NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY WEDNESDAY 22 FEBRUARY 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000100020072-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 72
• Publication Date: February 22, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence Daily
Wednesday
22 February 1984
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Contents
France-Lebanon: Changing Tactics ........................................ 2
USSR: New Ballistic Missile Submarine .................................. 3
USSR-Southern Africa: Soviet Concern ................................ 4
East Germany: Improved Financial Outlook .......................... 5
Nicaragua: Election Date Set .................................................. 6
Libya-Jordan: Relations Deteriorate ...................................... 6
USSR: New Move on Chemical Warfare .................................. 7
India: Religious Riots in the Northwest .................................. 8
USSR-Norway: Soviets Retaliate for Expulsions .................... 9
Honduras-US: Controversy Over Expropriation Case ............ 10
Bolivia: Increasing Opposition to the President ...................... 10
Japan: Budget Increase for Robot Development .................... 12
Special Analysis
Argentina: Regional Reactions to Alfonsin's Election ............ 13
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FRANCE-LEBANON: Changing Tactics
France is shifting its tactics in Lebanon in response to recent
events there.
The US Embassy reports the French are mainly concerned about
reaching a settlement that will keep Lebanon united and reduce civil
conflict. As a result, Paris may drop its support for President
Gemayel, who it believes has failed as a promoter of national
reconciliation. The French believe the agreement of 17 May is dead,
and, according to the Embassy, they are willing to concede Syria
The French want a UN force in Beirut as an initial step, and they
would be willing to exclude the MNF countries from participation.
They hope to maintain their own influence through their fleet and role
in the UN contingent in southern Lebanon.
A shift of French forces in southern Lebanon-which is already
partially completed-would free neutral UN troops for possible
assignment to a UN force in Beirut. The French believe that reducing
their troops in Beirut to a token force guarding their Embassy also
would reduce their exposure and the need for military reprisals if they
Paris still hopes to obtain Moscow's cooperation on the
arrangements for a UN force in Beirut. At the same time, however
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President Mitterrand believes too close an association with the USSR 25X1
would threaten the domestic political consensus for his policy.
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Comment: The French do not accept Soviet demands that the
MNF countries withdraw their fleets and promise no further
intervention. If the Soviets and the Syrians were included, however,
Paris might be willing to accept a mutual pledge of nonintervention.
The French clearly believe that, by taking a more independent
line, they will be in a better position to protect their own interests in
Saudi Arabia and other moderate states in the region. Quick progress
on a UN role, however, is unlikely.
Top Secret
2 22 February 1984
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a new nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine that is a variant of
the Soviet D-111 SSBN and that probably will carry 16 SS-NX-23
missiles.
The submarine is about 170 meters long, 14 meters longer than
the D-III. It has about 4 meters of the extra length forward of the sail
and about 10 meters aft of the missile bay.
The new submarine is approximately the same length as the
Typhoon SSBN. Its submerged displacement, however, is likely to be
only slightly more than half as great.
The missile bay appears to be about the same length as that of
the preceding D-III SSBNs, the 14th unit of which was first seen at
Severodvinsk in December 1981.
Comment: The submarine is a further modification of the Y-class
SSBN design, which was developed into the D-1, the D-11, and the D-111.
This is the first time that the basic design has been lengthened
forward of the sail, probably to improve torpedo handling and storage
and to provide more space for command and control functions.
The length of the missile bay indicates that the submarine
probably will carry 16 missiles. These are likely to be the three-stage,
liquid-propelled SS-NX-23 now under development. Although the
canvas covering over the missile bay prevents direct observation, the
increased size of the upper rudder suggests that the missile bay may
be somewhat larger than that of the D-III in order to accommodate
the SS-NX-23.
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Moscow appears concerned that South Africa's recent
negotiations with Mozambique and Angola-while reducing the threat
to Maputo and Luanda-could endanger Soviet influence in southern
Africa.
Recent Soviet media coverage on Angola
continues to highlight alleged plans by the US and South Africa to
undermine the regime in Luanda and force it to negotiate with UNITA
insurgents.
Comment: Despite misgivings about the US-brokered
negotiations with South Africa, Moscow presumably sees some merit
in reducing the security threat to the regimes in Luanda and Maputo.
Last year, for example, the USSR sent more military assistance to
Angola than at any time since the original Soviet-Cuban intervention
in 1975-76.
Moscow also recognizes that such accommodations with South
Africa could diminish Soviet influence in the region and hinder its
efforts to support insurgents in Namibia and South Africa. The
Soviets probably will try to create new suspicions in Luanda and
Maputo about US and South African motives in the hope of
preventing other concessions that undercut the USSR's interests.
Top Secret
4 22 February 1984
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East Germany: Financial Position
Billion US $
0 IV
1981
I
1982
II III IV I II III
1983
Top Secret
22 February 1984
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EAST GERMANY: Improved Financial Outlook
East Germany's financial prospects have been improved by
East Berlin's success in running trade surpluses and by bankers'
strengthened confidence that Bonn will serve as a lender of last resort.
Last month the regime announced a
"considerable" surplus in trade with nonsocialist countries in 1983,
its thir 7 iv annual surplus after deficits throuahout the
1970s.
Comment: This year East Berlin should be able to cover
estimated debt repayments of $3.6 billion, which is less than
repayments in either of the last two years. The reliance on short-term
credits, however, mean that n erosion of banker confidence could
pose liquidity problems
The regime seems committed to reducing its debt further. It
probably will be able to increase exports enough to accomplish this,
while increasing imports of key industrial products. East Berlin may
consider future economic deals with Bonn a good source of additional
funds, despite its fears of becoming overly dependent on West
Germany.
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The Sandinistas are portraying the announcement made
yesterday to advance elections to 4 November as a move to preempt
an expected increase in "US aggression." They also say it reflects
their commitment to pluralism. In addition, the junta announced that
the voting age should be lowered to 16 and that the period for
insurgents to accept amnesty would be extended to 4 May.
Meanwhile, Eden Pastora's insurgent group renewed its offer to
participate in the elections if the regime accepts international
supervision of them and separates the Army from politics.
Comment: The Sandinistas worked hard to make the anniversary
a major media event, and the announcement probably was timed to
gain propaganda mileage. A lowered voting age would please young
Sandinista supporters who have campaigned for a change in the
official election law proposal. The opposition, however, would see it as
additional evidence that the regime will use all available means to win,
and it is likely to continue to complain that the amnesty does not
include insurgent leaders. The Sandinistas will almost certainly reject
Pastora's election offer, but they will stress that individual insurgents
Libya claims Palestinians angry with King Hussein for meeting
with Egyptian President Mubarak in Washington last week are
responsible for the burning of the Jordanian Embassy in Tripoli on
Saturday. Libyan leaders met with visiting Palestinian radicals before
Comment: Libyan leader Qadhafi is out to scuttle any possible
cooperation between Hussein and PLO chief Arafat. He probably is
coordinating his efforts with Syria, and he may seek to sponsor other
operations by radical Palestinians against Jordan. Hussein will
respond to this latest incident by taking an even more cautious
approach to peace negotiations. He will point to the coordinated
Syrian-Libyan campaign as further evidence of Jordan's need for
advanced US weapons.
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The chief of the Soviet delegation at the UN Conference on
Disarmament in Geneva announced yesterday that the USSR would
agree to the principle of continuous on-site verification of chemical
weapons destruction by a combination of international inspectors and
sensors. Until now, the Soviets have agreed only to international
inspection by a quota system, not by continuous inspection. The
announcement also indicated that Moscow would accept the principle
of inspection on challenge but said this must be voluntary.
Comment: The Soviets have been on the defensive since last
year, primarily because of their verification position, and may be
trying to preempt a forthcoming US draft treaty. The announcement
indicates some movement in the Soviet position, but its significance
will become evident only in the course of detailed negotiations. Even if
adequate international verification of destruction sites could be
agreed upon, the omission of verification of production facilities
would severely limit monitoring of Soviet chemical warfare
capabilities. Moreover, Soviet refusal to accept mandatory challenge
inspection will probably remain a major stumbling block to a chemical
warfare agreement.
Top Secret
7 22 February 1984
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States with Religious Disturbances
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22 February 1984
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INDIA: Religious Riots in the Northwest
Nine days of mounting Hindu-Sikh violence in Punjab and
Haryana States have left at least 33 dead and 200 wounded. Last
weekend Sikh dissidents defying curfew orders fought national police
from the sanctuary of Punjab's holiest Sikh temple. US diplomats
report that leaders of Punjab's principal Sikh party, the Akali Dal,
have now ruled out participating in talks with the government on Sikh
demands for greater autonomy for Punjab.
Comment: Opposition parties are trying to make a major issue of
New Delhi's failure to control turmoil in Punjab and to resolve Sikh
demands before the national elections that have to be held by next
January. The renewed violence defies Prime Minister Gandhi's
imposition of direct rule from New Delhi. As a result, she is unlikely to
call for early elections in the next three months as many political
observers have speculated she might.
Top Secret
8 22 February 1984
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USSR-NORWAY: Soviets Retaliate for Expulsions
The Soviets probably calculate that their decision to declare two
former members of the Norwegian Embassy in Moscow personae non
gratae will not do serious damage to bilateral relations. Officials in the
Soviet Foreign Ministry told Norway's Acting Chief of Mission in
Moscow on Monday of the action against an interpreter and a former
first secretary, both of whom left the USSR some time ago. The
officials also protested Norway's expulsion of five Soviet diplomats
early this month. The Norwegian Foreign Minister publicly termed the 25X1
unexplained Soviet action ."unreasonable."
Comment: The move against the two Norwegians almost
certainly is in retaliation for Oslo's expulsions of the Soviet diplomats.
The USSR's limited response probably will not prompt additional
action by Norway or further damage the existing cool but businesslike
bilateral ties.
Top Secret
9 22 February 1984
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HONDURAS-US: Controversy Over Expropriation Case
A political controversy has developed around the issue of.
compensating a US citizen for land expropriated for use by the
Regional Military Training Center, the US-built training site near the
northern coast of Honduras. According to the US Embassy, some
members of the opposition National Party object to compensation
and have raised technical arguments to deny the landowner legal
claim to the property. President Suazo's administration says that its
negotiations concern remuneration for improvements made by the
owner to the property but not for the land itself. Meanwhile, the
Honduran Congress is investigating Suazo's letter of accession to the
Caribbean Basin Initiative, which commits Honduras to negotiating
just compensation.
Comment: Members of the National Party are using the issue to
discredit the ruling Liberal Party and to increase their popular appeal.
Their arguments probably will win some nationalistic sympathy, which
already has led to criticism of the center's role in training the
Salvadoran military. Suazo will have to stand firm on the issue or risk
jeopardizing his country's eligibility for new investment aid under the
Caribbean Basin Initiative.
BOLIVIA: Increasing Opposition to the President
President Siles's delay in ratifying promised wage increases is
contributing to widespread strikes and antigovernment
demonstrations.
Comment: Siles's indecisiveness in the face of labor pressures
has weakened his credibility with the left and with moderate
opposition groups, and it will complicate efforts to broaden his
government through a cabinet shuffle.
Top Secret
10 22 February 1984
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JAPAN: Budget Increase for Robot Development
Japan's National Project to develop robots for hazardous
environments has been allocated a substantial budget increase this
year, according to Japanese press reporting. The project will get
nearly $5.5 million, up from $170,000 in FY 1983. Last month a new
research association for the project, consisting of 17 robot
manufacturers and two industry associations, was formed. Areas of
research include robots for use in marine oil exploration, nuclear
power plants, and areas hit by fires or earthquakes.
Comment: The technologies being developed-including vision,
sensors, mobility, and control-will improve Japan's existing
industrial robots and its competitiveness in electronics and other
key areas. Moreover, the robots designed to operate in extreme
conditions may have important military applications. For example,
a marine robot could be used for minesweeping.
Top Secret
12 22 February 1984
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Special Analysis
ARGENTINA: Regional Reactions to Alfonsin's Election
The pledge of Argentine President Alfonsin to promote democracy
and human rights in South America is affecting domestic politics in
Uruguay, Chile, and Brazil, where military governments are in various
stages of returning to civilian rule. The tougher positions that the
armed forces in those countries are taking on transition matters are
directly influenced by antimilitary sentiments and the trials of former
government leaders in Buenos Aires. Alfonsin's moves have already
encouraged like-minded politicians in the region and, over time, he
may be inclined to move from low-keyed diplomatic and moral
backing to more overt support, at least in Uruguay and possibly in
Chile. For now, he has not openly backed dissidents, in order to avoid
Argentina's neighbors are sensitive to any signs that Alfonsin is
meddling in their internal politics.
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Regional opposition groups have been elated by Alfonsin's
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Reaction in Uruguay
President Alvarez has taken diplomatic steps to try to blunt the
impact of Alfonsin's actions on domestic politics.
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13 22 February 1984
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Leading political figures in Uruguay believe the civilian attacks on
the Argentine armed forces have contributed to the hardening
position of the Uruguayan military toward the transition process.
Alvarez has repeatedly sought military support to extend his term in I
office. He probably will use events in Argentina to try to persuade his
colleagues to be tough on conditions for civilian rule, if not to
postpone it.
Chile and Brazil
US Embassy and defense attache reporting indicates that Chilean
military officers fear investigations by civilians similar to those taking
place in Argentina. As a result, they have set aside differences and
rallied behind President Pinochet's protracted schedule for returning
to civil rule. One hardliner even suggested to the defense attache that
the military would have to retain influence into the 1990s to allow
memories of its war against subversion to fade.
Opposition leaders in Chile have told US officials in Santiago that
they have linked their hopes for a political opening to Alfonsin's
victory.
Brasilia has been searching a gressively for common ground with
the Alfonsin overnment
~At the same time, the Brazilians have publicly and privately
warned the Argentines to respect political differences and the pace of
Brazil's transition.
Alfonsin's policies have unsettled many Brazilian military officers.
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Alfonsin has toned down his initial strong public support for
nei hborin o osition rou s.
The President eventually may become more inclined to renew
overt support for dissidents, especially in Uruguay, where antiregime
sentiments are high and Alfonsin's foreign policy stake is low. Alfonsin
is a personal friend of presidential candidate Ferreira, who is disliked
by the military. Montevideo's crackdown on labor and the press could
make Ferreira and his allies increasingly dependent on foreign
support.
In Chile, delays in finding a settlement of the Beagle Channel
dispute could encourage Alfonsin to, risk Santiago's good will in favor
of strengthening democratic forces.
Alfonsin is likely to be especially wary in his dealings with Brazil.
He has the most to risk there, ranging from important international
policy initiatives to nuclear cooperation.
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