AVAILABLE TRANSCRIPTIONS OF BROADCASTS AND NOTICE OF UPCOMING PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01070R000200710001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 27, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

I
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27 May 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Media Highlights Recipients
SUBJECT: Available Transcriptions of Broadcasts
and Notice of Upcoming Program
1. We have on file the following transcriptions of braodcasts.
If you need to see them, please notify us and we will
make them available to you.
18 May, 10:15-AM, CNN-TV, DAYWATCH, Subject: Embassy Bombing/Ties
to Iranian Government. Comments by David Wise, CNN's intelligence
analyst.
19 May, 7:30 AN, WASH Radio, NEWS, Subject: Russian Tranquilizer
Machine.
21 May, 10:00 PM, WRC-TV, MONITOR, Subject: Interview with Soviet
defector Stanislav Levchenko.
22 May, 11:30 AN, CBS-TV, FACE THE NATION, Guest: Senator Barry
Goldwater discusses Central America.
22 May, 12:30 PM, WRC=TV, MEET THE PRESS, Guests: Gen. Brent
Scowcroft and Adm. Stansfield Turner discuss the MX. Panel:
Mary Lord of Newsweek, Bruce Neland of Time and Bill Monroe of
NBC News.
22 May, 11:30 PM, WJLA-TV, ABC WEEKEND REPORT, Subject: Report
on New York Times article concerning alleged DCI statement on
Nicaragua.
23 May, 7:00 AN, WJLA-TV, GOOD MORNING AMERICA, Subject: New
York Times/William Casey/Nicaragua.
23 May, 7:00 AN, WRC-TV, THE TODAY SHOW, Subject: New York Times/
William Casey/Nicaragua.
23 May, 7:00 AN, WDVM-TV, CBS MORNING NEWS, Subject: New York Times/
William Casey/Nicaragua.
STAT
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2. Word has been received of the following upcoming program:
29 May, 11:30 AN, CBS-TV, FACE THE NATION, Guests: Alan Greenspan,
member of President Reagan's Economic Policy Board and Robert Hormats,
former Senior Economic official for presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter
and Reagan.
STAT
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RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 656-4068
FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
PROGRAM D a y w a t c h STATION C N N T V
CNN Network
DATE May 18, 1983
SUBJECT Embassy Bombing/Ties to Iranian Government
HOST: There's been some speculation about the Iranian
terrorist group that claimed responsibility for last month's bomb
blast at the American Embassy in Beirut and its ties to the
Iranian government.
On his way out of the news conference last night, Mr.
Reagan said, if those reports prove accurate the executive branch
would take action.
REPORTER: Mr. President, if it turns out the Iranian
government...
(Confusion of voices)
RONALD REAGAN: I tell you that we will see what we're
going to do about it.
HOST: There have been some new reports this week that
the United States government might have had advance word about
the bombing of some building in Beirut at the time that the
Embassy was blasted. In that, 63 people died, including 17
Americans.
Senior correspondent Daniel Shorr told us about this
possibility several weeks ago. And this morning, former State
Department official, Joseph Cisco, told me that embassies and the
State Department get information about possible incidents of
violence all the time. CNN's intelligence analyst, David Wise,
is with us to talk about this. David, I know you've talked to
your sources as recently as today about this situation. What do
you know? Was there -- were there advance reports? Did the
Embassy tighten security? Did they not tighten it enough?
Material supplied by Radio N Reports, Inc. may be used for file and reference purposes only. It may not be reproduced, sold or publicly demonstrated or exhibited.
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DAVID WISE: Well, the sources that I've talked to say
that there were cables intercepted indicating that the Iranians
might be involved; but there was no specific and conclusive
evidence because the Embassy wasn't named as a target. It seems
clear and obvious that the security was not tightened up or it
wouldn't have happened.
What we know is that there was some cable traffic,
perhaps, from Iran to Syria which said, in effect, something in
Beirut may be bombed in the next couple' of days. And it happen-
ed. There's reports that a paymenet of $25,000 was to be made.
HOST: Well, David, with the Middle East being such a
hot spot these days of terrorist activity, would it not seem
logical to conclude that the American Embassy would, perhaps, be
a target if they intercepted those cables?
WISE: Certainly, and, as I said, the evidence wasn't
conclusive. There's a double irony in the failure to act on the
evidence because the NSA, the National Security Agency would have
been the agency that intercepted the cables between Tehran and
Damascus; and they share their information with the CIA. And in
the blast the entire CIA station was destroyed, including Robert
Ames, the top CIA Middle East expert.
HOST: I don't understand it. How could this have
happened? Did it slip through the cracks?
WISE: Well, NSA gets a great mass of information from
their big ears, thousands of listening stations around the world.
And this information comes in and tapes and occupies rooms. It's
not always processed in time to do any good. That's one of the
problems with intelligence. Too much is obtained and not enough
acted upon.
HOSTESS: Mr. Wise, at the time of the takeover of the
American Embassy in Tehran, there was some speculation that the
American intelligence had failed because we should have known
that was coming, too. Do you see any connections?
WISE: Well, there's no direct connection. The CIA
definitely did not have sufficient evidence that Khomeini was
going to take over, at least that the Shah would be deposed.
That's a well known fact. And that is one of their failures of
prediction that was institutional. This is a more specific
tactical kind of intelligence.
HOST: Dr. Joe Cisco said this morning -- we were just
talking -- he did an interview on an earlier program today. But
he said that when he was running the Middle East division of the
State Department, he would sit there every day and go over cable
after cable that had information about potential trouble. And he
said, getting the intelligence wasn't the problem; deciding what
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was real and what was not real and what the purpose of this stuff
coming in was was often more difficult.
WISE: I think that's also true, yes.
HOST: What should the United States government do to
prevent things like this from happening again? Is there a way to
speed up the process of getting information? For example, the
National Security Agency, as you say, they've got these big
satellite dishes everywhere and they probably know most every-
thing that's going on. What can speed up the process if some-
thing like this happens again somewhere?
WISE: Well, Congress has some interlocking problems
here. Congress has criticized the intelligence agencies for
failure to act on information. For example, when the Liberty was
bombed during the Six Day War in 1967, the message warning the
American ship away from Israeli's coast -- Israel's coast -- was
never received. It got lost. We're dealing with big bureau-
cracies. But also, there's an element of hindsight here. After
all, the Embassy was not named as a target. The bottom line is
security at the Embassy was very poor, and obviously that is what
is has to be tightened up. There's no way that a truck should be
able to drive right in -- in the snackbar and result in 64
people's being killed.
HOST: The solution, I guess, is that everybody work
together and beef up security most everyplace.
David Wise, well, thanks for being with us today.
WISE: Thank you.
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RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 656-4068
DATE May 19, 1983 7:30 A.M. CITY Washington, D.C.
Tranquilizer Machine
JOE CONNALLY: The Russians have invented a tranquilizer
machine. They've loaned it to a California hospital. It uses
radio waves to relax people instead of drugs. American doctors
put a cat into this box, they turned on the 40 megahertz radio
waves, just above the CB frequency, and in three minutes the cat
was sitting there calm as could be because of the radio waves
pulsating through the box.
Material supplied by Radio N Reports, Inc. may be used for tile and reference purposes only. It may not be reproduced, sold or oublicly demonstrated or exhibited.
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RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 656-4068
FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
DATE May 21, 1983 10:00 P.M.
SUBJECT Stanislav Levchenko
STATION W R C- T V
NBC Network
Washington, D.C.
STANISLAV LEVCHENKO: I spent the best years of my life
doing wrong things on the wrong side for the wrong cause.
LLOYD DOBYNS: His name is Stanislav Levchenko. He's
Russian. And what he was doing for all those years was being a
KGB spy.
DOBYNS: Major Levchenko started as a spy in 1965, when
he was 24. His first job was minor. His last job was not. From
February 1975 until October 1979, he was the KGB political
intelligence officer in Japan. He has finally begun to talk
about that in public, and it is a fascinating story.
DOBYNS: Late this week, a delegation from the Japanese
Diet, or parliament, began talking to Stanislav Levchenko about
his work in Japan and about the Japanese who helped him, some of
them politicians, some of them journalists. We talked to
Levchenko last week in Washington.
LEVCHENKO: I came to the United States to fight for my
people. And as long as my health will permit me, I'll fight for
that cause.
DOBYNS: Six years ago in Tokyo, Stanislav Levchenko is
a correspondent for the Soviet weekly magazine New Times. He
regularly files reports that are well-written and well-read. His
Material supplied by Radio N Reports, Inc. may be used for file and reference purposes only, It may not be reproduced, sold or publicly demonstrated or exhibited
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employers are pleased. But his employers are not the editors of
New Times. Levchenko is a KGB political intelligence officer,
and one of his jobs is to recruit Japanese for the KGB. A
successful officer will recruit one.
LEVCHENKO: I did recruit four Japanese people while I
was stationed in Tokyo.
DOBYNS: He rose from lieutenant to major. But in
October 1979, he asked the United States for political asylum
because, he says, he was just sick of it.
LEVCHENKO: I came to this conclusion, not overnight,
naturally, but the whole experience of my life brought me to that
conclusion, to the conclusion that I really cannot stand it
anymore. It's one thing. And the other thing, that the socia-
list system is evil, and there is nothing which can change it.
DOBYNS: In one way, it got no better. In 1981 a Soviet
court sentenced Levchenko to death in absentia. He chose to
ignore it.
LEVCHENKO: I did have two choices. The first choice,
yes, I did have an option to go into hiding. But the reason why
I came to the Free World country was not that. The reason was to
fight the Soviet socialist system.
I don't think too much, even, about the possibility
that, you know, KGB assassins can get me somewhere or can put
poison in my coffee, although I don't drink coffee. Probably
they know that I drink see. Or whatever other method they can
use to exterminate me. I'm thinking about what I'm doing, and
that's the main thing for me.
DOBYNS: One of the things he does is identify Soviet
propaganda, like the stories that Soviet leader Yuri Andropov is
a pro-American liberal with a love of Scotch whiskey and jazz
music. Andropov is the former head of the KGB. And that's only
one part of it.
LEVCHENKO: His life story shows that he's not a suave
close liberal at all. Because one of the very important points
in his career was his job as Ambassador to Hungary exactly during
the Hungarian uprising. And as the Soviet Ambassador to Hungary,
he showed that he's not only a ruthless person, but he's a very
devious person.
Shortly before most of the Hungarian leaders were
arrested, and then some of them were just banished, which means
the KGB murdered them, he met many of them, was very nice to
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then, and even waved his hand saying good-bye to them. And there
is no doubt whatsoever that he knew what kind of tragic end was
awaiting these members of Hungarian government.
DOBYNS: Yet the man you picture as the ruthless head of
the KGB wrote the letter to the little girl in Maine promising
that there would never be nuclear -- is that just part of the
campaign to make him a nice guy?
LEVCHENKO: Absolutely. Absolutely. There is no doubt
about that.
[Clip of demonstrators]
DOBYNS: And he says there is no doubt that Soviets are
trying to influence public opinion in other areas, taking
advantage of legitimate public concern.
LEVCHENKO: I personally have no doubts whatsoever that
the people whom you call average guys, entirely sincere people
who are fighting for the cause which they think is proper to
fight for, the thing is that a handful of people in certain
organizations and in certain movements are being manipulated by
the Soviets.
For instance, the Soviets were very heavily involved in
influencing the anti-neutron-bomb campaign in Europe. They
mobilized every possible resource which they had, all agents with
influence. They spent enormous amounts of money on [unintelli-
gible] black propaganda things, disinformation, forgeries.
In the United States, there was certain Soviet involve-
ment in the preparation of the June 12th, last year, demon-
stration in New York. They were using certain fronts upon which
they do have certain influence.
DOBYNS: But there is more than just influence. There
is the problem of keeping the Soviet Union current in high
technology.
LEVCHENKO: The smartest way to go is to steal high
technology from the Free World countries. It saves them enormous
amounts of money. Because, okay, for instance, KGB recruits a
certain engineer working for a certain company which produces
high-technology products, electronics, semiconductors, optical
equipment, or whatever. And they would pay this agent, let's
say, for his services $10,000, sometimes $100,000, sometimes
$500,000. But through that kind of person, they can steal
technological process the cost of which, sometimes, will be $100
million or $200 million.
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So, the Soviets know that that kind of stealing business
is probably one of the most profitable businesses which ever
exists.
DOBYNS: Do you have any idea how many KGB officers
there are stationed in the United States?
LEVCHENKO: It would be -- it won't be exaggeration to
say that about 40-45 percent of all Soviet officials stationed in
the United States are either KGB or GRU. Another half of the
Soviet citizens stationed in the United States, or any other
country, are KGB, either, informants or co-optees.
DOBYNS: The KGB is also heavily involved in gun
running, drug smuggling, terrorist activities, and guerrilla
training worldwide.
LEVCHENKO: The KGB does provide guerrilla-type training
for certain so-called national liberation movements or to PLO
officers and soldiers. Sometimes they would use the satellite
services for the purposes to train certain individuals. Bulgar-
ians are definitely [unintelligible].
DOBYNS: The attempted assassination of the Pope. It is
now widely believed that it was a KGB operation run by the
Bulgarians. Do you think so?
LEVCHENKO: Let's put it in this way. If the investi-
gation which is being run now by Italian government will provide
evidence that Bulgarians had been directly involved in the
attempt against Pope's life, then you read it that's KGB, because
Bulgarian intelligence service is under total, absolute control
by KGB.
DOBYNS: The American Communist Party has always said it
is not under Soviet control. But Levchenko says it gets its
money from the Soviet Union, probably passed to it by the KGB.
LEVCHENKO: American Communist Party gets financing from
the International Department of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. But the actual operation in
passing money to individuals in American Communist Party, I would
assume, goes through the KGB hands. Because International
Department officers are not intelligence officers. They don't
have skills in spy trade craft.
DOBYNS: Levchenko did have skills in what he calls spy
trade craft, and he was successful in Japan.
So, why did he quit?
LEVCHENKO: I had all kinds of experience in the Soviet
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Union. My career was successful and I had chance to try almost
everything I could try in my career. And everything was immoral
and everything was bad.
I spent the best years of my life doing wrong things on
the wrong side for the wrong cause. And I could not stand it
anymore.
DOBYNS: Report from a Soviet spy, part two, in a
DOBYNS: After he defected, Stanislav Levchenko worked
first as a journalist, then as a private consultant to busi-
nesses.
LEVCHENKO: No IRS calls me self-employed person, which,
in my understanding, means that I am a private consultant. I do
things for a few think tanks. I do lecturing. And now I started
to write a book about my personal life and personal experience.
DOBYNS: His biggest worry is the safety and future of
his wife and son. His son is now 18.
LEVCHENKO: Shortly after I came to United States, I
started to get certain news about the situation around my wife
and son back in Moscow. And in spite of the fact that, even by
the Soviet laws, they're entirely innocent people, KGB started to
viciously interrogate them and started to try to force them to
make all kinds of derogatory statements on me in public. My wife
flatly refused to cooperate with KGB. They then started to work
hard on my son. They were forcing him to write compositions in
the school on people who leave their country and things like
that, forcing him to denounce me, also. More than that, they
were forcing my son to change his last name. He flatly refused
to do that thing.
DOBYNS: Do you know how your wife and son are doing
LEVCHENKO: I didn't heard anything from them for last
three or four months. But what I do know is that last August,
when my wife was coming back home in the evening, she was beaten
up badly by, in quotes, mobsters. So she was beaten up so bad
that she had to spend four or five days in hospital.
I personally have no doubts that that so-called mob were
KGB counterintelligence officers who were punishing her for not
cooperating with them.
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My son had to go to different school because of intimi-
dation which he had. And when he tried -- he's 18 years old now.
And when he tried to become a college student, the commission,
the board in that college refused to accept him.
DOBYNS: You've been out now for 4 1/2 years.
LEVCHENKO: Uh-huh.
DOBYNS: Do you still do the kinds of things you were
trained to do?
LEVCHENKO: Thank God, I'm not doing anything which I
was trained to do. But once you've been intelligence officer,
you develop certain instincts, some of which are looking funny
for a commoner in the street, you know. For instance, I eat
fast. You know, in America people eat slowly, thoughtfully, they
chew the food all right, or whatever. And I had hard times, you
know, for instance, when I invite some of my friends to restau-
rant, or whatever, because I will eat the whole dish within five
minutes. Because when I was a KGB intelligence officer, I did
have many meetings in restaurants, but food was not the main
thing. The main thing was to extract information, to instruct
the agent, and things like that.
Another example. When I go to some public place, a
cafe, restaturant, I hate to sit with my back towards the
entrance. I want to watch the entrance. And I can't help it.
And there are a few things like that which is really
very hard to get rid of.
DOBYNS: Do you look around?
LEVCHENKO: It's instinct. Sure, I look around. And
thank God, normal human being, common sort of human being, you
know, he doesn't care what's going on around himself, or what-
ever. But again, it's another in-built instinct, you know.
For instance, if I go to certain place, some public
place, I will remember face of everybody around myself. It's
instinct.
DOBYNS: You don't really care, though.
LEVCHENKO: I don't really care. But just automati-
cally, I would remember all faces around myself.
When I'm driving car, again, instinctively, sometimes I
will look what is going on behind my car. I don't need it at
all, but still sometimes I will do it.
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DOBYNS: Have you gotten so that you could pick up the
paper and take a pretty good guess on whether something was
planted or whether it's true?
LEVCHENKO: Yes. You know, I'm glad that I'm out of
this business. But unfortunately, I think till the rest of my
life I would be deprived of the chance to read newspaper normal-
ly. Every morning, whatever newspapers I subscribe to, I read
between the lines. And it is a kind of side effect of my former
profession.
DOBYNS: A final question. You're a young man. What do
you see as your future?
LEVCHENKO: My dream is to become a teacher in some
university or college. I like to be with young people. And I
think that I can become a good teacher, because I like to
communicate with young people, to give them message; and at the
same time, to get their own point of view, their own opinion on
the topics of discussion. And it is a very challenging thing, I
think. And then, I think that it is probably one of the most
noble professions.
DOBYNS: Stanislva Levchenko no longer works for the
KGB. But it is not short of personnel. In the six weeks
beginning April 1st, Western governments expelled 53 accused
Soviet spies, and that's a record.
Of course, Yuri Andropov, former master of the KGB, now
heads the Soviet government.
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MEDIASCAN TRANSCRIPT
CBS Face the Natio
22 May 1983 - i/.3o/~?Ah)
Sunday
Sen. Goldwater, General Wallace *Nuddig who is in charge of our troops in Central
America, said that, like it or not, we are engaged in the war, the United States is
engaged in the war that's going on down there, and he says we have not done what is
required of us. What do you think? What is required of us and shall we do it or not?
GOLDWATER (Chairman, Intelligence Committee): I think the first thing that's required
is for the president to make a new statement of his position, which would be the
country's position, on Central America. Now I think this is such an important part of
our foreign policy that it's only become really important in the last two months, that
if I were the president preparing this paper, I would say if it becomes necessary to
save Central America, we will use our troops, our aircraft, our forces. It's that
important. And as I say, it's only become that important lately, and I agree with
General Nuddig. I read his report, and I think he's correct.
From CBS News, Washington, a spontaneous and unrehearsed news interview on Face the
Nation with Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) and chairman of the Senate Intelligence
Committee. Sen. Goldwater will be questioned by CBS News congressional correspondent
Phil Jones, by Elizabeth Drew of New Yorker Magazine and by the moderator, CBS News
correspondent George Herman. Face the Nation is produced by CBS News, which is solely
responsible for the selection of today's guest and panel.
HERMAN; Sen. Goldwater in your first answer you suggest that President Reagan state a
policy of American, United States' willingness to go in with troops into El Salvador.
That immediately brings up two questions, one military one political. Let me start on
thqv'`military one first. You're an old time soldier, Army, Air Corp and Air Force.
You remember the Armed Services Committee. What would it take, what would it cost the
United States in terms of men Sand equipment, to go into a place like El Salvador where
we might face an unfriendly populous who is not overly fond of Yankees? What would it
take for us to go in and solve the problem, clean it up? GOLDWATER: I think the mere
threat, if made in a strong way, if made in a way that people will believe, the mere
threat would suffice. Now we've lived long enough in this country offering to help
other countries and then not helping, failing to help, that our friends around the
world very much believe that we're a paper tiger, that I think if the president made
it abundantly clear that the Carribean is our problem now, starting with Cuba, and we
would use what forces necessary to maintain Central America, I have a strong feeling
we would not have any further trouble. If we had trouble, it's very difficult to
answer the question you've asked, because we really don't understand now, at least I
don't, the number of plans that would be required, the number of troops or ships. I
think we could start with a quarantine, for example, a ship quarantine to make it
possible to completely stop supplies going into Nicaragua and San Salvador. We could
use aircraft if that became necessary, and you have to keep in mind that they are just
completing, I think, a 10,000 foot strip in Nicaragua, where the Russians can land
their own equipment.
DREW: Sen. Goldwater, you said the president should make a new statement. He made a
speech before Congress not very many weeks ago in which he said, among other things,
'We will never use.... We will not use American troops,' to which he got great
applause. Do you think he should not have said that, or has the situation changed
MEDIASCAN - CBS Face the Nation 03/17/83
& 22
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dramatically since he did say that? GOLDWATER: Yes, the situation changed almost
immediately.
DREW: Should he have not said that? GOLDWATER: No, I think he had the right to say
that. He's the commander and chief, but I'm urging him now. Let me go back just a
space. I'm chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, and we passed a little
doodad that told him that he has until the end of this fiscal year, October first or
the end of September, to come up with a new statement, or he might have trouble
getting more covert funds approved by us. And I think that he's in the process now of
forming that statement. It will be a different statement, I hope.
JONES: Sen. Goldwater, what has occurred since the president made this statment that
makes it so much more critical? GOLDWATER: I think we've finally begun to realize,
and I'm not going to stand here and argue the truth or untruth of what I'm going to
tell you, I think the Soviets have reached sort of a stalemate in Europe. They're
facing tremendous forces in Red China. They're not doing well in Afghanastan.
Yugoslovia has not made up their mind, and they have Poland to contend with, and
that's quite a bit to contend with. Now, having reached an impasse over there, if I
were a member of the Politburo or head of it, I'd be looking someplace else. And the
natural place J would look would be Cuba and the Caribbean. That's a natural place
for the Soviets to start moving equipment, troops and influence.
JONES: Well, are they? GOLDWATER: Yes. JONES: More in the last month or two?
GOLDWATER: Well, we apprehended four aircraft just about a month ago, just after, I
think, the day of the president's speech and they were Russian aircraft. They have
the ability now to land in Nicaragua unless we prevent them from doing it. They have
vast supplies in Cuba. Cuba is really the trouble spot down there, and I have often
said, and*not too facetiously, it would make a good 51st state.
JONES: Senator, one of your former collegues, Jacob Javits, used to say during
foreign policy debates, 'Great nations don't bluff.' Do you think the American people
are ready to send American boys into Central America? GOLDWATER: Well, great nations
do not bluff, and great nations don't go to war. Had we been ready to tell Hitler in
the 1930s, 'You put a foot on the soil of this-country and we're going to be at you,'
there never would have been a World War II. Had we been willing to allow the military
to use the forces we had in Vietnam, we would have won in Vietnam, the same in Korea.
I think the American people are far, far ahead of what you hear around Washington. I
travel out across this country, and I think the general consensus that I've come to is
that the American people are ahead of us, that they're willing to take a chance to
keep peace, and I think that by a strong statement relative to Central America, we can
keep peace.
HERMAN: Do you think something is afoot there? I noticed that when your committee
said until October first or until the end of September, somebody interviewed a
guerrilla spokesman in Nicaragua or on the edge of Nicaragua, and he said, 'That's
time enough because we'll be in Managua by that time.' Is this problem going to take
care of itself without American, U.S. intervention? GOLDWATER: It can. Now we won't
get into an argument like the words covert and overt.
HERMAN: I was sort of looking forward to that. GOLDWATER: We are pretty much overt
now. Without that we can't operate overtly without really going to war. So I think
we're beginning to make progress. I remember when that fellow made that statement,
and up until that time, I'd say up until two weeks ago or even a month, we had no
positive proof that our efforts were producing any good results. Now, we get almost
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daily reports, not of a gigantic nature, but we are getting reports, encouraging
reports that we are stopping the flow of arms. We are making headway, but again, the
nature of the conflict down there being so diversified, it's hard to make a flat
statement that we're winning. We might be here. We might not be here.
HERMAN: Let me ask you then, the October first date which your committee set, which
you announced, is that engraved in stone, could you slip that a little bit if it
seemed as though progress were being made and the situation might take care of itself?
That's the cutoff point. GOLDWATER: The press if not too informed of how we operate.
Our Intelligence Committee approves or disapproves everything, requests for covert
action, whether it's made now, the next fiscal year or when. So whether we pass that
little resolution or not, come October the first they would have to come back up and
ask for approval or disapproval of covert action.
HERMAN: But you've announced the conditions. GOLDWATER: We've made.... Yes, we've
announced some conditions. We might change that, but I have my doubts. The votes
were there.
DREW: Senator, you've given us both an optimistic and pessimistic view, and I wonder
what really reflects your thinking. One is you answered George by saying yes, the
situation, at least in Nicaragua, might take care of itself, and you began by saying
that you thought the situation was deteriorating, but maybe you meant El Salvador and
that we might need to use troops. Could we just clarify which it is that you really
think? GOLDWATER: I'm on the optimistic side now. A month ago I was a little more
pessimistic, but I think that our covert action is beginning to take hold. We're
beginning to get better reports, not just from Nicaragua, but from observers down
there for that purpose.
DREW: Isn't it maybe time to drop the term covert? And we're all talking about it.
We see it on t.elevision. Isn't it a little silly to keep that pretense up?
GOLDWATER: Yes, I'll agree with you. But here we have a problem.
HERMAN: Are you saying the president was silly when he said in the news conference
that they could do covert activity, but they couldn't do overt because it was against
the law? GOLDWATER: Well, I'm the one that said that. Just off hand, you violate
nine different laws if you go overt. In fact, I think we're violating some right now.
But to go overt, and there are ways to get around it, you can give aircraft, tanks,
you can sell them to this country and swap around, but eventually it means war if
you're going to maintain an overt position of helping this particular government in
this particular country. And that's something we have to make up our minds before we
finally pass an overt resolution. Even though I have to admit with television
covering everything that's going on down there and newspapers covering everything
that's going on, under the dictionary definition of overt and covert, it's overt
action.
DREW: I'd like to ask you one more question. You said you're not entirely facetious
when you suggest that Cuba should be a 51st state. Do you think we should invade
Cuba? GOLDWATER: I think we should have.
DREW: What about now? GOLDWATER: I'm not opposed to it. If they continue to try to
take over the entire Caribbean, try to Cubanize our friends in South America, I think
if we want to have peace, long peace, you have to face up to these things. Now we
don't like them. I don't like them. Anybody who's been to war can see that's par for
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the course no more. But I want to prevent wars, and I think we're heading for trouble
as long as Cuba can be a warehouse for Soviet arms and Soviet men and equipment.
HERMAN: Let me broaden your scope a little bit, Sen. Goldwater. Prevent wars theory
has always been we have to have a good defense posture. Now we're engaged in a
seemingly endless brouhaha over the defense budget. Is there enough money in it? Is
there enough money in it as cut? What is your view of the defense budget? GOLDWATER:
Well, if you want to look at it in an arithmatic way....
HERMAN: Well, I hope not to get boggled down in details, but.... GOLDWATER: No, I
don't want to get boggled down in details, but I'll jsut tell you, we don't have
enough money. If we spent it all on. arms to match the Russians.... Let's forget
that. We can strengthen ourselves more than we're strengthening ourselves, to present
a constant trouble to any enemy that might want to take us on. Just one little fact.
We haven't bought enough aircraft in I forget how many years just to meet normal
attrition. Those are airplanes that get wrecked, catch on fire and so forth. I think
the budget that we're working on now, even with the cuts that have been made, if they
don't go too far, we can live with, and we can build a much better defense than we've
had. The big thing in our defense going for us now is the change in personnel. We
have a very, very fine collection of men and women making up our armed forces, and as
long as you have people working under command, equipment is not the major factor.
JONES: Senator, there are reports today that the Air Force is thinking about
eliminating some procurement for certain programs and research for others, including
the possibility of discontnuing the AWACS, the surveillance plan. Do you think there
are major systems that can be eliminated? GOLDWATER: Yes, I think we can go through
the military budget and make reductions. I'll give you a quick example. I objected to
the price of the AH-64 helicopter last year, and they finally knocked $2.4 million off
the price of the helicopter. That's about an $800 million saving. Now we can do
that. AWACS, we have enough AWACS, in my opinion, to do the work that we have to do.
We have the RS-71. I see they want to do away with the new Lockheed replacement for
the U-2. That's all right. We have a much better observation aircraft in the SR-71
that you can't hit. I think this is a very, very wise move on the part of the
Pentagon. I think it's time. This is one of the reasons that I had asked again the
president to come up with a national strategy. We don't have one. I want to have a
national strategy so that we cna plan how many of these things do we need?
JONES: What's going on then? Is the White House not organized on this? Several
times you've said this during the broadcast. GOLDWATER: Well, it comes down really
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff telling the president what I've just recited, because
every chief you talk to will say, 'We need a national strategy.' Now from a national
strategy you get into tactics. Now what are we going to do with tactics you've just
been talking about on Central America? The tactic of Cuba?
JONES: Well, who isn't performing here? Is it the joint chiefs? Is it the White
House? GOLDWATER: The White House. has to determine, has to come up with a strategic
statement. Now the president may not like that, but somebody has to put it together so
we can have a national strategy just as the Soviets have a national strategy. We have
a general strategy in NATO, but we are not equipped now, to get back to the original
question of cutting equipment, to be able to say, 'Well, we don't need this many tanks
because,' or 'We don't need this many plans because.' It's very difficult for those
of us on the Armed Services Committee. Well, I've spent most of my life in and out of
the military. It's difficult for me to argue, and especially when you realize today
that the great makeup of the Congress has never had a uniform on.
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JONES: Have you communicated this to the president? GOLDWATER: Yes, I wrote a
letter to him. I thought it was a beautiful letter, but nobody else did. I told him
we were in a welfare state, which we are, and we better start palnning how to conduct
ourselves, and we needed a national strategy.
DREW: Senator, I'd like to clarify one thing. You said earlier about the size of the
military budget that even with the cuts that have been made you think it can be lied
with. Does that mean that you think it is the level that the Senate agreed on this
week, in other words a 6% real growth increase, as opposed to the 10% increase that
the president requested, is enough? GOLDWATER: I would have preferred more money.
But I can say as a memeber of the committe that we can find places to cut it that will
not raise havoc. We have to.... You know what we have to put up with as well as I do.
We have a parochial situation in this country. Last year in my subcommittee on
tactical warfare, I said, 'We don't need anymore A-10s. We have 740 of them.' We've
never sold one to a foreign.... Well, who tries to put it back in? The senators and
congressmen in the districts of the state where it's built. And I finally had to say,
'Who are we fighiting, who are we fighting for? The United States or Long Island or
Arizona or Timbuktu. Now when we all get together and decide that we will eliminate
this weapon system, like John Tower has said, 'I want each senator to write me a
letter and tell me what facility they have in their state they don't want.' He didn't
get a damn letter.
HERMAN: Senator, I don't treavel around as much as you, but the little traveling I do
people say to me, 'What are those people on the Hill doing with this budget? They
vote this plan up in the Senate. They vote that plan down. It goes back to
committee.' What are you people doing, and does it make any sense? GOLDWATER: I
can't answer that.-question that it doesn't make any sense, and you may ask why didn't
I vote. I was the only guy that didn't vote the other night. I have to admit I
goofed. I was there from 7:00 in the monring until about midnight and I said to
Howard Baker, 'This is the first time I've felt a little bit tired after my
operation.' I said, 'Do you need me?' He said, 'No, go home.' So I went home, and I
found out the next morning I was the only jasper that wasn't there. Had I been there
it would have lost, but you have to keep in mind that this is only a resolution. The
president has no veto power over it. I think it's a bad way to raise money. It's a
bad way to legislate, and I have a bill that I'm going to introduce, I hope next week,
that will do away with the budget process.
JONES: Senator, what do you think of these, this so-called Gang of Five, moderate
Republicans in the Senate who are held fast to the argument and did win on the budget
resolution, that the deficits are the biggest problem, and they want taxes raised.
GOLDWATER: Well, that's their opinion, and while I have probably worried more about
deficits than anyone there because I'm one of the few businessmen in the place, the
American people want their taxes cut, and frankly the average Amercian couldn't care
less about deficits. But if we're going to get this economy going, it's not going to
be cutting that deficit. It's going to be releasing more money that people earn to
spend to build new factories, buy new equipment and create new jobs. Then we can
worry about the deficit. In fact, I think a 20% increase in employment would take the
deficit away.
JONES: What's going to happen to those Republicans in 1984 who are quoted for large
tax increases? GOLDWATER: I don't think any of them are running. If they are,
they're going to have trouble.
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DREW: Speaking of running and raising money, are you concerned with the amount of
time that members of Congress have to spend raising money for their compaigns?
GOLDWATER: It's absolutely ridiculous. I've been racking my brain to figure out ways
that we might cut this money need down. But every time I get going on it, the
constitution sticks its head up. I have some ideas that we're working on, my legal
staff and I. Not only are they getting too much money to run on, but we have
companies now in the very profitable business of raising money, and they keep more
money than they give to the candidate. I want to stop that kind of foolishness.
JONES: Senator, do you have any doubts about whether or not Ronald Reagan will seek
reelection, and should he? GOLDWATER: I kept saying for years that I didn't think he
would, but now I have to say I think he's going to run. And I'll follow that up by
saying that he'll beat any Democrat on the board.
HERMAN: What makes you think all of the sudden, what makes you change your mind and
think he's going to run? GOLDWATER: I had a conversation the other day with a
gentleman from Nevada.
JONES: Mr. Laxalt? GOLDWATER: Something like that.
JONES: Head of the Republican Party? GOLDWATER: Probably the sheepherder.
JONES: And what did he say? GOLDWATER: I think that the president's going to run,
but I don't know when he'll say anything about it, and if I were the president, I'd
keep my mouth shut.
JONES: Did Mr. Laxalt tell you that he was going to run? GOLDWATER: He didn't say so
in so many words, but when you get certain questions, you know, and a duck flies by,
you've got to think, goddamn, there goes a duck.
HERMAN: Senator, with a minute left, what do you think at this point are going to be
the major issues at that campaign that will enable Mr. Reagan, as you say, to win very
easily to beat any Democrat? I'll soften that a litte. GOLDWATER: I think the major
issue, frankly, is that the people like the president's honesty. They may disagree
with the things that he does, some of the things that he says, but you cannot point
your finger at this man and say that he's not basically honest. And I've found that
the American people respect that more than anything else. I remember old Harry
Truman. I didn't agree with Harry Truman, but by God you knew where he was when you
woke up in the morning. And we haven't had many presidents like that since
Eisenhower.
HERMAN: We had one candidate like that named Goldwater. GOLDWATER: Well, I got the
hell beat out of me. If I had it to do again, I'd do it the same.
HERMAN: I'm sure. Thank you very much, Sen. Goldwater, for being our guest on Face
the Nation.
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MEDIASCAN TRANSCRIPT
NBC MEET THE PRESS
22 May 1983
Sunday
KALB: I am Marvin Kalb, inviting you to Meet the Press with two military men who have
two different views on the need for an MX missile, Gen. Brent Scowcroft and Adm.
Stansfield Turner. Meet the Press, an unrehearsed press conference, is a public
affairs presentation of NBC News. Our guests on Meet the Press both come from the
military, but they do not agree on the controversial MX missile, whether the United
States really needs one. Congress is expected to vote yes or no, probably with
qualifications, within the next several days. Air Force Gen. Brent Scowcroft now
retired, headed a presidential commission which recently recommended deploying 100 MX
missiles. He was President Ford's National Security Adviser. Adm. Stansfield Turner,
also retired, headed the Central Intelligence Agency in the Carter administration. He
opposes the MX deployment, feels the U.S. ought to rely on Cruise missiles. Our
reporters today are Mary Lord of Newsweek, Bruce Neland of Time, and to open the
questioning, Bill Monroe of NBC News.
MONROE: Gen. Scowcroft, your commission has recommended we first build 100 new MX
missiles with 10 warheads each, then a few years later move toward a different
strategy based on a small so-called Midgetman missile with only one warhead. If small
missiles are better for the long run, why put $17 billion now into new big missiles?
SCOWCROFT: Mr. Monroe, the recommendations of the President's Commission on Strategic
Forces had three parts. You've discussed two of them. The third part is to integrate
arms control with our strategic weapons programs and to move both in the direction of
greater stability. We think that the three parts of that program are each essential
to the success of the.program, and we feel that, in order to have a small missile
which has the?environment most compatible with it, that the MX, for a number of
reasons, is an essential part of that program.
MONROE: Why is the MX essential? If we're going in the long run toward a long-range
strategy of small missiles, why build the MX now at at cost of $17 billion? What does
it do? SCOCROFT: It does several things. Prominent among those are: first, it
demonstrates U.S. national will and cohesion. We have now had four presidents who
have said that the MX is important, if not essential, to our national security. To
step back from that now, as a country, would send signals which could undermine one of
the two essential aspects of deterence, that is, national will. Whatever, you think
about the overall strategic balance in addition, there is an assymetry in ICBM forces.
That is, the Soviet Union, because of their large numbers of ICBMs, the large warheads
and their accuracy, are able to put our strategic forces at risk in a way that we
cannot in any way reciprocate. We believe that's an element of instability.
MONROE: In view of the gap, admiral, that Gen. Scowcroft has mentioned -- the Soviets
have much more striking power in their land-based missiles, and that threatens our
land-based missiles -- why wouldn't it help for us to even that gap by building our
own, big, new modern missiles. TURNER: I don't think there is a real gap. The
general made a slight error in his statement as he talked about our strategic forces
are vulnerable. Only our ICBM, our land-based strategic missiles, are vulnerable. We
have been much more farsighted than the Soviets. We've only put 25%, roughly, of our
total strategic forces in land-based missiles. The Soviets have put 75%. Yes. All
of our 25% of land-based missiles is vulnerable today. But we can make an equal
amount of the Soviet missiles vulnerable today too. If the president decided to pull
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the trigger this afternoon, 25% of the Soviet's total force would be dead. So we
don't have a real gap here.
NELAND: Gen. Scowcroft, even leaving aside the question of the vulnerability of the
missile, are 100 MX missiles really sufficient to make any difference? Do they really
threaten the Soviets in any significant way that would make them behave differently?
SCOWCROFT: Well, that's one of the last elements of the need for the MX I was going
to address, was its use in bringing the Soviets to negotiation in a way which would
permit us and hopefully facilitate them, encourage them to move in the direction of a
small, single warhead missile. Now, there is nothing magic about the number 100. We
wanted a number that was less than what I would call a full first-strike capability
against the Soviet Union, but a number great enough that its deployment would be seen
as a gesture of confidence, not of weakness.
NELAND: Is it essentially a political, or a negotiating ploy, then? I'm resisting
the term bargaining chip. SCOWCROFT: I think it is not a bargaining chip or
negotiating ploy as such. I don't think we ever should deploy weapons which we do not
feel we need simply in order to trade them away. Nevertheless, I think for any-of our
weapon systems, if we can achieve a degree of security by getting rid of them on
agreement with the Soviet Union, as by keeping them, then certainly any one of them
ought to be available for negotiation.
LORD: Adm. Turner, the general has just made a good point about the need for national
unity, and the need to bring the Soviet Union around to looking at single warheads.
How do you then say that the MX is not necessary? TURNER: I think it's inconsistent,
Miss Lord, to say we want to drive the Soviets to a single warhead small missile and
we go out and build a large multi-warhead missile. I don't know how that connects. I
just think that there are such risks in building the MX that it may go the opposite
direction. Mr. Ustinov, the. defense minister in the Soviet Union, said just the other
day, 'If the White House challenges us by beginning deployment of the MX missile, then
the Soviet Union will respond to this by developing a new missile of the same class.'
We run the risk of starting a race in these big missiles rather than driving the
Soviets to drop these big ones and go to small ones.
*NELAND: General, let me interrupt here. Isn't it true that the Russians are
already.... LORD: Yeah. NELAND: ...testing at least one or possibly even two new
missiles? SCOWCROFT: That's absolutely correct, and I think that we will almost
force them to deploy and build those missiles if we go to this direction.
LORD: But isn't there a perverse incentive there? I mean, if we built up a little
bit, couldn't we then both build down, rather than having a mismatch which people say
is so destabilizing? TURNER: I just doubt that you're going to get much in trade
from the Soviet Union, for a paper missile which we have not deployed when they've got
these big missiles they've already deployed. It's not a very good bargaining chip.
LORD: General, how would you respond to that? SCOWCROFT: I would respond that it is
essential. We're not talking about a paper missile. We're talking about a
determination to deploy it. One does not have to have a malevolent view of the Soviet
Union to feel that, in view of the favorable posture they have in ICBM forces, that
they're unlikely to give that up without some incentive to do so.
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MONROE: I'd like to ask each of you, starting out with Gen. Scowcroft, to what
extent is the MX a first-strike missile? Does it give us the capacity to wipe out
most or all of the Soviet's land-based missiles, and is that a good idea for us to
have a capacity that is first-strike or something close to first-strike? SCOWCROFT:
The United States procures its strategic forces for the purpose of deterrence. The
MX, in large numbers, could be a first-strike weapon. We feel that a hundred clearly
is not a first-strike weapon. And, under most kinds of scenarios of the initiation of
nuclear war, very unlikely under any scenario that those forces would be available and
not in a first-strike call.
MONROE: Admiral? TURNER: Well, the problem is that because we have not been able to
find any way to deploy the MX that won't leave it vulnerable, you can only use it in
one of two forms. You can use it as a first-strike weapon. You can initiate the war.
I don't think the United States ever will. Or you can use it as what we call a
counter-punch weapon, that is you can try to launch it in that 30 minute interval
while the Soviet weapons are en route to you if they initiate the war. That's very
dangerous. So therefore, whether we actually build a first-strike capability with a
hundred MXs or not, the Soviet Union is going to interpret it as our wanting a
capability for a first-strike. That's. going to put their finger on the trigger so
they can counter punch. And if we build the MX, we're going to be on a hair-trigger
response, also, because it's vulnerable. And we'll be worried that it will be knocked
out. I think it's very dangerous for both superpowers to be sitting there with their
finger on the trigger, so to speak.
MONROE: You seem to be agreeing with the General that 100 MXs do not constitute a
first-strike capacity?. TURNER: Added to our existing force, they begin to come close
to it, but not a real first-strike capability in themselves.
MONROE: General? SCOWCROFT: I would just like to add that at the present time and
for some time in the future, our bomber forces and our ICBM forces contribute what I
would call synergistic survivability to each other in that the Soviets have to attack
those forces with different forces of their own, and therefore, for some time in the
future cannot attack them simultaneously, so that they add, each to the other, a
substantial measure of protection.
MONROE: General, when you talked about a hundred, as a number, that sounds to me like
a compromise figure. Why not 75 or a hundred and fifty? And if it's a compromise, it
means that you had politics in mind when you came up with the number of a hundred?
Isn't that right? SCOWCROFT: No. As I said, there's nothing particularly magic
about a hundred. We did not want to recommend a sufficient number that would or could
constitute a full first-strike capability nor a number low enough that it would
demonstrate weakness rather than strength. A hundred happens to be the number that
the administration proposed in its last recommendation for deployment of the MX. It's
down from 200 proposed by the Carter administration.
MONROE: Yeah, but maybe the Russians think of 100 as the destabilizing number, and
you're applying a kind of American logic to the Kremlin. Will it work? SCOWCROFT:
I think it will. I think the Soviets can calculate what can be done with those
warheads as well as we can.
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NELAND: Adm. Turner, we're sometimes warned by our European allies that if we don't
deploy MX, they will not permit the deployment of Pershings and Cruises on their
territory. Is this a significant calculation for us to make? TURNER: I think you
have to consider it. But I would suggest that it was the Europeans who first asked
for Pershings and Cruise missiles on their territory. If today, because of what we do
with our strategic force, they decide they don't want to be defended by Pershings and
Cruise missiles, we would be very foolish to deploy them. It's the European decision,
not dependent upon what we do here. If they want to defend themselves, and they think
that's the way to do it, we've offered to help. We certainly don't want to offer that
help if they don't want it. It's their Europe, not ours.
NELAND: You wouldn't see that as a double loss for the U.S.,then? No MXs here, and
no Cruisers and Pershings there? TURNER: No, I wouldn't see that as a double loss at
all. The Pershings have one great value though. They are the big bargaining chip for
the Soviet Union. They are one of the things the Soviets really fear. And I think
that's where we should concentrate on giving the president leverage, not by giving him
an MX for bargaining purposes.
KALB: Miss Lord? LORD: All this wrangling, commission forming, problem solving
seems to deal with the vulnerability of our land-based forces. What is wrong, as some
experts have said, with going to a totally undersea or bomber force, de-emphasizing
land base to the point of extinction, and then going from there? SCOCROFT: The
multiplicity of our forces, the so-called triad of bombers, submarine forces and
ICBMs, exists for several reasons. The fundamental need for different kinds of forces
is in the event of a breakthrough against any one of them, we would not simply be
paralyzed. I think we're extremely fortunate at the present time, for example, to
have a submarine fleet that is essentially invulnerable to Soviet attack. If it were
not so, our present problems with the MX would be much more serious. TURNER: I agree
very much with the general that we must keep a mix of forces. But we have our
submarines, and I would not increase the reliance on those because you have to worry
about their future. We have our bombers, but we're now coming into a new era of the
Cruise missile. We're putting Cruise missiles on bombers and in submarines and on
land-launchers in Europe. We can put it on ships. We can put it in all kinds of
other modes. And therefore we can maintain a varied base, a very largely varied base
from which to keep our strategic forces.
LORD: But if the land-based systems are vulnerable, and your sea systems get
vulnerable, I mean, how is that a hedge against anything? I mean you've got two
vulnerables, and that's worse, isn't it? SCOWCROFT: What we've done, Miss Lord, is
to divide the ICBM problem into two parts--the near term part, deploying the MX
missile for the reasons which I earlier described, and over the longer run, turning to
a small single warhead missile, probably in a mobile configuration which will provide
the kind of survivability for the land-based systems over the longer term, we feel is
essential.
MONROE: Admiral, some Congressman now favor developing and flight-testing the MX on a
sort of skeptical basis. They want to reserve judgment on whether to go ahead and
build it, depending on how they see the president going in the direction of arms
control and that sort of thing. What do you think about this sort of two-phase
congressional approach--skeptical, saying okay, let's develop it and flight test it,
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but let's hold on building it? TURNER: I think it's the worst of both worlds, in
many ways. As. Marvin said in his opening remarks, the Congress is likely to pass the
MX with conditions. Well, that just means we haven't shown any resolve like the
general wants us to show. We don't come down and say yes, we're going this way. And
yet, we leave that threat dangling over everybody that we're heading for a first
strike. We look irresponsible, I believe. I think it's time for the Congress to say
to the president, we want a deterrent strategy, not a war fighting strategy. The MX
only fits into a war fighting strategy. Let's get going on building up our Cruise
missiles, our bombers, and our submarines in a purely deterrent form.
MONROE: General, what do you think about congressional approval on an iffy basis?
They might not want to really build it later. SCOWCROFT: I think that the program
deserves to go forward on its merits. I think that the Congress has expressed some
skepticism about the administration's sincerity in supporting all parts of the
commission's recommendations. I think some prudent milestones which would enable us
to review our progress in arms control, progress in development of the small missile,
I think could be quite acceptable.
MONROE: You'd rather, you'd like to see the Congress go ahead, presumably,
unconditionally, but you'd rather see them go ahead conditionally than not at all?
SCOWCROFT: I think some kind of milestone development which would enable to review
the program and its effectiveness, both in arms control and development of the small
missile would be quite (inaudible)....
MONROE: Why couldn't the Congress...? KALB: Mr. Neland? Mr. Neland, please?
NELAND: Gen. Scowcroft, your commission's report put heavy emphasis on three aspects,
and the third would be on arms control. In theory, though, would it be possible for
the United States to build a secure and invulnerable force, even without an arms
control agreement with the Soviet Union. SCOWCROFT: I think it might, in theory. I
think without some kind of an arms control regime, a small missile would become a very
much more difficult operation. With unconstrained numbers, with the Soviets, for
examplc, being able to deploy a SS-18 follow on, for example, with 10 warheads for
every small one we deploy, you get into numbers that drive the costs up very, very
substantially. I wouldn't say it would be impossible, but we think that an arms
control regime is important to provide the best environment for deployment of the
small missile.
KALB: Admiral, did you want to comment? TURNER: With modern technology, there are
only three ways you can achieve relative invulnerability. You can try to conceal your
force, like the submarines. You can put out lots of them so they're hard to hit all
at once, like Cruise missiles. Or you can make the mobile, like ships and submarines
and bombers. Unfortunately, the'MX just doesn't fit any of these. It's an obsolete
dinosaur, in effect, that deserves to be replaced by new technology, new generations
of weapons.
NELAND: Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown is noted for saying, 'We build.
Then the Russians build. We don't build. Then the Russians build.' So does it really
make any difference how we go about our programs? Does it make any difference whether
we build the MX, in that sense? The Russians will still build. TURNER: The
Russians are going to build what they think is necessary for them. We build what....
We should build what we think is necessary for us. And we have no need for this
missile because we're not going to start a war, and we don't want to have a
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counter-punch launch under a 30-minutes notice capability either. That's very
dangerous.
LORD: General, I'm curious. In the move to de-MERV or to reduce the numbers of
warheads, did the commission ever look at the possibility of upgrading Minute Man III
so that we would have the capabilities of taking out hardened, or military facilities
in the Soviet Union? That would accomplish one thing, which is to get rid of the
10-warhead MX and we would already have the silos ready built. SCOWCROFT: Yeah. We
feel that, that that is insufficient in several respects. First of all, it would take
considerably longer, a couple of years anyway, than deploying the MX. You could make,
warhead for warhead, make them virtually as accurate. The numbers are not the same.
And in addition, you end up still with an aging missile with no, what I would call,
flexibility to respond to the Soviets in any way they will. We still, if the Soviets
prove absolutely obdurant, and we need more forces, you cannot do it by that route.
LORD: Uhm. Another thing. The Midgetman missile. It's touted as sort of savior for
the next decade. How practical is it to build, when recent congressional Budget
Office studies show that it would be three times less expensive to just simply build
more Trident submarines and put our forces under sea? SCOCROFT: We believe that it's
very practical, but to develop and not to proceed ought to proceed with deliberation.
If one has to deploy these in the thousands, there's no question that a single warhead
missile, warhead for warhead, is more expensive than a MERV, than a many warhead
missile. And a mobile missile is more expensive than one which simply sits in silos.
But with the development which we think is possible, for the hardened mobile vehicle,
which would enable these to be deployed on some of our larger military reservations
and still not permit the Soviets to destroy them all by barraging the whole area with
just a few weapons is quite practical, at reasonable cost.
KALB: We've got two minutes to go. Mr. Monroe?
MONROE: Starting with Adm. Turner, I'd like to ask each of you, if you were confined
to a question that one congressman says he regards is the essential question.... This
is Mr. Glickman. The question is: will the funding for MX help or hurt our own
ability to reach an ultimate reduction in nuclear weapons arsenals? TURNER: I don't
think it will help at all because we simply are going to be tempting the Soviets into
a race. They are 75% dependent on large land-based missiles, 75% of their total
nuclear force. When we start to challenge that by appearing to want to make it
vulnerable, we're going to get them to build even more of those so that they will stay
relatively invulnerable, I think.
(REMAINING PORTION OF BROADCAST PREEMPTED BY LOCAL PROGRAMMING)
Betty Turner, Transcriber
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RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 656-4068
PROGRAM
ABC Weekend Report STATION
WJLA-TV
ABC Network
DATE
May 22, 1983 11:30 P.M. CITY
Washington, D.C.
SUBJECT
The Sandinista Regime
TOM JARRIEL: CIA Director William Casey reportedly has
told some congressmen that U.S.-backed Nicaraguan rebels have a
good chance of overthrowing the Sandinista regime before the end
of this year. Casey's prediction appears at odds with the Reagan
Administration's claim that U.S. support for the rebels is aimed
primarily at cutting off the flow of arms to leftist guerrillas
in El Salvador.
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 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200710001-9
RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 656-4068
Good Morning America
May 23, 1983 7:00 AM
William Casey: Nicaragua
STATION W J L A T V
ABC Network
Washington, DC
STEVE BELL: In other news this morning, CIA Director
William Casey is quoted as saying that the Sandinista regime in
Nicaragua may fall by the end of the year.
Several congressmen have told the New York Times that
Casey's view undercuts the White House assertion that American
support for anti-Sandinista rebels is aimed only at ending arms
shipmens to rebels in El Salvador.
Material supplied by Radio TV Reports, Inc. may be used for file and reference purposes only. It may not be reproduced, sold or publicly demonstrated or exhibited
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 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-01070R000200710001-9
RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815
656-4068
PROGRAM
The Today Show
STATION
WRC-TV
NBC Network
DATE
SUBJECT
May 23, 1983
CIA Report
7:00 A.M.
CITY
Washington, D.C.
JOHN PALMER: The CIA reportedly feels the overthrow of
the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua is near. According to the New
York Times, CIA Director William Casey believes U.S.-backed
rebels have a good chance of bringing down the Sandinistas by the
end of the year.
Material supplied by Radio N Reports, Inc. may be used for file and reference purposes only. It may not be reproduced, sold or publicly demonstrated or exhibited.
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 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-01070R000200710001-9
RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 656-4068
FOR
PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
PROGRAM
CBS Morning News STATION
WDVM-TV
DATE
May 23, 1983 7:00 A.M.
CBS Network
Washington, D.C.
SUBJECT
CIA/Sandinist Government
BILL KURTIS: Nicaragua's Sandinist government could
soon be on the way out. According to the New York Times, CIA
Director William Casey, an Administration official, and congres-
sional officials all believe that U.S.-supported rebels have a
good chance now of overthrowing the current regime in Nicaragua
by the end of the year.
Material supplied by Radio N Reports, Inc. may be used for file and reference purposes only. It may not be reproduced, sold or publicly demonstrated or exhibited.
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-01070R000200710001-9