
has proposed on constant, repeated occasions.
Comdr Ortega repeatedly stresses the continuation of the dialogue with the
United States, overlooking the fact that the responsibility of any good govern-
ment is primarily to consult with its own people. To date, we do not know what
the Sandinists have discussed in Manzanillo.
CDN insists upon a genuine referendum supervised by qualified democratic indivi-
duals or institutions, in which the Christian people of Nicaragua can say
whether they want a Marxist-Leninist government such as the one that the FSLN
wants to impose upon us.
We insist that this consultation be genuine, not like the previous ones; for
example, the consultation regarding education, in which the FSLN's decisions
prevailed, because of an alleged majority or majority support, the proof of
which has never been shown.
l'e hope that the government censorship will not prevent the publication and
dissemination of this document.
Otherwise, it will be proven once again that we Nicaraguans are still being
denied the right and opportunity to express opinions concerning our rights.
Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinating Body (CDN)
Dr Eduardo Rivas G., Chairman
Dr Jorge Ramirez A., Executive Secretary
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REPERCUSSIONS OF CURRENT PAPEh SHORTAGE CITED
Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to -press 15 Oct 85
[Article: "Paper Shortage in Printing Establishments")
[Text] Over half of the country's printing establishments have come to a stand-
still, because there is no paper of any kind. Therefore, Christmas greeting
cards will be conspicuous for their absence again this Christmas.
During a tour made by one of our reporters, he found that the only printing
establishment that still had paper was the "Union" press, located in the Alta-
gracia District. Others are operating with "scrap" paper.
The shortage is evident at the Central American University (UCA) printing shop,
where books, notebooks, memo pads, etc. for students are printed; it is at a
standstill, waiting to be supplied by the government. Otherwise, the univer-
sity students will have their studies upset.
The National Press had pledged that it would prepare the ENABUS [National Bus
Enterprise] mass transport tickets, but in view of the paper shortage, the
transportation enterprise has had to discontinue the ticket system on its
buses.
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FLOUR QUOTAS FOR HOTELS, BAKERIES REDUCED
Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 15 Oct 85
[Article: "Flour Shortage"]
[Text] As of 12 October, MICOIN [Ministry of Domestic Trade] ordered the selling
of only 50 percent of the flour quota to first-class hotels. For bakeries, the
sale of 10 quintales for every business transaction was assigned.
This announcement was made at AGROSA, a private sector institution which devotes
part of its industrial activities to the milling of wheat, to convert it into
flour to be sold to the public.
According to the source, after the aforementioned date, hotels such as the
Camino Real, Intercontinental, Las Mercedes and Estrella will be provided with
only 50 quintales apiece.
As everyone knows, AGROSA periodically purchases wheat from the government, at
a price imposed upon it depending on the circumstances. It appears that the
donations which have arrived have not sufficed to meet the country's domestic
consumption requirements. An AGROSA worker commented: "The most disturbing
thing is that, to date, no one has announced another donation of wheat."
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PSD'S RIVAS COMMENTS ON 1984 ELECTIONS
Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 15 Oct 85
[Article: "Febres Cordero Told the Truth"]
[Text] Dr Luis Rivas Leiva, secretary general of the Social Democratic Party
[PSD], claimed that what the Ecuadorean president, Leon Febres Cordero, said
about the elections held in Nicaragua during 1984 is a fact that the Sandinist
Front cannot conceal.
The elections were carried out under unequal conditions. The Sandinist Front
had all the state's resources at its disposal to use as it wished, as well as
all the freedom that it wanted, and it denied the parties of the Nicaraguan
Democratic Coordinating Body participation in those elections.
Rivas Leiva added that the recollection of the Sandinist "turbas" [pro-Sandinist
demonstrators] is still clearly in mind, attacking the demonstrators in Mata-
galpa, Chinandega, Leon and Masaya. There are the photographs of all the
smashed vehicles and, in addition, the press censorship of the political acti-
vities of the Democratic Coordinating Body, before it announced that it would
not run in those unsuitably named elections.
He asked: "Why is the Sandinist Front annoyed with President Febres Cordero
for stating a fact which culminated on 4 November 1984?"
The Social Democratic leader explained that the Sandinist Front only likes to
hear praise and support. When anyone criticizes it, it sets forth like a
wild creature. That is typical of this regime, and the ones suffering most
have been the civic forces striving for a political solution in Nicaragua.
"Febres Cordero stated a fact that we have been repeating for some time: there
should be egalitarian, democratic, free elections in Nicaragua." Dr Rivas
Leiva concluded by remarking: "There must be a national dialogue so as to
be able to lay the groundwork for an authentic democracy, if we want to achieve
peace."
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LABOR MINISTRY DECLARES SLAUGHTERHOUSE STRIKE ILLEGAL
Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 15 Oct 85
[Article: "Slaughterhouse Strike Declared Illegal")
[Text] Chinandega--A strike carried out by the slaughterhouses-in this town has
been declared illegal by the Ministry of Labor.
A meeting took place at the work center, in which delegates from the Slaughter-
house Union, the coordinator of the municipal junta, representatives from the
Ministry of Labor and delegates from the CAUS [Central Organization of Trade
Union Action and Unity], with which the union is affiliated, participated.
The slaughterhouses had been demanding the expulsion of the current administra-
tor of the Slaughter Control Office, Fabio Catin Romero, claiming that he had
falsely accused certain union members of stealing meat.
They had previously held talks with the coordinator of the municipal junta,
Nicolas Santos, but no progress was made, and the problem became worse, until
the stoppage of activities was ordered last Saturday, 5 October; and since
then the citizens of Chinandega have been without that basic food.
The eight members of the Cattle Suppliers Cooperative, who have complete control
over meat-cutting, for their part, refused to intervene directly in the conflict,
and left it to the authorities to resolve.-
The members of the aforementioned cooperative are: Eloy Reyes, the brothers
Cesar and Augusto Davila, Maximiliano Huete, Enrique Manzanares, Eduardo Molina,
Rolando Soto and Carlos Cardenas.
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PSC NATIONAL HEAD ON BREAK WITH ECUADOR
Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 15 Oct 85
[Article: "Ramirez Comments on Break With Ecuador"]
[Text] The national president of the Social Christian Party [PSC], Erick
Ramirez, declared: "The Sandinist Front which, in the past, sought continental
support in order to assume power in Nicaragua, must now respond to the historic
demand from the free countries of Latin America ., by establishing a really
democratic regime in Nicaragua."
LA PRENSA: Mr Ramirez, we ask you as a politician what your opinion is of the
position adopted by the president of Ecuador, Leon Febres Cordero, during the
past few hours, regarding the Central American political crisis.
Ramirez: The overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship was due in part to the resolu-
tion of the OAS' 17th Consultative Meeting, at which the FSLN itself pledged
that it would establish a regime based on the most complete democratic liber-
ties and on respect for human rights.
Ramirez continued: "This proposition had the support of all the countries of
Latin America, particularly the Andean Group, of which Ecuador is a member.
"The crisis in Nicaragua has its basic origin in the absence of a truly demo-
cratic regime. The elections of November 1984 did not have the participation
of democratic opposition sectors, because that electoral process took place
under conditions adverse to internal democracy and without suitable public
guarantees."
Ramirez went on to say: "This situation has brought us to the brink of wide-
spread war, with the implication of serious, unfortunate consequences for all
of Central America, which would be the result of violent action.
"The concern of the Latin American countries over the course of events in
Nicaragua reflects an interest in having legitimate democracy prevail in our
countries, instead of regimes based on force, of any ideological type."
He added: "The FSLN which, in the past, sought continental support in order to
assume power in Nicaragua, must now respond to the historic demand from the
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free countries of Latin America, by establishing a really democratic system in
Nicaragua."
Ramirez continued: "A break in diplomatic relations by any Latin American coun-
try that would isolate the Sandinist regime could also cause the isolation of
us democratic sectors within the country that are engaged in political action.
We consider it more suitable to devise a different type of diplomatic pressure
that would lead toward democracy and not toward the breaking of relations, or
a total break with the regime; because that might also bring about the consoli-
dation of the Sandinist political and ideological system, just as occurred in
Cuba during 1960."
Ramirez said: "I hope that, with this situation posed, the good will of the
countries backing the Contadora Group and the Support Group, consisting of
Argentina, Peru, Brazil and Uruguay, will prevail, aimed at a search for an
internal dialogue in the Central American countries that will ensure the
effectiveness of political pluralism and the existence of democratic political
regimes resulting from free, honest, secret elections."
We asked Ramirez: "FSLN has said that, if an invasion occurs in Nicaragua, the
war would be transferred to all of Central America, and the shooting would
even reach the Latin American countries, because it would be an attempt to
oust the Sandinist regime by force, with American aid. What is your opinion?"
He replied: "FSLN typically reacts like a regime based on force, which wants
to impose its views through violence, rather than through reason and good
judgment. We cannot support nor agree with that type of pressure; nor do we
back this theory, because it would only lead Nicaragua to greater sacrifices
and more bloodshed."
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PSD LEADER DISCUSSES NEED FOR PEACE
Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 15 Oct 85
[Article: "PSD Leader Encourages Internal Search for Peace"]
[Text] Engineer Adan Morales, PSD's [Social Democratic Party) secretary for
international relations, declared that asking the Contadora Group for its
good offices in requesting a kind of truce from the United States Government
does not mean attempting to acknowledge that this hostile attitude toward
Nicaragua is precisely a result of the antagonism produced by the contradic-
tory positions maintained by the Sandinists.
Peace in the Central American region must be a result of the efforts of each
government in the area, and not of the specific impulses of some governments
in particular.
The subject of the interview explained: "As I said previously, requesting that
the Contadora Group engage in such action is out of context, because we are
the ones who must foster the sincere search for that peace which has been so
long desired.
"In particular, we also wish to note that, before seeking peace in the region,
all of us Nicaraguans should engage in creating the necessary conditions for
finding our own internal peace, which will undeniably serve as a driving force
to give an impetus to that regional peace, to a large extent."
Engineer Morales Hernandez claims: "The conflicts that exist in Central America
have not been created,artificially, nor could they have been, because Nicaragua's
politics and living experience are different from those of the other countries
of the Central American Isthmus.
"These arguments which we are putting forth now have been strengthened when,
unfortunately, the Defense Ministry, in discussing a supposed American invasion,
says that, if Nicaragua is invaded, they will take the battle to all of Central
America.
"These statements undoubtedly alarmed the other governments even more, because
they were made by a minister of the Nicaraguan Government, also reflecting a
premise that does not correspond accurately to the Central American reality."
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CGT(i) SENDS DELEGATION TO NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 15 Oct 85
[Article: "They Insist on Demanding the Entire Christmas Bonus"]
[Text) A delegation consisting of 20 of the top-ranking leaders of the General
Confederation of Labor (independent) [CGT(i)] showed up in the National Assembly
this morning.
Part of that delegation was not able to enter the debating chamber where a work-
ing commission was to make known the decision regarding the payment of the
Christmas bonus to employees and workers throughout the country.
Meanwhile, at the CGT(i) headquarters, Alejandro Solorzano, surrounded by his
colleagues, continued his voluntary fast to express his "peaceful resistance"
to the measure to reduce the bonus.
Alejandro Solorzano said that he would continue that "fast," while receiving
messages of solidarity and support from workers, laborers and union members.
When reporters from LA PRENSA were holding a dialogue with the CGT workers and
leaders, the Socialist congressman, Domingo Sanchez Salgado, arrived, stating
that this was a clearcut position on behalf of the workers as a whole.
Later, another leader told the LA PRENSA reporter that a group of CGT(i) leaders
was planning to remain in front of the Assembly building, thereby demonstrating
the solidarity and backing for the proposition calling for complete, 100 percent
payment of the bonus, to all workers and employees of an administrative,
technical nature, etc.
Alejandor Solorzano had no comment on what certain news media had published,
supposedly expressed by leaders of labor unions such as CST [Sandinist Central
Organization of Workers], and ATC [Association of Agricultural Workers], and
Sandinist leaders.
Nevertheless, he denied that his position of fasting was a "demagogic, opportu-
nistic" demonstration, as a pro-Sandinist newspaper described it this morning.
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Sanc he.: Salgado claimed that, in the past, there had been a "Pancho Argenau
Papi" in the Chamber of Deputies, and that now there was another similar
one.
Hc: remarked: "In the past, there was a newspaper called NOVEDADES; now there
is another paper using the same technique, like calling the workers oppor-
tunists and demagogues."
The workers from different labor confederations started sending messages of
support to Alejandro Solorzano, to the CGT(i) and to the leaders who are
engaged in an effort to demand acknowledgment, this year, for payment of the
bonus, in its entirety, to all workers.
They also expressed great dissatisfaction with the statements made by a
minister of state, who claimed that it was very difficult to provide exact
statistics on the unemployment fund; "like someone saying that there is no
control there," commented one leader.
The workers also pointed out that the work on the Luis Alfonso Velazquez park
had been done with donations from Sweden; the Bolivar freeway, with donations
from Venezuela; many projects, such as the Tiscapa one, had donations from
France, and so on. Therefore, certain projects and communal works, as well
as infrastructural projects have been depicted in a confused manner, as if
they were constructed with the unemployment fund. The fact is that many
construction projects carried out since the victory have been based on dona-
Lion:s from countries friendly toward this revolution and this people, the
workers claimed.
Furthermore, it was established that at the end of each year, the ministers
are to be given $500, plus a Christmas basket containing wines, fine liquors,
canned goods and delicacies of an expensive type. They are also given very
expensive gifts, just because they are ministers or high-ranking officials;
but the workers are denied what they have gained through struggles and sacri-
fices. Another worker commented: "Demagoguery means taking away from the
workers what they have gained through sacrifice."
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CUBANS ACCUSED OF DISRUPTIVE BEHAVIOR
Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 16 Oct 85
[Article: "What Is To Be Done In Such Instances?"]
[Text] Chinandega--Neighbors of a residence occupied by Cubans cannot find
anyone to whom they can resort to have the latter's attention called to their
constant disturbances.
Th ere'is the residence that belonged to Dr Domingo Tuckler Martinez, located in
the Guadalupe district, which is currently being used to house a large number
of Cubans.
The neighbors note that, late last Thursday night, the aforementioned persons
arrived banging at the doors and causing a terrific disturbance.
Furthermore, another house which was owned by Mr Leonidas Zamora has also
been converted into a dwelling for Cuban physicians, who are similarly
committing abuses.
At about 2300 hours on Friday night, several of these doctors were driving
about on the town's streets in a red Toyota, with license plates IICC104, at
high speed, jeopardizing the few passers-by who venture out on the streets
at night.
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UNNAMED COMMANDANTE REBUKED IN OBANDO HOMILY
Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 16 Oct 85
[Article: "Cardinal Makes Comments..."]
[Text) "All the atrocities being committed in Nicaragua" were complained about
today by Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo in his homily at the Purity of Mary
School which is celebrating the veneration of the Virgin today.
After declaring that the hearts of some people have changed, the archbishop,
who was being pursued by several dozen foreign journalists, said that he was
shocked at the presumptuousness that an individual (who was not identified),
whom he accompanied on a plane traveling to Cuba, has today.
He remarked: "At that time, he told me that he could not explain why he had a
machine gun covering his legs, and yet today I see him filled with presumptu-
ousness."
This morning, the cardinal was received by the entire community at the Purity
of Mary School, where Alicia Tijerino, a fifth year student, told him: "This
day of your arrival is a cherished day for the entire school."
The homily given by the religious figure was concentrated on the maturity of
"the purity of the Virgin Mary, from whose heart only goodness and love
emerged."
Obando recommended to the school girls that they keep the Virgin Mary in their
hearts and on their lips, "so that we may be builders of a fraternal city."
After noting that it must be painful for some Nicaraguans to sing the verses of
the national anthem, which speak of "the voice of the cannon no longer roaring"
(while waging war), he said that he feared that, in the future, Nicaragua
would be a country of old people, "because all the youth are dying in the war."
The cardinal also cautioned the young girls not to drink from the contaminated
waters which are the ones causing hatred in hearts.
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BAR ASSOCIATION, LAWYERS' PROBLEMS DISCUSSED
Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 16 Oct 85
[Article: "Nicaraguan Lawyers Bar Association Organized"]
[Text] Dr Francisco Jose Aguado, also a delegate from Managua, stated that, with
the Nicaraguan Lawyers Bar Association completely organized in all departments,
steps would be taken to establish an office to receive complaints or reports
of human rights violations; and that, in addition, a free people's law office
would be set up for individuals of small means.
Lawyers: Our Profession Is Civilization
[Question] Is it true that many lawyers have given up the practice of their
profession?
[Answer] Yes, it is true. A large proportion of laywyers, the number of whom
we could not state exactly (but it exceeds 50 percent) have withdrawn from
practicing the profession. There are several reasons: scarcity of work, in
some instances and, in others, the risk represented by practicing the profes-
sion, etc.
[Question] Doctor,which area of the profession has the most difficulties for
its practice?
[Answer] The criminal field. During the tour that we made all over the repub-
lic, we always heard, in an identical manner, the same complaints and indigna-
tion from lawyers engaged in criminal law practice. For example, there is fear,
if not panic, over visiting the police centers. There, lawyers are treated as
dangerous enemies.
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MANAGUA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ON BUSINESS SITUATION
Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 16 Oct 85
[Article: "Commerce Requests More Facilities"]
[Text] The status of business is becoming more unstable and less competitive
every day, with high costs for operations and difficult conditions for imports,
provisions and stocks.
The foregoing is inferred from a fragmentary report supplied by an official
from the Managua Chamber of Commerce, Mr Manuel Bermudez, who noted that, at
the present time, goods can only be imported through a priority list, and that
the recreational lines, such as toys, bicycles, tricycles, dolls, etc., are
impossible to import.
Moreover, Mr Bermudez said that it is a fact that about 200 businessmen affili-
ated with the Chamber are being provided with $1,000 per month in the so-called
money exchange office; but that this sum now requires an investment of 720,000
cordobas, and keeping them bogged down in losses for the investors. Hence,
the goods which reach the trade are purchased at very high costs, because they
are supplied by dealers who have large expenses for hotels, travel fares, etc.
The representative of the Chamber of Commerce remarked: "Direct importing with
dollars purchased with one's own funds through the money exchange office, even
at 730 cordobas apiece, would be one solution for providing items for business;
but that is subject to a list that must be authorized by the Ministry of
Domestic Trade."
Stressing the conditions in Managua's business establishments, the promotions,
the offers for this coming Christmas and the possibility of purchasing products
for Christmas Eve and New Year's, the subject of the interview said that all
that was now impossible. The promotions could not be made, the goods acquired
inside the country are also very limited and most of the products, such as
shoes, clothing, luxury garments and beauty items are being channeled by the
state, and the stocks that business can handle are but few, commented Mr
Manuel Bermudez in conclusion.
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CUS LEADERS CRITICIZE NEWSPAPER CONFISCATION
Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 16 Oct 85
[Article: "Leaders Condemn Seizure of COPROSA"]
[Text] Both union and political leaders condemned the military occupation of
the offices of COPROSA on Tuesday by State Security, which has confirmed the
existence of persecution directed at the Catholic Church.
This military action will blur the image of Nicaragua in the international area,
and will nullify the Sandinist Front's statement before the National Assembly
claiming that religious freedom and the effectiveness of human rights exist.
"We regret what happened at the COPROSA offices," explained union leader Alvin
Guthrie Rivers, "because it will not aid internal peace; rather it will
make things worse."
This contradicts the Sandinist statement that there is religious freedom and
dissemination of the Catholic faith in Nicaragua.
The Confederation for Trade Union Unity (CUS) has expressed great concern over
this militarist position; because it will give the Nicaraguans abroad reason to
claim that there is no religious freedom.
Dr Luis Rivas Leiva, secretary general of the Social Democratic Party, explained
that the armed action carried out by State Security in the COPROSA offices
proves, of itself, the militarist features of the Sandinist regime.
The confiscation of thousands of copies of the Nicaraguan Bishops Conference
publication, IGLESIA, also shows that there is no freedom of speech or thought
in Nicaragua, and that there is religious persecution.
A preeminently ecclesiastical magazine, which does not deal with political nor
economic issues, does not deserve the persecuting treatment given by the
Sandinist Front.
Azucena Ferrey, head of the Social Christian Party, declared: "The military
occupation of the Catholic COPROSA offices eloquently confirms the truth of
what has been claimed about the persecution of the Catholic Church.
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"Furthermore, it is a flagrant violation of human rights, and a way of intimi-
dating the Nicaraguan people, the majority of whom are Catholic.
"We claim that the constitution is going to be the same as that of Russia,
which calls for all rights and freedoms in the country, but they are not in
effect.
"This position heightens the dissatisfaction of the Nicaraguan Catholic people,
and serves to maintain their unwavering faith in Christ, gathered around his
only true shepherds."
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CCT PROTESTS POLICE ACTION AGAINST COPROSA
Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 16 Oct 85
[Article:"Protest Over the Raid on the Curia's Publishing Establishment"]
[Text] San Jose, Costa Rica
Commandante Daniel Ortega Saavedra,
President of Nicaragua
Managua, Nicaragua
The Central American Workers Confederation (CCT), informed of the raid which
the Sandinist police carried out against the publishing establishment of the
Catholic Church of Nicaragua, conveys its most forceful protest. This act is
reprehensible in the eyes of the entire world because, by its nature, it is
an attack against the Christian principles of informational activity as well
as against the genuine freedom of speech which has been violated in the rights
which the Nicaraguan Catholic agencies have.
Alcimiro Herrera Torres
Secretary General
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rull UFl lt1/1L VOr, JILT
J-PRS-LAP-85-001-L
30 October 1985
SPECIAL 'TRANSLATION
CENSORED ARTICLES
FROM
MANAGUA LA PRENSA
I"R15 FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign
newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency
transmissions and broadcasts. Materials' from foreign-language
sources are translated; those from English-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
other characteristics retained.
Headlines, editorial reports, and materiAl enclosed in brackets
() are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text)
or (Excerpt) in the first line of each item, or following the
last line of a brief, indicate how the original information'was
processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor-
mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
item originate with the source. Times within items are as
given by source.
The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
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NOTICE
This special translation, "Censored Articles
From klanagua LA RRENSA," is a new FBIS report.
It is being distributed to all U.S. Government
consumers of the FBIS Latin America DAILY REPORT.
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ARCHDIOCESE FORMS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 13 Oct 85 p 1
[Article: "The Church Now Has Its Human Rights Commission"]
[Text] The Peace and Justice Commission directed by the Archdiocese of Managua
is being formed and will be officially announced soon by Cardinal Miguel Obando y
Bravo, it was learned from religious sources.
This commission would consist of several departments, among them the Legal
Department, which will be headed by Dr Martha Patricia Baltodano, former
coordinator of the CPDH [Human Rights Commission]. It was said that this
commission would be something like the "Legal Aid" of El Salvador, which is
under the direction of the Archbishopric of that country.
The offices of the Peace and Justice Commission are operating in the installations
of the Archbishop's Curia in Las Sierritas, Managua.
They will handle cases of human rights violations as well as violations that
persons and organizations commit against justice and peace.
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ANOTHER ISSUE OF CHURCH BULLETIN APPEARS
Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 13 Oct 85
[Article: "Church Newspaper IGLESIA Appears"]
[Text] The church bulletin IGLESIA, published by the Archdiocese of Managua,
appeared in public today and is being distributed in all the parishes of
Managua and other cities.
According to its publishers, the legal-size bulletin will have a biweekly
circulation and in its eight pages will carry ecclesiastic information.
Information provided in the Archbishop's Curia states that the initial edition
of this religious bulletin was 15,000 copies and that it could be increased
depending on the demand for it.
We learned that for the first edition of the newspaper IGLESIA its cost will
be a voluntary contribution; subsequent issues will cost 20 cordobas.
The official organ of the archdiocese, we were told, will not only be at the
service of the Curia but also of the other dioceses of the country.
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CHURCH BULLETIN CONFISCATED BY POLICE
Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 14 Oct 85
[Article: "Religious Persecution Continues, MINT Police Confiscate Catholic
Bulletin"]
[Text] The first edition of the Catholic bulletin IGLESIA, which began circulat-
ing throughout all the parishes of the archdiocese on the 12th of this month,
was confiscated on the afternoon of that same day by some 10 armed policemen
of the Ministry of Interior who arrived at the printshop of the Curia.
The foregoing was confirmed this morning to LA PRENSA by Cardinal Miguel
Obando y Bravo, archbishop of Managua, who also said that the total number of
8-page copies confiscated by the military was 10,000.
Asked his opinion or comments on the seizure of the religious newspaper, he
answered: "I want to have more information before speaking on the subject;
I would like to first have a contact with Monsignor Carballo, who at this time,
I understand, is meeting with the police authorities who seized the bulletin
IGLESIA last Saturday, through several policemen who surrounded the printshop
where it was published."
Prior to these statements by the archbishop, the vicar for the media and
director-editor of IGLESIA, informed this evening paper via telephone that
the Directorate of the Media of the Ministry of Interior, employing 10 police-
men, had last Saturday confiscated 10,000 copies of the Catholic bulletin,
which was the entire run published that day.
He added that in addition to the newspapers, they also took the plates and
negatives used to print IGLESIA.
All this happened, he explained, while he and other priests and helpers were
in the archdiocese print shop of the archdiocese shipping deliveries to the
various parishes of the capital.
At that time, he added, a driver of RADIO CATOLICA, Fracisco Aleman, who had
some copies of IGLESIA with him for distribution, was arrested by the police
and hours later released.
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According to Monsignor Carballo, the police used force to make the RADIO CATOLICA
driver to recover the newspapers which on that same Saturday afternoon he had
already distributed in some churches.
Monsignor Carballo also reported that under pressure by the Directorate of the
Media IGLESIA was formally registered Saturday morning with that office as a
prerequisite for being allowed to publish it, but that they subsequently
responded with the confiscation of the 10,000 copies which on Sunday were to be
distributed gratis among the faithful of the archdiocese of Managua.
He added that he had been called to appear this morning before Capt Charlotte
Baltodano, one of those responsible in the Ministry of Interior for applying
press censorship.
This is the first time that something like this has happened to the Nicaraguan
Church, since on previous occasions when the Curia had published other
registered bulletins they had never been censored nor much less confiscated
or seized.
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INDEPENDENT LIBERAL PARTY MEETS IN ESTELI
Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 14 Oct 85
[Article: "Godoy Calls for National Unity"]
[Text] Overcoming the fear existing among the people of La Trinidad, Department
of Esteli, the Independent Liberal Party [PLI] held a great municipal assembly
in that city, which last 1 August was the scene of large-scale warlike incidents,
which according to official figures caused a total of more than 100 casualties.
Members of the national leadership arrived early on the morning of Sunday,
13 October, headed by Dr Virgilio Godoy Reyes, who made a dramatic and patriotic
appeal once more for national unity as a step prior to a dialogue among all
Nicaraguans. He said: "We must stop this fratricidal war, it is definite that
we must resolve the underlying problems that assail us. Indeed, the present is
black but if we do not do something to try to change this tragic and gloomy
picture, the future will be gray.
"A worthy and self-sacrificing effort is necessary, which has already been done
generously by democratic groups and forces supported by all the people in 1978
and beginning of 1979, and which culminated with the government program written
in San Jose 6 years ago," said national leader Dr Godoy Reyes. He added:
"Unfortunately, from that time until now, the political parties have been
cornered in an attempt to make them disappear, threatened with the loss of the
legal status they had won because of their refusal to submit, retreat or
officially collaborate or coexist."
Throughout the interesting political speech by the esteemed and well-known
president of the PLI, among other things, he said: "No one is personally
safe today, and much less of the future of his house, property, companies,
and so forth. We no longer produce what we eat. Nicaragua had never in
its history purchased basic grains; the cordoba of 6 years ago is now worth
100 times less. Every child, before it is born, has a minimum debt of a
million cordobas. We have a foreign debt which exceeds $5 billion and in
order to bring our priority requirements up to date, there is a negative
balance of $1.2 billion." In conclusion, national leader Dr Godoy said:
"Because of a lack of foresight or technical capability the only two projects
of domestic economic salvation implemented left us with astronomical losses.
The new Victoria de Julio mill produces sugar at 30 centavos per pound and
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exports it at 4 centavos. The Chiltepe Project will process milk at a cost
of more than 1,000 cordobas per liter."
If we are'honest, we must admit that the cause of all this is noncompliance
with the promise made in San Jose. Nations, like individuals, should honor
their signatures, commented the members of the August meeting.
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STRIKE AT CHILTEPE MILK PROCESSING PLANT
Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 14 Oct 85
[Article: "Union Incident at 'Chiltepe Project"']
[Text] Labor officials were faced with serious problems when they had to avert
a strike decreed by more than 100 workers who work at the Chiltepe Milk Project
in the people's property area. They demanded wage [increases) and a number of
economic incentives, at the same time protesting the increase in the cost of
living.
The workers stopped working for more than 24 hours, while the harried officials
of the Departmental Inspectors Office and administrators of the complex made
great efforts to halt the strike by means of negotiations between the parties.
The members of the union leadership of the milk project showed the labor officials
that the wages now being received are not even enough to cover the most pressing
needs, indicating that each worker has to support no fewer than four people
including his wife.
During negotiations the workers spoke determinedly, saying that if their demands
were not met they would extend the strike indefinitely.
It was perhaps the determined attitude of the workers and union leadership which
led to the signing of several agreements between the administrators of the
project and labor officials, after which the workers halted their strike and
returned to their work.
According to reports, the administrators of the milk project promised to raise
the percentages of wages, not to take any reprisals against the strikes, and to
revise the incentives gradually until they are finally satisfied.
Labor officials, according to union sources, are now supervising the agreements
signed, and normalcy has returned to the complex after the 120 workers, who
decided to call the strike to make management acknowledge their grievances in
matters of wages and incentives, returned to work, the union leaders said.
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MATERIAL SHORTAGES CLOSE COFFEE PLANT
Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 14 Oct 85
[Article: "Former Employees of Cafe Presto Have Not Yet Found Other Employment"]
[Text] Economic problems, lack of raw materials, and other factors were the
reasons which forced the administration of the Cafe Presto S.A. Company to
halt its commercial activities and force a hundred workers and employees into
unemployment. Authorities have not yet been able to place them.
Union leaders reported that the company had been feeling that it was on the verge
of bankruptcy for several months, one of the reasons being the lack of a market,
a difficult financial situation, and the lack of essential raw materials.[as
published]
Although the administrators of the company held emergency meetings with govern-
ment officials, particularly with the Ministry of Agricultural-Livestock Develop-
ment and Agrarian Reform and the Central Bank, to seek foreign currency, the
crisis of the company became a reality.
Now labor officials and those of other government bodies are trying to place the
workers who were forced into unemployment.
As a first step, said union leaders, the unemployed have been taken in by the
company Cafe Soluble S.A., for which purpose there was a meeting recently
at an interministerial level, attended by several union bodies and service
sector organizations.
[The following appears as a continuation of the above]
Construction work on the Champas de Tiscapa Project of the Managua mayoralty
were halted several days ago when more than 400 workers decided to halt their
activities in protest at the continuing presence of a treasurer who is not to
the liking of the workers.
When they halted their work, the workers said they would only return to their
work if the treasurer is removed, otherwise they will stay on strike until he
is removed.
The union leaders who provided the information did not reveal the name of
the treasurer but said that he was a person with ties to one of the officials
of the Junta of Reconstruction of Managua.
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The treasurer was accused of many abuses of-which his victims are worker.
:-,
describes as not being "Sandinists." This charge was made by members of
union leadership to labor officials who intervened to avert the strike.
the
The workers halted their activities at 0945 on Friday and the conflict had
not yet been resolved conclusively this week.
Officials of the Departmental Labor Inspector's Office and members of the
administration of the Managua mayoralty, negotiated an agreement whereby
they pledge to study the way in which to remove the treasurer so as to also
avoid efforts at strikes that may in the future halt the work which is now
going on in Tiscapa, said union leaders.
In turn the workers signed another agreement pledging not to act in a hasty
manner and in the future to seek the proper channels for handling any
misunderstanding.
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LABOR LEADER BEGINS HUNGER STRIKE
Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 14 Oct 85
[Article: "Union Leader on Hunger Strike in Demand for 13th Month"]
[Text] "Mine is a civic action in solidarity with the working class," said
Alejandro Solarzano, the union leader of the Independent General Confederation
of Labor (CGT-I), this morning as he began a hunger strike.
"This strike is for the purpose of not harming the revolutionary process, for
not provoking an action of greater harm, for avoiding a strike in institutions
or a massive demonstration by the working class," he added.
"My action seeks to create an awareness because the working class wants to be
paid 100 percent of their 13th month or Christmas bonus," he said.
"A pair of blue denim trousers now costs up to 16,000 cordobas; a worker can
do nothing with the wage of 12,000 cordobas for his 13th month," he said.
While Alejandro Solarzano was making these brief statements at the CGT(I)
offices, other comrades of the construction industry surrounded the union leader,
who with a few but vigorous words reaffirmed his position of support for the
demand of the country's working class, who have asked that the Unemployment Fund
be reformed by the National Assembly.
This debate has been taking place for several months; it has been discussed
and debated among the working class and union leaders of the different worker
organizations and it has been established that there is a unanimity of opinions
despite strategic, political and ideological differences among them.
However, it is the CGT(I) which has demonstrated the greatest strength in this
demand because it contains the large worker mass of the construction industry.
The CGT(I) declares that it has more than 20,000 officially enrolled in its ranks.
Alejandro Solarzano is one of the leaders of the CGT in the National Executive
Council. His long career in the worker struggles goes back to the harshest years
of the Somocist dictatorship. He was the mentor of the great worker strikes for
obtaining better wages in the periods before the earthquake. He fought boldly
together with other leaders such as Carlos Salgado, Domingo Sanchez Salgado and
others for the labor agreements in the construction branch.
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Solarzano also said that last week in the Labor Commission of the Assembly
an attempt was made to make it understood that's ceiling of 12,700 cordobas
should be accepted, which does not satisfy the needs of the workers.
He said that there is a great support by the CONAPRO [National Confederation of
Professional Associations] Heroes y Martires, of Sandinist affiliation, for the
derogation of the Unemployment Fund provision. There are also many sectors
among the National Assembly deputies, particularly professionals, who agree
that this government disposition should be derogated.
He explained that in any case nothing will be known for the next 72 hours,
which is when the final decision on the provision will be made in the Assembly.
"I hope that the resolution will be positive," he added. Alejandro Solarzano
declared that the hunger strike he has imposed on himself has no limit and it
depends on the final resolution of the National Assembly, the commission
appointed for the case and the payment of 100 percent of the 13th month, which
is the demand of the workers.
He explained that in the meetings of the worker central organizations, all have
been in agreement that they request the derogation of the Unemployment Fund Law.
Among them are the CTN [Central Organization of Nicaraguan Workers], CUS [Con-
federation for Trade Union Unity], CAUS [Central Organization of Trade Union
Action and Unity], CGT(I), and independent unions. However, he indicated that
the Worker Front did not understand it and that it was indecisive and vague
toward this demand, and of course there is the CST [Sandinist Central Organiza-
tion of Workers], which has maintained a negative position toward the workers'
petition.
He reaffirmed that his action is civic, spontaneous, personal and in solidarity
with the working class, which is demanding that it be paid 100 percent of its
13th month.
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PERSPECTIVE
In mid-October, the Sandinistas expanded their three-year old state of
emergency, providing a legal framework to tighten controls over opponents who
have become increasingly outspoken. The new restrictions include broadened
press censorship, limits on public assemblies and internal travel, and bans on
political organizing by the opposition parties. The Sandinistas have used the war
to justify the decree, stating that it is aimed solely at counter-revolutionaries.
The pro-regime press has emphasized the rights still in force--primarily those
pertaining to criminal judicial procedures--and has tried to demonstrate that the
restrictions have impacted little on daily life.
the Catholic Church hierarchy's
Increasingly intense attacks on the regime precipitated the decree. Cardinal
Obando had been drawing large crowds during his domestic tour and many of his
This memorandum was prepared by the Central America North and South
Branches, ALA. It was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. It contains
information available as of 3 Novmeber 1985. Questions and comments are
welcome and should be addressed to Chief, Middle America-Caribbean Division,
ALA
12 Nov 85
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masses were only thinly veiled anti-government rallies
A series of other incidents--including the government's decision to
copies were hidden and will get underground distribution
renege on promises not to draft seminarians and threats to expel foreign priests
who supported Obarido--further heightened tensions. Just before Issuing the
decree, the regime confiscated the first issue of a Church-sponsored newsletter,
comprised primarily of anti-government articles, although several thousand
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In the wake of the decree, the Sandinistas occupied the curia offices and
Interior Minister Borge summoned the Cardinal to his office for questioning
about the Church's ties to the opposition political parties. The pro-regime press
also Issued what the US Embassy calls unprecedented attacks on Obando,
accusing him of supporting the insurgency. Despite these attacks, the Church
has continued to criticize regime policies. The Nicaraguan Bishops' Conference
Issued a mildly defiant communique reiterating calls for a national dialogue to
Include the armed insurgents. In addition, the Cardinal defied the government's
requirement that he obtain permission for outdoor masses, and,
his first mass following the decree attracted nearly 6,000
The regime Intensified attacks on civilian opponents as well. The press
reports that the Sandinistas warned two leaders of the Democratic Coordinating
Board, the main opposition coalition, not to publish any protests or analyses of
the government decree. At least one member political party was also warned not
to publish its newsletter. In addition, in late October security officials raided the
offices of an independent labor federation and arrested three union leaders for
worshippers.
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criticizing the emergency decree, according to press reports. The Sandinistas also
continued to harass some private sector leaders.
The Sandinistas' Western supporters expressed chagrin over the emergency
decree, but appear disinclined to criticize the regime harshly. French President
Mitterand, for example, "lamented" the tough measures, but also criticized US
policy in Central America. The Swedes also criticized the restrictions, but
reports no plans for a reduction in Swedish economic
assistance. The Argentines hoped to make a
joint demarche to the Nicaraguans with other members of the Contadora support
group.
The state-of-emergency, in our view, demonstrates the heightened
sensitivity of the regime to internal criticism. While it gives the Sandinistas
broad powers to control internal dissent, we believe they will continue their
policy of selective implementation to avoid charges that they intend to eliminate
the entire opposition. Managua probably calculates that this strategy will also
defuse broad popular resistance to the law and induce key leaders to go into
exile without prompting a damaging mass exit. The Church, as the regime's most
formidible opponent, will remain its primary target, in our view. The Cardinal is
likely to be able to defy some of the restrictions, but the regime has already
used the travel ban to limit attendance at his masses. More vulnerable second
echelon clerical and lay officials could also pay the price for Obando's resistance.
They could be detained and interrogated by the security services or, in the case
of foreign priests, be expelled by the government. The government suspended
the hierarchy's radio broadcasts for two days in late October, and publishing
facilities could also be closed down permanently. The inability to meet and
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publish communiques will further isolate and fragment the political opposition, in
our view. Urban-based opposition political parties and labor unions, for example,
will probably have difficulty continuing only recently renewed organizing efforts
outside the cities.
Western and Latin American countries will probably remain critical of the
state of emergency, but will likely keep their displeasure out of the public eye.
The Sandinistas probably believe they are more vulnerable to internal dissent
than foreign opprobrium and that the criticism will likely have little lasting Impact
on their international standing. Managua probably calculates that its supporters
In the West, while disapproving, will not abandon the regime out of fear that it
would encourage expanded US military pressures against Nicaragua. Further, the
Sandinistas are probably confident that Soviet and Bloc economic assistance
would limit the impact of any cuts in aid by Western democracies. In addition,
there are thus far no Indications that the state of emergency has become an
Issue In the Contadora negotiations.
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SANDINISTA COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN
In recent months, the Sandinista government has stepped up its efforts
to defeat the insurgents in the northwestern border area, and to bottle
them up inside Honduras.
-- Conscription was renewed in August following a four-month
suspension, demonstrating the government's determination to keep
manpower levels high and replace casualties despite domestic
opposition to the draft.
-- Since early October, Sandinista troops have concentrated in the
border area around the Las Vegas salient, where most insurgent
camps are located.
-- Insurgent leaders report that guerrilla units have been allowed to
cross into Honduras unmolested, but the Sandinistas have been
fairly successful in blocking their return to Nicaragua, creating
large concentrations of rebels in the border area which they fear
the Sandinistas will attack.
-- Sandinista forces increased intelligence collection against the
rebel base camps by sending patrols into Honduras on several
occasions in October.
The Sandinistas also are making greater use of militia units in the
northwest, and are attempting to improve their command and control.
-- Militia units have been hardenea by considerable combat experience
over the past two years, and are now such more proficient at
defense of towns and villages, allowing regular counterinsurgency
troops to concentrate on sweeps against guerrillas in the
countryside.
_ Ithe Sandinista General Staff held a
number of meetings in October with northwest region military
representatives In an effort to improve command and control.
Sandinista forces are also intensifying pressure elsewhere to counter
guerrilla attempts to spread the war.
-- A new counterinsurgency battalion inflicted heavy casualties on
insurgents operating in the gold mining region of northern Zelaya
Department
-- Government militia and special forces were also planning operations
on the east coast.
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Cubans appears to be playing a heavy role in the prosecution of the
war.
-- Cubans are piloting MI-25 helicopters, advising counterinsurgency
battalions, and working with signals intercept and radio-direction
finding personnel to improve tactical intelligence.
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ti
W *Vm D C 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
4 October 1985
NICARAGUA: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY STRATEGY
Summary
The Sandinistas' public diplomacy strategy is aimed at discrediting the armed
insurgents, undermining US policy in Central America, and preserving critical political and
economic ties with Latin America and Western Europe. At the same time, it is intended
to defend the regime against charges of human rights abuses, domestic political
repression and economic mismanagement. Using well-focused propaganda themes and a
range of dissemination techniques, the Sandinistas have, in our view, successfully
exploited inherent suspicions of US intentions, despite growing foreign disillusionment
with Managua. Given these successes, we foresee the Sandinistas maintaining their
basic propaganda thrust, but developments in Nicaragua and the region offer the regime
both new opportunities and challenges.
We believe the Sandinistas see the next few months as critical in containing the
rebels and convincing both the US public and the Congress that even with US funding
the guerrillas cannot win or force policy changes in Managua. They therefore have to
(Continued)
This Memorandum was requested by the staff of the National Security Council
Information as of 3 October was used in the preparation of this paper. It was prepared by
Middle America Caribbean Division, Office of African and Latin American Analysis. 25X1
and was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. Questions and comments may be
directed to the Chief, Middle America Caribbean Division, ALA. 25X1
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convince their audiences, therefore, that continued US backing for the insurgents only
prolongs -the devastation of the war and heightens the risk of direct US involvement in
coming months. The Sandinistas undoubtedly will trumpet their new constitution as
democratic progress. They will lobby hard to internationalize the Central American
situation, having achieved some success with the formation of the Contadora support
group in South America. Managua reportedly will use the likely favorable decision from
the International Court of Justice regarding its charges against the United States for
propaganda purposes and to request action by the UN. The Sandinistas next will work to
engage the Europeans more actively, either individually or via the EC. Finally, the new
governments in Costa Rica, Honduras and Guatemala are likely to be subjected to a blitz
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The Sandinistas' public diplomacy effort is a vital tool for achieving key foreign policy
objectives, such as discrediting the armed insurgents, marshalling international pressure on
Washington to change its policies in Central America-, preserving support in Latin America and
Western Europe, and defending the regime against charges of human rights abuses, political
repression, and economic mismnagement. To this end, the Sandinistas have controlled
information at home while developing a sophisticaged apparatus for disseminating propaganda
abroad, including the use of media, leftist solidarity groups, and personal diplomacy.
Recurrent Propaganda Themes
Discrediting the Rebels. The armed insurgency is a priority target for Sandinista
propagandists, who seek to discourage political and material support for the rebels from
non-US sources and to build international pressure on Washington to cut off aid. The regime
portrays the insurgents as US-backed mercenaries with no popular base in Nicaragua and
claims that the largest rebel group--the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN)--is dominated by
members of former President Somoza's hated National Guard. Further, the regime alleges that
the rebels are responsible for over $1 billion in damage to economic targets that has cost
thousands of Nicaraguan jobs and lives, as well as hindered economic development. The
Sandinistas also frequently report that significant numbers of insurgents--nearly 2,000 in the
past two years--have accepted offers of amnesty.
Allegations of human rights abuses against prisoners of war and civilians also has .
been a potent propaganda weapon against the rebels. Government newspapers constantly
report attacks on farming cooperatives and civilian truck convoys, as well as routine
kidnapings of peasants by roving bands of rebels. One I recently
claimed that the insurgents have been responsible for the murders of over 11,000 Nicaraguans
since 1980. Testimony by civilian victims and defectors and occasional photographs of
insurgent executions lend credibility to Sandinista accusations. Such charges constitute a key
argument in the Sandinista case against the United States in the International Court of Justice
(ICJ).
Undercutting the US. The Sandinistas have long viewed Washington as their most
important adversary. In addition to holding the US responsible for human rights violations,
they maintain that Washington seeks a military solution to regional problems. As evidence
they point to:
US aid to the anti-Sandinista insurgents, focusing most recently on the US
Congressional vote in June to provide non-lethal assistance to the rebels. They
accuse President Reagan of "war-mongering" and supporting state terrorism, and
they have chastised Congress for its lack of independence.
The threat of a US invasion. The Sandinistas portray themselves as besieged by
the United States, pointing to the frequent presence of US naval combatants off
both Nicaraguan coasts, joint military maneuvers with Honduras, and military
training for Costa Rican security forces. The Sandinistas also claim that the Foley
Amendment--intended to limit the President's power to insert US combat forces in
Nicaragua--provides the administration with clear "pretexts" for launching an
invasion.
-- Washington's refusal to resume direct negotiations with Managua. The Sandinistas
blame the United States for the impasse in last year's Manzanillo talks and have
repeatedly asked for a resumption of the talks, arguing that Washington s position
underscores its desire for a military solution to regional problems.
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The alleged role of the CIA in the region is another aspect of Sandinista propaganda. In
1983, the regime presented two prisoners it claimed were involved in a CIA plot to
assassinate several high-ranking Sandinista officials. Managua also blamed the CIA for an
assassination attempt against rebel leader Eden Pastora in May 1984, and the "CIA guerrilla
manual" t~ontroversy last fall provided considerable grist for Managua's public diplomacy
effort. In May, the Sandinista press claimed that the CIA was training commandos in Panama
to carry out attacks against embassies throughout Central America in an effort to turn
international opinion against Managua. In mid-July, Sandinista security officials publicized the
"discovery" of the "CIA's Black Eagle Plan," which called for using Indian rebels to carry out
The Sandinistas also blame US policy,. primarily the trade restrictions imposed in early
May, for Nicaragua's chronic economic problems. Calling the embargo an attack on all
Nicaraguans and a violation of international law, the regime charged it was another step
toward military intervention. Seeking to elicit international sympathy, the Minister of Health
proclaimed that the restrictions would deny Nicaraguan children vital medicines, even though
the embargo did not apply to health products. The refusal of the United States to sell badly
needed fertilizers and pesticides has also been blamed for poor crop production this year.
Indeed, President Ortega has accused Washington of using chemical and biological weapons
to bring on the current dengue fever epidemic and a serious cotton blight. The Sandinistas
have cited the necessity of replacing lost US markets and combating Washington's "econo M7
warfare" to justify closer ties with the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc. 25X1
Nicaragua as Democratic Peacemaker. The Sandinistas portray themselves as
committed to political pluralism and a regional peace settlement. Regime leaders point to the
pluralistic character of the draft constitution, participation in open forums with government
officials, the existence of the independent newspaper La Prensa, and their tolerance of illegal
opposition political parties as evidence , of their commitment to democratic government.
Further, they publicize government meetings with Church, business, and political opposition
leaders. The large progovernment vote in the November election and huge
government-sponsored rallies and marches also are cited as evidence of the regime's
popularity. Managua uses the insurgency to justify the three-year-old state of emergency,
which provides the legal basis for press censorship. The Sandinistas also are quick to refute
charges of human rights abuses, claiming that the alle ation are made by malcontents and 25X1
defectors who are paid CIA informants
Nicaragua has tried to appear flexible in the Contadora peace talks, blaming the United
States and other Central American countries for hindering progress. The Sandinistas have
touted their willingness to sign the September 1984 draft treaty--which was highly favorable
to Nicaraguan interests--and in early 1985 announced a unilateral moratorium on the
acquisition of new weapons systems and a decision to send 100 Cuban military advisers back
home as evidence of their desire to reach agreement. Managua claims Washington has used
its influence over Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica to impose unacceptable and
The Sandinista Propaganda Network
Control over the media in Nicaragua, promoting solidarity with leftists abroad, and
foreign leadership travel have been the most effective methods for disseminating Nicaraguan
views, according to a range of reporting. Indeed, Nicaragua has launched a massive
"Nicaragua Must Survive" campaign to intensify efforts in all these areas to bolster
Controlling the Information Flow. Sandinista dominance over the media is vital in
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JL.,..L I
obscuring internal dissent from outside view, giving international coverage to Sandinista
positions, and enabling the government to exploit propaganda opportunities. The regime
owns two of the three newspapers with a nationwide circulation, both television stations, two
powerful radio stations, and a network of smaller ones. The remaining newspaper. La Prensa,
and the few independent radio stations are subjected to prior censorship.
sometimes as much as 60 percent of La Prensa's material is proscribed.
The government also selectively prohibits the rebroadcasts of masses by Cardinal Obando V
Bravo, an outspoken critic of the regime. With such tight control, the regime can control
information project the impression of 'broad popular backing, and carefully orchestrate its
response to US policy initiatives. Dominance over the media also facilitates the government's
frequent disinformation efforts
The Sandinistas gradually have expanded the structures for dissemination of propaganda
abroad. The pro-Sandinista Nicaraguan Journalists Union, for example, is associated with
similar leftist organizations in Latin America and maintains ties with counterparts in the Soviet
Union, Eastern Europe, and Cuba. The New Nicaraguan News Agency--publicly acknowledged
to be progovernment--competes with other wire services in disseminating stories abroad.
The extensive Cuban press service, Prensa Latina, also helps to disseminte pro-Nicaraguan
stories, according to various sources. The official Sandinista newspaper, Barricada, publishes
a monthly international edition in English and Spanish, and a bilingual monthly magazine is
devoted to sensationalist stories, anti-Americanism, and personal attacks on US officials.
Closer to home, the Sandinistas closely monitor the Costa Rican press and have had some
success in placing favorable stories in San Jose periodicals.
Promoting Leftist Solidarity. Managua places particular emphasis on promoting
solidarity committees in foreign countries to spread favorable information about Nicaragua,
develop political and financial support, and mobilize pressure on other governments to
criticize US policies. Solidarity committees in Latin America and Western Europe have
mounted vigils and demonstrations, organized letter writing campaigns, collected clothing and
money for Nicaragua, placed newspaper advertisements, and mobilized contingents of
international volunteers to visit Nicaragua. Last July, Managua hosted delegates from the
various international solidarity committees to discuss strategy, according to press reports. The
Sandinistas also sponsor seminars in Nicaragua and other countries to provide forums to
strengthen ties with leftists Their support for the so-called
"popular church" in Nicaragua also has attracted the support of liberation theologians
throughout the Third World.
Diplomatic Efforts. The Sandinistas have used a range of diplomatic initiatives to
generate international support. They frequently dispatch high-level delegations abroad to
defend Sandinista policies. Vice President Ramirez, for example, toured Western Europe in
June and South America in July to explain the regime's position in the Contadora talks. Also.
in the wake of the US trade sanctions, Sandinista representatives aggressively presented their
case before a range of multilateral organizations, even those only marginally involved in
commercial matters, to gain publicity. Moreover, Managua continues to foster support in the
Nonaligned Movement and has sustained considerable sympathy for its policies in the United
Nations. They also have made propaganda gains from diplomatic protests, -especially in
calling attention to ongoing Honduran and Costa Rican support for the insurgents.
Propaganda Targets
The US Market. In our view, the Sandinistas consider US public opinion the most
important target for their propaganda, and believe they can influence US policy by
manipulating public perceptions. The Nicaraguan Embassy in Washington closely monitors
public and official opinion, and Ambassador Tunnerman--although not always heeded in
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I I
Manaoua--has demonstrated a keen n erstanding of the US political system
Nicaraguan officials are frequent travelers to the
United States and meet with student and other..groups. The regime also is generally
receptive to US journalists and Congressional visitors; indeed such openness becomes a
propaganda theme in itself and is contrasted with US denials of visas to a few high-ranking
Sandinista officials. These visits, according to various sources are carefully ated to
to include model schools, factories, and farm cooperatives.
The Sandinistas appeal to US citizens primarily on moral grounds. Managua constantly
reports alleged atrocities committed by US-backed guerrillas and discredits defectors who
accuse the regime of similar human rights violations. The Sandinistas also compare
Nicaragua to Vietnam, including accusations that the United States is supplying the insurgents
with a defoliant used in Asia. The regime paints the US President as war-crazed,
contemptuous of public opinion, and willing to expend millions of dollars and risk thousands
of American lives in a repeat of the Vietnam War.
Such appeals are
aimed especially at US religious and lay groups. The Nicaraguans,
also assisted members of the US-based Witnesses for Peace
organization to travel last July to combat areas. Moreover, they almost certainly welcome--if
not sponsor--the now weekly demonstration in front of the US Embassy by US citizens
resident in Managua. They also host contingents of private US visitors. Last spring, for
example, Managua hosted a group of US entertainers, who they anticipated would become
In Latin America and Western Europe. In South America, the Sandinistas are
concentrating on leaders of the democratic governments as well as leftist politicans and
clergy. Their goal has been to generate regional solidarity for their position and against US
policy. Managua bases its appeal on traditional Third World themes, including the doctrines
of non-intervention and self-determination. They argue that US involvement in Central
America poses a threat to all of Latin America and that a Sandinista defeat would set a
precedent for future US "aggression" in the region. Regime leaders travel throughout South
America to press these views, actively seeking endorsements from Latin American
legislatures.
In Western Europe, the Sandinistas exploit inherent suspicions of US policy among
government leaders. Their goal is to preserve critical political backing and persuade Western
leaders to pressure Washington to change its policies. The Nicaraguan diplomatic presence is
strong in most countries--in Sweden, for example, there are five resident Nicaraguan
diplomats while the other Central American countries are unrepresented, according to the US
Embassy. Sandinistas hold observer status in the Socialist International and devote
considerable attention to maintaining its support. In an apparent attempt to evoke additional
sympathy, the Sandinistas have likened the allecied at cities of the insurgents to those
committed by the Nazis. F_ 7
Sandinista Propaganda Effectiveness
The Sandinista propaganda machinery, in our view, effectively brings the regime's
message before world public opinion and raises doubts and suspicions about US policy, even
when specific accusations appear unfounded. Repeated charges of an imminent US invasion.
for example, have exploited fears that US involvement in Central America could result in a
repetition of the Vietnam War. The Sandinistas have also been fairly successful in portraying
themselves as victims of US intervention, while successfully deflecting charges of human
rights abuses and political repression. Further, Nicaragua's case in the International Court of
Justice, bolstered by testimony from a rebel defector and other witnesses, has drawn
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considerable attention to Managua's position. Few attempts are made in the international
media to rebut Sandinista allegations or demand proof. Government censorship of the
Nicaraguan media helps propaganda efforts by stifling criticism and averting refutation of
Equally important, Sandinista propaganda has helped to sustain the doubts some
international leaders have about the insurgents and prevented any precipitous drop in
international support for Managua. The Sandinistas probably calculate that popular fears
about another seemingly endless financial and human commitment has served as a constraint
on US policy. In Western Europe the Sandinistas have successfully exploited opposition to US
policies to prevent any substantial policy shifts or reductions in economic aid, despite
growing disillusionment among some leaders with Managua's policies. In South America,
where leaders have fewer illusions about Managua's intentions, the Sandinistas have appealed
successfully to long-standing fears of US military interventi n and concer eftist
backlash at home to discourage any major policy shifts.
What to Expect
Given their effectiveness, we believe the Sandinistas will sustain, and probably intensify,
the basic thrust of their propaganda themes. Moreover, events in Nicaragua and in the region
will offer new opportunities to influence international opinion. Domestically, the Sandinistas
have promised to promulgate their new "democratic" Constitution by the end of the year.
Trips to hold "consultations" on their charter have provided ample opportunities to
demonstrate a commitment to a pluralistic system of government. In our view, the regime
may also stage a carefully controlled plebiscite on the constitution, as well as municipal
Regionally, we believe the Sandinistas will look for propaganda opportunities within the
newly formed Contadora support group--composed of the left-of-center governments of
Argentina, Uruguay, Peru. and Brazil. Managua lobbied hard for the formation of this advisory
group, calculating, in our view, that "Latin Americanizing" the Central American conflict would
help to counter perceived US efforts to thwart the pro-Nicaragua environment of the talks.
The Sandinistas have consulted these countries frequently on the Contadora issue and almost
certainly hope that the support group will back a treaty with less stringent enforcement
provisions than sought by the other Central Americans. At the least, Managua believes the
group will dilute what it regards as increasing US influence over the members of the orginal
We expect the Sandinistas also will look for opportunities to influence the new
governments scheduled to assume office in coming months in Honduras and Costa Rica. In
recent press interviews, high-ranking Sandinista officials have indicated that they intend to
exploit divisions in those countries over the presence of rebels. We expect Managua to
intensify further its clandestine and overt propaganda efforts to pressure the new
We believe the Nicaraguans consider the next few months to be critical not only for
their war against the insurgents but also for their efforts to reverse public and Congressional
opinion. The Sandinistas will continue to focus on the moral dimensions of US policy,
especially rebel human rights violations. The regime probably will focus on proving that the
rebels cannot win--even with US funding--thereby exploiting Congressional concerns about a
long-term commitment to the insurgents.
Moreover, we believe the Sandinistas may try to internationalize further the Nicaraguan
issue in general and the peace talks in particular. The Sandinistas will fully exploit any
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favorable decision in the International Court of Justics, and intend to present it formally in the
UN Security Council. The regime will probably continue to calculate that an expanded number
of players offers the best route to deflect US pressures and achieve an accord based more on
general principles than linked to specific verification procedures and controls. Western
Europe is the most likely target, in our view. Last year the French, for example, mediated
border talks between Nicaragua and Costa Rica, and Paris has consistently backed Managua
against the United States. The Sandinistas may also approach other countries, either
bilaterally or through the EC. They may be tempted to try to move the talks to the more
friendly confines of the United Nations, if they cannot avoid an unfavorable treaty. 25X1
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CONFIDE JT!
Patterns of Sandinista Censorship of La Prensa, November 1984-May
1985
limelight or becomes the focus of intense US interest.
in March 1982 under state of emergency provisions. During the
past year or so, about 90 articles have been censored partially
or entirely each week. On more than 30 occasions since 1982,
censorship has been so heavy that La Prensa has decided not to
publish. More than half occurred during the last 16 months.
The subjects censored and level of censorship vary widely
and seem at times to depend on which censor reviews La Prensa's
submissions. A review of the censorship, however, indicates that
it tends to diminish when the regime comes into the international
The Sandinista regime imposed prior censorship of news media
^nNFInENTIA1
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CONFIDEN..i;, L
Patterns of Sandinista Censorships of La Prensa
Early July through
4 November 1984
8 November through
December 1984
Early January 1985
We January 1985
February through
early March 1985
Mid to late March
through early April
10 April until US
Congressional vote
News media censorship imposed by Sandinista regime.
Censorship eased as regime attempted to demonstrate
elections would be free.
Censorship resumed, reaching pre-July 1984 levels.
Reduced censorship as international figures gather for
Nicaraguan inauguration. Offensive material intentionally
submitted by La Prensa, but was allowed to appear intact.
Censorship again resumed.
Censorship eased, possibly because of congressional debates
on aid and increase in US Congressional visitors.
Intense censorship culminating in La Prensa decision not to
publish on 10 April.
As vote on Contra aid approached, censorship virtually
ended. On 22 and 23 April only one article censored-regime
tolerated heavy criticism of its policies.
CO IFIDEN - - - , . ,
Tip
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PATTERNS OF SANDINISTA CENSORSHIP OF LA PRENSA
1979-1982
Sandinistas establish a pattern of harassment of the sole
opposition newspaper, La Prensa.
-- Sandinistas temporarily close La Prensa five times for
violating the Law on Communications Media, which
prohibits the publication of articles that mock
national symbols, threaten "internal security," or
"infringe on" economic stability. One article that
prompts the regime to shut down the newspaper includes
a joke about FSLN founder Carlos Fonseca, while
another is a hostile interview with a businessman whom
the regime accuses of tax evasion.
Beginning in January 1980, little news can be
published about counterrevolutionary attacks, and the
December 1982 proscription on news about the Atlantic
coast prevents coverage of the forced relocation of
thousands of Miskito Indians.
-- Other regime actions include forced publication of
government communiques, public threats to close the
newspaper unless it changes its editorial policy, and
physical harassment of La Prensa employees.-
March 1982
Prior censorship of all public media is imposed under a
newly declared state of emergency.
-- The press controls--as well as restrictions on
opposition political activities-- are triggered by
insurgent attacks on two bridges in northern
Nicaragua.
-- La Prensa refuses to publish on 24 March because over
s 50 percent of the news stories are cut and the
material is returned too late in the day to permit
publication. Over the next three years, the newspaper
refuses to publish more than 30 times to protest
censorship of up to 90 percent of its front page
news. In some cases, some of the news stories have
already appeared in the Sandinista press.
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13
In May, the Sandinista-dominated legislature debates a
draconian media law, providing for the full
2
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The regime refuses to allow the newspaper to print
blank spaces or poetry in lieu of censored articles,
and the substitutions themselves must be submitted to
the censors, creating additional delays. Making
copies of censored material is technically punishable
by a jail term.
-- The Sandinistas use censorship to limit public
criticism, especially by refusing publication of news
articles and communiques of opposition political
parties. According to Nicaragua's independent human
rights organization, over 8,000 articles, editorials,
wire service reports, and photographs are censored in
whole or in part during 1982 and 1983.
-- The government also arbitrarily censors innocuous
items. The Interior Ministry blocks publication-of a
photograph of an elephant skiing, for example, saying
it is a distraction from the revolutionary process.
September-Qecember 1983
Government censors permit somewhat greater coverage of
selected domestic and international developments, probably
related to Sandinista efforts to engage the opposition in
pre-election planning.
censors articles critical of the FSLN, producing a 20
percent boost in circulation.
deliberately tested the waters by sending to the
The editor of La Prensa
January-July 1984
Heavy censorship resumes in late January, following
provocative La Prensa articles, and the newspaper refuses to
publish three times within an eleven-day span.
The Sandinistas arrest a La Prensa journalist and
stage a press conference in May in which he
"confesses" to contacts with insurgent agents and
implicates a number of opposition leaders and
institutions. He also charges falsely that a US
Embassy official attends weekly editorial
meetings. the
confession was poorly scripted and that a Soviet
diplomat implicity admitted as much.
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officials the week following the election that there
are now nine areas on which he is instructed not to
publish articles, including charges of electoral fraud
or abstentions, all political party news, and all
military news that does not originate with
high-ranking government officials.
An average of 10 articles are censored daily in
November, compared with an average of 5 in October.
Censored articles deal with such topics as shortages
of consumer products, the Manzanillo talks, articles
written by or about Arturo Cruz, complaints about the
Sandinista Defense Committees, and the problems
opposition leaders are having in traveling from
Nicaragua.
identification of press sources, banning "false news"
leading to price speculation, and prohibiting news
"which serves the interests of imperialism." Although
the draft law is later withdrawn--probably due to the
opposition of the FSLN's own allies--it undoubtedly
will serve as a model for the future control of the
media when the state of emergency is ended.
Mid-July-Early November 1984
Newspaper censorship slightly eases as the regime attempts
to demonstrate that the elections will be free.
-- Even during this "relaxation," La Prensa fails to
publish several times due to heavy censorship, and
coverage of opposition leader Arturo Cruz's campaign
is limited.
La Prensa editors tell) that the
Interior Ministry confiscated 30,000 copies of the 29
August edition after the censors had approved it.
They speculated that the move may have been related to
an article on an anti-draft demonstration or another
one reporting FSLN Vice Presidential candidate Sergio
Ramirez's involvement with a Somoza organization in
1956.
November 1984-January 1985
Newspaper censorship is resumed at pre-July 1984 levels
immediately following the elections.
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-- Chamorro goes into exile in December to protest
censorship, saying that 180 articles, photos,
cartoons, and headlines have been cut or banned in the
first 12 days of the month.
19
zo
Zo
zl
2,1
23
La Prensa fails to publish on 8 January because of
heavy censorship and closes its offices the following
day in order to attract international attention to its
plight on the eve of President Ortega's
inauguration. On 10 January, inauguration day, the
regime permits the paper to publish intact.
February-Early March 1985
Censorship is eased, possibly because of US Congressional
debate on aid to the anti-Sandinista insurgents and the
increase in Congressional visitors.
the volume of
censored articles is unchanged, but the censors are
more selective, eliminating offending paragraphs
rather than whole articles, thereby maximizing the
propaganda value of their ostensible liberalization.
Censors continue to delay the return of the
newspaper's galleys, preventing timely distribution
and decreasing reader access.
-- In an attempt to convey Sandinista flexibility, Vice
President Ramirez meets with La Prensa executives on 7
March to explore what the newspaper's line would be if
censorship were lifted. Newspaper officials say they
will never agree to self-censorship.
Mid-Marsh-Early April 1985
Intense censorship resumes.
In late March, the Sandinista press attempts to
discredit La Prensa editor Jaime Chamorro by accusing
him of advocating US support for the anti-Sandinista
insurgents. The articles cite tape recordings made
during the visit of a group of US "tourists" to the
newspaper in February.
Sandinista
National Directorate member Bayardo Arce defends
censorship, saying that through it "journalists are
made aware of what is right to do and what is wrong."
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Virtually every reference to President Reagan's 4
April peace initiative is censored from La Prensa,
prompting the newspaper to suspend publication 10
April in protest.
15
S01
lip
21-23 April 1985
Censorship is virtually eliminated in the days immediately
preceding the US Congressional vote on aid to the insurgents.
Only one article is censored on each of the two days
preceding the vote.
Late April 1985-Present
Censorship is relatively light for two weeks following the
Congressional vote, but indicates that
heavy censorship resumes in early may.
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UNCLASSIFIED
A20 Mi rim. Si.l'tf)Ilth:lt 311. I9-8. - -
7
tit. WASUI
Managua doss and will gow, the defense
ister predictedd. In Costa RicaUnrest
Sees rrrin
he said the democratic let
soon take up arms to ex~ress rtse t.
In Neighbor ca rrnt think that t
violence e of U.5- aQr asil n is nt
States nq to cross the border," he said.
Asked r er ; rea , sr
Anti-U.S. Upsurge Awaited to Aid Cause
By Joanne Omang
WA.Mugton R,., 't.ll Water
Costa Rica and Honduras, where
the rebel bases are, and Reagan's
li
ill h
cy w
ave to be reassessed,
MANAGUA, Nicaragua-The po
the diplomats predicted.
Sandinista leaders of Nicaragua, At the moment, all sides agree
predictin that the Nicaraguan Army has re-
ant r- S. feeling in Costa Rica--and taken the military initiative from
Honduras, say thev ar spending the rebels, who launched some brief
on those factors to helpthent defeat but daring raids this summer and
[.S-backed rebels and preserve have "a presence" but little strength
the n it sta revolution in nine of the 16 provinces.
Wliriterviews, 1Qicaragua's pres- Many Nicaraguans complain
ident, defense minister and interior about high prices, low wages, short-
nrinrster projected deterniination to ages and bureaucratic ineptitude.
persevere amid rebel attacks, a dis- But the splintered, tightly coil,
integrating economy and rising trolled domestic opposition parties
complaints from the Nicaraguan have failed to organize the discon-
public, in the expectation that op- tent to their advantage.
position to the rebels from Hondu- In Honduras, officials publicly are
ras, Costa Rica and possibly the supportive of U.S. efforts in the re-
U.S. public ultimately will combine gion but privately they are often crit-
to force President Reagan to aban- ical of the contras as brutal and coun-
don his anti-Sandinista campaign. terproductive. The Costa Rican gov-
"This war will be won by the side ernment, however, recently has be-
that has moral force, and that is our come critical of the Sandinistas.
side," President Daniel Ortega said. Ortega said Honduras and Costa
The officials' views largely echo Rica "are no more than pawns in the
those of other diplomats in Central U.S. plan," and that popular feeling
America and in Washington that is not reflected by either govern-
Reagan's policy now hinges on merit. He and his brother, Defense
whether the rebel forces, boosted Minister Humberto Ortega, both
by nonlethal aid from the United said this feeling will become more
States, can make military headway evident as the rebel, prove unable
against the stronger Sandinista to gain any military ground.
Army in the next few months, thus "They will become demoralized
demonstrating popular support for and become pandits in Costa Rica
their cause. and Honduras .... Do not discount
If they can. according to this the- the possibility that Costa Rica will
ory, the Sandinistas will have to begin to resemble Lebanon," the
gra!.t Reagan'; demand, in order to defense minister said. At that paint.
,ur t n,?: st've?r tout Ilid Cuban hr continued, n+-ither glr.ernnrent
tic,. demilitarize :Ind open Inc pu- will be able to cor{tirruc giving the
litical process to the rebels, known rebels sanctuary. 1
here as contras. "On the day they deride, they
It the contras are contained. as arrest everyone or take them to the
the Sandinistas insist they will be, border and that's it, the war is
the frustrated rebels are sure to over," Ortega said. Contra violence
cause trouble and resentment in already has begun to be felt in llon-
UNCLASSIFIEh
it was "not a threat, but a descrip-
tion of reality."
Costa Rica is the sole Central
American republic with an extended
democratic tradition. Honduras'
current government also was pop-
ularly elected.
U.S. officials. have charged Nica-
ragua with exporting revolution and
with training terrorists and have
warned the Sandinistas that any Nic-
aragua-backed attacks on U.S. cit-
izens in the region will provoke re-
taliation. Interior Minister Torrras
13orge called charges of terrorist
training camps "an obscene lie."
All three officials dismissed any
military threat from the new' pro-
rebel alliance of Miskito Indian
groups formed in Honduras this
month. "The alliance is convenient
for the FDN," said Borge, referring
to the largest rebel group, called
the Nicaraguan Democratic Force
in English. "But it generates con-
tradictions, too. The FDN discrim-
inates and the groups have no con-
fidence in each other."
Humberto Ortega said any unity
among the rebel groups in the re-
cently formed United Nicaraguan
Opposition has been imposed by the
United States and is tenuous at
best. The group has been desig-
nated by the State Department to
handle the recently approved $27
million in nonlethal U.S. aid.
The Nicaraguan leaders also dis-
missed the possibility that the con-
tras could continue their attacks
without U.S. help. U.S. aid contin-
ues through Honduras despite last
year's cutoff by Congress.
The Sandinista leaders agreed
that contra presslt:e, the 1'.5. ecu-
nonric htsycutt, low prices tuI exports
and their own wartime spending
have brought the Nicaraguan econ-
omy to the brink of collapse. But
they insisted that the hardships have
unified Nicaraguans against the con-
tras.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/05: CIA-RDP87M00539R001802780009-4