AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000301380001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 30, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 18, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

Directorate of
Intelligence
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?A G
Africa Review
18 April 1986
eb~
ALA AR 86-008
18 April 1986
385
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Africa Review) 25X1
Articles Somalia: Waiting in the Wings
succession and prospects for a peaceful transition
President Siad has recently dropped hints that his rule may be
drawing to an end. His comments have fueled speculation about
South Africa: Kids Who Kill) 5
Despite severe security measures, violence by young black activists
is spreading, and adult blacks and some black political organizations
are concerned that rising youth militancy is polarizing their
community.)
Angola: Holden Roberto and the FNLAI 7
Holden Roberto, still claiming to be leader of the once-powerful
National Front for the Liberation of Angola, recently was in the
United States seeking support for the nearly moribund anti-Marxist
insurgent group.F-I
Algeria: Shifting Stance Toward Chad I 9
The Bendjedid government has not openly chosen sides in the
Chadian civil war but appears to be moving away from Libyan-
backed rebel leader Goukouni and toward Chadian President
Habre. FI
Zambia: Key Economic Personnel Shuffled
Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
Production Staff Office of African and Latin American Analysis
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ALA AR 86-008
18 April 1986
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Africa Review
Articles
Somalia: Waiting in
the Wings
President Siad, who seized power in a military coup in
1969, has recently dropped hints that his rule may be
drawing to an end. Although apparently in reasonably
good health, Siad is in his seventies and reportedly
was ill earlier this year. His comments have fueled
speculation about succession and prospects for a
peaceful transition. Although Siad has carefully
avoided designating a successor, a member of his
inner circle initially would probably assume the
presidency. Political infighting and tribal tensions,
however, could easily erupt into a violent struggle for
power. The US Embassy believes that a peaceful
change in leadership is unlikely to have a major
impact on US-Somali relations. We believe a drawn-
out or violent transition could lead to reduced US
influence and open the door for Soviet inroads
A Peaceful Transition
Siad could step down for health reasons or be forced
to resign. Some officers in the military and some
government officials are disenchanted with the
country's military weakness, the perceived paucity of
Western economic assistance, and Siad's inability to
cope with growing domestic problems. If Siad leaves,
the Somali constitution states that the first vice
president-in this case Lt. Gen. Ali Samantar-is to
assume the presidency for a period of no more than 60
days. Somalia's only political party is to nominate a
candidate, who then is voted into office by the
National Assembly. F_~
Samantar, who is also Minister of Defense, would
probably face strong opposition to his assuming the
presidency. He belongs to the Tumal tribe, an outcast
group looked down upon by most Somalis. Samantar
has opponents within the military, especially among
those who belong to the politically dominant Marehan
tribe and its allies. These individuals do not believe he
Tribalism is endemic to Somali society, and every
government since independence in 1960 has included
various tribal coalitions. The Siad regime, which
officially bans any display of tribalism, is no
exception. Power is concentrated in the hands of
President Siad's Marehan clan and related clans
belonging to the Darod family, which makes up an
estimated 20 percent of the population, and elements
of the Hawiya family. This cabal controls the
nation's political, economic, and military life and
generally is resistant to reforms or changes that
could affect its interests.
Most Hawiya and Issak, who number approximately
47 percent of the population, resent their exclusion
from key sectors of the political and economic life of
the country, dominated by them prior to the coup.
Issak disenchantment is reflected in its support-
overt and covert-for an anti-Siad insurgent group,
the Somali National Movement (SNM), based in
Ethiopia. The regime has used a heavy hand to
suppress the Issak because of their close
identification with the SNM and the group has been
purged from many military positions. Most Hawiya
are indifferent toward the Siad government, although
a small number of dissidents are affiliated with the
SNM. The Hawiya and Issaks lack of 'friends in
high places" would limit their ability to influence
events in the immediate post-Siad period, according
to most observers, but their power may increase if the
Marehan grip on the country is weakened. F_~
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ALA AR 86-008
18 April 1986
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would promote their political and economic interests
with the same fervor as Siad, a fellow Marehan. The
that many other officers
resent the Defense Minister's efforts to further the
careers of other Tumals in the military and his
periodic efforts to crack down on corruption.)
Samantar, however, is not in disfavor with all in the
military and the Marehan tribe, according to the US
Embassy. Some reportedly view him as a professional
officer committed to the best interests of the country
and the militar . We believe, on the basis of US
Embassy an
would be an attractive compromise choice
for major tribes such as the Issak or Hawiya, long
discriminated against by the Marehan clique and in
no position to move one of their own into the
presidency. Samantar also is an adept infighter who
would probably work behind the scenes during the
transition period to build up tribal and personal
alliances that would allow him to gain and hold
power. F__1
We believe Samantar would face a serious challenge
from Brig. Gen. Hashi Ganni, a longtime opponent.
haste support o a number 01 e ow
tribesmen and midlevel officers who believe he would
defend their interests in the post-Siad era and provide
the country with firm leadership. In addition, many
Somalis view him as a strong nationalist who could
extract more military and economic assistance from
the United States in return for military access.
Ganni, however, has alienated the large Issak tribe
and factions within the military with his arrogant
manner and his often brutal suppression of dissent
during his tenure as northern sector commander. In
addition, other tribes see him as a defender of
Marehan interests and, according to the Embassy,
some Somalis believe that a Ganni bid for power
would split the country and result in bloodshed.
Ganni's aspirations, in our view, recently suffered a
setback when Siad sent him to the United States for
two years of training. The Embassy, however, believes
that he will remain an active participant in Somali
politics and would still play a significant role in the
succession issue.)
Another serious contender for president is Ahmed
Suleiman, the current Interior Minister. Although he
belongs to the Dolbanante tribe, Suleiman is related
to Siad by marriage, has support in Marehan circles
in the military, and reportedly has close personal
relations with Issak elders. He has long coveted the
presidency and, according to the Embassy, possesses
many of Siad's more devious traits. F-7
The Interior Minister, nevertheless, faces several
obstacles in his bid to succeed Siad. As the former
head of Somalia's security service, he has made many
enemies in the government and among the population.
In addition, his support in the Army is not extensive,
and he does not have direct command of military
forces to call on in the event of a widespread and
violent power struggle
An Unconstitutional Transfer of Power
A military coup against Siad is a possibility, in our
opinion, despite the President's demonstrated ability
to manipulate his rivals and to keep his opponents off-
guard. Siad's inability to ease Somalia's economic and
military malaise, nd
Embassy reporting, has created discontent in the
military and other sectors
Moreover, Siad has encouraged rivalries
between his potential successors, making an orderly
transition more unlikely.
A bloody transition probably would thrust a number
of senior Army officers onto the political scene.
Several of these officers, such as the northern sector
commander, Gen. Siad Hersi "Morgan," have close
ties to Samantar or the Marehan tribe. We believe
commanders of operational Army units in the
Mogadishu area or key sector commanders outside
the capital could end up on top in a free-for-all
struggle. F__1
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During a period of turmoil we believe power also
could be seized by middle-level or junior officers, most
of whom would be motivated by tribal or personal
loyalties. in recent 25X1
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years indicate that some in this group also harbor pro-
Soviet or strongly nationalistic ideals. This faction
blames the United States for many of Somalia's
problems-especially its military weakness-and are
critical of the re ime's clos a West. In
addition that several of
these officers have commented favorably on the
USSR's military support to its allies.
Implications for the United States
We generally agree with the Embassy's assessment
that a peaceful leadership transition probably would
not portend any major changes in US-Somali
relations. In fact, ties could even improve under
Samantar or Suleiman because both probably would
be more receptive to economic reform and political
liberalization than Siad. In addition, the seizure of
power by senior military commanders probably would
have little adverse impact.
that most of them are pro-West and have
received some training in the United States or Europe.
General Ganni is an exception, however, and we
believe a government dominated by him would be less
responsive to Washington.
We believe a weak or unstable post-Siad government
would give the USSR an opportunity to try to
enhance the positions of pro-Soviet or radical officers
in the military and other institutions. Moscow
probably would attempt to woo a new regime by
offering to try to obtain concessions from Ethiopia on
the Ogaden issue and with promises of limited
assistance in return for a less Western-oriented
foreign policy and the termination of US military
access. Libya's Qadhafi, with whom Siad has opened
a limited rapprochement, almost certainly would
attempt to do the same. FI
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South Africa: Kids
Who Killl
Unlike the 10,000 black youths who fled South Africa
during the Soweto riots in 1976 and 1977 as refugees
or to join the outlawed African National Congress
(ANC), young black activists today appear to be
remaining in the townships and continuing to agitate.
They are a major force in township unrest and their
demands have become increasingly strident. Despite
severe security measures, antigovernment activity is
spreading, and, according to the US Embassy, adult
blacks and some black political organizations are
concerned that rising youth militancy is polarizing the
black community.
Unprecedented Militancy
Out of school and unemployed for long periods, urban
black youths are among the most politically conscious
of the country's black population. According to
government figures, 201 of 763 blacks killed by
security forces in 1985 were children. Militant youths
also have been the source of much of the black-
against-black violence in recent months, as hundreds
of youth organizations-including the multiracial,
antiapartheid United Democratic Front (UDF), ad
hoc political committees, and street gangs-often
clash with one another, according to US Embassy
reporting. F]
In many cases, black political organizations are
unable to control the actions of militant youths. For
example, the recent national black education
conference-attended by more than 1,500
representatives from schools throughout the
country-was only partially successful in getting
students to return to the classrooms, according to
press reports. A group of youths firebombed a school
in late March, destroying free textbooks and school
supplies-a concession recently won from the
government by education committees. Many student
militants still adhere to the "liberation now, education
later" approach. F__1
In August the government banned the most
influential and militant political group for black
youths, the Congress of South African Students, but
Young black militants-a major
source of violence.
many members remain active. They have been prime
targets for detention by government security forces,
according to press reports, and boycotting students
currently list as one of their demands the lifting of the
ban on the group.F__1
Gangs of youths calling themselves "comrades" have
appeared recently in black urban townships.
Extremely militant and violent, they have displayed
the flags of the ANC and the South African
Communist Party even though we do not believe they
are under the control of any organization. Individual
comrades probably belong to some hardline groups in
the United Democratic Front, although we have little
evidence of comrades being organized into groups
with formal leadership.
The professed aim of the comrades is to make the
townships ungovernable-a goal shared by the
ANC-and they often instigate riots. In so-called
liberated areas in the townships, where sustained
violence and. resistance have nearly eliminated
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ALA AR 86-008
18 April 1986
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effective government control, comrades conduct
kangaroo courts, fine boycott violators, and frequently
execute those accused of collaborating with the
government. Their methods have become more
extreme toward township residents who resist boycotts
of white-owned businesses. According to press reports,
comrades often confiscate or destroy purchases of
boycott violators and, in some cases, have forced
violators to eat detergent or drink oil suspected of
being purchased in white-owned stores. They also
have killed or seriously injured fellow township
residents for alleged boycott violations-in the eastern
Cape police attributed at least 83 deaths to roving
gangs last year. F__1
We also believe a strong undercurrent of common
thuggery occurs along with the politically motivated
violence. Some township murders and executions-
one method is called "necklacing," in which a
gasoline-soaked tire is placed around the victim and
set alight-probably are the result of gang wars.
Looting and robbery have become common
byproducts of unrest incidents, and youths have been
killed for refusin to join gangs trying to extend their
influence
Alienating the Older Generation
Parents are indignant that their children are
ridiculing them for being passive in the past,
according to the US Embassy. They fear their
children are breaking with traditional tribal values
that allow free expression of views and respect of
elders. According to a recent survey, most urban
black youths now associate themselves less with their
tribal links than with being "black. "F_~
Some influential figures and political organizations
are beginning to distance themselves from the most
militant youths. Spokesmen for the UDF and black
opposition leaders-including Bishop Desmond Tutu
and Winnie Mandela-have called for a halt to black-
against-black violence. The UDF has denied any
connection with the "people's court" executions and is
discouraging harsh enforcement of the recently
reimposed consumer boycotts in Pretoria and Port
Elizabeth, according to press and Embassy reporting.
Outlook
The rising militancy, in our view, is a strong
countertrend to recent gains in organized black
political action, such as the current well-planned
black consumer boycott in the Pretoria area and the
recent success of the national black education
conference. We believe that many antigovernment
groups-including the ANC and the UDF-are
concerned that their lack of control over militant
youths will divide South Africa's blacks, leading
many moderates to abandon an activist course
because of youth excesses. They also probably believe
the extremism of the ouths will bring harsher
security measures.
Pretoria, too, recognizes that the increased black
militancy undermines its long-term reform strategy of
co-opting moderate blacks into a limited power-
sharing arrangement. Moreover, Pretoria fears
sporadic attacks on whites and demonstrations in
white areas will increase as militancy spreads.
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Angola:
Holden Roberto and the FNLA
Holden Roberto, still claiming to be leader of the once
powerful National Front for the Liberation of Angola
(FNLA), recently was in the United States seeking
support for the nearly moribund anti-Marxist
insurgent group. His efforts are in response to the
Congressional repeal last summer of the Clark
Amendment, which halted US aid to Angolan rebels
in 1976. Last September, Roberto attended a
fundraising conference in Dallas for anti-Communist
insurgencies around the world that was sponsored by
the World Anti-Communist League. In April, a group
of retired US military men-calling themselves
Civilian Military Assistance-announced they would
provide $200,000 in nonlethal aid to the FNLA,
according to press reports. Before releasing the aid,
however, the donors demanded Roberto's assurances
that the FNLA remains a viable fighting force in
Angola. In our judgment, the FNLA currently poses
no threat to the Angolan Government, and Roberto-
who lives in exile in France-probably has little
influence with the group's few remaining guerrillas.
Riches to Rags
In the decade since the Soviet-backed Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola came to
power, external support for Roberto and the FNLA
has become almost nonexistent. At its height in 1974,
the FNLA was the largest and best equipped
insurgent group in Angola, with 2,000 guerrillas
inside the country and another 10,000 to 12,000
operating from bases in Zaire, according to academic
sources. In March, a spokesman for the FNLA
claimed the group has only 1,500 "fighters" operating
in northern Angola. According to press reports, the
guerrillas remaining in Angola have few weapons and
little ammunition, and are not militarily active.
Moreover, the nonaggression pact Zaire signed with
Angola in 1979 sent Roberto into exile in Paris and
cut off Zaire as a base for guerrilla operations into
Angola.
WA 1;1 Mll
Holden Roberto (in sunglasses) with troops in
northern Angola in 1975.
Luanda's offers of amnesty to guerrillas willing to lay
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ALA AR 86-008
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1985, according to press reports, more than 150
former FNLA rebels were integrated into the
Angolan armed forces.
Roberto and the FNLA Today
The FNLA appears to be largely moribund today
with its traditional areas of operation in northwestern
Angola offering few government targets for attack.
Moreover, the group is too small and too poorly
equipped to sustain a credible campaign against more
lucrative targets elsewhere in the country. The FNLA
remnants seem to avoid contact with government
forces, according to journalists who have traveled with
the group.F-~
In our judgment, Holden Roberto's claims of active
leadership of the FNLA are doubtful. We believe he
has not been to Angola in at least seven years, and
judge it unlikely he will return soon to Zaire or
Angola. Roberto's absence from the field has
diminished his influence within the FNLA,I
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Algeria: Shifting
Stance Toward Chad
The Chadian civil war is an issue of longstanding and
growing importance to Algeria. Policymakers in
Algiers oppose French and Libyan involvement in the
fighting, and have attempted through diplomatic
means to encourage reconciliation between the two
factions in Chad. Algiers, however, now appears to be
moving away from Libyan-backed rebel leader
Goukouni and toward Chadian President Habre. The
reasons center on concern about Libyan leader
Qadhafi's aggressive foreign policy in Africa, the
potential security threat posed by Qadhafi's
adventurism in Sub-Saharan Africa, and doubts
about French resolve in Chad. Even so, Algeria is not
yet inclined to openly choose sides but probably would
do so if the Habre government appeared to be losing
control of the military situation. F_~
Algiers Upholds High Ideals ...
Algiers' official policy toward Chad is to remain
neutral. Its primary goal is the termination of all
outside intervention and the withdrawal of foreign
military personnel. The balance in this position is
reflected in a claim Algeria has made privately to
foreign diplomats that, although Habre represents the
"legal" government of Chad, the regime in
N'Djamena is not "legitimate." Algeria has been
involved in efforts by the Organization of African
Unity to facilitate a cease-fire and negotiations
between Habre and Goukouni. Although Algeria
would prefer a government of national unity including
both Chadian leaders, the government has indicated
to the United States and other governments that it
would support any regime in Chad that held out
promise of uniting the country. A settlement of the
conflict is vital to Algeria because it traditionally has
advocated the status quo in Africa with regard to the
international boundaries established in the colonial
era.
Concern over the deteriorating situation in Chad has
compelled Algerian President Bendjedid to use his
diplomatic resources to find a settlement. He has tried
quietly to mediate between Libya and France, and
According to the US Embassies in Algiers
and Paris, meetings between Algerian Foreign
Minister Ibrahimi and Mitterrand last February, and
a followup visit to Algiers one week later by former
French Foreign Minister Dumas, included discussions
on Chad. These talks occurred shortly after
Bendiedid's summit with Qadhafi in late January,
... While Advancing National Interests
In fact, however, the government's public position
masks shifting undercurrents of favoritism. Until late
1983, Algeria gave discreet support to Goukouni. It
hosted Goukouni on several occasions after his fall
from power and allowed his faction to maintain a low-
level diplomatic mission in Algiers. This treatment
was attributable to Goukouni's decision in 1980, when
he was President of Chad, to recognize the Saharan
Arab Democratic Republic-the government-in-exile
of the Algerian-backed Polisario guerrillas fighting
Morocco for control of Western Sahara-and Habre's
subsequent ambivalence toward the Polisario. Algiers
also was angry at Habre because his successful coup
against Goukouni was aided by France, which the
Algerians still suspect have colonial ambitions in
Africa. The government openly criticized French
military support for Habre and refused French
requests for military overflights when fighting
between Goukouni and Habre intensified in 1982.
Algiers even denied air transshipments of UN relief
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assistance for the Habre regime. Strains in relations
spurred N'Djamena to recall its ambassador from
Algiers and close each country's diplomatic mission in
August 1983.F__1
The Libyan invasion of northern Chad in 1983, as
well as Qadhafi's developing ties to Morocco-
Algeria's longtime adversary-encouraged Algiers to
shift ground on the dispute. Algerian leaders probably
believe Qadhafi's involvement in the conflict will
prolong the French presence on the continent and
encourage further Libyan meddling in the region if
Qadhafi is successful in Chad, thus challenging
Algerian pretensions of dominance in North Africa.
Algerian leaders probably calculate that a Libyan
victory in Chad would encourage Tripoli to step up
subversion in Niger, Mali, and Mauritania. In
addition, the Algerians may have viewed a turn away
from Goukouni as a necessary punishment for Libya,
given Qadhafi's decision to cease support for the
Polisario as part of the cost for the Moroccan union.
Algiers also may be concerned that Morocco's King
Hassan will use his ties to Libya to mediate an end to
the Chad conflict and thus gain international prestige
to the detriment of Algeria.F__-]
During the past year, Algerian disgruntlement with
Libyan actions in Chad has increased to the point that
Algiers is openly showing its sympathies. Meetings
last November between senior Algerian diplomats and
Habre and other Chadian officials were followed by
an unprecedented summit the next month between
Habre and Bendjedid in Algiers. The US Embassy in
Algiers reported that Bendjedid afforded Habre full
honors as a visiting head of state and that the visit
received prominent coverage in the state-controlled
media. Although there is no evidence, the two leaders
may have discussed Algerian military support.=
The Embassy believes Algiers purposely used Habre's
visit to signal to Tripoli its displeasure over
developments in Chad.
They are
probably upset with Libya's disruption of last month's
proposed Habre-Goukouni meeting.
Prudence Prevails
To be sure, Algiers' shift has been gradual. The US
Embassy in Algiers reports that Bendjedid has
allowed France to transit Algerian airspace for
overflights to Chad. Otherwise, the government has
refrained from giving Habre any vocal support, and
there is no evidence that it has offered weapons or
economic assistance. The government has refrained
from mentioning either Libya or France in statements
about the last round of fighting between Habre's
forces and Chadian dissidents. Both factions in Chad
maintain low-level representation in Algiers, although
the Embassy reports the government has downgraded
somewhat Goukouni's mission and has granted higher
Algiers'-caution probably is attributable to its distrust
of all of the parties involved in the conflict and poor
relations with Libya and France. The government also
appears to be in a quandary over how to proceed
diplomatically, even though it appears to view France
as the lesser of two evils in Chad. Open condemnation
of Tripoli would jeopardize Algeria's attempts to
foster rapprochement and cooperation with Qadhafi.
Algiers hopes its contacts with Libya will lead to
settlement of a longstanding border problem,
encourage Qadhafi to cease his attempts to subvert
Tunisia, and split Libya from Morocco and thus ease
the military threat to Algeria on two of its frontiers.
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look favorably on the firmer policy by France in Chad
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active policy by France, however, could also
exacerbate fears in Algiers of French neocolonialism.
Outlook
As long as the military stalemate continues in Chad,
Algeria is not likely to become deeply involved in the
dispute, except for diplomatic efforts to engage Habre
and Goukouni in negotiations. Algerian perceptions of
Libyan and French perfidy is such that Bendjedid will
want to avoid any commitments that might come
undone by another Libyan-French deal on Chad.
Bendjedid, however, might consider rendering some
limited covert aid to Habre, such as food and money,
and take stronger diplomatic steps to goad Libya into
curtailing its activities in Chad, such as private or
even public threats to Qadhafi.l
Algiers would consider direct engagement in the
dispute if Qadhafi were to make military gains and
France were to withdraw. Under these circumstances,
Bendjedid probably would offer Habre weapons.
Algeria might also again reinforce its military units
on the border with Libya and issue a strong warning
to Qadhafi to pull back in Chad. The government
probably would be reluctant to commit its own
military personnel to Habre, however. In the event of
an imminent military victory in Chad by Goukouni
and Qadhafi, Bendjedid might consider asking the
United States to intervene and assist Washington's
actions behind the scenes.F__1
25X1
25X1
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Secret
Kaunda's April 1986 Leadership Changes
Wilted Phiri
President Political Adviser
Unnamed diplomatic post
Paul Lusaka
UN Ambassador
Political adviser
Dominic Mulaisho
Economic Adviser
Private business
James Mapoma
Director General ZIMCO
Economic adviser
Lameck Goma
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Minister of Higher Education
Luke Mwananshiku
Minister of Finance
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Basil R. Kabwe
Minister of Education
and Culture
Minister of Finance
Chairman Prices/Incomes
Commission
Chairman Prices/Incomes
Commission
Party economist
Minister of Commerce and
Industry
Jameson Kalaluka
Minister of Mines
Minister of Commerce and Industry
Uniah Mwila
Minister of State-Industrial
Democracy
Minister of Industrial Democracy
Minister of Natl. Guidance,
Information and Broadcasting
Naphy Nyalugwe
Editor, Times ofZambia
Press relations
Mavis Muyunda
Minister of State for
Decentralization
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Rajah Kunda
Minister of Higher Education
Minister of Decentralization
Arnold Simuchimba
Minister of Natl. Guidance
Minister of General Education
Cosmas Chibanda
Minister of Information and
Broadcasting
Minister of Home Affairs
Minister of Land and Natural
Resources
Henry Meebelo
Minister of Decentralization
Minister of Presidential Affairs
Frederick Hapunda
Minister of Labor
Minister of Youth and Sports
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Africa
Brief
Zambia Key Economic Personnel Shuffled
President Kaunda on 4 April announced several dramatic personnel changes in his
top economic leadership, according to the US Embassy in Lusaka. These changes
come at a time when Zambia is facing growing parliamentary opposition to IMF-
sponsored economic reforms introduced last fall. The measures, which include
reduced food and fuel subsidies and a controversial foreign exchange auction
system, have resulted in a drastic increase in inflation and a decline in living
standards for the average citizen.
Among those replaced were the main architects of Zambia's economic reform-
Minister of Finance Luke Mwananshiku, and Bank of Zambia Governor David
Phiri-who the Embassy considers able administrators and pro-American.
Mwananshiku's replacement is said by the Embassy to have no experience in
economics, and the new Bank of Zambia Governor is reported to have studied
economics in the Soviet Union, in addition to having no background in
administration, according to the Embassy. Zambia's current UN Ambassador
Paul Lusaka-known for his anti-American views at the United Nations-
replaces a generally pro-Western presidential political adviser. ~
In our judgment, Kaunda has replaced effective, pro-Western officials as his close
advisers with weak administrators who are more left leaning. We believe his new
advisers are unlikely to support unpopular economic reforms, and probably will
counsel Kaunda to return to a more statist-oriented economy. Kaunda is probably
trying to gain more personal control over the reform process in order to slow it
down. Kaunda has publicly reaffirmed his support for economic reform, but will
probably use the confusion resulting from the shuffle as an excuse to slow the
process. We do not expect him to abandon the reform process altogether, however,
as he probably realizes there is no alternative to the IMF-sponsored program and
the Western aid it brings. F_~
13 Secret
ALA AR 86-008
18 April 1986
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