TERRORISM REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00685R000100160002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 17, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 17, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Terrorism Review
GI TR 85-012
17 June 1985
Copy 5 2 5
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Terrorism Review I
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I Focus: Libya in the Caribbean-Qadhafi's Expanding Activities
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DI/NESA, DI/ALA 25X1
3 Highlights
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French Extradition: Policy and Procedure
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21 Egypt Foils Another Libyan Plot 25X1
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This review is published every other week by the Directorate of Intelligence.
Appropriate articles produced by other elements of the CIA as well as by other
agencies of the US Intelligence Community will be considered for publication.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Executive Editor
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Focus Libya in the Caribbean: Qadhafi's Expanding Activities
Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi has recently sought to increase his influence in
the eastern Caribbean. His efforts will probably meet with limited success, perhaps
opening the door to Libyan involvement with terrorist groups in the region. Libyan
backing probably will lead to increased militancy among French Caribbean
separatists, but we expect English-speaking leftists to continue to reject violent
actions.
Qadhafi's immediate objective appears to be to undermine US and French
interests in the region. He regards the United States-and, to a lesser extent,
France-as the principal obstacle to achieving leadership in the Third World,
including the Caribbean.
Libya's Caribbean program is aimed at
variety of tools to obtain political influence, including
financial aid and economic projects, intimidation, indoctrination and propaganda,
and the exploitation of local Muslims in the region. Tripoli is trying to establish
regional bases of operation in order to implement this program. Large official
Libyan representations in Panama City and Caracas may indicate these People's
Bureaus are being used to coordinate the overall effort.
Libya is cultivating Suriname in order to gain similar freedom to operate in
Paramaribo, although officials of the two countries reportedly distrust each other's
motives. This mutual suspicion is likely to slow the growth of the budding
relationship and may limit Libyan activity there.
The Regional Threat
In our judgment, Libya's traditional contacts-leftist leaders from the English-
speaking islands of St. Lucia, Dominica, and Antigua-are basically opportunists
who pay lipservice to Qadhafi's ideology in exchange for financial handouts. They
are resisting Libyan demands for violent action, however, because they do not want
to damage their political standing or risk government retaliation. Many English-
speaking Caribbean leftists are also trying to broaden their appeal by playing
down their radical rhetoric and forming alliances with political moderates. So, for
the moment, Tripoli has toned down its calls for violent action by these groups.
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GI TR 85-012
17 June 1985
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Libya's apparent failure to increase militancy among the English-speaking leftists
will likely fuel Qadhafi's determination to strengthen ties to proindependence
radicals in the French Caribbean.
Prospects
Libya's aggressive policies in the Caribbean will likely continue to meet with
mixed results. Although Libya and Suriname probably will proceed with some
aspects of cooperation, Qadhafi's efforts to use Paramaribo for regional activity
will be hampered by mutual suspicions. We believe English-speaking Caribbean
leftists almost certainly will continue to resist any renewed Libyan call for
violence.
Qadhafi will probably increase his support for French separatists in the hope they
will step up terrorist operations and, perhaps, encourage English-speaking leftists
to follow their example. The French separatists have little hope of achieving
independence through the political process, and increasing desperation may drive
some to further militant action. Most French Antilleans oppose independence, and
only a few local leftists openly support terrorist tactics. Nevertheless, the more
deeply Qadhafi becomes engaged with dissidents in the Caribbean, the more
opportunities he will have to develop assets that he could use for terrorist forays in
the region.
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presage further terrorist attacks against the military.
Highlights
Targeting of Air Force Personnel
The recent assassination of a Salvadoran Air Force pilot in the capital may
training.
This assassination, the second attack against Air Force elements in the last mont
may reflect the rebels' desire to intimidate and impair that branch of the
Salvadoran military which has been most effective against insurgent operations.
The military's growing reliance on the Air Force to prosecute the war against tl
insurgents is putting an additional strain on its limited number of pilots and
ground support personnel, who require extensive training. The loss of only a few
men could reduce Air Force capabilities until additional personnel complete the
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GI TR 85-012
17 June 1985
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Significant Developments
Sikh Separatists Jump Bail
Four Sikhs, suspected supporters of a separate state of Khalistan, were arrested in
Vancouver earlier this year while trying to enter Canada on forged Malaysian and
Swiss passports. Three of them were subsequently released on bail, have gone
underground, and may have fled to the United States on the eve of Indian Prime
Minister Gandhi's visit. The fourth, still in custody,
rented by Action Directe (AD) militant Regis Schleicher, now in prison.
Police Net Action Directe Arms Cache, Suspects
French police in Nice discovered an arms cache in an apartment that had been
West Germany- Kurds Occupy Swedish Missions in Europe
Netherlands Members of the National Kurdish Liberation Front (ERNK) occupied Swedish
diplomatic missions in Hamburg, Frankfurt, West Berlin, and The Hague on 28
May. The protestors demanded the release of a Kurdish lawyer arrested in Sweden
in connection with a murder case-a demand Stockholm reportedly will not meet.
Police had to evict the petitioners in Hamburg and The Hague forcibly.
The ERNK is believed to be dominated by the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), a
violent secessionist group. The PKK is blamed for the deaths of several Kurds in
Europe since last summer, when it apparently began trying to consolidate its
leadership role in the ERNK. The Kurdish lawyer arrested in Sweden is being held
for his alleged involvement in one of those murders.
among Arab student factions.
Syrian Student Union Officials Targeted by Car Bombs
A car bomb killed three Romanian militia officers and wounded another as they
were attempting to defuse the device outside the foreign students' dormitories in
Bucharest on 26 May. A second bomb attached to another union official's car was
safely removed. Police apprehended two suspects, tentatively identified as Iraqi
nationals. The bombing attempts represent an escalation in ongoing violence
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now have, should have little trouble maintaining control.
Martial Law To Be Lifted in Ankara
The National Security Council will recommend that the government lift martial
law in six more provinces, including Ankara and Izmir, on 19 July. Martial law
would be replaced by a state-of-emergency rule, a largely cosmetic change.
Provincial authorities, who will assume the powers that martial law commanders
Libya-United States Qadhafi Renews Anti-Exile Activity in the United States
A Libyan diplomat at the United Nations was declared persona non grata and 16
unofficial Libyans were subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury for plotting to
kill anti-Qadhafi dissidents. After a two-month investigation, the FBI on 28 May
rounded up the suspects in Virginia, Colorado, Michigan, and North Carolina. In
addition to the Libyan UN facility, the Libyan Student Center in McLean,
Virginia, was also implicated in the plot
increasing determination to strike at his opponents.
While a Libyan student was shot in Colorado in October 1980 by a former Green
Beret hired by the Libyan Government, this recent campaign appears more
ambitious-targeting many oppositionists in various locations around the United
States. Press accounts claim pro-Qadhafi Libyans have established a network of
support for terrorist activity. The scope of the plan and the fact that Libyans-
rather than foreign mercenaries-were involved probably indicate Qadhafi's
end up in Hizballah hands.
Another American Kidnaped
On 9 June unidentified gunmen kidnaped Thomas Sutherland, Dean of
Agriculture at the American University of Beirut (AUB), as he was leaving Beirut
International Airport. According to the US Embassy, five carloads of gunmen
intercepted the convoy in which Sutherland was riding. The gunmen took
Sutherland, the only American, but did not harm any of his Lebanese escorts. No
group has claimed responsibility for the abduction, but we suspect Sutherland will
States. The convoy reportedly had been arranged for Plimpton.
The US Embassy reports AUB President Calvin Plimpton may have been the
actual target of the kidnaping. Plimpton had a confirmed ticket for the flight on
which Sutherland arrived, but, at the last minute, decided to stay in the United
Islamic Jihad Denies Responsibility for Recent Attacks
On 4 June Beirut newspapers published a communique from the Islamic Jihad
Organization denying responsibility for two explosions in Riyadh on 18 May, the
attack on the Amir of Kuwait on 25 May, and the murder of British lecturer Denis
Hill in West Beirut on 29 May. Separate callers had previously claimed credit for
all three attacks in the name of Islamic Jihad. The communique-delivered to a
Western news agency in Beirut with a photograph of recently kidnaped American
David Jacobsen-blamed "American and Zionist imperialism" for conspiring to
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harm Islamic Jihad's reputation, and warned the United States that "our heroes
are capable of undertaking all types of operations in the most farflung corners of
The terrorists holding the US and French hostages in Lebanon may have issued
the communique to dissociate themselves from operations they did not conduct.
We believe a variety of pro-Iranian Shia groups-such as the Hizballah factions in
Lebanon; the Dawa Party elements in Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Lebanon; and
the Islamic Front for the Liberation of the Arabian Peninsula in Saudi Arabia-
all use the nom de guerre "Islamic Jihad" to make threats or claim credit for
West Bank- Israelis Uncover Terrorist Cells
Gaza Strip Last month, Israeli security forces arrested 30 members of a Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine cell whose members reportedly were responsible for the
murder of an IDF soldier and for a grenade attack against a truck transporting gas
cylinders in the Ramallah district. Authorities also arrested 13 members of
another cell responsible for several political murders in the Gaza Strip and a
grenade attack against a bus in Tel Aviv. The suspected leader of the Gaza Strip
cell is reportedly a member of Fatah. The cell was uncovered five months ago, but
the arrests were not reported until this month because investigations were still in
progress.
sparked a series of bombings.
Three Bombings in Sabah State
One person was killed and at least four injured in three separate bombings on 25
May, 28 May, and 4 June in and around the capital of Kota Kinabalu. Local press
reports suggest the attacks were the work of a Muslim opposition party that has
protested the appointment of the state's new Christian chief minister following
elections last month. About one-quarter of Sabah's 1.3 million population is
Christian Kadazan; the rest are Chinese, Muslim Malays, or from various tribal
groups. Sabah has not experienced violence on this scale since the 1976 elections
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Western personnel.
UNITA Changing Timeworn Hostage Policies
Following UNITA's kidnaping of a British technician on 10 May, leader Jonas
Savimbi declared that all expatriate technicians working for the Luanda regime
were in danger. He added that UNITA would stop using the International Red
Cross as an intermediary in hostage situations. This statement follows Savimbi's
announcement last March that Westerners would no longer be routinely freed if
they were captured in the course of insurgent activity. These public statements and
the breaking of "relations" with the Red Cross indicate an increased risk to
2 June.
Ethiopian Rebels Kidnap Three British CARE Workers
Three food monitors were ambushed on 24 May while traveling in their well-
marked CARE vehicle on the Sudanese side of the border with Ethiopia. Their
captors, seven members of the Eritrean People's Liberation Forces (EPRLF), drove
them in their damaged truck into Ethiopia. Following negotiations with CARE
representatives, the EPRLF released them and escorted them back into Sudan on
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French Extradition:
Policy and Procedure
Extradition is contrary to all the traditions of
France.
Laws and Guidelines
The French Government has always stressed the
judicial nature of the extradition process.
Interior Minister Defferre
July 1981
Despite the unprecedented extradition of three
Basques to Spain last fall, the French Government
has been at pains to discourage any idea that it will
grant extradition for accused terrorists. Indeed,
Spain's failure to secure convictions in two of these
three cases will only reinforce France's traditional
reluctance to extradite "political" criminals. This
policy has long been a source of frustration to other
countries, and the Italian Government has become
increasingly critical of the French failure to act on
more than 100 extradition requests. The outcome of
these requests and the French reaction to the Basques'
acquittal will provide clues to any new directions in
French extradition policy.
19th-Century Treaties, 20th-Century Crime
The French often point to their legal system as the
reason-or excuse-for their approach to extradition.
France pioneered many of the important provisions in
modern extradition treaties such as the nonextradition
of a country's own nationals, the concept of speciality
(limiting a trial to offenses for which extradition is
granted), and exceptions for political offenders.
Indeed, many French extradition treaties date from
the 19th century, including those with Italy (1870),
Spain (1877), and the Netherlands (1895). Not only
have the mobility and methods of modern criminals
outdated these treaties, but the practice of
enumerating offenses in those treaties has resulted in
such anomalies as extradition for bigamy or robbery
but not for drug trafficking or hijacking. Nor are the
French eager to modernize. The United States, for
instance, has failed to make progress in updating its
extradition treaty with France. When Foreign
Minister Dumas was urged recently to move
negotiations beyond the technical level, he said the
treaty must have served reasonably well if it had
lasted since 1909.
The Extradition Statute of 10 March 1927 governs
extradition procedures if there are no treaty
provisions. According to the statute, extradition will
not be granted "when the crime or offense has a
political character or when it is clear from the
circumstances that the extradition is requested for a
political end." A "political offense" is nowhere
defined, and the French courts must, in effect, weigh
the political motivations of both the accused and the
requesting state.
France is one of the few Western countries that does
not make certain terrorist-associated activities illegal
under the penal code, and the 1927 statute says
extradition will not be granted "if the act is not
punished under French law." For example,
membership in a terrorist organization such as the
Red Brigades-a criminal offense in Italy-is not
grounds for extradition from France.
The Council of Ministers communique of November
1982, issued following the arrest of several Spanish
Basque terrorists in 1982, purports to define the limits
of "political" offenses in extradition cases. Any one of
four criteria can be the basis for refusing extradition:
? The nature of the political and judicial system of the
requesting state.
? The political character of the offense.
? The political motive of the extradition request.
? The risk of "aggravating" the situation of the
person accused because of his opinions, political
actions, and so forth.
The communique also determines that an offense,
such as murder or the taking of hostages, cannot be
considered political if committed in a state that
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respects liberties and fundamental rights. When the
courts disallowed the political exception defense in the
case of the Basques last fall and the government
signed the extradition decree, Prime Minister Fabius
noted that he did not want France to be a sanctuary
for those committing "blood crimes." In the case of
some Italian terrorists wanted for extradition,
President Mitterrand has also attempted a somewhat
muddled distinction between those who have "broken
with terrorism" and are now "embedded in French
society," and those guilty of "blood crimes" who
should be extradited "if French justice so decides."
How French Justice Decides
Governments that request extraditions from France
face a daunting process. More than 30 French
magistrates may examine each case. A request for
extradition must be presented to the French
Government through diplomatic channels,
accompanied by a decree of conviction or an arrest
warrant that contains a precise indication of the
charge and a copy of the text of the law applicable. In
the past, Italian requests have been said to list
offenses not included in the 1870 extradition
convention or in French law. The few Italians who
have been extradited since 1981 were charged with
common law offenses.
After the defendant has been identified and informed
of the charges, he appears before the appellate court
(chambre d'accusation of the cour d'appel) in the
district in which he was arrested. During the next
several weeks, the examining magistrate considers the
detailed extradition request and satisfies himself that
all the legal conditions are met. Should the court of
appeals rule against extradition, the decision is final.
Should the accused be found extraditable, he may
appeal to the Court of Cassation in Paris, the highest
judicial authority in France, which rules only on
points of law. The court may reverse a decision only
because of a misinterpretation or misapplication of
the law; it has no jurisdiction to render a decision on
the merits of the case.
Even if the Court of Cassation determines that
technically the accused can be extradited, the
executive branch has the final word and the Prime
Minister may elect not to sign the extradition decree.
The accused also has one last appeal to France's
highest administrative tribunal, the Council of State,
which rules on both evidence and form. The Council
verifies that the different phases of the extradition
procedure have conformed to the law and that the
rights of the defendant have been observed.
How the Government Decides
Extradition decisions generally have reflected the
political opinions of the French Government. In 1975,
the United States requested extradition for two
Americans who had hijacked a plane and extorted
$500,000 from the airline. The French courts allowed
the political exception defense, although the only
evidence of political motivation presented was that
initially the hijackers ordered the aircraft flown to
Hanoi. On the other hand, in 1977 the government
agreed to extradite to West Germany Klaus
Croissant, a lawyer for the Baader-Meinhof gang,
without benefit of proper appeal procedures. In line
with the concept of speciality, however, the West
Germans were allowed to try him on only one of the
charges against him.
Mitterrand, a frequent critic of interference with
judicial processes by the Giscard government, came to
power promising an independent judiciary.
In 1984, the Mitterrand government faced a
particularly thorny extradition decision in the case of
seven Basque fugitives sought by Madrid. Spanish
Basques in France traditionally have based their
defense for crimes such as armed robbery and murder
on "political" motivations, and, during the Franco
era, French courts generally agreed as a way of
permitting the accused to escape an authoritarian
regime.
The Mitterrand government wanted to make a
gesture of support for Spanish democracy and the
Spanish Socialist government while also discouraging
vigilante activity by the Spanish Antiterrorist
Liberation Group (GAL) in France. Paris decided to
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extradite three of the Basques, and the government
moved swiftly to have the case reviewed by the
Council of State and to deliver the Basques to Spain
within three days. As one magazine put it, the
Socialists "lost a little of their soul but he
[Mitterrand] went to the defense of Spanish
democracy."
The French may now consider the extradition to have
been a mistake. Although Madrid had insisted that
the evidence against the three was overwhelming,
Spanish courts acquitted two of them. French
Government officials have been quick to cite this as
proof of the impartiality of Spanish justice, but no
further Basques have been-or are likely to be-
extradited, although more than twenty-five have been
expelled to Third World countries.
Instead, the French are likely to continue their policy
of internal control. While reluctant to extradite long-
term residents who claim to have "disassociated"
themselves from violence, French authorities
nevertheless monitor their activities and now require
monthly renewal of residence permits. Many Basques
(and Italians) are in a status of "administrative
asylum"; they are tolerated but not officially
recognized. Nor is it likely the French Office for the
Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons
(OFPRA) will grant many of them political refugee
status, which does not shield an individual from
expulsion or restricted residence but does protect him
from the danger of extradition to his country of origin.
On occasion, an appeals commission or the Council of
State has overturned an OFPRA decision. One of the
Basques deported to Togo last September, for
instance, subsequently was granted refugee status
because he once had been tortured by the Spanish
police.
The Italian Extradition Requests
With the Spanish extradition to point to, Italian
Prime Minister Craxi and Minister of Interior
Scalfaro have voiced their exasperation at Paris's
failure to respond to Rome's numerous requests for
the return of known terrorists. Five Italian terrorists
currently in French custody are at varying stages of
the extradition process. The courts have found two of
these-Enrico Fedele and Gianni di Giuseppe-
extraditable, but instead they were expelled to
Burundi in May. Three others, wanted for "blood
crimes," are two leftwing terrorists, Massimo
Sandrini and Sergio Tornaghi, and one rightwing
terrorist, Fiorenzo Trincanato. The French refused
recently to extradite Sandrini because the charge
against him-"moral complicity"-has no equivalent
in French law, but Tornaghi or Trincanato may be
extradited to blunt criticism that France is a refuge
for terrorists and to dissipate some of the bad feelings
the issue has engendered between the two countries.
Land of Asylum ... Sometimes
In the final analysis, decisions in extradition cases are
largely made on political grounds. The Socialists
came to power in 1981 firmly committed to the right
of asylum and opposed to the extradition of political
refugees. The upsurge of terrorism in France and the
activism of some political refugees altered the outlook
of the government to the extent that more stringent
internal control measures were enacted and guidelines
on extradition adopted, but these guidelines have been
selectively ignored.
The publicity given pronouncements by French
leaders on the "blood crimes" criterion will make it
more difficult to refuse extradition in cases which
successfully run the judicial gauntlet. Extradition
may be granted in a few compelling cases where the
seriousness of the offense is coupled with a
scrupulously prepared extradition request, but the
process will never be automatic and political
considerations will remain paramount.
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ETA's 1985 Spring Offensive
Spring offensives by the Spanish Basque group
Fatherland and Freedom (ETA) have left 11 people
dead and at least 19 wounded. ETA has mounted a
two-front campaign. One part of the campaign
consists of bombings against tourist facilities along
the Costa del Sol. While these beach bombings, which
began in April, have caused no injuries, they probably
have hurt the tourist industry because they have been
accompanied by a highly publicized increase in street
crime. The number of tourists, especially those from
Great Britain, has declined this year. The other, more
violent part of the campaign, which has caused the
casualties, consists of six bombings and six armed
attacks. These attacks have been aimed mainly at
policemen in the Basque Provinces themselves.
This second offensive, however, may already be
proving counterproductive. Following the accidental
killing of a 14-year-old boy by an ETA car bomb on
30 May, ETA's popular image plummeted in the
Basque Provinces-something that has often
happened in the past in Spain after particularly
outrageous terrorist acts.' Thousands of angry
Spanish Basques in Bilbao and Pamplona rallied to
protest the group's continuing resort to violence.
' Public opinion in the Basque provinces has been shifting away
from ETA, but it remains volatile. For more than two decades,
terrorist outrages have produced dramatic shifts in opinion against
ETA. Almost invariably, however, excessive government
countermeasures have erased the gains made against the group.
The spring campaign probably indicates that the ETA
leadership has been able to restore at least some of its
operational effectiveness lost after the 1984
crackdowns by France. ETA may now be trying to
build an appearance of strength in response to press
speculation that the government might again attempt
to negotiate a cease-fire. Following the murder on 21
May of two policemen, for example, ETA declared in
a communique that the program it calls the "KAS
Alternative"-withdrawal of the Basque Provinces'
security forces, the inclusion of Navarra (the border
zone) into the Basque region, and self-
determination-must be accepted as the basis for
negotiations with Madrid. Continued ETA violence in
the Basque country, however, seems just as likely to
diminish what little popular support remains there for
the terrorists and could undercut the government's
inclination to make even more modest gestures toward
them.
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Chronology
24 April-12 May Costa del Sol. Eight low-yield bombs detonated in separate locations. No injuries,
little damage.
Pamplona. Three policemen injured by car bomb.
Pamplona. Policeman loses both legs and one arm as a result of car bomb.
Cestona. Two civil guards injured by car bomb.
San Sebastian. Policeman shot and killed.
Basauri. Two policemen killed and 1 1 others wounded by car bomb.
Bermeo. Taxi driver accused of being police informer shot and killed. Claimed, but
later denied by ETA.
19 May Vitoria. Police deactivate car bomb containing 25 kg of plastic explosive and 100
kg of loose hardware outside a packed soccer stadium.
San Sebastian. Two off-duty policemen shot and killed.
Pamplona. 14-year-old boy and policeman killed and two policemen injured by car
bomb.
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Bilbao. Renault showroom bombed.
Vizcaya. Citroen dealership bombed. No injuries. Little damage.
Valencia and Alicante. Two bombs planted at El Saler Beach, Postitguet Beach
and Altea Pleasure Port explode. No injuries.
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Libyan Plot
Egypt Foils Another
A Libyan-sponsored attack against the US Embassy
in Cairo was averted when, according to Egyptian
authorities, Egyptian intelligence learned of the plot
The Egyptians failed, however, to trick
the Libyans into believing the attack had occurred
and taking credit for it.
Tripoli's sponsorship of such a plot against the US
Embassy, if true, would indicate a departure from
Libyan leader Qadhafi's past practice of not directly
targeting US personnel and facilities. The Libyan
leader has only rarely planned such direct attacks,
probably fearing military reprisals.
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According to statements in the Egyptian press, the
Libyans-acting through the radical Palestinian
group Abu Nidal in Damascus-planned to infiltrate
a vehicle loaded with explosives into Alexandria and
drive it into the US Embassy in Cairo. The Egyptians
were able to locate and remove the
he vehicle when it arrived at the port
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GI TR 85-012
17 June 1985
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Terrorism in Latin America:
Patterns and Prospects, 1984-85
In contrast to the case for Western Europe and the
Middle East, distinguishing precisely between acts of
terrorism and other forms of political or criminal
violence in Latin America is often quite difficult. In
many Latin American countries, it has long been
common for persons who believe their goals cannot be
satisfied through the political process to resort instead
to violence-to insurgency, if they are strong,
resolute, and numerous enough and if the
circumstances permit. While some of these insurgent
groups have engaged in terrorism, few, however, use it
as a principal tactic.' Consequently, there are only a
few "pure" terrorist groups in Latin America, and
even most of these aspire to graduate into full-scale
insurgent groups. Finally, of the terrorist acts that
occur each year, most are purely indigenous-a
Peruvian attacking a Peruvian target, for example-
and not international.
Moreover, in some Latin American countries-
Colombia is a notable example-it is often difficult to
determine whether an act of violence has been
committed by political activists or by common
criminals. Insurgents and terrorists sometimes try to
conceal their responsibility for crimes such as
kidnapings or bank robberies; other times they take
credit for crimes-particularly bombings-they did
not commit. Further complicating the picture, Latin
American criminals, especially narcotics traffickers,
commonly engage in terrorist-type acts to dissuade or
impede government officials from suppressing their
criminal operations.
The pattern of terrorism and related political violence
in Latin America in 1984 was little different from
that of recent years. The leftwing insurgency in El
Salvador continued to produce terrorism, as did a
lesser insurgency in Peru. In contrast, most of the
Communist insurgent groups of Colombia signed
truces, albeit ones that often proved temporary, with
the government. Leftwing urban terrorist groups were
active last year in Chile, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador,
and El Salvador. Rightwing terrorist groups were
active in a number of countries, including Chile,
Argentina, and El Salvador. Narcoterrorist violence
afflicted Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico, among
other countries. Anti-US terrorism composed only a
small portion of the total terrorism in Latin America
in 1984.
Colombia
Colombia has long been plagued by societal violence.
Hundreds of thousands of persons are estimated to
have died violently there during the past two or three
decades. Much of this violence has been rooted in
banditry, narcotics trafficking, and other forms of
criminality. Nevertheless, some has been an
outgrowth of political conflict, especially efforts by
leftwing extremists to seize political power. According
to a recent local press estimate, for example, over the
past 20 years more than 70,000 persons have died in
Colombia as a result of subversive violence and efforts
to combat it.
Currently, most of the estimated 4,000 to 5,000
Communist insurgents are divided into four major
guerrilla organizations, some of which are among the
oldest active insurgent groups in the world: the 2,500-
member Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC), established in 1966; the 1,000-member 19th
of April Movement (M-19), established in 1970; the
500-member National Liberation Army (ELN),
established in 1963; and the 400-member People's
' Nowhere in Western Europe do the circumstances permit
dissidents to mount bona fide insurgencies. Nevertheless, the
prototypes of the modern leftwing urban terrorist groups now so
prevalent in Western Europe originated in South America. The
Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla, written by Brazilian terrorist
Carlos Marighela in 1969, served as a bible to a generation of West
European terrorists (such as the members of the Baader-Meinhof
Gang, founders of the Red Army Faction) who modeled their
groups after the seemingly romantic and sonorously named
Tupamaros of Uruguay and Montoneros of Argentina.F__1
Liberation Army (EPL), established in 1967.
On 28 May 1984, after protracted negotiations, the
Colombian Government and the FARC signed a
cease-fire agreement under which the FARC agreed
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GI TR 85-012
17 June 1985
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not to attack government forces or installations or
engage in kidnapings or extortions. In return, the
FARC would be allowed to organize politically, and
the administration would try to institute political and
agrarian reforms and facilitate the establishment and
functioning of worker and peasant organizations. The
FARC refused the government demand that it lay
down its arms permanently, while the government
refused the FARC demand that it withdraw its troops
from FARC operating regions. The government
subsequently concluded similar truce agreements with
the M-19 and the EPL. The ELN refused to deal with
the government.
After the cease-fire agreements, the number of armed
confrontations between insurgent forces and
government troops declined and has remained at a
relatively low level into the middle of 1985, even
though the ELN and dissident rebels associated with
newer groups such as the Ricardo Franco Front
(composed largely of FARC dissidents) refused to
honor the truce. And, despite the truce, a number of
bombings were conducted in Bogota, mainly against
government and military installations. In May 1985,
for example, the Ricardo Franco Front bombed a
bridge, some government buildings, and a police
academy.
Moreover, a record 215 kidnapings were reported in
1984; many other kidnapings and threatened
kidnapings (extortions) probably went unreported. Of
the 215 reported, 132 were attributed to various
guerrilla groups (69 to the FARC alone) that continue
to obtain their funds the traditional way. Popular
pressure is mounting on the government to take action
to counter the guerrillas' extortion and kidnaping
activities, but the Betancur regime is loath to
acknowledge that the peace process has failed.
Narcoterrorism. The government also increased its
pressure on narcotics traffickers in 1984. The
traffickers reacted in April by arranging the
assassination of Justice Minister Lara. Almost
immediately thereafter, in a reversal of longstanding
government policy, President Betancur approved the
extradition of four drug traffickers to the United
States and agreed to consider US requests for further
extraditions. The US agreement to extradite to
undoubtedly contributed to this turnaround.
Narcotics traffickers, probably those associated with
cocaine kingpin Pablo Escobar, threatened a wave of
terror, vowing to kill five Americans for each
Colombian extradited. In response, both Colombian
and US officials instituted intensive security
precautions. Since the lives of US Ambassador Tambs
and his family were specifically threatened, they left
the country for a period of time. These precautions
may have prevented some terrorist attacks; in any
event, the only actual attack against US interests was
a primitive car bombing near the US Embassy in
Bogota in November. Drug trafficking interests were
probably responsible. More recently, the US Embassy
has been the target of numerous anonymous bomb
threats and hoaxes, but no actual bombing attempts
have been observed.
Peru
Sendero Luminoso. Since 1980 the Sendero Luminoso
(SL), or Shining Path, a brutal Maoist insurgent
group composed mainly of Indians, has operated with
near impunity in Ayacucho Province in south-central
Peru. Unique in its insularity, the SL refuses
assistance from all foreign governments. The
guerrillas repeatedly have been implicated in the
slaughter of uncooperative peasants and the murder of
village officials who cooperate with the government.
Several such atrocities were reported in 1984.
Sporadically, the Sendero Luminoso has also
conducted attacks in and around major Peruvian
cities, especially Lima. It concentrates on actions that
have high public impact, such as the destruction of
electrical facilities. In December 1984, for example,
the group celebrated the birthday of its founder and
leader, Abimael Guzman, with a series of bombings of
transmission towers near Lima blacking out the city
for nearly 10 hours. On 5 February 1985, as Pope
John Paul 11 was arriving at Lima airport, the
Sendero Luminoso blew up enough power facilities to
cut power to the entire city; then it ignited a huge
hammer-and-sickle display on a nearby mountain. F
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The government has designated the Ayacucho region
as an emergency zone, placing it under a form of
military law. In 1984, government forces mounted a
major counterinsurgency campaign there.
Subsequently, several mass graves filled with the
corpses of peasants bearing marks of torture were
discovered in territory where government troops had
been operating. The government accused the Sendero
Luminoso of having murdered the peasants, but some
human rights groups have blamed government forces.
There is evidence the peasants were known or
suspected SL sympathizers who had been tortured for
their information and then killed as object lessons to
the rest of the citizenry.
Despite combat losses, or perhaps in an effort to
relieve government pressure, in mid-1984 the Sendero
Luminoso opened a separate operational front in the
north-central highlands of the upper Huallaga River
valley. The government responded by establishing a
new emergency zone there. As of mid-1985, the group
seemed to be drawing little support from the local
peasants, who apparently hoped the terrorists would
leave before they attracted government
counterinsurgency forces that might interfere with
their growing of the profitable coca crop.
In April 1985 Sendero Luminoso vowed to disrupt
Peruvian national elections but failed to do so.
Possibly in an effort to refurbish its credibility, the
group then stepped up its urban terrorist attacks. In
early May, for example, the group assassinated a
newly elected congressman. On 16 May, two days
before the fifth anniversary of the beginning of the
Sendero Luminoso's armed struggle, a dozen SL
bombings were reported in and around Lima; targets
included the Chinese Embassy,' the residence of the
US Ambassador, a US-Peruvian cultural center, an
election board office, a civil guard post, and electric
power facilities. The hit-and-run bombings caused no
casualties and in most cases only slight damage,
although two-thirds of Lima was blacked out. In its
search for the perpetrators, the government rounded
up more than 2,000 persons.
' The Sendero Luminoso has conducted nuisance bombings of the
Chinese Embassy on several occasions to protest China's de-
TupacAmaru. A lesser threat to Peru's security comes
from the Revolutionary Movement Tupac Amaru
(MRTA). Named after an 18th-century Indian leader,
Tupac Amaru probably numbers a few dozen leftwing
activists, most of them probably associated with
universities. It operates in the Cuzco and Lima areas.
The group surfaced in September 1984, when it
claimed responsibility for a number of rather minor
terrorist attacks in Lima, including a bomb explosion
outside the residence of the US Marine security guard
detachment in November 1983. According to its
manifesto, Tupac Amaru was organized to respond to
what its members viewed as the long history of
corruption and injustice in Peruvian politics, and to
combat "imperialist"-especially US-influence in
Peru. Because it casts its demands in populist terms
and operates chiefly in the cities, Tupac Amaru
potentially has a broader public appeal. The group,
however, is far from reaching the level of threat posed
by the Sendero Luminoso.
Chile
Leftwing Terrorism. Beginning with the assassination
of Santiago's military governor in August 1983, leftist
terrorism grew steadily throughout 1984, leading the
Pinochet regime to declare a state of siege in
November. The most active terrorist groups during
1984 were the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front
(FPMR), composed of former members of several
radical leftist organizations and associated with the
Pro-Soviet Communist Party of Chile (PCCh), and
elements of the 20-year-old Movement of the
Revolutionary Left (MIR), headed by Andres Pascal
Allende, the son of the former Chilean leader.
There were about 700 bombings in 1984, a fivefold
increase over the previous year. Most of the bombings
were directed at public utilities and police and
security facilities. On the night of 28 October, for
example, some 14 bombs exploded in Santiago.
Targets included telephone terminals, electrical
facilities, buses, and banks. Demonstrating their
increasing sophistication, the terrorists have also
begun to use remote-detonated devices. On 2
November, a national police unit was hit near
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Valparaiso by a remote-controlled, claymore-type
bomb that killed four carabineros and injured 12.
The leftist terrorist campaign has continued into
1985. On 14 May, for example, a series of bombings
against the railway from Santiago to Valparaiso
halted service for several hours. Bombs also exploded
in several government offices in Santiago, killing two
persons. One of them went off next to an elementary
school, injuring about 20 children. Both the FPMR
and the MIR claimed responsibility for some of these
bombings
Rightwing Violence. In combating the terrorists, the
government appears to have committed numerous
violations of human rights, with the security services
frequently implicated in instances of brutality,
torture, and the mysterious deaths or disappearances
of suspects. The National Information Center (CNI),
which is run by military officers, attracted the most
accusations in 1984. For example, after the regime
reported that 14 extremists had been killed and four
wounded in shootouts with government forces, CNI
was accused-in most cases by families or
associates-of murdering several while they were
trying to surrender or after they had already
surrendered and were in custody. More explicitly, the
"Chilean Anti-Communist Action" (ACHA) claims to
have killed one leftwing extremist and has threatened
several human rights activists with death if they do
not cease their antigovernment activities. ACHA
probably has links to Chilean security services. F_
Ecuador
Alfaro Vive, Carajo! A new subversive leftist group
calling itself Alfaro Vive, Carajo! (AVC)3 has
appeared in Ecuador. Although the group claims to
have been established in 1981, most of the present
members reportedly joined in early 1984 after
defecting from the Revolutionary Leftist Front.
Certainly, the AVC expanded its activities
considerably in 1984 and the first half of 1985. The
AVC espouses many of the standard anti-oligarchy,
anti-US, and anti-"imperialist" views held by radical
leftist groups in many Latin American countries, but
it prescribes populist rather than Marxist remedies,
possibly in order not to frighten away prospective
supporters.
In 1984, most AVC operations were bloodless and
geared to obtaining media attention rather than
causing damage per se. For example, the group
detonated a leaflet bomb outside the US Embassy,
briefly seized several radio stations in order to
transmit manifestos, and occupied the Costa Rican
Embassy in order to force it to send a message to San
Jose about some AVC personnel who had been
arrested there. Late in 1984, however, group members
reportedly began discussing more serious terrorist
activities, including ways of acquiring hostages to
swap for imprisoned comrades.
In March 1985, about 25 persons raided a Quito
police arsenal and made off with some 800 weapons.
In May, about 10 persons infiltrated a small
Ecuadorean naval base and seized a substantial
quantity of weapons before escaping in a hail of
bullets. The government says the miscreants were
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Under the state of siege, judicial review and press
coverage of government actions have been restricted.
Nevertheless, the government is known to have
conducted several mass sweeps of poorer
neighborhoods, temporarily detained some 8,000
persons, sent more than 400-mainly accused of petty
crimes-to a remote detention camp without trial,
and internally exiled nearly 300 others without
charges or trial
' Eloy Alfaro was a heroic Ecuadorean patriot around the turn of
this century who led an abortive revolution against an oppressive
military government. Alfaro Vive, Carajo! roughly translates as
AVC members, although
the AVC has denied it-and has
denied as well persistent allegations that some AVC
members have developed ties with the Colombian
insurgent group M-19 and undergone guerrilla
training in Colombia, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. In
April four AVC prisoners, including the second-
ranking leader, escaped from captivity via a 300-
meter tunnel. The sophisticated escape operation
seriously embarrassed the government and
highlighted the growing capabilities of the group. If
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the AVC is likely to present a serious insurgent
or terrorist problem in the coming months.
El Salvador
Most of the terrorism in EL Salvador is a byproduct
of the leftist insurgency that began there in the late
1970s. Government authorities have officially
acknowledged that, since January 1981, more than
10,000 civilians have been killed for political reasons
by leftwing or rightwing extremists. President Duarte
has estimated the actual number of civilian deaths
since the beginning of 1980 at more than 40,000, with
the right implicated in many more deaths than the
left. Left-leaning human rights groups have made
even higher estimates of the carnage. In 1984 the
death toll from political violence was much lower than
in previous years; still, some 750 Salvadoran civilians
were killed last year for political reasons.
Leftwing Terrorism. In 1980, at Cuban prodding,
most of the leftwing Salvadoran insurgent groups
emulated the Nicaraguan example and united in an
umbrella organization called the Farabundo Marti
National Liberation Front (FMLN). The insurgents
have received both ideological and materiel support
from Cuba and from Nicaragua, where their leaders
are based. The FMLN fields about 9,000 armed
combatants and is divided into various military fronts
operating in different parts of the country. Although
these guerrilla groups have engaged mainly in
paramilitary conflict with units of the Salvadoran
Army, they have also conducted kidnapings, sabotage,
and other terrorist actions and most of them have
"metropolitan" components to bring the conflict to
the cities.
For the past year and a half, the FMLN forces have
been divided into small units assigned to ambush and
sabotage missions in what Joaquin Villalobos,
commander of the largest FMLN group, the People's
Revolutionary Army (ERP), has termed a war of
attrition. Reportedly, the FMLN has now made
attacks against civilian personnel and installations a
formal part of its program. Since April 1985, for
example, the FMLN has kidnaped more than 10
elected mayors, mostly in the eastern part of the
country where the ERP is most active. In addition, in 25X1
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substantial rise in the number of killings of prominent 25X1
persons in San Salvador. One recent victim was
former National Guard commander General
Medrano, widely regarded as the father of the
rightwing death squads. Members of FMLN front
groups assigned to urban areas are believed to have
been responsible for these killings. The rise in such
urban terrorism has occurred while-and possibly
because-the insurgents have become increasingly
frustrated by their lack of progress on the battlefield.
The Clara Elizabeth Ramirez Front. The most active
and, for US citizens, the most dangerous of the
leftwing urban guerrilla groups is the Clara Elizabeth
Ramirez Front (CERF), named after a deceased
guerrilla heroine. The CERF came to public attention
in mid-1983 when it murdered US Navy Lieutenant
Commander Schaufelber er.
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is a dissident faction of the Farabundo Marti Popular
Liberation Forces (FPL), the second-largest
Salvadoran insurgent group. Its members apparently
propound an urban-oriented strategy and a primary
reliance on violence, in contrast to the mainstream
FPL position, which advocates a two-pronged military
and political struggle in both rural and urban areas.
Although most of the Salvadoran guerrillas avoid
attacking US targets, the CERF continued to be an
exception in 1984. CERF operatives murdered at
least two Salvadoran employees of the US Embassy,
including, in October, the supervisor of the Embassy
guards. In November a CERF team strafed the US
Embassy with machinegun fire from a speeding car.
In March 1985 the CERF assassinated Salvadoran
military spokesman Lt. Col. Ricardo Cienfuegos. The
CERF also took credit in May for murdering a
Salvadoran military judge who had overseen the trials
of numerous captured guerrillas.
Rightwing Terrorism. In 1984 rightwing political
violence declined considerably compared with
previous years, despite partisan maneuvering during
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the spring presidential campaign and the election of
President Duarte, a moderate. The reduction probably
stemmed from several causes-warnings from
Washington, disciplinary measures by military
leaders against certain human rights abusers, and the
government's search for ways to make violent rightists
more accountable for their actions.
Nevertheless, rightwing extremist leaders continue to
view the establishment of democratic procedures and
institutions as inimical to their interests and the use of
violence as their most effective tactic. The rightists
distrust President Duarte and doubt he can pursue
peace initiatives without conceding more to the
insurgents than the right could tolerate. If the
rightwing extremists decide the government is being
too soft on the insurgents, they may try to resurrect
their death squads and renew their assassination
campaign.
The Role of Nicaragua
Nicaragua promotes and supports subversive activities
throughout Central America to further its primary
objectives of preserving its own revolutionary gains
and destabilizing non-Marxist regimes in the area.
Members of many current and former subversive and
terrorist organizations-including Palestinian groups,
the Argentinian Montoneros, the Uruguayan
Tupamaros, the Chilean MIR and PCCh, and the
Spanish Basque ETA-are resident in Nicaragua.
reduced, owing mainly to interdiction operations by
the Salvadoran Army. The political leaders of the
Salvadoran insurgent movement are based in
The Role of Cuba
Salvadoran guerrilla leader Joaquin Villalobos has
said that, "we have to recognize that the Cubans are
the fulcrum of the revolution in Latin America."
Despite Cuban overtures early this year indicating
that the Castro regime was interested in improving
relations with the United States, Cuban spokesmen
have made it clear Havana would never sever its ties
to, or halt its support for, revolutionaries in any part
of the world.
The Castro regime maintains a large and complex
subversion support apparatus that provides backing
for all types of leftist revolutionaries and terrorists,
from insurgents in El Salvador to assassins in Chile.
This support includes everything from guns and
funding to asylum and training. Several accused
Basque terrorists, for example, currently enjoy
safehaven in Cuba. Many of the guerrillas infiltrated
into Honduras in 1983 and 1984 were trained in
Cuba. The training courses offered there run the
gamut of skills needed by terrorists: underwater
demolition, document falsification, communications
and cryptography, secret writing, urban and rural
guerrilla tactics, bomb fabrication, small arms
handling, marksmanship-virtually any kind of
expertise useful in insurgent or subversive activities.
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The Sandinista regime does, however, provide advice,
training, and safehaven, and channels Soviet Bloc
arms and ammunition to members of various Latin
American insurgent groups that engage in terrorist
acts. The FMLN forces have been the primary
recipient of Nicaraguan aid.
recent months, however, the flow of supplies and
ammunition from Nicaragua to the Salvadoran
FMLN guerrillas has apparently been greatly
Cuban President Fidel Castro has recently been
courting several South American nations as part of an
effort to ease US pressure on Cuban interests in
Central America, to garner support for Havana's
position on regional issues, and to gain access to new
economic markets. Nonetheless, Havana has not
ended its support for subversives in the region.
Throughout last year and into early 1985, Cuba
reportedly has been supplying arms, materiel, and
training to insurgents from El Salvador, Guatemala,
Chile, and Colombia.
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about 70 young members of the PCCh were reported
to have reentered Chile clandestinely after having
received terrorist training in Havana. Some of these
youths may have joined the Manuel Rodriguez
Patriotic Front. Cuba also continues to provide
training and possibly arms to the Colombian M-19,
while reportedly advising the group to abide by the
cease-fire for the time being
The Caribbean
The only significant terrorist problem in the
Caribbean in 1984 lay in the French Caribbean
departments, where 29 terrorist bombings were
recorded-26 in Guadeloupe and three in Martinique.
They caused four deaths and a number of injuries,
along with considerable property damage. The
Caribbean Revolutionary Alliance (ARC), a
clandestine separatist movement, is believed
responsible for most of the violence. Government and
police buildings were the primary targets.
The ARC announced early in 1984 that it would no
longer try to avoid attacks that endangered lives. In
response, the French Government increased
counterterrorist forces in the islands, outlawed the
ARC, and arrested nearly 20 ARC activists. By mid-
1984 the authorities seemed to have the situation in
the islands under control, but then, perhaps spurred
by the ambiguous French responses to the
sporadically violent independence movement in New
Caledonia, the Caribbean terrorists renewed their
relatively low-level bombing activities. The violence
has continued into 1985. About a dozen ARC activists
are believed to remain at large in Guadeloupe and
another dozen in Martinique.
Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi seeks to undermine
US and French interests in the region. He regards the
United States-and, to a lesser extent, France-as
the principal obstacle to achieving leadership in the
Third World, including the Caribbean. Qadhafi's
efforts to increase his influence will probably meet
with only limited success. He may succeed in
prompting increased militancy among French
Caribbean separatists, but English-speaking leftists
will probably continue to reject violent actions,
because they fear either damage to their political
standing or government retaliation.
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Chronology of Terrorism-1985
Below are described noteworthy foreign and international terrorist events and
counterterrorism developments that have occurred or come to light since our last
issue. Events and developments that have already been described elsewhere in this
publication are not included.
the Liberation of Corsica (FLNC) is suspected.
France: In Bastia, a bomb exploded in the debating chamber of Upper Corsica's
General Council, causing damage but no injuries. The banned National Front for
Uganda: Two North Korean agricultural technicians abducted by rebels. They
were released later the same day by the National Resistance Army (NRA). The
NRA is suspected of killing a Ugandan policeman captured at the same time.
robberies in Istanbul and was planning more in Bornova.
Turkey: Unidentified terrorist carrying explosives and weapon arrested near
Izmir. He is reportedly part of an as yet unidentified group that committed five
Democratic Party last September.
Japan: Police arrest Chukaku-ha terrorist. Fujii Takahiro is suspected of driving
the truck in a flamethrower attack on the headquarters of the ruling Liberal
Italian.
Iraq: South Korean workers kidnaped by Kurdish dissidents. The two men were
abducted from a gasoline station by several armed men in the Sulaimaniya area.
Kurdish guerrillas are currently holding two Japanese, one Chinese, and one
the leftwing terrorist group Chukaku-ha (Nucleus Faction), originally
suspected in a 7 May attack on Narita Airport, apparently is not the culprit. The
homemade rockets used in the attack-beer bottles filled with a powdered
explosive-were not comparable in sophistication to devices seen in other
Chukaku-ha attacks; another group, the Battle Flag Faction, is now suspected.
Japan: Airport attack probably not work of Chukaku-ha.
NPA members for refusing to pay protection money.
Philippines: New People's Army (NPA) kills US citizen in Pangasinan Province.
A retired US Army major of Philippine extraction was killed on his farm by seven
Brakpan. The early morning blasts caused no casualties.
33 Secret
GI TR 85-012
17 June 1985
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Portugal: FP-25 bank robbers arrested in Praia de Rocha. After robbing a bank,
four members of FP-25 were arrested by Portuguese police following a shootout in
which they were all wounded. F--]
Army.
Philippines: Three unknown gunmen kill priest in Polanco during mass. The
killers of Father Alberto Romero were probably members of the New People's
imprisoned tribal chief.
Pakistan: Australian couple kidnaped in Baluchistan. Dr. Robert Williamson and
his wife were abducted while working on a World Bank-sponsored forestry project.
The Baluchi kidnapers are demanding that the government release their
materials were confiscated.
Turkey: Ankara police arrest 18 members of the separatist Kurdish Workers Party
who were trying to reorganize the group. Pistols, ammunition, and organizational
South Africa: Gasoline bomb thrown through window injures black couple. They
probably were targeted because of their membership in a Grahamstown student
organization. A third member of the organization escaped injury in a similar
attack when a bomb bounced off a barred window and exploded in his yard.
Grahamstown has recently been the scene of other attacks on student leaders. F_
earlier that evening was responsible.
Lesotho: One killed, two injured in bombing of home. The dead man reportedly
was an ANC member who had been expelled from Lesotho in 1983. Authorities do
not know if he blew himself up while making a bomb or if a visitor he received
Rodriguez Patriotic Front claimed responsibility.
Chile: Several bomb attacks against electrical pylons cause blackouts throughout
country. The power outage, which lasted about 40 minutes, affected nearly 1,400
km of powerline between the cities of Concepcion and Copiapo. The Manuel
damage but caused no injuries.
Colombia: 30 National Liberation Army guerrillas attack Cravo Norte oilfields
near Venezuelan border. The dynamite attack did an estimated $250 million in
believed responsible.
Ecuador: US-Ecuadorean Binational Center in Guayaquil bombed. The blast
resulted in minor damage. The leftist subversive group Alfaro Vive, Carajo! is
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incident probably was related to the 2 June national elections.
Greece: Bomb explodes outside New Democracy campaign headquarters in
Iraklion, Crete, causing minor damage. No group claimed responsibility. The
control of Colombia's oil reserves. No injuries were reported.
Colombia: National Liberation Army guerrillas shoot down helicopter chartered
by Occidental Petroleum. The guerrillas told the pilot that they downed the
helicopter near the Venezuelan border in protest against the foreign company's
ambushed about 90 kilometers from the capital.
Angola: UNITA kills French priest going to mass and abducts wounded Irish
colleague. UNITA claimed the two were traveling with a military convoy that it
Court. He was convicted of setting up six arms caches in Johannesburg.
investigate clashes between the Army and M-19 during the year-old truce.
Colombia: M-19 supporters end occupation of Bogota Red Cross building. The
group began the occupation on 22 May in hopes of persuading the government to
facilities at night in order to avoid casualties.
South Africa: ANC claims credit for daylight bombing of Johannesburg Army
medical center, injuring as many as 17 persons. The bomb, which also caused
considerable damage, was discovered 10 minutes before it detonated, allowing for
a partial evacuation of the building. In the past, the ANC usually has bombed
train Costa Rica's new infantry battalion.
Costa Rica: Unknown gunmen fire several shots at presidential palace, causing
minimal damage. Although no group claimed credit, the attack may be related to
recent leftwing protests against the arrival of about 20 US military advisers to
against Arafat supporters.
Morocco: Syrian Embassy car explodes outside ambassador's residence in Rabat.
The blast shattered several windows but caused no casualties. No group has
claimed responsibility for the attack, but the PLO office in Rabat alleged that it
was carried out by Syrian security operatives in order to justify Syrian attacks
General Command.
West Bank: Small bomb explodes in garden near bus station in 'Alula. No
casualties were reported. The Voice of the PLO in Baghdad claimed responsibility
for the attack in the name of the recently surfaced Palestinian Revolution Forces
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least four of the attackers were reportedly trained and armed in Libya.
Niger: Government claims two soldiers killed by Libyan-backed Nigerien
dissidents. One attacker was killed and 11 others captured when 14 raiders tried
to storm an administrative office northeast of the capital; two others escaped.
Government gendarmes suffered two killed and one wounded in the assault. At
claimed credit for the attack.
South Africa: ANC bombs offices of Southern Cross Fund in Johannesburg. The
early evening blast caused no casualties and only minor damage. The ANC
explosives.
France: Corsican militant receives seven-year prison sentence in Ajaccio. Manuel
Luciani, a leading member of the Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC),
was imprisoned on charges of involvement in bomb attacks and illegal possession of
bomb by a man claiming to represent the Revolutionary Cells.
West Germany: NATO pipeline bombed, causing minor damage. The explosion
blew off the valve pit cover. A local clergyman received a phone call warning of the
Northern Ireland: Londonderry police defuse car bomb containing 272 kilograms
of explosives. The police later arrested three men near the scene. 25X1
Sri Lanka: Tamil attacks leave at least five dead in eastern villages. A
government spokesman originally announced that more than 50 Sinhalese farmers
near Trincomalee probably were killed, but later scaled that figure down. Colombo
usually minimizes casualties from terrorist attacks, and the initial figure may be
more accurate. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam were probably responsible.
movie.
Philippines: Two journalists killed. In Cebu, an outspoken progovernment radio
commentator and his bodyguard were killed while attending a beauty pageant.
The next day, in Davao City, another journalist was shot dead while attending a
be the work of the Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC).
France: Bombs damage Corsican vacation camp belonging to French Atomic
Energy Commission. There were no injuries from the blasts, which are believed to
Switzerland: Bomb shatters windows at Geneva's main railway station, but causes
no casualties. The previously unknown Martyrs of Tal al Zatar claimed
responsibility for that blast, and for placing other, unprimed explosives the same
day at Geneva's Cointrin Airport.
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involved in the 1 January rocket attack against the US Consulate General in Kobe.
Japan: Another Chukaku-ha member arrested. Japanese police announced the
arrest of Fumito Ogata, a member of the leftist terrorist group Chukaku-ha
(Nucleus Faction) wanted for I I years. Police suspect he was most recently
the following day.
Belgium: Belgian police arrest seven persons suspected in I May bomb attack
against Employers Federation in Brussels. Five suspects, arrested as they were
digging up arms near Leuven, had copies of Communist Combatant Cells
communiques in their car. Two other persons were arrested in Brussels and Liege
United Kingdom: Bomb partially explodes outside Syrian Embassy. London
police detonated the remainder of the 5-kilogram bomb concealed in a travel bag.
No casualties resulted and no group has claimed responsibility for the attack. F-
Sikh extremists probably are responsible.
India: Home of ruling party official bombed. In Punjab, five persons were slightly
injured when a bomb was thrown into the residence of the president of the
Hoshiapur City Congress-I party organization. No group has claimed credit, but
Breton Revolutionary Army are responsible.
France: Breton terrorist killed while planting bomb outside courthouse in
Guingamp. A short time later, two bombs damaged the offices of the deputy
mayor and the National Employment Agency. Police suspect members of the
6 June Spain: Bomb damages Citroen showroom in Durango. No group claimed
responsibility for the attack, but ETA is suspected.
homemade bombs ready for use in the suspects' houses.
New Caledonia: Two French settlers charged in 13 May bombings. Four persons
were hurt in a Kanak school, but there were no casualties in attacks on a yacht and
a courthouse. Police found rifles, pistols, and ammunition, including three
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