READINGS IN INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 336
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 23, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: MISC

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Iq
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Readings in Intelligence
Table of Contents
Fundamentals
Historical Background
From a speech given at Brown University on
15 October 1981, by William J. Casey.
by
STAT
publication of the Office of Public Affairs, CIA,
Organization
From "Fact Book on Intelligence", Office of Public STAT
Affairs, CIA
Congressional Oversight
From Studies in Intelligence, Spring 1985, by Gary J.
Schmitt
From Remarks Before The University Club, Washington, D.C.,
18 September 1986, by William J. Casey.
From "The Agency: The Rise and Decline of CIA", by
John Ranelagh
Glossary
From "Strategic Intelligence Operations", Defense
Intelligence College
Bibliography
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
Collection
Role of Case Officers (also called Operations Officers)
From "The Clandestine Service of the Central
Intelligence Agency", by Hans Moses
From "Facing Reality", by Cord Meyer
Agent Recruitment and Training
From "Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's:
Clandestine Collection" Roy Godson editor,
excerpts from a paper by Eugen Burgstaller
From "Street Man", by E. C. Ackerman
Defectors and Walk-ins
From "Breaking with Moscow", by Arkady N. Shevchenko
From "The CIA's Secret Operations", by Harry Rositzke
Audio Operations
From "The Craft of Intelligence", by Allen Dulles
Surveillance
From "Street Man", by E. C. Ackerman
Technical Support
From "Breaking with Moscow", by Arkady N. Shevchenko
From "Spy-Tech", by Graham Yost
From "The CIA under Reagan, Bush and Casey", by
Ray S. Cline
From "The CIA's Secret Operations", by Harry Rositzke
From "The CIA and the U.S. Intelligence System", by
Scott D. Breckinridge
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
Foreign Language Translations
From "FBIS Fact Sheet"
Photo Reconnaisance
From "Studies in Intelligence", Summer 1982, by
Clarence L. Johnson
Imagery
From "World of Secrets", by Walter Laqueur
From "Spy-Tech", by Graham Yost
Communications and Signals Intelligence (COMINT and SIGINT)
From "The Craft of Intelligence", by Allen Dulles
From "Spy-Tech", by Graham Yost
From "The CIA and the U.S. Intelligence System", by
Scott D. Breckinridge
Counterintelligence
Counterintelligence
From "Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's:
Counterintelligence" Roy Godson editor, by Roy Godson
From "The Craft of Intelligence", by Allen Dulles
Deception
From the "World of Secrets", by Walter Laqueur
STAT
STAT
iii
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
Analysis
Developing Analysts
From "Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's:
Analysis and Estimates" Roy Godson editor, article by
William E. Colby
Role of the Analyst
From "A Consumer's Guide to the Intelligence Community
and Its Products", a CIA publication.
From "Studies in Intelligence", Fall 1983, by
Richard W. Mansbach
Indications & Warnings Intelligence
From "Studies in Intelligence", Fall 1984, by Allen
Kitchens
Evaluation
From "Studies in Intelligence", Fall 1984, by
Helene L. Boatner
Production
Finished Intelligence Products
From "A Consumer's Guide to the Intelligence Community
and its Products", a CIA publication.
National Intelligence Estimates
From a speech given at Brown University on
15 October 1981, by William J. Casey.
From "The CIA and the U.S. Intelligence System", by
Scott D. Breckinridge
From "The Estimative Process", 3 March 1987, prepared
by the National Intelligence Council, CIA
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
The National Intelligence Daily
From "The National Intelligence Daily", 9 February 1987,
prepared by the Directorate of Intelligence, CIA
The President's Daily Brief
From "The President's Daily Brief", 9 February 1987,
prepared by the Directorate of Intelligence, CIA
Interaction with Policymakers
From "Studies in Intelligence", Winter 1980, by
From "Intelligence: Policy and Process", by Maurer,
Tunstall and Keagle editors, article by Hans Heymann
STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
ixan a speeai given at tsrvwn
University an 15 October 1981,
by Willia?n J. Casey
AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE YESTERDAY, TODAY AND TOMORROW
There was a time only 40 years ago when William J. Donovan, a New York
lawyer, was a one man CIA for Franklin Roosevelt. His World War I
Congressional Medal of Honor and his nickname of "Wild Bill" implanted on
him the image of a swashbuckling adventurer. In reality he was a mild,
softspoken intellectual, whose deepest interest was intelligence.
By the time Pearl Harbor came, Donovan had gathered hundreds of the finest
scholars in America and had them processing geographic, scientific, political
and military information in the Library of Congress. Two years later, Donovan
had scoured our campuses and mobilized thousands of the finest scholars in
America. He had assembled what had to be the most diverse aggregation ever
assembled of tycoons and scientists, bankers and foreign correspondents,
psychologists and football stars, circus managers and circus freaks, safe
crackers, lock pickers and pickpockets, playwrights and journalists, novelists
and professors of literature, advertising and broadcasting talent. He drew
on the great American melting pot to create small teams of Italian Americans,
Franco-Americans, Norwegian Americans, Slavic Americans, Greek Americans.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
What did he do with this array of talent? He used it to create
intelligence networks behind enemy lines, to support the resistance forces
which oppression always creates, to bring disaffected enemy officers over
to our side, to dream up scenarios to manipulate the mind of the enemy in
deception and psychological warfare programs.
But above all he.created a machinery to evaluate, sift and analyze.
Intelligence has many facets. It is a very uncertain, fragile and
complex commodity:
First, you have to get a report.
Then you have to decide whether it's real or fake.
Then, whether it's true or false as you find out what other intelligence
supports or contradicts it.
Then, you fit it into a broad mosaic.
Then, you figure out what it all means.
Then, you hive to get the attention of someone who can make a decision,
and,
Then, you have to get him to act.
That's the way it was at the inception of modern American intelligence
when Lyman Kirkpatrick and I were in the OSS together and that, at bottom,
is the way it is today.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
Fri an Office of Public Affairs, CIA,
publication by STAT
II RLY DAYS
'The basis for what we know today as the Central Intelligence
Agency can ~e found in the developr*nt and operation of an
organization known in World War II as the Office of Strategic
Services--the OSS. Under the leadership of Major General 'Wild
Bill' Donovan, a World War I hero and lawyer, the OSS was created on
the British model to give the US the capability to carry out
clandestine operations during the war, and to establish some form of
centralized research and analysis mechanism to exploit the
intellIgence information collected.
'During the war, the OSS, a multi-service operation, took
advantage of the intelligence collection capabilities of all
the military services, as well as civilian entities to create
the first all-source intelligence analysis organization in the
hostory of the US. During the war, many of the systems we have
today had their early beginnings. COMINT, ELINT, SIGINT,
PHOTINT, and HUMINT all made inputs to the central analysis
unit. And the analysis unit, in a break with tradition, began
to turn out estimative and analytic research papers.
Previously, intelligence analysis had been confined to making
comments on individual reports.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
The OSS also developed the capability to carry out what we
would today call Covert Action. Psychological warfare,
including propaganda operations, sabotage and guerrilla
operations, and the use of agents of influence all became part
of the OSS' bag of tricks. For the most part, these operations
were run in Europe, largely because General MacArthur insisted
that all intelligence activity in his theater come under his
direct control.
'While the results of the OSS operations got mixed reviews, for
the most part historians who have written about that
period--and OSS veterans who have related their
experiences--have left us a legacy of success. Because the
nature of our enemy was so clear--who could argue about doing
things to end the reign of the Nazis in Europe--there was
little discussion at the time about the morality or utility of
its intelligence operations. They received almost unanimous
support.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
The immediate reaction to the end of the war in Washington was
to revert to the same situation that existed before hostilities.
The OSS was disbanded, and General Donovan was handed his walking
papers--in a rather cavalier and thankless fashion. Some people in
President Harry Truman's administration urged that the COMINT
facilities again be shut down, that intelligence activity return to
the State or War Departments, and that covert operations be ended.
And this form of shutdown did indeed begin.
'But some in Washington did remember the legacy of Pearl
Harbor, and they were spurred by the beginnings of what later
came to be known as the "Cold War." The Soviets, immediately
after the war, began to try to expand their control from a base
in Eastern Europe to the West. The Communist Party in Italy
threatened to wrest control of the government, and similar
situations arose in Greece and Czechoslovakia. In addition,
the Communists in China threatened to force the Chiang Kai-shek
government off the mainland. In that atmosphere, the advice of
General Donovan again garnered some support in the White House.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
'In a letter to the President, Donovan recommended that a
central intelligence service, under civilian control, be
established at the national level. He envisioned an
organization that would be independent of the other executive
departments, that would be non-political and non-partisan, and
that would serve to support the national security decison
making process as a service of common concern. He suggested
that the central service should have the capability to collect
information on a clandestine basis, should have an all-source
research and analysis capability, and should also be able to
carry out propaganda, psychological warfare, and other such
clandestine operations in support of the government.
'Donovan also envisioned the appointment of an intelligence
"czar' to oversee the intelligence activities of the
government. This proposal was more easily acceptable to Truman
than the establishment of a central service, and so in 1946 the
first Director of Central Intelligence--DCI--was appointed.
The DCI was to serve as the President's chief intelligence
officer and was to coordinate the intelligence activities then
resident in State, War and Navy. Unfortunately, the DCI had no
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
legislative backing to carry out such a mandate, but the
creation of the Central intelligence Group, which incorporated
some. but not all of the other departmental intelligence
functions, gave the new DCI some basis for exercising his
authority.
'Finally, in 1947 Truman engineered the passage of
legislation--the National Defense Act--which-established the
Department of Defense, regularized the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
and created the Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA was to
incorporate all the functions of the Central Intelligence Group
and to acquire others as well. The CIA was to be an
independent agency with authority to collect information by
open as well as clandestine means, was to serve as the central
repository of all intelligence information of government, and
was to ' carry out such other functions related to intelligence
as the President and the National Security Council may from
time to time direct...' This established the basis for what
has become known as Covert Action.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
'The C:A was envisioned as an independent organization teat
would neither belonc to State or Defense, but would be
non-partisan in philosophy and non-political in structure.
Nhi i e the DC woul d be appointed by the President, the
tradition was quickly established that all other senior
officials would either be professional intelligence officers or
senior military officials. In fact, legislation requires that
when the DCI is military, his deputy must be a civilian. There
have been occasional breaks with tradition in regard to outside
appointments at levels below the DCI and DDCI, but they have
rare, and rarely sustained. Thus, the CIA has been able to
maintain a tradition or remaining outside the political strains
that infect State, Defense, and other parts of the Executive
Branch.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION
Presidential Executive Order No. 12333, 4 December 1981, assigns the
Director of Central Intelligence the responsibility to act as the primary adviser
to the President and the National Security Council on national foreign
intelligence. To discharge this and other assigned duties, the Director is the
appointed head of both the Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence
Community. These relationships and the mechanisms established by the
Executive Order to sustain them are discussed below.
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC)
The NSC was established by the National Security Act of 1947 to advise
the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military
policies relating to the national security. The NSC is the highest Executive
Branch entity providing review of, guidance for, and direction to the conduct
of all national foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities. The
statutory members of the NSC are the President, the Vice President, the
Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. The Director of Central In-
telligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff participate as
advisers.
SENIOR INTERAGENCY GROUP, INTELLIGENCE (SIG-1)
This committee of the NSC is composed variously of the Director of
Central Intelligence, the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, the Deputy Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Deputy Attorney General, the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Director of the
National Security Agency. The SIG chairman varies according to the meeting
agenda, e.g., the Director of Central Intelligence is chairman when theibody
addresses intelligence matters. The SIG (Intelligence) is charged to advise and
assist the NSC in discharging its authority and responsibility for intelligence
policy and intelligence matters. It ensures that important intelligence policy is-
sues requiring interagency attention receive full, prompt, and systematic
coordination. It also monitors the execution of previously approved policies
and decisions.
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
(PFIAB)
The PFIAB is maintained within the Executive Office of the President.
Its several members serve at the pleasure of the President and are appointed
from among trustworthy and distinguished citizens outside of Government
18
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
who are qualified on the basis of achievement, experience, and independence.
They serve without compensation. The Board continually reviews the perform-
ance of all Government agencies engaged in the collection, evaluation, or
production of intelligence or in the execution of intelligence policy. It also
assesses the adequacy of management, personnel, and organization in intelli-
gence agencies and advises the President concerning the objectives, conduct,
and coordination of the activities of these agencies. The PFIAB is specifically
charged to make appropriate recommendations for actions to improve and
enhance the performance of the intelligence efforts of the United States. This
advice may be passed directly to the Director of Central Intelligence, the
Central Intelligence Agency, or other agencies engaged in intelligence
activities.
INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB)
The President's Intelligence Oversight Board functions within the White
House. The IOB consists of three members from outside the government who
are appointed by the President. One of these, who serves as chairman, is also a
member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. The IOB is
responsible for discovering and reporting to the President any intelligence
activities that raise questions of propriety or legality in terms of the
Constitution, the laws of the U.S., or Presidential Executive Order. The Board
is also charged with reviewing internal guidelines and the direction of the
Intelligence Community. The IOB is a permanent, non-partisan body.
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
While the Director of Central Intelligence is head of the CIA, he is at the
same time leader of the Intelligence Community of which CIA is but one com-
ponent. The Intelligence Community refers in the aggregate to those Execu-
tive Branch agencies and organizations that conduct the variety of intelligence
activities which comprise the total U.S. national intelligence effort. The
Community includes the Central Intelligence Agency; the National Security
Agency; the Defense Intelligence Agency; offices within the Department of
Defense for collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through
reconnaissance programs; the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the
Department of State; intelligence elements of the military services, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of the Treasury, and the
Department of Energy; and the Intelligence Community Staff. Members of
the Intelligence Community advise the Director of Central Intelligence
through their representation on a number of specialized committees that deal
with intelligence matters of common concern. Chief among these groups is the
National Foreign Intelligence Board, which the Director chairs.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
The Intelligence Community
? Department of Defense Elements
Departmental Intelligence Elements (Other than DoD)
[] Independent Agency
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
25 sEPTE` B 1981
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Orlando, Florida
9 or 10 Feb 7b
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
Fran "Studies in Intelligence'
Spring 1985, by Gary J.
Sdiinitt
Riots, rules, reflections
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE
Gary J. Schmitt
In the section of Democracy in America titled "Accidental Causes That
May Increase the Influence of the Executive Power," Tocqueville states:
If executive power is weaker in America than in France, the reason
for this lies perhaps more in circumstances than in the laws. It is
generally in its relations with foreign powers that the executive power
of a nation has the chance to display its skill and strength.... The
President of the United States possesses almost royal prerogatives
which he has no occasion to use ... the laws allow him to be strong.
But circumstances have made him weak.,
Tocqueville's statement comes as a surprise to most students of American
government. It is surprising because it suggests that at bottom the American
presidency is in some respects "imperial." Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., notwith-
standing, Tocqueville clearly sees within the formal office of the chief execu-
tive the seeds of a powerful head of state.
Such a conception of the potential of the presidency is alien to most
students of the American constitutional system of separation of powers because
most have accepted without question an interpretation of separation of powers
most memorably expressed by Justice Louis Brandeis:
The doctrine of separation of powers was adopted by the Convention
of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of
arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid friction but, by means
of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of governmental
powers among the three departments, to save the people from autoc-
racy.2
In short, separation of powers is an institutional tool that was employed by the
architects of the American constitutional system for restraining government's
power, but not for promoting its effective use.
This view of separation of powers is not without some powerful and
prestigious adherents; it can be found in Woodrow Wilson's Constitutional
Government, in Richard Neustadt's Presidential Power, and in James
MacGregor Burns' The Deadlock of Democracy. The American constitutional
system was designed for deadlock, not decision.
That this vision of the formal framework of the government has had such
a powerful hold on academics and politicians alike is not surprising given the
' Alexis de Tocquesille. Democracy in Amenca. ed. Maser (Ne" York. Doubleda). Anchor Books. 19691.
pp 125-26.
2 Myers . United States. 2;2 U .S, 52. 293 (1926).
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
?- Oversight
pedagogic capacity of someone like Wilson and the regime's ever-present
democratic impulse to suspect instinctively any complexity as an impediment
to the immediate attainment of its desires. Its staying power notwithstanding,
the fact is, history gives little support to this interpretation of the American
system of separation of powers. As one suspects of most such matters, the truth
is more complex.
To begin with, if stalemate and inertia had been the goal toward which
the framers were in single-minded pursuit, it is somewhat difficult to explain
their substantial expenditure of energy in shedding the Articles of Confeder-
ation. If ever there was a system of government designed for deadlock, that
was it. Moreover, if that had truly been their goal, then in forming the consti-
tution almost any division of power among any number of arbitrarily chosen
branches would have sufficed. But this is not what happened. The framers
were careful to define the powers of government and almost equally careful in
distributing them to the branches of government which had been specifically
constructed to house them. To a much larger degree than is commonly under-
stood, and in contrast to Neustadt's famous description of the government as
"separate institutions sharing powers," the architects of the American system
of separation of powers were driven by "the belief that kinds of power are best
exercised by particular kinds of bodies."3
By the time of the Constitutional Convention, the general incompetence
of the Congress of the Articles of Confederation and the capriciousness of the
various state assemblies had changed many of the framers' minds about the
government's need for a vigorous and independent executive. Having earlier
reacted to the perceived abuses of king and governors alike with the establish-
ment of weak state executives and the disestablishment of an independent
executive authority on the national level, it was, according to James Wilson.
"high time that we ... chastise our prejudices; and that we ... look upon the
different parts of government with a just and impartial eye. "4
The desire for a separate executive branch of the government was par-
tially fostered bi- the incapacities of Congress under the Articles of Confeder-
ation in the areas of national defense and foreign affairs. The letters of Wash-
ington, Hamilton, Jay, Morris and even Jefferson bear testimony to this con-
cern.) For example, frustrated by the lack of energy and dispatch exhibited b
the national assembly in prosecuting the war, Colonel Hamilton conclude
that Congress had "kept the power too much into their own hands." After all,
"Congress is," Hamilton continued, "properly a deliberative corps and it for-
gets itself when it attempts to play the executive."a
Congress' reputation fared little better in the area of foreign affairs. John
Jai-, a member of Congress and eventually its Secretary for Foreign Affairs.
Richard E. Neustadt. Presidential Power, The Politics of Leadership (tie- York Wiles and Sons. 1960'.
p 33. Ann Stuart Diamond. "Thr Zenith of Separation of Powers Theors . The Federal Contention of 1Tb7."
Publius'Summer 19Th!. p 59
'James Wilson. Works. ed McCloskes (Cambridge Harvard Univ Press. 1967!. Vol 1. p 293.
See Louis Fisher. The Efficient) Side of Separated Posers.' Journal of American Studies August
19T1~
"Alexander Hamilton. Papers. ed S)rett chew York Columbia l mt Press. 19611. Vol 2. p. 404
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Oversight
complained repeatedly about the assembly's impotence in this area of concern.
The plural composition of the Congress made timely action nearly impossible,
and always improbable. Vacillation, not decision, was the norm. This was
especially evident in those issues of most importance to states, as exemplified in
Congress' tortured and factionalized attempts to draft instructions for the ne-
gotiators of the peace treaty with Great Britain. Jay, like Hamilton, did not
blame particular members of Congress for the delays or the failures. Congress
was just being a congress. In a letter written to Jefferson in 1787, just prior to
the Constitutional Convention, Jay suggests that the functional incapacities
then plaguing the government could only be overcome by the adoption of
separation of powers. As matters stood under the Articles of Confederation,
Congress was given both executive and legislative duties. According to Jay,
Congress is unequal to the first ... but very fit for the second ... and
so much time is spent in deliberation that the season for action often
passes by before they decide on what should be done; nor is there
much more secrecy than expedition in their measures. These incon-
veniences arise not from personal disqualifications but from the na-
ture and construction of government."
As Hamilton was to state succinctly elsewhere, there "is always more decision,
more dispatch, more secrecy, more responsibility where single men, than when
bodies are concerned.""
Instructed by their experience, the Constitution's framers adopted and,
through the administrations of Washington, Adams, and Jefferson, maintained
an executive office whose institutional logic was consonant not only with the
maxims of free government but also those of effective government.9 In general,
they recognized that the doctrine of separation of powers when effectively
implemented was not simply a tool to prevent power's abuse but a means to
assist its use. Brandeis' statement about the intention of the founders is only
half true. Charles Thach in his little-read The Creation of the Presidency
completes the picture:
The adoption of the principle of separation of powers as interpreted
to mean the exercise of different functions of government by depart-
ments officered by entirely different individuals, also seemed insist-
ently demanded as a sine qua non of governmental efficiency.10
Specifically, the framers came to understand a government's need for an in-
dependent and unitary executive whose powers and office were as carefully
molded as the checks they placed upon it. Through their implementation of
separation of powers, they hoped to meet the particular demands and neces-
John Jay, Correspondence and Papers, ed. Johnston (New York Putnam's. IS90-93). Vol. 3. p '_-'3
' Hamilton. Papers. Vol. 2. p 245
'See, in general, Abraham Sofaer. War. Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Pou er the Origins i(:am-
bridge: Ballinger. 1976) Of the first eight sears. sofaer comments that the "framework for executisr-
congressional relations deseloped- during that time "differs more in degree than in kind from the present
framework." p. 127.
"Charles C. Thach. Jr. The Creation of the Presidency: 1?.i-17.i9 (Baltimore- Johns Hopkins l'ni%.
Press. 1929). p. 74.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Oversight
sities placed upon a nation by its being only one among (a possibly hostile)
many.
This functional aspect of the American system of separation of powers is
key to understanding Tocqueville's statement about the presidency. Seen from
this perspective, it is hardly surprising that as circumstances warrant and the
necessities of foreign affairs grow, the latent powers of the presidency would
be tapped.
Again, if separation of powers is properly understood, the fact that there
was a rather marked increase in the power of the executive office after World
War II does not of itself mean that some form of constitutional usurpation had
taken place. Quite the contrary, given America's expanded role in the world. it
was "natural" that such an increase should occur. What some critics in the
not-too-distant past dismissed as rationalizations for the de facto dominance of
the presidency in foreign affairs are in fact connected to that office's de jure
qualities. As Edward Corwin wrote in the wake of World War I, "that organ
which possesses unity and is capable of acting with greatest expedition, secrecy
and fullest knowledge-in short, with greatest efficiency-has obtained the
major participation." I I
In general, through separation of powers the framers attempted to con-
struct a government which is 1.:. h effective and safe. Its powers were to be
complete but also carefully hedged. So understood, it is natural that over the
two hundred years of the Constitution's existence that power and prestige
would ebb and flow from the various branches of the government. Its explicit
division of labor made it inevitable that at different times, and in different sets
of circumstances, the different branches would grow and recede in strength.
There is in this system a certain assumption made by the framers that
adjustments in the strength of the branches would coherently follow the dic-
tate of necessity. To a large extent, their Enlightenment belief that necessity-
especially that of self-preservation-would be self-evident has been borne out.
In such instances as the Civil War and World War II, power has accrued quite
readily to the executive office. However, in those instances outside the circum-
stance of war, exercise of a strong executive power has proved more difficult.
In particular, since the end of World War II we have seen a shift from an
"imperial" to an "imperiled" presidency. The necessities of war are clear and
paramount; unfortunately, the necessities of peace and events leading to war
are rarely so clear. As a result, what becomes crucial is the public's understand-
ing of the circumstances the nation faces in times short of war. It is at these
times that the dominance of the presidency is dependent not upon the neces-
sities themselves, but the public apprehension and consensus about them.
It is the thesis of this essay that the key to understanding the history and
the prospects of congressional oversight of one of the President's more valued
prerogatives-the exercise of clandestine activities-is precisely that con-
" Edward S. Corwin, The President's Control of Foreign Relations (Princeton: Princeton l'nis Press.
1917). V. 205. See also. Corwin. -The Progress of Constitutional Theory Between the Declaration of
Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia Convention." 30 Amencan Histoncal Revicu t1925). Pp.
511.36.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Oversight
sensus. While the independent, deliberative capacity of the Congress should
not be dismissed, neither should it be accorded undue weight. Congress is, to
state the obvious, a representative body, first and foremost.
The Cold War and Executive Prerogative
In 1947, the Cold War began and with it two decades of consensus over
the principles and necessities guiding American foreign policy. In March of
that year, President Truman, reacting to the crisis posed by communist sub-
version in Greece and Turkey, declared that "it must be the policy of the
United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation
by armed minorities or by outside pressure." Truman's Doctrine was given its
most famous, expanded, and authoritative elucidation in George F. Kennan's
"The Sources of Soviet Conduct," which appeared in the July 1947 issue of
Foreign Affairs. Within four months, the theory and practice of American
foreign policy coalesced, and the execution of the policy known as contain-
ment had begun.
As explained by Kennan, containment was a political and military strat-
egy to resist Soviet expansion. It was, according to Kennan, "the adroit and
vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geograph-
ical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet
policy." Containment, as explicated by Kennan and understood by most, was a
long-term strategem to be used by the United States and its allies in a world of
undeclared hostilities.12 The hot war had become cold, but it was war never-
theless.
The public consensus that formed around the policy of containment was
remarkable in its strength. While a Democratic administration gave contain-
ment birth, its most explicit applications were to be found in the Republican
administration of President Eisenhower. The Republican platform of 1952
notwithstanding, Eisenhower rejected the policy of rolling back the Soviet
Union's imperium in favor of maintaining the status quo central to the doc-
trine of containment in the case of Korea and, later, Hungary. Around con-
tainment a bipartisan, national consensus coalesced. It was a consensus that
would last for some twenty years and four administrations-Truman's, Eis-
enhower's, Kennedy's, and Johnson's.
This post-World War II consensus about foreign affairs was the dominant
factor in how congressional oversight of intelligence was carried out. In an era
of undeclared hostilities it seemed only proper to most members of Congress
that the restraint they had shown toward the Executive Branch during the war
should carry over to this novel-but no less dangerous-age. Oversight of
intelligence was to be no exception.
As a former Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee noted at
the time, "[legislative interference with intelligence] would tend to impinge
upon the constitutional authority and responsibility of the President in the
12 "Mr. X.. [George F. Kennan], The Sources of Soviet Conduct." - Foreign Affairs. Jul 1947. reprinted
in G. F. Kennan. American Diplomacy 1900.1930 (Chicago Univ. of Chicago Press. 1931).
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Oversight
conduct of foreign affairs." 1a Or, as one scholar has put it a bit more pithily,
"(Congress'] World War II motto was said to be 'Trust in God and General
Marshall.' In the Cold War atmosphere ... the attitude seems to have been
'Trust in God and Allen Dulles.' "14
Formally, Congressional oversight did in fact exist. In the Senate and the
House of Representatives the Armed Services Committees and the Defense
Subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees had authorizing and appro-
priating jurisdiction for the intelligence community. Special subcommittees of
these four committees were formed to handle oversight, with the chairman of
the full committee assuming the chair of the subcommittee.
Substantively, however, oversight was de minimis.'S There were never
more than a few members of either house of Congress actually involved in
intelligence oversight. In fact, because of the leniency of Senate rules govern-
ing committee membership, there were Senators who held seats on both the
Armed Services and Appropriations intelligence subcommittees simulta-
neously. So great was the overlap that during a period in the 1960s, when
Senator Richard B. Russell of Georgia was chairman of both the Armed Ser-
vices and the Defense Appropriations Subcommittees, the two Senate intelli-
gence subcommittees often met and transacted their business as one.
Limited membership on the intelligence subcommittees was matched by
an even more limited number of committee staff to assist them in their delib-
erations. Often no more than the clerk and an assistant had access to the
subcommittee material. As one might expect, the number of subcommittee
hearings held was also limited. Indeed, there were several years where the
"joint" committee of the Senate met only once or twice. According to the CIA,
from 1967 to 1972 it averaged 23 annual appearances before congressional
committees. The greatest percentage of these appearances was before commit-
tees other than the four intelligence subcommittees.
This pattern of oversight seems generally not to have been a product of
CIA or intelligence community reluctance to appear before the committees or
inform the Congress. The subcommittees were apparently regularly informed
of the most significant covert programs and routinely briefed on the intelli-
gence budget. The mechanism for oversight clearly existed; what was missing
was an interest in using it-or more properly speaking, a consensus that would
legitimize its use. Such major events as the creation of the National Security
Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the merging of the State Depart-
ment's Office of Policy Coordination with the CIA's Office of Special Opera-
tions (centralizing clandestine activities within the CIA) were carried out by
executive fiat. In short, while Congress appropriated millions of dollars for the
"Statement of Sen. Carl Hayden. cited in Harry Howe Ransom. The Intelligence Establishment
(Cambridge: Harvard Uni% Press, 1970). p. 161.
1' Ransom. Establishment. P. 17 2.
15 "At their most active. the House' subcommittees' reportedly met with agent-, officials a half-dozen times
a year. spending as much for as little) as fifteen to twenty hours in oversight There was little. if any. record
keeping of formal reporting or staffing. with the exception of hudget review The Pattern in the Senate
was similar." Roy Godson. "Congress and Foreign Intelligence." eds. Lefever and Godson. The CIA and the
American Ethic (Washington: Ethics and Public Policy Center. Georgetown Unisersity. 1979). p 3S.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
Oversight
intelligence agencies, their creation and operations were generally understood,
for nearly a quarter of a century, as lying within the realm of executive
prerogative.
The year 1947 saw the adoption of the policy of containment. The effect
of the consensus supporting that policy on congressional oversight of intelli-
gence is largely exemplified in the National Security Act of the same year. The
Act created the Central Intelligence Agency, yet one would search in vain
among the various committee reports accompanying the legislation for more
than a passing reference to its establishment.
Isolation and Congress as Semi-Sovereign
From 1947 to the late 1960s the consensus surrounding the policy of
containment was solid. Under the pressure of the war in Vietnam that consen-
sus began to dissolve as criticism of our military intervention in Southeast Asia
necessarily brought with it questions about the wisdom and the utility of the
strategy of containment. This critique was carried on at two levels. On the
first, containment's apparent call to counter every thrust by the Soviet Union
left the US with little leeway to raise tactical and prudential questions neces-
sarily involved in any particular commitment of US power and prestige. A
second and more fundamental critique appeared later in the debate over Viet-
nam. It held that US intervention was not only tactically wrong but that in-
tervention per se was, in the words of the former Chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, a manifestation of the "arrogance of power." In
short, not only was the consensus upholding the means of containment shat-
tered, so also was the public's resolve to achieve its end.
The Nixon Doctrine and strategy of detente was an attempt to salvage the
goal of containment while jettisoning its unacceptable means. In place of US
intervention and dependence on US military strength, a sophisticated array of
coalitions (China), surrogates (Iran), and incentives (Pepsi-Cola) was to carry
the task of moderating Soviet behavior. Sophisticated or not, the Nixon Doc-
trine never stood a chance of gaining public acceptance on an order that
resembled the consensus surrounding containment. Left substantially unad-
dressed was that larger critique of containment which concerned the legiti-
macy of its ends. Indeed, the language used during this period-that of
spheres, superpowers, and balance of power-tended to cast the struggle be-
tween the East and West in terms more appropriate to mechanics than to
statecraft. The Nixon Doctrine exacerbated the very forces of isolation that it
had ostensibly attempted to counter.
As the consensus in support of containment disappeared, so did confi-
dence in the institution most conspicuous in carrying it out. The isolationist
reaction to an active American role in the world implied a diminished role for
the President and the instrumentalities he wielded in support of it. One after
another, presidential prerogatives in foreign affairs were challenged. Presiden-
tial discretion in these matters was greatly curtailed as Congress passed numer-
ous pieces of legislation to make him more accountable to the legislative
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Oversight
hranch.I A key element in the program to make the presidency less imperial
was the effort to reduce both the resources and autonomy of the intelligence
arm of the Chief Executive.
The impetus to rein in the presidency and American intelligence was
enhanced by a series of revelations and events. In 1971, the Pentagon Papers
were published; in 1972, the Watergate scandal began; in 1973, Agnew re-
signed; in August of 1974, Nixon resigned. One month later, a highly contro-
versial covert action program in Chile was disclosed. Three months later, dur-
ing Christmas week, the New York Times ran a front-page story on what it
called a "massive" domestic intelligence operation run by the CIA.
Immediately upon Congress' return from its holiday recess, both the
House and Senate created special committees to investigate the past and
present activities of the intelligence agencies. The two committees, most
widely known by the names of their respective chairmen, Senator Frank
Church and Representative Otis Pike, were, in the words of the former, after
the "rogue elephant." They were joined in that hunt by the President's own
special commission, known by the name of its chairman, Vice President
Rockefeller. For the next year and a half, the nation was treated to a deluge of
reports from these three bodies concerning the past failures and abuses of the
intelligence community. Among other things, they found: questionable domes-
tic surveillance operations, assassination plans, intercepts of mail and cable
traffic, programs to infiltrate dissident domestic groups, drug experiments on
unwitting individuals, and efforts to topple foreign governments.
In their final reports both the Church Committee and the Pike Commit-
tee recommended a major change in the oversight process. Both called for the
creation of select, permanent standing committees tasked specifically with
overseeing the intelligence community. In May of 1976, the Senate established
the Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and, a year later, the House cre-
ated its Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI).
Given their inheritance, it is not surprising that the new intelligence com-
mittees initially focused on setting down new rules and creating restraints.
Because the debate about intelligence during the mid-1970s had been con-
cerned principally with examples of improper and/or illegal activities, it was
natural that the agenda for the House and Senate intelligence committees be
the imposition of restrictions on the intelligence community.
Three pieces of legislation, two of which eventually became law, domi-
nated the first few years of the new oversight process. The most important of
these, the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act, had
been enacted into law before the establishment of the intelligence committees.
As with the creation of the committees, Hughes-Ryan was unprecedented. It
was the first law ever passed by Congress which called explicitly for congres-
sional oversight of an activity of a component of the American intelligence
community.
" See. in general. Allen Schick. "Politics Through Law Congressional Limitations on E.uecuti%e Discre-
tion," ed. King. Both Ends of the Avenue (Washington: AEI. 1953).
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
Oversight
President Ford signed Hughes-Ryan (P.L. 93-559) on 30 December 1974.
The amendment consisted of two key provisions. The first was that the CIA
could spend no monies on programs not related to the collection of intelligence
(that is, on covert action) until the President had certified "that each such
operation is important to the national security of the United States." The
second key provision of Hughes-Ryan was that after the President had made
such a finding he was obligated to report it "in a timely fashion" to the "ap-
propriate" committees of the Congress.
The first requirement had the consequence that in the future all covert
activity would clearly be the responsibility of the President. Although the
claim was advanced that internal executive branch guidelines made that the
case already, Hughes-Ryan gave those regulations the force of law. Under
Hughes-Ryan, there would be no room for a repetition of ambiguously author-
ized attempts to assassinate the likes of Fidel Castro; presumably, there is for
presidents no longer any room, for better or worse, for "plausible denial." A
second consequence of the requirement for presidential certification of every
covert action as "important to the national security" is the implication that
presidents are to make covert action an exceptional rather than a characteristic
tool of American foreign policy.
The indirect effects of Hughes-Ryan. were small in comparison with its
direct effect on clandestine activities by the requirement that the "appropri-
ate" committees of Congress be notified prior to or upon initiation of any
presidentially approved covert action. Before passage of Hughes-Ryan, covert
action had been rather loosely monitored by the Congress. Typically, a hand-
ful of senior committee chairmen were informed of major operations. The
discretion as to when or in what detail to brief the Congress lay mainly within
the domain of the executive branch. This discretion largely disappeared with
the passage of Hughes-Ryan. Reporting to the "appropriate" committees was
understood to mean reporting to the full membership of the Senate and House
Armed Services Committees, the Senate and House Defense Subcommittees of
the Appropriations Committees, the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. To these six bodies, both the House and
the Senate Intelligence Committees were added. In sum, under the prescrip-
tions of Hughes-Ryan eight committees were to be informed of each covert
action.
The result was inevitable. As one scholar noted at the time, "Most (covert
actions) ... which have been brought to the attention of congressional com-
mittees pursuant to Hughes-Ryan have become public knowledge." Succinctly
stated, it had "all but ruled out effective covert operations." v
Formally, of course, Hughes-Ryan only required that the committees be
notified of covert operations. Unlike the War Powers Act, Hughes-Ryan made
no mention of a congressional power to veto a President's decision. But having
so many members of Congress in the know virtually guaranteed that proposed
covert programs were not going to stay covert for very long. The result was
that Hughes-Ryan gave any member of the eight committees a virtual veto
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Oversight
over any truly controversial covert action through the power of the timely
leak. It was not long after the enactment of Hughes-Ryan that the executive
branch was proposing in the main only programs it was willing to see discussed
in public. With regard to covert action, statecraft gave way to poll-watching.
Covert action was not the only area of intelligence in this period to come
under new restraints. Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978,
commonly known as FISA (P.L. 95-511), domestic collection was also targeted.
FISA governs electronic surveillance (wiretaps, etc.) of places or persons, for-
eign or American, believed to be involved in espionage or terrorism in the
United States. Under FISA, before a US person's domicile or place of work can
be wiretapped, the intelligence community must make a case before a special
secret court detailing its reasons for wanting to take that action. If convinced
by that case, the judge will issue a warrant allowing the tap. The standard the
judge uses to rule on each case is specified in the Act as essentially a criminal
standard. Under FISA, there must exist probable cause to believe that the
person in question is knowingly engaged in clandestine intelligence activities
or terrorism before issuance of a warrant is justified. In short, the government,
under FISA, cannot tap a US person's phone to gather sensitive intelligence
which is otherwise unavailable. t"
The era of restraint culminated in the attempt to pass a comprehensive
charter for governance of the whole of American intelligence. This particular
piece of legislation, while proposed, was never enacted into law. The charter
was first drafted by the Senate Intelligence Committee and ran for some 300
pages. It attempted to establish a lengthy and complex set of regulations and
prohibitions to rule and restrain every activity of American intelligence. From
a few dozen words in the National Security Act of 1947 to several hundred
pages of charter legislation, congressional oversight of intelligence had evolved
from the sublime to the absurd.
Yet, the fact is, Hughes-Ryan, FISA and the proposed charter rather ac-
curately reflected the prevailing distrust and cynicism about the institutions of
government. Vietnam and Watergate produced a public both indignant about
and distrustful of its government. Congressional oversight of intelligence mir-
rored both. Of course, what was not reflected in a serious or sustained way was
an equally pressing concern about the competence of the intelligence agencies
themselves. As Samuel Huntington has bitingly noted:
In a different atmosphere ... congressional committees investigating
the CIA might have been curious as to why the Agency failed so
miserably in its efforts to assassinate Lumumba and Castro.... [At the
time, however] no one was interested in the ability of the Agency to
" One could argue that FISA was enacted as a positive remedy to the legal and political situation that
existed at the time with regacd to domestic electronic surveillance. Before passage of FISA. the Attorney
General reported that, with one exception. no L'S citizen was then a target of electronic surveillance. The use
of electronic surveillance for intelligence collection had all but ceased. In order to get the officers and agents
of the various intelligence agencies back into the streets (or, in this case, the adjoining room), something like
FISA was required. What this helps explain. of course, is the existence of the law. However. its content-
complex and restrictive proscriptions conioined to judicial review-is best explained by a quite different
animus.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
Oversight
do what it was told to do, but only in the immorality of what it was
told to do-19
The Collapse of Detente and a Sense of Relief
Congress never did pass an intelligence charter. The animus for doing so
gradually passed away. In some measure, this was caused simply by the pas-
sage of time and the fact that the intelligence community and the intelligence
committees got to know each other a little better. In place of the charter's
lengthy list of proscriptions and guidelines there was developing within the
oversight process a spirit of comity. This change was perhaps no better exem-
plified than by the Senate Intelligence Committee's decision in 1919 to drop its
Subcommittee on Investigations.
General maturation was not the principal reason for the change in spirit.
Much more important was the growing recognition that detente had collapsed.
A decade of its implementation had not produced a stable, balanced relation-
ship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Angola, Ethiopia. Af-
ghanistan-all supplied more than ample evidence that Moscow's expansionist
behavior had not been fundamentally modified by detente and the process of
"normalization." Indeed, if Soviet military expenditures, especially in the area
of strategic weapons, were any indication, then Soviet aggressiveness could be
expected to grow, not lessen. Faced with these facts and rudely shocked by
events in Iran, the American public began to reconsider issues of national
security. Given this change in the public's mood, it is not surprising that it was
reflected in the actions taken by their representatives-including those
charged with overseeing the intelligence community.
If the early years of congressional oversight had set as its agenda the
reining in of the American intelligence community, then the agenda of the
past 4 years has been, generally, to allow it to regain its former pace. This
program of relief has more or less typified the legislative record of the two
intelligence committees, with one obvious and important exception. Yet even
here, in the wake of the debate over Nicaragua, both the Senate and the House
have passed legislation exempting the operational files of the CIA from the
normal search and review requirements established under the Freedom of
Information Act.
The year 1980 appears to have been pivotal for this change of agenda. In
1980 Congress passed the Classified Information Procedures Act (P.L. 96-476),
also known as the "greymail" act. This bill established new procedures for the
introduction and protection of classified information in trials. In the past,
threats by defendants to subpoena volumes of classified information and ex-
pose that information in legal proceedings had, it was claimed, forced the
government and the intelligence agencies to drop a prosecution. With passage
"Samuel?. Huntington. American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony (Cambridge Har'ard I. niser-
sity Press, 1981). D. 191.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
Oversight
of the act, blackmailing the government into dropping such cases became less
of a problem.20
The year 1980 also saw the introduction of the Intelligence Identities
Protection Act, enacted into law (P.L. 97-200) 2 years later. This legislation
made it a crime for any person to seek out and publicize the names of Amer-
ican intelligence agents. Despite the fact that the law applied to journalists as
well, it passed both houses with overwhelming majorities.
The most important legislative event of 1980 was the passage of the In-
telligence Oversight Act (P.L. 96-450), which as Title V of the National Secu-
rity Act became law on 14 October. The act was noteworthy for two reasons.
First, it amended Hughes-Ryan. The key change was that the number of
committees to which the President was required to report covert operations
was reduced from eight to two: the intelligence committees of the House and
Senate. Other provisions were added which allowed the President to act, if
circumstances warranted, with greater dispatch and secrecy. The President
could now limit prior notice of covert action to the leadership of the House
and Senate and the ranking members of their intelligence committees. If he so
desired, the President could dispense with prior notification altogether so long
as he reported his actions in a "timely fashion" and provided a "statement of
the reasons" for dispensing with the prior notice. The second noteworthy as-
pect of the Intelligence Oversight Act lay in the fact that it made a matter of
law the principle behind Hughes-'Ryan, the legitimacy of congressional over-
sight in these matters. While the act itself was unprecedented in that it codi-
fied that principle, it nevertheless was understood to be a measure of some
comfort to the intelligence community.
The Oversight Act was, in quantity and quality, much different from two
charters introduced by the Senate Intelligence Committee. Even the more
moderate of the two documents was nearly 200 pages in length; what emerged
as law covered all of two pages.
The Intelligence Oversight Act established four basic obligations for in-
telligence officials. The first was that they keep the two intelligence commit-
tees "fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities." The second
outlined the revised notification provision concerning covert activities previ-
ously noted. The third prescription in the act was that the intelligence agencies
were to "furnish any information" deemed necessary by the oversight com-
mittees to carry out their responsibilities. The fourth, and final, obligation
concerns illegal or failed intelligence activity: both are to be reported to the
committees in a "timely fashion."
These obligations are themselves bound by provisions which recognize the
legal and constitutional duties of executive branch officials. For example, after
enumerating the various reporting requirements, the act directs the House and
the Senate committees to establish procedures, "in consultation with the
Z" As with FISA, there were mired motives behind passage of the Classified Information Procedures Act.
While the substantive thrust of the act was to grant some relief to the government in protecting classified
information. the act was also supported by some as a measure that might facilitate prosecution of active or
former intelligence officers charged with some wrongdoing.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
Oversight
Director of Central Intelligence," to protect the classified information that is to
be given. Equally important is the preamble to the specific mandates of the
act. There the need to protect classified information and information "relating
to intelligence sources and methods" is confirmed. Additionally, the preamble
acknowledges the "duties" conferred by the Constitution upon the executive
and legislative branches of the government.
When compared with the various proposed intelligence charters the In-
telligence Oversight Act of 1980 is, both in substance and tone, more moder-
ate. In place of congressional oversight's becoming dominated by legal partic-
ulars, it became a matter more of comity between the branches. In general,
passage of the act was, for the intelligence community, a matter of relief.
The Committees and the Elements of Intelligence
The literature on congressional oversight and the committee system is,
with some notable exceptions, generally governed by models constructed from
"interest group" theories. According to these models, the essential role played
by Congress and the committees is that of facilitating the process by which the
various interests of the society are aggregated and adjusted. The principal
activity of the Congress and its parts, then, is to haggle over, bargain about and
divvy up the federal pie for the constituents back home. Congressmen are
understood to be principally brokers.
While not completely without merit, this view of Congress and the over-
sight process is hardly sufficient. As Arthur Maas has written: "Much of what
Congress and the President do cannot be described adequately by using these
models"; they are often "insufficient" and "misleading. -21 This strikes one as
generally true with regard to congressional oversight in the area of foreign
affairs. While social and economic interests may well play some role in deci-
sions on such matters as the Panama Canal Treaty, SALT II, or a military
assistance bill for El Salvador, most members of a committee involved in the
legislative process will base their judgments on factors other than the subpoli-
tical. This seems to be particularly true for the process of congressional over-
sight of intelligence activities. Put crudely, since most of the oversight process
in this area takes place behind closed doors, there accrues to the Representa-
tive or Senator on an intelligence committee little of the traditionally under-
stood advantage of using his seat on the committee to serve the home district
or state.
A more straightforward model of Congress and congressional oversight is
one based on the proposition that Congress' principal function in this area is to
reflect and refine the views of the population. It should be both representative
and deliberative.
The Committees
Today the primary institutional forms through which that process is to
take place in the area of intelligence are the House Permanent Select Com-
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Oversight
mittee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.= To
understand how they both might reflect and refine public opinion on intelli-
gence, a closer look is required.
Before examining the committees and how they do or do not fulfill those
functions, however, one is obliged to note the revolutionary nature of the now
generally accepted assumption that committees should be so engaged. Prior to
1976, there were no permanent, standing committees dedicated uniquely to
overseeing the intelligence community. Notwithstanding Congress' stature as
the most powerful legis:ative body in the world, it had never exercised its
oversight powers so directly. In fact, this arrangement was revolutionary not
only in the United States but in the rest of the world as well; no other legisla-
ture had ever created such an entity.
Not that the idea of creating an intelligence committee was all that new.
As early as 1948, a motion was made to establish a joint committee to oversee
intelligence. Yet it, like the nearly 150 similar proposals made over the next
quarter of a century, never had the slightest chance of passing. Indeed, only
two motions ever made it to the floor; both- were soundly defeated by margins
of more than two to one.23
The first seriously considered proposal to establish an intelligence com-
mittee was put forward by the Rockefeller Commission in its final report. In
February of 1976, President Ford advanced the Commission's recommenda-
tion of a joint committee in a message Congress. Ford's recommendation,
however, was made not much in advanc of the Congress' own. In 1975, both
the House and the Senate had establish;?d temporary select committees to
investigate the perceived abuses of the intelligence community. By early 1976,
it was clear that both the Church Committee and the Pike Committee would
urge their respective chambers to create standing, permanent intelligence
committees.
The Church Committee's final report (S.Rept. 94-755) was issued in April
of 1976. As expected, it did call for the creation of a Senate committee spe-
cifically charged with the oversight of intelligence. Within a month, on 19
May, by a vote of 72 to 22, the Senate established, under S. Res. 400, the SSCI.
With the possible exception of a Tower-Stennis proposal to delete from the
new committee's jurisdiction the intelligence activities of the Department of
Defense, no serious challenge to the new committee was raised. Even here, the
vote against deletion was by a margin of two to one.
The House, largely because of the turmoil surrounding its rejection of the
Pike Committee's final report and the subsequent publication of large seg-
u HPSCI maintains three subcommittees: Legislation; Program and Budget, and Oversight and Evalua-
tion. The SSCI in the recent past has had four subcommittees: Anal sis and Production: Budget; Collection
and Foreign Operations; and' Legislation and the Rights of Americans.
sa On 11 April 1956. Senate Concurrent Resolution 2. a resolution to establish a joint committee. was
defeated by a vote of 59 to 27. Among its list of 33 co-sponsors were Senators Mansfield. Jackson. and Ervin.
A decade later. on 14 July. Senate Resolution 28.3. a resolution to establish a separate Senate intelligence
committee, was, on a point of order. defeated bs a vote of 61 to 2S Onis four senators who had previously
voted for the joint committee voted for the Senate committee also. Most notable among the four was Senator
Fulbright.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Oversight
ments of it in the Village Voice, took almost a year longer to establish an
intelligence committee of its own. On 14 July 1977, by a vote of 247 to 171, it
passed H.Res. 658 creating HPSCL
While there are some important differences between H.Res. 658 and
S.Res. 400, the critical fact is that both committees are given by their respec-
tive charters legislative, investigative, and authorizational authority for all of
the intelligence community. Each is to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the
CIA and the Director of Central Intelligence; each shares jurisdiction over the
rest of the community (NSA, DIA, and the intelligence components of the
Department of Defense, State, Treasury, Justice and Energy) with the Armed
Services, Foreign Relations/ Affairs and Judiciary Committees of both houses.
The resolutions mirror each other in other respects as well. A key point is
that both intelligence committees are "select" committees. Members are cho-
sen by the majority and minority leaders of the House and Senate. The ma-
jority and minority leaders also serve as ex officio, although nonvoting, mem-
bers of their respective committees. With regard to the professional staff. again
the resolutions are the same. All employees of the two intelligence committees
are required to sign secrecy agreements and be cleared in a manner "deter-
mined ... in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence."
H.Res. 658 and S.Res. 400 also establish elaborate procedures for declas-
sifying information. While neither resolution finally gives up its chamber's
right to declassify information, the procedures, formally at least, make the
exercise of that right quite unlikely. The two resolutions also require the
HPSCI-and the SSCI to maintain "crossover" members from the Armed Ser-
vices, Foreign Relations/Affairs, Judiciary and Appropriation Committees.
The difference between the charters here is that S.Res. 400 mandates that
there be two "crossover" members from each of those committees and that the
two be split between the majority and minority parties; H.Res. 658 requires
only one "crossover" member from each of those committees and there is no
mention of bipartisanship.
The resolutions also speak of rotating "to the greatest extent practicable"
a substantial portion of the committee membership each new congress. From
the HPSCI's total of 14, the number is 4; from the SSCI's total of 15, the
number is 5. Finally, both H.Res. 658 and S.Res. 400 establish bounds on the
length of time a senator or representative may remain on the intelligence
committee. For members of the HPSCI, the limit is six years; for members of
the SSCI, eight.2
Similarities aside, there are significant differences between the two reso-
lutions.
"With the end of the 98th Congress. both the SSCI and HPSCI faced a significant turno%er in
membership. Nine of the SSCI's I.i members reached the eight-sear limit at the end of the session, including
the Chairman (Senator Barry Cnidwater) and the Vice Chairman (Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan). On the
House side. HPSCI lost 7 of its 14 members, including the Chairman (Rep. Edward P Boland) and its ranking
minority member (Rep. J. Kenneth Robinson).
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Oversight
One such difference is that under S.Res. 400 the SSCI's jurisdiction does
not extend to include tactical military intelligence. H.Res. 658's mandate to
the HPSCI is broader and is understood to cover that facet of intelligence.
The most important difference between S.Res. 400 and H.Res. 658 is that
the former attempts to create a bipartisan committee while the latter makes no
such effort. Unlike the typical Senate committee, the ratio of majority to mi-
nority members on the SSCI is not distinctly disadvantageous to the minority.
Of its fifteen members, the SSCI has seven seats reserved for members from
the minority side of the aisle. Also, the next ranking member on the SSCI after
the chairman is not, as is normally the case, a member of the majority party.
Under S.Res. 400, the next ranking member is a member of the minority and
is titled vice chairman. In the Chairman's absence, he is acting chairman.
The Senate's decision to establish the SSCI on a bipartisan basis was pred-
icated in large measure by its judgment that if the intelligence agencies were
to regain their feet future activities had to rest on the widest consensus pos-
sible. The bipartisan makeup of the SSCI was designed to establish that basis.
As one of the authors of S.Res. 400 noted, the SSCI was meant to "reflect the
composition and philosophy of the entire Senate. "u
In this regard, the difference between the SSCI and the HPSCI could
hardly be great- -. Of the latter's total membership of 14, 9 are from the
majority. Implicitly or explicitly, no mention is made of bipartisanship in
H. Res. 658.
Coming as it did a year after the passage of S.Res. 400, the House reso-
lution's omission of the earlier document's bipartisan features stood out clearly.
As expected, their absence in H. Res. 658 was a matter of considerable dispute.
Representative John Rhodes, then Minority Leader, strongly objected to the
lack of "any provision establishing bipartisan membership" for the new com-
mittee. Rhodes' objection did not go unchallenged. Representative Richard
Bolling, Chairman of the Rules Committee, which had reported H.Res. 658,
rejoined: "The gentleman ... knows that matters of intelligence ... involve
policy ... it is only reasonable for us to follow the mandate of the American
people in our election to the House of Representatives on policy matters. "-1i
Elemenis of Intelligence
That the committees reflect the generally dominant views of the public
with regard to intelligence seems true enough from our earlier discussion.
r' Congressional Record IMay 13. 1976), p. 57275. The desire to maintain as broad a base as possible on
the SSCI has been reinforced by the composition of its staff. Under the rules of the committee, the professional
staff works for the committee as a whole. However, since its earliest dass. each member has had the power
to designate one individual to serve on the professional staff. As a result, most of the professional staff serve
at the pleasure of a particular ssenator. Not surprisingly. "committee" work often takes a back seat to the needs
and agendas of the individual members. The size of the professional staff is normaih in the mid-20's.
1? Congressional Record (Jul 14, 1977), p. H22942. In contrast to the composition of the SSCI professional
staff, HPSCI's Professional staff is composed principally of "nonpartisan' appointments hired by and
reporting to the chairman. While the staff, like the SSCV's, is also under a mandate to work for the committee
as a whole, the hiring and firing practices of HPSCI make it clear that most of the staff works for the chairman.
The size of the professional staff is normally a little over 10.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
Oversight
What is far less clear is how the two intelligence committees refine those views,
how they as committees affect the essential elements of American intelli-
gence-collection, analysis, and covert action.
Discerning the effect of oversight on the collection of intelligence is no
easy m, tter. There is a paucity of public sources upon which one can draw to
make one's case. This fact is itself significant. The lack of leaks and public
reborts suggests a general lack of interest in this element of intelligence on the
part of the two committees. With little at immediate stake politically, it is not
surprising that the intelligence committees have generally turned their atten-
tion elsewhere.
Two exceptions exist to this pattern of behavior. The first is that the
budget process has in the past generated discussion and review of individual
components of the collection process. Typically, however, this review is single-
member driven or produced by the need to trim the authorization package
back to an acceptable level. The second exception to the attention generally
given to collection by the committees is tied to major ongoing political debates
(SALT II) or to events in which American lives may have been lost due to what
is perceived to be poor collection (Beirut). While perhaps not unusual for the
Congress, there is much in the way that the two intelligence committees over-
see collection that is ad hoc in nature.
It is possible to argue, of course, that the reason why collection has not
been given more attention by the committees is that all is healthy. Yet this
appears dubious on its face. For example, it is well known that most of Amer-
ica's intelligence collection effort is targeted at the Soviet Union; it is also
known that much of that effort, at least in terms of dollars spent, is technically
based. Yet within the past decade, according to press accounts, three major
and essential collection platforms have been compromised through espionage:
ELINT, Boyce-Lee; IMINT, Kampiles; and COMINT, Prime. One would as-
sume that, given these events, -a thorough and resounding debate on the state
of American collection capabilities vis a vis the Soviet Union would be in
order. There is no evidence that this has in fact occurred in either the SSCI or
the HPSCI.
If the committees have not thought it necessary to review the state of
intelligence collection on America's prime adversary, it is not surprising that
there is little evidence that either committee has ever in a methodical manner
addressed the most fundamental question in the area of collection-which is.
what it is that we actually want collected. It is obvious but insufficient to say
"intelligence." It is no longer clear exactly what is meant by that term. There
are, in fact, two types of intelligence being collected today, each distinct and
each with its own advocates in the intelligence community and on Capitol
Hill. The first type is the kind of specialized, sensitive information we tradi-
tionally associate with cloak and dagger: the second type is the kind of general.
macro-level information about countries and the world generated by the social
sciences. Within the American intelligence community these two conceptions
of intelligence compete with each other for resources and attention. In order
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
Oversight
for the intelligence committees to resolve that competition in a reasonable
manner, 'it would seem essential that at some point they engage in some form
of debate about the relative merits of each. That neither committee seems to
have undertaken such a debate is further evidence that its oversight in the area
of collection is unsystematic and largely event-driven.
This reactive approach persists even in the area of domestic collection
where constituent concerns about civil liberties sharpen a Senator's or Repre-
sentative's political sensibilities. Under the terms of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA), the Attorney General is required to brief the two
committees fully twice a year on all electronic surveillances conducted in the
United States for purposes of intelligence collection. What is unique, and help-
ful for the student of the oversight process, is FISA's requirement that the SSCI
and HPSCI report annually on the first few years of the act's implementation
and include in that report an analysis of its functioning.
HPSCI has issued its fifth and final report. In none of HPSCI's reports has
it recommended any amendment to FISA. The clear impression is that the
committee is satisfied with the act's implementation and operation. The SSCI
has also issued its fifth and final annual report. As with the HPSCI, the SSCI
has not recommended a single change to FISA.
In general, the issues raised in the annual reports have been quite minor.
ranging from "certain paperwork problems" to "inadvertent" irregularities
during the execution of an electronic surveillance. The most serious question
posed by the committees' reports has centered on FISA's utility as a legal basis
or model for authorizing physical search techniques. In none of the reports is
there more than a hint that the committee has reviewed the implementation of
the act with an eye to determining its effect on the collection of foreign intel-
ligence or counterintelligence and whether that collection was in any way
adequate. While both the SSCI and HPSCI, according to their reports, thought
it necessary to do more than take the word of executive branch officials with
regard to the act's requirement that dissemination among agencies of informa-
tion concerning US persons be minimized, they took at face value the state-
ment of FBI Director William Webster that FISA "has not had a deleterious
effect on our counterintelligence effort."
It is difficult, after reading FISA and seeing the various complexities and
hurdles it constructs, not at least to wonder about its inhibiting effect on the
collection of intelligence. At first glance, it appears that whatever effect FISA
is having, it is not that. To date, out of the hundreds of applications made to
the special courts by the Department of Justice, not a single one has been
rejected. For many, this is a sign that the judges of the FISA court have
become a "rubber stamp" for the executive branch. But in theory, it is equally
possible that instead of executive initiative overwhelming judicial restraint.
judicial restraint has infused itself into the collection process. The very exist-
ence of the court has probably compelled the Justice Department to "scrub"
its applications so thoroughly that only the clearest cases are put forward for
the FISA judge to review.
It would seem reasonable to expect the two intelligence committees to
sharply question this statistical anomaly. But neither has. Both committees
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Oversight
would undoubtedly be alarmed if a large percentage of FISA applications
were rejected by the court. That a similar concern has not arisen over the fact
that not a single FISA request has ever been turned down is telling.
In general, concerted congressional interest in collection has been episodic
and largely driven by political concerns of the moment. Even in those in-
stances when committee oversight is exercised on a more systematic basis, it
leaves much to be desired.27
Analysis
The effect congressional oversight has had on intelligence analysis is dif-
ficult to measure. Neither of the two intelligence committees can be said to
have ignored this area. For example, during reviews of the intelligence com-
munity's budget, changes in either manpower or dollar levels are made to
strengthen or weaken specific analytic fields. Typically, these changes will
reflect the strong desires of a particular member. Some of the changes have
been substantial, others less so. Yet the total direct effect on the analytic ele-
ment of the community is far from clear.
Perhaps the most important impact of the new oversight process on anal-
ysis derives from the two committees having become themselves major "con-
sumers" of finished intelligence. With rare exception, the bulk of the analytic
product is now available to the SSCI and the HPSCI. Certainly, all National
Intelligence Estimates are.
It is easy to speculate that this constant committee perusal of the com-
munity's product increases the likelihood of its politicization. Surely in an area
where policy is in dispute a President or his representative, the DCI, has a
strong incentive to ensure either by heavy-handed or subtle means that the
finished intelligence does not undermine the administration's stated position.
Any politicization that occurs, however, probably is much less dramatic.
As the committees have become consumers, Congress has begun to see the two
intelligence committees as its own independent repositories for sensitive infor-
mation. Given its expanded role in the conduct of foreign affairs, Congress will
undoubtedly use the committees to review, challenge or validate intelligence
assessments that underlie key executive branch policies. Two past examples of
this phenomenon are the SSCI's 1979 report, "Capabilities of the United States
to Monitor the SALT II Treaty," and the HPSCI's 1982 report, "U.S. Intelli-
27 A representative sample of committee oversight of FISA is the Senate Intelligence Committee's final
report. -The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. The First Five Years." U.S. Senate. Select
Committee on lntelligenc. Report 98-660. Oct 5. 1984 In the report's 26 pages. not a single paragraph can
be found which indicates that the committee made an independent assessment of the impact FISA has had
on domestic intelligence collection. On the other hand, numerous pages are dedicated to reassuring the public
that under FISA "Rig Brother" is not listening. The single-mindedness of the oversight process in this area
of collection is exemplified bs- the first sentence of the reports final paragraph The Committee considers
its oversight role to be an integral part of the system of checks and balances that is necessary to protect
constitutional rights."
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Oversight
Bence Performance on Central America. -28
Such reviews have their effect. Like any set of bureaucrats, intelligence
analysts become set in their opinions and adopt "house" positions. Once these
positions have been established, individual reputations and institutional inter-
ests make it difficult for contrary views to be heard. Because the committees
offer a readership with a wide range of political views for these products,
assumptions are inevitably questioned and conclusions challenged. There is
much to be gained from a process in which analysts and agencies are required
to defend in a more exacting manner their "pet" positions.
On the other hand, there are dangers here. Not every analyst or agency
will rise to the challenge. When faced with the committees' wide range of
opinionated readers, it is equally possible that the analyst or agency will be
tempted to turn out a product that least offends the greatest number. This, of
course, only exacerbates the well-known problem within the analytic commu-
nity of consensus-produced estimates.
In general, it is unlikely that serious oversight of the analytic process is
possible if the committee's principal manner of proceeding is to challenge
areas of analysis on a seemingly random, case by case basis. At best, such case
studies raise the level of analytic reasoning in a particular area for some lim-
ited amount of time. More likely, they quicken bureaucratic instincts.
Yet, to date, oversight has been carried out in precisely this manner. Both
committees have undertaken a handful of case studies on diverse topics.
Among the subjects reviewed have been the fall of the Shah, the oil crisis of
1973-74, the expulsion of the Marielitos, and Soviet oil production. As is sug-
gested by this sample, the committees characteristically examine an issue after
it has become a matter of public concern or dispute.
The most recent HPSCI case study was a sharp critique of analysis on
selected issues pertaining to El Salvador and Nicaragua. Despite its title, "U.S.
Intelligence Performance on Central America: Achievements and Selected In-
stances of Concern," the report left no question that the committee saw far too
few achievements and much about which to be concerned. Some of its specific
criticisms were that the community had at times overstated its findings in
regard to external support to the Salvadoran insurgents, that it seemed to have
little interest in or grasp of rightist violence in El Salvador, that it was overly
simplistic in its analysis of the conflict between the Miskito Indians and the
Sandinistas, and that it sacrificed its more reasoned judgment about the Nica-
raguan military buildup to rhetoric. What praise the report did hand out was
in reference to the community's analysis of the organization and activities of
the Salvadoran guerrillas and its "detection" of assistance to the insurgents by
Cuba and other communist countries. Even so, the praise was faint since the
report's final judgment was that there were signs that the analytic "environ-
2" U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. "Principal Findings of the Capabilities of the United
States to Monitor the SALT II Treah.' Committee Print, October 1979. U.S. House of Representatives.
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Subcommittee on Oversight and Evaluation. "U.S. Intelligence
Performance on Central America: Achievements and Selected Instances of Concern. " Committee Print.
September 22. 1982.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Oversight
ment" was "under pressure to reinforce policy rather than to inform it." Left
unsaid, but clearly implied, was that the community's "achievements" were
the result of the administration's particular policy concerns.
Opponents of the Reagan Administration's policies in Central America
were quick to praise the report; supporters just as quickly denounced it. De-
bate was heated. Retired Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, who had become a
consultant to HPSCI after leaving the Deputy DCI position earlier in the year,
felt obliged to resign as a consultant to protest its publication. Whatever the
report's merits, it produced results which were sharply partisan. HPSCI's re-
port on Central America is markedly different from the SSCI's report on per-
haps the most important analytic effort of the last decade, the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board's (PFIAB) competitive examination of the
National Intelligence Estimate on Soviet strategic capabilities, the so-called
"A-B Team" experiment.29 HPSCI's report raises substantive concerns; in con-
trast, the SSCI's document is void of any substantive discussion of the findings
of the A-B Team effort.
The Senate report begins with the statement that its purpose is to assess
"whether the A-B experiment had proved to be a useful procedure in improv-
ing National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) on a centrally important question."
Its conclusion was that review of NIEs by outside experts is generally useful. It
also concluded that in this particular instance the review was "less valuable"
than it might have been.
Most of the reasons the SSCI report gives for this judgment are minor in
nature and essentially procedural in character. For example, it faults PFIAB's
B Team for reviewing more NIEs on Soviet strategic capabilities than had
originally been agreed upon with the DCI. The report also objects to the fact
that the experiment itself was leaked to the press and that the "agencies need-
lessly allowed analytic mismatches by sending relatively junior specialists into
the debating arena against prestigious and articulate B Team authorities."(!)
What the reader does not find in the SSCI report is any discussion of the
merits of the B Team's findings or any analysis of its arguments. The docu-
ment's drafters might claim that it was not the committee's intent to resolve
the debate between the community and the PFIAB. Nevertheless, it is difficult,
if not impossible, to discuss the usefulness of any analytic experiment independ-
ent of some assessment of the arguments themselves.
The very different tenors of the two committee reports reflect, of course,
the difference in the committees' respective constitutions. The majority..
dominated HPSCI might naturally be expected to produce a critique with a
partisan edge; the bipartisan SSCI to shy away from divisive analytic disputes.
Obviously, neither is finally satisfactory.
2? U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Subcommittee on Collection. Production. and Ought' .
"The National Intelligence Estimates .A-B Team Episode Concerning Soviet Strategic Capabilit' and
Objectives." Committee Print. February' 16. 1978.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4 -
Oversight
Covert action (sometimes referred to as "special activities") is defined by
the law as "operations in foreign countries, other than activities intended solely
for obtaining necessary intelligence." This definition, which tells you what
covert action is by telling you what it is not, obviously implies that under the
rubric of covert action lies a wide range of options. Covert action is a tool of
foreign policy which can be either carrot or stick, mundane or not. It may
simply consist in planting a news story in another nation's press or it may
encompass the training, arming, and employment of a paramilitary operation.
Covert action, in short, may be used to change a government's behavior or to
change a government altogether.
Formally, the reforms of the mid-1970s left the President's discretion to
use covert action intact, the only exception being the Clark Amendment of
1974 (P.L. 94-329) which prohibits clandestine assistance to the insurgents
fighting in Angola. The only other prohibition is a self-imposed one against
assassination. While the SSCI and HPSCI are to be informed and briefed on
every presidential finding, they have no advise and consent responsibility.
Nevertheless, in practice the two intelligence committees may exercise a
great deal of influence. The most direct formal control the committees have
over covert programs is through the budget process, as every covert operation
is subject to specific authorization by the committees. The second form of
control is much less direct.,ut nonetheless significant. The possibility that an
individual member migl - xercise a "legislative veto" by leaking a particular
program to the press cats- and does-inhibit the options put forward by the
executive branch. In shor while a president, under the law, has at his disposal
wide discretion in empl. , ng a variety of "special activities," he has in fact a
more limited number of options. Only noncontroversial findings remain co-
vert.
The Reagan Administration's reported covert support for the anti-
Sandinista insurgents is a case in point.30 According to press accounts. the
President apparently signed the requisite funding in December of 1981.31 In
short order, the stories were out.32
In some sense this was only too predictable. The controversy generated by
the State Department's White Paper on "Communist Interference in El Sal-
vador," published less than a year previously, clearly indicated a serious lack
of consensus regarding the strategic problems facing the US in Central Amer-
ica. Ironically, it was perhaps the very absence of a consensus that would
precipitate a decision to challenge the Moscow-Havana-Managua nexus with a
su"A Secret War for Nicaragua.'' Newsweek. Nov. 8. 1982.
61 "Secret War." Newsweek. p. 44
""Reagan Racks Action Plan for Central America." Washington Post. Feb 14. 1982. D Al. "U.S.
.Approves Covert Plan in Nicaragua.' Washington Post. March 10. 1982. D Al As is tsplcallR the case. the
administration then attempted to get its side of the stop out. The result i"according to senior Administration
officials") -U.S. Reportedly Spending Millions to Foster Moderates in Nicaragua." New York Times, March
11. 1982. p. At. "U.S. Said to Plan Covert Actions in Latin Region." New York Times. March 14. 1982. D.
Al.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Oversight
covert program.33 According to Alexander Haig's account in Caveat, he was
"virtually alone" among the President's senior advisers in suggesting that the
US bring its "overwhelming" military power "to bear on Cuba in order to treat
the problem at its source." The other camp favored, according to Haig, "a
low-key treatment of El Salvador as a local problem and sought to cure it
through limited amounts of military and economic aid ... along with certain
covert measures. -34 If true, it would seem to be a classic example of covert
action's being used as "a 'safe' option-something between diplomacy and
sending in the Marines-but in effect as a substitute for policy itself."33
More than a year and a half would pass before President Reagan would
make a nationally televised address before a joint session of the Congress on
the Administration's policy in Central America.
Predictably, in the absence of a policy publicly articulated by the Presi-
dent, the apparent tacit support initially given by the SSCI and the HPSCI
an to unravel. As noted previously, from a congressman's point of view the
normal political benefit of being a member of an intelligence committee is
small. The major problem he faces is the exposure of a sensitive, perhaps
embarrassing, and often misrepresented covert program. Not free under the
rules of secrecy established by each committee to defend his position or the
reasonableness of a particular program in any adequate manner, the member
is bound to feel politically exposed. For this reason the committees will tend to
act as a brake on covert programs.'
The two committees do not exercise this power in the same manner, as is
apparent in their respective handlings of the Nicaraguan program. The Senate
committee has addressed this issue in a fashion consonant with its composition
as a bipartisan body, one which is intended to "reflect the composition and
philosophy of the entire Senate." As reported by the press and the committee
itself, the SSCI forced the Administration over the spring and summer of 1983
`Early on in the crisis, it was decided that problems with Cuba and Central America should not become
presidential,' according to two senior Reagan advisors, who calculated that there was much political risk and
little potential gain in the military and political crises of the region.... A tide of protests ... poured in to
the White House over Central American policy. Richard Wirthlin, the presidential pollster. reported a sharp
and sudden drop in presidential popularity.- "Central America: The Dilemma," Washington Post, March 4.
1982. p. Al.
a? Alexander M. Haig. Jr., Caveat (New York: Macmillan. 1984), pp. 128-29. "Some officials, led by
then-Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig. Jr., favored a naval quarantine of Cuba and Nicaragua, but the
Pentagon was leery. As the result of a National Security Council meeting on November 16. 1981. Reagan
approved a 10-point program including economic and military aid to friendly nations. U.S. contingency
planning and military preparedness-but no U.S. military action. One of the 10 points, according to NSC
records, was to 'work with foreign governments as appropriate' to conduct political and paramihtar
operations 'against the Cuban presence and Cuban-Sandinista support i nfrastruct tire in Nicaragua and
elsewhere in Central America. -Racked Nicaraguan Rebel Arms Swells to "OW Men. Washington
Post, May 8, 1983, p. Al.
ss Malcolm Wallop. "U.S. Covert Action Policy Tool or Policy Hedge?" Strategic Renew (Summer 1954).
D 10.
A useful history of this tendency can be found in "Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence.
United States Senate, Januar 1. 1983 to December 31, 1984 " U S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
Report 98-665, October 10. 1984. see. "History of Nicaraguan Program." p Off One result of the contrnsers~
generated by this program has been the further formalization of the reporting process of covert activities bs
the CIA to the two committees. On the nature and content of this new process. see "Covert Action Reporting
Procedures," ibid. pp. 13-IS.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Oversight
to rewrite the presidential finding authorizing covert activity in Nicaragua.37
While the Senate committee apparently agreed to continued support of the
paramilitary operation, it did so by reaching a consensus, a middle position,
between those willing to see the Sandinista regime overturned and those gen-
erally disinclined to support paramilitary actions at all. The result was a pro-
gram which foreswore the former but maintained the program as a means of
bringing pressure to bear on the Sandinista regime to end its "subversion in
neighboring countries."38 It was a compromise which produced a program still
large enough to be controversial in nature but probably not large enough to be
decisive.
The House Intelligence Committee, unburdened by the institutional
norms of bipartisanship, could act in a straightforward and decisive manner.
Partisan in its composition, HPSCI was a ready vehicle from which to chal-
lenge a program that lacked any semblance of majority support. Since 1983,
the HPSCI, in concert with the Democratic leadership, has voted repeatedly to
end any support to the Nicaraguan insurgents.
The one exception to this voting pattern was the HPSCI's reported ulti-
mate approval of $24 million for the paramilitary program for FY 84.39 This
exception can perhaps be explained by the fact that, while there was no public
mandate in support of the program, neither was there a clear mandate to end
it and suffer the consequences ending it might bring. Also, the House found
itself in a legislatively difficult position. Essentially, the House was willing to
hold up passage of the intelligence authorization bill over its position on the
.Nicaraguan program. However, it had to be willing as well to frustrate adop-
tion of the Defense Appropriation Act, which contained the authorized appro-
priations for the program. Politically, holding up the former, given its rela-
tively small and secret numbers, over one highly visible issue is not nearly as
difficult as tying up all Department of Defense appropriations over the same
issue. Finally, the House conferees broke and accepted the Senate position, but
with the additional-and later, as funds ran out, crucial-proviso that spend-
ing for the program be capped at $24 million.
For FY 85, the House appeared to face a similar legislative dilemma. If
the House conferees were to maintain their opposition to the program, they
did so at the risk of holding up a "catch-all" appropriations bill required to
finance most of the government for the next 12 months. The administration
faced a dilemma as well; the first Tuesday in November was only a month
away. The White House obviously figured that the political cost of having to
shut down the government for an extended period-solely in order to save the
09 Ibid. p. 6. "U.S.-Backed Nicaraguan Rebel Army Swells to 7000 ten." Washington Post, May 8. 1933.
p. Al. "New justification for l'.S activity in Nicaragua Offered." Washington Post. Sept 21, 1983. p. A29
"Shultz States New Case for Covert Aid to Rebels." Washington Post. Sept. 22. 1983. p. A3.3. "Panel Approves
Nicaraguan Aid." New York Times. Sept 23. 1983. p. A4.
"""Aid to Nicaragua Rebels Backed." New York Times. Sept. 21. 1983. Sec. A. p. 4.
J? "Sec. 108. During fiscal year 1984. not more than 324 million of the funds available to the Central
Intelligence Agency ... mas be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of
supporting ... military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua." P.L. 98-215.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Oversight
program-was too high. The result: the House prevailed and aid to the Nica-
raguan insurgents was banned for 5 months.40
HPSCI's opposition to the program, its later acquiescence, and its final
victory are examples of that committee's tactical flexibility. As the political
advantage or liability of its position becomes clear, the House committee is
able to shift its position accordingly. While the SSCI often reflects a broad but
somewhat flaccid unanimity, the HPSCI just as often reflects a narrower but
more partisan-edged consensus.
To state the obvious, covert programs today do not fare well when they
operate outside the pale of consensus. It is equally obvious that world events
may run in advance of a well-grounded and publicly articulated policy. A
nation's foreign environment may be outside its control; friends in battle may
overnight become one's enemies. As a result, the contingencies of foreign af-
fairs may easily outstrip the consensus that ordinarily must exist if a democ-
racy is to pursue a policy. Most of the time this does not pose much of a
problem. At other times, however, the stakes may be very large. Given the
general tendency in the current system of congressional oversight to pull co-
vert action into directions on which there is little debate, the question arises as
to whether, in inhibiting imprudent risk-taking, it may also inhibit necessary
risk-taking.
Conclusion
Congressional oversight of American intelligence has on the whole been
uneven in character. On the one hand, reports of a CIA program to support
the insurgency in Nicaragua have caused serious divisiveness between the in-
telligence community and the two intelligence committees and among com-
mittee members, and have shattered the calm that followed the stormy days of
the Church and Pike Committees. On the other, reports of a CIA program to
aid the insurgency in Afghanistan have elicited none of the same protest. In
fact, it is difficult to find a member of either the SSCI or HPSCI who has
publicly criticized the idea of giving assistance to the Mujahidin. What criti-
cism there is holds that not enough is being done.
To some degree the controversy generated by reports of a Nicaraguan
program is an exception to Congress' general bent in recent years to grant
relief and be supportive of the intelligence agencies. Perhaps no better evi-
dence is available to support this view than that while Congress was prohibit-
ing US support to the Nicaraguan insurgents it was at the same time passing
legislation relieving the CIA from some of the requirements of the Freedom of
Information Act and enacting an authorization bill for Fl 85 which, according
to press accounts, continued the prior years' substantial increases in the com-
munity's budget. 41
The trend seems clear; however, it does not rest on a deeply held consen-
sus. As a result, the oversight system appears susceptible to sudden and some-
`Conferees Approve '85 Funds." Washington Post. Oct. 11. 1984. p. Al.
" P.L. 98-477. "Senate Balks at Raising Debt After Funding Bill is Enacted." Washington Post. Oct. 12.
1984, p. Al.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Oversight
times disabling shocks. While it is true that events such as the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan and the debacle in Iran changed public and elite attitudes
about the need to strengthen the various elements of the national security
establishment, there still lingers an underlying suspicion about those elements
in general, and intelligence in particular. Events, not a publicly articulated set
of strategic principles, have produced what little consensus there is; events can
strain and disrupt it just as quickly.
In theory, the two houses of Congress were meant to be both representa-
tive and deliberative. Through the committee system, Congress' division of
labor, both functions are to be carried out in a particular area of public policy.
It is not difficult to conclude that both the SSCI and HPSCI have managed the
former fairly well, although somewhat unevenly. As for deliberation, oversight
has left much to be desired. Over the past 4 years, public opinion has generally
been supportive of the need to enhance intelligence capabilities. The two com-
mittees have reflected that outlook but have not made a serious effort to refine
this support by a sustained and thorough review of these capabilities.
The potential for the two committees to exercise more substantive over-
sight exists. First, both the SSCI and HPSCI are "select" committees; their
members are chosen by the leadership especially for this task. This presumably
means that the membership of both is a cut above the usual congressional
committee. Second, while the lack of the typical constituent payoff may at
times disincline a member from expending much effort on committee work,
that very lack of constituent responsibility may also free him to deliberate
more seriously about the matter at hand.
It has also been argued that a sounder *oversight process might be achieved
by exchanging the two intelligence committees for a joint committee. Depend-
ing on just how the joint committee was constituted, this might well prove to
be the case. One could hypothesize that a single body, smaller than the com-
bined numbers of the two separate committees, would bear more responsibil-
ity and be more responsible in fulfilling this function. At minimum, creation of
a joint committee would be a sign that the pendulum of authority in foreign
affairs was swinging back toward the executive branch after a decade of ex-
panding congressional power. Whatever the merits of a joint committee, how-
ever, the irreducible fact will remain that a congressional committee is a con-
gressional committee is a congressional committee.
More critical to the future of oversight than any institutional change is the
public adoption of a new, coherent set of principles to guide American foreign
policy. The present period is marked by the abatement of the isolationist
impulse; however, no publicly accepted doctrine of foreign policy has arisen to
take its place.
For want of a majority-binding doctrine of foreign policy, it is hardly
surprising that oversight of intelligence should give way to the tendency, under
separation of powers, to muddle along. However, separation of powers, prop-
erly understood, also provides a possible remedy. Through the establishment of
an independent, unitary executive, the system invites (though it does not guar-
antee) the exercise of presidential leadership. The presidency is, as Theodore
Roosevelt pointed out, a "bully pulpit."
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
Oversight
Bully pulpit or not, only the presidency holds the potential for setting in
place a coherent foreign policy which might attract a solid, secure consensus.-12
Establishment of such a set of principles is key to defining the premises from
which those charged with oversight may best deliberate. Lacking a clear idea
of exactly what operative principles underlie American foreign policy today,
oversight naturally reflects that incoherence in its disposition of intelligence
issues. To those involved a decade ago in challenging the "imperial" presi-
dency it may seem ironic, but the invigoration of the current intelligence
oversight process is likely to require a vigorous and sustained assertion of pres-
idential leadership.
"This, however, is not to underestimate the difficulty of building and sustaining such a consensus.
Consider, for example. Halter Lippman's appraisal of the viability of Kennan's policy of containment given
American political culture. The Cold War: A Study in US Foreign Policy ('New York. Harper and Brothers,
1947), pp. 15ff.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Iq
Next 12 Page(s) In Document Denied
STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
From marks Before The University
Club, Washington, D.C.,
18 September 1986, by William J.
Casey
"Before I sit down, let me lay down just one more marker. I am sure
you have all heard about our recent efforts to deal with an old national
security problem that is becoming increasingly intolerable. I am
talking about the deliberate leaking of sensitive classified
intelligence information from the Executive Branch of our government,
and the replaying of that information by the media.
"I don't have time now to go through the whole chamber of horrors on
leaks. But I can tell you that we can, and do, lose sensitive
collection systems that cost billions of hard-earned tax dollars -
agents can, and do, die as a result of leaks - our allies can, and do,
lose faith in our abilities to protect information they pass us.
"Just a few weeks ago, the intelligence service of one of our
closest allies told us they can no longer pass us advance information on
terrorist activities. It has had enough of reading about its most
sensitive, well-protected information in the U.S..media. And when
intelligence sources and methods are compromised in areas such as
counterterrorism, the direct result easily could be dead American
tourists and other ordinary citizens. Unauthorized disclosure of
classified information puts lives and national security at risk and does
more damage to our intelligence capabilities than Soviet espionage.
"We know we can't throw rocks around in a glass house. Our first
priority must be to tighten discipline within our government and,
believe me, we are doing just that. We are putting into place
mechanisms to aggressively investigate apparent cases of leaking within
the government and to take punitive and legal action against government
employees who betray the trust placed in them. People have lost their
jobs in recent months.
"But, of course, the leak itself is just one side of the equation.
We have to do a much better job than we have in the past of convincing
the American people and the media of their own responsibility to protect
intelligence sources and sensitive collection systems.
"In this dangerous world we live in and in this modern era of
intelligence, the stakes have become entirely too high to sweep this
breach of trust, irresponsibility and violation of law in the handling
of sensitive classified information under the rug.
"The men and women of our. intelligence services are in a dangerous,
difficult, and not particularly well paid profession because they want
to ensure that their children and grandchildren, and yours, will
continue to enjoy the protection of the First Amendment and the
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
privilege of living in a country with a free press. But national
security is also a Constitutional right and privilege. Obviously what's
needed is some balance and accommodation between the government and the
media.
The issue is simply one of responsibility, discretion and common
sense. Who pays for establishing a new collection system or recruiting
a new human source to replace ones that have been compromised? You, me,
and every other taxpayer in the country.'
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
(+' [, Y 2.1
"In a way, I guess it was inevitable."
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
From "The Agency", by
John Panelagh
COVERING THE WATERFRONT
The first trend Cates saw was "the coming revolution in the way intelli-
gence is communicated to policy makers." The electronic dissemination of
finished intelligence from the analysts to the policy makers was already being
planned. There would be computer terminals on the desks of key people,
which, it was thought, "would speed current intelligence to real time should a
policy maker want it," and which might have a tall-back, capacity that would
improve the relationship between policy makers and analysts. Such a system
would have security advantages, it was argued, because there would be much
less paper and access to the information could be by handprint or other means
specific to the individual. The terminals would be designed so that they could
not be connected to other terminals or to printers. 31 The weakness of this sce-
nario was that it is not just how fast information reaches a policy maker that
matters, but how it may be buried by what else is on his or her desk. The tele-
phone already provides the same basic access as a terminal, but it is not often
used by policy makers contacting analysts, which suggests that the terminal-
on-the-desk future would simply be more clutter. For it to be otherwise, intel-
ligence recipients would have to be taught how to see information through in-
telligence eyes-much as Stansfield Turner attempted with Jimmy Carter.
The education of the consumer is as important as the information received.
Even the argument of security improvement was suspect: people will always
doublecheck by looking over each other's shoulders and by speaking to each
other. Information is separate from the way it is recorded.
The second trend foreseen was that "the data we need will be more diffi-
cult to obtain." Soviet camouflage and disguise techniques were already reduc-
ing the effectiveness of telemetry in monitoring missile tests, quite apart from
the traditional Soviet refusal to divulge information about their weapons sys-
tems development even when it came to arms reduction and limitation talks.
Compounding this, information that was once available about the Soviet
economy was no longer published and was increasingly restricted within the
Soviet governing elite. Further afield, other countries were increasingly picking
up American intelligence techniques and improving their own methods of
camouflage and deception.32
The increasing difficulties of intelligence collection, however, also con-
Speaking in general terms, Stansfield Turner observed:
Each President has to work out his own system. He's got to learn about intelligence. He
has to have tutorials. He can read a book, he can get briefing papers, he can listen to peo-
ple. But he has to understand that satellites stay Over MOSCOW only for three minutes a day,
and that every other day there are clouds, and that therefore he should not call up the DCI
and say, "Cet me a picture of the Olympics in Moscow today. I want it by three o'clock'"
The probability of doing this is only about :5 percent. The chances of getting it by three
o'clock are directly related to the satellite schedule-it may pass over Moscow at ten
o'clock, and you can't change that. The President has got to understand these things. Each
President has to have some technique for absorbing enough mechanical intelligence to
know how to manage it (interview, Stansfield Turner, July :q, 1953)
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
In Search of .Magic: 1950-1955
tained important benefits. It was not a one-way street. For example, b%, denying
economic information that until recently was published, the Soviets were pre-
venting levels of their own government from having it, thus increasing both the
chances of mismanagement and fueling an increase in espionage as Russians,
in effect, had to spy on themselves to discover facts about their own economy.
And with more people trying to obtain information, it would be easier for the
United States to "lose" its informers in the general activit}. Ans' society pays a
heavy price for the degree of secrecy sought by the Soviet Union, because it is,
in fact, seeking to keep information from itself.
The third future trend identified by Cates was that "recruitment would
become more difficult." The number of people of the right standard to be CIA
officers, and who could pass the polygraph, was declining. The overall pool of
talent for intelligence work was diminishing, and the effort to recruit people
was enormous. Additionally, government service was becoming less attractive,
although once people joined the agency they tended to stay. Among profes-
sionals, there was a less than 4 percent attrition rate, better than anywhere else
in the government or in industry.33 The principal reason for polygraph failure
was drugs, a strictly cultural problem which was likely to be accommodated in
some way eventually.? All societies learn how to adapt to themselves: in the
192os the consumption of alcohol would have been a disqualification, but
American law changed. A question behind the low attrition rate was, "Do you
want twenty-year people in the CIA?" The length of tenure was a clear state-
ment of the agency as an established bureaucracy rather than the fast-moving
and flexible creation of '947. And the pride in the low attrition rate was a dem-
onstration of contentment with this position.
Fourth, there was already "a revolution in relations with Congress,"
which would continue. Beginning in the mid-1970s, the flow of finished intel-
ligence to Congress had come to mean that Congress had as much intelligence
as the executive branch. Building on this, observed Gates, the huge number of
' In the early 1950s, China started to cultivate its traditional drug production with a view to
affecting American troops in Japan and Korea. In 1g6o, Castro apparently signed a secret agree-
ment with the Soviet Union to help distribute Soviet-produced drugs in America in cooperation
with elements of Czechoslovak intelligence. In iq6=, the intelligence forces of the member coun-
tries of the Warsaw Pact joined this effort. In 1965, Chou En-lai was reported to have told Nasser
that China was manufacturing heroin to spread addiction among U.S. servicemen in Vietnam
and through them back to young people in the United States. In 1975, Warsaw Pact efforts to
distribute drugs in the United States and Western Europe were stepped up, with Cuba acting as
the coordinator for America. It was an estimated S:oo-billion-a-year operation (interview, Octo-
ber 1_, 1985).
Thus, in an important sense, the Soviet Union and China as drug suppliers were effectively
damaging the CIA by affecting potential agency recruits. "Drugs are the secret weapon of the
KGB," observed one analyst. "In the last two years they've targeted Ireland to get at the British
forces there. We could cut the legs from under it by doing two things: address the alienation in
our society in the first place, and secondly, legalize drugs. But instead we treat drugs with a Jerry
Falwell approach. There is no rhyrpe or reason based on fact about it" (interview, October 14,
1985).
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
staff on Capitol Hill had enabled Congress to ask tougher and better-informed
questions of often hard-pressed officials. In turn, he suggested, this had resulted
in Congress playing a larger and more effective role in foreign policy.While
this was certainly true, the important point was ignored: Congress has never
initiated foreign policy. The result of what Cates described was simply more
business of foreign policy. Further, the developing relationship with Congress
was seen as a demonstration that Congress was a partner to the agency. In the
1970s the agency had lost its special place as the President's secret arm; in the
i98os it was seeking a special place with Congress. \Vhat, it might be won-
dered, would have been said if Cates had observed that, despite the flow of in-
telligence, Congress was not effective in policy-making terms?
The fifth trend was "the use by the executive branch of intelligence for
public education." It had begun under Carter and Turner with the release in
1977 of the agency's detailed analysis of the performance and prospects of the
Soviet economy,` and had subsequently expanded to include up-to-the-minute
analysis which required special declassification. In the summer of 1985, for ex-
ample, the agency's "key judgments" (the summary conclusions of an Esti-
mate) on Soviet strategic forces had been published in a sanitized form at the
insistence of the Executive branch.t It was part of the Reagan administration's
effort to win support for its defense policies in the press and in Congress."
This public education aspect held serious implications not only for the
CIA but for the intelligence effort of the United States. Public education used
to be done through background briefings to journalists and congressmen, but
the suspicions surrounding the intelligence community as a whole during the
1970$ forced more openness, and the publication of sensitive reports was a
consequence. This development gave analysts, collectors, and secret infor-
mants a headache. Still more, it betokened the isolationism which under-
pinned both Carter and Reagan, since it was saying that America was strong
enough (or unconcerned enough) to reveal its secret intelligence assessments
and withstand any consequent damage delivered to its collection and analytical
abilities (for example, by disinformation ploys) by the Soviet Union. Finally,
the use of sensitive information for public education in this way was political,
and the more involved politically intelligence becomes, the more vulnerable it
is to the small change of politics where superior information can put someone
' This was Soviet Economic Problems and Prospects Washington. DC: CIA. iq77i. It Was
followed by supplementary reports on Prospects for Soviet Oil Production AVasnington. DC:
CIA, 1977) and USSR: Some Implications of Demographic Trends for Economic Policies
(Washington, DC: CIA, 1977).
f Soviet Strategic Force Developments. testimony before a joint session of the subcommittee
on strategic and theater nuclear forces of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the defense
subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Intelligence, by Robert M. Cates, Chairman, Na-
tional Intelligence Council, and Deputy Director for Inteiligence. Central Intelligence Agency,
and Lawrence K. Cershwin, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs, National Intel-
ligence Council, June :6. 1985.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
In Scarch of \lagic: 19So-zq-5;
on the "inside" and where leaks are commonplace. "That's always been a
fear," Bernard McMahon agreed. "The design of the oversight committee, the
composition of the staff, the nonpartisan nature of the effort, are all geared to
reduce temptation. But it is a natural tendency because there is a sense in the
executive branch that the secrets belong to them and not to Congress because
intelligence belongs to the executive branch. Then there is the insider's fear
that the outsider is going to use that information against him-a political
means to a political advantage. \Vhat people talk about less is the power of the
executive branch to declassify information. Take the publication of the report
on Soviet Strategic Defense Programs: is that a glossy leak on legitimate de-
classified data? A skeptic could say that it is sophisticated leaking for political
purposes because the President is down to the wire on SDI. The committee
takes an interest in this process, because Congress has paid for the systems that
collected the information and it does not like to see leaks done for partisan po-
litical purposes when the appropriation of funds was nonpartisan and for the
good not of any particular administration but for the country as a whole." 36
"The Strategic Defense Programs release was an almost word-for-word replica-
tion of the National Intelligence Estimate," said a senior CIA official. "A lot of
it was declassified just for the purpose of putting out that document. Some-
body made the decision for political purposes. It was released by the White
House. They had obviously decided that now was the time to inform the
American people that the Soviets were doing SDI too, even though Gorbachev
denies it."37 "We have had little choice about the intelligence we provide to
Congress," said Gates. "So far it has provided us with no serious problems. So
far. "38 "I would contrast what Bob Gates and Bill Casey want to do with what
Colby and Turner tried to do," said a congressional intelligence staffer. "Colby
and Turner wanted to declassify stuff just for university, academic use-basic
encyclopedic knowledge-not so much to educate the public in the political
sense about the Soviet threat, but just to have CIA as a massive storehouse and
disseminator of encyclopedic information, noncontroversial for the most part.
What Bob and Bill want to do is make intelligence public and use it as part of
the political process."39
"The increasing use of intelligence by the policy community to show the
rectitude or the efficacy of our foreign policy to our allies" was the sixth trend
Cates identified. Dissemination of U.S. intelligence had also expanded beyond
the United States' traditional allies.+0 This development was a secondary event
in the much bigger show of changing world opinion. The receptivity of
allies-and others-to U.S. intelligence marked a shift in attitudes toward
both the United States and the Soviet Union by those allies. Policy makers are
power seekers, and they will always use intelligence for what they want and
need, so this use was to be expected. An institutional worry would always be
that agency intelligence distributed in this way would inevitably be double-
checked wherever possible by the recipients, with possible beneficial or detri-
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
mental results for the CIA depending on whether the double-checking was
done with a cooperative interest or not.
The seventh prospect already discernible was "the dramatic increase in
the diversity of subjects the community is required to address," said Gates.
The main subjects used to be the Soviet Union, China, and Southeast Asia.
While the Soviet Union and China were still major subjects. they had been
joined by a range that included foreign technology developments; genetic engi-
neering; trends in food, population, and resources worldwide; religion; human
rights; arms control; drugs; terrorism; and high-technology transfers.''
This was a key observation by Gates. The list of subjects alone showed
that the agency was thinking of itself not so much as a partner in policy, but as
a manager and a servant of policy. This had always been its formal position,
but its founding fathers had in fact established an agency role in the policy
making area. Now, with the overwhelming balance of CIA interest and atten-
tion reserved for its analytical and collection work, its intelligence effort was
following the general direction of the social sciences. The agency was becom-
ing an instrument for applied social science, ever less operational and ever
more seeking to fill in the blank spaces in forecasting. The range of subjects
showed an agency terrified of missing anything. It was another bureaucracy
saying it covered the waterfront, the reverse of its starting attitude of being the
worthy challenger to the State Department or the Department of Defense, of
being the agency that identified a few essential themes and mastered them.
Now it was, in effect, a secret extension of the Library of Congress.
"That's very true," said Bernard % IcMahon:
When you ask the agency what they're doing and why they're doing it, there
are two responses. The first is that more intelligence is better than less, and
who can argue with that? The second is that they never know what questions
they'll be asked, and they feel they have to be ready. So there's a limitless ap-
proach on their part. The National Intelligence Requirements document has
nine thousand listings. You can find a home for anything there. That's why
we say to them that they need a strategy. Apart from the fact that without a
strategy there's no way to tell where the money is going, if all they do is pro-
vide a library of material that nobody draws much out of, the CIA, the intel-
ligence community as a whole, will be a machine driven to its own perfection.
Some requirements they are the best people to determine because they know
what they need for their data base. And somebody has to perform a 'role as
Cassandra. But they should identify these requirements, and then we will be
able to see if all the intelligence goes into a library or goes into the product.':
"No, I do not feel that the agency has become a secret annex of the Library of
Congress," William Casey declared:
We have the kind of data that does not get into a library. The big surprise for
me coming back into intelligence was the breadth and the depth of the ana-
lytical work. Donovan did start that element with a formidable bunch of
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
In Search of Magic: 1930-1965 69;
people, and they did range beyond the military, but they weren't into things
like drugs or terrorism or international trade competition or oil flows or cur-
rency movements like we are today. In the OSS days, all you had to do was
figure out where a German division was. It was far more tactical than strate-
gic, which is the change today. \Ve make a great effort to make every product
practical. But the important thing is that the analysis and assessing have been
done. The fact that it's been done. The fact that it's there. The fact that
somebody did it. That's what is important.4'
"An increasing growth in the diversity of the users of intelligence" was
the eighth trend identified by Gates. Use in the early days was concentrated in
the write House, the State Department, and the Department of Defense.
Now, in addition to these, principal users included the Treasury and the De-
partments of Commerce and Energy.' Again, the agency saw this as a wel-
come challenge, defining its nature in the process. It was welding itself to the
bureaucracy, just as with Congress, seeking allies and support. For all the talk
about the speed with which intelligence should reach the policy makers' desks,
the agency was no longer being defined by its ability to respond, but by its abil-
ity to meet its quota of information and to drown questions with an enormous
volume of intelligence rather than with farsighted and accurate political analy-
sis. Secret intelligence is rarely general in its application. In 197 3, for example,
it was obvious that the Egyptians were considering attacking the Israelis across
the Suez Canal in the Sinai. But the enormous defensive sandbanks the Israelis
had built on the east bank of the canal were regarded by analysts in Washing-
ton (and by the Israelis) as major impediments to a successful Egyptian attack.
So, like the French in 1940, who thought that their Maginot line would pre-
vent a successful German attack, the Israelis placed undue confidence in their
sandbanks. Secretly, the Egyptians bought fire hoses, nozzles, and compressors.
They had worked out that they could blast through the sandbanks with water
from the canal. This knowledge, coupled with the purchase of the necessary
equipment, was the secret. For the CIA to extend its effort to cover such spe-
cialized intelligence analysis as would have been involved in estimating Egyp-
tian intentions and capabilities in 1973 (and it had failed to do this then, much
to Nixon's fury), so that it was providing specialized and useful information
combined with accurate forecasting on a wide range of subjects such as Egyp-
tian fire-hose purchasing as well as international currency markets, trade, and
energy to the respective government departments, would involve a gargantuan
effort very unlikely to be speedy. Ultimately, accurate forecasting depends far
more on the caliber of the forecaster than on the quantity of information.
Gates' ninth trend was that "intelligence is becoming steadily more cen-
tral to the foreign policy process of the government." In certain areas, policy
itself depends on intelligence. In technology transfer, drugs, terrorism, there
would, he suggested, be no effective policy without intelligence. In some other
areas, notably arms control, policy, had become more dependent on intelli-
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
gence.4 In effect, this was another way of saying that police work had become
more international. Technology transfer could be seen as involving a superior
form of patent law: drugs, a superior form of prohibition and traditional po-
lice/customs work. terrorism, a superior deterrent and police work for kidnap-
ping and murder. In these areas, a superior FBI might he better suited to
informing policy than the CIA. Indeed, in many of the suhiect areas along the
waterfront being covered under Casey, other government agencies might be
more appropriate and expert in the work required.
The last trend that Cates saw expanding in the future lay in the fact that
"intelligence is the only arm of government looking to the future." As the
world became more complex and as policy makers needed more data, the in-
telligence community was the only government sector looking two, five, ten or
more years ahead. This threw up the perennial working challenge of "having to
go to a policy maker whose hands are full and convince him to do something
which will benefit the future-a successor's successor's successor-at a time
when the cost of doing it is still low, but when there is no immediate bene-
fit." It was a problem of democracy's short horizons and brief attention spans
which all of Bob Gates' predecessors had faced and all of his successors would
face.
Lt. General Lincoln D. Faurer, who retired as director of the National Se-
curity Agency in 1985, made a further point about future planning:
People like to think that we are in competition with the Japanese. We are, in
fact, in competition with ourselves to provide systems that suit our needs in a
controlled manner for specific purposes. Our technological ingenuity creates
a threat to us by encouraging the pursuit of new, more, and costly systems all
the time. We can always find ways of making things better, but we should
not continue to pursue perfection. We must be more disciplined in deciding
what to pursue and sticking to it. We need to go back to basics in identifying
requirements. As a nation, we have always failed to be modest and austere in
identifying our requirements. And as resources become more scarce, as
money becomes tighter, a reduction in our requirements will enable us to re-
lease money for the task.{'
Faurer was voicing a major truth (although, of course, the United States was
also in competition with Japan). All nations face the danger of strangling
themselves by self-competition and becoming uncompetitive with the outside
world, as happened to Britain. At the same time, self-competition is vital to a
vibrant political and market economy, as it generates efficiency and focuses ef-
fort on important problems. In Aesopian language, Link Faurer was identifying
the fact that in intelligence there are few operations anymore where two or
three elite people can be effective. The United States was engaged in an intel-
ligence siege, not a battle, with the other countries of the world, a siege in
which what was involved was massive and would date very quickly.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Fran "Strategic Intelligence
Operations", Defense Lntellicer:ce
College, edited by
GLOSSARY OF INTELLIGENCE TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
acoustical Intelligence" (ACOUSTINT): Intelligence
information derived from analysis of acoustic waves
radiated either intentionally or unintentionally by the
target into the surrounding medium. (In Naval usage,
the acronym ACINT is used and usually refers to
intelligence derived specifically from analysis of
underwater acoustic waves from ships and
submarines.)
actionable intelligence: Intelligence information that
is directly useful to customers without having to go
through the full intelligence production process: it
may address strategic or tactical needs, close-support
of U.S. negotiating teams, or action elements dealing
with such matters as international terrorism or
narcotics.
administratively controlled information: Privileged but
unclassified material bearing designations such as
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY, or LiMITED OFFI-
CIAL USE, to prevent disclosure to unauthorized
persons.
advisory tasking: A non-directive statement of intelli-
gence interest or a request for intelligence information
which is usually addressed by an element of the
Intelligence Community to departments or agencies
having information collection capabilities or intelli-
gence assets not a part of the National Foreign
Intelligence Program.
agent": A person who engages in clandestine intelli-
gence activity under the direction of an intelligence
organization but who is not an officer, employee, or
co-opted worker of that organization.
agent of influence": A person who is manipulated by
an intelligence organization to use his position to
influence public opinion or decisionmaking in a
manner which will advance the objective of the
country for which that organization operates.
alert memorandum: A document issued by the
Director of Central Intelligence to National Security
Council-level policyrnakers to warn them of possible
developments abroad, often of a crisis nature, of
major concern to the U.S.; it is coordinated within the
Intelligence Community to the extent time permits.
analysis': A process in the production step of the
intelligence cycle in which intelligence information is
subjected to systematic examination in order to
identify significant facts and derive conclusions
therefrom. (Also see intelligence cycle.)
assessment": (1) (Genera! use) Appraisal of the worth
of an intelligence activity, source, information, or
product in terms of its contribution to a specific goal,
or the credibility, reliability, pertinency, accuracy, or
usefulness of information in terms of an intelligence
need. When used in contrast with evaluation assess-
ment implies a weighing against resource allocation,
expenditure, or risk. (See eralwtion.) (2) (Production
context) See intelligence assessment. (Also we net
assessment.)
asset': See intelligence asset. (Also see national
intelligence asset and tactical intelligence asset.)
authentication: (1) A communications security mea-
sure designed to provide protection against fraudulent
transmission and hostile imitative communications
deception by establishing the validity of a transmis-
sion, message, station, or designator. (2) A means of
identifying or verifying the eligibility of a station,
originator, or individual to receive specific categories
of information. (Also see commaaicatioas deception.)
automatic data processing system security: All of the
technological safeguards and managerial procedures
established and applied to computer hardware,
software, and data in order to ensure the protection of
organizational assets and individual privacy; it in-
cludes: all hardware/software functions, characteris-
tics, and features; operational procedures, account-
ability procedures, and access controls at the central
computer facility; remote computer and terminal
facilities, management constraints, physical structures
and devices; and the personnel and communication
controls needed to provide an acceptable level of
protection for classified material to be contained in
the computer system.
basic intelligence": Comprises general reference mate-
rial of a factual nature which results from a collection
of encyclopedic information relating to the political,
economic, geographic, and military structure, re-
sources, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of foreign
nations.
biographical intelligence- Foreign intelligence on the
views, traits, habits, skills, importance, relationships,
health, and curriculum vitae of those foreign personal-
ities of actual or potential interest to the United
States Government.
cartographic intelligence: Intelligence primarily mani-
fested in maps and charts of areas outside the United
States and its territorial waters.
case officer': A professional employee of an intelli-
gence organization who is responsible for providing
direction for an agent operation. (See agent.)
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Central Intelligence Agency Program (CIAPk See
National foreign laselligeaee Program
dpber': A cryptographic system in which the.
cryptographic treatment (i.e., the method of trans-
forming plain text by predetermined rules to obscure
or conceal its meaning) is applied to plain text
elements such as letters, digits, polygraphs, or bits
which either have no intrinsic meaning or are treated
without regard to their meaning in cases where the
element is a natural-language word.
clandestine: Secret or hidden; conducted with secrecy
by design.
clandestine activity: Secret or hidden activity con-
ducted with secrecy by design. (The phrase clandes-
tine operation is preferred. Operations are pre-
planned activities.)
clandestine collection: The acquisition of intelligence
information in ways designed to assure the secrecy of
the operation.
clandestine communication: Any type of communica-
tion or signal originated in support of clandestine
operations. (Also see illicit communication,)
clandestine operation': A pre-planned secret intelli-
gence information collection activity or covert politi-
cal, economic, propaganda, or paramilitary action
conducted so as to assure the secrecy of the operation;
encompasses both clandestine collection and covert
action.
Clandestine Services: That portion of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) that engages in clandes-
tine operations; sometimes used as synonymous with
the CIA Operations Directorate.
classification: The determination that official infor-
mation requires, in the interest of national security, it
specific degree of protection against unauthorized
disclosure, coupled with a designation signifying that
such a determination has been made; the designation
is normally termed a security classification. (Also see
declassf cation.)
classification authority: Those officials within the
Executive Branch who have been authorized pursuant
to an Executive Order to originally classify informa-
tion or material.
classified information': Official information which
has been determined to require, in the interests of
national security, protection against unauthorized
disclosure and which has been so designated.
code': A cryptographic system in which the crypto-
graphic equivalents (usually ailed code groups),
typically consisting of letters or digits (or both) in
otherwise meaningless combinations, are substituted
for plain text elements such as words, phrases, or
sentences.
code word':. Generally, a word or term which conveys
a prearranged meaning other than the conventional
one; specifically, a word or term chosen to conceal the
identity of a function or action, as distinguished from
a cover name which conceals the identity of a person,
organization, or installation. (Also see easier.)
CODEWORD': Any of a series of designated words
or terms used with a security classification to indicate
that the material so classified was derived through a
sensitive source or method, constitutes a particular
type of sensitive compartmented information (SCI),
and is therefore accorded limited distribution.
collateral: All national security information classified
under the provisions of an Executive Order for which
special Intelligence Community systems of eompart-
mentation (i.e., sensitive compartmented irformatlon)
are not formally established.
col action': See intelligence cycle.
collection guidance: See gxidaace.
co lection requirement: An expression of an intelli-
gence information need which requires collection and
carries at least an implicit authorization to commit
resources in acquiring the needed information. (Also
see intelligence rquirement.)
combat Information: Unevaluated data, gathered by
or provided directly to the tactical commander which,
due to its highly perishable nature or the criticality of
the situation, cannot be processed into tactical
intelligence in time to satisfy the customer's tactical
intelligence requirements.
combat intelligence- That knowledge of the enemy,
weather, and geographical features required by a
commander in the planning and conduct of combat
operations. (Also see tactical intelligeaea)
Committee on Exchanges (COMEXk See Director '
Central Intelligence Co mittee. (Also aft DCID
2/6.)
Committee on Imagery Regdreaenb and Expieibtisn
(COMIREX) See Director 4W Central latelligeenee
Committee (Also we DCID 1/13.)
commtadations cover: See asaaipalative eaauwanica-
tioas cover.
communication deception: The deliberate transmis-
sion, retransmission, alteration, absorption, or reflec-
tion of telecommunications in a manner intended to
cause a misleading interpretation of these telecom-
munications. It includes:
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
a. Imitative communications deception-Intrusion
into foreign communications channels for the purpose
of deception by introducing signals or traffic in
imitation of the foreign communications.
b. manipulative communications deception-The
alteration or simulation of friendly telecommunica-
tions for the purpose of deception.
communications intelligence' (COMINT) Technical
and intelligence information derived from intercept of
foreign communications by other than the intended
recipients; it does not include . the monitoring of
foreign public media or the intercept of communica-
tions obtained during the course of counterintelligence
investigations within the United States.
communications security' (COMSEC): The protection
resulting from any measures taken to deny unauthor-
ized persons information of value which might be
derived from telecommunications, or to ensure the
authenticity of such telecommunications.
communications security signals acquisition and
analysis: The acquisition of radio frequency propaga-
tion and its subsequent analysis to determine empiri-
cally the vulnerability of the transmission media to
interception by hostile intelligence services; it includes
cataloging the transmission spectrum and taking
signal parametric measurements as required but does
not include acquisition of information carried on the
system; it is one of the techniques of communications
security surveillance. (Also see communications seen-
Pity surveillance.)
eommuoications security surveillance: The systematic
examination of telecommunications and automatic
data processing systems to determine the adequacy of
communications security measures: to identify com-
munications security deficiencies, to provide data
from which to predict the effectiveness of proposed
communications security measures, and to confirm
the adequacy of such measures after implementation.
Community On-Line Intelligence System (COINS): A
network of Intelligence Community computer-based
information storage and retrieval systems that have
been interconnected for interagency sharing of ma-
chine formatted files.
eompartmentatioa': Formal systems of restricted
access to intelligence activities, such systems estab-
lished by and/or managed under the cognizance of
the Director of Central Intelligence to protect the
sensitive aspects of sources, methods, and analytical
procedures of foreign intelligence programs. (Also see
Jecomparrmenta:ion.)
compromise': The exposure of classified official
information or activities to persons not authorized
access thereto; hence, unauthorized disclosure. (Also
see classified information.)
compromising emanations: Unintentional emissions
which could disclose information being transmitted,
received, or handled by any information-processing
equipment.
computer security': The computer-driven aspects of
automatic data processing system security encompass-
ing the mechanisms and techniques that control
access to or use of the computer or information stored
in it. (Also see automatic data processing system
security.)
Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP): See Na-
tional Foreign Intelligence Program.
Consolidated Intelligence Resources Information Sys-
tem (CIRISk The automated management informa-
tion system used to identify and display the expected
distribution of all intelligence resources within the
National Foreign Intelligence Program.
consumer': See customer.
co-opted worker. A national of a country but not an
officer or employee of the country's intelligence
service who assists that service on a temporary or
regular basis. (In most circumstances a co-opted
worker is an official of the country but might also be,
for example, a tourist or student.)
coordination: (1) (In general) The process of seeking
concurrence from one or more groups, organizations,
or agencies regarding a proposal or an activity for
which they share some responsibility, and which may
result in contributions, concurrences, or dissents. (2)
(In intelligence production) The process by which
producers gain the views of other producers on the
adequacy of a specific draft assessment, estimate, or
report; it is intended to increase a product's factual
accuracy, clarify its judgments, resolve disagreement
on issues that permit, and sharpen statements of
disagreement on, major unresolved issues.
counterintelligence': See foreign counterintelligence.
cover. Protective guise used by a person, organization,
or installation to prevent identification with clandes-
tine operations.
covert See clandestine.
covert action: A clandestine operation designed to
influence foreign governments, events, organizations,
or persons in support of United States foreign policy;
it may include political, economic, propaganda, or
paramilitary activities. Covert action is referred to in
Executive Order No. 12036 as special activities. (See
special activities.)
covert operation: See clandestine, operation (preferred
term). A covert operation encompasses covert action
and clandestine collection.
Critical Collection Problems Committee (CCPC): See
Director of Central Intelligence Committee. (Also
see DCID 2/2.)
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
critical intelligence': Intelligence information or
intelligence of such urgent importance to the security
of the United States that it is transmitted at the
highest priority to the President and other national
decisionmaking officials before passing through regu-
lar evaluative channels.
Critical Intelligence Communications System (C.RITI-
COMM)c Those communications facilities under the
operational and technical control of the Director.
National Security Agency which have been allocated
for the timely handling of critical intelligence. (Also
see critical intelligence.)
critical intelligence message' (CRITIC) A message
designated as containing critical intelligence. (Also
see critical intelligence.)
cry ptanalysis (CA) The steps or processes involved in
converting encrypted messages into plain text without
initial knowledge of the system or key employed in the
encryption.
CRYPTO: A designation which is applied to classi-
fied, cryptographic information which involves special
rules for access and handling. (Also see cryptographic
information.)
ayptoRaphic information: All information signifi-
cantly descriptive of cryptographic techniques and
processes or of cryptographic systems and equipment,
or their functions and capabilities, and all cryptoma-
terial ("significantly descriptive" means that the
information could, if made known to unauthorized
persons, permit recovery of specific cryptographic
features of classified crypto-equipment, reveal weak-
nesses of associated equipment which could allow
recovery of plain text or of key, aid materially in the
cryptanalysis of a general or specific cryptosystem, or
lead to the cryptanalysis of an individual message,
command, or authentication). (Also see CRYPTO.)
cryptographic security: The component of communi-
cations security that results from the provision of
technically sound cryptographic systems and which
provides for their proper use.
a,ptoRsphie system All associated items of crypto-
material (e.g., equipment and their removable compo-
netts which perform cryptographic functions. operat-
ing instructions, and maintenance manuals) that are
used as a unit to provide a single means of encryption
and decryption of plain text so that its meaning may
be.concealed. also any mechanical or electrical device
or method used for the purpose of disguising,
autbentiating. or concealing the contents, signifi-
cance, or. meanings of communications; short name:
cryptography': The branch of cryptology used to
provide a means of encryption and deception of plain
text so that its meaning may be concealed.
cryptologic activities: The activities and operations
involved in the production of signals intelligence and
the maintenance of signals security.
cryptology: The science of producing signals intelli-
gence and maintaining signals security. (Also see
cryptanalysis and cryptography.)
cryptomaterial': All material (including documents,
devices, or equipment) that contains cryptographic
information and is essential to the encryption,
decryption, or authentication of telecommunications.
cryptosecurity: Shortened form of cryptographic
security. See above.
cryptosystem: Shortened form of cryptographic sys-
tem. See above.
current intelligence': Intelligence of all types and
forms of immediate interest to the users of intelli-
gence; it may be disseminated without the delays
incident to complete evaluation, interpretation. analy-
sis, or integration.
customer: An authorized person who uses intelligence
or intelligence information either to produce other
intelligence or directly in the decisionmaking process;
it is synonymous with consumer and user
damage assessment: (1) (Intelligence Community
context.) An evaluation of the 'impact of a compro-
mise in terms of loss of intelligence information,
sources, or methods, and which may describe and/or
recommend measures to minimize damage and
prevent future compromises. (2) (Military context.)
An appraisal of the effects of an attack on one or
more elements of a nation's strength (military,
economic, and political) to determine residual capabi-
lity for further military action in support of planning
for recovery and reconstitution.
DCID 1/2 Attachment: An annual publication by the
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) which estab-
lishes a priorities classification system; it presents
requirements categories. and foreign countries in a
geotopical matrix, against which priorities are as-
signed which provide the Intelligence Community
with basic substantive priorities guidance for the
conduct of all U.S. foreign intelligence activities; it
includes a system for adjusting priorities between
annual publications; priorities are approved by the
DCl with the advice of the National Foreign
Intelligence Board. (Also see priority.)
deception: Those measures designed to mislead a
foreign power, organization, or person by manipula-
tion, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce
him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests.
(Also see communications deception, electronic coun-
termeasures, and manipulative deception.)
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
declassification: Removal of official information from
the protective status afforded by security classifica-
tion; it requires a determination that disclosure no
longer would be detrimental to national security.
(Also see classification.)
decode: To convert an encoded message into plain
text.
decompartmentation: The removal of information
from a compartmentation system without altering the
information to conceal sources, methods, or analytical
procedures. (Also see compartmentation.)
decrypt To transform an encrypted communication
into its equivalent plain text.
decipher. To convert an enciphered communication
into its equivalent plain text.
defector*: A national of a designated country who has
escaped from its control or who, being outside its
jurisdiction and control, is unwilling to return and
who is of special value to another government because
he is able to add valuable new or confirmatory
intelligence information to existing knowledge about
his country. (Also see emigre, refugee, and disaffected
person. )
Defense Intelligence Community': Refers to the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National
Security Agency (NSA) and the Military Services'
intelligence offices including Department of Defense
(DoD) collectors of specialized intelligence through
reconnaissance programs.
departmental intelligence': Foreign intelligence pro-
duced and used within a governmental department or
agency in meeting its assigned responsibilities.
direction finding (DF) A procedure for obtaining
bearings on radio frequency emitters with the use of a
directional antenna and a display unit on an intercept
receiver or ancillary equipment.
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI): The President's
principal foreign intelligence adviser appointed by
him with the consent of the Senate to be the head of
the Intelligence Community and Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency and to discharge those
authorities and responsibilities as they are prescribed
by law and by Presidential and National Security
Council directives.
Director of Central Intelligence Committee: Any one
of several 'committees established by the Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI) to advise him and to
perform whatever functions he shall determine; DCI
Committees usually deal with Intelligence Commu-
nity concerns, and their terms of reference ordinarily
are specified in DCI Directives; members may be
drawn from all components of the Intelligence
Community. (Also see Director of Central Intelli-
gence Directive.)
Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID): A
directive issued by the Director of Central Intelli-
gence which outlines general policies and procedures
to be followed by intelligence agencies and organiza-
tions which arc under his direction or overview.
disaffected person: A person apparently disenchanted
with his current situation who may therefore be
exploitable for intelligence purposes; e.g., by the
willingness to become an agent or defector. (Also see
walk-in.)
disclosure: The authorized release of classified infor-
mation through approved channels.
dissemination': See intelligence cycle.
domestic collection: The acquisition of foreign intelli-
gence information within the United States from
governmental or nongovernmental organizations or
individuals who are witting sources and choose to
cooperate by sharing such information.
double agent': An agent who is cooperating with an
intelligence service of one government on behalf of
and under the control of an intelligence or security
service of another government, and is manipulated by
one to the detriment of the other.
downgrade: To change a security classification from I
higher to a lower level.
economic intelligence': Foreign intelligence concern-
ing the production, distribution and consumption of
goods and services, labor, finance, taxation, and other
aspects of the international economic system.
Economic Intelligence Committee (EIC) See Director
of Central Intelligence Committee. (Also see DCID
3/1.)
electro-optical intelligence (ELECTRO-OPTINT) In-
telligence information derived from the optical moni-
toring of the electromagnetic spectrum from ultravio-
let (0.01 micrometers) through far (long wavelength)
infrared (1,000 micrometers). (Also see optical
intelligence.)
electronic countermeasures (ECl1 That division of
electronic warfare involving actions taken to prevent
or reduce an adversary's effective use of the
electromagnetic spectrum. Electronic countermeas-
ures include electronic jamming, which is the
deliberate radiation, reradiation, or reflection of
electromagnetic energy with the object of impairing
the uses of electronic equipment used by an adversary;
and electronic deception, which is similar but is
intended to mislead an adversary in the interpretation
of information received by his electronic system.
electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCIM) The di-
vision of electronic warfare involving actions taken to
ensure the effective use of the electromagnetic
spectrum despite an adversary's use of electronic
countermeasures. (Also see electronic warfare.)
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
electronic emission security: Those measures taken to
protect all transmissions from interception and
electronic analysis.
electronic intelligence' (ELINT): Technical and intel-
ligence information derived from.foreign noncom-
munications electromagnetic radiations emanating
from other than atomic detonation or radioactive
sources.
electronic order of battle' (EOB): A listing of non-
communications electronic devices including site
designation, nomenclature, location, site function, and
any other pertinent information obtained from any
source and which has military significance when
related to the devices.
electronic security' (ELSEC) The protection resulting
from all measures designed to deny unauthorized
persons information of value which might be derived
from their intercept and analysis of non-communica-
tions electromagnetic radiations; e.g., radar.
electronic surveillance': Acquisition of a nonpublic
communication by electronic means without the
consent of a person who is a party to an electronic
communication or, in the case of a nonelectronic
communication, without the consent of a person who
is visibly present at the place of communication, but
not including the use of radio direction finding
equipment solely to determine the location of a
transmitter.
electronic warfare (EV1: Military action involving the
use of electromagnetic energy to determine, exploit,
reduce, or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic
spectrum, and action which retains friendly use of the
electromagnetic spectrum. (The three divisions of
electronic warfare are: electronic warfare support
measures, electronic countermeasures, and electronic
counter-countermeasures.)
electronic warfare support measures (ESM): That
division of electronic warfare involving actions to
search for, intercept, locate, record, and analyze
radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of
exploiting such radiations in support of military
operations; thus, electronic warfare support measures
provide a source of electronic warfare information
which may be used for immediate action involving
conduct of electronic countermeasures, electronic
counter-countermeasures, threat detection and avoid-
ance, target acquisition, homing, and other combat
support measures.
emanations security (EMSECX The protection result-
ing from all measures designed to deny unauthorized
persons information of value which might be derived
from intercept and analysis of compromising emana-
tions from other than cryptographic equipment and
telecommunications systems. (Also see emission
security.)
emigre: A person who departs from his country for
any lawful reason with the intention of permanently
resettling elsewhere. (Also see refugee and deflector.)
emission security: The component of communications
security resulting from all measures taken to deny to
unauthorized persons information of value which
might be derived from intercept and analysis of
compromising emanations from cryptographic equip-
ment and telecommunications systems. (Also see
emanations security.)
encode: To convert plain text into a different form by
means of a code.
encipher': To encrypt plain text by means of a cipher.
(Also see cipher.)
encrypt': To convert plain text into a different form in
order to conceal its meaning.
end product: See finished intelligence. (Also see
product.)
energy intelligence.. Intelligence relating to the techni-
cal, economic and political capabilities and programs
of foreign countries to engage in development,
utilization, and commerce of basic and advanced
energy technologies; it includes: the location and
extent of foreign energy resources and their alloca-
tion; foreign government energy policies, plans, and
programs; new and improved foreign energy technolo-
gies; and economic and security aspects of foreign
energy supply, demand, production distribution, and
utilization.
espionage': Intelligence activity directed toward the
acquisition of information through clandestine means
and proscribed by the laws of the country against
which it is committed.
essential elements of information (EEI) Those items of
intelligence information essential for timely decisions
and for enhancement of operations and which relate
to foreign power, forces, targets, or the physical
environment.
estimative intelligence: A category of intelligence
which attempts to project probable future foreign
courses of action and developments and their implica-
tions for U.S. interests; it may or may not be
coordinated and may be either national or depart.
mental intelligence.
evaluation': Appraisal of the worth of an intelligence
activity, information, or product in terms of its
contribution to a specific goal; or the credibility,
reliability, pertinency, accuracy, or usefulness of
information in terms of an intelligence need. Evalua-
tion may be used without reference to cost or risk,
particularly when contrasted with assessment (Also
see assessment); it is also a process in the production
step of the intelligence cycle. (See intelligence cycle.)
evasion and escape (E& Ek The procedures and
operations whereby military personnel and other
selected individuals are enabled to emerge from
enemy-held or hostile areas to areas under friendly
control.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
evasion and escape intelligence. Processed intelligence
information prepared to assist personnel to avoid
capture if lost in enemy-dominated territory or to
escape if captured.
exploitation': The process of obtaining intelligence
information from any source and taking advantage of
it for intelligence purposes. (Also see source.)
fl^isb Intelligence: The result of the production step
of the intelligence cycle; the intelligence product.
(Also see intelligence cycle and end product.)
foreign affairs community: Those U.S. Government
departments, agencies, and other organizations which
are represented in U.S. diplomatic missions abroad,
and those which may not be represented abroad but
are significantly involved in international activities
with the governments of other nations.
foreign counterinteWgence (FCI) Intelligence activity,
with its resultant product, intended to detect, counter-
act, and/or prevent espionage and other clandestine
intelligence activities, sabotage, international terrorist
activities, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf
of foreign powers, organizations or persons; it does not
include personnel, physical, document, or communica-
tions security programs.
foreign instrumentation signals (FISX Electromagnetic
emissions associated with the testing and operational
deployment of non-US. aerospace, surface, and sub-
surface systems which may have either military or
civilian application; it includes but is not limited to
the signals from telemetry, beaconry, electronic
interrogators, tracking/fusing/arming/command sys-
tems, and video data links.
foreign lnstrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT}:
Technical and intelligence information derived from
intercept of foreign instrumentation signals (see
above).
foreign Intelligence' (FIB The product resulting from
collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and inter-
pretation of intelligence information about a foreign
power and which is significant to the national
security, foreign relations, or economic interests of the
United States, and which is provided by a government
agency that is assigned an intelligence mission (i.e.,
an intelligence agency). (Also see intelligence cycle.)
foreign intelligence service: An organization of a
foreign government which engages in intelligence
activities.
foreign materiel (FORMAT) intelligence: Intelligence
derived from the exploitation of foreign materiel.
foreign official: A person acting in an official capacity
on behalf of a foreign power, attached to a foreign
diplomatic establishment or an establishment under
the control of a foreign power, or employed by a
public international organization.
forward-looking infrared (FLIR) system: An infrared
imaging system which raster scans the scene viewed
by internal means, both horizontally and vertically; it
can be spaceborne, airborne, seaborne, mounted on a
ground vehicle, or placed at a fixed site; and its field
of view is determined by the optics used, the scanning
mechanism, and the dimensions of the detector array.
fusion: The blending of intelligence information from
multiple sources to produce a single intelligence
product.
fusion center. A term used within the Department of
Defense referring to an organization having the
responsibility of blending both compartmented intelli-
gence information with all other available information
in order to support military operations. (Also see
actionable intelligence and tactical intelligence.)
General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP): See
National Foreign Intelligence Program.
geographic(al) intelligence: Foreign intelligence deal-
ing with the location, description, and analysis of
physical and cultural factors of the world, (e.g.,
terrain, climate, natural resources, transportation,
boundaries, population distribution) and their changes
through time.
general medical intelligence (GMI) See medical
intelligence.
guidance': Advice which identifies, interprets, clari-
fies, and/or expands upon an information need. (Also
see information need.)
human intelligence (HUMINT): A category of intelli-
gence information derived from human sources. (Also
see human source reporting and human resources
collection.)
human resources collection: All activities which attend
collection of intelligence information from human
sources. (See human intelligence and human source.)
Human Resources Committee (HRC) See Director of
Central Intelligence Committee. (Also see DCID
1/17.)
human source: A person who wittingly or unwittingly
conveys by any means information of potential
intelligence value to an intelligence activity.
human source reporting: The flow of intelligence
information from those who gather it to the customer;
it may come from information gathering activities
either within or outside the Intelligence Community.
(A form of the term is also used to denote an item of
information being conveyed, as in human source
report.) (Also see human intelligence.)
illegal: An officer or employee of an intelligence
organization who is dispatched abroad and who has
no overt connection with the intelligence organization
with which he is connected or with the government
operating that intelligence organization.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
illegal agent: An agent operated by an illegal
residency or directly by the headquarters of an
intelligence organization. (Also see illegal residency.)
Illegal communication: An electronic communication
or signal made without the legal sanction of the nation
where it originates.
illegal residency: An intelligence apparatus estab-
lished in a foreign country and composed of one or
more intelligence officers, and which has no apparent
connection with the sponsoring intelligence organiza-
tion or with the government of the country operating
the intelligence organization. (Also see legal
residency.)
illicit communication: An electronic communication
or signal originated in support of clandestine oper-
ations; it is a type of clandestine communication.
imagery: Representations of objects reproduced elec-
tronically or by optical means on film, electronic
display devices, or other media.
imagery intelligence (IMINT): The collected products
of imagery interpretation processed for intelligence
use. (Also see imagery interpretation below.)
imagery interpretation (11X The process of locating,
recognizing, identifying, and describing objects, ac-
tivities, and terrain represented by imagery; it
includes photographic interpretation.
imitative communications deception: See communica-
tions deception.
imitative deception: The introduction into foreign
channels of electromagnetic radiations which imitate
his own emissions.
indications and warning (1 & W): Those intelligence
activities intended to detect and report time-sensitive
intelligence information on foreign developments that
could involve a threat to U.S. or allied military,
political, or economic interests, or to U.S. citizens
abroad. It encompasses forewarning of: enemy hostile
actions or intentions; the imminence of hostilities;
serious insurgency; nuclear/nonnuclear attack on the
U.S., its overseas forces, or allied nations; hostile
reactions to U.S. reconnaissance activities; terrorist
attacks; and other similar events.
information: Unevaluated material of every descrip-
tion, at all levels of reliability, and from any source
which may contain intelligence information. (Also see
intelligence information.)
information handling: Management of data or infor-
mation which may occur in connection with any step
in the intelligence cycle; such management may
involve activities to transform, manipulate, index,
code, categorize, store, select, retrieve, associate or
display intelligence materials; it may involve the use
of printing. photographic, computer or communica-
tions equipment, systems or networks; it may include
software programs to operate computers and process
data and/or information; and may include informa-
tion contained in reports, files, data bases, reference
services and libraries.
information security: Safeguarding knowledge against
unauthorized disclosure; or, the result of any system
of administrative policies and procedures for identify-
ing, controlling, and 'protecting from unauthorized
disclosure or release to the public, information the
protection of which is authorized by executive order
or statute.
information need: The requirement of an official
involved in the policymaking process or the intelli-
gence production process for the best available
information and intelligence on which to base policy
decisions, recommendations, or intelligence pro-
duction.
Infrared imagery: A likeness or impression produced
as a result of sensing electromagnetic radiations
emitted or reflected from a given target surface in the
infrared portion of the electromagnetic spectrum.
integration': A process in the production step of the
intelligence cycle in which a pattern is formed
through the selection and combination of evaluated
intelligence information. (Also see intelligence
cycle.)
intelligence': (1) A body of evidence and the
conclusions drawn therefrom which is acquired and
furnished in response to the known or perceived
requirements of customers; it is often derived from
information which is concealed or not intended to be
available for use by the acquirer; it is the product of a
cyclical process. (Also see intelligence cycle.)
Examples:
- Policy development requires good intelligence.
- Timely intelligence is important to informed
decisionmaking.
(2) A term used to refer collectively to the functions,
activities, or organizations which are involved in the
process of planning, gathering, and analyzing infor-
mation of potential value to decisionmakers and to the
production of intelligence as defined in (1) above.
(Also see foreign intelligence and foreign
count erinlell i gene. )
Examples:
- Human source collection is an important
intelligence activity.
- Central Intelligence Agency.
-intelligence is a demanding profession.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
intelligence activity(ies)': A generic term used to
encompass any or all of the efforts and endeavors
undertaken by intelligence organizations. (Also see
intelligence organization.)
intelligence agency: A component organization of the
Intelligence Community. (Also see Intelligence
Community.)
intelligence assessment-. A category of intelligence
production that encompasses most analytical studies
dealing with subjects of policy significance; it is
thorough in its treatment of subject matter-as
distinct from building-block papers, research projects,
and reference aids-but unlike estimative intelligence
need not attempt to project future developments and
their implications; it is usually coordinated within the
producing organization but may not be coordinated
with other intelligence agencies. (Also see estimative
intelligence.)
intelligence asset Any resource-person, group, in-
strument, installation, or technical system-at the
disposal of an intelligence organization.
intelligence collector. A phrase sometimes used to
refer to an organization or agency that engages in the
collection step of the intelligence cycle. (Also see
intelligence cycle.)
Intelligence Community (IC): A term which, in the
aggregate, refers to the following Executive Branch
organizations and activities: the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA); the National Security Agency (NSA);
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); offices within
the Department of Defense for the collection of
specialized national foreign intelligence through re-
connaissance programs; the Bureau of Intelligence
and Research (INR) of the Department of State;
intelligence elements of the military services; intelli-
'gence elements of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI); intelligence elements of the Department of
Treasury: intelligence elements of the Department of
Energy: intelligence elements of the Drug Enforce-
ment Administration; and staff elements of the Office
of the Director of Central Intelligence.
Intelligence Community Staff (IC Staff): A term
referring to an organization under the direction and
control of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)
formed to assist the DCi in discharging his responsi-
bilities relating to the Intelligence Community.
intelligence consumer. See customer.
intelligence cycle': The processes by which informa-
tion is acquired and converted into intelligence and
made available to customers. There are usually five
steps in the cycle:
? See Appendix B, Alternate Definitions
a. planning and direction-determination of intelli-
gence requirements, preparation of a collection plan,
issuance of orders and requests to information
collection entities, and a continuous check on the
productivity of collection entities.
b. collection' --acquisition of information or intel-
ligence information and the provision of this to
processing and/or production elements.
c. processing'-conversion of collected informa-
tion and/or intelligence information into a form more
suitable for the production of intelligence.
d. production'-conversion of information or intel-
ligence information into finished intelligence through
the integration, analysis, evaluation, and/or interpre-
tation of all available data and the preparation of
intelligence products in support of known or antici-
pated customer requirements.
e. dissemination'-conveyance of intelligence in
suitable form to customers.
intelligence estimate': The product of estimative
intelligence.
intelligence information': Information of potential
intelligence value concerning the capabilities, inten-
tions, and activities of any foreign power, organiza-
tion, or associated personnel.
Intelligence Information Handling Committee (IHC):
See Director of Central Intelligence Committee.
(Also see DCID 1/4.)
intelligence information report: A product of the
collection step of the intelligence cycle. (Also see
intelligence report.)
intelligence officer A professional employee of an
intelligence organization who is engaged in intelli-
gence activities.
intelligence organization: A generic term used to refer
to any organization engaged in intelligence activities;
it may include either an intelligence agency or a
foreign intelligence service, or both. (Also see
intelligence agency and foreign intelligence service.)
Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB): A body formed by
appointment of the President to provide him and the
Attorney General with reports and advice on the
legality and propriety of intelligence activities; mem-
bership and duties are expressed in Executive Order
No. 12036.
intelligence producer. A phrase usually used to refer to
an organization or agency that participates in the
production step of the intelligence cycle. (Also see
intelligence cycle.)
intelligence related activities (IRA): Those activities
specifically excluded from the National Foreign
Intelligence Program which: respond to departmental
or agency tasking for time-sensitive information on
foreign activities, respond to national Intelligence
Community advisory tasking of collection capabilities
which have a primary mission of supporting depart-
mental or agency missions or operational forces, of
training personnel for intelligence duties, or are
devoted to research and development for intelligence
and related capabilities.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
intelligence report': A product of the production stcp
of the intelligence cycle. (Also see intelligence
iotformation report.)
Intelligence requirement': Any subject, general or
specific, upon which there is a need for the collection
of intelligence information or the production of
intelligence. (Also see collection requirement.)
intelligence Research and Development Council
(IR do DCk See Director of Central Intelligence
Committee. (Also see DCID 1/12.)
intelligence user. See customer.
Interagency Defector Committee (IDCk See Director
Qf Central Intelligence Committee. (Also see DCID
4/1.)
interagency intelligence memorandum (UM) A na-
tional intelligence assessment or estimate issued by
the Director of Central Intelligence with the advice of
appropriate National Foreign Intelligence Board
components.
intercept(ion)': Acquisition for intelligence purposes
of electromagnetic signals (such as radio communica-
tions) by electronic collection equipment without the
consent of the signallers.
intercept station: A station which intercepts commu-
nications or non-communications transmissions for
intelligence purposes.
international lines of communications (ILC) Those
communications services which are under the supervi-
sion of the International Telecommunication Union
and which carry paid public communications traffic
between different countries; also known as: Interna-
tional Civil Communications, International Commer-
cial Communications, Internationally-Leased Com-
munications, International Service of Public
Correspondence, and commercial communications.
international terrorist activity': The calculated use of
violence, or the threat of violence, to attain political
goals through fear, intimidation or coercion; usually
involves a criminal act, often symbolic in nature, and
is intended to influence an audience beyond the
immediate victims. International terrorism tran-
scends national boundaries in the carrying out of the
act, the purpose of the act, the nationalities of the
victims, or the resolution of the incident; such an act
is usually designed to attract wide publicity in order
to focus attention on the existence, cause, or demands
of the perpetrators.
interpretation: A process in the production step of the
intelligence cycle in which the significance of
information or intelligence information is weighed
relative to the available body of knowledge. (Also see
intelligence cycle.)
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC:
See Director of Central Intelligence Committee.
(Also see DCID 3/3.)
joint intelligence: (1) (Military context.) Intelligence
produced by elements of more than one military
service of the same nation. (2) (Intelligence Communi-
ty context.) Intelligence produced by intelligence
organizations of more than one country.
laser intelligence (LASINT) Technical and intelli-
gence information derived from laser systems; it is a
subcategory of electo-optical intelligence. (See elec-
tro-optical intelligence.)
legal residency: An intelligence apparatus in a foreign
country and composed of intelligence officers assigned
as overt representatives of their government but not
necessarily identified as intelligence officers. (Also see
illegal residency.)
manipulative communications cover. Those measures
taken to alter or conceal the characteristics of
communications so as to deny to any enemy or
potential enemy the means to identify them. Also
known as communications cove
manipulative communications deception: See commu-
nications deception.
manipulative deception: The alteration or simulation
of friendly electromagnetic radiations to accomplish
deception.
measurement and signature intelligence' (MASINT)
Scientific and technical intelligence information ob-
tained by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data
(metric, angle, spatial, wavelength, time dependence,
modulation, plasma, and hydromagnetic) derived
from specific technical sensors for the purpose of
identifying any distinctive features associated with
the source, emitter, or sender and to facilitate
subsequent identification and/or measurement of the
same.
medical intelligence' (MEDINT) Foreign intelligence
related to all aspects of foreign natural and man-made
environments which could influence the health of
military forces; it incorporates general medical
intelligence which is concerned with foreign biological
medical capabilities and health situations, and medi-
cal scientific and technical intelligence which assesses
and predicts technological advances of medical
significance, to include defense against Chemical,
Biological. Radiological Warfare; it applies to both
tactical and strategic planning and operations, includ-
ing military and humanitarian efforts. (Also see
biographical intelligence.)
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
military intelligence (MI) Basic, current, or estimative
intelligence on any foreign military or military-related
situation or activity.
monitor. To observe, listen to, intercept, record, or
transcribe any form of communication or media for
collection of intelligence information or communica-
tions security purposes, either overtly or covertly.
multi-level security: (For automatic data processing
(ADP) systems.) Provisions for the safeguarding of all
information within a multilevel information handling
system. The multilevel information handling system
permits various levels, categories, and/or compart-
ments of material to be concurrently stored and
processed in a remotely-accessed resource-sharing
ADP system, while simultaneously permitting mate-
rial to be selectively accessed and manipulated from
variously controlled terminals by personnel having
different security clearances and access approvals.
Security measures are therefore aimed at ensuring
proper matches between information security and
personnel security. (Also see roil-level security.)
national estimate: See national intelligence estimate.
National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC): An
organization established by and under the control and
supervision of the Director of Central Intelligence,
which is responsible for production of national
intelligence.
National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB): A body
formed to provide the Director of Central Intelligence
(DCI) with advice concerning: production, review,
and coordination of national foreign intelligence; the
National Foreign Intelligence Program budget; inter.
agency exchanges of foreign intelligence information;
arrangements with foreign governments on intelli-
gence matters; the protection of intelligence sources or
methods; activities of common concern; and such
other matters as are referred to it by the DCI. It is
composed of the DCI (chairman), and other appropri-
ate officers of the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Office of the DCI, Department of State, Department
of Defense, Department of Justice, Department of the
Treasury, Department of Energy, the offices within
the Department of Defense for reconnaissance pro-
grams, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National
Security Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation; senior intelligence officers of the Army, Navy.
and Air Force participate as observers; a representa-
tive of the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs may glso attend meetings as an
observer.
National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP): In-
cludes the programs listed below, but its composition
shall be subject to review by the National Security
Council and modification by the President.
(a) The programs of the Central Intelligence
Agency;
(b) The Consolidated Cryptologic Program, the
General Defense Intelligence Program, and the
programs of the offices within the Department of
Defense for the collection of specialized national
foreign intelligence through reconnaissance except
such elements as the Director of Central Intelligence
and the Secretary of Defense agree should be
excluded;
(c) Other programs of agencies within the Intelli-
gence Community designated jointly by the Director
of Central Intelligence and the head of the depart-
ment or by the President as national foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence activities;
(d) Activities of the staff elements of the Office of
the Director of Central Intelligence.
(e) Activities to acquire the intelligence required
for the planning and conduct of tactical operations by
the United States military forces are not included in
the National Foreign Intelligence Program.
national intelligence': Foreign intelligence produced
under the aegis of the Director of Central Intelligence
and intended primarily to be responsive to the needs
of the President, the National Security Council, and
other Federal officials involved in the formulation and
execution of national security, foreign political,
and/or economic policy.
national intelligence asset: An intelligence asset
funded in the National Foreign Intelligence Program,
the primary purpose of which is the collection or
processing of intelligence information or the produc-
tion of national intelligence. (Also see intelligence
asset and national intelligence.)
National Intelligence Estimate' (NIE): A thorough
assessment of a situation in the foreign environment
which is relevant to the formulation of foreign,
economic, and national security policy, and which
projects probable future courses of action and
developments; it is structured to illuminate differences
of view within the Intelligence Community; it is
issued by the Director of Central Intelligence with the
advice of the National Foreign Intelligence Board.
(Also see Special National Intelligence Estimate.)
National Intelligence Officer (NIO): The senior staff
officer of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)
and the DCI's Deputy for National Intelligence for an
assigned area of substantive responsibility; he man-
ages estimative and interagency intelligence produc-
tion on behalf of the DCI; he is the principal point of
contact between the DCI and intelligence consumers
below the cabinet level; he is charged with monitoring
and coordinating that portion of the National Foreign
Assessment Center's production that involves more
than one office or that is interdisciplinary in
character; and is a primary source of national-level
substantive guidance to Intelligence Community
planners, collectors, and resource managers.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
National Intelligence Tasking Center (NITC'): The
central organizational mechanism established under
the direction, control and management of the Director
of Central Intelligence for coordinating and tasking
national foreign intelligence collection activities, and
for providing advisory tasking to other intelligence
and information gathering activities.
national security: The territorial integrity, sover-
eignty, and international freedom of action of the
United States. (Intelligence activities relating to
national security encompass all the military, eco-
nomic, political, scientific and technological, and
other aspects of foreign developments which pose
actual or potential threats to U.S. national interests.)
national/tactical interface: A relationship between
national and tactical intelligence activities encom-
passing the full range of fiscal, technical, operational.
and programmatic matters.
sear-real-time: The brief interval between the collec-
tion of information regarding an event and reception
of the data at some other location, caused by the time
required for processing, communications, and display.
net assessment: A comparative review and analysis of
opposing national strengths, capabilities, vulnerabili-
ties, and weaknesses. (An intelligence net assessment
involves only foreign countries.)
nuclear Intelligence (NUCINT) Intelligence derived
from the collection and analysis of radiation and other
effects resulting from radioactive sources.
nuclear proliferation Intelligence Foreign intelligence
relating to (1) scientific, technical, and economic
capabilities and programs and the political plans and
intentions of nonnuclear weapons states or foreign
organizations to acquire nuclear weapons and/or to
acquire the requisite special nuclear materials and to
carry on research, development, and manufacture of
nuclear explosive devices, and; (2) the attitudes,
policies, and actions of foreign nuclear supplier
countries or organizations within these countries
toward provision of technologies, facilities, or special
nuclear materials which could assist nonnuclear
weapon states or foreign organizations to acquire or
develop nuclear explosive devices.
oftiah See foreign official.
omfielal laformsdon: Information which is subject to
the control of the United States Government.
ape. scarce information: A generic term describing
information of potential intelligence value (i.e.,
IMelllgence information) which is available to the
general public.
epsradoosl control (OPCON) (military context) The
authority delegated to a commander to direct forces
assigned so that the commander may accomplish
specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by
function, time, or location; to deploy the forces
concerned; and to retain or assign tactical control of
those forces. (It does not, of itself, include administra?
tive or logistic control.)
operational intelligence' (OPINTEL): Intelligence
required for planning and executing operations.
operations security (OPSEC): Those measures de-
signed to protect information concerning planned,
ongoing, and completed operations against unauthor-
ized disclosure.
optical intelligence (OPTINT): That portion of electro-
optical intelligence that deals with visible light. (Also
see electro-optical intelligence.)
order of battle (OB): Intelligence pertaining to
identification, strength, command structure, and
disposition of the personnel, units, and equipment of
any foreign military force. (Also see tecknical
intelligence.)
overt: Open; done without attempt at concealment.
overt collection: The acquisition of intelligence infor-
mation from public media, observation, government-
to-government dialogue, elicitation, and from the
sharing of data openly acquired; the process may be
classified or unclassified; the target and host govern-
ments as well as the sources involved normally are
aware of the general collection activity although the
specific acquisition, sites, and processes may be
successfully concealed.
penetration: (1) (clandestine operations.) The recruit-
ment of agents within or the infiltration of agents or
introduction of technical monitoring devices into an
organization or group or physical facility for the
purpose of acquiring information or influencing its
activities. (2) (automatic data processing (ADP)
operations.) The unauthorized extraction and identifi-
cation of recognizable information from a protected
ADP system.
personnel security: The means or procedures-such as
selective investigations, record checks, personal inter-
views, and supervisory controls-designed to provide
reasonable assurance that persons being considered
for or granted access to classified information are
loyal and trustworthy.
photographic intelligence (PHOTINT): The collected
products of photographic interpretation classified and
evaluated for intelligence use; it is a category of
imagery intelligence.
photographic interpretation (P1): The process of
locating, recognizing, identifying, and describing
objects, activities, and terrain represented on photog-
raphy; it is a category of imagery interpretation.
physical security': Physical measures-such as sates,
vaults, perimeter barriers, guard systems, alarms and
access controls-designed to safeguard installations
against damage, disruption or unauthorized entry;
information or material against unauthorized access
or theft; and specified personnel against harm.
plain text': Normal text or language, or any symbol
or signal, that conveys information without any
hidden or secret meaning.
planning and direction: See intelligence cycle.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Policy Review Committee (As pertains to intelligence
matters) (PRC(I)): A committee established under the
National Security Council which when meeting under
the chairmanship of the Director of Central Intelli-
gence is empowered to establish requirements and
priorities for national foreign intelligence and to
evaluate the quality of the intelligence product; it is
sometimes referred to as the Policy Review Commit-
tee (Intelligence); its specific duties are defined in
Executive Order No. 12036.
political intelligence': Intelligence concerning the
dynamics of the internal and external political affairs
of foreign countries, regional groupings, multilateral
treaty arrangements and organizations, and foreign
political movements directed against or impacting
upon established governments or authority.
positive intelligence: A term of convenience sometimes
applied to foreign intelligence to distinguish it from
foreign counterintelligence.
priority: A value denoting a preferential rating or
precedence in position which is used to discriminate
among competing entities; the term normally used in
conjunction with intelligence requirements in order to
illuminate importance and to guide the actions
planned, being planned, or in use, to respond to the
requirements.
processing': See intelligence cycle.
product (1) An intelligence report disseminated to
customers by an intelligence agency. (2) In SIGINT
usage, intelligence information derived from analysis
of SIGINT materials and published as a report or
translation for dissemination to customers. (Also see
production in Appendix B.)
production': See intelligence cycle.
proprietary: A business entity owned, in whole or in
part, or controlled by an intelligence organization and
operated to provide private commercial cover for an
intelligence activity of that organization. (Also see
cover.)
radar intelligence (RADINT) Intelligence information
derived from data collected by radar.
radiation intelligence* (RINT) The functions and
characteristics derived from information obtained
from unintentional electromagnetic energy emanating
from foreign devices; excludes nuclear detonations or
radioactive sources.
raw intelligence: A colloquial term meaning collected
intelligence information which has not yet been
converted into intelligence. (Also see intelligence
intformation. )
reconnaissance (RECCE or RECON): An operation
undertaken to obtain by visual observation or other
detection methods information relating to the activi-
ties, resources or forces of a foreign nation;, or to
secure data concerning the meteorological, hydro-
graphic, or geographic characteristics of a particular
area.
recruitment-in-place: A person who agrees to become
an,agent and retain his position in his organization or
government while reporting on it to an intelligence or
security organization of a foreign country.
RED/BLACK Concept: The separation of electrical
and electronic circuits, components, equipment, and
systems which handle classified plain language
information in electric signal form (RED) from those
which handle encrypted or unclassified information
(BLACK); RED and BLACK terminology is used to
clarify specific criteria relating to and differentiating
between such circuits, components, equipment, and
systems and the areas in which they are contained.
refugee: A person who is outside the country or area
of his former habitual residence and who, because of
fear of being persecuted or because of hostilities in
that country or area, is unwilling or unable to return
to it. (Also see defector and emigre.)
report: See intelligence report and intelligence
information report.
requirement': See intelligence requirement or collec-
tion requirement.
residency: See illegal residency and legal residency
sabotage.. Action against material, premises or utili-
ties, or their production, which injures, interferes
with, or obstructs the national security or ability of a
nation to prepare for or carry on a war.
safe house: A house or premises controlled by an
intelligence organization that affords-at least tem-
porarily-security for individuals involved or equip-
ment used in clandestine operations.
sanitizedon: The process of editing or otherwise
altering intelligence information or reports to protect
sensitive intelligence sources, methods, capabilities,
analytical procedures, or privileged information in
order to permit wider dissemination.
scientific and technical (S & T) Intelligence': Intelli-
gence concerning foreign developments in basic and
applied scientific and technical research and develop-
ment including engineering and production tech-
niques, new technology, and weapon systems and their
capabilities and characteristics; it also includes
intelligence which requires scientific or technical
expertise on the part of the analyst, such as medicine,
physical health studies, and behavioral analyses.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee
(STIC) See Director of Central Intelligence Commit-
tee. (Also see DCID 3/5.)
security: Establishment and maintenance of protective
measures which are intended to ensure a state of
inviolability from hostile acts or influences.
TYPES OF SECURITY
Automatic Data Processing System Security
Communications Security
Computer Security
Cryptographic Security
Electronic Emission Security
Electronic Security
Emanation Security
Emission Security
Information Security
Multi-level Security
National Security
Operations Security
Personnel Security
Physical Security
Signals Security
Transmission Security
Uni-level Security
security classification: See clesstfication.
Security Committee (SECOM): See Director of
Central Intelligence Committee. (Also see DCID
1/11.)
sensitive': Requiring special protection from disclo-
sure to avoid compromise or threat to the security of
the sponsor.
sensitive compartmented information' (SCIX All infor-
mation and material requiring special controls for
restricted handling within compartmented intelli-
gence systems and for which compartmentation is
established. (Also see compartmentation.)
sensitive Intelligence sources and methods: A collective
term for those persons, organizations, things, condi-
tions, or events that provide intelligence information
and those means used in the collection, processing,
and production of such information which, if compro-
mised, would be vulnerable to counteraction that
could reasonably be expected to reduce their ability to
support U.S. intelligence activities.
Service Cryptologic Agency(ies) (SCA): See Service
Cryptologic Elements.
Service Cryptologic Elements: A term used to
designate separately or together those elements of the
U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force which perform
cryptologic functions; also known as Service
Cryptologic Agencies and Service Cryptologic
Organirrtions.
Service Cryptologic Organizations (SCO): See Service
Cryptologic Elements.
sensor. (1) A technical device designed to detect and
respond to one or more particular stimulae and which
may record and/or transmit a resultant impulse for
interpretation or measurement; often called a techni-
cal sensor. (2) special sensor: An unclassified term
used as a matter of convenience to refer to a highly
classified or controlled technical sensor.
side-looking airborne radar (SLAft An airborne
radar, viewing at right angles to the axis of the
vehicle, which produces a presentation of terrain or
targets.
SIGINT activity: Any activity conducted for the
purpose of producing signals intelligence. (Also see
SIGINT-related activity.)
SIGINT Committee: See Director of Central latelli-
aence Committee. (Also see DCID 6/1.)
SIGINT-related activity: Any activity primarily in-
tended for a purpose(s) other than signals intelligence
(SIGINT), but which can be used to produce
SIGINT. or which produces SIGINT as a by-product
of its principal function(s). (Also see SIGINT
activity.)
SIGINT technical information: Information concern-
ing or derived from intercepted foreign transmissions
or radiations which is composed of technical informa-
tion (as opposed to intelligence) and which is required
in the further collection or analysis of signals
intelligence.
signal': Anything intentionally transmitted by visual
and other electromagnetic, nuclear, or acoustical
methods for either communications or non-communi-
cations purposes.
signals intelligence' (SIGINT) Intelligence informa-
tion comprising either individually or in combination
all communications intelligence, electronics intelli-
gence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelli-
gence, however transmitted.
signals security (SIGSEC)e A term which includes
communications security and electronics security and
which encompasses measures intended to deny or
counter hostile exploitation of electronic emissions.
signals security acquisition and analysis: The acquisi-
tion of electronic emissions and subsequent analysis to
determine empirically the susceptibility of the emis-
sion to interception and exploitation by hostile
intelligence services; it includes cataloging the trans-
mission spectrum and taking signal parametric
measurements as required, but does not include
acquisition of information carried on the system; it is
one of the techniques of signals security surveillance.
(Also see signals security surveillance.)
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
signals security surveillance: The systematic examina-
tion of electronic emissions to determine the adequacy
of signals security measures, to identify signals
security deficiencies, to provide data from which to
predict the effectiveness of proposed signals security
measures, and to confirm the adequacy of such
measures after implementation.
source': A person, device, system, or activity from
which intelligence information is obtained. (Also see
human source and sensitive intelligence sources and
methods.)
special activities: As defined in Executive Order No.
12036, activities conducted abroad in support of
national foreign policy objectives which are designed
to further official United States programs and policies
abroad and which are planned and executed so that
the role of the United States Government is not
apparent or acknowledged publicly, and functions in
support of such activities, but not including diplo-
matic activity or the collection and production of
intelligence or related support functions; also known
as covert action. (Also see covert action.)
Special Activities Office(r) (SAO): A control point for
certain categories of compartmented information.
(The acronym is often used to refer. to the compart-
mented information itself.)
Special Coordination Committee (SCC): A committee
established under the National Security Council
which deals inter alia with the oversight of sensitive
intelligence activities, such as covert actions, which
are undertaken on Presidential authority.
special intelligence (SI): An unclassified term used to
designate a category of sensitive compartmented
information (SCI). (Also see sensitive compartmented
information.)
special intelligence communications' (SPINT-
COMMr A communications network for the handling
of all special intelligence and consisting of those
facilities under the operational and technical control
of the chief of intelligence of each of the military
departments, under the management of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, and under the technical and
security specification criteria established and moni-
tored by the National Security Agency.
Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE): Na-
tional Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) which are
relevant to specific policy problems that need to be
addressed in the immediate future. SNIEs arc
generally unscheduled, shorter, and prepared more
quickly than NIEs and are coordinated within the
Intelligence Community to the extent that time
permits. (Also see National Intelligence Estimate.)
Special Security Office(r) (SSO): A control point for
security procedures within any activity authorized
access to sensitive compartmented information.
special sensor': See sensor.
strategic intelligence: Intelligence which is required
for the formulation of policy and military plans at
national and international levels; it differs primarily
from tactical intelligence in level of use, but may also
vary in scope and detail.
strategic warning: Intelligence information or intelli-
gence regarding the threat of the initiation of
hostilities against the U.S. or in which U.S. forces
may become involved; it may be received at any time
prior to the initiation of hostilities.
Support for the Analysts' File Environment (SAFES A
joint CIA/DIA project to develop a new computer
/microfilm m system to support production analysts
in reading, filing, and routing cable traffic; building
and searching private and central files: and writing,
editing, and routing intelligence memoranda and
reports.
surveillance: The systematic observation or monitoring
of places, persons, or things by visual, aural,
electronic, photographic, or other means.
tactical intelligence' (TACINTEL) Foreign intelli-
gence produced under the aegis of the Secretary of
Defense and intended primarily to be responsive to the
needs of military commanders in the field to maintain
the readiness of operating forces for combat opera-
tions and to support the planning and conduct of
combat operations. (Also see combat intelligence.)
tactical intelligence asset: An intelligence asset
funded in Department of Defense programs, the
primary purpose of which is the collection or
processing of intelligence information or the produc-
tion of tactical intelligence. (Also see tactical
intelligence and intelligence asset.)
target: A country, area, installation, organization,
weapon system, military force, situation (political or
economic), signal, person, or other entity against
which intelligence operations are conducted.
target intelligence: Intelligence which portrays and
locates the components of a target or target complex
and indicates its identification, vulnerability, and
relative importance.
tasking: The assignment or direction of an individual
or activity to perform in a specified way to achieve an
objective or goal.
technical intelligence (TI): Intelligence on the charac-
teristics and performance of foreign weapons and
equipment: a part of scientific and technical intelli-
gence and distinct from order of battle.
technical sensor. See sensor.
technical SIGINT: Intelligence information which
provides a detailed knowledge of the technical
characteristics of a given emitter and thus permits
estimates to be made about its primary function,
capabilities, modes of operation (including malfunc-
tions), and state-of-the-art, as well as its specific role
within a complex weapon system or defense network;
it is a contributor to technical intelligence.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
telecommunications: Any transmission, emission. or
reception of signs, signals, writing. images, and
sounds or information of any nature by wire, radio.
visual, or other electromagnetic systems.,
telemetry Intelligence (TELINT) Technical and intel-
ligence information derived from intercept, process-
ing, and analysis of foreign telemetry; a subcategory
of foreign instrumentation signals intelligence.
teleprocessing: The overall function of an information
transmission system which combines telecommunica-
tions, automatic data processing, and man-machine
interface equipment and their interaction as an
integrated whole.
TEMPEST: An unclassified term referring to techni-
cal investigations for compromising emanations from
electrically operated, information processing equip-
ment; they are conducted in support of emanations
and emission security.
terrorist organization: A group that engages in
terrorist activities. (Also see iaternatioaal terrorist
activity.)
traffic analysis (TA) The cryptologic discipline which
develops information from communications about the
composition and operation of communications struc-
tures and the organizations they serve. The process
involves the study of traffic and related materials, and
the reconstruction of communication plans, to pro-
duce signals intelligence.
transmission security (TRANSECX The component of
communications security which results from all
measures designed to protect transmissions from
interception and from exploitation by means other
than cryptanalysis.
unauthorized disclosure: See compromise.
uni-level security: (For automatic data processing
systems) Provision for the safeguarding of all material
within a single information handling system in
accordance with the highest level of classification and
most restrictive dissemination caveats assigned to any
material contained therein, as distinguished from
multilevel security. (Also see mwitl-level security.)
United States Signals Intelligence System (USSS) An
entity that is comprised of the National Security
Agency (including assigned military personnel); those
elements of the military departments and the Central
Intelligence Agency performing signals intelligence
activities; and those elements of any other department
or agency which may from time to time be authorized
by the National Security Council to perform signals
intelligence activities during the time when such
elements are so authorized; it is governed by the
United States Signals Intelligence Directives
(USSID) system.
upgrade.. To determine that certain classified informa-
tion requires, in the interest of national security, a
higher degree of protection against unauthorized
disclosure than currently provided, coupled with a
changing of the classification designation to reflect
such higher degree. (Also see classification.)
user. See customer
validation: A process normally associated with the
collection of intelligence information which provides
official status to an identified requirement and
confirms that the requirement is appropriate for a
given collector and has not previously been satisfied.
(Also we collection requirement.)
walk-in: A person who on his own initiative makes
contact with a representative of a foreign country and
who volunteers intelligence information and/or re-
quests political asylum. (Also see disaffected person.)
Weapon and Space Systems Intelligence Committee
(WSSIC) See Director of Central Intelligence
Committee. (Also see DOD 3/4.)
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
ACINT
ACOUSTINT
ACSI .........
CA ..
CAMS
CCF
CCP
CCPC
CI ............
CIA .......... .
CIAP
Appendix A
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
CIFAX ............... .... ....
....
CIPHONY ....... ................
CIRIS ...... _ ............. ..........
CIVISION ............ ..............
COINS ............... ... _ .........
COMEX ............................
COMINT ......... ..........
COMIREX. .......
COMSEC .... .
CONTEXT ..... ........ CRITIC _. .... ...._. . .....
CRITICOMM .................
CRYPTO ...........................
DAO ...................................
DCI
DCID ................. ..............
DEA ..... ................ ...........
DEFSMAC
.__.._..
DF.....
DIA .__.._..... .......
DNI ...... .............. .......
ECCM ............... ...... ....
ECM .... ... .... ......
EEI
E&E . . ............. . ..........
EIC _ ....................................
ELECTRO-OPTINT .........
ELINT ............................
ELSEC ..................................
EMSEC .............. ..........
EOB ...................................
ESM
EW .... .
FBI
FBIS
Acoustical Intelligence (Naval acronym; see definition.)
Acoustical Intelligence
Assistant Chief of Staff/Intelligence (Army or Air
Force)
Cryptanalysis
COMIREX Automated Management System
Collection Coordination Facility
Consolidated Cryptologic Program
Critical Collection Problems Committee
Counterintelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Central Intelligence Agency Program
Enciphered Facsimile
Enciphered Telephone
Consolidated Intelligence Resources Information System
Enciphered Television
Community On-Line Intelligence System
Committee on Exchanges
Communications Intelligence
Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation
Communications Security
Conferencing and Text Manipulation System
Critical Intelligence Message'
Critical Intelligence Communications System
CRYPTO (See definition.)
Defense Attache Office
Director of Central Intelligence
Director of Central Intelligence Directive
Drug Enforcement Administration
Defense Special Missile and Astronautic Center
Direction Finding
Defense Intelligence Agency
Director of Naval Intelligence
Electronic Counter-Countermeasures
Electronic Countermeasures
Essential Elements of Information
Evasion and Escape
Economic Intelligence Committee
Electro-optical Intelligence
Electronic Intelligence
Electronic Security
Emanations Security
Electronic Order of Battle
Electronic Warfare Support Measures
Electronic Warfare
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Foreign Broadcast Information Service
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Appendix A (Continued)
FCI ...... ..... ............ ....
FI..... . .............. ................
FIS ................................ ....
FISINT ............................
FLIR _ ........... ..........
FORMAT ...... ...................
CDIP ....... _ _ .......... .......
GMI .. ... . ............ ...
HPSCI .. .
HRC ...
HUMINT.
.................
IC .................. _......... ...........
ICRS ...........................
IDC ....................................
IHC .....................................
II ...........................................
IIM .......................................
ILC ........................................
:..
IMINT ..... ..........................
INR .......... ............................
IOB ........................................
IRA ........................................
IR&DC ................................
I&W ..
JAEIC ..................................
JINTACCS ............................
MASINT ...... ....................
MEDINT ........................... .
MI .........................................
NFAC ..................................
NFIB ...................................
NFIP ....................................
NIE ......................................
NIO _............ ......................
NITC ...................................
NMIC ..................................
NOIWON ...........................
NPIC
NSA
NSOC ..............
NSRL _..........
NTPC
NUCINT..... ..
Foreign Counterintelligence
Foreign Intelligence
Foreign Instrumentation Signals
Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence
Forward-looking infrared
Foreign Materiel
General Defense Intelligence Program
General Medical Intelligence
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
Human Resources Committee
Human Intelligence
Intelligence Community
Imagery Collection Requirements Subcommittee
(COMIREX)
Interagency Defector Committee
Intelligence Information Handling Committee
Imagery Interpretation
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
International Lines of Communications
Imagery Intelligence
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of
State
Intelligence Oversight Board
Intelligence-Related Activities
Intelligence Research & Development Council
Indications and Warning
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee
Joint Interoperability Tactical Command and Control
System
Laser Intelligence
Measurement and Signature Intelligence
Medical Intelligence
Military Intelligence
National Foreign Assessment Center
National Foreign Intelligence Board
National Foreign Intelligence Program
National Intelligence Estimate
National Intelligence Officer
National Intelligence Tasking Center
National Military Intelligence Center
National Operations and Intelligence Watch Officers
Network
National Foreign Intelligence Plan for Human
Resources
National Photographic Interpretation Center
National Security Agency
National Security Council Intelligence Directive
National SICINT Operations Center
National SICINT Requirements List
National Telemetry Processing Center
Nuclear Intelligence
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
_._..
OB........
OPCON
OPINTEL .. .
OPSEC............
OPTINT ......... _ .... _ ............
PARPRO ........................ ..
PHOTINT .......... ........... .
PI ........................ _,....... .......
PRC(I) . _. _ ..........................
RADINT ..............................
RECCE or RECON ............
RINT ...................................
S&T ......................................
SA ..........................................
SAFE ....................................
SAO .....................................
SCA ......................................
SCC ...... .................. .............
SCI ........................................
SCO ......................................
SECOM ................................
SI ................... :..... ..............
SICINT ....................:...........
SIGINT Committee ............
SIGSEC ................................
SIR VES ............................
SLAR .................... ..............
SNIE ....................................
SOSUS ..................................
SOTA ...................................
SPINTCOMM ....................
SSCI .... ........
SSO ........................................
STIC .....................................
TA ......................... .............
TACINTEL ........ ............
TI ......................... ..............
TELINT ............................ .
TRANSEC ............................
USSID ................................
USSS .....................................
WWMCCS ........... _ ......
WSSIC .... .. .. ......
Appendix A (Continued)
Order of Battle
Operational Control
Operational Intelligence
Operations Security
Optical Intelligence
Peacetime Airborne Reconnaissance Program
Photographic Intelligence
Photographic Interpretation or Photographic Interpreter
Policy Review Committee (Intelligence)
Radar Intelligence.
Reconnaissance
Radiation Intelligence
Scientific and Technical
Signals Analysis
Support for the Analysts File Environment
Special Activities Office
Service Cryptologic Agencies
Special Coordination Committee
Sensitive Compartmented Information or Source Code
Indicator
Service Cryptologic Organizations
Security Committee
Special Intelligence
Signals Intelligence
Signals Intelligence Committee
Signals Security
SIGINT Requirements Validation and Evaluation Sub-
committee (of SICINT Committee)
Side-Looking Airborne Radar
Special National Intelligence Estimate
Sound Surveillance System
SICINT Operational Tasking Authority
Special Intelligence Communications
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Special Security Officer
Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee
Traffic Analysis
Tactical Intelligence
Technical Intelligence
Telemetry Intelligence
Transmission Security
United States Signals Intelligence Directive
United States Signals Intelligence System
Worldwide Military Command and Control Systems
Weapon and Space Systems Intelligence Committee
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Bibliography
Books and Articles Cited in this Compilation
Ackerman, E. C. "Mike", Street Man: The CIA Career of Mike
Ackerman. Miami: Ackerman and Palumbo, 1976.
Breckenridge, Scott D., The CIA and the U. S. Intelligence
System. Boulder: Westview Press, 1986.
Colby, William E. (with Peter Forbath), Honorable Men: My Life
in the CIA. New York: Simon and Shuster, 1978.
Cline, Ray S., The CIA Under Reagan Bush & Casey. Washington,
D.C.: Acropolis Books, Ltd., 1981.
deSilva, Peer, Sub Rosa, Times Books, 1978.
Dulles, Allen W., The Craft of Intelligence. New York: Harper
& Row, 1963.
Godson, Roy (Ed.), Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s.
Washington: Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, National
Strategy Information Center, 1979-1986.
Laqueur, Walter, A World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of
Intelligence. New York: Basic Books, 1985.
Maurer, Tunstall, Keagle, (Ed.), Intelligence Policy and
Process. Westview Press, Boulder London, 1985.
Meyer, Cord, Facing Reality: From World Federalism to the CIA.
New York: Harper and Row, 1980.
Moses, Hans, The Clandestine Service of the Central Intelligence
Agency. The Association of Former Intelligence Officers,
McLean, Virginia, 1983.
Ranelagh, John, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA.
New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986.
Rositzke, Harry, The CIA's Secret Operations. New York:
Reader's Digest Press, 1977.
Shevchenko, Arkady N., Breaking with Moscow. New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1985.
Studies in Intelligence. Center for the Study of Intelligence,
CIA.
Yost, Graham, Spy-Tech. New York/Oxford: Facts on File
Publications, 1985.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
Other Books and Articles of Interest
Barron, John, KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents. New
York: Reader's Digest Press, 1974.
Bittman, Ladislav, The KGB and Soviet Disinformation,
Washington/New York Oxford London Toronto Sydney Frankfurt:
Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1985.
Hood, William, Mole. New York: W. W. Norton, 1982.
Kirkpatrick, Lyman B. Jr., The Real CIA. New York: Macmillan,
1968.
Leary, William M., (Ed.), The Central Intelligence Agency:
History and Documents. University, Alabama: Univ. of Alabama
Press, 1984.
Pforzheimer, Walter, Bibliography of Intelligence Literature.
Eighth Edition. Washington, D.C.: Defense Intelligence
College, 1985.
Phillips, David Atlee, Careers in Secret Operations: How to be a
Federal Intelligence Officer. Frederick, 21d.: University
Publications of America, 1984.
Powers, Thomas, The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and
the CIA. New York: Knopf, 1979.
Prados, John, The Soviet Estimate: U. S. Intelligence Analysis
and Russian Military Strength. New York: Dial Press, 1982.
Turner, Stansfield, Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in
Transition. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
From "The Clandestine Service
of the Central Intelligence
Agency", by Hans Moses
It has often been said, and more often intimated, that Clandestine
Service personnel are, or must be, a special breed. Advocates of
clandestine activities have stressed intelligence, discipline and dedication
as essential characteristics; critics have charged deviousness, moral blind-
ness, and over-aggressiveness.
Actually, Clandestine Service employees are no less varied in back-
ground and personality than those in most other large organizations in and
out of government; nor, as a matter of experience, are the criteria for
success fundamentally different. What distinguishing features there are
pertain not to ability or character, but to orientation. Clandestine Service
personnel must be, or become, intensely interested in foreign affairs.
Beyond that, they must be able to adapt themselves to certain environ-
mental conditions if they are to have a chance for a satisfactory career.
They must accept the fact that much of what they do, see, and hear cannot
be freely discussed with outsiders, nor necessarily with all their own
colleagues. As a rule, they must be willing to work for distinction within
the organization and forego the satisfaction of potential public acclaim.
They, and their families, must be ready to live with the inhibitions to social
life and public utterance that flow from the acceptance of secrecy and
relative anonymity. Depending on personality and outlook, this kind of
existence can be natural, easy, difficult, or impossible for an individual.
Those who find it too difficult or impossible are, of course, not suitable for
a Clandestine Service career and, if they nevertheless accept the required
restrictions, are apt to become frustrated and to create problems for the
service and for themselves. For those who can make the adjustment,
however, the work can be highly rewarding.
b. Operations Officers
The "operations officers" or "case officers" (erroneously called
"agents" by the media) are the mainstay of the Clandestine Service. They
are, in other words, the people most directly responsible for the spadework
of the Clandestine Service, as described above under "Collection Opera-
tions" and "Types of (Special) Activity."
Operations officers get extensive training and guidelines and follow
certain basic procedures (":radecraft"). While some of the elements of
their professional activity have parallels in other investigative, technical,
and adminstrative work as well as in news gathering and salesmanship, the
combination represented by their profession is unique. An operations
officer must, of course, be able and willing to live and travel abroad, he
must know something about the language and the culture of his area, and
he must be effective in person-to-person contact. He must be able to
achieve a thorough understanding of others without losing his independence
of judgment. And he must maintain discretion as well as integrity.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
It should be noted that few case officers are equally adept at all
phases of operational activity. One, for instance, may have great success
at recruiting agents while another may show special strength in exploiting
a recruited source over the long haul. Also, notwithstanding all common
doctrine, no two operations officers ever appear to get results in exactly
the same way, nor do different agents necessarily react the same way to
any one operations officer. Finally, even though an operations officer
often gets into situations where he must depend on his own ingenuity, he
knows that there are other people - superiors as well as specialists and
other potential supporters - on the same team. Thus, certain facets of
any operation are liable to become matters of shared participation and
responsibility. This is particularly likely when an operation requires
knowledge or resources beyond the capacity of an individual officer.
For reasons not hard to grasp, operations officers have sometimes
been called "generalists." That term distinguishes them from the many
others - in effect, the "specialists" - whose services are either necessary
or helpful in the operational framework. The range of such services is
wide. There is room for linguists, area experts, engineers, technicians,
researchers, reports and requirements officers, communications officers,
and many more. The Clandestine Service has all of them within its ranks
and, of course, all types of clerical personnel as well. Beyond that, it will
be remembered, its efforts are supported, as the occasion demands, by
personnel in other Central Intelligence Agency offices, especially those
with facilities for research and analysis.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
From "Facing Reality",
by Cord Meyer
The Agency officers serving under cover in the stations overseas
are known as case officers. Under the supervision of the station
chief. they are America's front-line troops in the continuing effort to
extract from human sources the information that the policymakers
require but which cannot be obtained from either the media. com-
munications intercepts, or satellite surveillance. They are both the
main competitors with the much larger KGB and its satellite services
and. individually, the principal and most important targets of KGB
recruitment and harassment. These case officers are not in most
instances spies themselves, but their job is to recruit and protect
foreign agents who do have access to the required information. In
countries that are close allies of the United States, these officers
work cooperatively with the host government's intelligence and secu-
rity services. Within the Soviet bloc their every move is watched,
their telephones tapped, and their apartments bugged. In addition to
their primary duties, most of them have to work at other jobs within
the embassy in order to make their cover credible.
They can receive no public credit for their achievements and even
when they receive awards within the Agency their citations are
deliberately vague and uninformative. When they retire early in their
mid-fifties, which is the practice in the clandestine service, they have
little to show prospective employers to demonstrate their compe-
tence, and in recent years a clandestine career in the Agency has not
been an easily salable commodity on the job market. In spite of these
drawbacks, I continued to be impressed up to the time of my own
retirement by the quality and ability of the young men and women
seeking this kind of intelligence career, and by the generally impres-
sive competence of the personnel serving in the clandestine service.
An awareness of the high stakes involved in this peculiar and unique
area of our competition with the Soviets perhaps explains the seri-
ousness of purpose and dedication that I found to be widespread.
What then about the motivation of the foreigners who agree to
provide secret information to CIA case officers at considerable risk?
Among the prevailing misconceptions is the belief that foreign agents
working for the United States are primarily motivated by greed. and
that the more valuable the information they produce the more money
they are paid. In reality, the reasons that persuade foreign citizens
to cooperate with American intelligence are infinitely various and
range across the whole spectrum of human motivation. Admittedly,
some of them are prompted only by financial considerations, but the
information they produce is often of marginal value, since they are
seldom in positions of authority. The most productive agents are
frequently those for whom financial reward is a secondary consid-
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
eration. and who are primarily moved by far more complex ambi-
tions, resentments. and beliefs. For example. there are those like
Oleg Penkovsky who come to the conviction that the Communist
system is a growing threat to the survival of human freedom. and
believe that they must warn the West of the dancer and give it the
information it needs to defend itself.
There are others inside the Soviet bureaucracy who are dissatisfied
with the progress of their own careers, and who so resent the privi-
leges and favoritism of the elite that they are presented to act against
it. There are still others who have personal reasons for seeking
revenge against some arbitrary act of regime injustice from which
they or their close relatives have suffered. There are even those who
have lost all belief in the official ideology and have become so pro-
foundly bored by the pervasive propaganda that they are prepared
to assert their own individuality by an adventurous act of defiance
against the entire system. Service abroad by Soviet diplomats and
KGB officers tends to expose them more than the ordinary Soviet
citizen to the wide gap between propaganda and reality, and the new
generation of Soviet officials tends to lack the depth of revolutionary
conviction that protected their fathers against disillusionment.
Then, there are many in Eastern Europe who are true believers in
the cause of national independence for their countries and who bit-
terly resent Soviet domination. Some of these are ready, at great
personal risk, to carry their opposition to the point of cooperation
with the United States in the hope that they can hasten the day when
the foreign yoke is removed. Within the U.S.S.R. itself, there are
minority ethnic groups with their own ancient national traditions and
cultural heritage. Some of them see themselves as victims of an
internal colonialism ruled over by the dominant Great Russians, who
control the state machinery and access to the best jobs. This sup-
pressed resentment can find expression in a decision to act against
the privileged Russian elite. In the far reaches of the third world,
there are determined men who have helped their countries win their
independence from Western colonial rule. They see Soviet interven-
tion in their internal affairs as threatening a new colonialism, which
they are prepared to resist by providing the United States with
information on the extent and nature of clandestine Soviet oper-
ations. High-minded belief in the cause of human liberty, patriotic
nationalism, a personal search for revenge, sheer adventurism. ava-
rice-all these motives and more, from the lowest to the highest. are
to be found among those who daily risk their lives by cooperating
with American intelligence. Modern espionage is far removed from
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
the caricature of the slinking spy in a trench coat with his hand out
for payment.
Another widely held misconception is the belief that the typical
CIA officer overseas leads an exotic existence and is himself engaged
in penetrating the secrets of the opposition by assuming false identi-
ties and disguises and by seducing the beautiful mistresses of high-
ranking officials. Reality is far different, as can be demonstrated by
following the recruitment and managment of an individual agent.
Whether he volunteers his services as a "walk-in," as many of the
most productive agents have done, or whether his willingness to
cooperate results from a long period of careful assessment and cul-
tivation, the first step after he has agreed to supply secret information
is to determine whether the offer is genuine. As previously noted,
the KGB makes extensive use of double agents to identify American
methods of operation, to divert attention from more promising tar-
gets, and to plant deliberately misleading information.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Fran "Clandestine Collection",
?oy Godson editor, excerpts
from a paper by Eugene PurgstaLle
Recruitment and Training of
Foreign Collection Sources
? Recruitment: Recruitment of a foreign collection source will nor-
mally constitute the culmination of a relatively lengthy and gradual
process of personal cultivation of that individual by an Agency oper-
ations officer during which the potential source is assessed with
respect to both his access to intelligence information of genuine
importance and the likelihood that he or she will prove receptive to
recruitment. An exception to this general rule, is. of course. the so-
called "walk-in," the person who suddenly presents himself, usually
at an American embassy or consulate overseas. in order to seek some
form of reward for information he believes likely to be deemed
valuable by the USG. A walk-in usually entails minimum risk to a
CIA Station of the kind of security flap that an unsuccessful recruit-
ment attempt can produce, but he will frequently overestimate the
true value to the USG of the intelligence information at his disposal,
if indeed he is not a deliberate fabricator. Initial meetings with a
walk-in should accordingly focus intensively on his true identity, his
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
real access and his actual motivation for offering his services as a
source. If the walk-in is finally adjudged to be bona fide and of real
potential value as an intelligence source. he will immediately become
an ongoing collection operation and further meetings with him should
be conducted in a fully secure. clandestine fashion.
As noted above, however. the recruitment process usually involves
extended cultivation and assessment of a potential source by an
Agency operations officer. Such cultivation will usually begin with
an initial chance or contrived encounter, often one at a diplomatic
reception. The operations officer's interpersonal skills must imme-
diately be brought into play in order to establish reasonably precisely
with whom it is that he has just come into contact, to make a tentative
judgment as to whether the new contact might be able to contribute
to any of the Station's assigned collection objectives and to create a
positive framework for further meetings on a one-on-one basis. Clearly
the operations officer's interpersonal skills will continue to be critical
to his success in developing an increasingly close relationship with
the potential source that can be manipulated to determine his prob-
able access to desired intelligence information, his basic personal
motivations and his ultimate susceptibility to a proposal for recruit-
ment. The relationship should be brought by the operations officer
to a degree of sufficient cordiality that even if the potential source
should decline to be recruited, he will not use its offer in order to
embarrass the officer who extended it.
? Training: Whether the newly-acquired source is the product of
cultivation leading to his successful recruitment or an effectively
validated walk-in, he or she will require training from the outset.
Many new sources will show surprisingly little concern for the secu-
rity aspects of their new activity, and few will possess the knowledge
of how best to protect their own security. Training should thus focus
initially on sharpening the source's sense of security and on the
means by which to ensure true clandestinity in all aspects of his
activities in his role as source, most importantly acquisition. tem-
porary storage and ultimate transmittal to the Agency operations
officer of sensitive intelligence information: his movement to and
from meetings with the officer; his concealment of any clandestine
gear which it may be necessary to issue him to enhance his effec-
tiveness as a source; and finally, his use of the extra income he will
now be receiving for his clandestine cooperation. The training of the
new source must also explore in depth the vital matter of his precise
access to intelligence information to ensure both that he exploits it
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
without drawing undesirable attention to his actions and that he does
so with maximum feasible productivity. Further training may well
become necessary as the operation develops in order to improve its
clandestinity and its effectiveness. This training might include such
kinds of covert communications techniques as dead drops. microdot.
secret writing or clandestine two-way radio: coding and decoding;
and clandestine photography. In reaching a decision to issue clan-
destine gear to a source it will always be necessary to judge as nearly
as possible whether or not his possession of such gear may constitute
a greater threat to his security than the improvement in his produc-
tivity would warrant. In general, the use of sophisticated clandestine
gear will more likely be truly required for sources in denied areas
than those in areas where the general security risk is distinctly lower.
Attention to the training aspects of a clandestine collection oper-
ation must continue to be accorded throughout the operation's dura-
tion, as sources will often prove prone to grow careless and cut
corners in the area of personal security and professional use of
tradecraft. The maintenance of true clandestinity in an operation
always requires greater effort and attention to detail. and the con-
scientious operations officer has to do all he can to protect his source
from the latter's potential security sins of omission and commission.
The assessment of a source must also continue consistently following
his recruitment, for his real motives may change, his access may
diminish or be lost entirely and thus impel him into fabrication in
order to retain his income for collaboration, or he may, of course,
be doubled against the service by some third party.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
will now read the minutes of our last top
TULSA TRIBUNE
28 January 1976
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
CLE A?
ON P$GE
CHICAGO TRIBUNE
9 January 1978
journalist? ' Welt,;inot exactly!"
t f
d
a
rom
irec
.''Did I get this report
..
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
Fran "Street Zan", by
E. C. Ackerman
Chapter VD
Martov came to me. But he was the exception. You can't just sit around and
wait for opportunity to knock at your door. You have to hustle. The street
man's reason for being is to seek out, assess and recruit the sources that can
provide the information he has been directed to obtain.
Who are those targets? One group consistently heads the list. Soviet parry
and government officials. Soviet military officers are number one. Their
country alone possesses the military capability to destroy our civilization. Of
course, we have satellites that can photograph their missile sites and eaves-
drop on their military communications. But these technical means cannot
inform us of their intentions-of any budding plans to use those weapons. Or
to attack us politically. Or to attack us economically. Only human sources can
provide that type of information.
Officials of countries allied to the Soviet Union can also, to a lesser degree,
provide this type of information. So civil and military officers of Warsaw Pact
nations are also targets. As are officials of other countries clearly hostile to
us-China. Cuba. North Korea, Viet Nam-and clearly capable of damaging
us militarily, politically or economically.
And there are other targets of a more. passing nature. With the Arab oil
boycott, economic warfare has gained high priority. An economist from an
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) nation can give us
early warning of economic moves against us. A source in a Latin American
terrorist group can help avert the kidnapping of an American diplomat. A
Turkish back-alley contact can keep a kilo of heroin off the streets of Chicago.
How does the street man identify potential sources in target groups? Many
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
ways. Sometimes an established source will point out a colleague or a contact
who for one reason or another might be willing to cooperate. Sometimes CIA
files call attention to a particular individual. Reports from many different
sources, when pieced together. may suggest an approach to a given indi-
vidual. Sometimes a street man meets the potential source by chance. More
often. he places himself in a position wherein he is likely to come upon
potential sources. He makes his own luck.
How do you get to the targets? You can't depend on circular letters, though,
believe it or not. it's been tried: and Pravda doesn't accept that kind of adver-
tising. You have to go to the targets-get belly to belly with them. You have
to develop a human relationship with them. To come to understand what
motivates them. To reach the point at which you can make a reasonably good
assessment of their willingness to cooperate, to provide intelligence infor-
mation.
Getting next to them involves the use of cover. Say the target is a Czech
military attache stationed in Paris. You can't very well phone him, introduce
yourself as a CIA officer and invite him to lunch. But he might be available for
an American military attache or a diplomat. Likewise, an OPEC economist
might not wish to meet with an American government official. But he might
talk to an American economist or an investment counselor. And a Latin
American radical politician might not agree to meet with any American. But
he might agree to chat with an Italian socialist or a Cuban Trotskvite.
In the course of my CIA career I operated under a wide variety of covers.
I met several Czech military attaches as an American diplomat. The diplomat
to diplomat approach is the most polite and most traditional. All major intel-
ligence senvices use it.
It entails attendance at a lot of diplomatic cocktail parties and consumption
of lots of hors d'oeuvres. You meet your target and zero in. Luncheon invita-
tions are exchanged. Your aim is to develop a human relationship with
him-to find out what makes him tick. You wonder about his designs on you.
Are you dealing with another intelligence officer? Or has he been co-opted by
his intelligence service to report on you?
Verbal fencing takes place. Sometimes you draw the conclusion that the
target can't be recruited and go on to someone else. Sometimes he tries to
recruit you before you've had a chance to get your own effort underway. And
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
sometimes your instincts tell you that a pitch might just be in order.
What brings you to this conclusion? Take the case of the Czech. Ideally,
there is some distinct discomfort with the present regime, with Soviet domi-
nation, perhaps some ideological affinity for the United States. Surprisingly,
this attitude isn't all that uncommon. I've met damn few Czechs who weren't
nationalists at heart and secret admirers of deposed Communist Party Secre-
tary Alexander Dubcek. secret proponents of the Prague Spring of 1968.
Few recruitments. however. are entirely ideological. In most cases there is
more than one motivating factor. Perhaps the target needs money. Perhaps
he is seeking revenge against a hated superior. Maybe he has a psychological
defect which can be manipulated. Or maybe he is filled with self-hate for
having remained silent in the face of the Soviet invasion of his country.
Maybe he is compelled to strike back.
But even if one or more of these factors is present, there's no assurance
that your target will say yes. It's like propositioning a woman. You never
really know until you ask. For one thing, it takes a great deal of courage to
enter into a clandestine relationship with a foreign intelligence service. The
Czech is laying his very life on the line, and no one knows it better than he.
Needless to say. it's damned tough to assess courage indirectly.
Sometimes, if the case officer is operating in his own name, as is usually
the case on the diplomatic circuit. and does not want to blow his own cover, a
colleague will be introduced in alias to make the actual pitch. The pitch itself
is always made unter vierAugen, under four eyes. In the case of a Soviet bloc
official it is always made boldly: "Will you provide information on a confiden-
tial basis to U.S. intelligence?" There is no use in beating around the bush.
Those fellows know the score.
Mostly, they'll say no. And if they do, you shrug it off. You're playing in a
tough league. If you bat .200 you're on the all-star team.
What about the targets who aren't diplomats and who don't want to deal
with diplomats? To approach them. non-official cover is used. The OPEC
economist doesn't want to be seen with an American official. but he will talk
to an economist or an investment counselor. Setting up that cover can be
complicated. It's very nice if the case officer can represent himself as an
officer of a large. well-known Wall Street investment house. But the invest-
ment houses aren't standing in line to seek out embarrasing situations, so
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
more often you're stuck with being a consultant from Omaha. And maybe
your office in Omaha is really just an answering service.
Ideally. the street man ought to have an academic or employment back-
ground which fits the commercial cover he's using. But that's a luxury you
can't always afford. It is more important that the case officer have experience
and proven abilities as a recruiter. He must be able to get in close to the
target personality, to read him, and to carry out the pitch. And that can't be
taught. If his knowledge in a given academic area leaves something to be
desired. he's given a set of books on the subject and a week to read in.
Of course, this type of flying by the seat of your pants leads to some tough
moments and some close calls. I called on an economist once at his university.
He was a macro-economist with expertise in central banking, so I naturally
said I was a micro-economist, with specialization in the development of
light industry.
"Splendid," he said, "I've been asked to take over a seminar on micro-
economics this afternoon. Won't you please lead a discussion on your
specialty?"
Somehow I bluffed my way through ninety minutes on the generation of
trickle-down industries in developing economies, and went on to develop a
warm personal relationship with the professor. Months later, when I dropped
my cover and pitched him, he was good-humored about the whole thing:
"I'll have to work with you," he said. "If not, you might tell people about how
you made a fool of me. To think you wouldn't know the multiplier effect from
a plate of spinach!"
I assured him that I knew all about the multiplier effect, but not very much
more.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Tii? WASHINGTON POST
9 MAR 1970
BY L1CBTY
"Our ination is that China has the nuclear 3
infor Red
Your, mia~
capaeiry:to destroy one Americaa city. ..
rion is to.~ f ind. out k: onel?
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
~s ova r ?/5-
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
ARTICLE APP RED CHICAGO TRIBUNE
ON PAGE I, 18 November 1985
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Fran "Breaking with Moscow"
by Arkady N. Shevchenko
1
DRIVING MORE CALMLY. I returned along back roads to the Grand Central
Parkway, over the Triborough Bridge, and found a parking space on a
dark street on the upper East Side. I hailed a taxi and took it to a corner
in the East Sixties. I was about ten minutes late. I hurried down an empty
side street and descended the steps of an ordinary brownstone.
The man who answered the doorbell introduced himself as Bert John-
son. He had a firm handshake and wore a well-cut conservative dark suit.
"I've been waiting for you," he said. "Come on upstairs."
Johnson was businesslike but hospitable. He offered me a drink. I
asked for scotch. We sat down on a sofa in a comfortably furnished library,
its walls filled with books and paintings, but the pleasant surroundings did
nothing to ease my tension.
I looked at him closely, searching his face for a clue to what kind of
C
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
man he was. His manner was easy and natural. He showed neither surprise
nor distrust.
He seemed to be waiting for me to get down to the business which
brought us together. But even after so much private rehearsal I could not,
for a while, find the words to begin.
"I'm not here on impulse. And this isn't something I just decided to
do in the last few days," I said at last.
He nodded quietly and somehow the gesture distressed me.
"The idea of escaping has been growing in me for years and I'm ready
to act and now I ask for your help," I continued.
Johnson nodded again. I could see that I would get no guidance from
him. I would have to proceed on my own.
"I'm telling you that I have decided to break with my government," I
blurted.
His nodding reaction was certainly natural, for he already knew what
I was going to say. But I grew more uneasy. I suddenly realized that what
bothered me was that he wasn't bombarding me with questions and argu-
ments regarding my motivations as I had anticipated. I stopped in a pause
that seemed to yawn for hours. Johnson did not try to fill the silence.
I started again. I tried to explain the process by which my convictions
had become clear to me. My lack of expertise in English had never seemed
so important before; now my head ached with my efforts to express myself
properly. I attempted to stress that I was no longer a Soviet in spirit, and
no longer could be a part of the Soviet world. I told him of the intolerable
situations where I often had to act like an idiot at the UN, defending a
Soviet position while at the same time pretending to act objectively, as I
was obliged to do, as Under Secretary General. My reasons seemed so
weak that I tried again from another angle.
I told Johnson that in the beginning I was full of hope. I bragged to
him how fast my career had moved, and boasted that I had friends, people
I had been to school with and liked, in positions of influence, and that
some of us once thought we might make a difference, might be able to
help open up the Soviet system.
Johnson simply sat there and let me ramble. Only later did I under-
stand that at that moment he (and the U.S. government) was not really
interested in researching my motivations. Rather, it was his job to make a
suggestion that would test me not by words but by deeds. I tried to calm
down, to sound more pragmatic, less idealistic.
"It isn't money or comfort," I said. "I get all the benefits of being a
Soviet ambassador. My wife and I have a good apartment in Moscow filled
with fine things; we have anything we want. We have a dacha, a country
place, in one of the best areas outside Moscow. We have plenty of money,
plenty. It's not that at all," I repeated. "It's that in exchange I have to be as
obedient to the system as a robot to his master-and I no longer believe in
the system."
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
The Reluctant Spy
I told him that our telephones were always tapped. that the KGB was
constantly watching me, often following me. that the Party was always after
me to do political work which had nothing to do with my job as a diplomat
but which intruded into my own and'others' personal lives. I was required
to be a propagandist for them, to parrot whatever they wanted me to say
at meetings and encourage others to think the same way. But, most dis-
tasteful of all. I was compelled by the Party to be a moral watchdog over
my fellow Soviets in New York. I detested the hypocrisy that this entailed;
I wanted instead to work for what I believed in and was interested in; I
wanted to do something valuable with my life.
Johnson listened in silence. Then he asked me whether I had in-
formed my wife about our meeting. I said I had not, but that I intended
to do so. I could see that Johnson was pleased with my answer, but he
made no further remark.
Finally, I made my request. What I meant to do was defect openly and
speak out for myself. I needed protection and I did not want to be con-
trolled.
"I want to work and write and live without any government telling me
what to do or say. Will your government let me do that?"
Johnson stood up and walked to the bar in the corner of the room. "I
don't know about you, but I'm going to have a double. How about you?"
he said.
The cone of his remark made all the difference. It was friendly; he
seemed to understand my tensions. He was suddenly a human being, not
an institution or court before which I had to justify myself. I quickly
accepted his offer. We stood at the bar while he poured scotch and soda.
He raised his glass to touch mine. For the first time that night we both
smiled.
Back on the couch, he lit a cigarette. "Okay," he said, leaning back.
"First of all, I'm authorized to offer you the protection you asked for. If
you're ready to defect, we're ready to welcome you, to help you, to receive
you right now if that's what you want."
"It's exactly what I want," I interjected.
"We know a lot about you," he continued. "`We've followed your career
for a long time, so I have to ask if you're really sure about this. If you have
any doubts, you should tell me now. Once this goes forward, neither of us
can stop it."
"I've made up my mind."
He said that in the United States I wouldn't have any special privileges
of the kind I had become used to as a member of the Soviet upper class.
No car and driver, no government-supplied home. None of the luxuries
that the Soviet government showered on its favored bureaucrats.
"All those things you take for granted-we don't supply them," he
reiterated. "Could you really give them up?"
"Yes, I can. I know what is important to mC-in life." I had a sudden
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
urge to laugh. I had the surreal feeling that I was in some sort of marriage
ceremony, a wild contrast to my emotions of two minutes before.
Johnson sipped his drink and put it down on the table in front of us.
He looked at me a moment and then said, "You realize that if you live
openly there will always be a risk to your life."
I knew quite enough about the KGB's long arm and memory. I won-
dered why Johnson said this: was he trying to discourage me from defect-
ing instead of reinforcing me in my decision? I began to be apprehensive.
Johnson broke into my thoughts: "A minute ago you said you wanted
to do something worthwhile. Do you think that defecting is the only way
you can do this?"
"Well ..." I hesitated. "By defecting I can contribute a great deal."
"There's no doubt about that," he said. "But think about how much
you could do if you stayed where you are a little while."
"What do you mean?"
He described the initial excitement in Washington when it was learned
that I wanted to defect. Everyone realized what a blow this would be to the
Soviets. And they were ready to help me if that's what I wanted. But there
had been other ideas too. Would I consider staying on as Under Secretary
General for a while? There was a lot of information I could provide from
that vantage point if we worked together. I could help them find out more
about Soviet planning and intentions, about the leadership's thinking. Be-
sides, he pointed out, I would need time to get my family ready f9r the
eventual defection.
I felt something like a chill cross my chest.
"That is to say, you want me to be a spy," I said.
"Well, not exactly," he replied. He thought for a few seconds and
continued: "We wouldn't have to call it spying. Let's say from time to time
you could provide us with information at meetings like this."
I didn't know what to say. The proposal had thrown me off my bear-
ings. "What you're asking me to do is extremely dangerous," I said finally.
"I don't have any training for that sort of thing."
He took another swallow of scotch. "Please think about it," he said
quietly.
I looked at him closely. His manner was not threatening or pressuring,
but it was clear what he wanted from me. I was not prepared to hear it; I
needed time to digest the idea. Almost automatically I told Johnson I
would think it over.
That satisfied him and seemed to conclude the meeting. I got up to
leave.
"When can we talk again?" he asked.
"Next Friday would be the best time for me. Is there a way to reach
you, a telephone number?" I asked.
He gave me a number to memorize. I repeated it several times to fix
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
The Reluctant Spy r r
it in my mind. We shook hands and I left, once again to journev through
Manhattan and out to Long Island. this time with a curious mixture of
relief and dread.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
HE FOLLOWING WEEK I was in turmoil, swinging from one decision to
another. To my surprise, I slowly began to reconcile myself to John-
son's proposal. If our places had been reversed, I knew I would do my
utmost to try to use him as an opportunity to penetrate the Soviets at a
high level. But although this seemed logical and natural as an abstract
proposition, I was still uneasy at being the man involved.
The more I reflected on the idea, the more I was able to find positive
aspects in it: I could gain time to prepare myself. Time would enable me
to make a better case with Lina, to persuade her to my view. We could
make practical arrangements for our new lives in America by bringing
some of the things we loved from our Moscow home. Furthermore, I
thought, to work for the Americans for a while would be the most effective
way of dissipating any doubts they might have about my honesty and
sincerity. The Americans could grant me political asylum, all right, but I
figured they were under no obligation to do more than that for me, and I
would need protection for quite some time as well as help in getting settled.
After the debriefings, they might throw me away like a squeezed lemon. I
hoped for more than that.
I resolved to prove myself not in words but in deeds. After all, my
original plan had been to help the United States by exposing the secrets of
the Soviet regime and speaking out against it: I wanted to help the West.
Here was a way to do it in spades.
The arrangements for my next meeting with Johnson seemed simple,
but when the time came to make the confirming phone call, I suddenly
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
The Relucta?tt Spy 223
found the mechanics daunting. I could not phone from my home, from
the Mission. from my UN office. All those lines were monitored. I could
use a pay telephone, but that seemed too risky. A Soviet colleague might
see me and wonder what I was up to, why I wasn't using my office phone.
Friday morning, as,I sat in a UN committee meeting, I listened with
only half an ear to the diplomats' talk, my mind preoccupied. Finally I
remembered the telephones the UN provided for the delegates' conve-
nience on the main floor. Even if those lines were tapped, my conversation
would be short, my voice unidentifiable. When the session broke for lunch,
I joined my colleagues and walked with them to the North Delegates'
Lounge. That huge hall, whose bar and comfortable chairs draw diplomats
for both serious and trivial talk throughout the working day, is well sup-
plied with telephones. It would be perfectly natural for me to use one as
though I were simply checking with my office for messages. Nonetheless,
I could not shake off an anxiety that mounted as I scanned the lounge.
Others were using the telephones and I had to wait.
I decided to take my chances in another place, the corridor that runs
behind the podium of the General Assembly. There was no bar here to
attract a crowd. Two telephones sat on separate tables about six feet apart,
and one of them was already taken. The man speaking into it was a
stranger whose English carried a heavy Spanish accent. A Cuban? Did he
recognize me? I stood indecisively for a moment, and then took what
seemed to me like an enormous plunge. I sat down and dialed the number.
It rang twice before a woman answered.
"Hello," she said. No other identification.
"This is Andy. I'll be on time tonight."
"That's fine," came her reply. "I'll tell him."
I hung up. The Latin American-as I had decided he was-was still
deep in his own conversation. If he had noticed mine, he gave no sign.
Still, to be on the safe side, I called my office in case I had been observed
and the observer checked on me later on.
The day wore on routinely, but apprehension continued to cloud my
perceptions. One of my Soviet assistants walked into. my office unan-
nounced; I was startled, but all he wanted was my permission to leave
early, to lengthen his weekend by a few hours. I probably surprised him
with my quick assent. My only thought, however, was to get rid of him.
My appointment at the East Side town house was for between eight
and ten o'clock that night. It was close to eight when I finished supper at
home and proposed to Lina that she join me for a walk. It was a safe offer
to make; she liked to walk in the country but not in the city. When she
went shopping, it was with a purpose. I liked to browse; she liked to buy.
That evening, as I expected, she chose to stay home.
Out on the street, I tried to look like a casual pedestrian. I gazed at
shopwindows, pretending an interest in men's clothing stores while my
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
real concern was to detect if anyone was following me. A few blocks down
Third Avenue I went into a delicatessen I often patronized, bought a
package of Finn Crisp crackers and a bottle of Perrier water, and came out
with my parcel and with a stronger feeling that no one was shadowing me.
Nevertheless, I walked further down the avenue, past the side street where
Johnson waited, turned right onto another quiet crosstown street. right
again on Lexington Avenue. and then quickly right again back toward
Third Avenue and the brownstone.
I hurried along the pavement, glad of the trees that lined it but also
worried that behind any one of them, invisible to me, might be some KGB
agent observing me and my destination. In the brownstone's doorway it
seemed an eternity until Bert Johnson answered my ring and let me in.
"It's good to see you," he said as he closed the door. "Everything
okay?"
"Yes ... and no," I answered. "I don't think anyone saw me, but I
don't really know."
Johnson told me to relax and led me to an elevator at the back of the
entrance hall, a creaking, old-fashioned wooden machine that groaned its
way to the second floor. As we rode up to the library, I noticed that his
appearance had changed. Instead of the dark business suit of the week
before he wore casual clothes and his shirt was open. Where he had been
reticent and formal, he was now affable, easygoing.
His attitude helped me to calm down as well, and I agreed with plea-
sure when he proposed that we call each other by our first names. I liked
that American custom, which is followed in Russia only between close
friends or relatives. As we sat down on the sofa, I expected him to put the
question I had been thinking about for a week. I still was not sure exactly
how best to approach it.
Instead, Johnson began by asking about my health. I admitted I was
exhausted. I told him that my workload at the UN was heavy, and that the
Mission had been after me more than usual lately, always wanting some-
thing. He expressed sympathy; he asked whether I took any exercise,
whether I had any vacation plans.
Why didn't he get to the point: I fidgeted slightly as I told him that I
had had little vacation, that the meetings in the Security Council had been
wearing, that I was tired. "Besides," I said, "since we talked, I haven't
thought of anything else."
"Well, what have you been thinking He wouldn't ask the question
directly.
I began to question Johnson about the nature of his proposal. and at
the same time said I wasn't sure I could do what he wanted. I reiterated
that I had never belonged to the KGB and I did not know their techniques,
had no training. Furthermore, I'd be taking a terrible chance; I would
probably be caught before I got started. I hoped he would let me off the
hook; he didn't.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
The Reluctant Spy 25
Johnson said that Washington was aware that I had no KGB connec-
tions. that his government trusted my sincerity. He touched a nerve. Of all
things, good or bad. that anyone could say about me. that was a point
about which I wanted no mistake.
"But I think you're exaggerating," he continued. "You're letting your
imagination run away with you." He stressed that the Americans had no
intention of involving me in dangerous operations. and that they did not
want me to follow people around or steal and photograph documents.
They would never ask me to do anything that would require the kind of
maneuverings people read about, with secret drops for material and all
kinds of fantastic gadgets.
What they desired was information to which I already had access.
They wanted to know about policy matters, political decisions, and how
those decisions were reached. They welcomed material that came from my
background, my contacts, my work.
"You've worked closely with Gromvko and a lot of others. You know
what they're thinking about and what's going on behind the scenes in
Moscow and in the Mission here. You can help us understand what the
policies are, how they're made, and who makes them."
I protested that I already intended to give that knowledge to Ameri-
can government specialists, so it wasn't necessary for me to stay in my
present position any longer for that purpose.
Johnson interrupted me: "Wait a minute, let me finish. There's an-
other angle to all this: your own motivation. You convinced me last week
that there's nothing impulsive or selfish about your decision. If you wanted
wealth and security, you'd stay with the Soviets, but if you really want to
fight them we can help you do it in the most effective way."
I- told Johnson that my special position in New York had disadvantages
as well as benefits. I had freedom to go anywhere and meet with anyone
without getting permission, but that also made me more exposed. The
KGB had to watch me because my safety was their responsibility. Although
the agents could not limit what I did or where I went, they were always
suspicious because their first instinct was to trust no one. I said I didn't see
how I could meet Johnson on a regular basis because I didn't know how I
could shake them.
He sensed that my unease was real and tried to reassure me, repeating
that he would not ask me to take foolish risks. He emphasized that I would
avoid establishing a set pattern or routine for contacting or meeting him,
that I would use various telephones when calling, and that I would make
no change from my usual habits.
His words were reassuring but they still did not address the core of
my doubts. I could spot most, but not all, KGB when I was under surveil-
lance. I had no idea whether they had followed me on the street, even
tonight. I asked Johnson if he had people who could check whether the
KGB showed any special interest in what I did and where I went.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
He promised to organize a special detail right away. He said he would
let me know immediately if there were an signs of trouble, and assured
me that the Americans would move in if necessary.
I was grateful for this attitude, but I knew that even' time I entered
the Mission I would remember that I could be held captive inside it and
forced to fly directly home to Moscow. Just that year. I had seen a junior
diplomat hustled out of New York with no chance to save himself.
The victim had been a Mission official who had been arrested by the
New York police for a drunk-driving episode that had included a quarrel
with a bus driver. The Soviet claimed, probably to protect himself. that the
arrest had been a provocation, that the Americans had used the incident
to try to recruit him. Whether or not the Mission security men believed
him, as soon as the city police released him to Soviet custody, he was put
under what amounted to arrest inside the Mission and shipped home on
the next Aeroflot flight.
I told Johnson about this episode, tame indeed compared to what I
was contemplating, to underscore my worry that something similar could
happen to me. "I go to the Mission almost every day. Once I'm inside,
there is nothing any government on earth could do if the Mission detains
me. They could invent any pretext for holding me or for sending me back
to Moscow. A sudden heart attack, a stroke, anything. They have used
such excuses over and over."
"But there are things we can do," Johnson insisted. He said there
really wasn't much danger that they would kill me inside the Mission. I
was too well known for them to risk that kind of disappearance; my wife
would raise a storm; the United Nations would ask embarrassing questions.
I agreed that the Soviets wouldn't want those kinds of things to be aired in
public.
"If they did try to take you back to the Soviet Union, they'd have to
get you through Kennedy Airport," he continued. "There we can step in
and make sure you're leaving of your own free will." He told me I should
always let them know when I would be taking a trip myself, and especially
whenever I was going to Kennedy. He asked me whether I went there to
meet people coming from Moscow on the regular Aeroflot flight.
I told him I went there frequently to welcome delegations or impor-
tant visitors or just to greet friends. Johnson said that they wanted to know
in advance when I was going, if possible. American agents routinely
watched those flights, and they would receive particular instructions about
me. They would go on special alert if I appeared unexpectedly.
"If that happens and you're in trouble, you should make a sign of
some sort, raise your right hand, and we'll know you need help," he said.
Johnson was completely businesslike in discussing this contingency,
but I pictured myself being shuffled, heavily drugged, by a squad of KGB
men through the airport lounge, unable to make any sign of distress at all.
I tried to repress the fantasy as he went on.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
The Reluctant Spy 27
"Besides. we would be alerted if you staved in the Mission for an
unusual length of time. But we should have an emergency arrangement to
contact you. Is there an American doctor that you see regularly?"
There was the dentist, but my wife used him more than I did. There
was a dermatologist I had seen several times during nn? assignment in the
sixties. I gave Johnson his name.
"Would it be unusual for him to ask you to come in for an appoint-
ment?"
"No, not really. He's done it before to remind me that I'm due for a
checkup," I replied. "My secretary knows he's my doctor."
"Okay. Then if you get a message that he's phoned. call me immedi-
ately. It should be a good way to warn you if something goes wrong."
Johnson was now clearly assuming that I would accept his proposition,
and he was right. I had no real resistance. He probably sensed that I felt I
had no choice.
"Look," he said, "why don't you try it for a while? I know you can do
it. You'll find it easier than you think. Don't worry, we're not going to put
you in danger." He paused. "Okay?"
"All right. For a while."
"Good." He smiled. He repeated his advice not to change my normal
routine. "As long as you keep to your habits, you won't create any suspi-
cion."
I looked at my watch. It was close to ten o'clock. We made arrange-
ments for our next meeting the week after next.
Tuesday, twelve days ahead, was clear, assuming no emergency arose
at the UN. Johnson suggested that we try to get together in the middle of
that day rather than at night, to vary the schedule. I promised to confirm
the meeting by telephone on Monday, but added that if I did not come
Tuesday, Johnson should wait for me again on Wednesday around lunch-
time.
We had talked so much about procedures that we had neglected sub-
stance. What kind of information should I bring?
Johnson said I would be the best judge of what was important and of
how much time to give to any subject, but that it would help to have a basic
pattern. He suggested I start with the most recent cables received in the
Mission, the date, the time they were sent, the text as fully as I could get
I was startled. What did he mean, the full text of cables? One minute
he was reassuring, concerned for my safety, minimizing the dangers I
would have to confront. Next he was asking me to risk my neck. To copy
a code cable inside the Soviet Mission would invite almost certain detection.
"I can't do that," I protested. "We aren't even supposed to make notes
on what we read in the code room, just the gist, not the actual language.
And you said I shouldn't take photos or have any compromising materials
on me."
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
28 BREAKING WITH MOSCOW
He quickly responded that they did not expect full copies, just what-
ever I could remember of the important messages.
I didn't want Johnson to expect too much from the cables that came
to the Mission. and I explained the limits on information received there.
He assured me that the lack of immediacy would not be a major drawback.
"The big developments will stick out a mile." Johnson said. "you'll spot
them right away." What might be of more interest to Washington might
be difficult for me to identify at first. Something that seemed completely
routine to me because it was so familiar might be absolutely novel to them.
I should try to read as if I were seeing the information for the first time. I
must try to think of its value to outsiders, what it might reveal to someone
without my background and experience.
Johnson particularly wanted me to be on the lookout for nuance, new
shades of meaning signaling a change in policy or indicating debates on
certain issues. I must have looked skeptical, for he reassured me that,
although I might not think so now, it would come very naturally after a
while and that my worries were more the product of my imagination than
of reality.
At home Lina was awake but incurious. I mumbled something about
my walk having made me thirsty, poured myself a glass of Perrier, and
settled into my chair, pretending interest in a book. My mind, however,
was on my conversation with Johnson. I had begun it uncertain as to where
it would end. Yet with the decision made, I felt a surge of anticipation. I
would strike this bargain with the Americans to win my freedom and gain
their assistance in my campaign against the Soviet regime. But I was im-
patient to start anew, and I wanted a quick passage through that interim
existence.
I did not realize at the time that I had overlooked a crucial point. I
had put no limit on the length of my secret service. I had entered a shadow
world without defined boundaries, and assumed that a matter of months
would be long enough to prove my sincerity. But years of anxiety were
before me and the danger which I first thought I could not face became,
for all that time, my constant companion.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Fran "The CIA's Secret Operations
by Harry Rositzke
5
RECRUITING
RUSSL1NS
On New Year's Day 1953 a short, neatly dressed man
handed a letter to an American vice-consul about to enter his
car with a girl friend in the international sector of Vienna. It
read: "I am a Soviet officer. I wish to meet with an American
officer with the object of offering certain services...." The
letter specified the time and place for a meeting, at which the
Russian satisfactorily identified himself as a major assigned
to the Vienna office of Soviet military intelligence-the
GRU. For the next six years Major B was the key CIA source
on Soviet military matters.
I took a particular interest in the self-recruitment of Major
B because he had been hailed by some of my colleagues as an
example of a real "ideological" agent, a Russian who had
come to us purely out of principle. In conversations with the
operations officers involved and from reading his case file, it
was clear that Major B had a strong sense of social injustice.
Born in 1923, the son of a peasant, he lived through Stalin's
collectivization program and retained an enduring hatred for
the regime's continuing mistreatment of the poor peasants.
Yet it was his own personal circumstances that triggered his
act. He was being criticized by his GRU chief for recruiting
only a few useless agents, one of whom, a Serbian woman, he
had taken on as his mistress without informing his boss.
When his wife and child arrived from the Soviet Union, he
began to run short of the money needed to support two estab-
lishments.
Only late in his first conversation with a CIA officer did he
disclose, almost casually, that he had offered his services
because he had "an affair to straighten out" and that he came
to CIA only "as an extreme measure." Political principle is
rarely the sole or main reason for the transfer of a man's
allegiance, and Major B was no exception.
He and one CIA case officer met secretly once or twice a
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
month in comfortable middle-class surroundings, where their
sessions often lasted eight or nine hours. They became inti-
mate companions with a strong mutual affection. B found in
his case officer the only man he had ever been able to talk to
in his adult years about his feelings and anxieties, his job
frustrations, and his attitude to his bosses and the regime.
After one of their many discussions about the relative merits
of the CIA and the GRU, B expressed his feelings about the
two services:
This is what I like about your organization. You can find
time to drink and relax. It is an entirely human approach.
You have respect and regard for an individual. With us, of
course, the individual is nothing, and the Government's
interest, is everything.
As the years went by, his secret contacts with the CIA
became "nerve-wracking." The GRU, apparently growing
suspicious, asked him to return to headquarters.
In his last meeting before going back to Moscow he felt
shaky but remarkably confident. He was urged by his case
officer to defect, but he refused: "I am not the man for that."
Arrangements were made to meet him in Moscow if he so
wished.
Major B was apparently arrested in February 1959, shortly
after his return to NIoscow, but the Soviet authorities kept
his arrest quiet in order to use him against the CIA. We
continued the contact in the hope of keeping him alive, but
immediately after an emergency meeting with him in October
1959, the CIA case officer was arrested. After attempting to
cajole him to work for the GRU, the Soviet security officials
released him on the basis of his diplomatic immunity. Accord-
ing to an official Soviet announcement, Major B was exe-
cuted shortly thereafter.
Major B was the most valuable source of Soviet military
intelligence of the time. He provided technical specifications
on Soviet conventional weapons, including the first informa-
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
tion on several new Soviet tanks. He furnished detailed order
of battle data and tables of equipment for Soviet tank,
mechanized, and rifle divisions. He reported large increases
in the number of amphibious vehicles and armored personnel
carriers a full eighteen months before they were spotted by
other sources. His other firsts included the description of
several tactical missile systems and reports on the existence
of Soviet nuclear submarines, a new heavy tank division, and
Soviet Army tactics in the utilization of atomic weapons.
This one man's reporting had a direct and substantial ef-
fect on U. S. military organization, doctrine, and tactics, and
saved the Pentagon at least a half-billion dollars in its re-
search and development program.
The second agent-in-place, unlike Major B, was a well-
educated aristocrat-the most publicized of CIA agents: Oleg
Penkovsky. The son of upper-class pre-Bolshevik parents, he
was a brilliant man who became a full colonel at the age of
thirty. He was sophisticated and extravagant, with a taste for
luxuries from white nylon sheets to good porcelain and fine
ladies. Not merely articulate, but voluble, he was a dynamo
of energy. He hit like a cyclone.
His first approach to the Americans resembled that of B in
Vienna. After reconnoitering the American Embassy in
Moscow for several days, and noting that all visitors were
being photographed from a KGB safe house across the way,
he strolled along the unlighted banks of the %Ioscow River,
and at 11 P.m. on August 12, 1960, he approached a pair of
obviously American tourists taking a walk. As an earnest of
his bona fides, he gave them some hitherto undisclosed de-
tails on the shooting down of the U-2 plane the previous
May-fourteen rockets had been fired, there had been no
direct hits, one near-burst had brought it down, etc. He then
handed them a letter to be delivered to the American Em-
bassy.
The letter offered his services to the United States "for the
ideals of a truly free world and of democracy for mankind." It
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
RECRUITING RussIANS
stated that he had "very important materials on many sub-
jects of exceptionally great interest" and wished to transmit
them to the Americans through a dead drop whose descrip-
tion he enclosed or through a drop designated by the Ameri-
cans.
In the atmosphere of the time, with the antispy crusade in
full swing, this approach by an anonymous stroller along the
Moscow River was read by the embassy and by Washington
as a possible KGB provocation, a clumsy effort to implicate an
American official in espionage as another proof to the Soviet
citizenry of the need for vigilance. Accordingly, no attempt
was made to establish contact.
Fortunately, Penkovsky was persistent. In December,
under cover of his civilian job in the State Committee for
Science and Technology, he asked a visiting British scientist
to deliver a package to the American Embassy. The scientist
refused. Penkovsky then actually passed a bulky sealed en-
velope to a Canadian trade official who, equally skeptical,
returned it intact.
Finally, on March 10, 1961, Penkovsky told a member of a
British commercial delegation led by a Mr. Greville Wynne
that he would soon head a Soviet delegation on a return visit
to England. He handed Wynne some papers and a letter. The
letter was addressed to the President of the United States and
the Queen of England.
On April 20, two British and two American intelligence
officers sat down with Penkovsky in a London hotel and let
him talk. He explained that various personal factors had en-
tered into his decision to work against the Soviet regime. His
principal motivation, however, was his overwhelming fear
that Khrushchev, then at the height of his power, would use
his atomic weapons to destroy the human race. He hated
Khrushchev and the system. Khrushchev was the system,
and he had to stop him from the threatened holocaust. It was
an idee fixe possible only in a brilliant mind.
Over the next two years, through carefully arranged con-
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
tacts in Moscow, Penkovskv supplied Western intelligence
with the most valuable strategic military information pro-
duced by an agent since World War II.
His detailed reports on Soviet strategic offensive and de-
fensive capabilities provided a firm basis for American esti-
mates on Soviet ICBM strength, on Soviet ABM capabilities,
and on Soviet doctrines of strategic and tactical nuclear war-
fare. He provided comprehensive details on Soviet medium-
range missile systems, unique data on tactical surface-to-air
missiles, and details on antimissile systems and locations. On
ten separate occasions between mid-July 1961 and September
1962 Penkovsky supplied timely and valuable comments of
senior Soviet generals on Khrushchev's announced effort to
force the Allies out of Berlin.
Largely through Penkovskv, when the Cuban missile crisis
came to a head in October 1962, President Kennedy knew the
realities of Soviet missile capability (it was inferior to the
American) and could safely work on that premise. Further,
the data provided by Penkovsky on the medium-range missile
system deployed in Cuba by the Russians permitted Ameri-
can intelligence to make precise estimates of the construction
stages and the dates for operational readiness of the Soviet
missiles-a crucial factor in the timing of the American re-
sponses. Pentagon concern over a Soviet countermove against
Berlin in response to the American action against Cuba was
moderated by his reporting.
Without Penkovsky's reporting the Soviet-American con-
frontation over Cuba would have been an even more precari-
ous event than it was.
By that time, however, Penkovsky was apparently already
under Soviet surveillance. There is no definitive evidence on
what led KGB counterintelligence to suspect him, but it is
likely that he was under close investigation in the summer of
1962 and placed under KGB control by mid-September. In
May of 1963 he was tried in open court, and, according to
official report, later executed for his espionage activities.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
THE WASHINGTON POST
19 December 1981
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
THE TULSA TRIBUNE
8 February 1977
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
From "The Craft of Intelligence",
by Allen Dulles
Collection-When the Machine Takes Over
A technical aid to espionage of another kind is the concealed
microphone and transmitter which keeps up a flow of live informa-
tion from inside a target to a nearby listening post: this is known
to the public as "telephone tapping" or "bugging" or "miking."
"Audio surveillance," as it is called in intelligence work, requires
excellent miniaturized electronic equipment, clever methods of con-
cealment and a human agent to penetrate the premises and do the
concealing.
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge in early June of 1960 displayed
before the United Nations in New York the Great Seal of the
United States which had been hanging in the office of the American
Ambassador in Moscow. In it the Soviets had concealed a tiny in-
strument which, when activated, transmitted to a Soviet listening
post everything that was said in the Ambassador's office. Actually,
the installation of this device was no great feat for the Soviets since
every foreign embassy in Moscow has to call on the services of local
electricians, telephone men, plumbers, charwomen and the like. The
Soviets have no difficulties in seeing to it that their own citizens
cooperate with their intelligence service, or they may send intel-
ligence officers, disguised as technicians, to do the job.
In Soviet Russia and in the major cities of the satellite countries
certain hotel rooms are designated for foreign travelers because
they have been previously bugged on a permanent basis. Micro-
phones do not have to be installed in a rush when an "interesting"
foreigner arrives on the scene. The microphones are already there
and it is only the foreigner who has to be installed. All the hotels
are state-owned and have permanent police agents on their staffs
whose responsibility is to see that the proper foreigners are put in
the "right" rooms.
When Chancellor Adenauer paid his famous visit to Moscow in
September, 1955, to discuss the resumption of diplomatic relations
between Russia and West Germany, he traveled in an official Ger-
man train. When he arrived in Moscow, the Soviets learned to their
chagrin that the wily Chancellor (who then had no embassy of his
own to reside in, for such limited security as this might afford) in-
tended to live in his train during his stay in Moscow and did not
mean to accept Soviet "hospitality" in the form of a suite at one of
the VIP hotels for foreigners in Moscow. It is reported that before
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
70 THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE
leaving Germany the Chancellor's train had been equipped by
German technicians with the latest devices against audio surveil-
lance.
Outside its own country an intelligence service must consider the
possible repercussions and embarrassments that may result from the
discovery that an official installation has been illegally entered and
its equipment tampered with. As in all espionage operations, the
trick is to find the man who can do the job and who has the talent
and the motive, whether patriotic or pecuniary. There was one in-
stance when the Soviets managed to place microphones in the
flowerpots that decorated the offices of a Western embassy in a
neutral country. The janitor of the building, who had a weakness
for alcohol, was glad to comply for a little pocket money. He never
knew who the people were who borrowed the pots from him every
now and then or what they did with them.
There is hardly a technological device of this kind against which
countermeasures cannot be taken. Not only can the devices them-
selves be detected and neutralized, but sometimes they can be turned
against those who install them. Once they have been detected, it is
often profitable to leave them in place in order to feed the other
side with false or misleading information.
In their own diplomatic installations abroad, the Soviets and their
satellites stand in such fear of audio surveillance operations being
mounted against them that they will usually refuse to permit local
service people to install telephones or even ordinary electrical
wiring in buildings they occupy. Instead, they will send out their
own technicians and electricians as diplomats on temporary duty
and will have them do the installing. In one instance where they
evidently suspected that one of their embassies had been "wired for
sound" by outsiders, they even sent a team of day laborers to the
capital in question, all of them provided with diplomatic passports
for the trip. To the great amusement of the local authorities, these
"diplomats" were observed during the next few weeks in overalls
and bearing shovels, digging a trench four or five feet deep in the
ground around the embassy building, searching for buried wires
leading out of the building. (They didn't find any.)
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
From "Street Man" , by
E. C. "Mike" Ackerman
Chapter I
It had taken me ninety minutes to get to Piazza Venezia, which is at most a
fifteen-minute walk from my, hotel. Three taxi rides. One shopping gallery.
Four narrow streets.
Lots of window shopping, using the plate glass much like a mirror to spot
surveillance. One of my training officers had put it this way: "When you catch
yourself really looking at the lingerie, it's the first sign that You've been on
the streets too long." Well, some day I may have time to look at the lingerie
and to talk to the pretty girls in the cafes. But not today.
MY principal challenge right now is to cross the pia::u. Roman traffic is
always the same. The world's most affable people. but put them behind the
wheel of a Fiat or an Alfa and they detest humanity. If all goes well. crossing
and re-crossing this piazza will be the riskiest part of this operation.
I walk around Victor Emmanuel's monument and up the stairs of the
Campidoglio, which is tucked behind it. A simple square, closed in on three
sides by two-story buildings. Designed by Michelangelo himself. Beautiful
in their simplicity. And two statues that look like David's kid brothers. They
always make me wonder if Michelangelo really was queer.
Every tourist who comes to Rome eventually visits the Campidoglio. He'll
be here too-looking like any other European. Sandals. Shirt collar opened
and worn over his sport coat. German camera-or maybe Japanese. I spot a
man who could pass for his brother. Brown hair. Solid build. Strong neck.
But it isn't my man. Not the face. How well I know that face!
Four o'clock. To be precise, 1602 hours. I'll linger for three more minutes.
If he doesn't show I'll walk down to the Forum, kill an hour and return.
Is there any chance of a misunderstanding? Remember Murphy's Law-it
is the natural order of things to be screwed-up. If an arrangement admits the
slightest possibility for an error or a misunderstanding, it will happen. The
corollary: Make every contact plan accident-proof and idiot-proof. I thought
I had, but you never knew.
He called yesterday-a number in Brussels. He spoke in French. "This is
Vidal. I have a message for Monsieur Duran. The shipment from Rome will
arrive at the airport at four p.m. on the tenth." Today is the tenth. There is no
doubt that he meant to set up a meeting in Rome at this hour. Will he remem-
ber that the contact point in Rome is the Campidoglio? He will. He's a
good one.
It could be that he had a last minute meeting laid on by his embassy, in
which case he'll show at five p.m., or seven p.m.--or tomorrow at one of
those times. Well, no matter. At least it's the Campidoglio. It's better than
the Paris East Railway Station. Had to keep coming back to that depressing
place for three days once. Glad I thought to set the contact point here.
There he is. A split second of eye contact. But how many important messa-
ges are passed! The most important is also the most basic. He's alive-and as
anxious to see me as I am him. A quick glance to his breast-pocket. No pen.
That too carries a message. He's safe-not under hostile control.
I take off back down the steps. He'll follow at a discreet distance. A right
turn at the foot of the steps, back towards the piazza. Through groups of
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
t.urtrnt.-h~ih 'chail students. nuns. Hadassah ladies. pilgrims. All out to
ctur...runc with art and with eternity. All oblivious to the procession of two
w ind.ng through their midst.
Then across the pia:=a. Again the reality of the Roman drivers. Made it.
H.'2e he does too.
Here comes a Roman beauty. Exquisite. There are more knock-outs here
per square foot than anywhere I've ever been. I'll turn around to admire her.
He's still behind me. Good. One of this days I want to turn around and really
look at the girl.
Next up is a stroll past a sidewalk cafe. Quite crowded. My eye settles on an
impeccably attired continental type in the second row who has obviously
discomfited the two American teachers-on-holiday alongside him. They'd be
a pushover for the distinguished gray-haired likes of him. Wouldn't they be
disappointed if they knew Tom was from Newark! And that he had taken that
particular table in order to have an unobstructed view of the square. Foot
surveillance-motorcycle-car surveillance. Tom's good. If they're on us,
he'll spot them.
Right on via Tritone. And into the Innocente Department Store. Up to the
third floor. He's still with me. Escalators are great for looking back. A pause
in the men's clothing department. Past a man trying on a sport coat. I don't
think they'll make the sale. Willie has two kids in college and another finish-
ing high school. He's still wearing three-button pin-stripes and couldn't care
less. Now to the down escalator. He'll follow me. If anyone follows him,
Willie will make him.
Out a side door. Are we clean? Don't know yet. Here comes another pretty
girl. Tall and fair-ash blond hair. Could be from Milan or Torino or
Venice-or Pittsburgh. I stare her down. She avoids my gaze. Excellent. If
she had winked I would have been in deep trouble. That would have meant
that Tom or Willie or another stake-out had spotted hostile surveillance. My
handkerchief would have come flying out of my pocket. and he would have
broken off in another direction. Sometimes it's nice to have a pretty girl not
re i nd to You.
Novh a left down a side street. Via Marcello. Third pala=:o from the corner.
"k% like all the rest. Its illegal to change the facing of a Roman building.
Thcv dig antiquities. You couldn't sell them Collins Avenue. Door is locked.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
I open it with my key and step inside, leaving it ever so slightly ajar. I wait.
He'll take a last look around before he risks entry. For him this is the moment
of truth. If anyone sees him enter the building he'll have a lot of explaining
to do.
Perhaps he could explain. Apartment five, on the second floor is rented to
Signora Marissa Gambelli who is, after all, known to entertain gentlemen.
And she will be prepared to swear that she did pass that afternoon with a
gentleman of his description.
Maybe they would accept that explanation and merely reprimand him for
violating socialist principles of morality. Or maybe they would check deeper
and find out that Marissa had spent the afternoon and evening with one of
her regulars-at the sea in nearby Ostia. That lucky fellow is probably still
wondering why Marissa had the sudden urge to spend a whole day with him
for the price of a tete-a-tete. That's easy. Dorrore Minervi pays Marissa's
rent. and when the good doctor asks her to disappear for a spell, she
dissapears.
I hear him open the door. I'm already on the stairs. Two flights-the
longest part of the journey, it always seems. So near to the safe-house.
At last the door. The key. I'm inside. He's inside. After the door closes the
abrazzo comes. A warm bear hug that seems awkward to many Americans but
is quite acceptable among other men.
It lasts a long time. There is great emotion on both sides. He had once
told me: "You are more than my brother."
I felt the same way. We were half a world apart. Different countries. Dif-
ferent ethnic backgrounds. Different languages. Brought up under totally
different political systems. Yet, more than brothers.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Fran "Breaking with Moscow",
by Arkady N. Shevchenko
5
I was scheduled to fly to Cuba the following Saturday. I would get
there in time to inspect the arrangements for the seminar and work on
any last-minute problems before it opened on Monday. Early in the week
I dropped off my razor with Johnson. and on Friday evening, the night
before my departure. I went to see him.
It was our first meeting at the Waldorf-Astoria. A large reception in a
downstairs ballroom gave me my excuse to be at the hotel. At the party I
chatted briefly with the host and a few other UN ambassadors, but soon
was able to slip out. I took an elevator to one of the upper floors.
Johnson had sketched the location of the room for me: it was down a
corridor to the right of the elevator shaft. But other people left the car
with me. I walked the length and width of the hotel and came to the room
from the back corridor, having reassured myself that the other elevator
passengers were ordinary guests uninterested in me or my destination.
Johnson was waiting for me, obviously pleased with himself. He
pointed to a low coffee table and two razors lying on it side by side. "Which
one is yours?" He grinned.
I examined them, hefted them in my hands, and could find no differ-
ence between them.
"They're both yours from now on," Johnson said, "but the one on the
left isn't the kind you can buy at the drugstore. I'll show you the differ-
ence."
He picked up the instrument and, as I watched, set the numbers on
the metal ring below the razor head at the minimum opening and then,
pushing hard against the bottom of the handle, twisted the cylinder. The
handle came apart, revealing that it was hollow. Into the opening Johnson
slipped a tiny roll of microfilm.
"That has everything you need on it," he said. "In case you forget the
details of the contingency plan we went over the other night. It's got phone
numbers, locations, people to contact in case you need them."
He made me practice opening and closing the razor until he pro-
nounced me an expert. I didn't feel like one.
I packed both razors the next morning and went to Kennedy Airport
to catch a flight for Jamaica, where, after a layover. I would take another
plane to Havana.
My UN associates who met me at the Havana airport were preoccu-
pied with last-minute problems in the organization of the apartheid semi-
nar. There was no Soviet welcoming party for me, no KGB detail on hand.
I stayed at a former luxury hotel which had become distinctly seedy.
The bathrooms were a rusty mess. Plumbing fixtures were exactly the kind
of thing the Cubans hoped the Soviet Union would supply to them. But
the U.S.S.R. had too little of such equipment for itself. Another item the
Cubans were desirous of was Coca-Cola. They missed their Cuba Libres.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
The Soviets were never able to produce Coca-Cola, so they asked the
Czechs. who did their best. but the result was not very good. "Checka-
Cola" never worked as well as Coca-Cola. The Soviet Union found it much
easier to be generous with military equipment, of which they had no short-
age..
I spent the next day checking arrangements for the apartheid discus-
sions. I met the Soviet Ambassador to Cuba only when the seminar opened
and he arrived to represent the U.S.S.R. at its sessions. We were not ac-
quaintances and, although we found time for a brief talk during a break
in the speechmaking, we made no effort to go beyond superficial conver-
sation. I did, however, accept his offer to spend the evening with two
couples from the embassy who were willing to accompany me for dinner
and a Cuban nightclub performance. It proved to be a pleasant evening,
and as I prepared to pack and return to New York, I told myself that
Johnson had been right. My worry had been for nothing. The worst was
over. As so often before, the worst had been mostly in my imagination.
My mood didn't last. I noticed that two of my shirts were not where I
had left them. Their disappearance was annoying, but I assumed they
would turn up somewhere in the suite. My nonchalance vanished com-
pletely when I went into the bathroom. The razor I had put on a shelf
above the sink was not there.
Sweat broke out all over my body. Which razor had I left in the
bathroom? I had forgotten to test it when I unpacked, to distinguish the
original from the hollow one. Where had I left the other one? In my
suitcase. That was it. I would get it, check it, find out for certain if I was
safe or self-betrayed.
Walking as though I were underwater, I went back to the bedroom
and fumbled through the clothes I had already packed until my fingers
grasped the razor. I brought it out and stood a moment, trying to recall
the procedure for opening it.
Set the number as low as possible. Twist the bottom part of the handle.
Damn. It wouldn't move. I tried again. Nothing.
They had taken the hollow one. I was found out.
I collapsed into a sitting position on the edge of the bed, staring at the
worn, dingy carpet, unable to organize my thoughts, to get control of
myself.
I do not know how long the seizure lasted, but it seemed an eternity
until I began to swim back toward reason. Finally, in a corner of my mind,
I remembered that I had omitted a step in the process of opening the
razor handle.
I tried a third time. Do it slowly. Do it right. Set the number. Push
hard on the handle and twist. Push hard. That was the action I had for-
gotten on the first two attempts. Now turn it.
It turned. It unscrewed. The microfilm was still safe inside.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
The Reluctant Spy
I gasped aloud with relief. Only a hotel maid stealing a few things
from her socialist brother. But was it= Perhaps it really had been Castro's
security police or the KGB. Maybe they had discovered something and
were sifting all possibilities. Maybe there was a mole in the CIA who had
tipped them off or even, I thought with rage, one of their moronic, careless
leaks. Only time could give me the answer.
From then until I returned that night to New York, I kept the razor
in my briefcase and never let the case out of my hands. Home in my
apartment I waited until Lina and Anna were asleep and then went into
the bathroom with scissors and a pair of heavy pliers. I extracted the
microfilm, minced it into slivers, and flushed it away. Then I mangled the
razor itself, twisting it into an unrecognizable lump. The remains went into
the trash.
For some time after, I was on the alert and suspicious of anything
even slightly unusual in anyone's behavior at the Soviet :Mission. But as my
routine settled back into ordinary patterns, the residue of shock from my
own "Cuban crisis" receded.
Contributing to the relaxing of my tensions was my somewhat surpris-
ing discovery that there were many similarities between spying and diplo-
macy. Spies and diplomats live double lives: one life for outsiders and
another among those whom they trust or for whom they -work. Both jobs
require constant vigilance, good nerves, and time to devote to collecting
information and compiling it for reports to one's government.
I began to feel that I was fishing in my own pond. Johnson had proved
right about my ability to make the gathering of intelligence a manageable
part of my routine. It took time, but I acquired the facility. He was wrong,
however, about my fears eventually dwindling away. Anxiety always re-
mained in a back corner of my mind. I was acutely aware that while dip-
lomats usually finished their lives with honor and died in their beds, even
brilliant spies often came to an abrupt and violent end or lived out their
lives in prison and disgrace.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
From "Spy-Tech", by
Graham Yost
4SURVEILLANCE
Tapping
There are two types of taps-direct and wireless. Direct caps, as
their name suggests, are intercepts that are attached directly to the
phone line anywhere between the telephone and the exchange and
then run off by wire to a listening post-which may be manned by
etcher the stereotypical agent, sweating in the basement, or merely a
tape recorder. A wireless telephone tap, although employing a
direct intercept of the line current, uses a radio transmitter rather
than a direct wire to send the intercepted call to the listening post.
If a spy wishes to cap a phone directly, he or she first locates the
phone line that is to be invaded. This is obviously easier to do when
it is just one overhead wire running from the suburban residence of a
foreegn consul than when it is one line of thousands in a downtown
building where the consul's office is located.
To cap a household in a suburban situation (the consul's or
perhaps a suspected Bulgarian safehouse in a town near Silicon
Valley), the wiretapper follows the "drop wire" that emerges from
the house and goes to a nearby pale-mounced terminal, where it
connects to a twenty-five-pair aerial distribution cable. The tapper
then climbs the pole and notes the color of the pair to which the
houses's drop wire is connected. He can either hook up a tap there or
follow the aerial distribution cable a few blocks to another pole-
mounted terminal, where it hooks up with an aerial branch feeder
cable with 200 pairs (in eight binder groups). Again, he can either
hook up the cap there or follow the line to the main feeder cable,
which consists of 600 pairs in twenty-four binder groups. Agents
consider it best to cap into the line at a terminal post because the
cables between the terminals are pressurized, so that any break in
their sheathing can be detected.
Tapping in an urban area poses problems. Whether the agent is
after a consular office in an office building or the apartment home of
a suspected terrorist, he must go to the basement where terminal
boxes are usually located in apartment and office buildings. There
are several ways the capper can find the pair of lines he wishes to cap
into if the subject is in an office or an apartment. If the person or
persons he wishes to cap happen to be on the line while he is at the
terminal box, he can simply hook up his headphones to each pair of
lines until he finds the voice he is looking for.
He may also hook up a lineman's handset to any pair, then dial
the number he wishes to cap, and let it ring. He then runs a wet
finger or a coin down the terminal posts in the box until he feels
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
either a small jolt or sees a spark from the 48 line volts being used to
ring the person's phone. To avoid this minor shock, a small light
bulb attached to a resistor can be touched to the posts, and it will
light up when it couches the active line.
Telephone line
Parallel
transmitter
a
When the proper line has been determined, the wiretapper can
then hook up a battery-powered high-impedance amplifier and some
headphones to the line and listen in. This type of cap is hooked up in
a parallel circuit, which does not use the phone system's power but
Surveillance 167
Diagram of the installation
of series and parallel
transmitters.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
Installation of .ln induction
tap.
requires batteries or some ocher form of power generation. If the spy
must use the phone system's electricity, then the tap can be hooked
up in series. These series caps create an extra draw on the line,
causing a drop in the line voltage that is easily detected. In fact, any
drop of over 20 milliamperes can be detected by the phone company
itself, and if they do detect an extra draw, they will send out a
repairman to investigate-something the agent does not want.
Another type of tap, the inductive cap, is also considered to be a
direct cap even though it does not require any direct contact with
either the telephone or the line. The inductive cap operates on the
basic principle of electromagnetism, that a magnetic field surrounds
any flow of electric current. Theoretically, therefore, by picking up
the magnetic field surrounding the current in the phone line an
agent can intercept a phone call without ever touching the line. But
this is more than theory. The inductive cap actually works, using a
metal coil wrapped around the phone lines, with wires from either
end of the coil running off to an amplifier. One advantage of this
method is that a properly installed inductive cap is virtually
impossible to detect. There are, however, detractions. Because the
magnetic field it caps is rather weak, the signal output from the
sensing coil is somewhat low, and the coil is subject to interference
and distortion from ocher magnetic sources as well.
Any tap can be made into a wireless tap. All that is necessary is to
hook up a small radio transmitter to the cap itself, so that
intercepted calls can be broadcast to a nearby receiver rather than run
there by wire. The simplest of these is the drop-in telephone bug, a
cap that is disguised to look exactly like a telephone microphone.
The agent merely unscrews the microphone cap, cakes out the old
mike, and drops in the new one. Inside this otherwise normal-
looking telephone mike is a small radio transmitter that broadcasts
the intercepted conversation along the phone line to the
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
eavesdroppers. Although easy to install, drop-in transmitters can be
easily detected because they draw power from the phone lines.
Other radio-transmitting taps are usually hooked up somewhere
along the line and are no larger than a grain of rice; tiny enough to be
slipped inside the insulation cover on a telephone line. However, as
will be discussed later, radio-frequency (RF) transmitters pose
certain problems in operation, so that direct wiretaps are preferred
by eavesdroppers.
There are a few devices that can make an eavesdropping agent's
life easier. With a gadget called a dropout relay, a tap can be set to
turn on only when the phone is in use (it detects the drop in line
voltage when the handset is lifted off hook). Also useful are
recorders, which will note when and to what number each call from
the phone under surveillance was dialed. Of course, the numbers can
also be recovered by taping the calls and playing them back at a
slower speed in order to pick up either the number of rotary dial
clicks or the tones from a push-button phone.
The Telephone as a Bug
Not only can a spy cap into a line to intercept phone calls; in
addition, the telephone and its line also can be used to bug a room,
and as the telephone is virt ually omnipresent these days, such a
prospect can be very attractive to the spy. Essentially, a phone used
to bug a room must be actually off hook while appearing to be on
hook. The hook switch must be bypassed so that some current gets
through to operate the carbon microphone. Thus activated by the
current, the mike can pick up the room conversation and then
transmit it over the telephone lines as if it were a regular telephone
conversation.
The notorious infinity transmitter is designed to do just that.
This type of transmitter got its name from its original manufacturer
who claimed that it could be operated from virtually an "infinite"
distance-from anywhere in the world with direct dialing. It is a
small device chat is installed directly in the target's phone. When
the spy wishes to listen in to the room conversation, he dials the
target's number and immediately, before the phone rings, sends a
tone along the line that activates the infinity transmitter, which
bypasses the hook switch and cuts off the ring. The phone has, in
effect, been answered: It is now off hook, even though it is still
resting on the cradle and appears on hook, and the occupant of the
room is none the wiser.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
The infinity transmitters used by agents and other professional
eavesdroppers have different levels of sophistication. The simplest is
triggered by one cone sent over the line. The problem with this is
that countersurveillance experts will "sweep" phone lines with a
tone generator in an attempt to trigger such a device. However, the
more sophisticated infinity transmitters are turned on by a coded
sequence of up to five tones, which makes them virtually impossible
to uncover with a tone sweep.
Infinity transmitters are not perfect eavesdropping tools. The
telephone's microphone can only pick up conversation within about
30 feet of the phone (if that), and the sound quality is rather poor.
Also, the switching systems in some countries may delay the
triggering cone so that it does not reach the target telephone befor
it rings. The abbreviated ring may alert the person the agent i~,
trying to bug that something is amiss.
Another problem is that the infinity transmitter only picks up
room conversation and will shut itself off the instant the phone is
put in use. It must do so, for if it remained in operation when the
target picked up his phone, the target would have a direct line to the
eavesdropper. Also, there is an attendant drop in line voltage with
the use of one of these devices. It doesn't drop so much that the
phone company thinks there is something wrong with the
telephone; it only goes down to around 23 volts, the voltage used
when one is on hold. But even this meager drop is easily detected by
professional sweepers.
The biggest problem with the infinity transmitter is that while it
is in use anyone else calling the target number will get a busy signal.
People who are told by friends that their phone is busy all the time,
even when they are not using it, would certainly get suspicious-if
not of an infinity transmitter, then at least that the phone was
malfunctioning.
The Listen-back, Keep-alive,
and Direct Crosswire
The listen-back and the keep-alive, like the infinity transmitter,
are tiny devices that are wired directly into the telephone instrument
and that allow the eavesdropper to bypass the hook switch and listen
in on the room conversation. But while the infinity transmitter is
triggered by a tone, with a listen-back or keep-alive the target phone
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
must be answered to trigger the circuitry. Then, when the target
hangs up, the keep-alive or listen-back will continue to allow a small
amount of current to trickle through the microphone and back down
the line to the eavesdropper; this current is shut off when the
eavesdropper hangs up. Of course, anyone calling in will activate
keep-alives and listen-backs, which are also subject to the liabilities
of an infinity transmitter (voltage drop, busy signal, etc.). Still,
such devices are very small and may be harder to detect by visual
inspection than an infinity transmitter.
The direct-crosswire technique can be used only with six-button
The direct crosswire.
listen-back and keep-ali: c
techniques. In box one wt
see u here the Sparc pair is
hooked up to the line i
eonitilS from the curb
cord. Box two thou: the
workings of the
hook-switch. As shown. the
phone is on book. if the
nodules u ere touching it
would be off-hook.
Listen backs and
keep-alines rig the switch
so that it is alu ay s
off-hook. whether the
receiver is on the cradle
and the buttons depressed
or not.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
phones (five lines and one hold button). In such phones there is
usually one pair of lines to each button as well as a loose spare pair or
two. One of these spare pairs can be hooked up directly to the lines
coming in from the microphone through the curly cord that
connects the handset to the phone. Then, outside on the line
somewhere, this spare line can be capped. In effect, hooking up the
spare pair directly to the microphone bypasses the hook switch and
keeps one line open at all times. In addition, as this is a spare line
and not a number that one could dial, it does not cause anyone
calling in to get a busy signal.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Fran "The CIA under Reagan, Bush
and Casey", by Ray S. Cline
Intelligence Liaison
My understanding of the intelligence world increased
immensely in this period when I succeeded in getting assigned
to the CIA contingent in London, serving there until November
1953. The assignment was something of an accident. Beetle
Smith decided to integrate the CIA activities overseas in major
posts by assigning what he called Senior Representatives of the
Director of the CIA. This meant the warring factions of OPC
and OSO would have a local umpire in addition to the station
chief, who often tended to get embroiled in the struggles. Smith
appointed General Lucian Truscott to manage the mammoth
German station and a suave, old-school Virginia gentleman,
retired Brigadier General Thomas Betts, to be Senior Represen-
tative in London. Betts was one of the few professional military
officers with a long career in intelligence. He had the good
judgment to see that exchanging our new intelligence pro-
duct-the NIE-with the British, in return for their joint
Intelligence Committee appreciations on the same subject,
would be mutually beneficial. Betts asked for a staff officer
from the new ONE to explain what we were doing to the British
and to find out what was going on in the more mature British
system.
When the message from London reached Washington, I
immediately asked Langer to let me leave ONE, which had
pretty well shaken down to the pattern of activities it
maintained for 20 years, and establish this new job in London. It
would give us the benefits of seeing how the evidence on
common strategic problems looked from the viewpoint of
another nation, a close ally with similar but separate interests. I
thought ONE and the CIA would benefit and I would learn
much from the British process. I believe I was right; the
exchange of "finished"-i.e., evaluated and analyzed-reports
with London continues to this day as does an informal liaison
exchange system on the analytical level. At its peak, it kept 13
CIA analysts busy in London comparing notes with their
counterparts in economic intelligence, scientific intelligence,
and general strategic analysis. The link is still strong and
valuable today. The foresight of Smith, Langer, and Betts paid
off handsomely.
146 Building an Intelligence System
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
My real awakening in London was the discovery of how much
we still benefited from formal liaison exchanges of intelligence
with Great Britain, over and beyond the give and take of
analytical papers. Tom Betts was an easygoing boss, perfectly
willing to let me do whatever I wanted, and he gave me free rein
to help other CIA components in London. I was also lucky in
having taken one of the best of the ONE secretaries, Barbara
Ewen, whose looks and southern accent devastated the young
Englishmen I dealt with.. She ran the office, handled the
paperwork, and managed my program to maximum benefit.
This fact I mention not only to show why I had so much spare
time in London, but to make a general point about secretaries,
especially those dealing with the sensitive and sometimes
delicate matters of intelligence handling and intelligence
exchange. It can be serious if they make a slip in talking with
high-ranking officials, especially foreign officials, by referring
to specific intelligence items they may not be supposed to know
about. My good fortune has been in having the help of
extremely competent women. To all of them-most of them
grossly underpaid for the responsibilities they carried-I am
much indebted, especially to my OSS secretary Penny Wright,
my first CIA secretary Marcelle Raczkowski, to Barb Ewen, to
Rosie Sarson in Taiwan, and to Dolores Unick, my last CIA
secretary, who went to Germany with me. These encomiums
are also due to Thayal Hall, my secretary in the State
Department in 1969-1973. All of these able women were
actually research assistants, managerial backups for my
administrative chores, and personal representatives with the
outside world.
With such support from Barb Ewen in London, I got around,
not ony with all kinds of British intelligence officials, but also
with the CIA liaison staff in Great Britain. The wartime
partnership was still paying off handsomely. The British,
recognizing the importance of keeping the United States
actively engaged in an effort to contain Soviet disruptive
thrusts, were extraordinarily open and cooperative with
Americans in intelligence matters. They provided not only most
of their highest-level joint intelligence estimates but also
supplied the station chief in London with most of their
clandestine intelligence MI-6 reports. The station chief was not
The CIA Under Reagan, Bush and Casey 147
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
very communicative with me in accordance with clandestine
tradition, but my OSS background, my acquaintance with
senior U.S. military men I had interviewed while writing the
Army history, and my entree to high-level British officials made
me persona grata with his staff, particularly his deputy, who
cooperated closely with me with the chief's tacit acquiescence. I
learned a lot from this collaboration.
One of the CIA's most closely guarded secrets is that its own
espionage efforts have been supplemented greatly in both
numbers and importance by contributions from the intelligence
services of friendly allies. Much of this intelligence is circulated
in Washington as standard CIA Information Reports so that
few know the difference. Of course a vast amount of reporting
from foreign governments was not disseminated outside the
CIA because it was unreliable or of little interest. Even this
material has helped, however, to guide the CIA's own collection
staffs.
Some of the material thus exchanged with liaison services
was from intercepted electronic signal messages. Eventually
most of this material was worked into the reporting system of
the National Security Agency, the consolidated cryptanalysis
and signals intercept facility set up in 1950 to manage the
signals intelligence work of the military services. The contri-
bution from this source has been enormous over the years and
still is. Here, too, many Washington recipients of intercepted
messages do not realize they are reading traffic that would not
be available except for good liaison relations with allies. On the
periphery of the Soviet Union and China, communications and
other electronic (radar, missile telemetry, etc.) intercept bases
provided unique data from remote regions.
The importance of these bases rose and fell with technolog-
ical and political changes over the years, but it is fair to say that
the CIA's official intelligence liaison in this field netted more
reliable material for Washington analysts and intelligence
processors than any other source. Many allies have contributed
to U.S. security in this way. In particular, West German and the
Nationalist Chinese efforts, exploiting native language abilities
and regional expertise, have greatly assisted the success of the
U.S. signals processing machine and thus created a solid fund of
knowledge on which analysts could draw in making their all-
Building an Intelligence System
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
source studies of defense and foreign policy issues. It was in
London, the hub of the closest intelligence exchange in all
history, that I perceived very early what vast benefits our allies
provided in the way of good intelligence. Without them, the
alliance system itself could not function effectively; U.S.
citizens will understand and value our foreign friends better if
they know this simple fact.
In Great Britain these extensive liaison arrangements were
supplemented by equally crucial exchanges in the counter-
espionage and counterintelligence field-also important in
liaisons with many other allies with good internal security
services-and by a unique system of sharing the burden of
monitoring and translating foreign broadcasts. While this latter
work is overt intelligence collection, it is a technically complex
and costly undertaking. By roughly dividing the world between
them and exchanging the materials recorded, the United States
and Great Britain have always saved themselves a great deal of
money and trouble and continue to do so.
It was most educational for me to have the opportunity to
look at global intelligence problems from the viewpoint of this
liaison link between the two most productive mature intelli-
gence systems in the world. One lesson I learned from the
British: there is no way to be on top of intelligence problems
unless you collect much more extensively than any cost-
accounting approach would justify and then rely on the wisdom
and experience of analysts to sift out the small percentage of
vital information that needs to be passed to the top of the
government. You might think you could do without most of
what is collected; but in intelligence, in fact, as in ore mining,
there is no way to get the nuggets without taking the whole
ore-bearing compound. Once at a cocktail party in London in
1952 or 1953 1 heard this point made succinctly by Sir Kenneth
W.D. Strong, the hawk-faced patrician Englishman who had
served as Eisenhower's G-2 in the Allied Forces in Europe in
World War II and stayed on to be the dominant personality in
British intelligence for about 25 years.' He observed that "an
intelligence official simply has to be temperamentally adjusted
He wrote two reflective books on his career in intelligence, Inte1ligence at the Top (1968)
and Men of Intelligence (1970).
The CM Under Reagan, Bush and Casey 149
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
to the fact that 95 percent of his organization's total effort is
utterly wasted, although it is all necessary to get the 5 percent
that is useful to policymaking." A young man there said in
dismay, "General Strong, surely you are exaggerating the
percentage of wasted effort?" Strong drew himself up to his
considerable height and somewhat histrionically proclaimed,
"Perhaps I should reconsider; yes, on second thought, I would
say 97 percent is useless effort, but our national safety depends
on finding the 3 percent!" It is not a bad formula.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
"Sometimes I wonder why I ever
joined CIA in the first place !"
Saturday Evening Post - 11 August 1962
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
THE WASHINGTON POST
8 July 1963
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Fran "The CIA's Secret Operations",
by Harry Rositzke
12
THE CIA AT 11011E
OPERATIONAL SUPPORT
Domestic support of CIA's secret operations is extensive.
It is essential to our foreign mission. It is carried out in secret
with cleared individuals, and often involves the secret han-
dling of money and contracts. It ranges from confidential
contacts with individual citizens to complex arrangements
with large corporations. The most crucial element in the
domestic support of CIA's secret operations is the provision of
cover for overseas case officers.
CIA operators overseas do not normally advertise them-
selves as "CIA" even in friendly countries where their main
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
business is to work with the local security intelligence ser-
vices. The latter prefer that the affiliation of their American
colleagues not be made public.
In the vast majority of overseas assignments CIA officers
operate under official American cover-as employees of the
Department of State or Defense or the Agency for Interna-
tional Development, usually depending upon the nature of
their assignments and the area involved. During the Ameri-
can occupation of Germany, for example, virtually all CIA
officers were DACs: Department of Army civilians. In In-
dochina during the sixties, Army and AID cover was most
appropriate. Today most CIA officers operate from our em-
bassies abroad.
Operating out of an embassy has many advantages for any
service, not least of which is diplomatic immunity for its
offices, files, and personnel. "Diplomats" are not arrested
and tried for espionage, but simply expelled. The main disad-
vantage, both for the CIA and the KGB, is the ease with
which official cover operators can be identified, surveyed,
and sometimes provoked. If diplomatic relations are broken
off, of course, the operators are forced to leave with their
legitimate colleagues.
Nonofficial cover--operators acting as ordinary American
citizens on business abroad-makes a less obvious target for
suspicion and often permits access to circles not open to the
local embassy. It also permits CIA case officers to remain in
place in a country that has broken off diplomatic relations
with the United States. It poses one rather drastic disadvan-
tage. If a man under unofficial cover is caught spying, he can
be arrested and jailed.
. Several types of "commercial cover" have been employed
over the years. In most cases CIA officers have been sent out
as employees of a company created and owned by the CIA,
so-called proprietary companies like Air America or front or-
ganizations like Radio Free Europe. In other cases small
firms have been established by CIA with the express purpose
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
of supplying a notional cover for a few men operating in one
or more countries. These covers require the cooperation of
many non-CIA Americans in setting up the companies and
acting as officers.
Sometimes a CIA officer is provided cover by an estab-
lished American company with offices abroad. In these cases
a training period at company headquarters is often a prelimi-
nary to a foreign assignment, for the CIA officer must be
qualified to carry out the firm's business. The main handicap
in this type of assignment is that the CIA officer often must
spend most of his time on his cover work, sometimes to the
detriment of his operational assignments.
Since an officer under unofficial cover is subject to arrest
for espionage acts, his assignments are normally confined to
handling an already recruited agent whose value and reliabil-
ity have been proved. He is normally in touch with the local
CIA station and can recommend potential recruits for follow
up by a "diplomat."
American manufacturers are also a vital element in CIA
operations involving advanced technical equipment. In the
late fifties CIA contracted with Lockheed to build the U-2
supersonic aircraft for overflights across Soviet territory. A
decade later plans were made to raise a sunken Soviet sub-
marine in the Pacific, and contracts were let to the Summa
Corporation to build a highly sophisticated salvage ship, the
Glomar Explorer. These are only two of the most conspicuous
examples of the contributions made by American science and
technology to CIA's collection of foreign intelligence.
Other CIA activities in the United States in support of its
overseas intelligence operations have very little to do with
American citizens. Foreign agents who cannot be trained at
overseas sites are handled at home-for example, the high-
altitude training of Tibetans in Colorado, or the selection and
training of Cuban emigres for intelligence operations against
Cuba. CIA agents working abroad sometimes visit the United
States or are assigned here on official or unofficial business.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Contact is maintained with them while they are here and
often provides an opportunity for more intense training and
debriefing than is practical overseas. Most high-level Soviet
and other intelligence defectors are brought to the United
States for interrogation by interested Washington intelli-
gence agencies. In these cases private American citizens or
companies often play a part in resettling them by helping to
cover their real identities, getting them a job or credit status,
etc.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Fran "The CIA and the U. S.
Intelligence System", by
Scott D. Breckinridge
CLANDESTINE COLLECTION
COVER
Clandestine collection of foreign intelligence requires that the op-
erator, often referred to as case officer, is not known publicly for what
he or she is. Operators must be able to move normally through the
environment in which they work. The Rockefeller Commission Report
effectively summarized this issue as follows:
A
Many CIA activities-like those of every foreign intelligence service-are
clandestine in nature. Involved CIA personnel cannot travel, live or perform
their duties openly as CIA employees. Even in countries where the CIA
works closely with cooperative foreign intelligence services, Agency per-
sonnel are often required by their hosts to conceal their CIA status.
Accordingly, virtually all CIA personnel serving abroad and many of
the Agency's professional personnel in the United States assume a "cover."
Their employment with CIA is disguised and, to persons other than their
families and co-workers, they are held out as employees of another gov-
ernment agency or of a commercial enterprise.
Cover arrangements frequently have substantial domestic aspects. These
include the participation of other United States government agencies, business
firms, and private citizens and creation and management of a variety of
domestic commercial entities. Most CIA employees in need of cover are
assigned "official cover" with another component of the federal government
pursuant to formal agreements between the CIA and the "covering" de-
partments or agencies. Where official cover is unavailable or otherwise
inappropriate, CIA officers or contract employees are assigned "nonofficial"
cover, which usually consists of an ostensible position with CIA-created
and controlled business entities known as "proprietary companies" or
"devised facilities." On occasion, nonofficial cover is provided for a CIA
officer by a bona fide privately owned American business firm.21
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
The considerations appN-ing to CIA employees abroad, especaliv
those engaged in clandestine operations, apply similarly to the collectors
and operators helanging to military intelligence organizations. Military
operatives can and do use nonofficial cover arrangements, although not
usually with the complex of special arrangements described in the
Rockefeller Report. It should be apparent that the need for nonofficial
cover is not as great with military intelligence personnel as it sometimes
is with CIA.
Clearly, clandesTine operators cannot engage in their missions abroad
if the purpose of their work is known, or if their identities are suspect.
They must have some plausible cover that avoids special attention.
Because of the publicity CIA has received, this principle applies to its
administrative and clerical personnel abroad, as well as to those officers
involved only in the relatively prosaic chores of liaison with allied
services.
In friendly areas, the lightest cover often is acceptable for liaison
officers. An individual assigned such work is officially accredited to the
host nation, is known to many within the intelligence community there,
and works with them much as other personnel in the official U.S.
installation deal with people in the various ministries of the host
government. Although the work is relatively overt, many of those assigned
to liaison duties may belong to the Clandestine Service and remain
subject to later assignment to operational tasks. For them, some continuity
of sound cover is required. Their cover will be more complete, being
known as "deep" cover, in contrast to the "light" cover of less sensitive
personnel.
In practice, the very fact of cover presents some problems for
clandestine operators. If integrated into the personnel system of another
government organization, they may be expected to perform some work
for it. These "cover duties" intrude on the time otherwise available for
basic activities and tend to stretch the work day. Official protocol chores
may become a part of the assignment, further trespassing on the time
available. As mentioned earlier, the Church Committee expressed concern
over the effect of protocol duties on Defense Attaches. Yet "living one's
cover" is an important part of the work.
Official cover carries with it the inconvenience of having to work
out of an official installation, where hostile counterintelligence officers
are better able to identify a possible operator and establish surveillance
of him or her. This situation complicates the mobility of the person
under official cover, requiring extra activity to ensure that there is no
surveillance before engaging in the more sensitive work, or eluding it
if it is present.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Those serving under nonofficial cover are free from the burdens of
official cover, often doing only enough work at their ostensible vocation
to be convincing to the casual observer. That applies primarily to the
person in a devised or proprietary facility, as mentioned in the Rockefeller
Report. In a bona fide commercial organization, intelligence personnel
must also perform normal duties within that company to avoid attracting
attention. The advantages of mobility that may attach to the person
under nonofficial cover are offset, at least in part, by problems of
communication. The person "outside"-that is, not working in an official
installation-has the same responsibility to report on a timely basis as
does the person "inside." Sometimes this situation presents problems,
one of which is the time consumed during observation of security
procedures. Emergency contact can be established and occasionally special
communications can be arranged, but the basic problem remains.
Clandestine intelligence operations are somewhat labor-intensive,
involving detailed one-on-one meetings between agent and case officer.
The problems of operational security and communications add to this
labor-intensive situation, in which cover is but one aspect of the problem.
Living one's cover is a built-in feature of the clandestine operator's
tradecraft. To the experienced officer it becomes an accepted, though
onerous, part of the work.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE
Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) is a domestic field
office of the FBIS Production Group. Guided by Community requirements,
the divisions of Production Group select material to be processed from
foreign publications. These unclassified items are then sent to JPRS for
translation by some 1,300 independent contractors skilled in more than 70
languages. JPRS staff editors, based on their knowledge of each
contractor's capabilities, assign the work to an appropriate contractor.
Contractors normally receive their assignments by mail and do their
translations at home. They are paid by the number of foreign-language
words they translate. When an assignment is completed, the staff editors
prepare it for publication and send it to Printing and Photography
Division for printing.
JPRS publishes 54 serial reports, totalling 300,000 pages annually.
Distribution within the government averages 175 copies per report.
Except for those restricted to official use only, reports are on sale to
the public through the National Technical Information Service of the
Department of Commerce.
All JPRS publications are listed in the "Monthly Catalog of U.S.
Government Publications." Bound copies of most JPRS reports are held in
the Current Periodicals Reading Room of the Library of Congress, and
photocopies may be obtained from its Photoduplication Service. An index
to JPRS publications is prepared monthly by Bell and Howell's Microphoto
Division.
JPRS' premises are unclassified and include a reading room open to
U.S. Government personnel. Available to readers are the tables of
contents of JPRS reports back to 1963, report indexes and microfiche
copies of reports published since January 1975. Microfiche readers are
available.
JPRS also offers its translation services to other government
agencies on a cost-reimbursable basis. JPRS does not ordinarily publish
these translations. Reimbursable work accounts for about 10 percent of
JPRS translations.
Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
The FBIS-maintained Consolidated Translation Survey (CTS) is an
index of items which have been translated into English from foreign
publications. It is the only systematic means available to the U.S.
Government to ensure that translations done by one agency are not
duplicated by another at a later date, thereby saving the U.S. Government
some $2 million annually in prevented duplications.
The CTS file dates from 1949 and contains more than 2 million
entries. CTS includes records of only unclassified translations.
Documents are indexed by:
1. Author's or editor's name and
2. Source--the transliterated title of the original document.
The CTS product is a bibliographic citation. CTS does not make the
actual translation available to the requester but rather refers the
requester to the office which produced the translation.
CTS can provide printouts by author and by source. Analysts and
researchers can request printouts of the translated articles by a
particular scientist or journalist or from a particular specialized
journal or other publication. Such printouts can serve as an index to
translated materials on a particular subject.
CTS includes data on items translated or in the process of
translation by agencies throughout the U.S. Government, primarily those
of the Intelligence Community. The CTS file contains references to
translations produced by more than 60 U.S. Government organizations;
commercial translating houses; and Australian, British, and Canadian
governmental or quasi-official agencies.
CTS welcomes queries from all U.S. Government departments and
agencies. Government agencies should call CTS:
1. To determine whether an item has been translated.
2. Before beginning to translate.
3. To advise that a translation is in process (CTS enters
"in-process" translations in its files so other agencies
will not need to undertake the same translation).
4. To advise that a translation has been completed.
Agencies can contact CTS by mail both to request a search of the
data base and to inform CTS of the availability of a completed
translation. Correspondence should be sent to Foreign Broadcast
Information Service/CTS, P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013.
Government agencies are also welcome to telephone CTS at 703-351-2567.
To arrange for a translation, contact Chief, Translation Services
Staff at the same address; telephone number is 703-3S1-2979.
Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
DAILY REPORTING DIVISION
The Daily Reporting Division (DRD), is responsible for the two
primary outlets for the distribution of information--the Wire Service and
the DAILY REPORT. The division also serves as the focal point for
quality control of the field product and trains Information Officers for
field assignments. DRD is organized into the Office of the Chief, the
Wire Services Staff, the Publications Staff, the Reference Staff, and
four geographic branches that prepare the DAILY REPORT.
The 24-hour Wire Service functions as the operations center for
FBIS. Supported by a communications and computer system, its duty
officers screen all incoming traffic from the field, averaging 300,000
words a day, for information of immediate concern to key national
operations centers and other recipients of the Wire Service "ticker."
The Wire Service carries an average of 30,000 words a day. As watch
officers, Wire Service personnel alert major offices to newsbreaks,
oversee and coordinate FBIS field bureau coverage of breaking
developments worldwide, and act as liaison between consumer offices and
FBIS Headquarters and field components during evening and overnight
shifts and on weekends. The Wire Services Staff's Communications Center
provides general communications support to FBIS Headquarters components
and operates the computer system that produces the Wire Service "ticker"
and the FBIS DAILY REPORT.
The DAILY REPORT, published Monday through Friday, is divided into
eight geographic volumes--China, Eastern Europe, Soviet Union, Asia F4
Pacific, Middle East F, Africa, Latin America, Western Europe, and South
Asia. The Middle East & Africa and the South Asia volumes are the only
books produced using computerized text editing and composition
facilities. The other six volumes will be automated in the near future.
Together the eight volumes carry about 300,000 words in 400 pages each
day. They include selected items provided by the area divisions of
Production Group along with material monitored in the FBIS field. They
are printed overnight for distribution the next morning in more than
10,000 copies throughout the government and are available for public
subscription through the National Technical Information Service of the
Department of Commerce. Microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORT are also
available.
The Reference Staff provides reference services to Headquarters and
field personnel and handles cable distribution to all Headquarters
components.
Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
The Analysis Group (AG) systematically studies the content and
behavior of broadcast and print media of the Soviet Union, China, and
other key countries, reporting and interpreting its findings in the
weekly TRENDS and in ad hoc Analysis Reports and Special Memoranda.
Analysis Notes, run on the FBIS Wire or issued in typescript, call
attention to developments of immediate interest.
The focus of FBIS analysis has long been on policy trends in the
communist countries, whose controlled, integrated media lend themselves
to systematic examination for clues to regime attitudes, problems, goals,
and intentions. Analysis efforts now also address media of Third World
countries, chiefly in the Middle East and Central America.
AG's stock-in-trade is analysis of current public statements and
propaganda in the perspective of past statements and in the context of
political developments--identifying new elements, changes in
formulations, and in general any departures from the norm that might
point to incipient policy shifts or political trends. The TRENDS
contains articles on such topics as Soviet-U.S., Sino-U.S., and
Sino-Soviet relations, developments in East Europe, Eurocommunism, arms
control issues, leadership politics in communist countries, policy trends
and international alignments in the Middle East, and developments
relating to Cuba, Nicaragua, and Salvadoran insurgents. Issues of
current interest are examined in greater depth and over longer time spans
in Analysis Reports. Special Memoranda often respond to requests from
Agency offices, the State and Defense Departments, and the National
Security Council. A list of projected special studies in AG's Research
Program is distributed quarterly to key consumers.
The TRENDS and most special reports are distributed to government
recipients in some 600 copies. Selected articles from the TRENDS are
wirefiled to U.S. missions abroad and to Washington-area recipients in
advance of the printed version to ensure that they reach these consumers
without delay. Research and analysis support for U.S. embassies, for
U.S. negotiators at international conferences, and for high-level U.S.
officials traveling abroad is also provided by wire or cable.
USSR/Europe and China/Third World divisions include six branches
whose analysts maintain close working relationships with counterparts
throughout the intelligence and policy communities.
AG's Research Staff develops and maintains central media files used
by analysts throughout the Group in researching the antecedents of
current statements. Research Staff also responds to requests levied
directly by other offices.
The staff's holdings include comprehensive files of the texts of
speeches by top foreign leaders, official government and party
statements, publicized diplomatic communications, and authoritative press
articles covering some 35 countries, as well as statements by 134
nonruling communist parties in 82 countries. Extracts of Soviet and
Chinese authoritative statements addressing key themes and issues are
computerized in Project PASKEY, a program that permits retrieval by
thematic category and keyword. The computerized theme file of Soviet
Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
statements dates from October 1964 and of Chinese statements from 1960.
A smaller PASKEY file covers North Korean statements from 1978. Other
theme files are projected. Modernization planning looks toward a
computer-based system encompassing PASKEY and other files now maintained
in paper.
Volume and audience targeting data on Moscow and Beijing
international radio. broadcasts are also maintained in the Research Staff,
developed from listings compiled by FBIS field bureaus.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), with some minor
title changes, has monitored foreign media on behalf of the U.S.
Government since 1941. FBIS expanded its mission in 1967 to assume the
translation of foreign publications, as a service of common concern to
departments and agencies of the U.S. Government.
FBIS administers both overseas and domestic installations in support
of its mission. Units abroad are staffed by a mix of U.S. and foreign
national personnel and generally function as part of a sponsoring
embassy, consulate, or military unit.
The products of FBIS monitoring are made available in several ways:
--Selected materials are wirefiled to U.S. embassies and
military commands worldwide from the foreign field
installations.
--Watch officers functioning round-the-clock in FBIS
Headquarters screen all incoming field teletype information
and disseminate via the FBIS Wire Service priority
selections to a number of official recipients, including
the White House and State Department.
--The bulk of the field-processed material focusing on news
accounts, commentaries, and official speeches and statements
appears in the FBIS DAILY REPORT, published Monday through
Friday in eight geographic volumes--China, Eastern Europe,
Soviet Union, Asia and Pacific, Middle East and Africa, Latin
America, Western Europe, and South Asia. Most of the finished
translations from foreign-language publications in the
political, economic, technical, and scientific fields are
organized into serial reports and ad hoc issuances
published by the Joint Publications Research Service
(JPRS), a domestic facility of FBIS. All reports are
distributed to a wide range of government users; most are
available for public subscription through the National
Technical Information Service (NTIS) of the Department of
Commerce, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Va. 22161.
--Video selection lists, describing selected video
portions of monitored foreign television, are wirefiled
to interested customers and are available through regular
liaison channels. The videotapes also may be ordered
for viewing through the same liaison channels.
Additionally, FBIS analyzes the content and behavior of the
broadcast and printed media of key countries in support of the
government's foreign affairs community, reporting its findings in serial
and ad hoc publications. Analytic observations of immediate interest are
disseminated to major U.S. Government users by means of the FBIS Wire
Service.
Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
From "Studies in Intelligence"
Suimsner 19 82 , by Clarence L.
Johnsen
ABOUT AN AIRPLANE
Twenty-five years ago, with the U-2 still new, work on its successor was
under way. The effort would produce a revolutionary airplane. In this issue of
Studies in Intelligence, the Editorial Board presents a three-dimensional
account of that accomplishment, a technological triumph for intelligence with
a bittersweet twist.
The account begins with "Development of the Lockheed SR-71 Black-
bird," by Clarence L. (Kelly) Johnson, who was in charge of that development.
Next is another first-hand recollection, "J58/SR-71 Propulsion Integration," by
William H. Brown, an authority on the engine. Both articles were originally
published in Lockheed Horizons, Issue 9, Winter 1981/82, Copyright (c)
1981-Lockheed Corporation, Burbank, California 91520. The Editorial
Board gratefully acknowledges permission from Lockheed Horizons, its editor,
Roy A. Blay, and the authors to reprint the articles and accompanying
illustrations.
The third part of the account is a Studies classic, "The Oxcart Story," by
Thomas P. Mclninch, reprinted from the Winter 1971 issue (Volume 15,
No. 1)-as a convenience for readers who did not see that issue, and as a
refresher for those who did.
As the articles discuss the various versions of the airplane under develop-
ment, the nomenclature expands. A glossary:
- A-11 was the designation Mr. Johnson gave to his initial design as
submitted to CIA. It was frequently used thereafter, as for example in
the President's announcement.
A-12 was the designation for the single-seated CIA reconnaissance
version. It remained classified.
- OXCART was the familiar name for the A-12, and also the code name
for the program which developed the basic aircraft. Also classified.
- YF-12A was the designation given to a two-seated interceptor version
of the A-11, three of which were built for the Air Force. Two of these
three were flown to Edwards Air Force Base for display after the
President's announcement. Unclassified.
- SR-71 became the designation for a two-seated reconnaissance version
produced for the Air Force. Unclassified.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
Recollections from the "Skunk Works"
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LOCKHEED SR-71 BLACKBIRD
Clarence L. Johnson
This paper has been prepared by the writer to record the development
history of the Lockheed SR-71 reconnaissance airplane. In my capacity as
manager of Lockheed's Advanced Development Division (more commonly
known as the "Skunk Works") I supervised the design, testing, and construc-
tion of the aircraft referred to until my partial retirement five years ago.
Because of the very tight security on all phases of the program, there are very
few people who were ever aware of all aspects of the so-called "Blackbird"
program. Fortunately, I kept as complete a log on the subject as one individual
could on a program that involved thousands of people, over three hundred
subcontractors and partners, plus a very select group of Air Force and Central
Intelligence Agency people. There are still many classified aspects of the
design and operation of Blackbirds but by my avoiding these, I have been
informed that I can still publish many interesting things about the program.
In order to tell the SR-71 story, I must draw heavily on the data derived
on two prior Skunk Works programs-the first Mach 3-plus reconnaissance
type, known by our design number as the A-12, and the YF-12A interceptor,
which President Lyndon Johnson announced publicly 1 March 1964. He
announced the SR-71 on 24 July of the same year.
Background for Development
The Lockheed U-2 subsonic, high-altitude reconnaissance plane first flew
in 1955. It went operational a year later and continued to make overflights of
the Soviet Union until 1 May 1960. In this five-year period, it became obvious
to those of us who were involved in the U-2 program that Russian develop-
ments in the radar and missile fields would shortly make the U-Bird too
vulnerable to continue overflights of Soviet territory, as indeed happened
when Francis Gary Powers was shot down on May Day of 1960.
Starting in 1956, we made many studies and tests to improve the
survivability of the U-2 by attempting to fly higher and faster as well as
reducing its radar cross-section and providing both infrared and radar
jamming gear. Very little gains were forthcoming except in cruise altitude so
we took up studies of other designs. We studied the use of new fuels such as
boron slurries and liquid hydrogen. The latter was carried into the early
manufacturing phase because it was possible to produce an aircraft with
cruising altitudes well over 100,000 feet at a Mach number of 2.5. This design
was scrapped, however, because of the terrible logistic problems of providing
fuel in the field.
Continuing concern for having a. balanced reconnaissance force made it
apparent .that we still would need a manned reconnaissance aircraft that could
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
be dispatched on worldwide missions when required. From vulnerability
studies, we derived certain design requirements for this craft. These were a
cruising speed well over Mach 3, cruising altitude over 80,000 feet, and a very
low radar cross-section over a wide band of frequencies. Electronic counter-
measures and advanced communications gear were mandatory. The craft
should have at least two engines for safety reasons.
Getting a Grasp on the Problem
Our analysis of these requirements rapidly showed the very formidable
problems which had to be solved to get an acceptable design.
The first of these was the effect of operating at ram-air temperatures of
over 800?F. This immediately ruled out aluminum as a basic structural
material, leaving only various alloys of titanium and stainless steel to build the
aircraft. It meant the development of high-temperature plastics for radomes
and other structures, as well as a new hydraulic fluid, greases, electric wiring
and plugs, and a whole host of other equipment. The fuel to be used by the
engine had to be stable under temperatures as low as minus 90?F in subsonic
cruising flight during aerial refueling, and to over 350?F at high cruising
speeds when it would be fed into the engine fuel system. There it would first
be used as hydraulic fluid at 600?F to control the afterburner exit flap before
being fed into the burner cans of the powerplant and the afterburner itself.
Cooling the cockpit and crew turned out to be seven times as difficult as
on the X-15 research airplane which flew as much as twice as fast as the SR-71
but only for a few minutes per flight. The wheels and tires of the landing gear
had to be protected from the heat by burying them in the fuselage fuel tanks
for radiation cooling to save the rubber and other systems attached thereto.
Special attention had to be given to the crew escape system to allow safe
ejection from the aircraft over a speed and altitude range of zero miles per
hour at sea level to Mach numbers up to 4.0 at over 100,000 feet. New pilots'
pressure suits, gloves, dual oxygen systems, high-temperature ejection seat
catapults, and parachutes would have to be developed and tested.
The problems of taking pictures through windows subjected to a hot
turbulent airflow on the fuselage also had to be solved.
How the Blackbird Program Got Started
In the time period of 21 April 1958 through 1 September 1959, 1 made a
series of proposals for Mach 3-plus reconnaissance aircraft to Mr. Richard
Bissell of the CIA and to the U.S. Air Force. These airplanes were designated
in the Skunk Works by design numbers of A-1 through A-12.
We were evaluated against some very interesting designs by the General
Dynamics Corporation and a Navy in-house design. This latter concept was
proposed as a ramjet-powered rubber inflatable machine, initially carried to
altitude by a balloon and then rocket boosted to a speed where the ramiets
could produce thrust. Out'studies on this aircraft rapidly proved it to be totally
unfeasible. The carrying balloon bad to be a mile in diameter to lift the unit,
which had a proposed wing area of one-seventh of an acre!
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
SR-71 Blackbird
Convair's proposals were much more serious, starting out with a ramiet-
powered Mach 4 aircraft to be carried aloft by a B-58 and launched at
supersonic speeds. Unfortunately, the B-58 couldn't go supersonic with the
bird in place, and even if it could, the survivability of the piloted vehicle
would be very questionable due to the probability of ramiet blow-out in
maneuvers. At the time of this proposal the total flight operating time for the
Marquardt ramjet was not over 7 hours, and this time was obtained mainly on
a ramjet test vehicle for the Boeing Bomarc missile. Known as the X- 7, this test
vehicle was built and operated by the Lockheed Skunk Works!
The final Convair proposal, known as the Kingfisher, was eliminated by
Air Force and Department of Defense technical experts, who were given the
job of evaluating all designs.
On 29 August 1959'our A-12 design was declared the winner and Mr. Bis-
sell gave us a limited go-ahead for a four-month period to conduct tests on
certain models and to build a full-scale mock-up. On 30 January 1960 we were
given a full go-ahead on the design, manufacturing, and testing of 12 aircraft.
The first one flew 26 April 1962.
The next version of the aircraft, an Air Defense long-range fighter, was
discussed with General Hal Estes in Washington, D.C. on 16 and 17 March
1960. He and Air Force Secretary for Research and Development, Dr.
Courtlandt Perkins, were very pleased with out proposal so they passed me on
for further discussions with General Marvib Demler at Wright Field. He
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
directed us to use the Hughes ASG 18 radar and the GAR-9 missiles which
were in the early development stages for the North American F-108 intercep-
tor. This we did, and when the F-108 was eventually cancelled Lockheed
worked with Hughes in the development and flight testing of that armament
system. The first YF-12A flew 7 August 1963.
In early January 1961 I made the first proposal for a strategic reconnais-
sance bomber to Dr. Joseph Charyk, Secretary of the Air Force, Colonel Leo
Geary, our Pentagon project officer on the YF-12; and Mr. Lew Meyer, a high
financial officer in the Air Force. We were encouraged to continue our
company-funded studies on the aircraft. As we progressed in the development,
we encountered very strong opposition in certain Air Force quarters on the
part of those trying to save the North American B-70 program, which was in
considerable trouble. Life became very interesting in that we were competing
the SR-71 with an airplane five times its weight and size. On 4 June 1962 the
Air Force evaluation team reviewed our design and the mock-up-and 'e
were given good grades.
Our discussions continued with the Department of Defense and also, in
this period, with General Curtis LeMay and his Strategic Air Command
officers. It was on 27 December 1962 that we were finally put on contract to
build the first group of six SR-71 aircraft
One of our major problems during the next few years was in adapting our
Skunk Works operating methods to provide SAC with proper support,
training, spare parts, and data required for their special operational needs. I
have always believed that our Strategic Air Command is the most sophisti-
cated and demanding customer for aircraft in the world. The fact that we
have been able to support them so well for many years is one of the most satis-
fying aspects of my career.
Without the total support of such people as General Leo Geary in the Pen-
tagon and a long series of extremely competent and helpful commanding
officers at Beale Air Force Base, we could never have jointly put the
Blackbirds into service successfully.
Basic Design Features
Having chosen the required performance in speed, altitude, and range, it
was immediately evident that a thin delta-wing platform was required with a
very moderate wing loading to allow flight at very high altitude. A long,
slender fuselage was necessary to contain most of the fuel as well as the
landing gear and payloads. To reduce the wing trim drag, the fuselage was fit-
ted with lateral surfaces called chines, which actually converted the forward
fuselage into a fixed canard which developed lift.
The hardest design problem on the airplane was making the engine air
inlet and ejector work properly. TI,.e inlet cone moves almost three feet to
keep the shock wave 'where we want it. A hydraulic actuator, computer
controlled, has to provide operating forces of up to 31,000 pounds under
certain flow conditions in the nacelles. To account for 'the effect of the
fuselage chine air flow, the inlets are pointed down and in toward the fuselage.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
The use of dual vertical tails canted inward on the engine nacelles took
dvantage of the chine vortex in such a way that the directional stability
mproves as the angle of attack of the aircraft increases.
aerodynamic Testing
All the usual low-speed and high-speed wind tunnel tests were run on the
various configurations of the A-12 and YF-12A, and continued on the SR-71.
Substantial efforts went into optimizing chine design and conical camber of
the wing leading edge. No useful lift increase effect was found from the use of
wing flaps of any type so we depend entirely on our low wing-loading and
powerful ground effect to get satisfactory takeoff and landing characteristics.
Correlation of wind tunnel data on fuselage trim effects was found to be
of marginal value because of two factors: structural deflection due to fuselage
weight distribution; and the effect of fuel quantity and temperature. The
latter was caused by fuel on the bottom of the tanks, keeping that section of
the fuselage cool, while the top of the fuselage became increasingly hotter as
fuel was burned, tending to push the chines downward due to differential
expansion of the top and bottom of the fuselage. A full-scale fuel system test
rig was used to test fuel feed capability for various flight attitudes.
By far the most tunnel time was spent optimizing the nacelle inlets, bleed
designs, and the ejector. A quarter-scale model was built on which over
250,000 pressure readings were taken. We knew nacelle air leakage would
cause high drag so an actual full-size nacelle was fitted with end plugs and air
leakage carefully measured. Proper sealing paid off well in flight testing.
With the engines located half way out on the wing span, we were very
concerned with the very high yawing movement that would develop should an
inlet stall. We therefore installed accelerometers in the fuselage that immedi-
ately sensed the yaw rate and commanded the rudder booster to apply 9
degrees of correction within a time period of 0.15 seconds. This device worked
so well that our test pilots very often couldn't tell whether the right or left
engine blew out. They knew they had a blowout, of course, by the bad
buffeting that occurred with a "popped shock." Subsequently, an automatic
restart device was developed which keeps this engine-out time to a very short
period.
Powerplant Development
Mr. Bill Brown of Pratt & Whitney presented a fine paper on this subject
13 May 1981 to the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics in
Long Beach, California. Mr. Brown's paper is reproduced following this
article.
I have little to add to Mr. Brown's fine paper except to record an
interesting approach to the problem of ground starting the J-58. We learned
that it often required over 600 horsepower to get the,.engine up to starting
RPM. To obtain this power, we took 'two Buick racing car engines and
developed a gear box to connect them both tq the J-58 starter drive. We
operated for several years with this setup, until *more sophisticated air starting
systems were developed and installed in the hangars.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Provisional engine starter cart (above) which used two Buick racing car engines (below)
geared to a common shaft drive to rotate the 158 engine. This rig produced over 600
horsepower for starting.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Structural Problems
The decision to use various alloys of titanium for the basic structure of the
Blackbirds was based on the following considerations:
1. Only titanium and steel had the ability to withstand the operating
temperatures encountered.
2. Aged B-120 titanium weighs one half as much as stainless steel per
cubic inch but its ultimate strength is almost up to stainless.
3. Conventional construction could be used with fewer parts involved
than with steel.
4. High strength composites were not available in the early 1960s. We did
develop a good plastic which has been remarkably serviceable but it
was not used for primary structure.
Having made the basic material choice, we decided to build two test units
to see if we could reduce our research to practice. The first unit was to study
thermal effects on our large titanium wing panels. We heated up this element
with the computed heat flux that we would encounter in flight. The sample
warped into a totally unacceptable shape. To solve this problem we put
chordwise corrugations in the outer skins and reran the tests very satisfactorily.
At the design heating rate, the corrugations merely deepened by a few
thousandths of an inch and on cooling returned to the basic shape. I was
accused of trying to make a 1932 Ford Trimotor go Mach 3 but the concept
worked fine.
The second test unit was the forward fuselage and cockpit, which had
over 6,000 parts in it of high curvature, thin gauges, and the canopy with its
complexity. This element was tested in. an oven where we could determine
thermal effects and develop cockpit cooling systems.
We encountered major problems in manufacturing this test unit because
the first batch of heat-treated titanium parts was extremely brittle. In fact, you
could push a piece of structure off your desk and it would shatter on the floor.
It was thought that we were encountering hydrogen embrittlement in our
heat-treat processes. Working with our supplier, Titanium Metals Corporation,
we could not prove that the problem was in fact hydrogen. It was finally re-
solved by throwing out our whole acid pickling setup and replacing it with an
identical reproduction of what TMC had at its mills.
We developed a complex quality control program. For every batch of ten
parts or more we processed three test coupons which were subjected to the
identical heat treatment of the parts in the batch. One coupon was tensile
tested to failure to derive the stress-strain data. A quarter-of-an-inch cut was
made in the edge of the second coupon by a sharp scissor-like cutter and it was
then bent around a mandrel at the cut. If the coupon could not be bent 1800 at
a radius of X times the sheet thickness without breaking, it was considered to
be too brittle. (The value of X is a function of the alloy used and the
stress/strain value of the piece.) The third coupon was held in reserve if any
reprocessing was required.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
For an outfit that hates paperwork, we really deluged ourselves with it.
Having made over 13 million titanium parts to date we can trace. the history of
all but the first few parts back to the mill pour and for about the last 10 mil-
lion of them even the direction of the grain in the sheet from which the part
was cut has been recorded. On large forgings, such as landing gears, we
trepanned out 12 sample coupons for test before machining each part. We
found out the hard way that most commercial cutting fluids accelerated stress
corrosion on hot titanium so we developed our own.
Titanium is totally incompatible with chlorine, fluorine, cadmium, and
similar elements. For instance, we were baffled when we found out that wing
panels which we spot welded in the summer failed early in life, but those
made in the winter lasted indefinitely. We finally traced this problem to the
Burbank water system which had heavily chlorinated water in the summer to
prevent algae growth but not in the winter. Changing to distilled water to
wash the parts solved this problem.
Our experience with cadmium came about by mechanics using cadmium-
plated wrenches working on the engine installation primarily. Enough cad-
mium was left in contact with bolt heads which had been tightened so that
when the bolts became hot (over 600?F) the bolt heads just dropped off! We
had to clean out hundreds of tool boxes to remove cadmium-plated tools.
Drilling and machining high strength titanium alloys, such as B-120,
required a complete research program to determine best tool cutter designs,
cutting fluids, and speeds and feeds for best metal removal rates. We had par-
ticular trouble with wing extrusions which were used by the thousands of feet.
Initially, the cost of machining a foot out of the rolled mill part was $19.00
which was reduced to $11.00 after much research. At one time we were
approaching the ability at our vendor's plants to roll parts to net dimensions,
but the final achievement of this required a $30,000,000 new facility which
was not built.
Wyman Gordon was given $1,000,000 for a research program to learn
how to forge the main nacelle rings on a 50,000-ton press. Combining their
advances with our research on numerical controls of machining and special
tools and fluids, we were able to save $19,000,000 on the production program.
To prevent parts from going undergauge while in the acid bath, we set up
a new series of metal gauges two thousandths of an inch thicker than the stan-
dard and solved this problem. When we built the first Blackbird, a high-speed
drill could drill 17 holes before it was ruined. By the end of the program we
had developed drills that could drill 100 holes and then be resharpened
successfully.
Our overall research on titanium usage was summarized in reports which
we furnished not only to the Air Force but also to our vendors who machined
over half of our machined parts for the program. To use titanium efficiently
required an on-going training program for thousands of people-both ours in
manufacturing and in the`Air Force in service.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
YF-12A test pilot in full pressure suit with walk-around oxygen kit.
Throughout this and other programs, it has been crystal clear to me that
our country needs a 250,000-ton metal forging press-five times as large as our
biggest one available today. When we have to machine away 90 percent of our
rough forgings today both in titanium (SR-71 nacelle rings and landing gears)
and aluminum (C-5 fuselage side rings) it seems that we are nationally very
stupid! My best and continuing efforts to solve this problem have been
defeated for many years. Incidentally, the USSR has been much smarter in
this field in that it has more and larger forging presses than we do.
Fluid Systems
Very difficult problems were encountered with the use of fuel tank
sealants and hydraulic oil. We worked for years developing both of these,
drawing as much on other industrial and chemical companies as they were
willing to devote to a very limited market. We were finally able to produce a
sealant which does a reasonable job over a temperature range of minus 90?F to
over 600?F. Our experience with hydraulic oil started out on a comical
situation. I saw ads in technical journals for a "material to be used to operate
up to 900?F in service." I contacted the producer who agreed to send me some
for testing. Imagine my surprise when the material arrived in a large canvas
bag. It was a white powder at room temperature that you certainly wouldn't
put in a hydraulic system. If you did, one would have to thaw out all the lines
and other elements with a blow torch! We did finally get a petroleum-based
oil developed at Penn State University to which we had to add several other
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
SR-71 Blackbird
chemicals to maintain its lubricity at high temperatures. It originally cost $130
per gallon so absolutely no leaks could be tolerated.
Rubber O-rings could not be used at high temperatures so a complete line
of steel rings was provided which have worked very well. Titanium pistons
working in titanium cylinders tended to gall and seize until chemical coatings
were invented which solved the problem.
The Flight Test Phase
The first flight of the A-12 took place 26 April 1962 or thirty months after
we were given a limited go-ahead on 1 September 1959. We had to By with
Pratt & Whitney J75 engines until the J58 engine became available in January
1963. Then our problems really began!
The first one was concerned with foreign object damage (FOD) to the
engines-a particular problem with the powerful J58 and the tortuous flow
path through the complicated nacelle structure. Small nuts, bolts, and metal
scraps not removed from the nacelles during construction could be sucked into
the engines on starting with devastating results. Damage to the first-stage
compressor blades from an inspector's flashlight used to search for such foreign
objects amounted to $250,000! Besides objects of the above type, the engine
would suck in rocks, asphalt pieces, etc., from the taxi-ways and runways. An
intensive campaign to control FOD at all stages of construction and opera-
tion-involving a shake test of the forward nacelle at the factory, the use of
screens, and runway sweeping with double inspections prior to any engine
running-brought FOD under reasonable control.
The hardest problem encountered in flight was the development of the
nacelle air inlet control. It was necessary to throw out the initial pneumatic
design after millions of dollars had been spent on it and go to a design using
electronic controls instead. This was very hard to do because several elements
of the system were exposed to ram-air temperatures over 800?F and terrific
vibration during an inlet duct stall. This problem and one dealing with aircraft
acceleration between Mach numbers of 0.95 to 2.0 are too complex to deal
with in this paper.
Initially, air temperature variations along a given true altitude would
cause the Blackbird to wander up and down over several thousand feet in its
flight path. Improved autopilots and engine controls have eliminated this
problem.
There are no other airplanes flying at our cruising altitude except an
occasional U-2 but we were very scared by encountering weather balloons sent
up by the FAA. If we were to hit the instrumentation package while cruising
at over 3,000 feet per second, the impact could be deadly!
Flight planning had to be done very carefully because of sonic boom
problems. We received complaints from rpany sources. One such stated that
his mules on a pack-train wanted to jump off the cliff trail when they were
"boomed." Another complained that fishing stopped in lakes in Yellowstone
Park if a boom occurred because the`flsh went down to the botton for hours. I
had my own complaint when one of my military friends boomed my ranch
and broke a $450 plate glass window. I got no sympathy on this, however.
12
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
Operational Comments
The SR-71 first flew 23 December 1964. It was in service with the
Strategic Air Command a year later.
In-flight refueling from KC-135s turned out to be very routine. Over
18,000 such refuelings have been made to date by all versions of the
Blackbirds. The SR-71 has flown from New York to London in 1 hour 55 min-
utes then returned nonstop to Beale Air Force Base, including a London/Los
Angeles time of 3 hours 48 minutes.
It has also flown over 15,000 miles with refueling to demonstrate its truly
global range. It is by far the world's fastest, highest flying airplane in service. I
expect it to be so for a long time to come.
The author about to By in an early A-12 flight test.
CLARENCE L. (KELLY) JOHNSON is serving as senior advisor to
Lockheed corporate management and the firm's advanced development
projects (Skunk Works). He retired as senior vice president of the corporation
in January 1975 and from the board of directorsjn May 1980.
Johnson joined Lockheed in 1933 as a tool designer. After assignments
as flight test engineer, stress analyst, aerodynamicist, weight engineer, and
wind tunnel engineer, he became chief research engineer in 1938. In 1952,
Johnson was named chief engineer at Lockheed's Burbank, California plant,
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
now the Lockheed-California Company. When the office of corporate vice
president-research and development was established in 1956, he was chosen
for the post. He became vice president-advanced development projects in
1958, a member of the board of directors in 1964 and a senior vice president
of the corporation in 1969.
Johnson has played a leading role in the design of 40 world renowned
aircraft-among them the F-80, America's first production jet; the high
altitude U-2; the double-sonic F-104 Starfighter; and the spectacular
2000-m.p.h. YF-12A and SR-71.
A native of Michigan, Johnson was born in Ishpeming on February 27,
1910. He later moved to Flint, was graduated from Flint Junior College, and
completed his education at the University of Michigan, where he received
his bachelor of science degree in 1932 and his master of science degree in
aeronautical engineering in 1933.
Many honors have come to him for his unique contributions to aerospace
development through the years, and to the defense of the United States. He
has won the Collier Trophy twice and has also received two Theodore von
Karman and two Sylvanus Albert Reed Awards. In 1964, President Lyndon
B. Johnson presented to him the Medal of Freedom, the highest civil honor
the President can bestow. He was elected to the Aviation Hall of Fame in
1974 and is the 1981 recipient of the Daniel Guggenheim Award.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Fran "The World of Secrets",
by Walter Laqueur
Technical Means of Reconnaissance
Of the various means used in technical reconnaissance, photo intelli-
gence is the youngest, though not by much.11 Most studies on the subject
make mention of the balloon view of Boston's downtown area taken by
James Wallace Bleck in October 1860; even earlier, aerial pictures had been
taken in. Europe. In 1890 the first of many textbooks on the subject was
published, and in 1909 the first motion pictures were taken from an air-
plane (piloted by Wilbur Wright). From that date on, the airplane replaced
kites and balloons as the main platform for aerial photography. The two
world wars, especially the second, gave a great boost to the new art.
Comparative coverage (repeated checks to discover changes) had already
been developed in World War I. night photography was developed in the
1930s, and infrared film came into use during World War II to detect
camouflaged targets. Stereoscopic vision and other basic tools of the trade
were introduced, and it was quickly recognized that the shape of objects
observed was of great importance, as were tone and texture, configura-
tions, shadows, and halation.12
According to a prediction, probably apocryphal, by the German General
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
The Anatomy of Intelligence
Fritsch, the side with the best photo reconnaissance would win the war.
According to General Chennault, 80 percent of all vital U.S. wartime
intelligence came from aerial photos. This may have been true in the Far
Eastern theater of war, but elsewhere it was not. By and large, World
War II was a SIGINT, not a PHOTINT war.
Following some abortive attempts at aerial reconnaissance, the major
intelligence breakthrough in the postwar period came with the appearance
of the U-2, which made its first flights over the Soviet Union in 1956. This
plane, a CIA-sponsored project, had a range of 3,000 miles and could fly
at an altitude of over 70,000 feet. At one time the plane produced some
90 percent of the hard data on Soviet military developments. Each over-
flight of the Soviet Union had to be authorized by the president. The era
of the U-2 came to an end when Gary Powers's plane was shot down (or
exploded) over Sverdlovsk in May 1959. The U-2 was succeeded some five
years later by the SR-71 (Blackbird), another plane developed by Lock-
heed, flying at Mach 3 and at a height of nearly fifteen miles. It was
equipped with optical and infrared sensors, radar and television cameras,
and transmitted data back to earth instantaneously. But the SR-71 has not
been used for flying over the USSR except for some peripheral flights.along
Soviet borders. Its main task has been reconnaissance in other parts of the
world.
Today the term "remote sensing"-exploration by means of electro-
magnetic sensors, mainly from airborne and spaceborne platforms-is
frequently used to cover the whole range of activities of which aerial
photography is just a part. Other tools include aerial thermography,
which measures the radiant temperature of earth surface features
through thermal' and multispectral scanners. Another technique, spectral
pattern recognition, is largely an automatic process based on a numerical
key that identifies and classifies the physical features of the target
through pattern recognition. A third method is microwave sensing, better
known as radar, which can see through clouds and other obstacles that
were otherwise impenetrable during World War II. Side-looking airborne
radar (SLAB) was a major innovation of the 1950s; in contrast to most
previous radar, it produced images. The part of radar in remote sensing
has further expanded with the utilization of lower wavelengths on the
one hand and the application of space exploration to intelligence on
the other.13
Not all remote sensing is carried out from space. Aircraft, ships, and
ground bases are involved, and in at least one case, a large helium balloon
carrying sensitive antennae. In 1978, fifty-four Soviet fishery research
ships were identified as electronic platforms of various types; some of them
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
The Production of Intelligence
came close to Cape Canaveral, Vandenberg Air Force Base, and the
Charleston, South Carolina naval base.
American ground intelligence operations of this kind are mainly run by
the National Security Agency and usually serve more than one purpose.
Electronic listening posts equipped with over-the-horizon radar designed
to intercept radio transmissions can monitor Soviet missile tests. Some of
these posts in Pakistan, Iran, and Ethiopia were lost in the 1970s, but others
continue to operate.14
Several basic considerations should be borne in mind about remote
sensing. Techniques are steadily advancing, military application is proba-
bly ten to fifteen years ahead of usage in the civilian sector, and informa-
tion on the precise resolution of photographs is classified. For the fourth
generation of satellites, which came into use in the 1970s, it was claimed
that they could identify various makes of automobiles, read car license
plates, and even distinguish between Guernseys and Herefords on the
range." Specific claims have been questioned, and some even ridiculed, but
it is certain that there is steady progress in this field.'
Since the early 1960s, the burden of intelligence collection in highly
denied areas has passed to space-borne sensors. The first recovery of a film
canister from a satellite /Discoverer 13) was accomplished just a few months
after the U-2 had gone down over Sverdlovsk The first Soviet surveillance
satellite is thought to have been launched two years later. Since then both
nations have launched hundreds of satellites designed to intercept signals
from various points along the electromagnetic spectrum.
The most important surveillance satellites have been those for early
warning using infrared telescopes to detect quickly the hot emissions of
missile boosters. The multipurpose use of satellites=early warning and
verification of arms control, "close look" cameras carrying multispectral
scanners, and "search and find" techniques covering a wider area to locate
unidentified targets-became possible with the fourth generation of satel-
lites, the "Big Bird" since 1971 and the "Key Hole," or KH-11 system first
orbited in 1977.
Other new techniques in reconnaissance include thermal imaging, using
infrared scanners that measure temperature differences between the earth's
surface and its targets. Thermal imaging can detect emissions from tank
engines, and even evidence of underground construction. Other recent
The size of objects that can be identified as "resolved" is obviously a factor of paramount
importance. Further improvement in this direction is hampered for the time being by the grain
.size of photographic film emulsion or by the atmospheric scattering of light. This may be
corrected by further development of the new technique in adaptive optics that eliminates
"image wander" as the atmosphere changes. The traditional kind of film is gradually being
replaced by light-sensitive silicon with integrated circuits embedded in it.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
The Anatomy of Intelligence
innovations include long-wave infrared technology for the detection of
radiation, and digital-image processing systems using sonar and satellite
data for the detection of submarines and the analysis of aerial reconnais-
sance information.ls
After the outbreak of the 1973 war between Egypt and Israel, the Soviet
Union was able to launch five additional surveillance satellites within two
weeks to supplement its coverage of the Middle East, which had previ-
ously been handled by a single satellite. By contrast, shortly after the start
of the Iran-Iraq conflict in the late 1980s, one of two U.S. reconnaissance
satellites over the region failed. As no backup was immediately available
for launch and collection, capabilities were halved for some time.
Seen in historical perspective, the dividing line between photo intelli-
gence, or remote sensing, and signals intelligence has become less rigid
with the development of modern technologies. In the popular mind,
SIGINT until recently was the breaking of codes, a preoccupation going
back at least a few thousand years. In its modern form it came into being
with the use of electronic communications. While cable lines were tapped
and telegrams purloined in the nineteenth century, systematic military
monitoring began only on the eve of World War I, when monitoring and
decoding became established practice. The achievement of the British Ad-
miralty's "Room 40," where up to 2,000 signals were daily intercepted are
well known, especially because of the political uses to which intercepts
such as the Zimmerman Telegram were put. Signals intelligence (ULTRA,
MAGIC) played an even more important role in World War II. The British
military historian Ronald Lewin wrote that every large war has its salient
characteristics, and if the unprecedented use of masses of artillery was the
most striking feature of World War 1, SIGINT was the dominant feature
of World War I1." Since then enormous technical progress has been made
in SIGINT technology, with its main components of COMINT (radio
communications intelligence), ELINT (the interception of electronic sig-
nals), and RADINT (radar intelligence)"
Specially designed satellites are an important source of SIGINT. Since
the early 1970s, electronic surveillance, or "ferret," satellites have been
orbited, deploying huge antennae capable of eavesdropping on broadcast
transmissions along the electromagnetic spectrum. Some SIGINT satellites
are launched into geosynchronous stationary orbit 22,300 miles above the
earth, providing uninterrupted, full-time coverage of the targeted area.
Other electronic intercept satellites are in lower orbit to detect signals such
as radar emissions and local radio broadcasts. The satellite network can
also pick up and broadcast back to earth telemetry data from satellites and
missile tests.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
? From "Spy-Tech", by
Graham Yost
3THE USE OF SPY SATELLITES
Operations
Even where satellites are used, they are not automatons that
operate by themselves, they are machines operated by people. A
satellite will not take a picture unless it has been instructed to do so.
The request for a satellite picture to be taken may start with a low-
level analyst in the CIA's Intelligence Directorate, who, upon
reading intelligence reports and after looking at a collection of
satellite photographs taken before, may decide that it is time for a
new series of photographs of, for example, the Soviets' Tyuratam
space and missile launch facility in Central Asia.
1. Vandenberg Air F
2. Sunnyvale 4
3. Los Angeles
4. Colorado Springs
5. San Cristobal
6. Havana
7. Cape Canaveral o
8. Miami
10. New
11. New Hampshire b
12. Thule A
13. London A
Map of key spots discussed,
including American
satellite control ground
stations and American and
Soviet launch sites.
14. Berlin
15. Bodo
16. Leningrad
17. Murmansk
18. Plesetsk
19. Moscow
20. Sverdlousk
22. Tyurat
24. Peking
25. GuamA
26. Hawaii 4
M e=Y
o American launch sites
American satellite ground stations
* Soviet launch sites
The analyst's request for more Tyuracam photos will pass upward
through the hierarchy, being evaluated for priority at every level,
until it finally reaches the national intelligence officer responsible
for the junior analyst's area of concern. (In this case it might be
Soviet Central Asian missile sites or Soviet military space activity.)
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
With the proper support and priority, the request will go on to the
reconnaissance committee of the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB).
The reconnaissance committee-or Comirex-is composed of
members representing the various agencies that request photo
reconnaissance data. If the board members agree that the request is
warranted, they will pass it along to the National Reconnaissance
Office (NRO).
The NRO (established August 25, 1960) has for a long time been
the most secret of U.S. intelligence operations, even more hush-
hush than the equally colossal National Security Agency (which
monitors communications and makes and breaks codes). Although
its budget is almost $3 billion annually, and its personnel numbers
perhaps 50,000, the NRO is neatly hidden away in Air Force
Intelligence. Only recently has the public been made at all aware of
this spy-satellite operations agency-indeed, as late as 1981 many
congressmen and senators had never heard of it.
The NRO's budget is controlled by the National Executive
Committee for Reconnaissance (Excom), which is composed of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the Director of the
CIA, and the President's National Security Adviser. As mentioned,
the NRO receives operational requests from Comirex, and it is from
those requests, and the priority assigned each, that it draws up the
Joint Reconnaissance Schedule, which sets down what the satellites
will gather and when.
Master Control
Once a satellite mission request is posted in the joint
Reconnaissance Schedule, it will find its way to the Big Blue Cube.
Located in Sunnyvale, California, the Big Blue Cube is a nine-story,
pale-blue, windowless block of a building in the middle of an
industrial park. The only hints of its true business are the telltale
white satellite dishes in the parking lot. Housed inside the Cube is
the Satellite Test Center, the headquarters of the Satellite Control
Facility (SCF). The SCF comprises a system of eight ground stations
(including the Big Blue Cube) located around the world that are
used to monitor and control the NRO's secret satellites. The ocher
stations are at Thule, Greenland (800 miles from the North Pole),
the Seychelles Islands (in the middle of the Indian Ocean), Guam,
Hawaii, Vandenberg AFB, New Hampshire, and England (just
south of London).
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
The SCF monitors and controls the roughly fifty military
satellites that are in orbit at any one time, making five contacts with
each satellite each day. It is within the Big Blue Cube at Sunnyvale,
however, that the true control of the satellites is maintained. There
are seven mission-control centers inside the Cube, each assigned to a
different type of satellite (reconnaissance, navigation,
communications, etc.). Each mission control has its own line of
communication to the various tracking stations, so that it can
instruct the personnel at each station what commands are to be
transmitted to the satellite when it passes over that station. These
stations can command the satellite to do any number of things, from
turning on a camera to firing a thruster to boost the satellite into a
higher orbit. The stations also receive information from the satellite
in the form of telemetry, information that ranges from the mundane
(the satellite's report on its position and condition) to the dramatic (a
picture of a new Soviet radar site in Siberia). This information is sent
back to that satellite's mission-control center in the Cube, then
finally on to whichever agency or service requested the information.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
Fran "The Craft of Intelligence",
by Allen Dulles
CODES AND CIPHERS
"Gentlemen," said Secretary of State Stimson in 1929, "do not
read each other's mail," and so saving, he shut down the only
American cryptanalytic (code-breaking) effort functioning at that
time. Later, during World War II, when he was serving as Secretary
of War under President Franklin D. Roosevelt, he came to recog-
nize the overriding importance of intelligence, including what we
now call "communications intelligence." When the fate of a na-
tion and the lives of its soldiers are at stake, gentlemen do read
each other's mail-if they can get their hands on it.
I am, of course, not speaking here of ordinary mail, although
postal censorship has itself often played a significant role in intel-
ligence work. However, except in the detection of secret writing,
there is little technology involved in postal censorship. Modem
communications intelligence, on the other hand, is a highly tech-
nical field, one that has engaged the best mathematical minds in an
unceasing war of wits that can easily be likened to the battle for
scientific information which I described a little earlier.
Every government takes infinite pains to invent unbreakable sys-
tems of communication and to protect these systems and the per-
sonnel needed to run them. At the same time, it will do everything
in its power to gain access or insight into the communications of
other governments whose policies or actions may be of real concern
to it. The reason for this state of affairs on both sides is obvious.
The contents of official government messages, political or military,
on "sensitive" subjects constitute, especially in times of crisis, the
best and "hottest" intelligence that one government can hope to
gather about another.
There is a vast difference between the amateur and professional
terminology in this field. If I stick to the amateur terms, I shall
probably offend the professionals, and if I use the professional
terms, I shall probably bore and confuse the amateur. My choice is
an unhappy one and I will be brief. In a code, some word, symbol
or group of symbols is substituted for a whole word or even for a
group of words or a complete thought. Thus, "XLMDP" or
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
72 THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE
"79648," depending upon whether a letter or number code is used,
could stand for "war" and every time they turn up in a message that
is what they mean. When the Japanese Government set up the
famous "East Winds" code for their diplomats in the United States
in December, 1941, they were prepared to indicate through the
simplest prearranged code words that an attack in the Pacific was
forthcoming.
In a cipher, a symbol, such as a letter or number, stands for a
single letter in a word. Thus, "b" or "2" can mean "e" or some
other letter. In simple ciphers the same symbol always stands for the
same letter. In the complex ciphers used today, the same symbol
can stand for a different letter each time it turns up. Sometimes a
message is first put into code, and then the code is put into cipher.
The United States military forces were able to resort to rather
unusual "ready-made" codes during World War I, and in a few
instances during World War II, in communications between units
in the field. These resources were our native American Indian lan.
guages, chiefly the Navajo language, which has no written forms
and had never been closely studied by foreign scholars. Two mem-
bers of the same tribe at either end of a field telephone could
transmit messages which no listener except another Navajo could
possibly understand. Needless to say, neither the Germans nor the
Japanese had any Navajos.
In modern terminology, the word "crypt," meaning "something
hidden," conveniently gets around the distinction between codes and
ciphers since it refers to all methods of transforming "plain text"
or "clear text" into symbols. The over-all term for the whole field
today is "cryptology." Under this broad heading we have two
distinct areas. Cryptography has to do with making, devising, in-
venting or protecting codes and ciphers for the use of one's own
government. Cryptanalysis, on the other hand, has to do with break-
ing codes and ciphers or "decrypting" them, with translating some-
one else's intercepted messages into proper language. To put one's
own messages into a code or cipher is to "encrypt" them. However,
when we translate our own messages back into plain language, we
are "deciphering."
A cryptogram or cryptograph would be any message in code or
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
COLLECTION-WHEN THE MACHINE TAKES OVER 73
cipher. "Communications intelligence" is information which has
been gained through successful cryptanalysis of other people's traffic.
And now, having confused the reader completely, we can get to the
gist of the matter.
The diplomatic service, the armed services and the intelligence
service of every country use secret codes and ciphers for classified
and urgent long-distance communications. Transmission may be
via commercial cable or radio or over special circuits set up by gov-
ernments. Anyone can listen in to radio traffic. Also, governments,
at least in times of crisis, can usually get copies of the encrypted
messages that foreign diplomats stationed on their territory send
home via commercial cable facilities. The problem is to break the
codes and ciphers, to "decrypt" them.
Certain codes and ciphers can be broken by mathematical analysis
of intercepted traffic, i.e., cryptanalysis, or more dramatically and
simply by obtaining copies of codes or code books or information on
cipher machines being used by an opponent, or by a combination
of these methods.
In the earlier days of our diplomatic service, up to World War I,
the matter of codes was sometimes treated more or less cavalierly,
often with unfortunate results. I remember a story told me as a
warning lesson when I was a young foreign service officer. In the
quiet days of 1913, we had as our Minister in Rumania an
estimable politician who had served his party well in the Midwest.
His reward was to be sent as Minister to Bucharest. He was new to
the game and codes and ciphers meant little to him. At that time
our basic system was based on a book code, which I will call the
Pink Code, although that was not the color we then chose for its
name. I spent thousands of worried hours over this book, which I
have not seen for over forty years, but to this day I can still re-
member that we had six or seven words for "period." One was
"PIVIR" and another was "NINUD." The other four or five I do
not recall. The theory then was-and it was a naive one-that if we
had six or seven words it would confuse the enemy as to where we
began and ended our sentences.
In any event, our Minister to Rumania started off from Wash.
ington with the Pink Code in a great, sealed envelope and it
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
74 THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE
safely reached Bucharest. It was supposed to be lodged in the lega.
tion's one safe. However, handling safe combinations was not the
new Minister's forte and he soon found it more convenient to put
the code under his mattress, where it rested happily for some
months. One day it disappeared-the whole code book and the
Minister's only code book. It is believed that it found its way to
Petrograd.
The new Minister was in a great quandary, which, as a politician,
he solved with considerable ingenuity. The coded cable traffic to
Bucharest in those days was relatively light and mostly concerned
the question of immigrants to the United States from Rumania and
Bessarabia. So when the new Minister had collected a half-dozen
coded messages, he would get on the train to Vienna, where he
would quickly visit our Ambassador. In the course of conversation
the visitor from Bucharest would casually remark that just as he
was leaving he had received some messages which he had not had
time to decode and could he borrow the Ambassador's Pink Code.
(In those good old days, we sent the same code books to almost all of
our diplomatic missions.) The Minister to Bucharest would then
decipher his messages, prepare and code appropriate replies, take
the train back to Bucharest and, at staged intervals, send off the
coded replies. For a time everything went smoothly. The secret of
the loss of the code book was protected until August, 1914, brought
a flood of messages from Washington as the dramatic events leading
up to World War I unrolled. The Minister's predicament was
tragic-trips to Vienna no longer sufficed. He admitted his derelic-
tion and returned to American politics.
The uncontrollable accidents and disasters of war sometimes ex-
pose to one opponent cryptographic materials used by the other. A
headquarters or an outpost may be overrun and in the heat of re-
treat code books left behind. Many notable instances of this kind
in World War I gave the British a lifesaving insight into the mili-
tary and diplomatic intentions of the Germans. Early in the war
the Russians sank the German cruiser Magdeburg and rescued from
the arms of a drowned sailor the German naval code book, which
was promptly turned over to their British allies. British salvage
operations on sunken German submarines turned up similar find-
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
COLLECTION-WHEN THE MACHINE TAKES OVER 75
ings. In 1917 two German dirigibles, returning from a raid over
England, ran into a storm and were downed over France. Among
the materials retrieved from them were coded maps and code books
used by German U-boats in the Atlantic.
Military operations based on breaking of codes will often tip off
the enemy, however. Once the Germans noticed that their sub-
marines were being spotted and cornered with unusual and startling
frequency, it was not hard for them to guess that communications
with their underwater fleet were being read. As a result, all codes
were immediately changed. There is always the problem, then, of
how to act on information derived in this manner. One can risk
terminating the usefulness of the source in order to obtain an im-
mediate military or diplomatic gain, or one can hold back and con-
tinue to accumulate an ever-broadening knowledge of the enemy's
movements and actions in order eventually to inflict the greatest
possible damage.
Actually, in either case, the attempt is usually made to protect
the real source and keep it viable, by giving the enemy fake indica-
tions that some other kind of source was responsible for the in-
formation acquired. Sometimes an operation that could damage
the adversary is not undertaken if it would alert the enemy to the
fact that its origin was solely due to information obtained by read-
ing his messages.
During World War I the first serious American cryptanalytic
undertaking was launched under the aegis of the War Department.
Officially known as Section 8 of Military Intelligence, it liked to
call itself the "Black Chamber," the name used for centuries by the
secret organs of postal censorship of the major European nations.
Working from scratch, a group of brilliant amateurs under the
direction of Herbert Yardley, a former telegraph operator, had by
1918 become a first-rate professional outfit. One of its outstanding
achievements after World War I was the breaking of the Japanese
diplomatic codes. During negotiations at the Washington Disarma-
ment Conference in 1921, the United States wanted very much to
get Japanese agreement to a 10:6 naval ratio. The Japanese came
to the conference with the stated intention of holding to a 10:7
ratio. In diplomacy, as in any kind of bargaining, you are at a tre-
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
76 THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE
mendous advantage if you know your opponent is prepared to
retreat to secondary positions if necessary. Decipherment of the
Japanese diplomatic traffic between Washington and Tokyo by the
Black Chamber revealed to our government that the Japanese were
actually ready to back down to the desired ratio if we forced the
issue. So we were able to force it without risking a breakup of the
conference over the issue.
The "Black Chamber" remained intact, serving chiefly the State
Department until 1929, when Secretary Scimson refused to let the
department avail itself further of its services. ,McGeorge Bundy,
Stimson's biographer, provides this explanation:
Stimson adopted as his guide in foreign policy a principle he always
tried to follow in personal relations-the principle that the way to make
men trustworthy is to trust them. In this spirit he made one decision for
which he was later severely criticized: he closed down the so-called Black
Chamber. . . . This act he never regretted.... Stimson, as Secretary of
State, was dealing as a gentleman with the gentlemen sent as ambassadors
and ministers from friendly nations.2
Our Army and Navy had, fortunately, begun to address them-
selves to the problems of ayptanalysis in the late 1920s, with par-
ticular emphasis on Japan, since American military thinking at that
time foresaw Japan as the major potential foe of the United States
in whatever war was to come next. By 1941, the year of Pearl Har-
bor, our cryptanalysts had broken most of the important Japa-
nese naval and diplomatic codes and ciphers; and we were, as a
result, frequently in possession of evidence of imminent Japanese
action in the Pacific before it took place.
The Battle of Midway in June, 1942, the turning point of the
naval war in the Pacific, was an engagement we sought because we
were able to learn from decrypted messages that a major task force
of the Imperial Japanese Navy was gathering off Midway. This in-
telligence concerning strength and disposition of enemy forces gave
our Navy the advantage of surprise.
A special problem, in the years following Pearl Harbor, was how
to keep secret the fact that we had broken the Japanese codes. In-
vestigations, recriminations, the need to place the blame somewhere
2 Henry L Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War,
Harper & Brothers, 1948.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
COLLECTION-WHEN THE MACHINE TAKES OVER 77
for the disheartening American losses threatened to throw this
"Magic," as it was called, into the lap of the public, and the Japa-
nese. Until an adequate Navy could be put on the seas, the ability to
read Japanese messages was one of the few advantages we had in
the battle with Japan. There were occasional leaks but none evi-
dently ever came to their attention.
In 1944, Thomas E. Dewey, who was then running for President
against President Roosevelt, had learned, as had many persons close
to the federal government, about our successes with the Japanese
code and our apparent failure before Pearl Harbor to make the
best use of the information in our hands. It was feared that he
might refer to this in his campaign. The mere possibility sent shivers
down the spines of our joint Chiefs of Staff. General Marshall him-
self then wrote a personal letter to Mr. Dewey, telling him that the
Japanese still did not know we had broken their codes and that
we were achieving military successes as a result of our interception
and decoding of their messages. Mr. Dewey never mentioned our
code successes. The secret was kept.
One of the most spectacular of all coups in the field of com-
munications intelligence was the British decipherment of the so-
called Zimmermann telegram in January, 1917, when the United
States was on the brink of World War 1.3 The job was performed by
the experts of "Room 40," as British naval cryptanalytic head-
quarters were called. The message had originated with the German
Foreign Secretary Zimmermann in Berlin and was addressed to the
German Minister in Mexico City. It outlined the German plan for
the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare on February 1,
1917, stated the probability that this would bring the United States
into war, and proposed that Mexico enter the war on Germany's side
and with victory regain its "lost territory in Texas, New Mexico,
and Arizona."
Admiral Hall, the legendary Chief of British Naval Intelligence,
had this message in his hands for over a month after its receipt. His
problem was how to pass its decrypted contents to the Americans
in a manner that would convince them of its authenticity yet would
prevent the Germans from learning the British had broken their
3 This story has been well cold in Barbara Tuchman's book. See Bibliography.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
78 THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE
codes. Finally, the war situation caused Lord Balfour, the British
Foreign Secretary, to communicate the Zimmermann message for-
mally to the American Ambassador in London. The receipt of the
message in Washington caused a sensation at the White House and
State Department, and created serious problems for our govern.
ment-how to verify beyond a doubt the validity of the message and
how to make it public without letting it seem merely an Anglo.
American ploy to get the United States into the War. My uncle,
Robert Lansing, who was then Secretary of State, later told
me about the dramatic events of the next few days which brought
America close to war.
The situation was complicated by the fact that the Germans had
used American diplomatic cable facilities to transmit the message
to their Ambassador in Washington, Count Bernstorff. He relayed
it to his colleague in Mexico City. President Wilson had granted
the Germans the privilege of utilizing our communication lines be.
tween Europe and America on the understanding that the messages
would be related to peace proposals in which Wilson was interested.
The President's chagrin was therefore all the greater when he
discovered to what end the Germans had been exploiting his good
offices. However, this curious arrangement turned out to be of great
advantage. First of all, it meant that the State Department had in its
possession a copy of the encrypted Zimmermann telegram, which it
had passed to Bernstorff, unaware, of course, of its inflammatory
contents. Once the encrypted text was identified, it was forwarded
to our embassy in London, where one of Admiral Hall's men re-
decrypted it for us in the presence of an embassy representative, thus
verifying beyond a doubt its true contents. Secondly, the fact that
deciphered copies of the telegram had been seen by German diplo-
mats in both Washington and Mexico City helped significantly to
solve the all-important problem that had caused Admiral Hall so
much worry, namely, how to fool the Germans about the real source
from which we had obtained the information. In the end the im-
pression given the Germans was that the message had leaked as a
result of some carelessness or theft in one of the German embassies
or Mexican offices which had received copies of it. They continued
using the same codes, thus displaying a remarkable but welcome
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
COLLECTION-WHEN THE MACHINE TAKES OVER 79
lack of imagination. On March 1, 1917, the State Department re-
leased the contents of the telegram through the Associated Press. It
hit the American public like a bombshell. In April we declared war
on Germany.
When one compares the cryptographic systems used today with
those to which governments during World War I entrusted the pas-
sage of their most vital and sensitive secrets, the latter seem crude
and amateurish, especially because of their recurring groups of
symbols which tipped off the cryptanalyst that an important word
or one in frequent usage must lie behind the symbols. When Ad-
miral Hall's cryptanalysts saw the combination "67893" in the
Zimmermann telegram, they recognized it and knew that it meant
"Mexico." Under the German system it always meant that. Today
such a cipher group would never stand for the same word twice.
Today not only all official government messages but also the
communications of espionage agents are cast in equally secure and
complex cryptographic systems. Soviet agents, for example, in re-
porting information back to Moscow, use highly sophisticated
cipher systems. Here as elsewhere, as defensive measures improve,
countermeasures to pierce the new defenses also improve.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Fran "Spy-Tech", by
Graham Yost
Principles of Photo Inte re`ojlon
NPIC was started under Art Lundahl's direction in the 1950s and
is now located in the Washington, D.C. Navy Yard, at the corner of
1st and M streets in the Southeast section of the city. Building 213
in the yard is the home of NPIC. It is a five-story, yellow cement
building notable for the fact that most of its windows have been
cemented over, in an effort, it is supposed, to prevent
eavesdropping. To gain an understanding of what goes on behind
those closed windows, it is necessary to look at some of the
principles of photo interpretation.
The most basic aerial photo interpretation is done with a single
black-and-white photograph. The first step in interpretation is to
learn the nature of how objects on the ground appear from the air. In
day-to-day life we usually see objects on the ground from a height of
5-6 feet. And we are used to seeing cars and buildings and
landmarks from the side, not the top. Accurate identification of
objects depends of course on the size of the object itself and on the
resolution of the photograph (from above, a haystack may look the
same as a small tree or a shrub).
In general, long, thin objects like roads are the easiest to identify.
Unpaved roads are lighter in color and are easier to spot then paved
roads, which usually have more regular, controlled curves.
Similarly, railway lines, which appear dark and narrow and are
difficult to spot, can be distinguished by their long, smooth curves.
While power lines themselves are too fine to be resolved, individual
power line towers can be spotted, and the route of the lines can be
plotted when they cut a swath through a wooded area.
In identifying other objects, such as buildings, vegetation, and
landmarks, shadows play an important role-they may be either a
help or a hinderance. They can help by giving a sense of the height of
an object, but they hinder interpretation when the shadow can be
confused with the object that casts it (from above, the shadow of a
house with a black roof and the house itself may together just look
like one big house). Shadows can also fall on other objects of
interest, blacking them out.
The most helpful cool for a PI is a stereoscope. Most aerial
photographs are taken with 60-percent overlap, so that a feature on
one photograph will also appear either on the photograph before it or
on the one after it in line. As the airplane or satellite is at a different
point over the feature when the first picture is taken than it is when
the second is snapped, the two photos will show two slightly
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
different angles on an object. The stereoscope exploits this slight
difference in angle so that the object can be viewed with the illusion
of three dimensions.
A stereoscope is a pair of special magnifying glasses that are set 3-
4 inches above a pair of overlapping photos. The matching features
on the photographs are separated by the distance between the
viewer's pupils-roughly 2 inches. By looking at photographs
through the stereoscope, the brain is tricked into thinking that these
separate images are the slightly different angled images that each eye
normally sends to the brain. It takes some patience and
concentration, but once the brain is fooled, it fuses the two flat
images into one with three dimensions of startling, exaggerated
proportions.
The stereoscope is essential in gauging the contour of terrain,
something that is almost impossible to judge without a sense of
depth. Through a stereoscope one can tell if a road is following a
stream, a valley, or a ridge, or whether a feature is being obscured by
a shadow, as the feature will pop up while the shadow remains flat.
Objects viewed through a stereoscope will be vertically exaggerated
by two to three times, so that a two-story building may appear to be
six stories in height through a stereoscope. If, however, one happens
to know the true height of at least one object in a photograph, even
The Use of Spy Satellites 147
An Air Force intelligence
photo interpreter at work.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
with the stereoscope's exaggeration, one can then calculate the
height of other objects shown.
The use of infrared-sensitive film is another boon to the photo
interpreter. Because of chlorophyll's specific absorption spectrum,
green vegetation, which appears dark on regular panchromatic film,
is quite light in infrared. Thus, one can tell the difference between
true vegetation and something only painted to look like vegetation,
such as military camouflage. Infrared is also very handy in plotting
the precise location of water (water appears black in IR photos) and
of paths and roads through fields (the vegetation appears light while
the track comes out dark), and in separating a shadow from the
object that cast it.
While film cannot pick up the longer-wave IR emissions from
objects, detectors (like those used in the KH- 11) have this
capability. The information can then be translated into photographs
for use by the Pls. The great advantage in detecting longer-wave IR
is that it includes thermal radiation-heat. It is said that the
thermal IR detectors available during the Vietnam War were so
sensitive that they could pick out footprints in the jungle at night,
since the footprints were warmer than the ground around them. For
the PI, however, the great advantage of thermal IR information is
that it can give indications of what goes on inside
buildings-previously completely inaccessible terrain. By analyzing
the heat patterns that emanate from a building, one can figure our
the building's internal structure, traffic flow, energy consumption,
and level of activity.
The partner of IR photography is multispectral photography.
Just as vegetation has its own specific absorption spectrum in IR, so
it does in every other band of light. This applies to all objects. A
road may appear very light in the blue band and very dark in the
yellow. By comparing photographs of the same terrain taken in
different bands, one may distinguish between features that in
panchromatic film may have appeared to be exactly the same. An
example is a well-traveled road versus an unused one. Through
comparison of photographs multispectral photography can provide
information on the shape, size, texture, color, hue, and contrast of
an object, all areas that are very hard to determine with black-and-
white or even color photography.
Computers have revolutionized photo interpretation just as they
have everything else. Photographs can be scored digitally, making
such things as comparing different multispectral photographs easier
and more exact. For example, a computer can process a picture taken
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
in the blue band and simply superimpose it on one taken in the red.
The PI is then able to see instantly the differences and similarities
between the two photographs. A thermal IR picture of a missile site
taken one night may indicate activity in one area, while a picture
taken the next night ma} reveal work going on in a slightly different
place. By comparing the two pictures in a computer, the PI can find
out where the activity is concentrated.
Of crucial strategic value is the computer's ability to measure
exactly. Its precision in photogrammetry allows the PI to judge, for
example, whether or not the gauge of a rail line is wide enough to
support the transport of missiles or, indeed, if a new missile's size
violates a treaty. The computerized viewing screens at N'PIC allow
PI to move a cursor around on a photograph and get an exact
measurement of an object instantly.
With the KH-1 l's digital imaging system, the data already exist
in a form compatible with a computer, making the use of such
information that much simpler. The computer is able to manipulate
the image in ways that one is unable to do with pictures taken on
film. If there are several different pictures of the same terrain taken
from slightly different angles, the computer can fuse these images to
form a graphic composite model that can be manipulated on all three
axes. Suddenly, one is able to examine a three-dimensional model of
a missile site that is not exaggerated like a stereoscopic image. Thus
height, depth and contour become ever more measurable.
The computer is also able to scan back through a history of digital
images of one target site so that it can determine what developments
and changes have occurred at the site over the years. Computers can
also enhance images by removing any static, by increasing or
decreasing the intensity of the light, and by enlarging and
highlighting certain areas, all at the touch of a key.
The new technology has in many ways made the job of the Pis
easier (they can quickly scan for patterns, check old pictures,
measure objects, and perform other tasks almost instantly), but it
has also made their jobs harder by increasing the amount of
information that each PI has to digest. Essentially, though,
computers or not, the PIs' duties have remained the same since the
days of Art Lundahl in the 1950s and '60s: They are supposed to
figure out what is going on on the ground by examining pictures
taken from as far as 100 miles above the Earth.
The Use of SPY Satellites 149
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Fran "Spy-Teti" , by
Graham-Yost
5SECRET COMMUNICATIONS
The NSA Network
The NSA intercepts communications all around the world, using
either its own equipment and personnel or those of the armed
services. Its main targets are the Soviet Union's radio and radar
signals. Because of this there are listening posts flanking all sides of
Russia-in the arctic, Japan, Turkey, Germany-wherever a base
can be put close to the border. A listening post can be anything from
a receiver in the back of a van in Berlin to a mammoth Wullenweber
antenna sprawling across the Scottish highlands.
The Wullenwebber facility in Edzel, Scotland, looks like
something out of a science-fiction movie-a 20th-century
Stonehenge. Designed to pick up everything from low-band
submarine communication to high-frequency radiotelephones, it is
composed of four concentric rings of poles, ranging in height from 8
to 100 feet, with the outer ring having a diameter of 1,000 feet. The
outer ring, which picks up high-frequency transmissions, is a series
of 120 poles, one for each 3 degrees of the circle. The next ring
coming inward, or second ring, is a reflector screen that protects the
outer ring from unwanted signals. It is made up of wires dangling
down from horizontal braces suspended between tall poles. The
third ring picks up low-frequency signals with a series of very tall
poles, and the fourth ring-the inner ring-acts as the third ring's
reflector screen.
In the middle of the Wullenwebber antenna are two boxlike
operations buildings. Cables, all exactly the same length, run from
the poles to the buildings. By noting which pole receives a signal
first, operators get the direction of the transmitter, and by cross-
referencing with other listening posts, they can figure out exactly
where the signal is coming from by using a process of triangulation.
Two of the major listening posts in the United States are at Vint
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
Hill Farms in Virginia (30 miles south of Washington) and Two
Rock Ranch in California (north of San Francisco). Vint Hill uses
rhombic arrays to pick up communications to and from the
embassies in Washington. A rhombic array is a wire strung a few
feet off the ground around a set of four posts arranged in a diamond
shape, with no more than 10 feet separating any two posts. Unlike a
Wullenweber antenna, a rhombic array will only receive in a very
specific direction, and so there are thirty or forty of these arrays
scattered over several hundred acres at Vint Hill, all connected to an
operations facility by coaxial cable.
The NSA's biggest station, and their biggest failure, is the
antenna at Sugar Grove, West Virginia. Sugar Grove is in the
middle of a 100-square-mile radio-quiet zone, initially established
in the 1950s for the purposes of radio astronomy. In 1959 the NSA
decided that it would be an ideal place for the ultimate listening
post. The grand scheme was to build an antenna that could pick up
Soviet communications as they bounced off the Moon. Originally
priced at $60 million, the antenna was to be the largest movable
structure ever created. It was to take 36,000 cons of steel to make
the dish, which was to be 66 stories call and 600 feet wide, and was
to rest on mammoth drives capable of angling it up and down and
moving it 360 degrees around a 1,500-foot track. Unfortunately,
the mathematics needed to build such a structure was so complex
that at that time there wasn't a computer in the world that could
handle it. As well, the costs of the project skyrocketed-it was
estimated that it would have cost $200 million or more to
complete-and eventually it was canceled.
Even though the big dish was abandoned, to this day an intense
secrecy still surrounds Sugar Grove, perhaps because only 60 miles
away, in Etam, West Virginia, are the COMSAT dishes, used to
carry half of the commercial international communications that go
in and out of the United States. Ecam is only one of the COMSAT's
four ground stations. Conveniently, the NSA has a station nearby
the three other COMSAT facilities in Maine, Washington, and
California.
Not all internation.!! communications go via satellite. How is the
NSA to cap the transatlantic cable? It would be possible to lay a
second cable down nearby and pick up the conversations by
induction, but that would be very expensive and complicated. As it
happens, at the U.S. end of the cable, in Rhode Island, the signals
are converted to microwaves and beamed to the AT&T station in
Montville, Connecticut. It is a simple matter for the NSA to
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
intercept that link (as we saw in the earlier section on data
surveillance) as well as any other- microwave links in the
country-especially those used by foreign governments between
New York and Washington.
Intelligence From Above
As was mentioned in the first half of this book, in order to gain
information on how the air defenses of an enemy operate, the United
States flies quick-penetration border sorties to trigger radar and
radio alerts, while nearby (or actually flying the penetrations
themselves) are reconnaissance planes such as an EC-47 or an EC-
121, waiting to pick up this RADINT (RADar INTelligence) and
ELINT (ELectronic INTelligence). The NSA is responsible for
analyzing much of this data, much of which also comes from
satellites.
The most important satellites to the NSA are the Rhyolite series,
all of which are designed to monitor Soviet missile test launches
(picking up TELINT, or TELemetry INTelligence) as well as to
intercept whatever microwave transmissions they can. It is believed
that Rhyolite, although a successful satellite, is nevertheless no
replacement for the loss of the ground station in Iran, which was
only a few hundred miles away from the Soviet test site at Tyuratam,
instead of over 20,000 miles up in space. The only possible
replacements for Kabkan may be a combination of the new
Aquacade ELINT satellite (if it ever gets up in the shuttle) and a
listening post in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, a
remote mountain area in China. (At this point the Chinese are
willing to cooperate with the United States if it means getting
information on the activities of the Soviets.)
While the National Reconnaissance Office operates the satellites,
the NSA maintains its own ground stations to receive the data the
satellites pick up. There are stations in Australia (at Pine Gap),
England (Menwith Hill Station in Harrogate), and the United
States (Buckley Air National Guard Base near Denver).
Listening From the Sea
In the early 1960s, while the NSA had the Soviet Union and
China well covered, they lacked an extensive listening-post network
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
for the rest of the world-there were only two posts in all of
Africa-so a decision was made to copy the Soviets and outfit
trawlers with listening gear and send them along the coasts of the
world. The NSA used big, old boats that could creep along the shore
without creating suspicion, for they moved so slowly. They
patrolled the coasts of Africa, South America, and throughout the
Indian Ocean, the South Seas, and the Pacific. However, after what
many refer to as the "accidental" destruction of one such ship, the
Liberty, by Israeli jets and torpedo boats during the 1967 war, and
after the capture of the Pueblo by the North Koreans in 1968, the sea
venture, as a clandestine eavesdropping activity, was dropped.
Military ships, however, continue to listen in to whatever they can
pick up as they patrol.
The Targets of the NSA
The main target of the NSA is of course the communications of
the Soviet Union. That is what makes the computers whir and the
cryptanalysts sweat over their blackboards and graph paper, as they
consult their foreign language dictionaries. But it also appears that
there have been times when the NSA has done some eavesdropping
at home.
It began in 1945, when AT&T, ITT, and RCA were approached
by the U.S. government to turn over all international cables sent or
received by foreign governmental representatives in this country.
Although the companies were at first reluctant, afraid they would be
breaking the law, they were assured that all was legal, as the
government was only interested in the activities of foreign nationals.
Operation Shamrock, as it was known, did indeed begin its career as
a foreign intelligence operation, but over the years it grew
increasingly domestic, and by the 1960s the system was being used
to gather information on drug traffickers, criminals, and even peace
groups, in a direct contravention of the U.S. Constitution. When
Shamrock was exposed in the mid-' 70s, it was quickly dismantled.
Some suspect that the NSA is still secretly conducting domestic
surveillance. It has been estimated however, that even with its vast
facilities the NSA is at best only capable of monitoring one tenth of
one percent of the nationcs communications, primarily because
listening in requires so much time and manpower. Still, one tenth of
one percent of the American population is roughly 250,000 people,
a not insignificant amount. In the future, voice identification and
transcription computers may drastically cut down the amount of
effort required to mount such an operation.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Fran "The CIA and the U. S.
Intelligence System", by
Scott D. Breckinridge
10
TECHNICAL COLLECTION
SIGINT COLLECTION
SIGINT activities of the U.S. government consist of a number of
different technologies. The oldest of these, Communications Intelligence
(COMINT), involves intercepting and, where necessary, decoding the
communications of other nations. As the eavesdropping aspect of this
procedure offended the sensibilities of Secretary of State Henry L.
Stimson in 1929, he was prompted to terminate the department's support
for the work. The U.S. Army and Navy, viewing the requirements of
national security differently, continued to intercept foreign radio com-
munications and thereby produced intelligence from them.'
SIGINT also encompasses Electronics Intelligence (ELINT), once
referred to as Electronics Intercept at a time when some questioned
whether its technical contributions really constituted "intelligence."
ELINT consists of technical and intelligence information derived from
the interception of electromagnetic radiations emitted by radars and
other special communications equipment. These electronic signals are
studied to determine the equipment's unique characteristics. An outgrowth
of this activity was the sophisticated study of missile telemetry, known
as Telemetry Intelligence (TELINT),3 provided for in the SALT II Agree-
ment.
Secretary Vance's explanation of SALT II referred to the radar facilities
at Shemya Island in Alaska, where reentry of Soviet test-missile firings
is monitored. Such activities gave rise to the term RADINT, for Radar
Intelligence. Mentioned here-not because it is SIGINT (it is not), but
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
130 SECRECY, ACTIVITIES, AND TECHNIQUES
because of the electronic technology involved-is infrared photography',
which will be discussed later in the context of overhead reconnaissance.
The U.S. government's SIGINT program is managed by the National
Security Agency (NSA). Unlike CIA, which has a legislative charter,
NSA was created in October 1952 by presidential directive. It replaced
the short-lived Armed Forces Security Agency, which had only limited
powers over the government's SIGINT activities. NSA, which reports
directly to the Secretary of Defense, was given operational control over
the military cryptologic agencies: the Army Security Agency (ASA),
which subsequently was merged with other organizations into the Army
Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM); the Naval Security
Group (NSG); and the Air Force Electronic Security Command (for many
years known as the Air Force Security Service).` These three organizations,
subordinate to their respective departments, are responsive to NSA
operational direction. Estimates of the personnel engaged in the national
SIGINT program range between 70,000 and 120,000;6 a more accurate
estimate would probably fall about halfway between these extremes.
NSA responds to both national and tactical requirements, political
as well as military, but its major and primary collection effort is directed
to military targets.' The scope of coverage by NSA and the three military
cryptologic agencies requires that personnel be stationed around the
world," including an impressive net of facilities abroad. According to
the Church Committee Report of 1976, the U.S. SIGINT program was
then the largest and most expensive single program in the national
intelligence budget.9 The rapid growth of the overhead reconnaissance
program, with its highly sophisticated technology and equipment, may
have modified the balance somewhat.
One writer close to the SALT II process described the intelligence
programs of which SALT 11 verification was a part. His description was
general, but it included a specific reference to the SIGINT facilities that
had been located in northern Iran prior to the fall of the Shah:
The Iran stations were part of a varied and far-reaching network of American
facilities that kept track of Soviet military activity, including missile tests.
These facilities include airplanes, satellites, ships and ground stations outfitted
with an array of equipment for taking photographs, detecting launches by
infrared sensors, intercepting radio messages and tracking missiles and their
warheads by radar. Many of the functions are overlapping. Redundancy is
a deliberately designed and highly prized feature of the system.1?
The Eurasian landmass occupied by the Soviet Union and its empire
extends from 10? east longitude at the western limit of East Germany,
through 170? east longitude at the end of the Chukotsk Peninsula across
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
the Bering Strait from Alaska. The size of the collection task in this
vast area is enorrtlous. Numerous collection activities around the pe-
riphery of the Soviet Bloc are required. The reported loss of the valuable
sites in Iran conveys something of the nature of the intelligence effort.
The press has reported collection efforts in Turkey, where U.S. forces
had at one time been ousted owing to a congressional initiative in
relation to Cyprus. Unconfirmed press reports have stated that an
arrangement exists with China for operation of a similar collection site
in western China. Such widely separated activities suggests something
of the scope and variety of the effort involved.
Europe has been considered an area of strategic priority among U.S.
interests, both military and cultural. The largest military confrontation
exists there, given the NATO forces aligned to oppose any armed
aggression from the Warsaw Pact forces in East Europe. Probably the
greatest concentration of U.S. SIGINT collection facilities is in the NATO
area, where both the United States and its NATO allies conduct in-
dependent SIGINT programs, with arrangements for exchange of the
"take" among them. SIGINT collection serves the essentially defensive
purposes of NATO strategy and tactics, but it also exhibits a potential
for offensive use in the event of war.
Permanent installations have been established along the length of
the East European borders. As a rule, their locations are determined by
terrain and radio reception conditions, although sometimes by the location
of communications and other collection targets in East Europe. SIGINT
facilities engage in electronic "listening" for all manner of signals
emanating from the other side of the East European borders.
Soviet and other Warsaw Pact ground forces in East Europe can
rely on ground lines (normal telephone systems) when not on maneuvers.
But wireless communications systems must be kept active, and when
the troops take to the field for seasonal exercises, or to move their
location, they invariably use radio communications. During routine
practice and "command post exercises," SIGINT collection on the ground
forces is most active. Maneuvers are followed closely to verify continuation
of known procedures and to identify new ones, as well as to learn what
communications may reveal about organization. Exercises are monitored
closely to ensure that they do not a cloak a real offensive. Air-to-air
and air-to-ground radio communications also form a part of normal air
force operations in peace or in war. Electronic observation of Warsaw
Pact flight activity makes it possible to determine aircraft basing, move-
ment, levels of flight experience and training, numbers, and organization.
As Warsaw Pact forces are relatively near and mobile, continuing
watch is maintained by the United States for any indication of change
in deployment and readiness. "Indications" and "warning" intelligence
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
is crucial to Western readiness to meet possible military initiatives from
the East. Against Luch an eventuality a list has been prepared of steps
to be expected in the event the Pact began preparations for hostilities,
and a watch is kept of developments in those areas. The U.S. European
Command (EUCOM) has a "watch list" of some 500 discrete indicators
(more than 700, counting subsets), and daily reports are assembled for
review." SIGINT is one of the more important sources of information
to he included in these lists of possible preparations for war.
Similarly, there are collection programs targeted on the Soviet Navy,
which has become a "blue water navy" in the past two decades in
contrast to its traditional role as something of a coastal defense force.12
Soviet ships can be observed visually when they exit the Black Sea,
the Mediterranean, and the Baltic. This susceptibility to visual observation
probably was a probable factor in the Soviet decision to base a considerable
portion of its fleet, especially its submarines, along the Kola Peninsula
on the White and Barents seas, which are quite inhospitable in winter.
Other Soviet naval bases exist in East Asia, both in northern USSR and
in Vietnam. The new global role of the Soviet navy makes it a more
difficult SIGINT target than it was when it had a more limited mission.
Although SIGINT facilities in the European and Mediterranean areas
provide considerable coverage in those regions, other arrangements have
had to be made for surveillance of Soviet naval forces in the South
Atlantic, the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific.
The majority of the Soviet SIGINT targets are at fixed sites, although
a number of the radar facilities have some mobility. Of special continuing
interest are the large fixed-site facilities that would have to be dealt
with in the event of retaliation against Soviet aggression in Europe. For
example, the capabilities of the Soviet Bloc air defense system would
have to be determined in order to design tactics to penetrate it.
SIGINT collection sites along the borders between West and East
Europe can identify different types of Soviet radars-general search and
aircraft-acquisition radars, anti-aircraft artillery radars, surface-to-air
missile radars, tracking radars, interceptor radars for aircraft, and so on.
To identify and locate these radars is not enough. It is necessary also
to know how they function in operational situations. This information
is acquired in part through so-called ferret flights, in which specially
equipped aircraft fly along the borders of the East European line of
demarcation. These aircraft will be picked up by Soviet Bloc radars and
tracked, accompanied by routine precautionary measures in the Warsaw
Pact air defense system. Bloc interceptor aircraft are often scrambled to
move along with the ferret flights. Anti-aircraft systems will activate
their equipment against the possibility that the ferret flights might turn
to penetrate the East European airspace. Western SIGINT collection
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
TEIrli.1LAL CULLECTION 133
facilities, as well as the electronic equipment on the ferret aircraft,
monitor these reactions as defensive responsibility is moved from sector
to sector in the Warsaw Pact air defense system. These defensive responses
usually provide subject matter for CO MINT and ELINT collection. It
also reveals a good deal about the organization, functioning, and ca-
pabilities of Pact air defenses, and contributes to the design of tactics
and strategy for penetrating the system if that should become necessary.
The Soviet Bloc is quite aware of what is happening, but it usually
feels obliged to react in order to ensure that the ferret flights are not
about to turn east over Warsaw Pact airspace.
Ferret flights along the demarcation line in Europe are in friendly
airspace, often with accompanying fighter protection. They have proven
to be basically safe patrol missions. But the same has not always been
true of similar flights that approach Soviet or other communist coastal
areas over international waters. These latter flights occasionally have
been attacked and U.S. patrol aircraft downed. Such incidents occurred
in 1955, 1956, 1958, and 1960" during the Eisenhower administration,
and in 1969 during the Nixon administration." Analysis of those incidents
has indicated that the aircraft had invariably flown over international
waters. Communist motives have not always been clear, although there
doubtless is some irritation about the obvious purpose of the ferret
flights.
In addition to the aircraft usually employed in ferret activity, the.
U.S. Air Force operates a special high-performance aircraft-the
SR-71-capable of speed in excess of MACH-3 at very high altitudes.
Originally designed as the follow-on to the U-2 aircraft, the SR-71 has
been used on a limited basis owing, at least in part, to the performance
of reconnaissance satellites. The SR-71 can perform SIGINT along with
its other missions. Unmanned drone aircraft equipped with sensors have
been flown into areas in which a hostile reaction is expected.'5 The
Church Committee, concerned with the risks of overflight activity, both
to human life and the possibility of escalating reactions if an aircraft
is shot down, recommended that unmanned drones be used where
possible in place of manned ferret flights.16 Although surveillance satellites
have eliminated much of this element of risk, manned flights may
sometimes be necessary.
Ferret flights are supplemented by naval equipment. Secretary Vance
has mentioned the use of ships to monitor Soviet missile tests. The role
of DCI Helms in their use of these ships for this work was also mentioned
in Chapter 5. There are other naval vessels equipped for more general
SIGINT work. Naval communications ships designed for SIGINT missions
execute more normal collection tasks, although their work is not always
without risk. The USS Pueblo, engaged in a general SIGINT mission
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
off North Korea in 1968, was attacked on the high seas and seized by
North Korea. '` The USS Liberty, conducting SIGINT operations in the
eastern Mediterranean during the so-called Six Day War in June 1967,
was attacked repeatedly by Israeli naval vessels and aircraft.",
Other forms of SIGINT collection were discussed by the Church
Committee in the context of electronic techniques. Although these
discussions concerned domestic activity in particular, the techniques
obviously have application for foreign collection activities as well.
Mentioned in the Church Committee summary were intercept of voice
communications from microwave relay systems, intercept of non-voice
communications from microwave relay links, and intercept of both voice
and nonvoice communications from satellites.'9
Not all SIGINT operations involve the intercept of signals on the
air. One dramatic incident that received some publicity is known as the
Berlin Tunnel Operation. In the mid-1950s a tunnel was dug from an
empty building on the west side of the Berlin Wall to underground
communications cables on the east side. CIA communications specialists
installed banks of recorders tapped in to East German and Soviet
communications cables in the tunnel.20 The operation ended in a scramble
in mid-1956 when Soviet authorities stumbled on it.
This general discussion should provide some sense of the scope and
nature of both usual and unusual SIGINT collection. Although much
of the activity is pro forma in nature, special opportunities may result
in unique operations. Given the variety of modern technology, SIGINT
has found a place in the overhead reconnaissance program as well.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
13 June, 1985
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
THE WASHINGTON TIMES 21 June, 1985
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
Fran "Intelligence
Requirerr nts for
CHAPTER ONE the 1980's -
Counterintellicence
by Roy Godson
Counterintelligence:
An Introduction
Roy Godson
It is not easy to define counterintelligence. Its practitioners them-
selves disagree about the meaning of the concept. At a minimum,
however, CI can be defined as the identification and neutralization
of the threat posed by foreign intelligence services, and the manip-
ulation of these services for the maniaulator's benefit. Some say CI
is more all encompassing: That it should deal with a wider range of
threats to a nation's security, from that posed by adversary states in
their totality, rather than by-their intelligence services alone. as well
as threats posed by such non-governmental forces as terrorist groups
and internationally-organized crime. But the "minimalist" focus on
the threat posed by foreign intelligence services is almost universally
shared, as a starting point at least.
Few also would disagree that Cl is important not only to the
nation's security but to the effective functioning of the nation's
apparatus for intelligence as well. The public is reasonably well aware
that CI exists to prevent spies, foreign and domestic, from penetrat-
ing our government, armed forces and intelligence agencies. There
is even widespread recognition that this country should not be with-
out means to safeguard the security of the high technology produced
by our industry, and that nations cannot deal with terrorist organi-
zations, or with large-scale internationally-organized crime, by ad
hoc investigations alone, subsequent to the event.
Essential to dealing with all of these threats is information that can
be obtained only by clandestine technical and human means, by a
panoply of what have come to be called "intrusive techniques,"
often involving audiovisual surveillance. Nor is there much need to
argue that. if the US is going to discover the "illegals" whom the
Soviet Union has sent to this country for purposes of long-term
infiltration, the systematic counteraction must comprise sophisti-
cated analysis as well as investigation. There are those-among them
the leaders of the American Civil Liberties Union-who have urged
the virtual abolition of all CI and clandestine collection from human
sources, both home and abroad (see, for example, Ernest Lefever
and Roy Godson, The CIA and the American Ethic, Washington, D.C.:
Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1979). But the proposition that Cl
is essential to the maintenance of democratic processes and human
liberties usually does not have to be demonstrated.
It is far less clear, however, except to specialists, that CI is essen-
tial to the success of all other components of intelligence. Neither
collection nor analysis can produce reliable results, nor can covert
action be effectively conducted without constant attention to what
hostile (and even friendly) services might do to turn our intelligence
activities to their advantage.
The security of the processes by which we collect intelligence is
often precarious. For example, it is impossible to know a priori
whether any human source is actually working for us or is feeding us
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
false or doctored information. Intelligence services traditionally,
wisely and necessarily employ a variety of techniques to investigate
and, above all, to test their human sources. Technical sources also
can be used by hostile services to deceive us. Telemetry (the signals
emitted by missiles in test flight) is an obvious example of information
that the adversary knows we are capable of picking up. It would be
uncharacteristic, at the very least, if the adversary failed to take this
into account in planning the format and content of the telemetry of
its test platforms. We also must assume that the adversary is aware
of its potential vulnerability to other methods of technical collection
and is doing the utmost not only to deny us data but to bias the data
we do get. We always can try to minimize our vulnerability to coun-
termeasures by keeping our collection activities as secure as possible.
But the collection system has yet to be devised that will be able.
completely to neutralize the adversary's efforts to deny and to mis-
inform. Therefore, CI experts must constantly devise and carry out
tests to determine how, and how well, the adversary is coping with
our collection activities.
Covert action couples the promise of significant gains for our
country with the real prospect of embarrassing failure and the waste
of precious assets. This century is replete with examples of covert
political and paramilitary activity turned to the initiator's disadvan-
tage. Among the major methods of determining if a covert action is
about to be "turned" are painstaking, skeptical analysis of all the
information connected with the operation and the subtle, constant,
testing of both assets and opponents. Only by working hand-in-glove
with CI, as a general rule, can those in charge of covert action
maximize their chances of success.
Analysis may be the most important and is surely one of the most
vulnerable components of the intelligence process. Analysts are re-
quired to answer difficult questions on the basis of usually limited
data. Thus they are frequently tempted to accept data more or less
at face value. The active involvement of CI specialists can be very
helpful in assisting analysts to deal with the adversary's efforts to
confuse them or lead them deliberately to the wrong answers. CI
specialists, by highlighting the activities of foreign services, may also
be able to provide positive information of extraordinary value to
analysts. The down side is that excessive concentration on CI can
sterilize the analytical process. But, at its effective best, CI not only
protects analysts against deception but provides them with a vital
increment of in-depth knowledge of their subject.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
The Soviet KGB and other hostile intelligence services pose a
broad-gauged threat both to our country and to our intelligence,
considered organizationally and substantively. The KGB, the largest
and most centralized major intelligence service in the world, has
excelled over the years in traditional espionage and the penetration
of Western services. The number of intelligence officers under legal
cover in Soviet embassies and official missions in the US and other
countries grew considerably in the 1970's. In addition, unlike many
of the Western services that operate against the Soviet Union. the
KGB does not limit itself to sending out "legal" intelligence officers
to recruit agents and sources. The KGB and other bloc services make
extensive use of "illegal" agents, who are infiltrated into target
countries until ordered into action, sometimes years later and after
thoroughly establishing their local credentials. The Soviet services
also have demonstrated a facility to use the considerable assets of
the world's Communist parties and front groups both for collection
and for covert action.
Given the nature of open societies in the West and the ready supply
of Moscow's human assets, the Soviet Union does not have to put
particular emphasis on sophisticated and expensive means of tech-
nical collection. It is likely, however, that the Soviets realize that
the US has had to rely (or even over-rely) on precisely these means.
Thus, the Soviets have the incentive, and may have developed the
means to bias the results of US technical collection. Indeed, there is
considerable evidence that they devote significant resources and
senior personnel to deceiving their adversaries at almost every level
of competitive endeavor, from infantry tactics to international trade,
to missilery.
Powers hostile to the US, and especially the Soviet Union, also
have developed impressive capabilities for unconventional warfare
and for training and supporting terrorist organizations. The trans-
national movement of paramilitary forces, terrorists and members of
'their support groups, poses a serious challenge to US counterintel-
ligence. These groups frequently are organized and do much of their
work prior to the actual initiation of hostilities or violent terrorist
acts. Insofar as such paramilitary forces and terrorists become in-
volved in bolstering political movements friendly to the Soviet bloc
and undermining pro-western governments and nongovernmental
forces such as democratic trade unions, co-operative movements
and the independent press in many parts of the world, the US is
obliged to treat these activists as challenges to itself. And, Cl must
begin to identify and prepare to neutralize these forces before they
strike.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
From "The Craft of Intelligence
by Allen Dulles
9
Counterintelligence
In today's spy-conscious world each side tries to make the opponent's
acquisition of intelligence as difficult as possible by taking "security
measures" in order to protect classified information, vital installa-
tions and personnel from enemy penetration. These measures, while
indispensable as basic safeguards, become in the end a challenge to
the opponent's intelligence technicians to devise even more in-
genious ways of getting around the obstacles.
Clearly, if a country wishes to protect itself against the unceas-
ing encroachments of hostile intelligence services, it must do more
than keep an eye on foreign travelers crossing its borders, more
than placing guards around its "sensitive" areas, more than checking
on the loyalty of its employees in sensitive positions. It must also
find out what the intelligence services of hostile countries are after,
how they are proceeding and what kind of people they are using
as agents and who they are.
Operations having this distinct aim belong to the field of counter-
espionage and the information that is derived from them is called
counterintelligence. Counterespionage is inherently a protective and
defensive operation. Its primary purpose is to thwart espionage
against one's country, but it may also be extremely useful in un-
covering hostile penetration and subversive plots against other free
countries. Given the nature of Communist aims, counterespionage
on our side is directly concerned with uncovering secret aggression,
subversion and sabotage. Although such information is not, like
positive intelligence, of primary use to the government in the forma-
tion of policy, it often alerts our government to the nature of the
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
122 THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE
thrusts of its opponents and the area in which political action on
our part may be required.
In 1954, the discovery of concealed arms shipments, a whole boat-
load of them, en route from Czechoslovakia to Guatemala first
alerted us to the fact that Massive Soviet support was being given
to strengthen the position of a Communist regime in that country.
The function - of counterespionage is assigned to various U.S.
agencies, each of which has a special area of responsibility. The
FBI's province is the territory of the United States itself, where,
among other duties, it guards against the hostile activities of
foreign agents on our own soil. The CIA has the major responsi-
bility for counterespionage outside the United States, thereby con-
stituting a forward line of defense against foreign espionage. It
attempts to detect the operations of hostile intelligence before the
agents reach their targets. Each branch of the armed forces also has
a counterintelligence arm whose purpose is mainly to protect its
commands, technical establishments and personnel both at home
and abroad against enemy penetration.
The effectiveness of this division of labor depends upon the co-
ordination of the separate agencies and on the rapid dissemination
of counterintelligence information from one to the other.
It was a coordinated effort that resulted in the capture of Soviet
spymaster Colonel Rudolf Abel. In May, 1957, Reino Hayhanen, a
close associate and co-worker of Colonel Abel in the United States,
was on his way back to the Soviet Union to make his report. While
in Western Europe, he decided to defect and approached U.S. in-
telligence, showing an American passport obtained on the basis of
a false birth certificate. Hayhanen's fantastic story of espionage
included specifics as to secret caches of funds, communications
among agents in his network and certain details regarding Colonel
Abel. All this information was immediately transmitted to Wash-
ington and passed to the FBI for verification. Hayhanen's story
stood up in every respect. He came back willingly to the United
States and became the chief witness at the trial against Abel.
As soon as Hayhanen reached our shores, primary responsibility
for him was transferred to the FBI, while CIA continued to handle
foreign angles.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 123
The classical aims of counterespionage are "to locate, identify
and neutralize" the opposition. "Neutralizing" can take many forms.
Within the United States an apprehended spy can be prosecuted
under the law; so can a foreign intelligence officer who is caught
red-handed if he does not have diplomatic immunity. If he has im-
munity, he is generally expelled. But there are other ways of neu-
tralizing the hostile agent, and one of the best is exposure or the
threat of exposure. A spy is not of much further use once his name,
face and story are in the papers.
The target of U.S. counterespionage is massive and diverse be-
cause the Soviets use not only their own intelligence apparatus
against us, but also those of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Ru-
mania and Bulgaria, all of which are old in the ways of espionage
if not of Communism. Chinese Communist espionage and counter-
espionage operations are largely independent of Moscow, though
many of their senior personnel in earlier days were schooled by
Soviet intelligence.
Although the purpose of counterespionage is defensive, its meth-
ods are essentially offensive. Its ideal goal is to discover hostile
intelligence plans in their earliest stages rather than after they
have begun to do their damage. To do this, it tries to penetrate the
inner circles of hostile services at the highest possible level where
the plans are made and the agents selected and trained, and, if the
job can be managed, to bring over to its side "insiders" from the
other camp.
One of the most famous cases of successful high-level penetration
of an intelligence service is that of Alfred Redl, who from 1901 to
1905 was chief of counterespionage in the Austro-Hungarian Em-
pire's military intelligence service, and later its representative in
Prague. From the available evidence it would appear that from
1902 until he was caught in 1913 Redl was a secret agent of the
Russians, having been trapped by them early in his intelligence
career on the basis of two weaknesses-homosexuality and over-
whelming venality. He also sold some of his wares at the same time
to the Italians and the French. But that wasn't all. As a leading
officer of the Military Intelligence, Redl was a member of the Gen-
eral Staff of the Austro-Hungarian Army and had access to the
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
124 THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE
General Staff's war plans, which he also gave to the Russians.
Despite the fact that Redl was apprehended just before the war,
his suicide at the "invitation" of his superior officers immediately
after his treachery was discovered eliminated the possibility of
interrogating him and determining the extent of the damage he
had done. The Austrians were more interested in hushing up the
scandal. Even the Emperor was not told of it at first.
Ironically enough, Redl was caught by a counterespionage meas-
ure-postal censorship-which he himself had developed to a point
of high efficiency when he had been counterespionage chief. Two
letters containing large sums of banknotes and nothing else were
inspected at the General Delivery Office of the Vienna Post Office.
Since they had been sent from a border town in East Prussia to a
most peculiar-sounding addressee, they were considered highly suspi-
cious. For almost three months the Austrian police doggedly waited
for someone to come and collect the envelopes. Finally Redl came,
and the rest is history. However, it still amazes counterintelligence
specialists who study the case today that the Russians, in an opera-
tion of such immense significance to them, could have resorted to
such careless devices for getting money to their agent, especially
since postal censorship was one of the favorite counterespionage de-
vices of the Okhrana itself.
It is, of course, not necessary to recruit the chief, as in the Redl
case. His secretary, had he had one, might have done almost as
welll. Actually, the size of a major intelligence organization today
makes it impossible for the chief to be concerned with all the opera-
tional details an opposing service would wish to know. Not only
that, but today the headquarters of an intelligence organization are
as "impenetrable" as the best minds assigned to the task can make
them. As a consequence, counterespionage usually aims at more
accessible and vulnerable targets directly concerned with field
operations. These targets will often be the offices and units which
intelligence services maintain in foreign countries. As is well known,
they are frequently found in embassies, consulates and trade dele-
gations, which may afford the intelligence officer the protection of
diplomatic immunity as well as a certain amount of "cover."
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 125
How does the counterespionage agent "penetrate" his target?
By what means can he gain access to the personnel of another in-
telligence service? One of the ways is to come supplied with be.
guiling information and offer it and his services to the opposition.
Since some of the most crucial intelligence in recent history has
been delivered by people who just turned up out of a clear sky, no
intelligence service can afford to reject out of hand an offer of
information. Of course, behind the Iron Curtain and in most diplo-
matic establishments of the Soviet Bloc outside the Curtain, the
general distrust and suspicion of strangers is such that an uninvited
visitor, no matter what he is offering, may not go beyond the re-
ceptionist. In the end, however, his ability to get a foot in the door
depends on the apparent quality of the information he is offering.
Every intelligence service has the problem of distinguishing, when
such unsolicited offers come along, between a bona fide volunteer
and a penetration agent who has been sent in by the other side.
This is no easy matter.
If counterespionage succeeds in "planting" its penetration agent
with the opposing service, it is hoped that the agent, once he is
hired by the opposition, will be given increasingly sensitive assign-
ments. All of them are reported duly by the agent to the intelligence
service running the "penetration."
The Soviets used this method against Allied intelligence offices
in West Germany and Austria during the 1950s. Refugees from the
East were so numerous at that time that it was necessary to employ
the better-educated ones to help in the screening and interrogation
of their fellow refugees. The Soviets determined to take advantage
of this situation and cleverly inserted agents in the refugee channel,
providing them with information about conditions behind the Cur-
tain which could not fail to make them seem of great interest to
Western intelligence. Their task for the Soviets was to find out
about our methods of handling refugees, to get acquainted with our
personnel and also to keep tabs on those among the refugees who
might be susceptible to recruitment as future Soviet agents.
This same penetration tactic can be used to quite a different end,
namely, provocation, which has an ancient and dishonorable tradi-
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
126 THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE
tion. The expression "agent provocateur" points to French origins
and was a device used in France during times of political unrest,
but it is the Russians again who made a fine art of provocation. It
was the main technique of the Czarist Okhrana in smoking out
revolutionaries and dissenters. An agent joined a subversive group
and not only spied and reported on it to the police, but incited it to
take some kind of action which would provide the pretext for
arresting any or all of its members. Since the agent reported to the
police exactly when and where the action was going to take place,
the police had no problems.
Actually, such operations could become immensely subtle, com-
plicated and dramatic The more infamous of the Czarist agents
provocateurs have all the earmarks of characters out of Dostoevski.
In order to incite a revolutionary group to the action that would
bring the police down on it, the provocateur himself had to play
the role of revolutionary leader and terrorist. If the police wished
to round up large numbers of persons on serious charges, then the
revolutionary group had to do something extreme, something more
serious than merely holding clandestine meetings. As a result, we
encounter some astounding situations in the Russia of the early
1900s.
The most notorious of all Czarist provocateurs, the agent Azeff,
appears to have originated the idea of murdering the Czar's uncle,
the Grand Duke Sergius, and the Minister of the Interior, Plehwe.
The murders then gave the Okhrana the opportunity of arresting
the terrorists.
One of Lenin's closest associates from 1912 until the Revolution,
Roman Malinovsky, was, in fact, a Czarist police agent and provoca-
teur, suspected by Lenin's entourage but always defended by Lenin.
Malinovsky helped reveal the whereabouts of secret printing presses,
secret meetings and conspiracies to the police, but his main achieve-
ment was far more dramatic He got himself elected, with police
assistance and with Lenin's innocent blessing, as representative of
the Bolshevik faction to the Russian parliament, the Duma. There
he distinguished himself as an orator for the Bolsheviks. The police
often had to ask him to restrain the revolutionary ardor of his
speeches. Indeed, in the cases of both Azeff and Malinovsky, as with
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 127
many "doubles," there is some question as to where their allegiance
really lay. Since they played their "cover" roles so well, they seem
at times to have been carried away by them and to have believed in
them, at least temporarily.
The double agent is the most characteristic tool of counterespio-
nage operations, and he comes in many guises. In an area like West
Germany with its concentration of technical and military instal-
lations, both those of the West Germans and of the NATO forces,
there is a flood of agents from the Soviet Bloc spying on airfields,
supply depots, factories, United States Army posts, etc. Many are
caught. Many give themselves up because they have found a girl
and want to stay with her or simply because they find life in the
West more attractive. Such men become double agents when they
can be persuaded to keep up the pretense of working for the Soviet
Bloc under Western "control." The ones who are caught often
agree to this arrangement because it is preferable to sitting in jail
for a couple of years.
The aim is to build up the agent, allowing him to report back to
the Bloc harmless information, which is first screened. It is hoped
that the Soviets will then give him new briefs and directives, which
show us what the opponent wants to know and how he is going
about getting it. Sometimes it is possible, through such an agent, to
lure a courier or another agent or even an intelligence officer into
the West. When this happens, one has the choice of simply watch-
ing the movements of the visitor, hoping he will lead to other
agents concealed in the West, or of arresting him, in which case
the operation is naturally over, but has succeeded in neutralizing
another person working for the opposition.
A more valuable double is the resident of a Western country who,
when approached by an opposition intelligence service to under.
take a mission for them, quietly reports this to his own authorities.
The advantages are obvious. If the Soviets, for example, try to recruit
a Westerner, they must have something serious in mind. Secondly,
the voluntary act of the person approached, in reporting this event,
points to his trustworthiness. The target of Soviet recruitment will
usually be told by his own intelligence authorities to "accept" the
Soviet offer and to feign cooperation, meanwhile reporting back on
all the activities the Soviets assign him. He is also provided with
information which his principals desire to have "fed" to the Soviets.
This game can then be played until the Soviets begin to suspect
their "agent" or until the agent can no longer stand the strain.
The case of the late Boris Morros, the Hollywood director, was
of this kind. Through Morros, who cooperated with the FBI for
many years, the Soviets ran a network of extremely important agents
in the United States, most of them in political and intellectual
circles. This operation led to the apprehension of the Sobles, of
Dr. Robert Soblen and numerous others.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
"Surveillance" is the professional word for shadowing or tailing.
Like every act of counterespionage, it must be executed with maxi-
mum care lest its target become aware of it. A criminal who feels
or ;snows he is being followea has limited possibilities open to him.
The best he can hope for is to elude surveillance long enough to
find a good hiding place. But an intelligence agent, once he has
been alarmed by surveillance, will take steps to leave the country,
and he will have plenty of assistance in doing so.
The purpose of surveillance in counterespionage is twofold. If
a person is only suspected of being an enemy agent, close observa-
tion of his actions over a period of time may lead to further facts
that confirm the suspicion and supply details about the agent's
mission and how he is carrying it out. Secondly, an agent is rarely
entirely on his own. Eventually he will get in touch, by one means
or another, with his helpers, his sources and perhaps the people
from whom he is taking orders. Surveillance at its best will un-
cover the network to which he belongs and the channels through
which he reports.
Surveillance was largely responsible for the British success in
rounding up five Soviet agents in the Lonsdale ring in January,
1961. Harry Houghton, an Admiralty employee, was suspected of
passing classified information to an unidentified foreign power.
Scotland Yard tailed Houghton to a London street, where he met
another man so briefly that it was impossible to tell for certain
whether anything had passed between them or whether they had
even spoken.
However, the fact that both parties acted furtively and seemed
extremely wary of surveillance convinced the British that they were
on the right track. The Yard split its trained men into two teams to
follow the suspects separately. This eventually led them, after many
days of tireless and well-concealed surveillance, to a harmless-
looking American couple who operated a secondhand book store.
Their role, if any, could not be immediately ascertained.
On a later occasion Houghton came up to London again, this
time with his girl friend, who worked in the same naval establish-
ment. Again under surveillance, the two of them, walking down the
street carrying a market bag, were approached from the rear by the
same man whom Houghton had met previously. Just as this fellow
was about to relieve Houghton and the girl of the market bag,
which was dearly a prearranged method for passing the "goods,"
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
130 THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE
all three were arrested. The unknown man was Gordon Lonsdale,
the Soviet "illegal" with Canadian papers who was running the
show.
A few hours lacer, the harmless-looking American booksellers met
.the same fate. They were being sought by the FBI for their part in
a Soviet net in the United States and had disappeared when things
had become too hot for them. In London they had been operating
a secret transmitter to relay Lonsdale's information to Moscow.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
THE (t'4SHINGI U!, 'C'SI Aur~w?, r ~e:
.Drawing
Board
RELAX, MR. 3ONLS, DON'T THINK Of IT AS A LIE DETECTOR, THINK OF IT AS A STRESS DETECTOQ.
STRESS IS MEQELY AN INDICATION TUi VOUQC A LIAR, MR.JONES, SO QCLAX, BECAUSE ONE SNAKY ANSWER AND
YOUR ENTIRE GOVERNM(NT CAREER IS OVER. WE'LL BEGIN WITH AN EASY QUESTION, MR JOCKS. NAVE YON EV(Q
~~'~ '?'"I`I~'`IVI-,''r-~'i~j'1'1'Ij~~'!j(Ir~'~~~1~1MN'~~~i7Y!'~'~~r~-~~rvYYw~1M~~~v~rll~~~(1~i(11y~,rn,~w
~~ ~ ~ f ~fITT-
CONSIDERED PICKING UP THIS Pp1VC Lp{i AND SNOYIN(,11 DOWN M YY FACE 9 WO? NOT AGOOD ST4RT, -'IQ.JON[S.J
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Iq
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied
STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Fran "World of Secrets", by
Walter Laqueur
CHAPTER- 9
The Causes
of Failure
Deception
Deception is an integral part of warfare, yet the peacetime manipulation
of potential enemies, while frequently attempted, is successful only under
certain conditions. In wartime it is possible to influence the other side's
assessment by "plants," or by the systematic fabrication of false evidence.
World War 11 offers countless examples; among the best known are the
story of the "man who never was," the Englandspiel carried out by the
German Abwehr, and the successful British attempt to "turn" (that is,
convert into double agents) virtually all German spies operating in Britain.
In our time, the question of whether the Soviet Union has lived up to its
commitments under the SALT Treaty, and how great its military expendi-
ture has been, have been issues of intense debate. The same refers to the
unending disputes about whether certain defectors from the Soviet Union
were genuine or double (or even triple) agents.
On the other hand, it is difficult to think of successful strategic deception
in peacetime. In the 1920s Germany tried to conceal the fact that it was
rebuilding its army in violation of the limits set by the Treaty of Versailles.
Yet the news still came out-in many different ways-and if Britain and
France faileZto react, it was not for lack of information." The alleged
German manipulation of Stalin in the 1930s has frequently been invoked
as a classic case of successful deception. German intelligence informed
Stalin that Soviet military leaders had conspired with German generals
against him, whereupon Stalin ordered the execution of most members of
the Soviet general staff. The story is probably apocryphal, for Stalin was
engaged in a large-scale purge of the entire party and state apparatus
anyway and there is no sound reason to assume that he would have
excepted the army, no matter what information he received from
Germany. He may even have used this information as evidence without
believing it.
Another famous case of deception often cited as the cause of a major
intelligence failure was the Stalin-Hitler pact in August 1939. The head of
the Northern Department in the British Foreign Office later claimed that
he and his colleagues faced a problem very similar to the captain of the
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
The Causes of Failure
forty thieves in the story of All Baba. That is, the enemy had provided so
many possible clues as to what was going on that rational choice among
them was impossible.
The reference to the story of Ali Baba is an interesting example of special
pleading, but the analogy does not hold up. Had Hitler made a violent
anti-Soviet speech while negotiations with Russia were proceeding, or had
Stalin attacked Nazi Germany just then, we would be dealing with a clear
case of deception. But there were no such blatant attempts to mislead the
outside world. The real reason for the intelligence failure was far more
prosaic-Great Britain and France were not informed about the talks be-
tween Berlin and Moscow, let alone the fact that the negotiations were
going well.52 So ignorance, not deception, was to blame.
In the Second World War neither American, German, nor Soviet military
leadership was willing to devote very much effort to strategic deception.
This was partly due to the innate conservatism of military leaders, but also
to the firm belief that the really decisive components of victory would be
elements like massive firepower, the concentration of troops, and speed of
maneuver-not rumors spread by diplomats, wooden tanks, or other
decoys. Major operations had to be kept secret, of course, but military
leaders saw no reason to go beyond the elementary rules of caution. The
British leadership on the other hand, believed in deception and it invested
a good deal of effort in such operations, two of them of some importance.
Fortitude South induced the German command to make false dispositions
in France at the time of the invasion, and to a lesser extent, Fortitude North
persuaded the Germans to retain troops in Norway and Denmark that were
thus unavailable for the defense of Frances'
Deception is rarely a total success even in wartime-the Trojan horse (if
the tale is true) is an exception. Usually the most to be hoped for is to
spread doubt, rather than to make the antagonist accept a specific untruth.
If through Fortitude North or Fortitude South, the Allies had induced the
Germans to concentrate all of their forces in Norway or the south of France
in 1944, the war would have been over sooner. But then, the Allied inva-
sion would probably not have succeeded had the,Germans known the
exact time and place of the landing. In that event, Allied deception was
partly successful. The Germans knew about the impending invasion, but
they thought that it was more likely to occur in the Pas de Calais, 300 miles
from the D-day landings. Yet they took other possibilities into account and
therefore did not concentrate all their forces in the part of France nearest
to the English coast.
Is it true that Soviet counterintelligence successfully deceived the CIA
during the 1960s and much of the 1970s about the extent of Soviet defense
spending and the number and accuracy of Soviet missiles? It is no longer
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Theories of Intelligence
seriously questioned that the CIA underrated the Soviet military effort. It
is also true that the Soviets were hiding whatever could be hidden but
whether systematic Soviet disinformation played a decisive role is doubt-
ful. Western errors were not based on false figures, procurement costs, or
dollar-ruble conversion tables smuggled in by Soviet influence agents.
They were rooted in mistaken fundamental assumptions about the nature
of Soviet aims and strategy. The belief that the Soviet aim was strategic
parity amounted to Western mirror imaging, not to successful Soviet
deception.
One of the great masters in the field, R. V. Jones, once noted that "In
principle it should always be possible to unmask a deception." However,
he added the important corollary that "it is surprising how effective decep-
tion can be in the stress and speed of operation. 1154 As there is usually far
less stress and urgency in peace than in war there should be correspond-
ingly little successful deception when the guns are silent.
Then how does one explain the frequent intelligence failures in peace-
time such as, for instance, the misjudgment on the part of British intelli-
gence of the extent of German and Italian rearmament in the 1930s, or the
fact that Hitler underrated Soviet military preparations? It is certainly true
that Mussolini greatly exaggerated both numbers and performance of his
air force and navy, but he deceived himself and his allies even more
thoroughly than his enemies. Despite the Duce's impressive claims, British
intelligence had doubts about the Italian war potential from the beginning.
Hitler used deception with regard to German rearmament, especially in the
early years (1936-38) when he was trying to appear strong when he was
still weak. British intelligence was admittedly feeble at the time; the in-
formation received from a retired group captain, Malcolm Christie, was
more reliable than the estimates of the officials in charge of intelligence
production."
Yet even in its weakened state, British intelligence was never far off
regarding the order of battle of the German air force; that applies both to
the early years (they knew Hitler was bluffing in 1935) and to the time of
the Munich crisis.* British intelligence predicted in December 1938 that
the Germans would have 3,700 planes by the end of 1939; when war broke
out Germany had 3,647 planes. The British committed serious mistakes in
their projections up to 1937, underrating the German effort and assuming
that the British aircraft industry could keep step. They were also mistaken
in their appraisal of German strategy for use of the air force. They were
Most governments were by and large correctly informed both on the eve of World War
I and 11 about their potential enemies' capabilities. They mainly erred with regard to their
intentions. See Ernest R. May, ed.. Knowing Ones Enemies: Inteiigenre Assessments 8efore the Two
World Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1985).
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
The Causes of Failure
mistaken, however, not because Hitler deceived them, but because they
made no real effort to understand the Nazi phenomenon-a combination
of British conservatism and mirror imaging.
The Soviet Union was more effective in keeping its military preparations
secret. Hitler and the German staff seriously underestimated the number
of Soviet divisions, as well as the quantity and quality of Soviet equip-
ment.36 They underrated the capacity of the Soviet armament industry.
They belittled the fighting spirit of the Soviet soldier and exaggerated (like
everyone else) the impact of the purges of the late 1930s on the senior
officer corps of the Red Army. Yet Soviet secrecy also had its dangers-
if the Soviet Union had played down its military strength, its supposed
weakness might have invited attack. But if it had made known the full
extent of its preparedness, even exaggerated it, this could have provoked
Hitler to attack "before it was too late."57 In any case, it was not deception
that misled the rest of the world about the state of Soviet armed might,
but secrecy. The Soviet Union was a closed society, the opportunities of
outside intelligence to obtain reliable information were minimal. Given the
difficulties of penetrating a society of this kind, even the most accom-
plished theory of deception or counterdeception would have been to no
avail.
Attempts have been made to compose a theory of deception, drawing
heavily on work done in experimental psychology, especially that con-
cerned with judgment under uncertainty. This approach rests on a num-
ber of indisputable propositions: that the evidence facing the intelligence
interpreter is frequently incomplete, ambiguous, and fuzzy; that percep-
tions once formed are resistant to change; that human beings have a
preference for consistency and are willing to base their judgment on a
narrow basis of facts, or continue to cling to discredited evidence just to
avoid inconsistency; and that there is a bias in thought (particularly pro-
nounced perhaps among intelligence analysts and policy makers) toward
causal explanations, to see direction and planning where there is just
accident.sa
All this is true, but it is not sufficient to ensure successful deception in
time of peace. Deception is usually costly, and to prepare it with sufficient
thoroughness requires a considerable expenditure of time and effort-as
the cost increases with the scale of the deception.59 The U.S. intelligence
community in the postwar period has been influenced more by Sun Tzu,
the great believer in deception, than by Clausewitz. No doubt Mao's vic-
tory has something to do with this.60 Allen Dulles extensively quoted Sun
Tzu, and so did many other practitioners and writers. But this reverence
derives, at least in part, from a misunderstanding. For deception is bound
to play a considerably greater role in the kind of partisan warfare con-
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
The Causes of Failure
caused demoralization in London and a certain amount of distrust among
the Western Allies. Yet the Engiandspiel had no influence on the course of
World War II. While Philby and his friends played a lamentable role, it
would be difficult to show that, but for their treasonable activities, British
postwar history would have taken a different course .61 As Lord Dacr:
(Hugh Trevor Roper) wrote many years later, the idea that men like Philby
could influence British policy was absurd; mechanically it was impossible.
Usually they were not even in a position to suppress intelligence passing
through their hands, and on the rare occasions that this might have been
possible, it was not likely to be effective, for "a Foreign Office does not
base policy on the narrow trickle of evidence which a single counteres-
pionage officer can occasionally block."63
Why has so much recent attention been paid to deception?" Partly, no
doubt, because a great deal of shrewdness and inventiveness has been
invested in various schemes and ploys of this kind, giving it a certain
intellectual fascination. Another reason is that Soviet intelligence has
greatly increased its disinformation effort during the last twenty-five
years. Some students of deception, not content with the study of classic
cases, have come to include in their purview not only active deception
(fraud) but also self-deception, general confusion, incompetence, and
"passive deception" (secrecy). But a certain amount of secrecy is the nor-
mal climate in which foreign policy has been and is conducted. It seems
no more fair to put secrecy and active deception in the same category than
to equate, say, a Trappist monk and a pathological liar.
Deception is an interesting subject; its importance has to be measured,
however, not by the ingenuity of its methods but by its ultimate political
results. Seen in this light there are obvious limits to successful strategic
deception in war, and there is even less scope for it in peace, provided that
elementary rules of vigilance are adhered to.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
'171.0; INP.W luhtu h
December 11, 1965
"'The C. I.d. did it. Pass it along.,,
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
SEP 11 1965
?,. ? Careful , . _ .. , , ...., ..., .__.. Tv
q .,~
Be , 009...Youre Spilling'OurrStj.at , y
.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Iq
Next 19 Page(s) In Document Denied
STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
From "Intelliaence Requirements
for the 1980's: Analysis anri
Estimates", article by
William E. Colby
1. William E. Colby
Three revolutions have taken place in American intelligence since
it became a permanent professional service-and it will be well to
keep them in mind, as a kind of ground base, in all the reflections
that follow. These major changes are the "central" role that analysis
has assumed since 1942; the technological revolution that has re-
sulted from the U-2 and satellites, electronics and computers; and
the evolution of the spy as a contributor but no longer as the "cen-
tral" feature of the process. Each of these three revolutionary
changes, and all of them together, have changed the nature of intel-
ligence from the secret spy service answerable only to the monarch.
This must be better understood in our centers of learning and knowl-
edge, and within the communications universe, so that recruitment
for intelligence can take place with less media titillation and protest
generation. These revolutionary changes bear as well on the training
of analysts and the incentives that influence their performance.
Another approach to the subject at hand involves the following
key question: What kind of analysis is needed for the best intelligence
results? A variety of possible approaches present themselves, and
the selection of any one would predetermine the techniques of re-
cruitment, training, and incentive for it.
Does analysis equate with academic discipline, with its careful
marshalling of evidence, its arrangement into rational patterns, rig-
orous examination of alternatives, selection of the more and the less
probable among them, and subjection of the conclusions to scholarly
and critical debate?
Or does analysis today stress the "methods" approach, employing
all the assistance the new information processing machinery and
disciplines can provide, to ensure that all facts are centrally related
and interrelated, that models are all-inclusive and sensitive to what
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
might apparently be minor changes in input, and that a firm audit trail
exists for any conclusions through the factors and facts which led up
to them?
Or should the analysis function stress the value of intuition, par-
ticularly that based upon the analyst's experience with the subject
being analyzed? This involves reliance upon the wisdom of individ-
uals who have struggled and suffered with the subjects for many
years. It allows the inclusion of intangibles, which are otherwise
more visible in hindsight than in foresight. It requires acceptance of
imprecision in conclusions which are perhaps hard to dissect into
their rational foundations.
Related to these questions is whether the analyst should ideally be
a specialist in his subject, acquainted with its details and accustomed
to its twists and turns over time, or whether he should be the gen-
eralist who can look beyond a subject to see the other factors which
might impinge upon it from the outside and cause major changes in
its conformation.
The best answer to these questions is, of course, "all of the
above." Each approach can make a substantial contribution to better
analysis. As the so-called information age has come upon us, it has
become increasingly clear that the broadest possible approach must
be taken to the problem of knowledge, which is fundamentally what
intelligence is seeking. Myopic focus on sensational scenes has too
often obscured the reality of complex situations, as in simplistic
fascination with the dramatic guerrilla theater media event. Our
awareness has grown that events are interrelated and that there are
no shortcuts to wisdom. Analysis cannot rest alone on the output of
the brash computer expert, as he may only produce garbage if he
unthinkingly puts garbage in. But the tweed jacketed professor is
equally mistaken if he rejects the contribution the machine can make
to the management of today's information explosion. The accelera-
tion of communication has forced us to seek new forms of analysis
and thought in order to keep up with fast-breaking events.
The challenge of the intelligence profession today is to absorb the
mass of information which forces itself upon us. We can neither
narrow our attention to a specialty to the extent that we lose contact
with the real factors outside it nor, on the other hand, generalize at
the expense of becoming so shallow that significant details and dif-
ferences are overlooked. The same problem faces many professions,
from medicine to journalism. The old dilemma of learning more and
more about less and less is matched by the equal dilemma of learning
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
less and less about more and more. It is precisely through the re-
cruitment. training. and incentives. and I might add organization. of
analysts that we have to look for the resolution of these problems in
intelligence, and indeed in the private world at large which faces
much the same problem.
It is plain then, that recruitment cannot seek only one of these
types of analysts. Any hard and fast requirement of a post graduate
degree in history, political science, or economics could bar from the
corps-of analysts the mudcaked activist who has tramped the back
jungle and fluently empathized with its inhabitants, learning more of
their incentives and values than any anthropological study might
provide. Recruitment on the basis of current expertise in a subject
could fill an immediate need but possibly omit the individual whose
life history reveals a pattern of successful examination of new prob-
lems and selection of the right course of action to take among them.
But some qualities are directly related to the intelligence process.
Curiosity is, of course, fundamental, as is a thoughtful turn of mind,
matched with some humility against presumptions of infallibility.
Neither bubbling optimism nor cynical pessimism are appropriate,
but an ability to communicate, orally and in writing, are essential if
the intelligence process is to function internally and serve its "cus-
tomers." And with the wide spectrum of subjects demanding intel-
ligence attention, it is certainly appropriate to acquire expertise
already accumulated through study or experience.
These considerations about the types of analysts intelligence needs
point out the targets for recruitment. The universities obviously are
a source for such individuals, both at the undergraduate and the
graduate level. But they should not be the only source. Thus the
public at large through advertisements, the personnel job search
agencies, the military and other government career services, and the
professional and commercial world must all be probed for individuals
who could find more fulfillment in the analytical function in intelli-
gence than in their present positions. Recruitment must include the
lateral entrant as well as the youthful entrant on the bottom of the
ladder, despite the strain and trauma this usually presents to a settled
career service.
A preliminary step to as broad an approach as this must be a better
comprehension in the world at large of the true nature of analysis
and of modern intelligence. University student protests against the
intrusion on campus of a nefarious spy service will continue until the
public is convinced that American intelligence has clear proscriptions
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
against behavior Americans would reject. The public must perceive
that the true challenges of the decades ahead lie more in the intellec-
tual gymnastics of coping with the flood of information than in the
physical or even sexual gymnastics of latter day James Bonds. This
message is gradually permeating the cognoscenti. But only a steady
program of explanation of the real nature of intelligence today will
cause it to be understood and accepted by all but the most extreme
fringe.
Part of the recruitment process is the screening of potential appli-
cants to avoid wasting the time of the intelligence service or the
applicant on useless applications. Thus the jobs and careers for which
recruits are sought must be carefully outlined in advance literature
with as little obscurity and exotic connotation as possible. Matching
of immediate needs with potential applicants is important, but it must
be supplemented by a broader approach than simple "hiring" for
particular job assignments. The individual with an extensive knowl-
edge of the Middle East and unique experience therein may not fill
the requirements of a specific job to analyze Central Africa, but a
wise recruitment process seizes upon his obvious potential contri-
bution and straightens out the job allocations later.
The screening process involves the security clearance. This means
more than a check of central records to see whether the individual
has previously been convicted of some felony or today is the active
agent of a foreign intelligence service. The security clearance should
include a broader approach, as does that of CIA, looking into vul-
nerabilities to outside pressure and to the applicant's basic equa-
nimity, to lessen the chance of later explosion in frustration at the
slowness of promotion or substantive disagreement with the intelli-
gence agencies' policies. The analytical function does not require
that the selection process determine whether the individual can para-
chute, but it does require some modern psychological testing to judge
overall suitability for a life in the comparative half-light of intelli-
gence. These testing techniques should also assist in determining
analytical weaknesses such as a tendency to intellectual arrogance,
a disinclination to drudgery, and satisfaction with the superficial.
Recruitment must also maintain clear records on accepted and
rejected applicants and the reasons therefor. Some cross analysis of
these and some ex post facto review in later years can bring out
significant lessons on the techniques, the targets, and the arenas of
recruitment, and the successful or unsuccessful later employment
histories of the applicants chosen.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
Training for analysts requires a consideration of the role of analysis
in decisionmaking. The traditional concept was that the analyst
should be carefully insulated from the enthusiasms of the collectors
and the preferences of the policyrnakers. Only thus, the theory main-
tained, can he distill objective analyses of the situations facing the
country. This produced an academic campus away from the center
of power on which such analysis could be conducted, the results
being handed down the Potomac River with somewhat the same
implication as those which came down from mountains in earlier
eras.
But the theory did not work. Careful insulation of the analysts
from collectors ensured that the analysts would be operating in a
sterile world of paper, not a world of grimy human beings with
different cultures, languages, and predilections. Separation from the
policymaker may have made the intelligence estimates more Olym-
pian, but it also tended to make them less relevant to the day-to-day
concerns and agonies of the decisionmakers. And the analysts in the
rarified academic atmosphere had a tendency to embrace the theses
currently fashionable in other academic centers at the time. Congres-
sional praise for" objective" CIA comment reducing the Pentagon's
threat projections was reversed by Albert Wohlstetter's article dem-
onstrating its underestimates of the pace of Soviet strategic growth
in the 1960's. The certainty of some analysts that the Soviet Backfire
bomber could not be a strategic weapon because it could not make
a round trip in a nuclear encounter finally yielded to the fact that
American B-52s also are programed for one-way missions.
The training process then is directly related to the organizational
and conceptual role of the analyst. I believe that this is moving
toward an integrated "intelligence officer" approach, whereby each
participant in the process must understand the entire process and not
satisfy himself with a mere motion on the assembly line as the product
passes him. This can be accomplished through the normal methods
by which such training is accomplished in other situations, i.e., by
descriptive courses, by orientation on the organization and its pro-
cedures, by intern assignments, by periodic refresher courses, and
by rotation of duty assignments. Intelligence has, of course, some
special restraints on this process, in terms of the sensitive source
information which must be protected against too much rotation and
exposure. This is not an insoluble problem, however, as many of
these duties can be performed without specific knowledge of the
sources involved; compartmentation can be preserved by rotation to
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
different functions but always restricted to one general subject.
Particular care is required so that the analyst receives appropriate
direct exposure to the subject of his analysis. The analyst of a geo-
graphic area must have a chance to visit his area of concern. to serve
there for an extended period of some months to absorb its intangibles,
and to make return visits periodically over the years. The functional
analyst of military weapon systems should supplement his studies by
direct visits to military units. The oil flow analyst must visit petroleum
production and transportation facilities.
And familiarity with the subject language must be insisted upon,
despite current American disdain for such studies. Idioms, expres-
sions, and even pronouns reveal much of the culture in which lan-
guages flourish, and help in the deduction of attitudes and motives
in many situations.
On the other end of the process, the analyst must have a sense of
the final product to which his material contributes. He should have
a direct relationship with the individuals occupying the policymaking
offices (or their staffs) to permit easy and informal communication
of interests, concerns, and hopes for which the analyst could produce
helpful material.
A continual effort must be made to keep substantive analysis as
the primary focus of senior officer attention and not allow him to be
suffocated by orsubordinated to managerial concerns. The inevitable
bureaucratic impulse is to focus on management as the indicator of
success rather than the quality of individual product. "Training"
along these lines really constitutes an organizational problem of how
to ensure that analysts are rewarded for their substantive work,
through direct recognition, commendation, and promotion. In part
this can flow from geographic organization, so that the leader of an
organizational element becomes the spokesman in the community
for the intelligence contribution to any decisionmaking on the sub-
ject, rather than left to manage while other experts star.
Another element of training must include discipline. This does not
mean the times of arrival and departure at the desk but rather the
techniques to ensure that the analyst is continually aware that he is
subject to high standards and that his performance against them is
being noted. Techniques of accomplishing this start with the hard
editorial blue penciling of overly smooth and comprehensive English
prose which covers all of the alternatives but gives little indication
as to the choice between them. They include periodic recording in
precise terms of analysts' estimates of major developments for later
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
evaluation, even in probabilities, so a track record can be seen. Other
procedures can be applied to force the analyst to articulate the basis
for his position and his reasons for modification from one period to
another. These techniques must of course be protected against the
dangers of playing safe. sticking to the general consensus opinion so
that error will at least have company if it occurs. and discouraging
the more venturesome Lonely cry of alarm. The important element of
our discussion here is the need to recognize the need for this kind of
discipline in training and development for better analysis.
The chief incentive for better analysis will and must lie in challenge
to analysts. Even when the analyst continues his work over the years
to constitute a career, each day he must be stimulated to generate
the enthusiasm and adrenalin to improve the performance of the
individual and of the team. The intricate raw material, the process of
intelligence analysis, and the purpose served in policymaking to
make a direct and visible contribution to a better world are thus the
chief bases for incentive.
The primary incentive is thus intellectual, the search for better
ways to understand the complex workings of our world. This requires
the collection of as much relevant material as possible, its careful
organization and dissection, and meticulous consideration of its
meaning. As the intelligence profession has become more institu-
tionalized, and the role of the analyst better understood, the single
information report is seen in better perspective; and awareness has
increased that it must be viewed in the matrix of events to which it
is related. The days of fascinating presidents with raw reports have
been replaced by a discipline requiring such reports to be processed
before presentation, so that their reliability can be established and
their significance assessed, in order to reduce the risk of premature
and erroneous reaction. Whether this analysis focuses on the im-
mediate likely behavior of a terrorist gang, or the longer term impli-
cations of a change of the Soviet Union from an oil exporter to
importer, it is clear that the contribution of the intelligence analyst
to better decisionmaking is substantial.
This intellectual challenge is not only in the utilization of analysis
today but also in the innovation and invention of new techniques for
tomorrow. New processes of modeling, tracing of decision trees and
their alternatives, new techniques of interrelating material. new pro-
cedures to ensure that facts are examined in proper perspective, all
are parts of the next revolution in intelligence, i.e., the new disci-
plines which will be applied to the analytical process to improve its
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
170 RECRUITMENT. TR41NING AND INCENTIVES
precision, its breadth, and its depth. The TV camera may zoom in on
the single soldier out of step in a parading battalion, but the analyst
judging the unit's training and combat discipline will insist that the
frame be extended to show the whole unit, the circumstances of the
parade, and the mission of the unit when not parading.
Intellectual challenge can also be found in the interplay of ideas
and assessments among those knowledgeable in the field. In this
respect, the increasing tendency to declassify the substance of in-
formation about the world and the explosion of information otherwise
publicly available through modern communications techniques has
expanded the circle of those able to conduct scholarly debate about
many of the important governmental issues of our time. No longer
is intelligence information only the private prerogative of an intelli-
gence priesthood: to an increasing degree, the intelligence analyst is
wrestling with the meaning of the same raw information as his col-
league in the academic community, the think tank, or the commercial
risk analysis service. Challenge can stem from exchange and debate
with panels of these experts from the public as well as the intelligence
world. The Team B exercise was certainly a useful step, as were
certain other intelligence panels: they need now to be supplemented
by Teams C, D, and E ad infinitum to enable many qualified and
knowledgeable participants to sift evidence and arrive at better con-
clusions through debate and contest over alternate interpretations.
And one incentive for better analysis is psychic. This can be in the
realm of the contribution an anonymous analyst makes to the iden-
tification of some danger, or the suggestion of some unnoticed po-
tential benefit. The experience of briefing the National Security
Council or seeing national policy turn on the result of an analysis can
be a strong incentive to renewed dedication. These psychic rewards
are considerable even at the first-level interagency meeting at which
the photographic interpreter points out the laying of a keel in some
faraway hostile shipyard.
For best results this psychic reward should be encouraged by
giving direct personal recognition of the contribution made by indi-
vidual analysts. Their names should appear on their final work prod-
uct, and they should participate in interagency and policy discussions
so that their reputation grows with the excellence of their contribu-
tion over time. This presents an organizational problem to permit the
individual expert on the narrow question to surface through the layers
of hierarchy all busily managing and being generalists, so that he or
she can present a direct contribution to the policymaker at the time
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
of decision. The expert on Senegal must be known as that and not
subordinated under generalists on West African politics, economics.
and military affairs, in order to reward the several year attempt to
learn and understand the intricacies of Senegal at a time when little
interest is shown. The experts on Turkistan, Uzbekstan, and Ka-
zakhstan must be gathered with their colleagues from the other sec-
tors of the Soviet Union in mock Central Committee meetings to see
how an overall Soviet policy alternative appears to its component
republics. The war game long familiar in the Pentagon must be sup-
plemented by the political, the economic, the trade games, to permit
more challenging hypotheses to emerge and to force the unexpected
and the unlikely before the analysts for examination. These psychic
incentives will be of far greater stimulation to better analysis, better
understanding, and knowledge than complex debates about grade
levels and step increases. These latter rewards must indeed be pro-
vided, and they should be supplemented by appropriate awards in
medals or in certificates, but the real incentive should be the psychic.
This review, then, indicates that intelligence analysis is no longer
a special discipline limited only to the secret corridors of a shadowy
intelligence service. More and more its raw material is being exposed
to public use and comparison with that available from open media,
communication, and information dissemination capabilities. What-
ever intelligence might lose from this in romanticism or exoticism,
it can gain more by a frank recognition of its partnership with the
world of academic research, commercial and industrial information
and risk analysis centers, and the media. With these, it can wrestle
with the problems of collection, analysis, and communication of
information and assessments to permit wise decisionmaking by the
political leader or by the voter, investor, or consumer. The more
intelligence analysis is seen to share this common problem, the more
it can benefit by common focus on the need to improve recruitment,
training, and incentives for analysts in all of these fields. Opening
American intelligence to this new public discipline is the next task to
be accomplished, and I believe that its impact on the excellence of
our intelligence analysis will be as revolutionary as the impact of
technology on our collection capabilities has been in the past twenty
years.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
From "A Consumer's Guide to the
Intelligence Carrninity and Its
Products", a CIA publication
D. Analysis
Most intelligence organizations have a body of analysts, each
assigned to a particular geographic or functional specialty, broad or
narrow. The collection and processing systems are designed to bring to
the individual analyst all the information from all sources pertinent to
his responsibilities.
If he or she is a current intelligence analyst, the job is to absorb
incoming information as it arrives, to evaluate it, and to produce a kind
of continuing assessment of the state of affairs within his or her field.
A research analyst's task is different; the job here is to define the
question to be answered, to issue the necessary requirements for new
collection, to review and evaluate both existing and new information,
and to produce from the results a paper or briefing responsive to the
task given him.
Analysts in all agencies are formally grouped into functional or
geographic units, but equally important is the ad hoc task grouping,
formed to bring together all the specialists involved in responding to a
given question. A question with regard to Cubans in Angola, for
instance, will involve not only the Angola analyst from an African
regional unit, but the Cuba analysts from a Latin American regional
unit, air and sea transport specialists from an economic intelligence
unit, and foreign policy specialists from a Soviet analytical unit.
During periods of crisis in foreign affairs, as during the Arab-Israeli
War of 1973, or to support critical negotiations, units called task forces
are normally formed in each of the agencies involved, and for a major
crisis the DCI may direct that a National Task Force be organized, with
a particular agency as executive agent responsible for its support. Such
a national task force has as one of its major tasks the production of
periodical situation reports (SITREPS), disseminated to the appropriate
policy-makers.
The general product of analysis and of analysts, however, is called
finished intelligence. This is a term of art to describe intelligence that
has been evaluated and, if necessary, correlated with other information.
It is possible for a raw intelligence report to be totally valid and need
neither comment nor additional context. In this case the act of the
analyst in determining that it stands by itself converts it from raw to
finished intelligence.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
SEP 2 5 1964
Intelligence Briefing on SouthcasL Asia
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
From "Studies in Intellicrence",
Fall 1983, by Richard W.
Ma mbach
To point out
the discontinuities
THE TRAVAIL OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
Richard W. Mansbach
The intelligence professional is in an ambiguous position. He is neither the
initial collector nor the final consumer of intelligence information. On the one
hand, he must be able to spin gold from common cloth by addressing critical
issues with a paucity of data. On the other hand, he must have the skill to pro-
vide crisp and timely evaluations even as he tries to stay abreast of mountains
of information. His most difficult task is to synthesize diverse materials and
clothe them with context and logical inference in order to make them germane
to the choices confronting policymakers. As facts rarely speak for themselves,
the intelligence analyst must speak on their behalf and elaborate their present
and probable future consequences for his government. He is successful to the
extent he is able to provide the intelligence and policymaking communities
with a common meaning for information that might otherwise assume as
many meanings as there are observers. In doing so, his judgment is tempered
by his knowledge ' of history and his inferences are refined by the accepted
canons of logic.
In fact, the analyst's work rarely meets the exacting standards which he
sets for himself. His labors are corrupted by the pressures of time and politics
and by the demands of his organization and career. Consequently, the analyst
will be tempted to take cognitive shortcuts. The challenge is to navigate the
epistemic perils that await him as he compensates for the imperfections of his
environment
Interpretation vs. Narration
The remorseless demands for rapid assessment of unfolding situations pose
the single greatest barrier to thoughtful and comprehensive analysis. Under
these conditions, there is a temptation to serve up information as it is
received-stringing together cable traffic or snippets from papers already on
the shelf. This procedure is economical in terms of time and protects the
analyst from egregious error and controversy because it tends to reiterate
"agreed" judgments and avoids the necessity to reopen intra-agency negotia-
tion on an issue. Resulting analyses, however, contribute little to the work of
initial collectors and forgo fresh assessment in favor of the mere accretion of
information. The pressure of time notwithstanding, the intelligence specialist
is responsible to distinguish between "true" and "false" facts and to winnow
out trivia from incoming information in order to reassess the logic of events in
light of policy and national interest.
The propensity to substitute narration for interpretation is fostered by the
intelligence community's encouragement of narrow research specialties. On
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
Travail
the one hand, such specialization provides a needed pool of technical
expertise; on the other hand, it reduces conflicts over "turf." But whatever the
virtues of the system, its consequences are an insensitivity to linkages
events and issues, an inability to make analysis relevant to policy cnceamog
rns na
subtle ptopensity to ignore anomalies and amass information to confirm
agreed-upon hypotheses, and a flight from analytic responsibility. And those
who might be expected to comprehend the big picture are necessarily
absorbed in managing the myriad tasks of narrowly focused experts. Finally,
the community's structure encourages the proliferation of standard oating
procedures for routine occurrences and effectively discourages the search for
emerging discontinuities.
Analysis vs. Speculation
Speculation-in the sense of uninformed or baseless prediction-is anath-
ema to intelligence analysis. At its worse, speculation may appear as prejudice
informed by nothing more than casual introspection. But the boundary
between speculative and analytic enquiry is often very
intelligence specialist's professed aversion to narrow, and the
pro-
Density to unjustifiable caution. Aware that they atiwill havem ok defend
idiosyncratic judgments to skeptical peers and superiors, analysts tend to
rationalize anomalies so that they reinforce "conventional wisdom." Con-
firmed evidence is commonly demanded for uncomfortable assertions of
change in existing patterns; in the absence of such evidence, assertions of this
nature may be dismissed as "speculative." The cult of confirmation, however,
may lead to analyses that predict only what has already happened-post hoc
rationalizations
This mind set tends to confuse speculation (predictions based on pre-
existing biases and randomized guesswork) and deductive-nomol
eses (theoretical predictions of specific events derived from general l prooposi-
tions about how `actors behave under certain conditions). It reveals a
Preference for strictly inductive analysis in which general conclusions are seen
as valid only if they are based on the cumulation of data.
Unfortunately, the institutional preference for induction minimizes the
prospect that analyses will encompass subtle variations in the logic of a
situation or awareness of important possibilities that are incompatible with
past patterns The common practice of legitimizing projections of the present
into the future by imbedding them in highly subjective probability statements
further reduces the incentive to account for emerging anomalies. Of course,
the probability that significant shifts will occur in a defined period of time in
major situations (e.g., the stability of a government) is low. The future usually
will repeat the past, and most policy planners-even if deprived of intelli-
gence-are able to fare tolerably well on the basis of that assumption.
Nevertheless, significant changes will occur in the global environment every
year, and these changes-however few-are more important to political
leaders than all the "non-changes."
Pointing out possible discontinuities-however improbable they may be in
a statistical sense-and elaborating their implications may be the most critical
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
task an intelligence analyst can perform. As a rule, policymakers prefer to
believe that the calculable status quo will persist, and conservative judgments
by intelligence specialists tend to reinforce such wishful thinking. Only if
significant contingencies are pointed out by the intelligence community in
timely fashion is it possible for policy to be initiated in order to preclude unde-
sirable developments. Paradoxically, such policy may "falsify" the original
analysis on which it was based.
Policy Advocacy
One reason commonly given for avoiding "speculation" is that the
inclusion of judgments that are not fully confirmed is likely to reflect political
or ideological preferences. While there is no need here to discuss the necessity
of avoiding policy advocacy, it should be pointed out that, in fact, every
analysis contains implicit or indirect policy recommendations. The purpose of
intelligence analysis is to facilitate the policy process; an analyst is indulging in
irresponsibly irrelevant diagnosis and. prognosis if he fails to explicate the
impact that US policy has had or may have on the situation before him.
Although the analyst cannot substitute his judgment for that of the
policymaker and must protect the "neutrality" of his examination, compre-
hensive diagnosis and prognosis inevitably entails the subtle inclusion of policy
prescription. Diagnosis requires this because the present and past policies of
the United States are likely to have been critical factors in shaping the
problem being confronted. More importantly, US action or inaction will
inevitably impinge on the manner in which the situation at hand will unfold
and will, in consequence, intrude upon the analyst's prognosis. An evaluation
of the differing effects of alternative US policies is a necessary component of
the most "disinterested" analysis. If stated so.as to be relevant to the policy-
maker, it will indicate those courses of action that will benefit or harm him.
The intelligence specialist, moreover, has a responsibility to point out the
impact of systemic and secular conditions on the issues at hand in order to in-
dicate the limits of policy. The zealous policymaker, viewing foreign affairs
through the prism of his limited tenure and constantly in the hurly-burly of
making decisions, tends to look at the world around him as far more plastic
than it really is. The analyst, with a longer perspective, must assume the
responsibility for distinguishing between those aspects of a situation that are
malleable and those that are not.
Whatever his self-image may be, no intelligence specialist is free from
political conviction. On occasion, the failure to wrestle with convictions
directly actually leads to the unrecognized inclusion of bias. The analyst,
priding himself on being a guardian of intellectual continuity, is dismayed by
rapid shifts in perception and policy from administration to administration.
The focus of the Carter Administration on human rights and the Third World
was seen by some as entailing an underestimation of the Soviet factor in world
politics. Similarly, the Reagan Administration's focus on the Soviet "threat"
was viewed by others as a dangerous excursion into the past. In both instances,
papers and estimates were written that were unconsciously slanted toward the
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
status quo ante-often by declaring that there was "insufficient" evidence to
justify the shift. The exercise, however laudably motivated, inevitably includ-
ed unadmitted advocacy. In a sense, it is the antithesis of telling the
policymaker what he wants to hear, but it is equally unjustifiable.
Short Term vs. Long Term Analysis
The demands of policymakers and the episodic eruption of crises place a
premium on rapid turnaround and brevity of expression. The necessary
emphasis on the unfolding present commonly leads the intelligence specialist
to dichotomize falsely between short- and long-term analysis. The dichotomy
is false because the analysis-while dealing explicitly only with the present
and near future---can transcend journalism only if it is infused with implicit
models of the past and future patterns of events surrounding the topic at issue.
Whether conscious or not, such models provide the analyst with necessary
premises about his topic. And, however brief the exposition, the analyst's
premises should be articulated in order to reveal the logic that lies behind the
analysis and its conclusions. Long-term analysis, then, even if only dimly
apparent in any single report or piece of research, is the father of true
probability statements about individual events. And each event in turn will
serve to modify the analyst's assumption about his topic once again. If the
specialist were not engaged in continuous long-term analysis, his short-term
conclusions would be no more valuable than informed opinion, and he would
not be a specialist at all.
Conclusion
This brief essay by no means encompasses the range of analytic pitfalls
into which the intelligence specialist may step. Those that have been addressed
are rarely the consequences of intellectual limitation. Rather, they are the
products of the intellectual milieu and culture of the intelligence community.
They are responses to the host of pressures and constraints imposed by
bureaucratic mores, institutionalized practices, and the pressures of time and
career in a hierarchical organization. As a consequence, however diligent the
individual specialist, they will not be eliminated Nevertheless, self-conscious
appreciation of the degree to which they may detract from intelligence
products may minimize their impact.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
From "Studies in Intelligence",
Fall 1984, by Allen H. Kitchens
CRISIS AND INTELLIGENCE: TWO CASE STUDIES
An international crisis can take on different forms and result from various
developments-a surprise attack, the outbreak of war, a coup, the collapse of a
government, increasing growth of an insurgency, rampant demonstrations and
riots, assassination of an important political leader, massive economic failure,
downing of aircraft, sinking or seizure of a ship, and so forth. A crisis can
develop suddenly with little or no warning, it can gradually develop over time
and then suddenly blow, or it can be a heightening of or sudden development
within a crisis already in progress.
The role of intelligence prior to a crisis is to eliminate surprise by alerting
and warning of an impending development. Once the crisis is taking place, the
role of intelligence is to keep the policymakers and crisis managers informed
of what is going on and what to expect. There are a wide variety of ways prior
to and during a crisis in which intelligence is fed into the policymaking and
management machinery. Written products primarily include the Central
Intelligence Agency's (CIA) National Intelligence Daily, the Department of
State's (Bureau of Intelligence and Research, INR) Morning Summary, and
the Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA) Daily Intelligence Summary. These
are intelligence community priority publications, read daily at the White
House and by others at the top in the foreign affairs and defense establish-
ment. Other written products include Special National Intelligence Estimates
(SNIEs), briefing memoranda, and warning memoranda. The Vice President,
Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and other top advisers also receive
special briefing materials provided daily to the President.
A fast-breaking situation causes a great surge of incoming material-
cables, intelligence reports, news items-and produces an acute need on the
part of the policymakers to know quickly what is happening and what may be
about to take place. In addition to the regular daily intelligence publications,
situation reports are particularly useful in meeting this urgent need for
information and analysis. In addition to the situation reports and other special
memoranda, there would be-depending on the type of crisis-oral briefings
using maps, photographs, and charts.
The timely production of objective analysis and its proper use by the
policymakers is critical to the handling of a crisis. There are unfortunately a
number of obstacles and barriers which often lead to intelligence and policy
failures. Richard Betts of the Brookings Institute, in an article entitled
"Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable,"
commented that "most crucial mistakes have seldom been made by collectors
of raw information, occasionally by professionals who produce finished
analyses, but most often by the decision makers who consume the product of
$ Adapted from a presentation to the International Studies Association. March 1984. in
Atlanta, Georgia.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
Case Studies
intelligence services. Policy premises constrict perception, and administrative
workloads constrain reflection. Intelligence failure is political-and psychologi-
cal more often than organizational."
Betts and others have over the years observed various reasons for failure
or near failure. In terms of the cases I will be discussing, the most significant
factors are:
- Policymakers tend to disregard analysis which runs counter to
preconceptions; that is, the mindset. In addition, some at the policy
level tend to place more weight on raw intelligence than on analysis in
finished intelligence. This is particularly the case in a crisis situation
where both data flow and policy formulation outpace analysis: the
policymakers and crisis managers develop, as former INR Director
Thomas Hughes put it, "the succulent taste for the hot poop." Some
policymakers have a bias against intelligence analysts; they may insist
on being their own intelligence officer. Policymakers also tend at
times not to share vital information with the intelligence community.
This impedes accurate analysis.
- Intelligence analysts tend to be guilty of mindset-to be overly
cautious and unwilling to challenge effectively conventional wisdom.
to be ambivalent and waffle. In such a situation the analyst serves
little purpose in assisting the Policymakers by objectively informing
her/him of what is going on and why, a- I what to expect and why.
- There is a tendency in the joint preparation of estimates, such as
SNIEs, to resolve through consensus substantive differences to the
point that the product may make ambivalent or ambiguous
judgments.
- The presence in a crisis of an excess of information, much of it
fragmentary and conflicting, makes it very difficult for an analyst to
sort out what is real and unreal in order to be able to make clear judg-
ments as to what is happening and what it all means.
- Operational agencies tend to justify their own performance by issuing
overly optimistic assessments and reports.
- Policymakers tend to be preoccupied by other often equally signifi-
cant policy matters, or to be suddenly distracted by another crisis
somewhere else in the world or right smack in the middle of the one
already at hand. This kind of situation also affects the intelligence
community.
Can Study: Tet Offensive in Vietnam, 1968
On 30 January 1968, during Tet, the lunar New Year, nearly 70,000
communist soldiers launched a surprise offensive of incredible scope. These
forces attacked more than a hundred South Vietnamese cities and towns,
including Saigon, thus shifting the war for the first time from the rural setting
to the seemingly secure urban areas.
After some days of fierce combat, the enemy was cleared from most cities
and towns. While the commgnists may have concluded that they suffered a
political defeat because their: more ambitious objectives were not reached-to
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
Case Studies
liberate key urban areas long enough to organize the population and lead a
genuine rebellion against the Saigon regime-the offensive dealt the US and
its allies a severe setback by demonstrating the communists' great capacity to
launch major attacks and to inflict severe punishment. The demonstration of
urban vulnerability also had a major adverse effect on allied confidence in
ultimate victory, and it had a decisive effect on American public opinion. Tet
set into motion the eventual changes in US policy on Vietnam.
The investigations and other post-mortems which took place in the
aftermath of Tet found that the scope, intensity, coordination, and timing of
the attacks were not fully anticipated; that the nature of the attacks-against
urban and not rural area targets-had not been predicted; that a major
unexpected element had been the communists' ability to hit so many targets
simultaneously; and that civilian and military leaders had been lulled into a
false sense of security-based on a belief fed by illusory reports on communist
strength, casualties, infiltration, recruitment, and morale-that the commu-
nists' overall position had deteriorated.
With regard to the timing of the communists' offensive, most of the
intelligence analysts concluded that the offensive likely would occur immedi-
ately prior to or following the Tet holiday period which extended from 2" Jan-
uary to 3 February. Some analysts and commanders, including General
Westmoreland, included in their estimates the possibility that the attacks
might take place during the holidays and shifted some troops just in case.
Throughout the fall and into the winter of 1967-68, there was a considerable
amount of fragmentary evidence that the communists were planning a major
offensive around Tet. That fall the communists had taken the offensive in a
series of assaults against allied border positions and then began the siege at Khe
Sanh on 21 January. Throughout that period reports were coming in that
communist units were being upgraded with greater, more modern firepower,
and were developing an improved command and control capability that
would allow them to coordinate operations between regular and guerrilla
forces, as well as between headquarters (including between Hanoi and
COSVN) and widely separated operational areas. The allies were caught off
guard not because they did not anticipate the usual attacks in and around Tet,
but probably because they were distracted or maybe even deceived by what
was happening at Khe Sanh and elsewhere during this period. At the time the
military believed that the communists were closing in on Khe Sanh as part of a
broad strategy designed to seize and hold South Vietnam's northernmost
provinces prior to negotiations.
In the intelligence available in the pre-Tet period, there were indications
that the communists were preparing for a series of coordinated attacks on a
larger scale than previously attempted and the intelligence even mentioned as
possible targets many of the places actually attacked. The intelligence did not
suggest that the attacks might concentrate on urban targets to the virtual
exclusion of the rural areas, nor did the analysts predict the extent of the
attacks which actually occurred or the communists' ability to attack simulta-
neously to the degree that they did. Moreover, Washington and Saigon had
dismissed the possibility that ,the communists might make a go-for-broke
general offensive, thus risking not only their regular troops and their best
guerrilla forces but their political cadres, local militia, and underground
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
Case Studies
administrative infrastructure as well. The judgment made in January 1968 was
that the offensive would be more intensive but follow 'traditional lines-
attacks against military bases, airfields, command posts, outposts, pacified
hamlets, and that most of the effort would be aimed at the northernmost
provinces (again the trend which many thought was being set by the Khe Sanh
siege). In the case of a situation like Vietnam where some policy makers and
leaders have been deeply involved in it for some time, the task of intelligence
in attempting to get them to recognize new courses becomes even more
difficult.
One problem which contributed to underestimating the communists'
capabilities was the controversy beginning in 1967 over the strength of the
communist forces. CIA, DIA, and INR concluded that the communists had an
insurgency base-regulars and militia-of about 600,000, a number which
then suggested to the analysts that the war of attrition was not as successful as
previously thought, and that the communists were able to recruit, something
else which had become almost unthinkable. The US Embassy and military in
Saigon, however, supported a. figure of 300,000, the difference being that
Saigon did not accept the development of a militia from which new cadre and
regulars could be drawn. In addition, those in Saigon could not accept the fact
that the communists were able to recruit. Despite efforts by the intelligence
community, especially in Washington, to resolve the differences. the matter
remained unresolved and thus contributed to a serious misreading of the
situation on the ground.
The enormous amount of raw intelligence being received on Vietnam,
much of it fragmentary, had a significant effect on the ability of the
intelligence apparatus-in Washington and in Vietnam-to sort out, analyze.
and respond in a timely fashion. In addition, the clutter of conflicting and con-
fusing reports served to dull the warnings. Many senior officials in Washington
and Saigon faced with the necessity of having to make prompt decisions often
were unable to wait for processed intelligence and instead frequently relied on
raw intelligence reports. Thus they were in a situation which exceeded their
capability to absorb or scrutinize the high volume of material judiciously.
The final element which contributed to the policymakers' failure to give
sufficient focus to the impending situation on the ground in Vietnam was
Washington's preoccupation with the Pueblo crisis at the same time. The
seizure by North Korea of the Pueblo, a US intelligence ship, a week before
Tet immediately plunged most of the foreign affairs and defense establish-
ment into a crisis which raised the spectre of war on the Korean peninsula and
worries over the security of Japan. In addition, Washington was at the time
also deeply concerned with growing tensions in the Middle East.
Case Study: The Iranian Situation, 1977-1979
The Iranian crisis culminated in the departure of the Shah, the coming to
power of the Ayatollah Khomeini, the taking of the US hostages, the serious
setback for US interests, and the further heightening of tension in Southwest
Asia and the Middle East: My comments on this crisis and the role intelligence
played in it generally will cover the period from late 1977 to the Shah's
departure on 16 January 1979, end Khomeini's return to Iran on 1 February
1979.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
During preparation of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran in
1975, the intelligence community concluded that the Shah's regime was
inherently vulnerable because it was not only rigid but also highly fragile-
there were no independent institutions to support it, no legitimate succession
procedure to select viable survivors, and no mechanism to diffuse and
reconcentrate power and authority as the pressures of various situations might
require. The community in essence concluded that should the regime receive a
shock or come under sustained pressure, it would probably collapse. But no
one in the group that prepared the NIE, and members of the academic
community who were consulted, could honestly claim later that he or she
could have foreseen the events that would later transpire. The missing element
was the breadth and depth of anti-Shah sentiment-the hidden apathy,
ambivalence, and hatred.
Although no one could predict what ultimately happened, there was a
warning failure. Violent demonstrations and hostilities erupted in 1977 and
more so in 1978, placing the regime in jeopardy and with it the substantial US
interest in Iran's stability. Still, the attention of top policymakers was not
brought sufficiently to bear on Iran until October 1978. By then, the rapid
pace of events and the degree of dissidence made orderly transition away from
the Shah's rule nearly impossible and policy options which might have existed
earlier no longer held promise.
In 1979 the House Subcommittee on Evaluation of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence concluded that rather than being simply an
intelligence failure, it was "a failure to which both the intelligence community
and the users of intelligence contributed. The intelligence and policymaking
communities must each carry part of the blame for insensitivity to deep-
rooted problems in Iran. More importantly, intelligence and policy failings
were intertwined."
The subcommittee made two basic findings. First, intelligence collection
and analysis were judged to be weak. There was an inadequate information
base with which to gauge the capability of the religious opposition and the
breadth of popular opposition and to predict that certain events would come
together to drive out the Shah and lead to a collapse of the government.
This conclusion is not entirely fair. The problem connected with the
Iranian situation developed not because of inadequate intelligence. The US
compiled a substantial amount of accurate information and analysis about
major events, particularly the demonstrations and riots. In terms of the overall
situation and its implications, however, there were a number of factors which
inhibited analysis and more effective policy and decision making. These were:
- the difficulty in diagnosing the potential of religion combined with
economic dislocation and corruption as a political weapon;
- the rapid development of revolutionary organizations in 1978 from
rudimentary demonstrators in January and February to well-disci-
plined cadres by September, a development so rapid that it exceeded
the capacity of analysts and users effectively to analyze the situation,
and to propose and carry out timely actidn;
- the lack of a watershed event to wake everyone up and unify
perceptions, such as the. attack on pearl Harbor or the photographs of
Soviet missiles in Cuba; and
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Case Studies
- the policymakers' strong, personal beliefs concerning the staying
power of the Shah.
The latter factor leads to the subcommittee's second basic finding that the
policymakers' confidence in the Shah's ability to weather the storm in turn
skewed intelligence. Long-standing US attitudes toward the Shah inhibited
intelligence collection, dampened policymakers' appetites for analysis on the
Shah's position, and deafened policymakers to the warning implicit in
available current intelligence. Because of this attitude-this mindset-there
were no incentives for analysts to challenge conventional wisdom. The nature
of American policy vis-a-vis Iran influenced the formulation and evaluation of
intelligence reporting and analysis. Analysts were not required to consider the
possibility that religious and popular opposition might undermine the Shah's
rule. Policymakers were not asking whether the Shah's autocracy would
survive, policy was premised on that assumption.
In terms of the intelligence community's performance-a portion of
which has been discussed above-there were a number of specific
inadequacies.
Until mid to late 1977, embassy and intelligence community reporting on
the Iranian political situation received low priority compared to reporting on
other matters concerning Iran. Very few reports based on contacts with the re-
ligious opposition had appeared during the previous two years, and there was
little reporting on the internal situation based on sources within the opposition
during the first quarter of 1978.
As indicated above, one of the significant weaknesses was insufficient
insight into the goals and expectations of opposition elements, and popular
attitudes toward them. The subcommittee found that the critical weakness in
intelligence collection on Iran was a lack of widespread contact with Iranians
of.various persuasions, leaders and followers alike. Such contact would have
made possible more reliable assessments of the volatility of the situation, the
degree of polarization, and relationships among groups and between
individuals.
A senior official in the US Embassy at Tehran during this period contends
that as the political pace quickened in 1977, the mission picked up hints that
the dissidents were growing more powerful and began to cultivate the
organizers. By September 1978, he indicates that Farsi-speaking officers knew
personally at least one leader in each of the dissident groups except the
communists. The one bare spot was that until March 1978 there were no direct
encounters between embassy officers and religious leaders. This was an
important reason why we failed to comprehend the organizational capability
and the skills of the Shiite religious community, and the degree to which the
religious leaders had infiltrated and co-opted elements of the military.
Current intelligence was most effective as a warning vehicle and in
reporting on events that stood out clearly, but did not lend itself as well to as-
sessments of the long-term significance of events and their implications for US
policy and interests. The long-simmeripg problems in Iran, when examined
over time and through hindsight, did show a clear pattern. But at the time the
events were occurring the task of sorting out reliable data from the mass of
information obscured the significance to analysts.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
The last, and a. serious intelligence community inadequacy, was the
failure to produce a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran. The process
bogged down in differences over the product's focus and substatTce. As the
year 1978 wore on, and events in Iran attracted consumers' attention and
increased the need for short-term estimation, analysts regarded the NIE as a
distraction from more pressing business and there was a tendency to avoid
tackling the substantive differences. Ultimately, no NIE was produced.
The issue which divided the intelligence community was over the critical
elements of the Shah's power-where it resided. CIA and DIA supported the
view that his power rested with the military and security services; it was only
necessary, therefore, to monitor the loyalty of the Shah's military and security
services and ensure that he maintained his own self-confidence. INR assigned
greater weight to popular support and to economic conditions which were
exacerbating popular dissatisfaction. INR believed that in determining
whether the Shah and his regime were in danger of losing control and power it
was more important to ask more questions about the level of popular
dissatisfaction and the trends that had been uniting intellectual dissidents and
religious traditionalists.
In terms of the policymakers' view, the United States' historical connec-
tion with Iran, particularly its close ties with the Shah, weighed heavily. The
Shah's power was generally seen as stable for the foreseeable future and
assessments to the contrary tended to be played down or ignored. There was
no formal policy review to assimilate new ideas and trends, let alone to change
existing policy. The failure of the users lay in paying insufficient attention to
intelligence analysis-though it was somewhat flawed-and in misjudging the
personal power of the Shah.
In this crisis, as with Tet, the pace of events outran the ability of those
involved to keep fully abreast of them. John Stemple, a foreign service officer
who was directly involved in the Iranian crisis, pointed out in his book, Inside
the Iranian Revolution, that "even the opposition, which maintained greater
control over the pace than any other participants, found itself caught up and
pushed along by the onrushing accidents of history-the Abadan fire, the Jaleh
Square shootings, and the Tabriz riot." For Washington, the developing crisis
came at a time when the President and the top policymakers were preoccu-
pied with the SALT II negotiations, the normalization of relations with Beijing
and, in the crucial time-frame of August to December 1978, the Egyptian-
Israeli peace talks at Camp David.
Regrouping in the Aftermath
Official post-mortems of intelligence failure usually contain recommen-
dations for reorganization and changes in operating norms. In the case of Tet,
it was recommended that a study be made to determine whether the normal
intelligence process could be improved in order to ensure the timely and
accurate collection and preparation of intelligence during critical situations. If
the normal process could not be improved, then institutional changes should
be made. In the case of Iran, recommen4tions were made for a more
centralized effort to watch international situations as they developed over time
in order to put the intelligence community in a better position to predict what
might happen.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Case Studies
While some bureaucratic and procedural fixes will help, the belief that
reorganizations and so forth will ensure-or at least lessen the-chance of
surprises-that there will be no more Tets or Irans is illusory. Richard Betts in
his article, "Analysis, War, and Decision," accurately makes the case:
"Intelligence can be improved marginally, but not radically, by altering the
analytic system. The illusion is also dangerous if it abets overconfidence that
systemic reforms will increase the predictability of threats. The use of
intelligence depends less on the bureaucracy than on the intellects and
inclinations of the authorities above it." In the same article Betts also points
out that:
"Organizational solutions to intelligence failure are hampered
by three basic problems: most procedural reforms that address
specific pathologies introduce or accent other pathologies; changes in
analytic processes can never fully transcend the constraints of
ambiguity and ambivalence; and more rationalized information
systems cannot fully compensate for the predispositions, perceptual
idiosyncrasies, and time constraints of political consumers. Solutions
that address the psychology and analytic style of decision makers are
limited by the difficulty of changing human thought processes and
day-to-day habits of judgment by normative injunction."
Select Bibliography
Betts, Richard K., "Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable,"
World Politics, XXXI, October 1978, pp. 61-89.
Hughes, Thomas L., "The Fate of Facts in a World of Men," Farewell Lectures Given for the
Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the Department of State, July 1969.
Karnow, Stanley, Vietnam: A History, Viking Press, 1983.
Ledeen, Michael and William Lewis, Debacle: The American Failure in Iran, Alfred A. Knopf.
1981.
Ledeen, Michael and William Lewis, "Carter and the Fall of the Shah: The Inside Story," The
Washington Quarterly, 3, 1980, pp. 3-40.
Mansur, Abul Kasim, "The Crisis in Iran: Why the US Ignored a Quarter Century of Warning,"
Armed Forces Journal International, January 1979, pp. 26-33.
Nickel, Herman, "The U.S. Failure in Iran," Fortune, 12 March 1979, pp. 95-106.
Oberdorfer, Don, Tot, Doubleday, 1971.
Stemple, John D., Inside the Iranian Revolution, Indiana University Press, 1981.
Sullivan, William H., Mission to Iran, W.W. Norton, 1981.
US House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Evaluation of the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence, "Iran Evaluation of U.S. Intelligence Performance Prior to November
1978," Washington, 1979.
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, "Some Lessons and Non-Lessons of
Vietnam: Ten Years After the Paris Peace Accords," Washington, 1983.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Frcri "Studies in Intelligence",
Fall 1984, by Helene L.
Boatner
THE EVALUATION OF INTELLIGENCE
Helene L. Boatner
Facing the press after the Bay of Pigs disaster, President John F. Kennedy
quoted an old saying: "Victory has a hundred fathers and defeat is an
orphan." ' A colleague at CIA has adapted this bit of wisdom to the business of
intelligence analysis as "Failure has many fathers; success is an orphan." Our
failures attract a great deal of attention, while our successes usually go
unheralded-and sometimes unrecognized even by ourselves. Our greatest
successes occur when nothing happens.
In evaluating the contribution of intelligence to US foreign policy, there
are two major issues:
- How successful are we (which depends on how you define our role in
the policy process)?
- How successful can we reasonably expect to be (which varies greatly
by topic)?
Intelligence and Policy
The role of intelligence in the policy process is a longstanding topic of de-
bate-among intelligence analysts, among policy officials and between the two
groups.' The issue was a favorite topic of Sherman Kent, who headed the
Office of National Estimates from 1952 through 1967.
For analysts, the fundamental question is how intrusive a role intelligence
should play.
- Those who are purists on the question of separating intelligence from
policy would prefer to deliver authoritative judgments-buttressed by
facts, when available-and watch the policymakers accept those
judgments and act accordingly.
- At the other extreme are analysts who argue for intimate involvement
at all stages during the formulation and execution of foreign and
defense policy.
Consumers, for their part, have varying views of what intelligence should
do for them.
- Some believe intelligence units exist to deliver facts in response to
their questions and that policymakers should make the analytic
judgments, as well as the policy decisions that follow.
' This article is adapted from a paper prepared for the twenty-fifth annual convention of
the International Studies Association, March 1984. Atlanta, Georgia.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
- Other policymakers value analysis, forecasting, and speculation in
principle, and want the intelligence community to take the initiative
in raising issues. But even they often resent such offerings if they
happen to run contrary to existing policy or to the policy preferences
of the individual.
The two groups have somewhat different perspectives on the relative
importance of the situation abroad to the policy decisions being made.
- Intelligence analysts typically see foreign developments within their
purview as the central issue for policymakers-they expect the
policymakers to do what is "right" on their accounts. They like to
believe that the intelligence input to decisions is of prime importance.
And they take pride in seeing the world "as it is."
- Policymakers are usually juggling a variety of foreign and domestic
considerations within the confines of a particular view of how the
world should operate-a policy perspective.
- Normally, moreover, policymakers see a shapeable world, while
intelligence analysts see a less tractable world.
Early debates on this subject emphasized the dangers of close interaction
between the two. groups. Kent, for example, was something of a purist,
believing that too much contact with the policy community could undermine
the objectivity of our work. My own view of our role, after listening to a
decade of criticism of our work as not relevant enough to the real concerns of
policymakers, lies more toward the activist end of the spectrum and strongly
in favor of analysis and estimating. I would define our job as contributing to
formulation and execution of policies that have a good chance of succeeding.
- In my opinion, we cannot contribute effectively unless we are
involved in the process.
- Assembling facts and making them intelligible is a vital function, but
the judgments we draw are the essence of our business-and by far
the hardest part of the job.
- To maintain the independence of our judgments, however, our
involvement must stop short of policy advocacy.
- Drawing that line is not easy. The lure of actually making policy is
ever-present and seductive. A former chief of Israeli Military Intelli-
gence summed it up eloquently: an intelligence chief who gets too
close to the policy process "is then unable to detach himself from the
festivities of policymaking just like the other self-gratified members of
the court who bask in their connections with power." '
The basic argument for involvement is that intelligence officers need to
know what is going on in the US Government in order to contribute in a
timely and effective manner. And policy officials are prone to keep their
initiatives, and the options under consideration, secret from anyone who is not
involved in the deliberations. Ray Cline has made no secret of the fact that he
resigned as head of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and
' See "The Intelligence-Policymaker Tangle" following this article.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
Research because Henry Kissinger would not share information that was
essential to effective intelligence support, and Cline cites such secrecy as a
major cause of intelligence failure.' There is no element more important to
good intelligence support for the policy process than a clear set of priorities
established, and continually revised, at the policy level-a point made in the
final report of the Church Committee and nearly every other study done on
the subject.' Only by sitting in on the policy deliberations can we detect the
shifting needs for intelligence support in a timely fashion.
Reasonable Expectations
Intelligence analysts can be certain of two things beyond death and taxes:
- They will make errors. (Even if they never go beyond reporting facts,
some of those "facts" will be wrong.)
- Their message will usually be unwelcome, since they usually will be
pointing out problems and drawing attention to obstacles facing the
policymaker.
Not surprisingly, therefore, intelligence analysis is a profession that
appeals to the brave, the dour, and the aspiring martyr.
In judging the quality of analysis, a number of factors have to be
considered. Accuracy (on both facts and judgments) is one key ingredient.
Timeliness is another-if the analysis does not arrive before the critical US
decisions are made, it serves no useful purpose. Effective delivery-a clear
message forced to the attention of the people who need it-is another essential.
Finally, objectivity is the characteristic that separates intelligence analysis
from advocacy or from catering to the policy preferences of our customers. Of
these, accuracy and objectivity are the two that come in for the greatest
amount of discussion.
How right or how wrong we can expect to be varies a lot by topic.
- Some distinctions are obvious, like our differing access to facts in open
versus closed societies.
- Concealment and deception are potential hazards on many subjects.
- But the accuracy of our assessments also depends on whether
relationships between the facts we have and the ones we lack are fixed
(physics), generally predictable within some range (economics), or
highly irregular (politics). The more human decisions affect the
relations. between the known and unknown facts, the harder it is for
an analyst to assess the present, to say nothing of predicting the future.
- Moreover, the future is always to some degree governed by the
intentions of human beings; intentions are always hard to glean and
subject to change.
- The problem is compounded if you are dealing with advanced
technologies. The object of your analysis is not merely a machine or
weapon but also a scientist, or group of them, who may have made a
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
major technological breakthrough or a major technological mistake. In
either case the decisions to apply the technological developments to
actual weapons development will be made by human beings balanc-
ing a wide range of political, economic, and military considerations.
To make matters more challenging, it is 'the discontinuities we are trying
to predict. Henry Kissinger once commented that "all intelligence services
congenitally overestimate the rationality of the decisionmaking process they
are analyzing," and he is certainly correct.' Some of our most famous
"failures" have involved this factor. But any analyst who begins with the
presumption that all decisionmaking processes are irrational and likely to
produce irrational results is left with nothing to analyze. This approach is
about as helpful as an admonition to believe only reliable intelligence, about
which Clausewitz commented: "What is the use of such feeble maxims? They
belong to that wisdom which for want of anything better scribblers of systems
and compendia resort to when they run out of ideas." " The trick is to remind
ourselves constantly that irrationality is possible and accidents happen. We
also have to remind our readers that non-Western thought processes can lead
to decisions that might appear illogical or irrational to us but are entirely
sensible in another cultural context.
In very general terms-and subject to many exceptions-I would charac-
terize the spectrum of difficulty in intelligence analysis as follows:
The easiest task is to report on implementation of a decision already made
that involves a wealth of straightforward evidence:
- an army on the move,
- policies and actions of organized groups in an open society,
- construction, production, or delivery of physical objects (ships, grain,
oil, tanks).
For problems of this sort, the most important job of an analyst is what we
practitioners call collection tasking-figuring out what you need to know to
follow the problem and how that information can be obtained.
Unfortunately, dealing with the "easy" questions is seldom enough. More
often, the important questions we face deal with decisions not made or
evidence that is not clear. We are asked to assess the reactions of various
countries to alternative US policy moves, to predict the outcomes of wars on
the basis of imperfect knowledge of opposing armies, and to make economic
forecasts without access to vital economic data. Generally speaking-and my
own background as a political analyst no doubt influences my thinking-I
would say that military analysis is somewhat "easier" than economic analysis
and economic somewhat "easier" than political analysis-in the sense of the
probability of being "right"-but not in the sense of the need for rigor,
experience, and training.
In sum, we are not soothsayers. We cannot predict the future with
confidence. But we can reduce the range of uncertainty facing the policy-
maker, promote more thorough and enlightened debate within the policy
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
community, examine the probable consequences of policy alternatives, and
alert our customers to possible disrupting events and potential areas for
progress toward US objectives. If we do these things effectively, we have
succeeded, in my view.
Consumer reaction to our various products varies considerably, but all our
attempts to survey consumers show consistent results.
- Receptivity to what we call basic intelligence ("give me the facts") is
uniformly high. People throughout the government appreciate access
to a storehouse of biographic material, maps, directories of foreign
government officials, data on weapons, economic statistics, population
figures, insider reports on cabinet meetings or terrorist plans, and a
variety of other data. In short, customers value transfer of knowledge
from us to them.
- Reactions to our regular current intelligence products are more
mixed-from comments that they are uniformly good to charges that
they are superficial. (In large measure I think the variation relates as
much to what the particular customer expects as to what we deliver.)
- We get consistently high marks for our responsiveness to requests for
products tailored to the specific needs of policymakers engaged in
crisis management, because sensible decisions cannot be made in fast-
breaking situations without up-to-date information. (If you were
reading your daily newspapers after the tragic shootdown of a Korean
airliner last year, you got a good example of the amount of detail we
can pull together in a hurry when the situation demands it.)
The greatest criticism of US intelligence analysis has always focused on
"estimates"-a form of the art that refers to longer range predictions and
usually carries a connotation of intelligence community participation. Many
customers feel that they can project the future as well as we, if they have the
same facts. And they are particularly prone to be critical if they do not like the
conclusions we reach. Dick Betts, for example, has cited Lyndon Johnson's
view that negative CIA assessments on Vietnam were undermining the policy
process, not contributing to it., Perversely, policymakers have also been known
to dismiss our estimative work as unnecessary if it happens to support existing
policies, although President Johnson was delighted with our gloomy findings
on the Soviet economy in the early 1960s and President Carter was similarly
pleased with our estimates of the world oil outlook.,
Certain peculiarities of the human thought process also increase the level
of criticism on estimates. Numerous experiments demonstrate that knowing
the outcome of any situation inevitably leads ex-post-facto judges to perceive
that outcome as much more likely-hence more predictable-than it was. And
as Roberta Wohlstetter has argued in her brilliant post-mortem on Pearl
Harbor, hindsight also makes it much easier to separate "signals" from
.'noise." "
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Strengths and Weaknesses
For someone who is on the inside of the intelligence establishment to try
to assess the quality of our work in a public forum presents certain practical
difficulties. For one thing, my objectivity is suspect. Moreover, most in-depth
examinations of the product in the past have taken the form of "post-
mortems"-which is to say, examinations of situations in which intelligence
failed, at least in part, to warn of impending trouble or to accurately predict
events. A number of our internal evaluation efforts of this sort have gotten into
the public domain, notably via the Pike Committee. As a result, our failures
are fairly well documented on the public record, while our successes are not.
But even some of the failures involved elements of success. Success is, in any
event, difficult to judge.
For example, we clearly did not predict that the Soviets would introduce
missiles into Cuba in 1962. But did the fundamental error of judgment lie with
US intelligence or with the Soviets? Our judgment was based on a careful
assessment, reached after serious consideration, that the Soviets were not
prepared for the major confrontation with the US that such a move would
entail. And our reason for our judgment turned out to be correct-they were
not prepared for confrontation and when it came they reversed themselves. So
we were fundamentally right about the USSR's strategic position, although we
erred in assuming that the Soviets would correctly assess the strength of US
reaction to such a move. Moreover, intelligence performance during the
missile crisis was superb-reporting and analysis provided all the information
needed to force Khrushchev to withdraw the missiles."
Then there is the problem of self-defeating prophecy. If we judge that
one country is planning an action that is undesirable from the US perspective,
and if the US undertakes a private demarche, and if the action does not occur,
have we succeeded or not? Did US representations to New Delhi and Moscow
during the India-Pakistan war of 1971 dissuade the Indians from their
reported plans to try to destroy the Pakistani army in West Pakistan? Or were
there no such plans, as the Indians claimed, and many US officials believed? 11
Yet another problem is action and reaction. Much has been written on the
accuracy of our estimates of Soviet strategic weapons deployments over time.
And there is no doubt that we have made mistakes, as well as a number of
"right" estimates, in this area. But the political impact of intelligence
judgments may well have had a major impact on weapons trends. Here the
argument is that the "missile gap" controversy of the late 1950s led to a major
US defense buildup. The Soviets, in response, accelerated and expanded
programs already underway (and tried to put missiles in Cuba). The buildup
on their part led in turn to perceptions in Europe and the US that the West
faced an increasing threat and to a buildup by the US that is now in its early
stages."
There is also the difficulty of how human beings use evidence. Psycholog-
ical research indicates that readers typically underestimate how much they
learn from new facts or new analyses-and hence give less credit than they
should to the contributions of intelligence to their own knowledge or thought
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
processes." This, too, is illustrated by Henry Kissinger's belief that it was he
who made the analytic leap in 1970 from soccer fields near a naval facility in
Cuba to an increased Soviet naval presence there; he has no doubt completely
forgotten that he heard it first from the intelligence analysts. And he also does
not seem to realize that it turned out to be an analytic error; we learned ' later
that soccer had become quite popular in Cuba by 1970 and was not a good
indicator of Soviet presence.'s
That said, let me offer my own opinion of our historical track record and
the present state of affairs with regard to quality of analysis. There is no
gainsaying that we have made some major errors--the Middle East war of
1973 and the overthrow of the Shah are two of the most notable. However,
most of the attention to our work on the 1973 war has centered on our
negative assessments immediately before the war broke out; far less mention
has been made of very good work a few months earlier, both in an interagency
paper and in the Department of State, pointing to the possibility of war by fall
and outlining in some detail the events that might bring about such a result. At
that juncture, we clearly understood that Sadat might initiate a war for
political reasons, knowing that he would not win militarily. By the time the
war began, our analytic perspective had shifted, and we discounted war
because we were confident that the Arabs could not win and that they knew it.
The real question, therefore, is why we lost sight of the right answer, not why
we never found it."
On Iran, the public report of the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence dealing with intelligence performance faults the users of intelli-
gence equally with the producers-for their lack of receptivity to the negative
information they did receive, as well as their failure to question their own con-
fidence in the Shah." Kissinger argues that Iran was not primarily an
intelligence failure but rather a conceptual failure in understanding the
impact of rapid economic development." For my own part, I believe that our
misestimates of how the Iranian situation would evolve lay less with our lack
of understanding of the social forces at work-although we certainly did not
do well on that score-than with our belief that the Shah had accurate
information about his own country and would act effectively to handle the
situation.
We have also made some relatively inconsequential mistakes that have
been blown all out of proportion for political reasons. For example, we
discovered a Soviet brigade in Cuba in the fall of 1979 that had probably been
there undetected for years. Substantively, this mattered little. But the political
climate of the time was highly charged and the matter of the brigade got
linked to the very contentious issue of SALT ratification. Consequently it was
the subject of glaring headlines and heated exchanges-in the US and between
the US and the USSR."
The public focus on such errors has left an erroneous impression that
intelligence seldom spots impending developments before they are obvious to
all. As I said at the beginning, our greatest successes leave few ripples, and
most are not a matter of public record. But some are. For example, we
correctly alerted policymakers to the impending Sino-Soviet split at a time
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
when conventional wisdom held that the USSR and China were still firm
allies. We alerted President Eisenhower and the National Security Council to
the possibility of a Soviet earth satellite several months before the first Sputnik
was launched, and we have been highly successful in predicting the advent of
major new Soviet strategic systems well before they have become operational.
We were very accurate in predicting the timing of the first Chinese nuclear
explosion. We did a remarkable job on the Arab-Israeli war of 1967-
predicting it, predicting who would win, and predicting how long it would
last. And this was done in the face of great skepticism at the senior policy level.
Thomas Powers cites this performance as the single most important factor
accounting for the high regard in which Richard Helms was held by the
Johnson Administration. We were right-much to the displeasure of many in
the policy community-in judging in 1969 that the Soviet SS-9 missile would
not have a MIRV capability. We made some mistakes on certain tactical or
specific questions concerning Vietnam-notably with regard to the Tet
offensive of 1968 and the role of Sihanoukville as a transshipment point. But
the overall record of intelligence assessments on Vietnam from 1954 on is very
good, and especially so considering the political pressures involved.zo
More recently, our work on Soviet oil production, while initially flawed
by inadequate consideration of the ability of the USSR to finance oil imports
at the level we suggested, destroyed the then prevalent assumptions about
Soviet oil production capabilities (and incidentally probably caused the Soviets
to increase their resource commitments to energy production). Our examina-
tion of alternative withdrawal lines was vital to the Egyptian-Israeli agreement
on the Sinai. We began discussing the possibility of a Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan months before it happened, and we were right about Soviet
reluctance to invade Poland. Recent reports of the two congressional oversight
committees have given us good marks on predicting the Chinese invasion of
Vietnam, on forecasting the world oil market, on alerting the Carter adminis-
tration to the possibility of a mass emigration from Cuba, on Central America
(with particular kudos for our work on Nicaragua in the period before and
after Somoza was overthrown and our work on the Salvadoran guerillas), and
on Soviet involvement in international terrorism.2'
Indeed, in the long run, I believe that much of the criticism of
intelligence analysis in recent years, sparked in large measure by public release
of some of our own post-mortems, has had efficacious results. The fact that the
analytic elements of the intelligence community were understaffed and
underfunded emerged clearly, and you may have noted that we are actively
recruiting for personnel these days. Less noticeably, we have the funds
necessary to finance foreign travel, support conferences, let contracts, and
underwrite training-all essential to improving our capabilities. One major
benefit that stems from these more generous budget allocations is increased
interaction with the private sector, which helps to counteract a tendency to
insularity. And we have examined our own ways of doing business and made
some changes.
From my perspective, there are several key areas where I think we can
still do better. We don't put as much emphasis as I think we should on the
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
responsibility of analysts for guiding intelligence collection assets in an active
way. We have been habituated to making our best estimate of how a
particular situation will evolve; we need to move further than we have toward
examining less likely outcomes if they have significant implications. Examina-
tion of alternative outcomes has to leave room for the possibility that one or
another actor will have motives we do not fully understand or a view of the
"facts" we do not share. We still tend to seek consensus when "point-
counterpoint" might be more effective and helpful for our consumers. We are
presently well attuned to the policy process at the highest levels of govern-
ment, but we need to do better at forging links with policymakers at lower
levels, so we can find out what kinds of research and analysis can make the
greatest contribution to the process. We need to do better at ensuring that our
products reach the people who need them. And we need to encourage more
movement of people into the intelligence business at middle and senior levels
and more movement back and forth between the analytic, policy, academic,
scientific, and business communities.
We have our strengths as well. Critics notwithstanding, we have excellent
personnel. We work in a "can do" environment-intelligence analysts as a
group are willing to put out the effort to produce what is needed, when it is
needed, using the information available to them. They accept midnight phone
calls, canceled vacation plans, and wasted theater tickets as part of the job.
And we have been given a clean bill of health on the politicization issue by a
long string of investigators, including our oversight committees.2 We have
access to a massive amount of information that really does provide unique
insights into foreign capabilites and foreign intentions. In the studies I and my
group have done, we have consistently found more to praise than to criticize.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Evaluation
SOURCES
1. Wyden, Peter, Bay of Pigs-The Untold Story (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979).
2. Recent literature contains many good discussions of this issue. Among the best are Richard
Betts in "Analysis. War and Decision" (World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 1. October 1978)
(hereafter Betts, "Analysis"), and "Intelligence for Policymaking," (hereafter Betts, "Intelli-
gence") (Washington Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 3, Summer 1980) and Shlomo Gazit in "Estimates
and Fortunetelling in Intelligence Work" (International Security, VOL 4, No. 4, Spring 1980).
3. Harkabi, Yehoshafat, "The Intelligence-Policymaker Tangle," Jerusalem Quarterly, Num-
ber 30, Winter 1984.
4. Clint, Ray S., "Policy Without Intelligence," Foreign Policy, No. 17, Winter 1974-75.
5. U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities, Final Report, Book 1, 1976 (hereafter Senate SCI, Final Report).
6. Kissinger, Henry. For the Record: Selected Statements, 1977.1980 (Boston: Little, Brown,
1981).
7. Clausewitz, Carl von, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret
(Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1976).
8. op. cit., Betts, "Analysis.
9. Cline, Ray S., The CIA Under Reagan, Bush & Casey (Washington: Acropolis Books, Ltd,
1981) (hereafter Clint, CIA).
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (hereafter SSCI), Staff Report: "The Soviet Oil
Situation, an Evaluation of CIA Analyses of Soviet Oil Production" (hereafter "Soviet Oil"),
May 1978. '
10. Fischhoff, Baruch, "Hindsight Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment
Under Uncertainty," Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and
Performance, Vol. I, No. 3, 1975, and "For Those Condemned to Study the Put: Heuristics
and Biases in Hindsight" in Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, edited
by Fischhoff and others (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
Wohistetter, Roberta, Pearl Harbor. Warning and Decision (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1962).
11. op-cit., Cline, CIA.
Knorr, Klaus, "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Cuban Missiles."
World Politics, April 1964.
It Brandon, Henry, The Retreat of American Power (New York: Doubleday, 1973).
Kalb, Marvin and Kalb, Bernard, Kissinger (Boston: Little. Brown, 1974).
Powers, Thomas, The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms & the CIA (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1979).
13. Stech, Frank J., "Self Deception: The Other Side of the Coin," Washington Quarterly, Vol.
3. No. 3, Summer 1980.
14. op-cit., Fischhoff.
15. Garthoff, Raymond L. "Handling the Cienfuegos Crisis," International security, Vol. 8,
No. 1, Summer 1983.
16. Cline, Ray S., in "U.S. Intelligence Agencies and the Performance of the Intelligence
Community," Hearings Before the House Select Committee on Intelligence, 1975.
Kissinger, Henry, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982).
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Evaluation
17. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (hereafter HPSCI), Subcommittee on
Evaluation Staff Report: "Iran: Evaluation of U.S. Intelligence Performance Prior to
November 1978," 1979.
18. op. cit., Kissinger, Henry, For the Record.
19. Duffy, Gloria, "Crisis Mangling and the Cuban Brigade," International Security, Vol. 3,
No. 1, Summer 1983.
20. op. cit., Cline, CIA (Sino-Soviet, China nuclear, Sputnik).
op. cit., Powers (Arab-Israeli War, SS-9, Vietnam).
op. cit., Betts, "Intelligence" (SS-9).
21. op. cit., SSCL "Soviet OiL"
op. cit., Senate SCI, Final Report (Sinai).
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Security and
Scientific Affairs, Hearings: "The Role of Intelligence in the Foreign Policy Process," 1980
(Afghanistan).
Kondrace, Morton, "Tinker, Tinker, Tinker, Spy," New Republic, Nov. 28, 1983 (Poland).
Turner, Stanfield & Thibault, George, "Intelligence: The Right Rules," Foreign Policy, No.
48, Fall 1982 (Poland).
HPSCI, Subcommittee on Oversight, "Intelligence on the World Energy Future," Decem-
ber 1979.
HPSCI, Subcommittee on Oversight and Evaluation, Staff Report: "U.S. Intelligence
Performance on Central America: Achievements and Selected Instances of Concern,"
September 1982.
HPSCI. Annual Report to the House of Representatives, November 1980.
Latimer, Thomas K., "United States Intelligence Activities: The Role of Congress" in
Intelligence Policy and National Security, ed. by Robert L Pfaltzgraff, Jr. and others
(Archon Books, Hamden, Conn., 1981) (China/ Vietnam).
22, In addition to the sources cited under note 19, see HPSCI, Subcommittee on Oversight,
"Soviet Biological Warfare Activities," June 1980.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
r L Vl l l in %-.vc i5 Lu i+ci 5 Guide to the
Intelliaenoe Carrrtunity and
Its Products", a CIA
publication
E. Presentation
There are four broad categories of finished intelligence presented to
the consumer by the agencies listed in Section III of this guide:
1. Current intelligence essentially follows day-to-day events,
seeking to apprise the consumer of new developments, to deepen his
understanding of their background, to appraise their significance, to
warn of their near-term consequences, and to alert him to potentially
dangerous situations in the near future. Current intelligence answers
such questions as: What are present Turkish attitudes toward Cyprus?
Is tomorrow's mobilization in southern Peru an exercise or a prelude to
war with Chile? What is the meaning of today's statement from the
Iranian Oil Minister? Current intelligence is presented in daily, weekly,
and some monthly publications, and frequently in ad hoc oral briefings
to senior officials.
2. Estimative intelligence, often but by no means always enshrined
in National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), projects forward; it deals
with the unknown (but knowable) and with the unknowable: What are
the present Soviet capabilities for war against China? What is the likely
outcome of an Arab-Israeli war in 1985? Estimates may be briefed
orally, but the normal form of presentation is in a document which can
be cited as authoritative and which can be more or less formally
subscribed to or dissented from. NIEs and their "special" counterparts,
SNIEs, as well as estimative Interagency Memoranda, are produced
under the aegis of the National Intelligence Officers. NIEs and SNIEs
are reviewed and approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board
(see Section I.A. above).
3. Warning intelligence relates to warning of hostile attack against
the US or its allies, or to some other imminent major development
strongly inimical to US interests. As used in the Intelligence
Community, a warning notice or paper is assumed to carry such impact
that it will lead the consumer to consider taking some kind of action
immediately when he receives it. A warning notice also implies that the
Intelligence Community itself has already placed its assets on some
degree of alert to gather and analyze additional information about the
development.
4. Intelligence research is presented in monographs and cooperat-
ive studies from virtually all agencies. Research underpins both current
and estimative intelligence, grappling with such questions as: What are
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
the characteristics of the Soviet SS-X-20 missile system? Where are the
Arabs investing their oil profits? What is the political "base" of the new
Soviet Defense Minister? A vast amount of technical research on
foreign military matters is done within the Department of Defense to
assist in developing its own programs and in support of the services and
commands; this material seldom enters the general stream of national
intelligence production on its own. Much of the research done by and
for the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State
is for the direct support of the policy bureaus or for the Secretary
himself, but it also circulates in the Intelligence Community.
Basic intelligence, a subcategory of research, consists primarily of
the structured compilation of geographic, demographic, social, and
political data on foreign countries. This material is presented to the
consumer in the form of maps, atlases, handbooks, and even on
occasion sand-table models of terrain. The Office of Geographic and
Cartographic Research in CIA is a major resource for basic material of
this kind.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Fran a speech given at Brown
University cn 15 October 1981,
by William J. Casey
ai THE ESTIMATIVE PROCESS
The highest duty of a Director of Central Intelligence is to produce
solid and perceptive national intelligence estimates relevant to the issues
with which the President and the National Security Council need to concern
themselves.
Over the years and particularly during the last decade a lot of
criticism has been levied at our national intelligence estimates.
Much of the criticism is based on unrealistic expectations of what an
intelligence service can do. The CIA does not have powers of prophecy.
It has no crystal ball that can peer into the future with 20-20 sight. We
are dealing with "probable" developments.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
If we can't expect infallible prophecy from the nation's investment in
intelligence, what can we expect? We can expect foresight. We can expect
a careful definition of possibilities. We can expect professional analysis
which probes and weighs probabilities and assesses their implications. We
can expect analyses that assist the policymakers in devising ways to prepare
for and cope with the full range of probabilities. The President does not
need a single best view, a guru, or a prophet. The nation needs the best
analysis and the full range of views it can get.
The process of analysis and arriving at estimates needs to be made as
open and competitive as possible. We need to resist the bureaucratic urge
We don't need analysts spending their time finding a middle ground or
weasel words to conceal disagreement. Their time needs to go into evaluating
information -- searching for the meaning and the implications of events and
trends -- and expressing both their conclusions and their disagreements
clearly. The search to unify the intelligence community around a single
homogenized estimate serves policymakers badly. It buries valid differences,
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
forcing the intelligence product tQ the lowest or blandest common denominator.
The search for consensus also cultivates the myth of infallibility. It
implicitly promises a reliability that cannot be delivered. Too frequently,
it deprives the intelligence product of relevance and the policymaker of the
range of possibilities for which prudence requires that he -prepare.
Above all, the policymaker needs to be protected from the conventional
wisdom. Let me give you some horrible examples.
Before there was a CIA, Senator Brian McMahon and Lewis Strauss, then a
member of the Atomic Energy Commission, performed one of the most important
intelligence missions in the history of our nation. Together, they insisted
that we had to develop a program to monitor and detect all large explosions
that occurred at any place on the earth. We had to have that intelligence.
The first chance to perfect such a system was offered by tests which we
were planning to conduct.in the vicinity of Eniwetok in the spring of 1948.
A detection system was devised by the end of 1948 but the Air Force found
itself short of funds to procure instrumentation for the monitoring program
and that about a million dollars would be required to cempl ete it. Contracts
had to be let at once if the instruments were to be ready in time. Lewis Strauss,
a great patriot and Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, volunteered to
obligate himself for the million so that the contracts could be made firm
immediately. This effort was launched in the nick of time and in September
it established that an atomic explosion had occurred somewhere on the Asiatic
mainland and at some date between August 26 and 29, 1949.
Had there been no monitoring system in operation in 1949, Russian success
in that summer would have been unknown to us. In consequence, we would have
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
made no attempt to develop a thermonuclear weapon. It was our positive
intelligence that the Russians had exploded an atomic bomb which generated
the recommendation to develop the qualitatively superior hydrogen weapon --
thus to maintain our military superiority.
On January 30, 1950, President Truman made the decision to build the
bomb. We were able to test our first hydrogen bomb in November, 1952. The
Russians tested their first weapon involving a thermonuclear reaction the
following August.
Had we relied on the conventional wisdom about Soviet nuclear capability,
the Russian success in developing thermonuclear weapon capability in 1953
would have found the United States hopelessly outdistanced and the Soviet
military would have been in possession of weapons vastly more powerful and
devastating than any we had.
Early in 1962, John McCone, newly arrived as Director of Central
Intelligence, saw reports coming in about the arrival of anti-aircraft
weapons in Cuba. What are they there to protect, he wondered. There are
no targets there no~?;, he concluded, so they must intend to bring sornethir.g
there which will need to be attacked and hence will need to be defended.
Thus, he was many months ahead of anyone in Washington in predicting the
possibility that Moscow might base offensive missiles in Cuba. When Cuban
refugees brought reports that large missiles were being brought in and
installed, McCone considered this confirmation of his tentative forecast,
while everyone else in Washington dismissed them on the basis that the Soviets
would never do anything so foolish, until the U-2 pictures could not be denied.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
To protect against the conventional wisdom, CIA, military intelligence,
and every other element of the intelligence community should not only be
allowed to compete and surface differences, but be encouraged to do so.
The time has come to recognize that policymakers can easily sort through a
wide range of opinions. But, they cannot consider views and opinions they
do not receive.
The time has also come to recognize that the intelligence community has
no monopoly on truth, on insight, and on initiative in foreseeing what will
be relevant to policy. For that reason, we are in the process of reconstituting
a President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. It will be made up of
strong and experienced individuals with a wide range of relevant backgrounds.
To get all the intelligence we need, we've got to go beyond the formal
intelligence organizations. We've got to tap all the scholarly resources of
the nations and the perspectives and insights you develop from your activities
around the world. We're geared to do that in open and direct contact with
the campuses, the think tanks and the business organizations around the
country.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
Fran "The CIA and the U. S.
Intelligence System by
Scott D. Breckinridge
12
FINISHED INTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATES
The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) can be considered the
culmination of the intelligence process. Its purpose is to provide a
synthesis of the Intelligence Community's knowledge and wisdom, telling
policy levels what is known and what it means. Sherman Kent described
his understanding of the Estimate in the one section in his book, under
the section headed "Probable Courses of Action: Estimates."" Obviously,
if reliable predictions can be made about what another nation will do,
they are invaluable to those responsible for the conduct of national
foreign policy.
Given the uncertainties of intelligence, one can entertain some
reservation about Kent's description of the estimative product pointing
out "probable courses of action." One would prefer a description of
the conclusions as "most likely courses of action." Such a description
has something to do with the state of mind in which estimators approach
the analytical task, and with what policy-level consumers may feel
entitled to expect in the reports they receive.
The hazards of estimating future events have been stressed in the
preceding pages. Even if there is a report of a foreign leader's declared
intention to do a certain thing, problems encountered in implementing
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
SECRECY, ACTIVITIES, AND TECHNIQUES
the action may modify what actually is done, not to mention the influence
that colleagues may have on that judgment. Moreover, an opponent's
foreign policy may change in reaction to the United States' own response
to some initiative or act of preparation.
The American word estimate has acquired the connotation of pre-
diction, and some of those engaged in the work have come to believe
that prediction is what they unerringly can do. The temptation to speak
out clearly and to avoid "weasel words" sometimes causes one to make
categorical statements. When this tendency replaces the careful distinc-
tions of precise writing, it can prove embarrassing. The British, who
tend to be more conservative and precise in their use of the English
language, use the word appreciation to describe their review and appraisal
of a situation, and what it may mean for the future.
Sherman Kent was called to Washington to put his principles into
practice, and for about a quarter of a century presided over the center
of the Intelligence Community's estimative function, giving it form, life,
and purpose. His CIA Office of National Estimates (ONE) was unique,
with a senior Board of National Estimates composed of officers from
private life and other government agencies, supported by a staff of
experts who labored with the substantive problems. In 1973 the Office
of National Estimates was disbanded in favor of a new approach to the
work.
The strength of the ONE arrangement was, initially, its function as
a central mechanism for producing national estimates. Specialists on the
office's staff worked on their areas of special interest. The board members,
responsible for bringing to bear senior experience and knowledge of
attitudes and developments outside the relatively cloistered life of ONE,
had a direct influence on research. In addition, members of the board
usually chaired meetings within the Intelligence Community on the
various NIEs being processed. The ONE system provided direct and
substantive support, centrally, with access to the agencies in the Intel-
ligence Community. Among the perceived problems of the office was
the tendency for personnel to stay on instead of rotating to other
assignments after a period, as had originally been the practice. This
tendency was seen as developing an in-grown quality that placed staff
members at ONE increasingly out of touch with the activities and
interests of others in the Intelligence Community. A system of rotational
assignments might have prevented this problem. Some critics felt that
members of the staff also developed attitudinal biases on certain issues
in which objectivity was essential.34
Dissolving the Office of National Estimates seemed a drastic way
of handling the perceived problems, especially as the new arrangement
experienced some basic problems in the beginning. In place of a formally
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
organized office, the new approach consisted of a group of senior off,; e-
attached to the Office of the Director of Centra:.lnte'l,Rence T;-,?-?.
title;; National Intelligence Officers (NIOs)" and Here known cnlie,t:~c ,
as the National lrte4igence Council '- Each N1O was assigned ar area
in which he or she 'had special expertise Six N10. were res~ ~-~e
for specific geographic areas Africa. China-East Asia Latin Arneica
Near East and South Asia. USSR-Eastern Europe and Western Eu-:
Four NIOs had general assignments not described in a char: :+UhhcnYj
in late :98 : and three had special, responsi^illries Strategic rrog-am'
Genera; Purpose Forces and Warning rresurnahls the catego-lei n;
responsibility were subject to some variation to meet changing require-
ments.
In the earlier days of the system, its weaknesses were felt to be a
result of both the loss of direct control over staff-level support on
substantive matters and the reduction of institutional access to communi'v
resources (which, in turn, resulted from the loss of formal organization
behind the NIO). As the NIOs came from different agencies, they were
able to solve the problems incurred by loss of familiarity with the
Intelligence Community, which were thought to have become a collective
weakness of ONE. ONE had gathered a staff of superior writers over
the years, and when the office was dissolved that reservoir of talent
was lost. As a result, some of the papers produced by the new system
were criticized as being too ponderous (however well documented they
might have been as research papers) for busy policy-level consumers
to read and digest. It was felt that the personal access the NIOs had
to members of the Intelligence Community counterbalanced this problem
as the new system developed.
With the passage of time, in the way of all administrative orga-
nizations, a line of command developed within the National Intelligence
Council-including a Chairman and Vice-Chairman, who had clear roles
in organizing the work, and formalized procedures for coordinating
within the Intelligence Community. The terms of reference for proposed
NIEs are developed by this council, contributions to he used in preparing
draft NIEs are submitted by members in the Community, and one person
is designated to prepare a working draft for review at a coordination
meeting of representatives from members of the National Foreign In-
telligence Board. An agreed draft-when agreement exists-is prepared
for submission to the NFIB. Where there is disagreement, the points of
variance are set out clearly, thus highlighting the issues for policy levels.
But the overall objective remains unchanged, whatever the machinery.
This objective is the production of a clear summary of the subject,
consideration of its significance, and formulation of alternative future
developments. Sometimes the summary can provide a reliable forecast;
even in times of uncertainty, it still can highlight the issues. In some
cases it describes how foreign governments may react to various courses
of action from which U.S. policymakers must choose. This latter function
comes close to the making of policy, which must be handled carefully
in order to preserve the objectivity of the analytical effort.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
From "The Estii tive Process",
3 March 19 87 , orenared by
the National Intelligence
Council, CIA
THE ESTIMATIVE PROCESS
Interagency intelligence production of the country's National
Intelligence Estimates is centered in the National Intelligence Council
(NIC). The NIC serves the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in his
role as head of the US Intelligence Community not as Director of the CIA.
The NIC is comprised of a chairman, two vice-chairmen, and 16 National
Intelligence Officers (NIOs), their staffs, and a supporting Analytic
Group. Each NIO acts as the DCI's senior substantive officer in the
Intelligence Community, for either a geographic region of the world, a
transnational issue, or a specialized functional issue. There are six
regional NIOs plus ten NIOs for functional or transnational issues such as
Soviet strategic programs and science and technology. They serve as special
advisors to the DCI, and his representatives to the Community. They are
responsible for the development of all interagency intelligence estimates in
their area. They oversee the objectivity and integrity of the process that
produces these estimates.
Although the NIC is located at CIA Headquarters, its officers are drawn
from throughout the Intelligence Community (DIA, CIA, NSA, State, the
military services, etc.) as well as academia, outside think tanks, and the
business world. The Chairman of the NIC (C/NIC) is at present an Air Force
general officer. The role of the NIC, in particular its NIOs, is to work
with the Intelligence Community to produce quality, timely estimates
relevant to key questions affecting national security; these estimates look
ahead several months to several years and attempt to predict developments of
key importance to the United States.
The NIC, in conjunction with the Intelligence Community, produces five
types of coordinated Intelligence Communty papers:
National Intelligence Estimate NIE . NIEs deal with issues of
fundamental importance; they are fully coordinated within the
Intelligence Community and issued by the DCI upon the recommendation of
the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB).
Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE). SNIEs can have the same
characteristics as NIEs, but they are more urgent and accomplished in a
shorter period of time. They are usually specially requested by a
policymaker and produced in a matter of weeks or days.
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum (IIM). IIMs deal with more detailed
and focused topics than NIEs and SNIEs. They are produced by working
level representatives of NFIB agencies and generally do not require
formal NFIB review. They are normally approved by C/NIC.
Interagency Intelligence Assessments (IIA . IIAs are short estimates
produced very quickly when a more formal paper is inappropriate,
possibly involving less than all the NFIB agencies. They are approved
for publication by C/NIC.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Memorandum-to Holders (M/H). M/Hs to any of the products above are
updates where extensive a reconsideration is not required. M/Hs are
managed by the same procedures as their parent papers.
In order to be useful to policymakers, estimates must deal with the
topics that are relevant and timely, and must reach the right officials
before key decisions on the particular issue are made. Estimative topics
are generated in several ways. A policymaker or the DCI may ask the
Intelligence Community to take a thorough look at an issue; or the C/NIC or
an NIO--trying to anticipate policymakers' needs--may initiate an estimate.
Following the identification of the estimates to be produced, the key
stages in the estimative process are:
Concept Paper/Terms of Reference (CP/TOR). The CP indicates the
estimate's origins purpose and asks key questions to be answered; the
TORs outline in greater detail the central or pivotal issues to be
addressed in the estimate. The CP/TOR are reviewed by the Community;
representatives of National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) agencies
meet to discuss and amend them, and they are then approved by the DCI.
Writing of Estimates. The NIO supervising the draft selects a drafter
from the N IC, or from the analytic offices of the CIA or one of the
other agencies of the Intelligence Community. When the draft is
completed, it is reviewed by the NIO and the NIC's front office, and by
the DCI's Senior Review Panel (SRP)--whose members include former
ambassadors, general officers, and academicians. When possible,
estimates are also reviewed by specialists outside the Community to
provide fresh perspectives. Estimates accommodating these comments as
appropriate are sent to the DCI with a recommendation that they be sent
out to NFIB agencies for formal coordination.
Coordination. Formal coordination meetings with representatives from
the Intelligence Community are held, in which any differences are either
resolved or highlighted, with emphasis on the latter when they are
significant. Such dissenting views are clearly stated in the estimates
as alternative language or footnotes.
NFIB Approval. Once an estimate has been so coordinated, the DCI
reviews the paper. If he is satisfied with the quality of the product,
he submits it to NFIB principals for final coordination. NFIB,
comprised of the heads of the government's intelligence agencies,
reviews the estimate, sometimes challenges its judgments and adds
additional alternative language or footnotes, and recommends that the
DCI approve or remand it.
Feedback. Once an estimate is approved and published, feedback is
sought from the policymakers concerning the relevance of the analysis.
Further retrospective analysis is done as the topic is being prepared
for treatment again to determine how the Community's views may have
changed and why.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
From "The National Intelligence
Daily", 9 February 1987,
Drepared by the Directorate
of Intelligence, CIA.
The National Intelligence Daily
The Intelligence Cormmmity's primary vehicle for disseminating current
intelligence is the National Intelligence Daily. The NID is published every
morning except Sundays and holidays; it distills into 15 pages or so the
Commmity's information on and judgments about international political, economic,
military, and technological developments relevant to US policy interests.
The NID is the closest thing the government has to an insider's New York Times,
and for a while it was even produced in a tabloid newspaper format.
The Daily's designation as a "national" publication means that it conveys
the collective views of the Intelligence Conammity. The great majority of
items published in the NID are prepared by analysts at CIA. But each item
is reviewed in draft by, at least, the intelligence component of the Department
of State, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency.
Their formal concurrence is indicated on the last line of each item. The
Departments of Commerce, Treasury, and Energy also weigh in on subjects of
particular interest to them.
Most NID items, unless they are essentially analytic in content, are
formally divided into "fact" and "comment" sections. The reader is presented
first with the bare specifics of a story uncolored by analytic interpretation.
Analysts as well as readers can and do differ about the meaning of a set of
"facts." The NID accommodates interagency differences of this sort by
appending a dissenting paragraph -- with attribution -- to the originating
agency's analysis. Two or three longer, more interpretive pieces usually
occupy the last few pages of the NID. These judgments often have been
summarized from extensive research papers.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
The Daily is an "all source" document, incorporating information
from a variety of both openly available and classified reporting from human
and technical sources. The sensitive intelligence sources and methods involved
necessitate strict control -- and prompt return to CIA -- of every NID.
Duplication of any portion requires specific prior authorization.
The Daily is disseminated in its most highly classified version to a
hundred or so recipients at the deputy assistant secretary level and above.
Several hundred more copies of a "sanitized" version are published at a lower
level of classification. These copies will have sentences, paragraphs, or
even whole items deleted. The NID is also passed electrically -- with
differing levels of sanitization -- to US diplomatic and military installations.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
From "The President's Daily
Brief", 9 February 1987,
prepared by the Directorate
of Intelligence, CIA
The President's Daily Brief
The President's Daily Brief is our principal regular means
of conveying current intelligence to senior policy makers. It is
published six days a week and draws on the analytic expertise of
the entire Intelligence Directorate with occasional contributions
from the Operations Directorate.
The PDB now has a total of seven recipients, but it is very
much the President's publication and the only intelligence
community document he receives regularly each morning. As a
result, we try to stay in tune with his interests. A piece on
the Moroccan economy is more likely to run if King Hassan is here
in the next day or two. Stylistically, we keep individual entries
short for our busy readers, and we use as many maps, photographs
and charts as we can to illustrate our point.
PDB coverage parallels that of the National Intelligence
Daily, but its limited distribution enables us to include the
most sensitive intelligence reporting. Unlike the NID, the PDB is
a CIA product and is not coordinated in the Intelligence
Community. We are, however, sensitive to substantive differences
within the Community and try to ensure our readers are aware of
different points of view when they exist.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
At the President's order, the PDB also goes to the Vice
President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs, the President's Chief of Staff and his National
Security Adviser. In most of these cases, we actually take the
PDB to the individual's office and sit with him--one-on-one--
while he reads. This has provided valuable feedback for both
analysts and collectors, as well as an opportunity to get answers
quickly for our readers when there are questions.
The PDB is transmitted electrically to the seven readers
when they are traveling abroad or on vacation. We often ride
with them to meetings or see them at their homes on Saturdays or
holidays. Briefings have been held in the Secretary of Defense's
helicopter, and one rainy morning under an umbrella at the entry
to the National Press Club.
Our regular briefing sessions mean we can personalize the
service with intelligence reporting in addition to the PDB. Often
this involves updating items with information received after the
PDB has gone to bed at about 0400. It also means carrying
individual reports on subjects we have learned will be of
interest to one or more of the recipients.
It is the nature of our business that most of our reporting
is of wars and pestilence. Occasionally, we like to ease the
burden with a light-hearted item. One recent example was a
report from a small Caribbean nation about a security official
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
who was sure his country's problems were the result of UFOs and
who took counter-action with a shotgun--getting three geese in
the process.
More seriously, our relationship with senior policy makers
provides an unprecedented opportunity for service. It also makes
us very conscious of the need to maintain an independent and
unbiased view, to work hard to be policy relevant without being
policy prescriptive, and to have the courage to bring news of a
failed policy if that is what the evidence shows.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
JUN 1 9 1985
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Winter 1980, by
STAT
"Intelligence is like money and lone:
there is never enough."
- A Senior White House Official
AN OPPORTUNITY UNFULFILLED
The Use and Perceptions of Intelligence
Analysis at the White House
STAT
"Collection, processing and analysis all are directed at one goal-producing
accurate reliable intelligence.... Who are the customers who get this finished
product? At the very top, of the list is the President. He is, of course, the Central
Intelligence Agency's most important customer.-
-intelligence: The Acme of Skill
(CIA Information Pamphlet)
And what have our most important customers and their principal assistants had to
say about how well we achieve that goal?
"1 am not satisfied with the quality of our political intelligence."
- Jimmy Carter, 1978
"What the hell do those clowns do out there in Langley?"
- Richard Nixon. 1970
"In the 1960s and early 1970s, for eleven years in a row, the Central Intel-
ligence Agency underestimated the number of missiles the Russians would deploy;
at the same time the CIA also underestimated the totality of the Soviet program
effort and its ambitious goals.... Thanks in part to this intelligence blunder we will
find ourselves looking down the nuclear barrel in the mid-1980s."
- Richard Nixon. 1980
"CIA Director McCone .. , made recommendations for checking and improving
the quality of intelligence reporting. I promptly accepted the suggestions...."
- Lyndon Johnson, Memoirs
"During the rush of ... events in the final days of 1958, the Central Intel-
ligence Agency suggested for the first time that a Castro victory might not be in the
interests of the United States."
Dwight Eisenhower, Memoirs
"The Agency usually erred on the side of the interpretation fashionable in the
Washington Establishment.... The analytical side of the CIA ... generally re-
flected the most liberal school of thought in the government.... When warnings
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
Opportunity Unfulfilled
become too routine they lose all significance; when reports are not called specifically
to the attention of the top leadership they are Lost in bureaucratic background noise,
particularly since for every admonitory report one can probably find also its opposite
in the files."
- Henry Kissinger. Memoirs
"During the past year, I have seen no clandestine reporting from Soviet sources
that significantly influenced my judgment on how to deal with the Soviet
Union.... The Intelligence Community must find ways to sharpen and improve its
analysis.... We see too many papers on subjects peripheral to our interests.... Too
often the papers we see explain or review events in the past and give only a bare nod
to the future."
- Zbignier Brzezinski. 1978
During the darkest days of revelations about CIA by the Rockefeller Commission
and the Church and Pike Committees, professional intelligence officers clung to the
notion that, whatever misdeeds might have occurred, throughout its history CIA had
rendered exceptional service to American Presidents by producing the finest analysis
based on the best human and technical sources in the world. We judged our contribu-
tion to White House decisionmaking on issues of moment and events great and small,
and found it outstanding. This contribution made us. in our view, indispensable and
cemented a special relationship between several Presidents and CIA. Have we been so
long and so deeply mistaken? Has an entire Agency of people who specialize in
political nuance, subtle signals and human relationships deluded itself and over a
generation totally miscalculated the value of its work to six very different Presidents?
The above quotations would suggest so. After all, they did in fact say those terrible
things about us-and still are.
The way intelligence is processed at the White House and how it is received and
regarded behind the scenes has never been clear to CIA, even at senior levels, except
in broadest outline. It is time to lift a corner of that curtain in order that intelligence
professionals might better understand what happens at the White House to the prod-
uct of our collection nd analysis, what the President and his Assistant for National
Security Affairs expect, what they see, how it is processed, how they react-and,
finally, whether they really mean what they say about us.
SETTING THE SCENE
To understand how intelligence is used and regarded at the White House first
requires an understanding of the context in which it is received. The sheer volume of
paperwork addressed to the President is staggering. Hundreds of federal employees in
more than 200 agencies seek to draw his attention to this or that program, proposal or
vital piece of information. An astonishing amount of their work survives departmental
review and finds its way to the White House. There these papers join a river of
correspondence to the President from countless consultants, academics, think tanks,
political contacts, family and friends, political supporters, journalists, authors, foreign
leaders, and"concerned citizens. (Lest you think such correspondence can easily be
Disregarded, it is my view that most Presidents often attach as much-if not more-
credibillty to the views of family, (old) friends and private contacts as they do to those
of executive agencies. Vice President Rockefeller once asked my office if Denmark
really was planning to sell Greenland. Wondering all the while if he was in the market,
we confirmed with CIA that this rumor from a private source was untrue. But Rocke?
feller had taken it seriously.)
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Opportunity Unfulfilled
It is the responsibility of the Domestic Policy Staff, the NSC, other Executive
offices, and the White House Office itself to impose order on this avalanche of pulp
and to reduce it to proportions manageable by someone who works 13-16 hours a day,
often seven days a week. The NSC alone processes 7,000.10,000 "action" papers a
year-not including intelligence analyses or other purely "informational" papers. Dr.
Brzezinski once asked me to calculate how many pages of reading he sent to the
President weekly; the total averaged many hundreds of pages-and among White
House offices the NSC is among the most stringent with respect to the length and
number of items going to the President. These, then, are the first hurdles that an
intelligence product faces: a president with a heavy schedule, inundated by paper and
demands for decisions, surrounded by senior assistants who have as a main role trying
to keep that President from being overwhelmed by paper, and a President with vast
and varied non-intelligence sources upon which he also relies and in which he often
has considerable confidence.
The President routinely receives only one intelligence product that is not sum-
marized or commented upon by someone outside the Community: The President's
Daily Brief. He is handed this by his National Security Adviser early every morning.
along with a package that has varied little from President to President: F_
(Contrary to what is commonly believed, this is the only regularly
scheduled package of current intelligence the President receives during the day. How-
ever, through the course of the day. the National Security Adviser keeps the President
apprised of significant developments overseas and may handcarry especially impor-
tant cables directly to the President. In a crisis, the flow of information increases. More
analysis and reports will be given to the President. He will receive current intelligence
orally in meetings with his senior White House. State, Defense and Intelligence advis-
ers, as well as from the media-often the first source of information. Nevertheless, on
a day-to-day basis apart from the PD8, successive Presidents generally have seen only
that current intelligence selected by the National Security Adviser, who works to make
that morning package as succinct and small as he responsibly can.
It was not always this way-even in modern times. Before the Kennedy Admin-
istration, the President, his National Security Adviser and the NSC Staff relied almost
entirely on CIA and State to provide incoming current intelligence as soon as it was
processed by their operations centers and circulated to substantive officials who could
decide what to send to the White House. This system was revolutionized, however,
when President Kennedy created the White House Situation Room to which CIA.
State, NSA and the Pentagon began to provide unprocessed intelligence information
electronically. Thus, the NSC and President began receiving intelligence and diplo-
matic cables on developments abroad often as soon as, and often before, intelligence
analysts. (The present system is not without flaws, however. Henry Kissinger observes
in his memoirs, for expample, that, "It is a common myth that high officials are
informed immediately about significant events.... It happens not infrequently-
much too frequently for the security adviser's emotional stability-twat even the
President learns of a significant occurrence from the newspapers." He notes that
President Nixdn learned of the historic 1969 meeting in Beijing between Kosygin and
C~ u En-Lai when he read about it in The Washington Star. One result of the
establishment of the Situation Room was a significant diminution in the value of
current intelligence publications that to this day has not been fully grasped by the
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Opportunity Unfulfilled
Intelligence Community. Only analysis by experienced intelligence specialists lent
(and lends) value to current intelligence provided the White House. Daily publications
reporting purely factual information without trenchant analysis-apart from Situation
Reports on crises-too often have been duplicative, too late and irrelevant. Thanks to
the Situation Room, urgent information from abroad is often in the President's hands
before reaching the DCI, other senior intelligence officials, and sometimes the media.
Naturally, the President receives information through channels other than the
early morning folder and the occasional cable during the day For example. President
Carter routinely received current and longrange intelligence analysis through regular
briefings by the DCI. Such frequent sessions specifically devoted to analysis were an
innovation under Carter and provided an opportunity that did not exist before 197
for interchange among the President. Vice President, Secretary of State and National
Security Adviser on substantive intelligence issues. DCI Bush on occasion gave Presi-
dent Ford personal analytical briefings and, of course, analytical matters would often
come up spontaneously during Bush's twice-weekly meetings with the President. All
DCIs also have briefed the President and his senior advisers routinely in formal meet-
ings of the National Security Council. Moreover, discussion at such meetings serves to
convey information to the President from diverse sources. The President also receives
abbreviated versions of intelligence assessments which are included in policy options
papers.
President Carter saw fewer CIA assessments, NIEs. research papers and other
longer range studies than either Presidents Ford or Nixon. This is due primarily to
greater encouragement during the latter two Administrations for the NSC Staff to
prepare "Information Memoranda" summarizing for the President the salient points
of such longer intelligence papers and attaching the full text. The only longer intel-
ligence reports to reach President Carter were those the DCI delivered personally or
the infrequent instances when the National Security Adviser forwarded an exceptional
one for the President's reading. Thus, while under Nixon and Ford virtually no major
intelligence study reached the President without an NSC cover memorandum sum-
marizing it and perhaps making independent comments or judgments, many more
reports reached their desks than reached Mr. Carter. The NSC Staff was not encour-
aged to forward such studies, due in large measure to reluctance to burden the Presi-
dent with additional-and optional-reading: again, the consequence of the volume of
paper coming into the White House. This was due in part to President Carter's pen-
chant to read an entire paper-not just the summary-and the consequent effort to
avoid diverting him with "interesting" versus "essential" reading.
In sum, each of the last three Presidents has received through regular channels
only a tiny portion of published intelligence and only a fraction even of analysis
specifically prepared for senior policymakers. This has placed a premium on the
PDB-an opportunity neglected until recently-and on the willingness of the DCI to
give important assessments (published or oral) directly to the President or call them to
the direct attention of the National Security Adviser. (Even personal transmittal slips
to the latter are of little value since as everyone resorts to this device and thus render it
too common to be effective.) Disinterest or reluctance on the part of a DCI to take an
activist role-is a severe-even irreparable-handicap to ensuring that intelligence
assessments are read by the President and the National Security Adviser.
WHAT PRESIDENTS THINK OF WHAT THEY GET
Perhaps in recognition of how busy Presidents are for years there has been an
adage at the White House that the absence of criticism should be regarded as praise.
Along these lines, Presidential comment on intelligence assessments are so rare that we
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Opportunity Unfulfilled
are understandably tempted to assume satisfaction with what is being received.
Regrettably, however, this is doubtful. Many of the infrequent comments we do re-
ceive are critical and, more importantly, Presidents have repeatedly (during or after
their term of office) expressed general dissatisfaction with broad aspects of intelligence
analysis-as for example President Carter did in his well-known note to the Secretary
of State. DCI, and National Security Adviser in November 1978, and as President
Nixon did both while in office and in his memoirs. Mr Nixon often criticized -CIA
analysis of the Soviet Union and Europe for not being sufficiently "tough-minded."
Kissinger also presumably reflected both Nixon's and Ford's dissatisfaction when he
would assail CIA's failure to predict various developments or events abroad, or for
preparing "flabby" assessments that he regarded as written from the standpoint of a
bureaucrat of the subject country rather than of the United States Government.
These and other principals-note the introductory quotes of this article-also
have faulted the agency for lack of imagination in anticipating the needs of the
President and for insufficient aggressiveness in keeping itself informed on policy issues
under consideration. `either these Presidents nor their Assistants for National Security
Affairs felt it their responsibility to keep senior Agency officials well informed in this
regard, to provide day-to-day detailed tasking or to provide helpful feedback. The
Agency had to depend for such guidance on what the DCI could pick up in high-level
meetings and contacts-and the skill and interest of different DCIs has varied greatly
in both.
Of the three Administrations I served at the NSC. the Carter team worked most
conscientiously to. inform CIA of the analytical needs of the President and construc-
tively to advise the Agency of perceived shortcomings in its analysis, especially with
respect to subject, timing and form. President Carter personally communicated his
concerns and criticisms.
Pehaps the most comprehensive White House guidance (and indication of the
President's views) in recent years was provided by Dr. Brzezinski in January 1978,
when he sent a memorandum to the DCI that made the following points:
- Greater attention needs to be paid to clandestine collection targeted on the
thinking and planning of key leaders or groups in important advanced and
secondary countries, how they make policy decisions and how they will react
to U.S. decisions and those of other powers.
- Political analyses should be focused more on problems of particular concern to
the U.S. Government. Too many papers are on subjects peripheral to U.S.
interests or offer broad overviews not directly linked to particular problems,
events or developments of concern to the U.S. Government.
- There needs to be greater attention to the future. More papers are needed that
briefly set forth facts and evidence and then conclude with a well-informed
speculative essay on the implications for the future: "We expect and hope for
thought-provoking, reasonable views of the future based on what you know
about the past and present.... Analysts should not be timorous or bound by
convention."
STAT
.The Carter White House took other steps to ensure better communication of
high-level sybstantive concerns as well as perceptions of analytical shortcomings. The
Political Intelligence Working Croup, set up to organize remedial action in response to
the Presidents November 1978 note, interpreted its charter broadly and worked to
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Opportunity Unfulfilled
improve and better foc?+s field reporting hN State, ('I.A anel Attaches, to impreevr cover
so critical to good reporting; to resolve bureaucratic impediments to good reporting,
and a number of other issues aimed at improving analysis and making it more respon-
sive. As part of the work of this informal group, senior staff representatives of Dr.
Brzezinski met periodically with representatives of the Secre tars of State and the DCI
to review foreign developments or issues of current concern to the President and to
provide feedback on intelligence coverage. I believe all involved would agree that
these efforts had a salutary effect in improving communication between intelligence
and the White House and thus improving intelligence support to the President.
Presidents and their senior advisers will never be fulh content with intelligence
support and analysis. First, and despite occasional protestations to the contrary, Presi-
dents expect that for what they spend on intelligence, the end-product should be able
to predict all manner of coups, upheavals. riots, intentions. military moves and the like
with accuracy. Intellectually, they know most such specific events are incredibly hard
to predict-and that we are incredibly lucky when we do. Nevertheless, in the earls
morning hours when the National Securits Adviser must repair to the President's
study with the (usually) bad news about such events, the Chief Executive Will not
unnaturally wonder why his billions for intelligence do not spare him surprise.
Second. Presidents do not like internal controversy in the Executive Branch-
especially if it becomes public. And, from time to time. intelligence anals yes provoke
dispute. often in public. DCI Helms' disagreement With Secretary of Defense Laird a
decade ago before Congress on whether the SS-9 was a MIRY' or a \IIR\' is a case in
point. Internal Executive Branch disputes over energy estimates. technology transfer.
Soviet civil defense, and verification of aspects of SALT are others. Such controversies
have become more frequent as disputes to contain within the Executive Branch be-
come harder by virtue of greater Congressional access, journalistic aggressiveness and
leaks. The White House's general unease with unclassified CIA analysis is rooted in
this dislike for what is regarded as needless controversy. Our own citizens, not to
mention foreign readers, cannot be expected to assume that a CIA publication does not
reflect an official U.S. Covernment view-and this confusion is of concern to the
White House and often a public relations and policy headache. Thus, to the extent
intelligence analysis results (in White House eyes) in internal government controversy,
problems with the Congress, or embarrassing publicity, it will draw Presidential ire or
at a minimum leave the Chief Magistrate with unflattering and enduring feelings
toward intelligence.
Third, Presidents do not welcome new intelligence assessments undercutting poli-
cies based on earlier assessments. As professionals, we are constantly revisiting impor-
tant subjects as better and later information or improved analytical tools become
available- When this results in changing the statistical basis for the U.S. position in
MBFR, substantially elevating estimates of North Korean forces at a time when the
President is pressing to reduce U.S. forces in South Korea, or "discovering" a Soviet
brigade in Cuba, it is no revelation to observe that Presidents regard us less than
fondly. Presidents do not like surprises, especially those that undermine policy. Intel-
ligence is most often the bearer of such surprises-and pays the price such messengers
have suffered since antiquity.
Finally, successive Administrations have generally regarded with skeptical the
growing direct relationship between Congress and CIA above and beyond the actual
oversight process. In recent years, the provision of great quantities of highly sensitive
information and analysis to Members of Congress and their staffs has eroded the
Executive's longstanding advantage of a near monopoly of information on foreign
affairs and defense. The flow of information to the Hill has given the Congress a
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Opportunity Unfulfillfd
Powerful tool in its quest for a greater voice in the making of foreign and defense
policy vis-a-vis the Executive-and Presidents cannot he indifferent to the fact that
intelligence has prn%ided Congress with that tool and that the White House is nearly
helpless to blunt it accept in very rare cases.
OVERCOMINC ISOLATION (OURS) AND SUSPICION (THEIRS)
Presidents expect their intelligence service to provide timely, accurate and farsee-
ing analysis. Thus. nearly all Presidential comments on the quality of intelligence are
critical-prompted by our failure to meet expectations. Indeed, all but one quote at
the outset of this article was in response to a specific situation where intelligence was
perceived to have failed to measure sup. In short. Presidents often consider intelligence
as much another problem bureaucracy to be dealt with and warily watched as it is a
source of helpful information, insight and support.
To the relent intelligence professionals isolate themselves from White
House. NSC officials and are unresponsive to White House analytical needs, this
adversarial nature of the relationship will be emphasized and understanding of what
we can and cannot do will be lacking. Thus, the Intelligence Community must take
the initiative to establish and maintain close personal ties to White House and NSC
officials from the President on down. It must also aggressively seek new ways to stet
the maximum amount of analysis before the President. even while experimenting with
old mechanisms. such as the P08. White House procedures and relationships are
always dynamic: accordingly. we must alwas s be searching for new and better was to
serve Our principal customer.
Although the routine order of business and internal organization may vary greatly
from Administration to Administration. I would suggest se%eral general rules:
Senior intelligence officials must establish and maintain a network of personal
contacts in the NSC Staff and the immediate office of the National Security
Adviser to ensure that we are well informed as to the issues of concern to the
President; policy matters under consideration in which intelligence analysis
can make a contribution. and the overall foreign and defense affairs agenda so
that we can anticipate the President's nerds.
? For intelligence to be useful, it most he timely. Insofar as policy issues.
foreign visitors and such are involved, often a day or two makes the
difference between a vital or irrelevant contribution.
? Periodic visits to NSC staffers on a quarterly, semiannual, or annual basis
to seek guidance during the coming period is worse than useless; they can
be misleading and eventually waste valuable analytical resources. Most
NsC: staffers do not think about their work in these terms. The ordinary
result of such an approach is that the staffer will respond off the top of
the head (or off the wall) or ask for work related to what he has just
completed or knows to be in his in-lux. We will du ourselves more good
by establishing daily dialogue.
? Similarly, as has been done occasionally in the past, the terms of ref-
erence of major papers should hr shared with the \SC to ensure that
N hat we have in mind best meets the policy nerd and to obtain sugge-s-
tioijus of additional points to be covered to be mint helpful.
The role of the DC! is central to understandings the President's meths and
conveying analysis to him. Few DCIs before Admiral Turner took a sustained
inCeri-jr in analysis or an active role in getting substantive matters before the
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Opportunity Unfulfilled
President either orally or in writing Few have been so brash as literally to
hand the President published intelligence reports to read. Future DCIs must
be persuaded that these undertakings are central to their role as the President's
principal intelligence adviser Moreover. the DCI should assume a similar role
with the National Security Adviser-perhaps the best source of information on
issues of topical interest to the President and the foreign affairs and defense
agenda. Finally, the importance of routine, detailed feedback by the DCI
from policy meetings, briefings and conversations with the President. Vice
President, Secretary of State. Secretary of Defense, the National Security Ad-
viser and Chairman, ]CS to analytical managers. NIOs and' senior analysts
must be impressed upon DCIs. The dearth of feedback before 1977 was dam-
aging to our work and contributed to a sense "downtown'- that we were un-
helpful and unresponsive. Contrary to the views of some intelligence pro-
fessionals, We cannot properly do our work in splendid isolation.
- We must exploit every opportunity to get analysis to the President. When
exceptional analysis is available, an appropriate senior intelligence official
should telephone his personal contact(s) noted above and alert him to the
paper (but judiciously to preserve credibility). Meanwhile. DCI briefings. NSC
meetings, intelligence contributions or annexes to policy options papers, type-
script memoranda, spot reports, and all Other mrans need to be used to get
information to the Security Adviser and to the President.
- Intelligence should be unafraid to speculate on the future. Everyone else
around the President does-and most are far less experienced or capable an-
alysts than we. A preferred approach would be to alternative futures and then
above all state clearly our best estimate, however we caveat it. Waffling
conclusions have too long made intelligence estimates a laughingstock among
policy makers. "On the one hand ... but on the other ... " is no help to a
policy maker and clearly undermines confidence in our analytical capacity. if
we have no confidence in our judgment, why should the Presidents
- In all but two or three cases National Intelligence Estimates as presently pre-
pared have been ignored by the White House in recent years. They are usually
too late, too formalistic, and too equivocal to be of value to senior
policymakers-much less the President or his Security Adviser. This need not
be so. A return to the practice of issuing brief, short-deadline special NIFs that
would focus on specific policy relevant issues would mean that intelligence
would be available before decisions are made-and would better serve the
President and his senior advisers. It would also ensure that the intelligence
assessment is not buried in long options papers which rarely reach the Presi-
dent anyway.
-Such SNIEs would have to be disseminated on a restrictive basis. On
important issues, the circle of policy players is kept small; the contribu-
tion of any intelligence paper will be enhanced by its limited circulation
and, more importantly, by the perception by its readers of its limited
high-level readership. If the President or his closest advisers make a spe-
cial request of analysis, they do not like to see a response apparently
published in the hundreds of copies. We are mistaken as well when we
become preoccupied with format and presentation to the detriment of
analytical (vice reportorial) content-a problem in the past.
- The responsibility for making intelligence more relevant, timely and helpful is
that of senior officials of the Intelligence Community alone. Analysts and
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Opportunity Unfulfilled
managers at all levels must assume the burden of keeping better up to date on
events and policy issues relevant to their area of professional concern. Such
awareness must infuse all analysis from drafter to Director. Only when prior-
ity attention is given at all levels to the relevance and value of intelligence to
tlw consumer from President to desk officer will intelligence analysis be better
received and, in the end, be better.
The above "rules" apply to doing our work better. They will not resolve the
several causes of Presidential displeasure-our support of Congress. changing assess-
ments that have policy implications, surprises, and so forth. Even here there are some
steps we can take. For example:
We should take the initiative to let the Security Adviser or the NSC Staff know
that we are- preparing an estimate or other form of analysis that will revise
earlier assessments and have an impact on the President's policies. This would
include advance warning of new and important conclusionsjn military es-
timates.
- Intelligence needs to develop a mechanism for better informing the White
House about support provided to the Congress. The intelligence agencies are
part of the -Executive Branch, the DCI is appointed by and reports to the
President. It is not improper or inappropriate for us to keep the President's
foreign affairs staff more completely and regularly advised of papers we pro-
vide the Congress, possibly controversial testimony or briefings, etc. Again,
some of this has been done-but a mere schedule of planned appearances or
an occasional phone call are not enough. Keeping the Executive informed
about our dealings with Congress is an important aspect of building Presiden-
tial confidence that we are not trying to undercut him or his policies by
responding to legitimate Congressional requests.
Finally, it would be helpful to continue keeping the White House informed in
advance when we plan to publish an unclassified substantive intelligence and
to highlight possible controversial points. This will become important as pres-
sure for such unclassified publications increases. We should acquiesce in those
rare circumstances in which the Security Adviser or the President asks us not
to publish certain information for public consumption. Our charter is to serve
the President and, secondarily, the Congress. Once information and analysis is
provided to them, our responsibility is fulfilled. Unclassified publications are
Indeed a public service but also, frankly, a public relations enterprise. If such a
service/enterprise complicates life for the President, we should be prepared to
forgo it. Only a fraction of unclassified publications would be affected-and
our willingness to withhold them would help build confidence at the White
House that we seek to be supportive.
Although several of the above "rules" and suggestions may be controversial, the
reader should be aware that all have been pursued by CIA at one time or another and
by one official or another. I wish to emphasize that haphazard. occasional im-
plementation has not ameliorated the underlying suspicion and dissatisfaction of
successive Presidents and their advisers with intelligence analysis or their perception
that'weoften peddle our product to the Congress and public in a freewheeling manner
designed to benefit us, regardless of the problems caused the policymaker.
Spme will argue that the steps I -propose would subvert the independence of the
analysis process and subordinate our judgments to policy considerations. That is not sol
25
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
Opportunity Unfulfilled
None implies any interference with the analyst or his judgments-.except to make the
latter relevant to the needs of the President and to improve the odds someone at the
White House will value the analyst's work. Most are intended to allot the analyst his
rightful voice in policy deliberations and to ensure that receptivity to his work is not
diminished by irritation or pique resulting from controversy we have sparked on the
Hill; the White House being caught unawares by analysis that undercuts policies based
on earlier intelligence conclusions; or because the White House has been embarrassed
by publication of unclassified analysis.
Above all. we in intelligence should appreciate the primacy of personal relation-
ships in making government work. We have neglected to develop fully such relation-
ships at the White House and NSC in recent years-although of course there have
been exceptions. We must pursue such contacts-bearing in mind that we start all
over every four or eight years and. indeed, every month as familiar faces at CIA and
downtown are replaced by new These personal contacts and a greater sensitivity to
White House needs and perceptions (including of us) are essential to mitigating Presi-
dential criticism and ensuring that the best possible intelligence product in fact
reaches our "most important customer" in time to make a difference
STAT
STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
Fran "Intelligence: Policy and
Process" edited by Maurer;
Tunstall and Keagle, article
by Hans Heymann
Intelligence/Policy Relationships
If we in intelligence were one day given three wishes, they
would be to know everything, to be believed when we spoke,
and in such a way to exercise an influence to the good in the
matter of policy. But absent the Good Fairy, we sometimes get
the order of our unarticulated wishes mixed. Often we feel the
desire to influence policy and perhaps just stop wishing there.
This is too bad, because to wish simply for influence can, and
upon occasion does, get intelligence to the place where it can
have no influence whatever. By striving too hard in this
direction, intelligence may come to seem just another policy
voice, and an unwanted one at that.
-Sherman Kentl
In the catechism of the intelligence officer, the thesis that
intelligence is and should be strictly separate from policy is taken as
axiomatic. It is as hallowed in the theology of intelligence as the
doctrine of the separation of church and state is in the U.S.
Constitution. For much of our early history we tended, somewhat
self-righteously, to view intelligence as objective, disinterested, and
dispassionate and, somewhat disdainfully, to regard policy as slanted,
adulterated, and politicized. We strove mightily to maintain the
much-touted arm's-length relationship with policy, believing that
proximity to policy would corrupt the independence of our intelligence
judgments. Indeed, legend has it that members of the Board of
National Estimates of the 1950s and 1960s systematically discouraged
analysts and estimators from going downtown to have lunch with
policymakers, for fear that such exposure would make them policy
advocates and tempt them to serve power rather than truth.
Whatever the validity of this legend, such strictures were quite in
keeping with the traditional view of a proper intelligence/policy
relationship. By enforcing this kind of rigorous separation, the old
Board of National Estimates no doubt hoped to protect the policy
neutrality of intelligence; what it did was to impose a splendid
isolation upon intelligence that ensured its eventual policy irrelevance.
The vanishing applause for its product coming from the policy side
prompted intelligence to reexamine its assumptions, and a new,
unconventional wisdom came to be heard. Its message was that our
faith in the arm's-length relationship was misplaced, that no such
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
relationship really ever existed, and that close ties between
intelligence and policy are not only inevitable but also essential if the
polleymakers' needs are to be served.
A new way of thinking about intelligence and policy emerged, in
which the two communities were seen as awkwardly entangled and
Intertwined in what might be described as a competitive and often
eonflictual symbiotic relationship. Thomas Hughes put it most aptly
when he spoke of the relationship "as a two-way search: of
intelligence in search of some policy to influence and of policy in
search of some intelligence for support "2 Suddenly defunct is the
comforting illusion that intelligence stands outside of and above the
policy fray, that it can load analytic and estimative ammunition on its
wagon and let the wagon roll down in the general direction of the
battle without worrying where it will come to rest, whether the
ammunition is of the right caliber, or how it will be used-to say
nothing of whether someone might shoot it back. In place of that
illusion is the less comfortable notion that if it is to be at all
relevant to policy, intelligence must participate in the battle; it must
be attuned to the strategy and tactics being pursued; and it is by no
means invulnerable to being seesawed and whiplashed in the
sociopolitical tug of war known as the policymaking process.
How this process unfolds in the real world and the intricate ways
in which intelligence interacts with it have been the subject of some
first-rate analytic writing. Within the past decade, three contributions
to this literature on intelligence and foreign policy are particularly
worthy of note:
1. First is the observation, vividly illustrated by Thomas
Hughes,3 that the intelligence community is no more a unitary actor
than is the policy community, and that it should instead be seen as a
Hydra-headed agglomeration of competing institutions often at odds
with each other and not necessarily falling into predictable patterns.
In studying the budgetary, organizational, and substantive struggles
within this community, Hughes notes that
the cross-cutting complexities were striking: position disputes
within agencies, alliances shifting with issues, personal strayings
from organizational loyalties, hierarchical differences between
superiors and subordinates, horizontal rather than vertical
affinities, and much ad hoc reaching for sustenance somewhere
outside. Thus, while the struggles within the intelligence
community sometimes mirrored simultaneous struggles in the larger
policy community, they did so by no means invariably and never
symmetrically.
It should not be astonishing, therefore, to find that policymakers view
the intelligence process with as much ambivalence and suspicion as
intelligence makers perceive the policy process, and that the
interactions among them tend to be contentious and rivalrous. To
quote again from Hughes:
Viewed from above by the ranking policy-makers, the intelligence
community often seemed cumbersome, expensive, loquacious,
probing, querulous, and at times axe-grinding. Viewer from below
by the intelligence experts, the policy community often seemed
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
determined to ignore evidence plainly before it-or (even worse)
to mistake the intelligence managers for the experts. Viewed
from in between at the intelligence-policy interface, it looked
like controlled chaos-and not surprisingly-for here was where
means and ends were brokered jurisdictional rivalries
compromised, contentious controversies delineated .4
2. Second is the thesis, persuasively argued by Richard Betts,5
that so-called intelligence failures are more often than not policy
failures; to put it more gently, it is usually impossible to disentangle
intelligence failures from policy failures, since (intelligence) analysis
and (policy) decisions are interactive rather than sequential processes.
Betts sees the intelligence role as seeking "to extract certainty from
uncertainty and to facilitate coherent decision' in an incoherent
environment." In seeking to reduce uncertainty, intelligence is often
forced to extrapolate from evidence that is riddled with ambiguities.
Inability to resolve these ambiguities leads to intelligence products
that oversimplify reality and fail to alert the policy consumers of
these products to the dangers that lurk within the ambiguities.
Critical mistakes are consequently made by policymakers who, faced
with ambiguities, will substitute wishful thinking and their own
premises and preconceptions for the assessments of professional
analysts. As Betts puts it, "Because it is the job of decision-makers
to decide, they cannot react to ambiguity by deferring judgement
. When a welter of fragmentary evidence offers support to various
interpretations, ambiguity is exploited by wishfulness. The greater the
ambiguity, the greater the impact of preconceptions"6
3. A third example is the recent revelation, in a strikingly
outspoken article by Yehoshafat Harkabi (Israeli scholar and former
chief of Israeli Military Intelligence and adviser to the Israeli Prime
Minister)7 that the tense and ambivalent relationship between
intelligence and policy is not a uniquely American phenomenon.
Reacting sharply to the highly critical Kahan Commission report and
its public indictment of the performance of the Israeli Defense Force's
Intelligence chief of the Yom Kippur war, Harkabi argues that the
greater fault lay with the policy side. His observations, made in an
Israeli political setting, reveal some of the same peculiarities of the
intelligence/policy relationship noted earlier by Hughes and Betts. To
wit:
1. The selective rejection of intelligence by policy consu:ers:
What they often look for is not so much data on the basis of which to
shape policy, but rather support for preformed political and ideological
conceptions.
2. The importance of preconceptions; Matters get worse the
more ideologically motivated is the regime, for then policy is made
more on the basis of ideological inputs than on the basis of
intelligence reportings on reality which, to the extent that they
contradict the ideology, may be discarded, and the intelligence service
ends up frustrated.
3. Policy's resistance to change: Policy can be judged according
to the extent of its "sensitivity" to intelligence. Will it change if a
certain (intelligence) evaluation requires such a change? As a
concrete example, what intelligence reporting could induce a change in
Israel's present policy on Judea and Samaria? Does the rigidity of a
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
political position make it impervious to intelligence? In short, good
intelligence is no guarantee of good policy, and vice versa.
4. The pros and cons of intelligence/policy intimacy at the top:
Presumably it is good that the chief of the intelligence service be on
Close terms with the policymakers and have their trust. However, such
bosom companionship also has its drawbacks. True, the more the
polleymaker is a part of the inner Byzantine court that develops as a
matter of course around state chiefs, the greater is his or her
influence;, however, the policymaker then also loses perspective as well
as independent critical vision, and gradually succumbs to the
conceptions of the policymakers.
The dilemmas and foibles associated with the intelligence/policy
interface are hardly novel or startling to seasoned intelligence
practitioners, especially those senior officers charged with "brokering"
the intelligence/policy relationship-the communicators and interactants
who reside in the twilight zone between intelligence and policy. For
them, this is familiar terrain. As managers and stimulators of
intelligence production, they know with what difficulty a crisp, lucid
analytic product is extracted from a dissentious community; as
participants in the interagency policy process, they observe the ease
with which that product can be selectively utilized, tendentiously
summarized, or subtly denigrated. But for these privileged
practitioners who move readily from the world of analysis to the world
of action, familiarity with policy does not breed contempt. Rather, an
appreciation of the murky and frenetic policy environment tends to
evoke a certain sympathy for the policymakers' plight.
However, such knowledgeable, involved practitioners represent
only a very small traction of the intelligence population. The vast
majority of that population-Collectors, operators, and analysts-is
essentially isolated from the hurly-burly of the policy process. The
intelligence services at large, therefore, are often mystified and
frustrated by the policymakers' perennial unhappiness with their
product. Given this puzzlement, it seems worthwhile to try to delve a
little more deeply into the reasons for such unhappiness.
THE VIEW FROM THE BRIDGE
Clearly, policy does not speak with a single voice. Policies have
multiple authors. The numerous players who take part in policy
formulation differ in temperament, education, and experience, as well
as in personal and institutional loyalties. As a consequence, their
attitudes toward intelligence and their propensity to accept or reject
its assessments will also vary widely. Nevertheless, although
generalizations are always hazardous, we can discern some common
attributes and concerns of policymakers, especially the "national
security principals"8-the key players at the highest levels of
government-that predispose policymakers to react to intelligence
offerings in predictable ways.
First, key decisionmakers are political leaders who have risen to
their positions by being decisive, aggressive, and self-confident rather
than reflective, introspective, and self-doubting. They attribute their
success at least in part to their tried and proven ways of thinking, to
the simplified models and paradigms that explain to them what makes
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
the world go 'round. They often regard themselves as their own best
analysts and hence tend to be distrustful of the untested and often
counterintuitive judgments of the intelligence professionals.
Second, they have a strong vested interest in the success of their
policies and will be disproportionately receptive to intelligence that
"supports" these policies. They bear the burdens of great responsibility
and find themselves perpetually embattled with a host of critics,
competitors, and opponents, all eagerly looking for chinks in their
armor. They thrive on optimists and boosters but encounter mostly
alarmists and carping critics.
Festooned in this way, and operating in so hostile an
environment, these highest-level consumers of intelligence can hardly
be blamed for responding to its product with something less than
boundless enthusiasm. In fact, it can be documented that every
president since Eisenhower, and virtually every secretary of state since
Acheson, has expressed dissatisfaction and irritation with intelligence
analysis, either in his memoirs or in public or semipublic statements.
The best-remembered and most widely quoted expostulation was
reported to have been delivered by Lyndon Johnson to his director of
Central Intelligence at a White House dinner: "Policy making is like
milking a fat cow. You see the milk coming out, you press more and
the milk bubbles and flows, and just as the bucket is full, the cow
with its tail whips the bucket and all is spilled. That's what CIA does
to policy making "9
Is intelligence at fault for creating this unhappiness? Should it
alter its ways to court greater popularity? Or is the problem integral
and endemic to the intelligence/policy relationship? The answers to
these questions may become clearer as we look at some of the
concrete ways in which the frictions arise.
WHY POLICY RESENTS INTELLIGENCE: FIVE WAYS TO BE
UNPOPULAR
Presidents and their senior advisers will be unhappy with
intelligence when it is not supportive of their policies. They will feel
particularly frustrated under the following circumstances.
When Intelligence Fails to Reduce Uncertainty
Policymakers operate under a burden of jervasive uncertainty,
much of it threatening to the viability of their policies. They are
forever hopeful that someone will relieve them of some of this
uncertainty, and so they look to intelligence for what common sense
tells them should be reserved to augury and divination. Forecasting,
to be sure, is the lifeblood of the intelligence estimator; but there is
a world of difference between a forecast (an analytic judgment resting
on carefully defined assumptions) and an oracular prophecy (secured by
divine inspiration). Unfortunately, much of what is expected of
intelligence by policymakers occupies this latter realm.
A good example is the perennial complaint that intelligence failed
to predict a coup d'etat-that is, a coercive regime change or palace
uprising; but, of course, a coup is typically a conspiratorial act thet
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
depends for its success on the preservation of secrecy. If intelligence
gets wind of such an event, it means that secrecy has been
compromised and that the coup is almost certain to fail.
Intelligence forecasting is actually done quite respectably by the
community and can be of real value to the thoughtful policy analyst.
When it stays within its legitimate bounds of identifying and
illuminating alternative outcomes, assigning subjective probabilities to
them, and exploring their possible implications for U.S. policy, the
decisionmakers are well served; but the decisionmakers themselves will
rarely think so. For such a forecast, far from narrowing uncertainty,
will make them aware of the full range of uncertainty they face and
render their calculations more difficult rather than easier. Indeed,
much intelligence estimation is and must be of this nature. Precisely
because it seeks to reflect complex reality, its product often makes
for hardship in the lives of harassed decisionmakers.
When Intelligence Restricts Options
Every new administration comes into office with a national
security agenda of its own, bent upon putting its mark on the nation's
foreign policy. It believes that a significant shift in that policy is
both desirable and possible. It will encounter a foreign policy
bureaucracy (including intelligence) that believes it is neither.
Intelligence professionals will greet the administration's new policy
initiatives with cogent analyses, showing how vigorously allies will
oppose these new policies, how resolutely neutrals will pervert then. to
their own ends, and how effectively adversaries will blunt them. At
every step, it will appear to the policy leaders that intelligence fights
them, seeks to fence them in, and, indeed, helps them fail.
The pattern persists. As the policy leaders face unexpected
foreign challenges, their quick responses will often be met with more
intelligence assessments that seem to be saying "it didn't work" or "it
will almost certainly not succeed." The decisionmakers will conclude
that intelligence not only constricts their room for maneuver but arms
their political opponents as well. Worst of all, it constantly and
annoyingly reminds them of their limited capacity to influence events.
No matter how well the interaction may serve the interests of sound
policy, there is no question that it builds tension between the two
sides.
In these encounters, we should acknowledge that intelligence does
not always "know better." There are times when intelligence is
unaware that stated objectives are not real objectives of policy and
will leave out of its analysis elements of the picture that may be
important to the decisionmakers. Presidents paint upon a canvas far
larger than the particular segments on which intelligence tends to
focus. The assessments of intelligence, therefore, may be quite valid
for those segments, but they may also miss broader considerations that
presidents care about.
The Carter administration's proposal to impose sanctions-including
a grain embargo-on the Soviet Union in response to their invasion of
Afghanistan provides a vivid example. The stated objective was to
penalize the offender by imposing political and economic costs on him.
When intelligence was asked to assess the potential impact of the
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87M01007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
sanctions package, it responded with a judgment, the thrust of which
was that the sanctions package would not be an effective instrument.
It was argued that without solid participation by our allies, sanctions
would do no serious damage to the Soviet economy nor impair the
leadership's objectives in any significant way. Not surprisingly,
President Carter gave the assessment a rather frigid reception, and the
assessment's negative judgments turned out to be a less than decisive
factor in his calculus. From the president's perspective, the sanctions
package was just right. He considered a highly visible response to
Afghanistan to be imperative, but it also had to be low risk. A
military undertaking was ruled out as far too hazardous. Inaction was
ruled out because it would signal to the rest of the world the
existence of U.S. irresolution and condonement. The sanctions, though
unsatisfying in terms of direct effects, would convey a strong sense of
disapprobation and censure, without engendering worrisome
consequences. It would satisfy the popular need to express the
nation's sense of outrage and would portray the president as willing to
take the political heat of angering an important domestic
constituency-the farmers-for the sake of a foreign issue of principle.
Intelligence could not then, and can never, be expected to take such
considerations into account.
When Intelligence Undercuts Policies
Administrations have often found that intelligence analyses appear
at times and in various ways unhelpful to the pursuit of policies on
which they had embarked. This can happen in two ways: (1) through
a genuine and protracted divergence of intelligence judgments from
publicly stated administration views of it given situation, and (2)
through fortuity or inadvertence.
An example of the first phenomenon was provided by the stubborn
independence displayed by the intelligence community in the early
phases of the Vietnam escalation in 1964-1965, when its national
intelligence estimates consistently offered up a far more pessimistic
assessment of North Vietnamese staying power than was reflected in
the Johnson administration's public assertions. Although this divergence
between intelligence and policy did not become public knowledge until
the infamous appearance of the Pentagon Papers in 197i, the
intelligence performance of the mid-1960s evoked considerable disquiet
and chagrin among policy insiders at the time.
The days of such protracted differences of view between
intelligence and policy are probably over. In the intelligence,'policy
environment of the 1980s, it seems highly unlikely that a divergence of
assessment could be sustained for very long. Congressional oversight
and its intimate access to intelligence analysis would bring any
significant disparities quickly to the surface and thus cause their, to be
resolved.
The other cause, policy undercutting by fortuity and inadvertence,
is more likely to survive as it constitutes a matter of human frailty.
Sometimes it is merely a question of miserable timing-as in the classic
case of the intelligence reassessment of North Korean militar\ forces
that credited them with substantially greater capabilities than. ha_ been
previously appreciated. The estimate was fine, but it just happened to
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
"hit the street" within a week of President Carter's announcement of
his controversial decision to begin withdrawal of U.S. forces from
South Korea. A pure coincidence, but it caused understandable
consternation.
At other times, this policy undercutting is a matter of
Inattention-as in the so-called discovery of the Soviet brigade in
Cuba, which, it turned out later, had been there all along. Issues of
this kind, seemingly unimportant, can suddenly escalate into heated
public controversy and make life difficult for the policy leaders.
However minor the transgression, they will regard Intelligence less
fondly thereafter.
When intelligence Provokes Public Controversy
From time to time, routine differences within the community over
how to interpret ambiguous intelligence evidence turns into heated, and
perhaps even acrimonious, debate. When the competing interpretations
clearly affect important policy issues, the internal controversy can
easily spill over into the public arena. In the 1950s and 1960s, when
what transpired in the world of intelligence remained largely opaque,
such disputes could easily be contained within the executive branch.
Now, with the progressive "opening up" of intelligence through
Congress and the media, and through its more visible involvement with
policy, a disputation within the community soon finds itself drawn into
and exploited by the public debate, often in ways that make life more
difficult for the national security policymakers.
Examples of policy-relevant debates that have been stimulated or
intensified by intelligence controversy come quickly to mind: whether
the Tupolev Backfire bomber is an intermediate range or an
intercontinental-capable bomber; whether extensive Soviet civil defense
preparations add up to enhanced "survivability" for Soviet society; how
significantly Western technology contributes to the growth of the
Soviet economy and its military power; whether Western calculations of
Soviet military spending adequately reflect the real size and burden of
Soviet defense; and to what extent the Soviet natural gas pipeline will
aggravate Western Europe's dependence on imported energy.
This brief sampling is sufficient to show that the issues in
dispute often bear on strategic, budgetary, arms control, or economic
policy decisions important to an administration's overall strategy. To
the extent that intelligence controversy helps arm the opposition in
such disputes, its contribution is not exactly appreciated.
When Intelligence Fails to Persuade
Ever since John F. Kennedy's tour de force in unveiling
photographic intelligence on the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba to
a hushed UN audience, successive administrations have sought to
emulate that feat. Although the results have been mixed at best, hope
springs eternal that a release of intelligence findings or a public
display of exotic evidence will enlighten an uninformed or misinformed
public, win over a cynical journalist, or convince a skeptical member
of Congress. The intelligence product now finds its way into the
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
public domain through more and more channels and in ever greater
volume-most of it, of course, at the instigation and under the aegis of
the policy community. It moves through such vehicles as press
conferences, media briefings and beckgrounders, testimony on the Hill,
formal reports to Congress, and official glossy publications widely
disseminated.
In a general way, this sea change in public access to intelligence
has undoubtedly had its beneficial impact on public understanding of
often complex and murky situations. Far more questionable, however,
is whether intelligence can be used effectively as an instrument of
public persuasion-whether the marshaling of intelligence evidence on
one side or another of a sharply debated issue ever succeeds in gaining
solid converts. In a tactical situation, when a heated debate moves
toward a crucial vote, a well-focused, lucid intelligence briefing can
often sway a wavering agnostic and stiffen an irresolute supporter.
The record suggests, however, that the conversion will not stick, that
the gnawing doubts will soon return.
The reasons for this phenomenon are not hard to find:
1. When public disclosure of intelligence was a rare and notable
event that summoned up an aura of mystery and miracle, the product
was endowed with uncommon authority. As disclosure became ever
more routine, the gloss wore off and an inevitable "debasement of the
currency" set in. Moreover, in today's world of global information
overload and media hype, even the most striking intelligence "release"
will find it heavy going to try to capture the attention of a
perpetually distracted audience.
2. Intelligence assessments-when lifted out of their context,
fuzzed, and diluted ("sanitized") to protect sources and methods--lose
much of their authenticity. To the intelligence professional who has
built his or her mosaic from a welter of carefully evaluated raw data,
often accumulated over many years, the evidence may be totally
compelling. To a public audience, coming to the issue cold and
exposed only to the sanitized version, the evidence will often seem
ambiguous and the judgments inadequately supported.
3. Intelligence evidence is brought into public play in situations
of deep controversy, in which the contention usually occurs not over
observable facts but over principle. The physical phenomena that
intelligence is best at recording are often not much help in settling
points of principle. Central America offers a good example:
Divergent views of the threat implicit in that area revolve around the
conceptual question of whether the revolutionary situation in El
Salvador is fundamentally endogenous (i.e., rooted in and fueled by
internal, historic forces) or exogenous (i.e., externally stimulated and
sustained). This conceptual issue cannot be resolved by displays of
intelligence evidence, however persuasive, that Soviet arms do indeed
now through Nicaraguan ports to Salvadoran rebels.
4. The impact that intelligence can have on public perceptions is
further constrained by the understandable tendency of people to reject
bad news-what social psychologists used to call "cognitive dissonance."
A classic example is the case of "Yellow Rain," discovery of lethal
toxins being used under Soviet tutelage in Southeast Asia and
Afghanistan. In spite of the overwheL,.ing weight of confirmatory
evidence accumulated over eight years, the - findings continue to be
challenged and contested, sometimes with offerings of bizarre scientific
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4
66
counterexplanations that utterly defy common sense. The extreme
reluctance to accept the evidence at face value cannot be attributed
simply to the fact that intelligence could never meet the rigorous
laboratory standards for evidence. Rather, it must surely lie in the
unpleasantness of the implications, insofar as they raise doubts about
the viability of arms control agreements.
In sum, policy leaders are bound to develop a rather ambivalent
view of the support they can hope to get from their intelligence
community. Clearly the resulting "love-hate relationship" is endemic to
the situation, and there is not much that intelligence can, or should,
do to alter it. Indeed, a greater effort to "serve policy well" could
lead to even greater ambivalence and discord on the part of those we
seek to serve. Thus, we return to Sherman Kent's admonition in the
leitmotiv at the beginning of this chapter: "By striving too hard in
this direction, intelligence may come to seem just another policy voice,
and an unwanted one at that .n
1. Sherman Kent, "Estimates and Influence," originally presented in
London (September 1966) and subsequently published in Foreign Service
Journal 46 (April 1969).
2. Thomas Hughes deserves great credit for being the first, and
surely the most articulate, iconoclast toppling the old conventional
wisdom. His two Farewell Lectures as departing director of the
Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State in
July 1969 contain the quoted passage. The lectures were subsequently
reprinted in Thomas L Hughes, The Fate of Facts in a World of Men
(New York: Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series No. 233, 1976).
3. Thomas L Hughes, "The Power to Speak and the Power to
Listen," in Thomas M. Frank et at., eds., Secrecy and Foreign Policy
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 15.
4. Ibid., p. 19.
5. Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence
Failures Are Inevitable," World Politics 31 (October 1978).
6. Ibid., p. 70.
7. Yehoshafat Harkabi, "The Intelligence-Policymaker Tangle,"
Jerusalem Quarterly, no. 30 (Winter 1984), p. 125.
8. These principals include, at a minimum, the president,
vice-president, national security adviser, secretary of state, and
secretary of defense.
9. Henry Brandon, The Retreat of American Power (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday, 1973), p. 103.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP87MO1007R000400810001-4