Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 24, 2008
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 30, 1982
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP87R00029R000200430026-3.pdf157.37 KB
Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP87R00029R000200430026-3 1 July 1982 NOTE FOR: NIO/SP Colby's call for a joint US-Soviet "war room" (See Sun item, attached) is another indication of gathering interest in tTe Nunn ro osal that we talked about yesterday. so plan to -send-_ a memo summarizing yesterday's discussion about problems attending a nuclear freeze with a suggestion that he try to fit in a visit to Oak Ridge. cc: SA/NPI C/ACIS State Dept. review completed i-n?.i1T1Thc TrT AT Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP87R00029R000200430026-3 25X1 lox] Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP87R00029R000200430026-3 - I'EARED ? THE BALTIMORE SUN 29 June 1982 0 Ex-'CIA chief favors nuclear arms freeze Washington-Former CIA Direc- tor William E. Colby yesterday en- dorsed the idea of a Soviet-American nuclear weapons freeze, saying either a freeze or an arms limitation agree- ment "is adequately verifiable for the safety of the country, and the chance of violation is minimal." "The chance of injury to the coun- try is minimal, and the advantage to our country and the advantage to the Soviets of reducing the numbers of and the ingenuity of these new devic- es which are progressively more dan- gerous is well worth that minimal chance of violation of a minimal de- gree," he said. In fact, he said, any nuclear arms accord with Moscow would make it "easier rather than harder" to keep tabs on what the Soviets are doing by empowering the United States to de- mand an explanation of any suspi- cious Soviet arms behavior. Mr. Colby, who headed the CIA from 1973 to 1976, made his remarks at a press breakfast organized by the nuclear freeze movement. He said normal CIA intelligence checks on Soviet compliance- through satellite photography, elec- tronic eavesdropping and analysis of observable Soviet activities and pub- lications-would come into play. In addition, he said, the Soviets would have to consider whether some Soviet official knowledgeable about the cheating would reveal it. He said the Soviets could surrepti- tiously violate an agreement to freeze the production, deployment or testing of new nuclear weapons for a while. but not for long enough to endanger America's security to any significant degree. "It is conceivable they can go into one of those salt mines and produce something and hammer it out all. very, be able to see it or know about it," h strike, "we have the problem of in- sane men getting ahold of them- that's why we have to reduce them." said. "But the question has to be asked, can they do that in a way that has any strategic significance? And there I think the answer is basically ? no.,, His position on verification differs from the Reagan administration's. In April, a State Department policy statement said: "A freeze on all testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons would include important elements that cannot be verified. The practical result is that the United States would live up to a freeze in all its aspects, while there would be considerable doubt that the Soviets would also live up to it. We simply cannot afford to base our national security on trust of the Soviets." Mr. Colby said that although no sane American or Russian leader would use nuclear weapons in a first He endorsed President Reagan's proposal for deep mutual cuts in nu- clear warheads through a strategic a'*ns reduction treaty. The assumption that war can be forever deterred by the fear of mu- vial annihilation "is becoming more ants more~esavotTs as a o asis for g," Mr. Colby said. e also called for. a treaty that would establish a joint "war room" staffed by American and Russian offi- "We have got to r crisis communications." he said, adding that with the two superpowers de- ploying increasingly accurate mis- siles. a nuclear crisis "can take place in a matter of hour., and even short- er." Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP87R00029R000200430026-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP87R00029R000200430026-3 ?CONFIDENTIA10 82 8943044 SCP' PAGE 001 TOR: 301829Z JUN 82 PP RUEAIIB ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH PP RUEHC DE RUEHC ?1351 1811724 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P R 301657Z JUN 82 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY INFO RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0000 RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0000 RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 0000 RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 0000 BT C 0 N F -I D E N T I A L STATE 181351 TAGS: PARM, MNUC, UR SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO USA CONTROL TOPICS 2. WHILE WE DO NOT WANT TO SUGGEST THAT DAVYDOV AT USA INSTITUTE CONSTITUTES AN OFFICIAL CHANNEL, WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO INFORMALLY IDENTIFY TO DAVYDOV IN GENERAL TERMS FOUR AREAS OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENTS MIGHT EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES FOR COOPERATIVE ACTION: (1) ENCOURAGING ADHERENCE TO NON-PROLIFERATION TREATIES (NPT AND TLATELOLCO); (2) TIGHTENING EXPORT CONTROLS; AND (3) ENCOURAGING SUPPLIERS TO ADOPT A FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS POLICY. WITH REFERENCE TO QUESTIONS IN REF A, EMBASSY MAY WISH TO DRAW UPON FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS IN DISCUSSION WITH DAVYDOV. NON-PROLIFERATION TALKING POINTS ARE LARGELY BASED ON MATERIAL PREPARED FOR DISCUSSION WITH MOROZOV ON MARGIN OF RECENT IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNMENTS (SEE REF B). THE EMBASSY SHOULD ALSO INFORM DAVYDOV THAT SOME RECENT SOVIET PRESS ARTICLES, HIS IN PARTICULAR, BADLY DISTORT 3. BECAUSE A MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENTS REAGAN AND BREZHNEV HAS NOT YET BEEN ARRANGED, EMBASSY SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO DAVYDOV THAT IT IS PREMATURE TO DISCUSS AN AGENDA. 4. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT IT IS PREMATURE TO DISCUSS WITH ANY - T-T ACTION wirw GHT RESULT R UACKSON-NUNN PROPOSAL. CONFIDENTIAL SA/NPI INCOMING 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP87R00029R000200430026-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RRDP87R00029R000200430026-3 ? CONFIDENTIAN 82 8943044 SCP PAGE 003 NC 8943044 TOR 301829Z JUN 82 ---------------------------------------------------- ------------------- -_ AS YOU MAY KNOW, THE UNITED STATES PRESENTED TO THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP AN INFORMAL DISCUSSION' PAPER PROPOSING THAT NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS ADOPT A COMMON POLICY OF REQUIRING THAT RECIPI- ENT NDN-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES ACCEPT IAEA SAFEGUARDS ON ALL PRESENT AND FUTURE FACILITIES AS A CONDITION FOR SIGNIFICANT NEW NUCLEAR SUPPLY. -- IN GENERAL, THE U.S. IS SUPPORTIVE OF EFFORTS TO EXPAND THE COVERAGE OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS AND BELIEVES THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES CAN PROMOTE PROGRESS TOWARD THIS GOAL BY VOLUNTARILY ACCEPTING IAEA SAFEGUARDS ON THEIR CIVIL NUCLEAR FACILITIES. ACCORDINGLY, THE U.S. WELCOMES THE ANNOUNCEMENT BY FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO ON MAY 15 AT SSOD II IN NEW YORK OF THE USSR INTENTION TO PLACE A "PART OF" ITS CIVIL NUCLEAR FACILITIES UNDER IAEA "CONTROL." HAIG END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP87R00029R000200430026-3