NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000100170001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 30, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate Seeret
Intelligence of I MASTER FILE CUPY I
T CIzE OUT
02 Mt' ON
Near East and
South Asia Review
30 August 1985
NESA NESAR 85-019
30 August 1985
Copy 416
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Near East and
South Asia Review
Articles Algeria: Intentions Toward Morocco
Although the Moroccan Prime Minister has portrayed Algeria as an
imminent threat to his country, Algiers does not want relations to
deteriorate to the point that large-scale military hostilities are likely
but will instead focus its pressure on King Hassan to negotiate an
arrangement allowing some Saharan autonomy.
As Tunisia's traditional, Western-oriented nationalism loses impetus
with the aging of President Bourguiba and the waning of his appeal,
Islam provides a focus for those repulsed by Soviet-style Marxism
and offended by what they perceive to be the overweening influence
of European political and cultural values.
Saudi Arabia, among the most conservative of the world's Islamic
states, maintains religious police to assure public adherence to the
regime's religious and social strictures, with powers to arrest, detain,
and even flog transgressors, and, as the country grows more
conservative, these police will play a more visible role
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The Palestinian Diaspora: Perspectives on Status and Prospects in 15
the Arab Worl
Palestinians working in Jordan, Egypt, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia
were surveyed on the way they were treated by their host
governments, their economic prospects and plans, political activities,
attitudes toward the PLO, the US role in the Middle East peace
process, and the issue of a separate homeland. This article
summarizes the results in Kuwait and Saudi Arabi
Secret
NESA NESAR 85-019
30 August 1985
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The Fursan, a paramilitary force of Kurdish tribesmen who assist
Iraq in suppressing dissidents in Kurdistan, have begun to waver in
their loyalty to the regime, and this could seriously complicate
Baghdad's task of keeping peace in its troubled Kurdish region.
The Ordeal ournalist in Afghanistan
Jacques Abouchar's account of his six-week imprisonment in
Afghanistan, In the Bear's Cage, gives a unique picture of Soviet
and Afghan handling of suspected foreign intelligence agents,
although he was better treated than many suspected foreign agents
would have been because he is a well-known French journalist
India: Gujarat-Social Conflict and Stability
For more than five months, the industrialized west Indian state of
Gujarat has been the scene of major caste and communal violence,
and by moving deliberately on Gujarat's problems Prime Minister
Gandhi has demonstrated that he is less likely than his mother to
meddle in state governments but in return will expect from them
greater competence.
Although most of India's military airlift assets are deployed to
support ground forces along its mountainous northern border, new
Soviet-built IL-76 and AN-32 transports will give India an
enhanced ability to intervene in the islands of the Indian Ocean, and
the door is slightly open for US sales of C-130s to India.F__1
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Backdrop to Negotiation
a strong impact on prospects for a negotiated settlement between the
Sinhalese-dominated government and the Tamil separatists.
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authors,
Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents
normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items
will be designated as noncoordinated views. Comments may be directed to the
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Algeria:
Intentions Toward Morocco
The Moroccan Prime Minister recently portrayed
Algeria to US officials as an imminent threat to his
country. We believe the two countries' historically
troubled relationship is at a low point over the
Western Sahara conflict and King Hassan's political
union with Libya. Nevertheless, Algiers, in our
judgment, does not want relations to deteriorate to
such a point that large-scale military hostilities are
likely. We do not believe that Algiers is actively
seeking Hassan's overthrow, which could produce a
more hostile government in Rabat. With regard to the
Western Sahara problem, small skirmishes probably
will continue with little warning along Morocco's
defensive berm to keep pressure on King Hassan to
negotiate an arrangement allowing some Saharan
autonomy. The greatest danger is that these minor
clashes might lead to wider warfare. President
Bendjedid's willingness to tighten the screws on Rabat
may also be limited by Hassan's "union" with Libya
and the danger that Algeria could suddenly encounter
hostilities on both its eastern and western borders.
If the allegations of an Algerian role are true, Algiers
may have decided to put pressure on King Hassan by
stirring up trouble inside Morocco, rather than trying
to do something on the Western Sahara issue.
President Bendjedid is under pressure from his
senior Army officers to act more forcefully against
Morocco. They are concerned about Bendjedid's
refusal to prevent Rabat's completion of extensive
defensive berms in the Western Sahara. The more
leftist-leaning officers also are disgruntled with
Bendjedid's courting of the United States and the
West, particularly because of continued US and
French military support for Morocco. They want to
give the Polisario guerrillas more weapons and to
prosecute the war with Morocco with even greater
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Moroccan Dissidents: A New Angle?
The most recent incident highlighting the tensions
between Morocco and Algeria are charges by Rabat,
heatedly denied by Algiers, that the Algerians are
attempting to foment political instability in Morocco.
The government of Morocco put on trial 17 dissidents
whom it claimed were captured in July after entering
the country from Algeria. Rabat also claims the
dissidents were trained by Algerian security officials.
the majority of
those arrested have admitted that they were acting in
cooperation with a Moroccan Islamic fundamentalist
to improve relations with the United States.
Another possibility is that the dissidents were allowed
to reside in Algeria, but that their plans and activities
were not closely monitored by the government. Senior
security and military officials opposed to Bendjedid
may have sponsored the infiltrations, expecting them
to fail, to embarrass Bendjedid by illustrating to
foreigners the "contradictions" in the moderate
foreign policy image he has sought to establish. We
believe this may have been the case with last spring's
abortive PLO raid on Israeli defense headquarters.
The terrorists told the Israelis that senior Algerian
officials knew about the operation and authorized
carrying it out during Bendjedid's state visit to
Washington. In our opinion, Bendjedid would not
have approved something that was not only doomed to
fail but would have also negatively affected his effort
Secret
NESA NESAR 85-019
30 August 1985
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Legacy of Bitterness
Rabat's accusations of Algerian support for dissidents
are part of the longstanding antagonism between
Morocco and Algeria. Underlying the dispute are
deep-seated suspicions based on political, geographic,
economic, and psychological factors. Algeria and
Morocco have the largest populations and most
abundant resources in the Maghreb, and each views
the other as the principal roadblock to its regional
dominance. In addition, the political systems of the
two countries-revolutionary socialism versus a
feudal monarchy-are antithetical.
The principal source of tension between Algeria and
Morocco in the past decade has been Rabat's claim to
the Western Sahara. Algerian leaders believe their
assistance to the Polisario is necessary both to counter
what they see as Moroccan expansionism and to
demonstrate Algeria's commitment to support wars of
national liberation. Although Algeria has won the
political battle thus far in the OAU and Nonaligned
Movement by gaining widespread diplomatic
recognition for the Saharan Democratic Arab
Republic, its prospects on the battlefield-where the
outcome will be determined-are grim. Morocco's
commitment of 80,000 men and its construction of a
defensive perimeter during the past two years have
proved effective in defending the territory from
attacks by the 3,500 Polisario. Moreover, King
Hassan's political union with Libya has created a new
threat on Algeria's eastern frontier, and Algeria will
have to consider action from Libya if it becomes
embroiled with Morocco.
Algiers has tried different, and often contradictory,
strategies to counter these diplomatic and military
setbacks. President Bendjedid earlier this year
emphasized finding a political solution, almost
certainly realizing that the Moroccan berm precludes
a military victory by the Polisario. Hassan's rejection
of Algeria's peace plans, however, appears to have
encouraged Algiers to adopt a more confrontational
policy toward Morocco. For example, contacts
between the two countries have been reduced, and we
are seeing more intensive efforts among nonaligned
countries to win wider diplomatic recognition for the
Polisario. (Liberia recently granted recognition after
Algiers offered Monrovia petroleum, and some press
The Algerian Strategy: More of the Same
In our judgment, Algiers's continued support for the
Polisario and its diplomatic wrangling with Rabat are
the primary elements in Bendjedid's program to
harass Hassan for his "intransigence" on the Western
Sahara problem. The Algerians probably believe that
they can make the Western Sahara conflict so costly
that Hassan at some point will agree to Saharan
autonomy. Algeria may also anticipate that its
support for the Polisario will deter Hassan from a
more ambitious scheme to resurrect the idea of a
"greater Morocco," which includes not only the
Western Sahara, but Mauritania and parts of
southwest Algeria as well.
We believe that the Bendjedid government does not
want a major military conflict with Morocco. Even
though Algeria enjoys an overwhelming local military
advantage, its leadership almost certainly realizes
that the rugged terrain along the border would limit
military action to cross-border strikes by Algeria that
could lead to a protracted war of attrition. Algiers
may also realize that Morocco has a clear advantage
along the southern portion of the border and could
overrun Tindouf, the only significant Algerian
settlement in the southwest and the political and
military headquarters of the Polisario. Rabat could
also launch airstrikes against Algeria's strategic
petroleum and natural gas facilities. F_~
Algiers probably perceives that a protracted military
engagement may prompt a successful move against
Hassan. Senior Algerian officials have
expressed their preference for a Morocco led by
Hassan and view the King as a factor for stability
there. They fear his departure would produce a weak
government led by Crown Prince Sidi Mohamed,
which could be manipulated by strongly anti-Algerian
elements or even Libyan leader Qadhafi. Neither does
Algeria want a nationalistic military regime in Rabat
that would be readier to adopt a belligerent policy
toward Algiers.
Alternative Scenarios
A number of developments might compel Algeria to
reassess its position toward Morocco and encourage
its leaders to adopt an even tougher policy. A decision
reports suggest India may follow suit.)
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by King Hassan to engage in "hot pursuit" of
Polisario guerrillas into Algeria or possibly into
northern Mauritania might lead the Algerians to
become more directly involved in the fighting and to
use its Army to harass the Moroccans along the
northern frontier. This could lead to wider conflict
between the two countries.
There are other, less likely scenarios that, in our
opinion, could result in a more aggressive anti-Hassan
posture. Morocco's purchase of highly sophisticated
weapon systems, for example, might cause Bendjedid
to feel more threatened and to consider a preemptive
military strike. The Bendjedid government probably
would respond militarily if it believed that Morocco
and Libya were planning aggression against it or in
retaliation for a hostile act, such as terrorism.
Bendjedid might even consider the military option if
he and his advisers suspected Moroccan-Libyan
involvement in a plot to subvert his government.
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Tunisia: The Political
Momentum of Islam
The role of Islam both in the personal life of Tunisians
and the politics of the country continues to grow. As
the traditional, Western-oriented nationalism loses
impetus with the aging of President Bourguiba and
the waning of his appeal, Islam provides a focus for
those who are repulsed by Soviet-style Marxism and
offended by what they perceive to be the overweening
influence of European political and cultural values in
an Arab and Muslim society.
Embassy reporting indicates that the
principal Islamic organization, the Islamic Tendency
Movement (MTI), is taking advantage of the appeal of
Islam to expand its influence in key opposition labor
and student organizations. Extremist Muslim groups
have appeared as well, some with reported
connections to Libya, which might be a catalyst for
widespread domestic unrest in a post-Bourguiba
period. At a minimum, any successor to President
Bourguiba probably will have to make political
accommodations with the Islamists to maintain
domestic stability.
Islam Spreads Its Roots
According to the US Embassy in Tunis, the practice
of Islam is enjoying a renewal in public life. During
this year's Ramadan holy month, for example, more
Tunisians observed the daylight fast, and restaurants
tended more often than in the past to enforce
voluntarily regulations prohibiting the consumption of
alcohol. The Embassy also reports incidents of
harassment by religious zealots of Tunisians either
not observing Ramadan or conspicuous for their
Western dress.
MTI leaders sentenced in 1981 for antiregime
political activities.
noted renewed use of neighborhood
mosques for political agitation by religious militants
in both urban and rural areas.
these activities as the latest
attempt of the MTI to press the government to
legalize the MTI as a full-fledged political party.
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MTI Targets Students and Labor
The MTI now appears more willing than it was in the
past to solicit cooperation with-or co-opt-legal
political movements often at loggerheads with the
government. Tunis is only now acknowledging this
trend-and its potential for instability-as a result of
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November, university students backing the MTI
organized a general student congress to reactivate the
General Union of Tunisian Students. The government
tacitly supported the convocation in the belief that
students affiliated with the ruling Destourian
Socialist Party (PSD) would control the proceedings.
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controlled the proceedings. Moreover, student
elections last spring resulted in a decisive victory for
the MTI at the universities, especially on the major
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Concurrent with the rise of Islamic consciousness
during Ramadan is a resurgence of political activity
by MTI leaders. In June the MTI reconstituted its
political bureau, and leaders hope to enlarge the
bureau with the return of MTI members living in
Europe. The regrouping of the MTI was made
possible by the government's pardon of 17 MTI
leaders last August, including MTI President Rachid
Ghannouchi and Secretary General Abdefatteh
Mourou. The government now has released all 105
More critical in terms of potential instability is the
MTI's alleged contact with the General Union of
Tunisian Workers (UGTT), the largest mass political
movement other than the ruling PSD.
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Baccouche, editor of the union newspaper, could be
connected to UGTT-MTI consultations. Baccouche is
an opponent of UGTT leader Habib Achour and
publicly blamed his removal on MTI influence in the
union. He believes that Achour fired him because of a
desire to solidify control of the UGTT through
cooperation with the MTI
Basis of MTI Strength
The emergence of the MTI as a potent political force
since the late 1970s derives from two general sources:
deteriorating social and economic conditions in the
country and the group's unique position among
opposition movements. The MTI draws much of its
appeal from the burgeoning ranks of Tunisian
students, who are having considerable difficulty
finding satisfactory employment in an increasingly
tight job market. Most of the population is under 26
and has little memory of the first two decades of rapid
economic growth and prosperity. At the same time,
their high rate of education by Middle Eastern
standards has created expectations that the
government cannot satisfy. The inability of the
Bourguiba government's Western economic model to
alleviate economic problems and the social strains
caused by rapid urban migration and population
growth have made young people receptive to other
political and economic solutions. Increasing economic
disparities between the more affluent north and the
less developed and less "modernized" south also have
provided the MTI with a regional theme and audience
for its propaganda
The MTI draws supporters because of its political
program and position on the political spectrum. Along
with other oppositionists, the MTI calls for nonviolent
political reform, including a new national charter
ensuring democratic freedoms, recognition as a
legitimate political party, the equitable redistribution
of society's wealth, support for Third World liberation
movements, and rejection of foreign-and
particularly Western-influence. These positions echo
demands of other groups, such as the main political
opposition Social Democratic Movement of Ahmed
Mestiri. The MTI and its leaders, unlike most other
regime opponents, have never been affiliated with
Bourguiba and the country's traditional elite.
Consequently, they have the advantage of offering a
"fresh" and, what younger Tunisians in particular
view to be, a truly independent opposition stance.
Government Response: From Stick to Carrot
The government of Prime Minister Mzali appears to
be wary of the appeal of the MTI and Islamic
fundamentalism in general and is mixing jawboning
with accommodation in dealing with the Islamists, in
our view. Release of the 17 MTI leaders last August
probably marks a new and "softer" government
policy. Uppermost in the minds of Tunisian leaders is
the need to placate civil servants, military officers,
and Tunisians outside the government who may be
latently sympathetic to the MTI.
At the same time, Mzali has accompanied his "softer"
policy with pressure on the MTI to lower its political
expectations. At the time of the release of the MTI
leaders, official statements and progovernment
editorials called upon the MTI to abide by the
established political rules. The Embassy in Tunis has
reported that the government has talked to the MTI
behind the scenes about its demand for political
recognition. Mzali is most concerned about winning a
firm MTI pledge to renounce violence, to accept the
Constitution, and to avoid ties to foreign governments.
In return, Mzali has admitted publicly that Islam
could provide a base for the future life of the country.
Nevertheless, he has called upon religious leaders to
interpret the Koran in ways that will be applicable to
modern life and has emphatically refused any
reconsideration of the personal status code. The code,
which was unveiled by Bourguiba after independence
and puts the social position of women in the family
and society on a Western footing, has been the main
target of the MTI.
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The Muslim Fringe
One factor that could further complicate relations
between the MTI and the government is the political
activity of radical Islamic activists, some of whom
operate outside the MTI. MTI leader Mourou has
alluded in press interviews to an extremist wing in the
a faction known as Al Dawa (The Call), consisting
largely of students and dedicated to harassing the
government to goad it into a repressive posture. The
group apparently believes such retaliation would help
recruitment efforts.
Other groups outside the MTI include the Islamic
Liberation Party, the Information Committee of the
Islamic Movement, the Arab Nationalist Grouping,
the Islamic Progressive Movement, and the Islamic
Cooperative Movement. None of these groups is as
large or as influential as the MTI.
of the objectives of the MTI. On the other hand, they
are more inclined to operate clandestinely, since they
espouse pan-Arabism and a political system with only
Islamic parties. The Islamic Liberation Party, which
is perhaps the most active of these extremist groups,
envisions the re-creation of the caliphate. This party is
associated with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt,
and Libya and has recruited adherents in the armed
forces. Although the extent of foreign influence over
these smaller groups cannot be ascertained, the Al
Dawa grouping in the MTI, the Arab Nationalist
Grouping, and the Islamic Progressive Movement are
sympathetic to Libya.
Outlook
Tunisia, in comparison with the other Maghreb
countries, is the most vulnerable to resurgent Islam.
Unlike Algeria, in which Islam supported the
anticolonial struggle, and Morocco, where Hassan's
political strength rests in large part on his descent
from Muhammad, Islam in Tunisia has had no
political role. Traditionally, Islamic clerics were tied
to the political power structure but played no role in
the independence movement because of Bourguiba's
dominance. Moreover, Bourguiba consciously sought
to remove Islam as a social force in the years
following independence because of his antipathy to it.
The renewed appeal of Islam in Tunisia puts in doubt
the success of Bourguiba's policy and suggests that
Islam will present a formidable challenge to his
successors.
In the short term, the growth of the MTI probably
will depend to a large extent on the government's
attitude toward domestic political reform. As long as
the government maintains its policy of "benign
authoritarianism" toward its opponents and refuses to
allow democratic representation, the MTI will gain
adherents because of its emphasis on egalitarianism
and its platform of social populism.
MTI's effectiveness also will depend on its ability to
control its radical followers and undercut the more
extremist groups. The unwillingness of the MTI to
clarify its stand on secularism and general social and
political issues-no doubt because of its need to strike
a balance between its extremist followers and
moderate Tunisians-could jeopardize the moderates'
control of the MTI and inhibit the organization's
growth. Efforts by the MTI to work with more
established and nonreligious opposition groups also
could split the MTI and encourage radical Islamic
fundamentalists to immerse themselves in clandestine
activity.
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God's Squads: Saudi Arabia's
Religious Police
Saudi Arabia is among the most conservative of the
world's Islamic states and adheres to religious and
social strictures that often seem arbitrary and
oppressive to Westerners. The Mutawaiin, or religious
police, perhaps the most curious institution in Saudi
Arabia, are charged with maintaining at least public
adherence to these strictures, enforcing religious
observances and ensuring public morality. The
members of the organization have the power to arrest,
detain, and even flog suspects, and can be a particular
nuisance to unwary or incautious expatriates.
Over the last few years the government has tried to
strengthen the organization, upgrade the quality of
police recruits, streamline training, and make the
organization more aware of the cultural differences of
foreigners. At the same time, the Saudi regime bases
its claim to legitimacy on its defense of Islamic values
and principles and will continue supporting the
activities of this extremely conservative organization.
Moreover, the Iranian revolution has heightened
Riyadh's awareness of the potential threat from the
conservative Islamic backlash against Western
influence, and the Saudis are cautioning Westerners
that they must respect the country's Islamic precepts.
As the country grows steadily more conservative, a
process likely to be accelerated by the current
economic downturn, the Mutawaiin will play a more
active, arbitrary, and visible role.
The Enforcers
The approximately 7,000 Mutawaiin-known
collectively as the Organization for the Promotion of
Virtue and the Prevention of Vice-enforce religious
observances such as closing shops at prayer times and
attendance by the faithful at mosques. They also
monitor public morality, ensuring that men and
particularly women are modestly dressed, that they
display a minimum of flesh or jewelry, and that
women are accompanied in public by a male relative.
The Mutawaiin patrol city streets and shopping malls
in groups of three to four from 0600 to 1000 and
again from 1600 to 2000. They are easily
distinguishable by their beards, relatively short robes,
and batons used to beat offenders on the spot. In
residential areas they generally patrol in jeeps
equipped with loudspeakers, blaring the call to prayer.
They occasionally search restaurants to ensure
sexually segregated dining. They were also
instrumental in early 1983 in closing video arcades in
Makkah Province on the grounds that they were a
corrupting influence on Saudi youth. They cooperate
with Ministry of Interior officials and police on issues
related to morality, such as alcohol or drug problems,
but have occasionally been criticized for involving
themselves in civil matters outside their jurisdiction.
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The organization's influence has grown in the major
urban areas, according to Embassy reporting. It is
most powerful in the Nejd, the heartland of Saudi
Arabia where Riyadh is located, and less influential in
the more cosmopolitan Jidda area and in Taif.
Although zealous about monitoring public behavior,
the enforcers generally do not extend their purview to
private homes.
Extensive Powers
The organization and its individual police have
considerable power. Its conservative president,
Shaykh Abd al-Aziz Al al-Shaykh, has Cabinet rank
and reports directly to the King. The Mutawaiin are
bureaucratically independent of both the Interior
Ministry and the government's premier religious
organization, the Department of Religious Research,
Advisory Opinions, Proselytization, and Guidance.
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Secret
The vice president of the organization, Shaykh Saleh
ibn Saad al-Luhaydan, is increasingly influential in
the Saudi religious establishment, according to
Embassy reporting. Only 37 years old, he has served
in several senior judicial positions and in his current
post supervises many Mutawaiin officials
considerably older than he. He attends the weekly
meetings of the senior religious leaders with King
Fahd, at which they discuss Islamic law and its
application in the kingdom as well as major social
issues. Although Luhaydan is believed to have good
relations with the government, his outspokenness on
social issues prompted government officials to cancel
his conservative religious television program in 1982
because of his growing appeal among Islamic
traditionalists)
Individual police are empowered to arrest and detain
suspected offenders for up to 48 hours in cells
attached to neighborhood Mutawaiin offices, after
which suspects must be turned over to regular police.
They frequently flog suspects during interrogation or
as a summary punishment if they confess. Although
they do so rarely, they can search private homes
without warrants if they suspect immoral behavior is
taking place.
The group is not popular with much of the public,
according to Embassy reporting. The enforcers are
avoided by most people and only rarely challenged.
Although frustration with them is high among some
segments of the populace-Westernized middle-class
Saudis and university professors, for example-it is
confined to private grumbling. The police, however,
enjoy considerable support among the growing
conservative elements of the population, which makes
both the government and their critics reluctant to
challenge them. Although King Fahd is believed to
hold more moderate views, he has not curbed their
growing power for fear of focusing conservative
criticism on the excesses of the royal family.F__1
Headaches for Expatriates
The Mutawaiin are generally more of a nuisance than
a threat to Westerners, largely by limiting their
ability to move freely and enforcing an often shifting
and capricious standard of dress and public behavior.
Western expatriates apprehended for immodest dress
are usually deprived of their resident permits, taken to
a neighborhood center, then lectured and released
upon signing a statement of confession and repentance
in Arabic
Arrests are infrequent. Cases of Westerners being
flogged are rare, according to the Embassy, although
US officials are looking into allegations by one US
citizen. In Riyadh, government officials will intervene
with Mutawaiin on behalf of foreigners if prompted,
and in one case it had an overzealous enforcer
transferred to a remote area.
The problem for expatriates has been most severe in
the isolated Eastern Province, where the oil industry
and much of the expatriate community is
concentrated. Pressure from the Mutawaiin appears
to fluctuate. Reports of harassment increased, for
example, in the spring of 1984, when expatriate
women increasingly were confronted by the religious
police for alleged improper dress. In recent years
before each Christmas, the local religious police chief
issued strong proscriptions against holiday parties or
decorations by expatriates. He is one of the most
conservative and hard line of the Mutawaiin and has
been difficult for Westerners to deal with. The
problem was worsened by the previous Amir of the
province, who was notoriously reluctant to rein in the
police and who deflected requests for help from the
US Consulate. According to the Consulate, the new
Amir probably will be more responsive to appeals
from US officials.
The expatriate population of the Eastern Province has
dropped by a third in the last two and a half years,
from 30,000 to 20,000, but pressure by the religious
police has not been a major reason for the sharp
decline, It probably
has been a contributing factor, however, as the
economic downturn has made working in the kingdom
much less attractive financially, and workers are less
willing to live under social and religious constraints.
Gradual Changes
The Mutawaiin leadership has attempted over the last
few years to streamline the organization and improve
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Secret
relations with both the Saudi populace in general and
the expatriate community. In 1980 its personnel
system was amended to conform with other Saudi
civil service organizations. Although the religious
police are generally believed to be older and poorly
trained, the organization is successfully recruiting
among the young-particularly religious zealots-
and improving the training of recruits, according to
the Embassy. Many recruits receive a yearlong course
in Islamic practices and lectures to acquaint them
with different expatriate customs and diplomatic
immunity.
In addition, the leadership of the organization has
expressed its willingness to work more closely with
diplomatic officials to prevent future problems. The
current police vice president, who appears to be the
principal public relations spokesman, seems to be
reasonable. He noted to US officials that he had read
Dale Carnegie and is quick to praise such modern
events as Prince Sultan's space flight and criticize
what he characterizes as Khomeini's misguided
interpretation of Islam.
Prospects
The Mutawaiin are likely to play a more powerful role
in policing Saudi public behavior, at least for the near
term. There are no signs that the growing religious
conservatism in the country will abate soon, and
it is growing rapidly among
the young. A further downturn in the economy is
likely to fuel this trend, and public displays of wealth
or frivolity will come under sharper attack by the
religious establishment. The government is not likely
to try to rein in the conservatives to avoid being
charged with failing to preserve the public welfare.
Although harassment of expatriates will occur less
frequently as their numbers decline, those remaining
are likely to come under greater pressure to conform
to Islamic precepts and may find themselves targets of
arbitrary abuses, particularly if they are blamed for
growing economic troubles. Such a trend probably
will not pose a major risk to expatriate security, but it
may require much greater caution in public behavior.
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The Palestinian Diaspora:
Perspectives on Status and Prospects
in the Arab World
surveyed Palestinians
Table 1
Distribution of Palestinians
in Selected Arab States, 1980 a
Thousand
persons
working in four Arab countries on the way they are
treated by their host governments, their economic
prospects and plans, political activities, attitudes
toward the PLO, the US role in the Middle East
peace process, and the issue of a separate homeland.
In all, 299 Palestinians from diverse economic
backgrounds were interviewed in 1984 in Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt. Twenty interviews
with Middle East specialists in the United States
supplemented the field research. Interview data are
fleshed out with descriptions of the host countries'
formal policies and informal practices for handling
both their Palestinian expatriate populations and the
Palestinian question as a political issue. This article
summarizes material from interviews with 75
Palestinians in Kuwait and 50 Palestinians working in
Saudi Arabia.'
Palestinians living in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have
contributed greatly to the modernization of their host
countries, but they probably will be squeezed out
gradually over the next few years because of economic
and political forces largely beyond their control.
Reversals in the oil market have led Gulf governments
to hire cheaper foreign labor and to cut back on the
educational and health benefits that attracted so
many Palestinians over the last several decades.
Moreover, Gulf interest in the Palestinian question is
declining as concern over the terrorist threat is rising.
Most Palestinians have not yet fathomed the
implications of these trends. Apolitical or politically
moderate, they focus their efforts on achieving a high
standard of living for themselves and their children
and rarely express animosity toward their host
governments. The inevitable outflow of thousands of
Palestinians from the Gulf states probably will create
serious problems for Jordan, which will be expected to
absorb them, and will revitalize the notion of an
independent Palestinian homeland.
Egypt Jordan Kuwait Saudi
Arabia
a Official census data where available or estimates.
b Recent interviews with Palestinian sources place this figure at
more than 125,000 (1984): 62,000 before and after the 1948
partition; 55,000 after the 1967 war; 3,000 after the Jordanian civil
war; and 6,000 in 1982. The official 1976 census reported only
29,162, a number that the Palestinian Statistical Abstract also
reports. Unless post-1980 migration has been much higher than
previously believed, the 1984 figure appears to be inflated.
Kuwait
It is often said that the Palestinians built modern
Kuwait. The approximately 350,000 Palestinians in
Kuwait (roughly 20 percent of the Kuwaiti
population) occupy key positions of professional and
intellectual leadership in Kuwait's educational
institutions, government organizations, and business
and financial enterprises. With a small native
population (currently less than 40 percent of its total),
Kuwait sought skilled foreign labor to fulfill its
ambitious modernization plans. Arabs, compatible in
language and religion, were preferred. Palestinians
were among the most highly educated Arabs and
flocked to Kuwait in large numbers in the 1960s and
early 1970s.
Kuwait offered foreign workers excellent health and
housing benefits along with educational opportunities
for their children, an advantage much valued by
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Table 2
Palestinian Occupational Structure
in Selected Arab States by Category a
Number of
Persons
Percent of
Total
Employed
Number of Percent of Number of Percent of
Persons Total Persons Total
Employed Employed
Professional/
technical
884
16.8
NA
Administrative/
managerial
230
4.4
NA
Clerical/
administrative
support
769
14.6
NA
Production/
transportation/
general labor
1,222
23.2
NA
a Based on official census data for years indicated.
b Given the rapid growth in the Egyptian economy after 1976 and
the sharp increase in employment opportunities elsewhere, this
figure was no doubt considerably reduced in the late 1970s and
early 1980s.
Palestinians. Palestinians have enjoyed access to jobs
at nearly all administrative and managerial levels.
Only the very highest executive levels and politically
appointed positions were beyond their reach.
Palestinians have become well integrated in Kuwait's
economy, but they have remained outside its political
and social life. Very few have been granted
citizenship. While. allowed to engage in
entrepreneurial activities, they cannot buy or hold
land. Even after working two or three decades in
Kuwait, they have no continuing job rights and
receive no social security (although a lump sum
payment is customary upon retirement).
The presence of a large Palestinian population has
reinforced Kuwait's support for the Palestinian cause.
The government allows the PLO to operate offices in
the country, provides financial assistance, and offers
Arafat unrestricted access to decisionmakers.
Kuwait's posture, however, is less ideologically and
culturally rigorous than that of the frontline Arab
states and tends to mirror that of other moderate Gulf
states.
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In recent years, crises in the economy and in internal
security have caused Kuwaiti leaders to turn
increasingly inward, resulting in a decline of interest
in the Palestinian issue and a new policy toward
expatriate workers that will have serious implications
for the Palestinians. Plummeting oil revenues,
followed by the collapse of the domestic stock market
have produced a climate of economic malaise. Threats
of further radical terrorist attacks and the proximity
of the Iran-Iraq war have heightened the Kuwaiti
sense of vulnerability already inflamed by the
population imbalance between natives (36 percent)
and foreigners (64 percent).
Kuwait's long-term development goals reflect revised
priorities: the number of expatriate workers will be
reduced by half within five years. Highly paid
expatriates with families (mostly Palestinians) will be
replaced by foreigners who will accept lower status
jobs, lower pay, and leave their families at home-
primarily South Asians and Egyptians. After training,
Kuwaiti nationals will take over other jobs held by
foreigners.
Specific measures taken by the government strongly
affect Palestinian interests: the children of foreign
workers can no longer attend government schools
(private schools are prohibitively expensive for many
Palestinians); the dependent children of nonnationals
cannot remain in the country after graduating from
high school unless they have a job; if they leave the
country to attend college, they cannot reenter, even
for a visit, as long as they are in school. They may
return after completing school only if they have a job.
Only a limited number of expatriate children are
allowed to attend Kuwait University, and even then,
only in the less prestigious fields of liberal arts or
commerce. They too must leave the country at
graduation unless they have a job. Expatriates can no
longer bring their families with them to work in
Kuwait. The government is also breaking up
Palestinian residential areas by tearing down the older
apartment buildings and replacing them with high-
cost buildings. (A lump sum payment to those evicted
may be offered.) The government is requiring most
foreign workers to live in labor camps, a measure that
further discourages families.
These steps have not dramatically affected the size of
the Palestinian population in Kuwait, but some
Palestinians have left, most returning to Jordan. Some
of those remaining in Kuwait have begun sending
their assets out of the country so that when they
receive notice-they may be given as little as a week
to leave-they will have less to lose. A substantial
drop in Kuwait's Palestinian population is inevitable,
although it will probably happen gradually, given the
serious obstacles to indigenization.
Kuwait's official policy of supporting the Palestinian
cause is not likely to change fundamentally.
Nevertheless, there is likely to be some drift, possibly
major, away from the prevailing support for the
Palestinian position, and financial assistance will
probably decline.
Palestinian Perspectives
Palestinians in Kuwait characterize themselves as
moderates or apolitical. Most express support for the
mainline PLO and Yasir Arafat. Few-primarily
professors, trade unionists, and the like-have been
politically active on the local scene working for a
settlement of the Palestinian issue.
The Palestinians see Kuwait as a nice place to work in
for as long as they can. Their attitude toward Kuwait
combines a sense of economic vulnerability and
resentment at being treated shabbily after long
service, with a desire to remain permanently if
possible. They believe they have been the most
dependable and stable portion of the non-Kuwaiti
labor force and are being dismissed because of the
Palestinian issue and fears of terrorism. They accept
their fate with resignation and claim to harbor no
animosity toward the government for denying them
full rights. Although they have not absorbed the
implications of Kuwait's new policies or fathomed the
hard choices ahead, their reactions are likely to be
social and personal rather than political.
All respondent groups demonstrated pronounced
insecurity with their situation, most especially the
youngest and those ready to retire. The youngest have
known no other home and will have to leave after high
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school graduation. Their elders face the prospect of
leaving behind friends and possessions and moving to
an unfamiliar place, or a place they may have left
decades ago. Educated and skilled members of the
middle class believe they will be the last affected and,
in any case, will have job options elsewhere. Members
of trades and crafts realize that Kuwait has removed
much of the financial incentive for staying and, will
try to relocate, although with little optimism.
A very large number would prefer to remain in
Kuwait, as permanent residents if possible. Most say
they would feel more at home in Kuwait than in
Jordan. They also would prefer Kuwait to a future
Palestinian state. But they realize that they have been
living on borrowed time in Kuwait and are beginning
to consider other options seriously. The Gulf states,
however, are following policies similar to those of
Kuwait, and the war has damaged Iraq's economy
severely, leaving little opportunity for foreign workers
until a settlement is reached. As for Jordan, the
Palestinians fear that it could not absorb them and
that the Jordanian economy is not strong enough to
provide appropriate employment and the necessary
protection for their assets. They believe that Israel has
made the West Bank an unattractive place to live.
Palestinian sentiment for some sort of resolution to
their dilemma is likely to build quickly. Many
Palestinians are beginning to believe they have no
other choice but to look to a separate homeland-a
place where they can raise their children safely, where
they can retire, and which provides a secure haven for
their capital and other assets. New employment
opportunities elsewhere would ameliorate this trend,
but none appear on the horizon.
Palestinians in Kuwait do not expect the United
States to play a constructive role in reaching a
settlement, believing that US policy is subject to
Israeli interests. Some express a faint hope that a
united Arab coalition might make some progress.
Some of those interviewed believe that Jordan will
bear the brunt of the Palestinian exodus. Jordan will
be denied the steady inflow of remittances that have
supported its economy for many years, and it cannot
sustain the number of workers who will have to be
repatriated (most with Jordanian passports). Thus,
Jordan could be the place where Palestinian
frustrations and hopelessness crystallize into political
activism.
Saudi Arabia
The Saudis have not developed a coherent, integrated
policy on the import of labor, and the mix of
expatriates has fluctuated widely over time.
Originally, Muslims were preferred; then East Asians
were hired for their greater productivity. Most
recently, both skilled and unskilled South Asians are
being hired because they will accept lower wages.
Foreigners are not as predominant in Saudi
population statistics as they are in Kuwait's, nor do
Palestinians predominate in the expatriate work force.
Of about 10 million Saudis, 1.5-2 million are
estimated to be foreign workers, and, of these, about
150,000 to 200,000 are Palestinians. As in other host
countries, the Palestinians fill many of the most
highly skilled positions as doctors, engineers, teachers,
and professors.
The Saudi Government tightly controls the entry of
all foreigners and allowed few to enter the kingdom
before about 1978, when large development programs
got under way. It also maintains strict controls over
naturalization and emigration as well as over
expatriate behavior in the country. Only Muslims are
eligible for citizenship. As in Kuwait there is little
chance that any of the children born in the kingdom
to foreign parents will become naturalized citizens.
Working primarily through employers, the
government keeps close tabs on worker activities and
has a policy of prompt banishment for even minor
criminal offenses. Political activity is proscribed for
foreigners. As a rule, high economic payoffs offer
expatriate workers good incentives for circumspect
behavior.
Those Palestinians that succeeded in immigrating
during the earlier years (1948 or earlier) generally
managed to integrate themselves, obtained
citizenship, and even attained leadership roles in
government and business. Those that arrived after
1967 achieved only economic acceptance.
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Officially, the Saudis support the Palestinian cause by
offering financial support to the PLO, as well as
allowing PLO leaders high-level access-but on a
more limited basis than in Kuwait. In return for Saudi
aid, the PLO restricts its activities in the country.
Saudi support is diluted by suspicions deriving from
the 1970 civil war in Jordan and Palestinian actions in
Lebanon. These suspicions also affect the Saudi view
of Palestinian workers, who are believed to be more
highly politicized than other foreigners in the country.
Deteriorating economic conditions have taken their
toll in Saudi Arabia, and, while the Saudis are not
publicly announcing a change in policy toward the
import of foreign labor, they are implementing
existing restrictions more vigorously (if selectively)
and adding new conditions. Three conditions for
granting a job to a non-Saudi must be met: the
prospective foreigner must be qualified for the job; no
qualified Saudi native can be found for the job; and
the worker must have a sponsor who will vouch for
and employ him. New restrictions affect dependents,
limit the staying time of foreigners (even if they find a
new job, they must leave the country and reenter), and
penalize employers of foreigners who try to evade the
law. It is now more difficult for Palestinians to enter
the country than other Arab nationalities. The
government is also active in cutting wages and
replacing highly paid workers with lower paid, as well
as "Saudi-izing" the work force as rapidly as possible.
Pressure to Saudi-ize the work force is strongest in the
public sector, although it is apparent in the private
sector, too. The kinds of jobs that Palestinians hold
are coveted by educated Saudis-professional and
engineering jobs, middle- and high-level managerial
positions, or highly skilled technical positions. In the
push to replace foreigners with Saudis, minimal
attention is apparently given to qualifications. Saudi
Arabia has been increasing the pace at which
foreigners are removed from important civil service
posts to give them to generally young, inexperienced
nationals, most of whom have just completed their
education. For example, a Palestinian with 22 years of
experience who had been the general manager of a
Saudi bank told of being replaced with a Saudi half
his age with virtually no experience. Few Palestinians
will be allowed to take new jobs at technical and
managerial levels, and some are being replaced by
nonnationals with comparable skills and experience
but at lower pay.
No recent statistics are available on trends in the
Saudi labor market. Observers believe that the level
of Palestinian workers is declining slowly and project
a continuing gradual decline, mostly through
attrition. Saudi Government actions are not usually
sudden or acute, but slow and situation oriented. The
government can avoid the onus of appearing anti-
Palestinian by allowing market forces to do its work.
Palestinian Perspectives
Economic opportunities brought the Palestinians to
Saudi Arabia. Originally, their dependents had few
restrictions placed upon them and were free to take
advantage of Saudi schools and universities, except
for the Medical College. Social security benefits are
available to Palestinians working for the government;
private business tends to pay large lump sum
payments. Health care has been available at no cost,
although expatriates working in the private sector will
soon lose this benefit.
Aside from these advantages, Saudi society holds
little attraction for Palestinians. They generally
regard the Saudi system as backward, tribal, and
archaic
Unlike the case in Kuwait, once the economic and
educational benefits dwindle away, little will remain
to keep the Palestinians in Saudi Arabia.
The younger Palestinians living in Saudi Arabia
express some resentment at the tightening restrictions
on their activities. They carry no refugee stigma in
their own minds and recognize the discrimination
against them. While they fear being displaced from
the only home they have known, they realize that
opportunities are becoming increasingly limited in
Saudi Arabia. Their elders are resigned to the
situation and remark that "insecurity is a way of life"
for Palestinians, who must take their opportunities
where they can. Few would want to retire in Saudi
Arabia anyway. Those who have lived there less than
15 years are most outspoken in their criticism.
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Most Palestinians in Saudi Arabia regard themselves
as apolitical or decidedly moderate. They support
Arafat and the PLO but do not engage in political
activism and are cautious about even expressing
opinions about the host country. None expressed the
desire to see the system change or to be active in
seeking to change it but comment about it with a
sense of superiority and detachment.
Saudi-based Palestinians support an independent
homeland more strongly than those who live in
Kuwait. The fact that few Palestinians in Saudi
Arabia have any desire to stay permanently appears
to play a large role in their attitude toward a separate
state. Their reasons are the same as those residing in
Kuwait-the need for long-term economic security, a
safe place to invest their assets, and for practical
requirements such as passports and an acceptable
international entity to defend their rights.
On the other hand, they doubt that a separate
homeland would be economically viable and question
if it could absorb large numbers of highly skilled
Palestinians, at least initially. In the absence of other
attractive options, however, the separate state solution
is being more seriously considered than at any time in
the past four or five years.
Palestinians in Saudi Arabia are fatalistic about their
prospects for achieving a homeland. They believe the
United States has a role to play in a Middle East
settlement but generally characterize US policy as
unhelpful and not likely to change. The former
idealism about what the United States stands for has
been dissipated, although no strongly negative feelings
were expressed toward the United States.
In sum, for these Palestinians, life in Saudi Arabia is
preferable to unemployment elsewhere. They will try
to stay as long as they can, but there will be no
assimilation. Domestic economic and security issues
will preoccupy Saudi leaders, and their interest in the
Palestinian issue will probably decline. Even if the oil
market should turn around, the gradual downward
trend in the Palestinian presence in Saudi Arabia is
likely to continue. Many unemployed Palestinians will
return to Jordan, and support for a Palestinian
homeland will grow.
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Iraq: The Kurdish Fursan
The Fursan, a paramilitary force of Kurdish
tribesmen who assist Iraq in suppressing dissidents in
Kurdistan, have begun to waver in their loyalty to the
regime.
Fursan are starting to doubt Baghdad's ability to
contain the rebel threat. Disaffection among the
Fursan could seriously complicate Baghdad's task of
keeping peace in its troubled Kurdish region.
Background
The Fursan is a militia composed primarily of Kurds
recruited from the Herkki, Sorchi, and Zibari tribes.'
The tribesmen have sided with the government in part
because they have longstanding feuds with some of
the major Kurdish resistance groups. The US
Embassy in Baghdad estimates there are some 25,000
Fursan fighters divided into 54 battalions. According
to the Embassy, the Iraqi Government pays 750
dinars monthly to each Fursan commander who
provides 1,000 fighters; individual militiamen get 85
dinars (an Iraqi Government Minister earns 500
dinars monthly).
Initially, the Fursan shared the job of guarding the
north with the Popular Army-the militia of Iraq's
ruling Bath Party. Embassy officials report that
recently Baghdad has begun to redeploy Popular
Army units to the southern front at Al Basrah. This
leaves the Fursan as the most important security force
in the Kurdish region, an area beset by two
insurgencies. Some 5,000 members of the Kurdish
Barzani tribe have started a revolt along the Iraqi-
Turkish border, while 2,000 to 3,000 guerrillas of the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) are fighting
farther south around As Sulaimaniyah
' The term Fursan comes from the Arabic for "cavalrymen."
Baghdad has designated the Kurdish tribesmen loyal to it the
"cavalrymen of Salahadin." Salahadin, a Kurd, was the Muslim
warrior who defeated the Crusaders. The Fursan also are referred
to as Light Battalions
The Fursan Versus the PUK
In 1983, Iran invaded Iraq at Panjwin, the stronghold
of the PUK. Fearing that the PUK would join forces
with the Iranians, Baghdad negotiated a deal with the
group's leader, Jalal Talabani. The government
enrolled the PUK into the Fursan and paid the
guerrillas regular subsidies, in return for which the
PUK helped Baghdad to repel Iran's invasion
The PUK's deal with Baghdad lasted only nine
months, largely because the Fursan undermined it.
the Fursan
refused to accept Talabani as an ally because they
had fought him for years. They conspired to drive a
wedge between him and Baghdad by luring an aide of
Talabani to a meeting and murdering him. When
Talabani sought revenge, open warfare erupted
between the two groups, and ultimately Baghdad was
drawn into fighting Talabani. The government's anti-
Talabani campaign continues today.
The Fursan Versus Barzani
The Barzani tribe spearheaded Iran's invasion of Iraqi
Kurdistan in 1983. The Barzanis' objective was to
regain tribal land from which they had been driven in
the mid-1970s. As a result of the invasion, the
Barzanis carved out a number of bases along the
Iraqi-Turkish border. The Fursan subsequently tried
but failed to drive the Barzanis out of this region.
Last August, Mas'ud Barzani-the leader of the
Barzanis-traveled to Syria and Libya, where he met
President Assad and Colonel Qadhafi. The two
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leaders invited Barzani to join the Democratic
National Front, a coalition of Iraqi dissidents seeking
to overthrow Iraqi President Saddam Husayn. In
return, the Syrians and Libyans promised Barzani
arms and ammunition. According to US Embassy
officials, Barzani has used the equipment Syria and
Libya. supplied him to expand his control over the
border region.
some
elements of the Fursan recently have begun to waver
in their loyalty to Baghdad.
Fursan fighters are disturbed by the Iraqis' apparent
inability to wipe out the PUK. Baghdad has pushed a
ruthless campaign to reconquer the area held by
Talabani, but the PUK guerrillas have stubbornly
held out, and in recent weeks Iran has begun to supply
them with aid.
The Fursan also are dismayed by the sophisticated
weaponry Barzani is getting from Syria and Libya. A
Fursan chief claimed the Barzanis are being supplied
with shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles. Recently,
the guerrillas shot down an Iraqi MI-17 helicopter
with one of the missiles. The helicopters formerly
were the scourge of the Kurdish guerrilla groups.
US Embassy officials report that some Fursan units
are avoiding engagements with the guerrillas, and a
few appear to have concluded local truces with them.
According to these officials, the Fursan and the
Barzanis are jointly administering several areas of the
Kurdish north. The officials claim that in one area
along the border, only two of 80 villages are under
Baghdad's authority.
Implications for Baghdad
The Fursan's disaffection from Baghdad is likely to
continue. According to US Embassy officials, years of
living on the government's bounty have spoiled the
Fursan. Individual commanders have grown wealthy
and are no longer willing to risk their lives against the
guerrillas-many of whom, like Barzani, are fighting
for land they believe was unjustly taken from them.
The officials contend the Fursan are seeking a modus
vivendi whereby they and the guerrillas can live side
by side.
If the Fursan continue to strike deals with the
guerrillas, Baghdad's job of keeping control over
Kurdish-inhabited areas will become more
complicated. The regular Iraqi Army already is
stretched thin defending the central and southern
battlefronts against Iran. It seems unlikely that
Baghdad will risk a major confrontation with the
rebel Kurds. It probably will cordon off the area they
hold and not try to reclaim it until after the war with
Iran.
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The Ordeal of a French
Journalist in Afghanistan
Jacques Abouchar's account of his six-week
imprisonment in Afghanistan, In the Bear's Cage,
gives a unique picture of Soviet and Afghan handling
of suspected foreign intelligence agents. The Soviets
and Afghans tried to force Abouchar to say he worked
for US or French intelligence by using threats,
frequent and prolonged interrogation, and isolation,
but they did not physically abuse him. Abouchar
denied any ties to the CIA or French intelligence, but
he provided his captors with some potentially useful
information on the insurgents.'
Capture by Soviets ,
Jacques Abouchar, a noted French television
journalist, and two French camera technicians
entered Afghanistan from Pakistan with an insurgent
band allied with resistance leader Sayed Ahmad
Gailani on 17 September 1984. Abouchar intended to
film the group's planned attack on Soviet and Afghan
regime forces. Although Abouchar's network is
controlled by the French Government, he claims that
the French Foreign Ministry and the French Embassy
in Islamabad were unaware of his project.
Soviet airborne troops apparently had advance
intelligence about Abouchar's plans. They captured
him in Qandahar Province after his group had been in
Afghanistan only a day; the French technicians
escaped to Pakistan. The Soviet commander indicated
that he had known when the party was going to enter
Afghanistan. Abouchar believes that Afghan
Government agents found out about the party's plans
at Chaman, the Pakistani border town where the
party stayed for several days.
The Soviet airborne troops treated Abouchar
correctly. They did not interrogate him extensively
during the 24-hour period they held him. Abouchar
refused to say whether he was accompanied by other
journalists, and his captors did not pursue the
question. They also untied his arms after an hour and
' Abouchar's book, Dans la Cage de 1'Ours, was published in
France in 1985. He is currently working in Washington for French
shared their food and water with him. They seemed
much more interested in France-repeating
frequently "Paris" and "champagne"-than in
Afghanistan. F__-]
The Soviet forces, however, stole Abouchar's
traveler's checks, toothpaste, and toilet paper. Only
their commander prevented them from taking his
watch.
Abouchar noted that the troops' clothes were filthy,
their boots had no laces, and they used string to hold
up their pants.
Soviet Interrogation in Qandahar
After his capture, Abouchar was taken to Qandahar,
where he was interrogated for three days by Soviet
officers. The senior Soviet officer asked Abouchar
about CIA operations in France and CIA relations
with French intelligence, but the officer did not
pursue the subject when Abouchar said he knew
nothing. The officer at Qandahar was fairly relaxed
and ended the interrogation by recalling the fine
relations between France and the Soviet Union during
World War II.
Lower ranking Soviet officers were more hostile
toward Abouchar. One officer accused him of
belonging to a neo-Nazi organization and of planning
sabotage.F_~
Afghan Interrogation Techniques
Abouchar was then taken to Sidorat prison in Kabul.
During his first week there, Afghan intelligence
(KHAD) officers tried to force Abouchar to admit
that he was either an employee of the CIA or French
intelligence. During the second and third weeks, the
Afghans tried to persuade him to admit that he had
been forced into carrying out his project by his
superiors at French television. Two KHAD officials
interrogated him most of the time.
Secret
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Secret
Abouchar says that KHAD director Dr. Najibullah,
who joined the interrogation before Abouchar's press
conference and trial, tried to convince him to
cooperate. Najibullah was correct but cold. None of
the interrogators tried to recruit Abouchar to work for
Afghan or Soviet intelligence.0
Afghan intelligence used threats, frequent and
prolonged interrogation, and isolation to try to extract
a confession:
? They threatened Abouchar with a long prison term
unless he cooperated.
? Although they never threatened physical violence,
Abouchar shared a cell with Afghans who were
beaten, and he occasionally heard screams of people
being tortured.
? Afghan intelligence questioned him nearly every
day for periods lasting up to 12 hours. Most
interrogations started at dawn, although some
began around midnight.
? They gave him a monotonous diet of thin soup,
corned beef, and bread. He had to sleep in a cold,
small cell with three other people, wash with cold
water despite the cold weather, and was allowed to
use the toilet only at certain times. He was allowed
walks only rarely but was permitted to see a doctor.
? They isolated Abouchar from nearly all contact
with the outside world, rejecting his repeated
requests to see the French Ambassador in Kabul or
receive letters from his family and colleagues. They
also forbade contact with all prisoners except those
in his cell. Abouchar heard no news because prison
guards intentionally lowered their transistor radios
during news broadcasts.
Abouchar's Response
Abouchar made few compromises with his
interrogators. He admitted only to having entered
Afghanistan illegally and to having claimed falsely on
his passport to be a businessman. Abouchar denied
categorically that he had links to the CIA and French
intelligence and claimed he revealed little important
intelligence information. He, however, did provide
KHAD with a physical description of the insurgents
he accompanied and described where they procured
their arms and how the Pakistani Army allowed them
to pass unhindered through numerous roadblocks in
Baluchistan. He claimed this information was too
vague to be of much use.
Show Trial and Release
After his interrogation at Sidorat, Afghan and Soviet
authorities displayed Abouchar at a press conference
and trial. There they accused him of being a member
of foreign intelligence services and presented his
captured camera equipment and introductory letter to
an insurgent group in Qandahar as evidence.
After a brief show trial, Abouchar was found guilty
and sentenced to 18 years in prison. Abouchar's
treatment improved during his short incarceration at
Puli-Charki prison in Kabul. He could awaken when
he wanted, ate better food, and circulated freely
among most of the prisoners. He was released on 29
October after only five days
We believe that Abouchar was released quickly after
his trial because Moscow wanted to limit damage to
its relations with France. Abouchar's capture received
widespread publicity in France and sparked protests
and demonstrations, including several outside the
Soviet Embassy in Paris. Even the French Communist
Party sought his release. The French Government told
Soviet officials that bilateral relations would suffer
seriously if Abouchar were imprisoned for a long
period.F----]
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We believe Abouchar was better treated than many
suspected foreign agents would have been because he
is a well-known French journalist. Soviet and Afghan
authorities treated a French doctor whom they
captured in 1983, Philippe Augoyard, far worse.
Augoyard spent five months in prison even though he
praised the Afghan Government and criticized the
insurgents at a public trial. Afghan authorities also
periodically threatened Augoyard with hanging.'
3 Augoyard's book, La Prison pour Delit dEspoir, was also
published in France in 19$5. Aueovard is still active in France in
STAT
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Afghanistan
KABUL*
;,_~Haryana 1
NEW DELHI ~D0Ih?
/ j
; I.
jr
Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra
Goa) Karnataka}
Andhra
Pradesh
(Pond cherry
ANDAMAN
ISLANDS
LAKSHADWEEP
(India)
Sri Lanka
*COLOMBO
RANGDDN*
NICOBAR
ISLANDS
(India)
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative,
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India: Gujarat-Social
Conflict and Stability
For more than five months the industrialized west
Indian state of Gujarat has been the scene of major
caste and communal violence that has cost more than
250 lives and millions of dollars in property damage.'
Prime Minister Gandhi's slowness in resolving this
crisis is in sharp contrast with his decisive approach to
other issues that he saw as more urgent, such as the
Sikh problem in Punjab and the Sri Lankan conflict.
Gandhi also was preoccupied with his foreign visits
this spring. By moving deliberately on Gujarat's
problems, Gandhi is trying to signal to the state
Congress parties that he is more patient than his
mother and less likely to meddle in state government,
but in return he will demand greater competence and
honesty from the state parties.
Gujarat-Background to Caste Violence
The widespread violence in Gujarat demonstrates that
the antidiscrimination measures in the Indian
Constitution cannot protect the rights of all members
of society in the face of the institutionalized and
traditionally sanctioned strictures of the caste system.
The conflict in Gujarat stems from disgruntlement
among higher caste Hindus and opposition parties
with the state government for its political
manipulation of job and education opportunities
reserved for members of low castes and local tribes.
Violence erupted last March after Gujarat's Chief
Minister Solanki promised on the eve of the state
election that he would raise the percentage of reserved
positions for Other Backward Classes by 18 percent if
elected. Upper caste Gujaratis were already feeling
pinched by the number of school and employment
opportunities reserved for low caste applicants and
' Caste refers to the hereditary classes into which Hindus are
divided by orthodox tradition. A person's caste dictates his social
status, rules of social intercourse, customs, and occupation.
Marriage, social relationships, and employment opportunities are
Under the Indian Constitution, a percentage of
educational openings and government jobs at the
national and state level are reserved for members of
tribal groups and Hindu untouchables. The exact
proportion of reserved positions varies with the caste
makeup of each state. This parity formula is set
nationally for each state-in Gujarat, 14 percent of
government jobs and educational opportunities are
reserved for untouchables ("scheduled castes, " in
legal usage) and 7 percent for indigenous groups (or
"scheduled tribes'). States have discretion in
allotting seats to other locally disadvantaged groups,
known as other backward classes (OBCs)-most of
them also low in caste and social status. In Gujarat,
OBCs account for another 10 percent of all reserved
positions.F_~
called for strikes and demonstrations. Low caste 25X1
Hindus and members of scheduled tribes in the major
cities of the state struck back with counter-
demonstrations and economic boycotts. Clashes
between "reservationists" and "antireservationists"
increased through the spring, and the level of violence
rapidly escalated.
Although Chief Minister Solanki won the election by
a large margin, he could not control the mounting
violence. As more state institutions were closed by
strikes and Solanki's inability to restore order became
increasingly apparent, Prime Minister Gandhi finally
sent in the Army to patrol the state capital,
Ahmedabad, and other urban centers in late spring.
The violence, however, spread to other cities, arousing
longstanding local Hindu-Muslim rivalries as well. By
Secret
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Secret
mid-June calls for Solanki's ouster began to increase
within the state Congress Party as well as the
opposition. Gandhi sent trusted party officials to
Gujarat in June to measure the damage and prepare
an assessment. Based on the findings of this
committee and personal interviews with party leaders
in Gujarat and with Solanki himself, Gandhi removed
the chief minister in early July and replaced him with
a less flamboyant official from the local Congress
Party apparatus, A. Chaudhuri.
Solanki's dismissal cleared the way for a new round of
political negotiations between the government and
leaders of the pro- and antireservationist factions, and
by the first week in August Chaudhuri could
withdraw the Army from most cities. He offered high
caste leaders a compromise by reducing quotas for
educational and government positions to their
preelection levels. Most state employee unions have
accepted some form of this offer and returned to
work.
Upper caste student association leaders, however,
apparently sense the potential for more gains, perhaps
even a full reversal of the reservation policy, and are
still calling for strikes and demonstrations. Sporadic
violence is continuing between pro- and
antireservationist groups. Moreover, Chaudhuri's
proposals have had little effect in dampening violence
between Hindus and Muslims in Ahmedabad,
according to press reporting.
In our view, Gandhi moved quickly once he decided
that Solanki must go. He brought Chaudhuri into the
picture promptly and supported his appointment with
public statements. Chaudhuri's immediate concern is
to show that he can balance the conflicting demands
of the three contending groups in Gujarat: the low
caste proreservationists, the high caste
antireservationists, and the several communal groups
that are fighting for control in the streets. In the short
term, we believe his first priority will be to
demonstrate to New Delhi his ability to maintain
order and obviate the need to call back the Army.
Why Did Gandhi Allow Gujarat To Unravel?
We believe Gandhi failed to respond to the situation
in Gujarat in the early stages because his attention
was centered on the crisis in Punjab and his state
visits to the Soviet Union and the United States in
late spring. Gandhi had identified the Sikh conflict as
the primary challenge facing his administration after
his election last winter. The timing of last month's
Punjab accord suggests he probably spent much of the
spring working on the details of the agreement. In
addition, his foreign travels occupied much of May
and June, when the violence in Gujarat took some
critical turns for the state government
Gandhi's inexperience with center/state relations also
may have slowed his response. For example, he may
have failed to realize how corrupt the state party had
become under Solanki or the kind of irresponsible
maneuvering the chief minister was willing to
undertake to increase his hold on the state
government.
Rajiv's reluctance to move quickly in Gujarat is also
due, in part, to Congress Party politics. Gujarat has
been a stronghold of support for the Congress Party
largely on the strength of its coalition with a number
of scheduled castes and tribes. Solanki, who headed
the state government for five years, was from a
backward class. Because his successor, Chaudhuri, is
a member of a scheduled tribe, the Congress
Party-led government in Gujarat cannot afford to
give too much ground on the reservation issue
Moreover, we believe that Rajiv's closest advisers
have reminded him of the severe challenge posed to
his mother by caste unrest in the state in 1974. Many
observers trace her imposition of a nationwide state of
emergency in 1975 and subsequent loss of the prime-
ministership in 1977 to her inability to contain the
spread of caste-based violence in Gujarat. Rajiv
appears to want to display greater patience in
responding to state challenges and is seeking to avoid
renewing fears of a return to his mother's
heavyhanded tactics.
Looking Forward for Gujarat and Gandhi
Gandhi probably believes he has bought some
breathing time in Gujarat by changing chief
ministers. We believe he is looking forward to a period
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Secret
of reconciliation and a respite from opposition
criticism of his leadership on this issue.
We believe Gandhi hopes to use his handling of the
issue to send signals to several sectors of Indian
society regarding his developing style of leadership.
He wants to demonstrate that compared to his
mother, who attempted to emasculate Congress Party
leadership at the state level to prevent challenges to
her domination of the party, he will give greater
latitude to state leaders, but that in return he will
expect a higher level of competence.
The communal and caste conflict in Gujarat,
nevertheless, demonstrates a dilemma for Indian
leaders that we believe will persist regardless of
Gandhi's immediate response. Lower castes have
come to look to the Congress Party in both the
national and state governments for further special
concessions to advance their social and economic
status. Upper castes, however, increasingly view such
concessions as encroachments on their access to
economic and educational opportunities. The Indian
Government-and Rajiv Gandhi-will continue to
have difficulty either reconciling or defusing these
;conflicting demands.
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India's Military
Airlift Capabilities
New Soviet-built IL-76 and AN-32 transports are
expanding the Indian Air Force's readiness and reach.
Although most of India's military airlift assets are
deployed to support ground forces along its
mountainous northern border, these aircraft also give
India an enhanced ability to intervene in the islands of
the Indian Ocean. Nevertheless, the new transports do
not fully satisfy Air Force requirements, and the door
is slightly open for US sales of C-130s to India.F_
Current Deployments
The large majority of the Air Force's fixed-wing and
helicopter airlift assets are deployed in an arc along
the Himalayan mountains that runs from Kashmir to
Assam. In our judgment, this deployment indicates
that their primary mission is to supply and transport
ground forces defending India's northeastern and
northwestern frontiers, which lack adequate roads and
rail lines. For example
exercise.
Indian airlift assets are also used, although to a lesser
extent, to support military operations and exercises
elsewhere. The southernmost-based helicopter unit,
equipped with MI-8 Hips, is colocated in Jodhpur
with one of the Army's five parachute battalions.
According to satellite photography, AN-12s were
present at Port Blair in the Andaman Islands this
spring to support India's annual triservice amphibious
rotary-wing transport aircraft
Modernization Programs
The Indian Air Force has placed a high priority on the
modernization of its airlift fleet. Since 1980 it has
spent over $650 million to procure 120 fixed- and
Fixed Wing. The Air Force is in the midst of a major
upgrading to replace seven squadrons of C-47 and
C-119 aircraft with new Soviet-built AN-32 Clines.
New Delhi acquired its Canadian, US, and British-
made transports over 20 years ago, and they have long
passed into obsolescence. The Indians contracted to
purchase 98 AN-32s, valued at $539 million, in 1981,
and over 40 have been delivered
The Indians have been quick to press their AN-32s
into service.
t at mes a v ee
replaced C-47s in one squadron at Jorhat in the
northeastern sector. A second AN-32 squadron has
been established at Agra, home of India's sole
parachute brigade, replacing one of two C-119
squadrons. The AN-32s, probably from this squadron,
have been seen in small numbers at Pathankot,
Chandigarh, and Srinagar-airfields along the
northwestern rim of the Himalayas.
New Delhi ordered at least six IL-76 Candid
transports in 1984 for $155 million. The first arrived
this spring and has been pressed into service. This
summer the Air Force converted one of its two AN- 12
Cub squadrons to IL-76s, allowing the AN-12s, many
of which are inoperable, to be consolidated into one
squadron, according to
Helicopters. India's inventory of MI-8 helicopters is
being supplemented with new Soviet-built MI-17s,
which will probably be used in an air assault role.
India purchased 20 MI-17s in 1984, and, according to
satellite imagery, 13 have been delivered so far this
year. None are yet operational.
nrvl
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India has requested delivery of 16 MI-26 Halo heavy-
lift helicopters from the Soviet Union, but Moscow
has not yet agreed.
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the Air Force needs at least 10 of these
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aircraft, which can each carry 100 troops, to move
1,000 men on short notice.
Secret
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Increased Capabilities
The new Soviet aircraft will increase the capacity and
range of the Indian air transport fleet. The Air
Force's older aircraft had experienced significant
operational problems in the last few years. All of the
C-119s were grounded in 1982, placing an increased
strain on the aging AN-12s. Overall, the Air Force
had only 60 percent of its transports operational last
year. With the new AN-32s and IL-76s, this
percentage should increase to about 80 to 90 percent
in the next few years.
Obtaining the new aircraft has also allowed New
Delhi to use its older aircraft to form new units for
less critical missions.
new squadron has been formed at the Air
Force reserve base at Sulur in southern India where
satellite photography shows an increased number of
C-47s.
were used last year to help form an air wing for the
paramilitary Border Security Force. The Border
Security Force is looking into obtaining some
helicopters to enhance its capability and may obtain
additional C-47s and other old transports as the Air
Force accepts newer aircraft
We estimate that the new aircraft will allow the Air
Force almost to double the number of paratroopers
and the amount of cargo it can carry by the end of the
decade (see table). Under optimal conditions the
Army will be able to move two, instead of one,
infantry brigades by air on a single mission.
The Air Force will also be able to support missions
much farther from its airbases or conduct more
missions close to home with fewer planes. The IL-76s
will be able to fly troops and supplies over 4,000
nautical miles from India's southernmost airbases,
significantly increasing India's ability to intervene in
the island nations of the Indian Ocean.
Nevertheless, the new Soviet aircraft-purchased for
political and economic as well as military reasons-do
not meet all Air Force requirements. Their
performance at high altitudes and on short runways in
the mountainous regions where India's transport
aircraft primarily are used is suspect. When the Air
Force first considered the IL-76 in early 1981, it
Projected Indian Fixed-Wing
Airlift Capabilities
Paratroops
(men)
Cargo
(1,000
kilograms)
Force Structure
1984
3,000
700
13 squadrons with seven dif-
ferent types of aircraft,
60 percent operational
1990
5,600
1,300
98 AN-32s and 26 IL-76s,
80 percent operational
98 AN-32s, 18 IL-76s, and
36 C-130s, 80 percent
operational
discovered that the aircraft could not take off with
cargo from the airfield at Leh, where India's
northernmost Army division in Kashmir is stationed.
The Indians are also aware that an AN-32 would
have problems staying in the air in the Himalayas if it
lost power in one of its two engines.
Air Force planners have considered buying US
C-130s to overcome these limitations.' The deal has
been postponed because of funding problems,
although visiting high-ranking
t at
funds were available for necessary systems. The
Indians have not given the C-130 deal a high priority
in recent arms negotiations with the United States
An Army Aviation Corps
Final Indian decisions on the C-130 deal and possibly
new helicopters may await the outcome of the Army's
longstanding battle to create an aviation corps.
' By purchasing two squadrons of C-130s at the expense of some IL-
76s, the Indians would significantly increase their cargo-carrying
capability while only slightly reducing their paratroop-lift
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the Army has
proposed sequentially gaining control of:
? Observation aircraft now operated by the Army, but
owned and maintained by the Air Force.
? Air Force helicopters used to transport Army troops
and supplies.
? Air Force fixed-wing aircraft committed to the
same taskl
suggest that the Army has
pointed to the Pakistani Army's attack helicopters
and the takeover of Iraq's helicopter air assault assets
by the Iraqi Army to support its case. The government
is inclined to favor the Army's position largely
because of its outstanding performance in internal
security over the last few years. If the Army wins this
interservice contest, it will join the ranks of a handful
of armies in the Third World that have successfully
won possession of their own airlift assets.
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Sri Lanka: Population
Redistribution and Resettlement-
A Backdrop to Negotiations
The continuing redistribution of the Sri Lankan
population will have a strong impact on prospects for
a negotiated settlement between the Sinhalese-
dominated government and the Tamil separatists. The
redistribution involves two major migration streams: a
government-sponsored program to resettle Sinhalese
on state lands in the Northern and Eastern Provinces
claimed as "traditional homelands" by Tamils; and
the resettlement of Indian Tamils from the plantation
areas of the central highlands to state lands in the
north and east.
Colombo has also proposed major political
redistricting. The redistricting plan is aimed at the
same goal as the resettlement of Sinhalese: dilution of
Tamil political strength in areas of the country where
they are now concentrated.
At the root of much of the current and proposed
resettlement in Sri Lanka are an extensive political
gerrymandering attempt by the Sinhalese and a
Tamil attempt to secede from the country. The
movement of Sinhalese into Ceylon Tamil-dominated
areas helps local electorates return Sinhalese
candidates. In response, the Ceylon Tamils have used
the resettlement of Indian Tamils to create a buffer
zone against the Sinhalese population
Resettlement
Government-sponsored programs to settle Sinhalese
in northern and eastern areas of the country have
been under way since the 1960s. The strategy,
according to public statements by government leaders,
is to create a society in which each province reflects a
mix of population equal to the national proportion of
ethnic groups. Ceylon Tamils, dominant in the
sparsely settled areas targeted for resettlement,
oppose the programs because they would give the
Sinhalese, who constitute more than three-quarters of
the national population, dominance in every province
of the country. The government recently has provided
arms and ammunition to the Sinhalese settlers for
defense against angry Tamils facing eviction. Despite
the resettlement, Tamils are still the majority in five
of Sri Lanka's 23 districts but have lost the majority
they once held in Trincomalee District as a result of
resettlement and differing population growth rates.
As a counterstrategy, Indian Tamils, under the
sponsorship of the Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC),
a plantation workers' union with close ties to the
ruling United National Party, have been migrating
gradually from the central highlands and resettling on
state land in northern and eastern areas of the
country. According to a 1983 government study, a
CWC land redistribution center located in Vavuniya
District planned the resettlement of about 20,000
Indian Tamils in northern Batticaloa District within a
triangular area along the eastern coast reserved by the
government for Sinhalese settlement. Although
condoned by the central government, this resettlement
scheme was opposed by hardline Buddhist leaders who
led Sinhalese into the area to seize lands targeted by
the Indian Tamils. The Buddhist-Sinhalese
countermove was apparently successful, although the
government has given no indication of a shift in
resettlement policy.
Indian Tamil participation in a broad Tamil
resettlement scheme is not an indication of support for
the separatist movement. Indian Tamils have
supported neither the insurgency nor separatism, in
general, and the leader of the CWC, S. Thondaman,
is a member of the Cabinet and an avowed opponent
of the separatist movement. Thondaman, however, is
the leading Indian Tamil politician and a champion of
Indian Tamil rights. The creation of Indian Tamil
majorities in sparsely settled voting districts is a way
of increasing the political power of Indian Tamils, the
majority of whom have gained Sri Lankan citizenship
only in the last decade.
Secret
NESA NESAR 85-019
30 August 1985
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Redistricting
Colombo could also rely on more traditional
gerrymandering such as the redrawing of electoral
boundaries. A government study recommends the
creation of three new administrative districts that
would in effect drown Ceylon Tamil concentrations in
a sea of Sinhalese. Minor civil divisions and voting
districts along the east coast are generally elongated
north and south, as are the larger administrative
districts. Since Ceylon Tamils are concentrated in the
coastal strip, the existing voting districts tend to favor
Tamil majorities. The government plan would
reorient districts in an east-west direction to include
large inland Sinhalese concentrations. The port city of
Trincomalee, for example, has a large concentration
of Ceylon Tamils, while the hinterland is solidly
Sinhalese. By redrawing political boundaries so that
each district has a small concentration of coastal
Tamils and a large number of hinterland Sinhalese,
Tamil political strength would be diluted
The Sri Lankan Constitution prohibits creating such
districts, and we doubt that a constitutional
amendment can be passed. Redistributing Sinhalese,
rather than redistricting, is likely to remain the
principal government strategy even if some
redistricting is part of a negotiated settlement.
President Jayewardene, as recently as August 1985,
however, has suggested that some local redistricting
may be possible without amending the Constitution.
The government is likely to propose to Tamil
separatists some redistricting in the Northern and
Eastern Provinces as part of a negotiated settlement.
Outlook
Any settlement of the current communal conflict will
have to deal with past and proposed population
redistribution. Tamil separatist leaders, we believe,
will settle for less than a separate Tamil state but will
insist on considerable regional autonomy for the
Tamil-dominated areas. Such an agreement, however,
is pointless unless it provides for a cessation of
Sinhalese settlement in what is considered by Tamils
to be their traditional homeland. Otherwise,
"autonomy" will mean only that the Sinhalese will
dominate at the national and regional levels.
A negotiated political settlement will need to address
the question whether Sri Lanka will follow the pattern
of Malaysia and attempt to become a fully integrated
pluralist society-clearly the Sinhalese aim-or
whether traditional Sinhalese-Tamil regional divisions
will continue to exist. A third possibility, an
independent state sought by Tamil extremists, similar
to Singapore's separation from Malaysia, is highly
unlikely. Separatism is strongly opposed by the
governments of both Sri Lanka and India and by
many Tamils as well.
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