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November 19, 1979
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Approved For Releas f QO /tORK ]GA-RDP88-01315R0004 ARTICLE A.Pf':AREn 19 November 1979 ON PAGEr0YY- lf0 KULECT IONS THE SALT PROCESS N the summer of 1978, when it be- gan to. be clear that the SALT II treaty would be signed with the Soviet Union, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Sen- ate began to prepare for its role in the procedures by which the Senate would take up a resolution of ratification. As a member. of the ' committee, .I jour- neyed to Geneva to talk to the negotia- tors of the draft agreement that was taking shape and began to go over the history of SALT I, more formally known as the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms . and the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, signed in 1972. It did not take long to establish that, whatever else SALT I. might have done, it accomplished little by way of limit- ing strategic offensive arms. For that matter, it wasn't even an agreement about weapons, as ordinarily under- stood. Rather, it was an agreement to limit the number of launchers each party would have for its long-range ballistic missles..A launcher (or silo, in the usage of the military) for a land-based missile is a hole in the ground. You could get hurt by falling .into one, but it is missiles, and, more specifically, the warheads of missiles, . that kill people, and these. were not at "all limited by SALT I. Nor, it appeared, would they be much limited by SALT II. From the time of. the first agreement, the number of American warheads in- creased steadily, and those of the So- viets more than doubled. It appeared they would double again under SALT II. This was hardly reassuring. But more troubling still was the realization that this all came as news to me. I had never given great attention to the sub- ject, but from the time of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water, of 1963, I had had the impression that things were,going.well enough, or at least not badly.. I did not have the excuse most persons might have for being vague about the details. I had served in four successive Ad-- ministrations, from that of Kennedy WAS to wait almost a year, until I the morning of Wednesday, July 11, 1979, when Dr. William J. Perry, Under-Secretary of Defense for Re- search and Engineering, testified on SALT-Ii before the Committee on For-. eign Relations. Perry, a mathematician, speaks plainly and, as with many in his rarefied profession, is a man of un- assuming appearance and manner. All the more was the contrast with the on. I had known virtually- all of the 11 principal arms negotiators and,. from university life, a good number of the strategic-arms theorists. 1 . had . sat at. the Cabinet table of two Presidents listening to reports on progress. Al- ways they were reports on progress. Or such was the impression I took away. I now began questioning my own judgment, then that of others- especially as the Carter Administration began to proclaim the virtues of SALT Ii in terms I could recognize as essen- tially the same as. those in which the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford Administrations had presented their achievements in arms control.- I began to wonder whether anyone from the most recent Administration, or more generally from the world of arms con- trol, would ever describe the agree- ments in terms that comported with what now appeared to me as a differ- et, even new reality. Caucus Room of the Old Senate Office Building, in which the hearings. were 'held.. The Caucus Room is. a place -of unashamed exhi- bition.-and splendor dating from 1906, when Theodore Roosevelt, having built the West Wing of the White House, commenced to chal- lenge the Congress from his new office, and the Senate decided to get itself an of- fice building of its own. Un-_ til that period, Presidents had worked in their living rooms, as it were,. and?sena tors at their desks in the Senate Chamber. Neither fa- cility had been much ex- panded from the time of Jef- ferson, although during the eighteen-forties a kind . of box was- fitted onto the tops of Senate desks, adding a little storage space. (Daniel Webster declined the extrav- agance, so that to this day his desk is single-storied.) If the interior of the Capitol can be said to be Palladian. and given to republican' vir- - -010 0011 Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350019-3 toes in design, the Caucus Room, only slightly smaller than thaAftttav?ifliFe her itself, is Roman Imperial, and make no mistake. It struck me as a not inappropriate setting for 1}r. Per- r_v's subject, SAL Ii. The Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, had just finished his prepared statement in favor of the arms-limita- tio'n treaty. Curiously, the charts and displays he had brought along to illus- trate his points, in the manner of mil- itary briefings, were exclusively con- cerned with recent and prospective improvements in and additions to the nuclear arms of both countries. The capabilities of both the United States and the Soviet Union to destroy so- called hard targets, such as missile silos, were represented as about equal, with the Soviets slightly ahead as of now and maintaining a slight lead through 1990-when both capabilities would have about trebled. - Perry's testimony began. He had no prepared statement, it being his role to provide answers to technical questions the Secretary's testimony might have raised. But he said a few words any- way, and in doing so made perhaps the best case yet presented for SALT 11, while describing with a technician's candor its shortcomings. Ile said: SALT 1's success was in getting the process started. There was a substantial arms control success in the [Anti-Bal- listic Missile] Treaty, but essentially, there was no success in reducing the number of offensive weapons. The best evidence of that is, just look to see-what happened to the number of warheads in- dicated on that chart since SALT I. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have added about 3,000 warheads since 1972. The Vladivostok agreement [of 1974] was one more important advance in this process. It did specify upper bounds. It included bombers, not just missiles in the forces, but it still permitted sub- stantial increases in warheads as of that time. President Carter tried to break that upper spiral with his March, 1977, pro- posal for SALT, and as you well know, that was rejected by the Soviet Union. In fact, it is my belief that any SALT proposal in this time frame that does not preserve the Soviets' right to modernize their ICB\I [Intercontinental Ballistic Missile] force would be rejected. My judgment is, they have made a very sub- stantial commitment to that. The ICBM is really the only strong component of their strategic forces, and they seem to he resolutely opposed to making any sub- stantial reduction in it. Therefore, the SA 1.1' ii treaty which, we have arrived at, while it is a major, improvement over the Vlgsllv,~ i~k r r merit... still allows si - i ; spiral of the number of nuclear weapons. I anticipate that the Soviet Union will continue to pursue the modernization of day, by far the greatest portion of r=ur ReIe Srelf4l' /0-11f*21P 614 P$ OuSi15RQ 4i Qt3~AO8s s from what areieures w itch r Brown showed you. " and that we will respond to that, so that both sides then will continue tu- have significant increases in nuclear warheads. I That is the bad news, The good news that comes with that is that SALT t1 also establishes a process and goals. The most significant goal is the one to achieve a real reduction in nuclear weapons-not! in delivery vehicles.but in actual weapons. t My question then, as a defense planner, is bow do Ave structure our strategic programs in the years ahead to he com- patible with that goal-ant only to he compatible with it but actually-to facili- tate the achievcmerit 01 that goal of get- ting a reduction,- a real reduction, in nu- clear capons in the future. The master term here' is "process." Clearly,-neither the first nor the second ~ agreement did much to limit arms. Weapons and weapons systems on both sides continue to accumulate. But the agreements 'did establish a forum in which the two nations, discussed these matters, and entered into a degree of cooperation concerning them. This was the case, I had undcrstotxl for sonic time, in the matter of inonitorin`-the various means by which each nation keeps track of the activities of the other in order to verify that the \L?r agreements are being kept. \Vheth-' er our abilities here are sufficient ryas the question the Intelligence Commit- tee faced when it bean formal hear- ings on the issue of verification soon af- ter SALT 11 was signed by Presidents Carter and Brezhnev in Vienna, on June 18th. LONE of the standing or select. 1 committees, the Select Commit- tee on Intelligence normally does its -work in closed sessions, which meet in the Capitol dome in a small Bearing room that is suspended, you might say, from the cupola. It was built up there for the use of the joint Committee oil Atomic Energy, the first committee ofd the Congress that routinely did itsi work in camera. Of the materials the Intelligence Committee deals with, none arc more sensitive, because they really are secrets, than these concern- ing information about Soviet strategic nuclear forces, and, more especially, concerning the means by which that information is obtained. A minuscule fraction of the information conics from agents of one or another sort-ttt`- bllxn', in the contraction favored by the intelligence community. Early- in the postwar period, it a .vas judged that the Soviet Union was much ton . , n Relfs id 2Q05?('f1Y14': LIB E3P [OI1.43(15F29QO400;3BWI' Vkae House leaked ton agents. Machines were put to work, the New York Times that the Unit with ever-increasing sop}iiytic:ttiun; tu- ed States had a similar station in Nor-! known as technical collection sys- tems." Basically, there are three such; systems. First, a number cE satellites; continuously circle the earth taking photographs of the Soviet Union, as can how be done with extraordinarily high' resolution. (The technician-, speak of picking out "the golf bail on the green.") Second, the United States can monitor the radio signals, known as "telemetry," which the Soviet mis- siles send back in flight. Third, Ameri- can ships watch incoming missiles in the Pacific firing zones, establishing distances travelled, the pattern in which multiple warheads land (known as the "footprint"), and otht-r such in- formation. The Russians have com- parable systems. Either side can effec- tively count the number of land-based missiles set to silos and ready to be! launched on the other side. The num- bers of submarines and launchers' are readily enough established, as are the numbers of intercontinental bomb- ers. Each side, naturally, hopes that the. other side will not know when some new advance has been made in detec- tion systems, and on this score thereI was some difficulty to be resolved as the Senate prepared to consider v_ri-; fication under the SALT II a,,recrocrt:. In recent years, Soviet intelligence hi the United States had scored a number; of successes that alerted the Russians to the development of new-American in- telligence technology. In 1975, So-'? viet agents had obtained in-ormation 1 about a major satellite system known As Rhyolite. In 1978, it was learned: that agents had also obtained the oper-1 sting manual for the most advanced oft our satellites now in operation, they KH-I1. In both instances, the espio- nage had seemingly been simple and. inexpensive; in one case, th.: mater-,- als were acquired, for quit: modest; amounts of money, from a youthful: employee of the TRW' co:?poration,l and in the other from an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency itself.! This suggested that the Soviet; have no, great difficulty learning what we are capable of spotting, and can take appro i priate evasive action. In add.=tion, the! loss to the United States of listening, posts in Iran which monitored activity`! at a missile range near the Aral Sea, in south-central Soviet Asia, involved a= considerable loss of information not eas-: fly obtained otherwise Then on Ju e; way. The leak was intenr~tional to reas- sure those favorable to t14~RW.4 ; tF-R the same time it jeopardized the Nor- wegian "asset," to use another term of the intelligence community. Thus, the question arose as to whether the United States would be able to be certain that the Russians were abiding by the terms of an arms-limitation treaty that would extend through 1985. .The record of SALT I was both reassuring and cau- tionary. There was no conclusive proof that the Soviets had committed any nma- jor violations of SALT I strictly con- strued. By and large, what they agreed not to do they did not do. But where we said we hoped they would not do something they paid not the least at- tention. This, as it turned, out, was no small matter. One of the principal negotiat- ing objectives on the American side in SALT I was to insure that neither side built any more "heavy" missiles. This is a term for missiles big enough to carry a huge "payload," which can deliver a large number of nuclear warheads'- ca-pable of reaching and destroying mis- siles on the other side. They are; po tential "counterforce" weapons', be- cause they can be used` effectively against other forces. (Missiles aimed against cities are called "countervalue" weapons.) As of 1972, the Russians had three. hundred and eight ,heavy SS-9 missiles, while the United States had 'no modern heavy missiles. In SALT I, it was agreed to freeze both sides, meaning that the Soviets would and we would not have modern heavy missiles. Although this appeared to be an imbalance, American strategic doc- trine at that time did not call for coun- terforce weapons, and-we were well enough content. It was understood that the Soviets would replace their SS-9 missiles with a new model, or "genera- tion"-the SS-18. However, the So- viets were then also planning to replace a medium-sized missile, the SS-11, with another new model, the SS-19, which was so much bigger and more accurate as to become, for practical purposes, a new heavy. As the Intelligence Com- mittee stated on October 5, 1979, in the public portion of its report to the Senate on the capabilities of the United States to monitor SALT II: The 'Soviets' unanticipated ability to emplace the much larger SS-19 in a slightly enlarged SS-11 silo circumvented the safeguards the United States thought it had obtained in SALT I against the substitution of heavy for light ICBMs. Rel~ec r i 469W L/ X bA-ft'P- 'f 5RO1001400990(~ 19,3id the B-I bomber. mated, in order to compensate or the In a press conference on June 22,. Soviets' "geographical disadvantage." 1972, Nixon stated that Laird was; (To reach the open Atlantic Ocean, correct in this judgment: ie n So st f i t ri b a ce v nes mu or ns t su ma , pass through the relatively narrow gaps: between Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom; our submarines; reach the open ocean at once.) But the range of the SS-N-8, the new Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile, turned out to he considerably greater than expected, enabling it to be fired at American targets while the submarine remained in the Barents Sea. There is little reason to think the Soviets cheat- ed by misrepresenting the range of their weapon at that time. They simply remained silent about its full potential. But in any case they got in edge on us. Our monitoring system soon estab- lished that the SS-1 I had been re placed by the SS_ 19, although the new-1 er missiles used the same silos, slightly; enlarged. The State Department was! provided the facts and presented them to the Soviets. It was then that the problem arose. The Soviets agreed, or did not disagree, that they were put- ting an entirely new strategic-weapons system in place but asserted that noth- ing in the SALT I agreement prevented their doing this. Nothing did. Mr. Brezhnev made it absolutely clear to nie that in those areas that were not, controlled by our- offensive agreement; that they were going ahead .vith-their I programs. For us not to would seriously jeopardize the security of the United States and jeopardize the cause of world': peace. I SALT 1, he added, "while very impor- tant, is only the first step, and not the biggest step." SALT ii has so far followed precise- ly this pattern. Just as Nixon had done, President Carter, immediately upon returning to the United States from his summit meeting, delivered an address to a joint session of Congress last June in which he hailed the agreement, and in the same address (not waiting two weeks) he announced there would hel more weapons. Indeed,. he asserted that I one of the principal advantages-of the treaty is that it would enable us to go forward with a new missile system--- the MX. This "missile experimental" (one day it will no doubt be named for a Greek god) is to be a mobile land based missile, our first. It will be more powerful even than the liquid-fuelled .SALT i-the Anti-Ballistic Missile Atlas and Titan giants of the nineteen- Treaty permanently limiting each fifties, the only heavy missiles the side's ABM systems, and the "interim" United States has ever, so far, de- executive agreement that essentially played. On September 7th, President prohibited each side from building ad- Carter announced the "basing mode" ditional ballistic-missile launchers for and other specifics of the MX. Each five years-was signed by President would be placed on a vehicle and Nixon in Moscow on May 26, 1972. moved to a couple of dozen different In an address to a joint session of Con- launching emplacements around a "race gress on the day he returned to the track," in random and presumably tin- United States, the President hailed the, predictable ways, so as not to be "tar- event, saying, "This does not mean geted" by Soviet missiles. Each would that we bring back from Moscow the carry ten warheads, each of these with ,promise of instant peace, but we do a yield equivalent to hundreds of kilo- ' bring the beginning of a process that tons of explosives. (The Hiroshima can lead to lasting peace." However, bomb was twenty kilotons.) The "race ;two weeks later, in a message trans- tracks" will require thousands of miles mitting the agreements, to the Senate,. of road and an area the size of Mas- he stated that while together these were sachusetts. The President said the new an "important first step in checking MX "is not a bargaining chip," to be the arms race.*. . it is now equally es- bartered away in any future arms nego- sential that we carry forward a sound tiations, but will represent a perma- strategic modernization program to nent "unsurpassed" feature of the na- maintain our security and to ensure tion's strategic nuclear deterrent. Two that more permanent and comprehen hundred ' 1X missiles would be deployed sive arms-limitation agreements can be in Nevada and. Utah. This mode, thei reached." President said, met requirements he had At this time, the Secretary of Defense, set for a mobile missile system: surviv- Melvin R. Laird, was maintaining that ability, verifiability, affordability, envi- the Con re st o a ronmenjj,al ~e~ n ~ss and consistency Regr01yiP$set'fe? 15RQlfTaals. On this occa- permitted by SALT I, such as the Tri- sion, Secretary Brown, while predicting Similarly, in SALTAjVreF&- States-conceded to the Soviets the right to build a larger number of missile- that the Soviets would respond "nega- tively" to this United Slaw?8 cetldtfr16 tnent, said that if they a tpaoed in a fruitless race" to try to overwhelm our new system they would strain their eco- nomic resources, and that if they cre- ated a new land-based missile system of their own they would he vulnerable to United States attack, presumably from the new American system. The Fedcration of American Scien- tists promptly declared the MX to he "not just an inflationary multi-hillion- dollar strategic mistake, but an arms- control disaster." The F.A.S., begun in 1946 as the Federation of Atomic Scientists, has since that time been It leading advocate of nuclear-arms con- trol. Its judgment was stern: The :NIX missile announced today con- tains the seeds of its own destruction since, as a counter-force weapon, it will necessarily stimulate the Soviet Union to procure still more warheads which will, in turn, quickly threaten MX quite as much as the Minuteman missiles are presently threatened. In the process, the SALT limits will become untenable. Worse, the Air Force will ask for the right to abrogate the ABM treaty to get anti-ballistic missiles to defend the MX. Thus the AIV%I treaty will also be threatened and the arms race will really be back with a vengeance. The F.A.S. warned that there was "no strategic need to imitate the Rus- sian preference for large land-haled missiles," and added, "The precipitous quality of the decision to move to match the Soviets in land-based ntisssile throw-weight has been induced by SALT." Induced by SALT? If this seems a contradiction in terms---or, at the very least, "counterintuitive," to use a term of systems analysis-then all the more reason to pay heed. There are systems that exhibit such properties, pro- ducing the opposite of their intended outcome, with the consequence that in- tensifying the effort to achieve the de- undesired. As the summer pared into autumn, attacks on SALT it from arms-control advocates increased. Just two days after the F.A.S. issued its statement, Richard J. Barnet, who served in the Arms Control and Ilisarmatment Agency in the Kennedy Administra- tion, described the treaty in an article in the Washington Post as "something to stir the. hearts of generals, defense contractors, and senators from states disarmament nor arms control but all exercise in joint arms management. The Releetm 28 OrIeMI fduc CIA WQilS military in both countries because it rati- fies the huge weapons-acquisition pro- grams both are pushing. In the fall issue of.Foreign Policy, , p y Leslie H. Gelb began an essay on the the number of Russian warheads in- future of arms control with the blunt; creased in the years immediat)y ahead , assertion "Arms control has essen from five thousand to thirte m thou- bally failed." He had a friendly word " sand, rather than to only twelve. If for SALT 11, which is perhaps not sue- an additional thousand mattered, sure- prising, far, as a director of the Bureau i ? an additional seven thous: nd mat- of Politico-Military Affairs from 1977 1 tered more. Well not nece ssariiy- sponsibility in the Department of State for conduct of the negotiations once the Carter Administration came to of- fice. But he concluded that in the main the process had not worked. Only a few weeks. ago, the Times, with what measure of irony one can- called for ratification by de- not say , as n agree to claring, "SALT 11 is a sound agreement tern, but almost no heed was beingI that will confine the nuclear arms race paid to the fact that both they and` to specified channels." It is perhaps not= (now) we are roaring ahead in an, fair-minded to press the images of edi arms race, and using the treaty as an, torialists too far, but it may be notedi argument for doing so. that when a diffused flow is forced into Was this "the bureaucratic mind atI a confined channel the result is accel-! work"? Preoccupied- with predictabil- to 1979, he had had the principal re-I Ionly if the increase provided-the So- e.ration. Whatever became of arms control? A T each stage of the SALT negotia- tions, and with each new agree- ment, the nuclear forces on both sides have increased. Those of the Soviets have increased faster than those of the United States, but this trend was pres- ent prior to SALT. When the talks , were first proposed, in 1967, the So-I the playful maxim that with respect tol viets had nine hundred nuclear war-; heads. They have some five thousand pons are almost invariably 'wrong. today. At the expiration of the SALTI among the intuitive and the severely tone : ... ...,... -eti...-atat ... . ? -- they will have roughly twelve thou- sand. During that period, the number of United States warheads will grow, from the present nine thousand two hundred, to about twelve thousand also. By 1985, the Soviets will have four warheads for every county in the United States, and the United States will have four warheads for every ray- on, a comparable unit of government in the Soviet Union. But the Soviet warheads in total will have more than three times the megatonnage of the American warheads. Although it is pos- sible that these rates of growth would be greater without the treaties, it is also possible that they would be lower. At the hearings concerning our ability to verify the Russians' compli- ? the probabilities and the diffi j ultics of verification, but always in the conte~lt 56~40AORMAg-~oviet numbers. It ,came to me that, with numbers so ;great, verification couldn't much mat- ter. Suppose that by foul duplicity, com- American incompetence ' ounded b viets some special edge. But they would have an edge on megatonnage in either event. Indeed, they already have that edge. There was something unreal about our inquiry. The possibility that the Soviets might increase rheir nu- clear forces at a pace grer.ter than ity, but scarcely at all distressed when what seems' predictable is disaster? In. part; yes. The Arms Control and Dis- armament Agency has been in place for almost two decades now, and may be assumed to he as committed to the SALT process as the Bureau of Rec- lamation is to irrigation, and process can become sufficient unto itself. Jay known as a vicious circle. .There was, in any event, a more portentous paradox to be resolved, and as the Intelligence Committee hearings droned on my attention drifted away; from verification toward the subject of doctrine. The SALT process' has its premise in the doctrine of deterrence. The NIX missile is incompatible with the doctrine of deterrence. It is, as, its advocates in the Administration like to say, a "hard-target-kilcounter- force weapon." But the str:tteb c doc-1 trine of deterrence specifically precludes: either side from obtaining counter-, force weapons. ' How, then, could we be building the missile that undermines the doctrine in - order to sttstain the doctrine? brimming .with military reservatiums and arms plants." His tone verged out the contemptuous:. . Time 100 pave treaty; t'iA'frpW,4lF c the prospectus for a bond issue, is neither ancc Wtt,t Life L,Caay, 11sc,1 UL a'-' " a+o- t paraooxr x es, ana the maFtng ; elehW 2@(fg?gf42r~If;l* l $50P 15ROd94O O b918yond human dimen-1 sionate, some detached, came be ore lion. I had best be out with it directly. the Intelligence Committee to argue, Deterrence was a stunning intellectual int7 object of much con- a w d has c3ntributed Forrester, at M.I.T. achievement. It "solved" the seeming- IV insoluble problem of4JYr &'1f$ the use of nuclear weapons. But it tivas flawed and has been undone by the intuitive but wrong assumption that the' Soviets would see the logic of our solu- tion and do as we did. Especially that they would see the meaninglessness of strategic "superiority." As no other subject, strategic-arms doctrine has been the realm of the in-, tellectual and the academic. This is military doctrine, to be sure, but it has never, in this nation, been formulated by military men. It began with the physicists who created the weapons- men such as J. Robert Oppenheimer, Hans Bethe, and Leo Szilard-who were then joined by other physicists and scientists, and also by social sci- entists. These latter-men such as Al- bert Wohlstetter, Herman Kahn, Fred C. IkIe, Alain C. Enthoven, Henry; Rowen, and Henry Kissinger--came to be known collectively as "defense intel, lectuals." They moved in and out of Washington, but in the main they kept to their campuses and think tanks, or almost always returned to them, where their task, in Kahn's phrase, was "thinking about the unthinkable." In- deed, they have been something of a caste apart, even in academia. Oppen- heimer at Alamogordo as the first atomic bomb exploded-"I am become death, the shatterer of worlds"-gives something of the aura of it. They ate at their own tables in the faculty clubs, and held seminars to which few were invited.-They met with Russians when few others did. And they developed the doctrine of deterrence-a doctrine of weapon use of which the first premise was that the opment. SALT ii seems destined to in- Releh , c T t 12 : RDP 8 J 1 i5 as come u , In t e because the Russians did not keep to our rules. There has been nothing aca- demic about their strategic doctrine, or at least not that we know of. They ap- pear, to have just gone plodding on, building bigger and better weapons, until, by an incremental process, they nuclear force of their own, whereupon het yie issue was joined: How to face ROOr44i6N`~~1w~it- the same powers of 1 are on the point of being able to! wipe out American land-based mis- siles-a counterforce ability. At one level, this achievement has been spec- tacular; at another, less so. For all the sophistication involved, nuclear weapons today are still nothing more than improved versions of the _ V-2 rocket with an atom bomb on top. But the improvements have reached the point where the doctrine that was to prevent their use has evidently been utterly undone. It had been the hope of the early arms-control negotiators that we would teach the Soviets our doctrine and they would abide by it. If there was' something patronizing in the notion of "raising the Russians' learning curve," as the phrase went, there was also much respect in the belief that once we had come to the correct solution of a complex prob- lem they could be brought to see that we were indeed correct. These were serious American academics, who held their Russian counterparts in full re- gard. But the enterprise failed. And why? Because the Russian situation is not our situation, the Russian experi- ence not our experience. If intellect must fail, let it fail nobly; and it is in nobly rejecting the notion of failure that intellect fails most often. Perhaps that is too strong. To state that an enterprise has failed is to sug- gest that it might have succeeded. Yet .from the outset this has somehow seemed improbable. Let it be said for the postwar' strategic nuclear theorists that they were not intimidated by their subject, nor immobilized by it. They did not shrink from action in the face .of an incredible new dimension of war. The influence of the theorists was to be seen early on, when the United States government, in 1946, proposed destruction.. In one respect, this' was an issue as old as the airborne bomb-a develop-' ment recognized as revolutionary long before it became so. George Quester, in his fascinating book "Deterrence! Before Hiroshima," has traced thej "prehistory" of nuclear deterrence. In 1899, the First Hague Conference banned bombing from balloons, but! the Germans went ahead even so to de- velop the first strategic bombing force, using dirigibles, while the British may be said to have prepared for them with a theory. In a study, "Aircraft in War- fare," published in 1916, a British math- ematician, F. W. Lanchester, offered a quite contemporary notion of what we think of as the nuclear deterrent: A reprisal to be effective must be de- livered with promptitude like the riposte of a skilled fencer. A reprisal which is too long delayed possesses no moral weight and has every appearance of an independent act of aggression; it may even plausibly be given as an excuse for subsequent repetition of the original of fence.... The power of reprisal and they knowledge that the means of reprisal. exists will ever be a far greater deterrent than any pseudo-legal document. There was much discussion in the pre-nuclear era of the utility of attack- ing cities, of the ability to defend cities, of preempting the enemy's offensive air forces, and the like. In a letter writ- ten in 1914, Winston Churchill re- vealed himself a firm advocate of what would be known as "counterforce." "The great defence against aerial men- ace," he wrote then, "is to attack the enemy's aircraft as near as.possible to their point of departure." However, perhaps because the opportunity was so new, most thinking concentrated on at tacking cities. In this respect, the outlines of an enduring argument were apparent well before the technology itself was at hand. It was in the Second World War that technology created -oppor- tunities to implement speculation. What to do with a strategic -bombing, force? What to do with emerging mis-I Bile forces? We now know from the United States Strategic Bombing Sur- vey, conducted at the war's end, that the bombing of German cities was less effective in weakening Germany than was thought at the time. We also know that Hitler's V-2 rockets might have had significant impact if, instead, weapon must never be used first, and of which the principal object was that it never be used at all. The nuclear .power was to deploy its forces so that if attacked it could attack back, in-. flicting assured destruction on the party that had attacked in the first place. This capacity could be achieved by a fairly limited number of missiles aimed at the cities. of the potential adversary. Only two developments could under- mine the doctrine. If the adversary de- veloped and deployed a defensive weap- on-an ABM-that could protect his cities, then his destruction. would not be assured and he could become ag- gressive and threatening. Or if the adversary possessed an offensive weap- on that could destroy the missile force ,aimed at his cities---which is to say a i counterforce weapon - he could become aggressive and threat- a e contemp at w c ve reta on, s of being used as terror weapons against lea e 2n8 d1t `ar 1o' R00> 0 1fi i they had been used o aggression y on ent a n s. ) a orts---the sta - ainst the Channel g g p the late nineteen-fifties, however, the ing areas for the Allied offensive into Soviets commenced to have a strategic; to turn its atomic bombs over to the United Nations-a proposal that the Soviet Union blocked. Then, for a pe- riod, the theorists receded from influ- ence as the United States, with the only strategic nuclear force around, adopted, or said it had adopted, a policy of "mas- t d l hi h i i li " the Continent-which is where some of the German generals wanted to send them. Approved F Consideration of these issues in the nuclear era was surely colored by the use of the atomic bomb against Hiro- shima and Nagasaki, in what current theorists would call a "countervalue" mode. So awesome was the scale of destruction from what, by today's standards, was a small bomb that the destruction of whole countries could now he envisioned. Had the distinction between military and civilian targets in flight with an anti-ballistic missile. disappeared? It was this possibility, im-1 \Vhereu)on the issue of defense arose. mobilizing to many, that brought forth E ential to the doctrine of deterrence the doctrine of deterrence. The prob- lem for the United States, as earlier it had been for Great Britain, was to deter aggression. We were the great heavily protected. This was then an in- vulnerable second-strike force. But soon r Rft617 2P0/?jVu1 jZdr QryRDPtll8- doubt. Not only did the Soviets acquire more missiles and more. warheads, which was predictable, but an unpre- dictably rapid rise in accuracy also took place. Missiles once meant to hit within miles of a target now possessed accu-: racks prescribed in hundreds of yards. Hardened silos could be destroyed. Another technology was also being developed-that of destroying missiles termed. If damage limitation }:as pos- sible, how could it he foregone? W lilr 315RQ004003041nding tilt missile sites. The logic was impeccaltle. The Air Force, understandably-, w_is vi.?or- ried about the vulnerability of our Minutemen, and with a str. ightfor- ward military logic proposed to double their number: with more targets, a So- viet first strike would have lent chance of wiping out our second strike. But with twice as many Minutemen the United States could target the Soviets' missiles as well as cities, and so reduce their capacity for a retaliator,- strike. Doctrine has it that, given available was that neither side have any defense. technology, two warheads must be In effect, each side exchanged hostages, aimed at a silo to have a satisfactory whose lives thereafter depended on probability of a "kill." Given the num- their side's good behavior. The Rus- ber of Soviet missiles at the time, one power, with no need or desire to attack" sians were given American cities, to be thousand single-warhead Mi-itltemen others but wishing to avoid being at- destroyed instantly if the United States could not be counted on to "tike out' tacked.. We had not succeeded with launched a nuclear attack on Russia. the Soviet strike force, but two thou Germany and Japan. But the nuclear This was our guarantee to the Russians sand could. (There is the eve --present weapon suggested that the power of, that we would not launch such an at- problem of "fratricide," whereb} the retaliation had become awesome in- tack. The Russians were deemed to first warhead to land des:rot's its deed=enough to inhibit any would-bed have given us their cities. But now mate-but enough.) It was .mr doc- aggressor who had any sense of the' there was talk of hedging. It seemed : trine to deny ourselves any such capac- realities involved. Not only awesome the Russians might be developing a ity, lest the Soviets understandably be- but capable, in Lanchester's words, of means to defend themselves against iii- come alarmed. Better to keep to' the being "delivered with promptitude," in; coming missiles, much as anti-aircraft one thousand, but to defend totem. Not contrast to the long buildup that had defenses were developed in an earlier so, said others, most especiall:,? Robert been required for American forces be-I period. ABM systems are highly tech- S. McNamara, the Secretary of De fore they could he effectively used ini nical in design but simple enough in Tense. If we defend anything, the dc- I the Second World Var. concept. One bullet shoots down anoth- mand will spread to defend every- Albert \Vohlstetter conceived the er bullet. But if the systems worked, if thing. "second strike" as the key concept of our second strike did not assure the John Newhouse begins. "Cold deterrence. This is to say, the nuclear destruction of Soviet cities, then the Dawn," his account of SALT I, which _ riposte. If an enemy strikes, you. will Soviets could contemplate a first strike, originally appeared in this magazine, strike back with devastating conse- and deterrence would fail. In this see- b}' likening the debate to the disputa- quences. In addition, Wohlstetter of- nano, the nation that defends its cities tions 61-the Church Fathers: fered two crucial insights: There is an Call strike first, knowing that its cities So much of the substance and vocabu- essential requirement for the invulner- are no longer hostage. In another lary of SALT are at least as remote from' ability of one's ability to strike back. scenario, the nation watching this de- reality, as most of us perceive it, as earl.: The design of strategic forces and their. Tense being built strikes first, before it Christian exegesis....As in tie case o~ emplacement has to insure this. But its has lost its hostage. This is how SALT the early Church, contending schools form began. around antagonistic strategic concepts. is also the case that this can never be The most relevant of these are known asf insured once and for all, fl ray force be- assured destruction and damage limita- comes vulnerable over time, especially HEY are not impersonal intellect togs, and each can claim broad support if an adversary' is working hard at tuals who made these calculations. and intellectual respectability Debates snaking it so. Hence, there can be no Some are intense and committed as between the tiro schools recall those be- few men of the age. But to share twecn the Thomists and the essentially; final deterrent. Franciscan followers of Dues Scotus. It was Wohlstetter's insights that their passion it is necessary to elite)- The `iscan sus prevailed, as have the pro- made made defense planners aware, in the their logic. Vhat dtt you mean, tine; ponents of assured destruction, who as-l late nineteen-fifties, that the bombers' could ask, when you say that we must sect, for example, that ballistic-missile+ of the Strategic Air Command were) not defend ourselves because if we do defense of population is immoral because our enem will attack? The problem it may degrade your adversary's ability }' to destroy your gun cities in a second becoming vulnerable to Soviet attack. I When the Russians had few warheads of public perception was not great in strike. His confidence under pined, he+ and no missiles, two dozen dispersed the nineteen-sixties. A deference sys-I might then be tempted in a cris to strike) SAC bases were secure enough. But as tem-a \vllluidnsss to leave difliault pre-emptively; in short, knowing you are Soviet capabilities grew in the nineteen- decisi+tlis to e!:pr ' its-which hid risen effectively protected from has strike assault and fearing your intentiSecond- ons, fifties the airplanes became vulnerable. in place since the h+unh x%-as built, con- he may choose" to strike first. Thus, sta- In response, however, from 1962 toI tinucd undisturbed. But then heresyl bility, a truly divine goal in the nuclear) 1967 the United States deployed a appeared in the midst of the close-knit age, becomes the product of =secure sec- thousand Minutema missiles in the and almost closed community of cx- ond-strike nuclear offenses on both sides. ++ OR ; e e2psets2 i1?f A Qi 1 1 81 111" ROQD4130s36t~Ofi190hing to know about Midwest in harden to say, in launchers dug deep and i or "damage limitation," as it wacl SALT: The decision to propose talks, INUED and the first agreements, constituted a I defenses that would preserve our sec- victory. for a specific rMk ReWsEtr2QO5M4At2=ttOlA F %4-01 cured destruction." It was even then al ABM defense of the Minutemen. But contested doctrine and gave signs of doctrine decreed that this, too, would be how vulnerable it might be to ideologi- destabilizing. Once an anti-ballistic-mis- cal attack in the form of caricature. In sile defense was perfected, the tempta- 1969, Donald. Brennan, of the Hud- tion to use it to defend cities as well as son Institute, labelled it "rnulual as missile silos would grow. And the oth- sured destruction," so that the acro- er side could never be sure that we nym "MAD" came into play, like some weren't planning to do exactly that, as new weapons system all its own. But quickly as possible, at a time of our even earlier, in the 1964 film "Dr. own choosing. Strangelove," Stanley Kubrick had car- The decision point came on Decem- icatured a proposal of Herman Kahn, ber 6, 1966-"the precise beginning "the doomsday machine," which would of SALT," as Newhouse has it-at a automatically produce a second strike, meeting between McNamara and so that the victim of a first strike could Lyndon Johnson, in Austin, Texas. never hesitate to retaliate and decide Instead of going forward with an d surrender Malting a second ABM system, as proposed byr the Joint t Minister Alexei Kosygin arrived III, 15MQ04QO061J3ey, for a summit' meeting with President Johnson. Dean Rusk, who was Secretary Of State at that time, later recalled for Newhouse that the Americans tackled Kosygin in a "go for broke fashion." The Rus- 1 sians, naturally, wondered what we were up to. When told of the dangers of the ABM, Kosygin replied, in effect, "How can you expect me to tell the Russian people they can't defend them- selves against your rockets?" This sure- ly is a recognizable political instinct. At about this time, Senator Richard Rus- sell was saying that if there was a nit- clear war and only two persons sur-1 rived he wanted them both to be, Americans. . A year later, on June 24, 1968, the Senate voted funds for the deployment of an ABM system known as Sentinel, which had been developed but not put in service. Three days later, Soviet For- eign Minister Andrei Gromyko an- nounced that his government was ready to begin negotiations.. Roger P. Labrie, of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, writes that "SALT, like all previous attempts at ne- gotiating limitations on nuclear weap- ons, stemmed from the interaction ofl new weapon programs with prevailing strategic concepts." Then the Russians invaded Czecho- slovakia. The first SALT talk, scheduled II for September 30, 1968, was put off,) and before the atmosphere had clearedf Richard Nixon had succeeded Lyndon Johnson. But the two Presidents dif- fered fered little in strategic doctrine. Nixon, if anything, was the more concerned with the nuclear race. Finally, the talks began. Kissinger took over. SALT I was signed. WHAT was SALT I? First, agree- VV YV ment was reached that neither side would deploy a general ABM de- fense. This was a success; surely-at least for doctrine. There , would be little defense against strategic missiles. (Each party was to he allowed two truncated ABM sites, but no more.) Second, the Soviets obtained agree- ment to nuclear parity' with the Unit- ed States. This was a large achieve- ment for them, in both symbolic and real terms, but one that doctrine al- lowed the United States to concede. At the time 'the SALT process began, McNamara calculated that the United States had a three- or four-to-one ad- o rnstea strike inevitable in order to prevent a Chiefs of Staff, McNamara urged that first strike was eminently logical, but a decision be put off until the State De- its proponents could also be made to partment could explore' with MoscowI seem crazy, like the mad scientist in the idea of talks on limiting strategic Kubrick's film-a caricature which arms. suggested that because so many of the In these events, as in others, Mc- defense intellectuals were German, Namara emerges as a man of deep their thinking must also be Teutonical- feeling and utter integrity, but almost ly rigid. too much of the latter. A Captain Vere Looking back, it seems clear that the without serenity. It was his judgment urgency with which the Americans that assured destruction required an approached the Russians in the hope of ability to destroy twenty to twenty-five obtaining an arms agreement that per cent of the Soviet population and would protect the assured-destruction fifty per cent of its industrial capacity doctrine arose as much out of concern in a retaliatory strike. He also judged to secure the doctrine in American) that-the Soviets must be convinced that strategic policy as to introduce it to the they could do as much damage to the strategic policy of the Soviet Union. If United States if it fell to them to re- it could be codified in an agreement taliate. Hence, there must be no Amer- with the Soviets which committed both ican missile defense. In a speech at sides, then the argument at home Ann Arbor, in 1962, he had questioned would be more secure. For good or the prudence, even the morality, of ill, attacks on MAD had about there al such a targeting doctrine, but there- quality. of the political left. If the Rus- after he put qualms behind him and sians could be shown to have the same did his duty. He held unflinchingly to dispassionate view of nuclear realities, the proposition that deterrence "means this might mollify such opposition in ? the certainty of suicide to the aggres- the United States. Of course, if Amer- sor." Through the nineteen-sixties, icans of both left and right persuasions pressure grew for the United States to would argue later on that assured de- develop modern heavy missiles, as the struction is a strategy that places ex- Soviets had done, or to double the Min- ceptional reliance on the good faith and uteman force. He successfully blocked good judgment of quite unreliable each effort, asserting, in 1967, when adversaries, the adversaries could well the United States had five thousand remark that this was our idea, not warheads, that this number was "both theirs. . greater than we had originally planned But there was also a technological and in fact more than we require." He imperative. In the middle nineteen-Six- repeatedly warned against the "mad ties, the Soviets began to deploy their momentum intrinsic to . ,, . all new nu- own missiles in hardened silos, which clear weaponry," adding, "If a weapon over time might give them a second- system works-and works well-there strike capability, and even a first-strike is strong pressure from many directions capability, to destroy U.S. land-based to procure and deploy the weapon out t level d h i e pru en on to t missiles in a surprise attack. No great of all proport technological feats were involved-just required. In s a steady creep of nurj~< jct rc elete e r IgQI~gu~- curacy. Planners in the Pentagon an defense intellectuals began to talk of h after) vantage in number of warheads, which > p 141 SROkM&, M l 'b true measure of nu- clear power. ut the doctrine of as- sured destruction minimizes the ques-j Lion of advantage. As long as the scc-~ tain agreement that neither side would h 1 ? and strike is devastatin r g,A+l~i$1~t11* Superiority, in this perspective, loses its - meaning. -In--July, - 1974,-. after -the SALT I I negotiations had begun, Kissin- ger responded to a question in a press cc,nfercnce thus: "What in the name of God is strategic superiority? What is; r Re n e ~`0~ 1' t~ r klitt c AI istic Itt1syt ii the: significance of it ... at these levels of numbers?" .After a point, numbers meant nothing-to us. The doctrine of assured destruction holds that the curve relating numbers of -weapons to strategic power flattens out-at 'a fairly early stage. It may or may not he chance that this stage was seen to have been reached at about the number and extent of the weap- ons svstems. the- United States already had in the mid-sixties. In 1971, two of the most gifted and experienced defense intellectuals, Alain Enthoven aid K. WTayne -Stnitlt (the former an official of the Kennedy-and John- son administrations, the latter an official of the Nixon Administration), wrote in their book "How Much is Enough?": - The main reason for stopping at 1,000 -Minuteman missiles, 41 Polaris subma- rines and some. 500 strategic bombers is that having more would not be worth the additional cost. These force levels are sufficiently high to put the United States an the "flat of the curve." It may he said that this judgment was reached at a time when the at- niosphere of the Vietnam \V'ar made it pointless to consider any increases. Even so, there should be no question that the view ivas sincerely held. Again, looking back, it seems clear that this doctrinal consideration took the edge off the American disappoint- ment that SALT I did not provide for any real arms reduction. The United States had hoped to put a freeze on the development of any further heavy mis- siles, with their greater capacity to knock out an enemy's ability to retali- ate after a first strike. But the Russians were going ahead with both their SS-1S and SS-19, and there was no stopping them. In ballistic-missile-firing sub- marines, the Russians were accorded a numerical advantage of sixty-two to our forty-four to "corr,pensate" for the greater distances their underwater craft would have to travel to be on station. As noted above, they soon equipped these submarines with a longer-range missile, wiping out their disadvantage, and thus coming out ahead of where they had been. If we were disposed to think that such margiA dnt F e1'I clearly the Russians a no . ire United States very much hoped to ub-i ing came of tlti?. The great and debilitating failure of SALT 1, huwcrcr, is that it did n,,t produce any agreement between the two nations on strategic doctrine. It might have seemed that it did, and certainly Americans hoped timat it did, but it did not. This failure was made clear in July-, 1972-two months after the treaty was signed-hy William R. Van Cleave, a political scientist who has served as an adviser to the SALT "My Country and the World," Andrei D. Sakharov, the Russian phi sicist, ie- P15% 0 3 }QAL9-fir .1955 in Siberia, delegation. In testimony before a Sen- ate subcommittee headed by Henry M. Jackson, Van Cleave made a point that it was time some political scientist made: The U.S. arms-control community has always had an academic character and a hype r- rationalistic approach to arm+ con- trol that assumes arms control to be an intellectual problem rather than a politi- cal one. Van Cleave was critical of the "ea- gerness" of the American negotiators for an agreement that, he felt, led them repeatedly to change positions. He was scornful of the belief, as he saw it, that we and the Soviets shared` an overriding common goal of strategic: stability as defined by American strati-I gic and arms-control concepts. The over-all evidence, he said, "is persuasive that the Soviet leaders do not share out assured-destruction doctrine. That thcc do is an unsupportable notion." What doctrine did the Soviets es- pouse? This seemed evident enough' to Van Cleave: "The Soviets--in contrast to the United States-have seen the strategic-force balance as an expression of political power." It had been Nlc- Namara's view, and it persisted, "that the strategic-force balance had no im- portant political meaning." Whatever the case, it was clear .to Van Cleave that the Soviets thought otherwise. To hare the power to blow up the world three times was to have more power than did he who could blow it up on!G- twice. The Soviet military seemed to have a simple notion that more was better than less. There were, at the very least, those among them who were prepared to think of nuclear wars as winnable, in the sense that ono side would emerge better off than the other. This sort of thinking, of course, is in- compatible with the doctrine of ns- snred destruction. The Soviet Union'-, military were, where he had successfully tested a So- viet hydrogen bomb: The evening after the test, at a pri- vate banquet attended only by the officials in charge of the tests, I proposed a toast that "our handiwork would never ex- plode over cities." The director of the tests, a high-ranking general, f at obliged to respond with a parable. It!, gist was that the scientists' job is to -mprove a weapon; how it is used is nore of their business. The American negotiators of SALT I were to learn early on just how firmly the Soviet military were in charge when they found that they knew more about Soviet strategic forces than did their Soviet civilian counterparts. Mili- tary secrets are not widely shared in the Soviet Union, and at ons point the negotiations a Russian general sub;- gested to an American that it wasn't necessary to talk about sue matters in the presence of-what?--unautho- rized listeners! Soviet military plans were not, in any significant measure,1 subject to negotiation with Americans; or anyone else. In consequence, the Americans returned home to face a sec- ond negotiation with their own mili-I tary. What seems to happen. in SALTi talks is that when negotiators have, ink effect, agreed with the military forces: of another nation that those forces; should be increased they are almost re-I quired to return and agree with their! own military forces that their. forces should be increased also. It is a matter of relationships. If the Rus -.ians were building a Caribbean fleet, and the United States was either ignoring this or else snarling and snafping and threatening, American admirals, while! .they. would certainly be urging a Baltic' fleet or some such countermeasure,; could nonetheless be told to stay out of the argument and leave foreign affairs to the President. But once the Press-I dent had agreed with the Soviets that; it was quite acceptable for thorn to have, a flotilla in the Caribbean he simply: would not be in a position to tell his own admirals that they wculd be al- lowed no compensatory increases. He could, of course, but he wo-ild be dis-' credited as a man who preferred the' interests of other people's nilitary toy his own. In a situation where the so- viet military always insists on more,1 the process will always-end with the: American military insisting on more asI well. ele a'f c `ir~tTI - 4 ~r3i~ R4~ $ 119t eign'Rela:ions Com-~ is not made by professors. In his hook 1 mittee last July compared the Poseidon missile, now deployed ~-~, ~e Pa }on he la vtie But we hadn't viets "coon Mete assurance against ant nuclear submarines, witti6t iie riclen Re~ aour s ar ion OF4f4i P1 ~8 J~115R~Q~ ~ t5~~ t%i rforee threat from ' " missile that has been designed for the, new Trident submarines, the first of' which will go to sea sometime next year. Secretary Brown's display ticked off the revelant information: TRIDENT IMPROVEMENTS OVER POSEIDON * Weight-15% greater * Fuel-advanced technology, more ef- ficient * Accuracy-/ more accurate at same range * Range-twice as great * Explosive power-twice as great Those' who follow weaponry would; have noted that the new missile, with far more destructive power, is none- theless about-the same size as its prede- er admitted to ourselves that the Rus- sians did not accept deterrence as doc- trine; that, unless stopped by the most 1 forceful intervention, they would build until they achieved superiority. They But the Russians the United States. abruptly turned it down. Grornyko was 1scarcely polite. He all but suggested! that to propose to the Soviets that they reduce strategic arms was an insult.! (To be sure, his actual remarks were' addressed to the suddenness with which the proposal was made.) In any event,! with significant reductions dismissed, the SALT II negotiations proceeded toy a wan conclusion, the basic numbers almost unchanged after two and a half years of negotiations by the new team. At Vladivostok, in 1974, President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev had agreed that each party should have 2,400 strategic nuclear delivery vehi- cles ? (missiles and bombers), with 'a sublimit of 1,320 bIIRVed missiles plus bombers capable of carrying cruise mis- siles. (A cruise missile is essentially a pilotless plane. Unlike a.ballistic' mis- sile-which simply goes where it has been aimed, like a bullet--a cruise missile can be directed' in flight.) SALT II reduces this over-all limit to 2,250 by .1951, but without any conse- quence. The Soviets will scrap some antiquated missiles they have probably kept around only for bargaining pur- poses. We will hold on to our B-52s- planes that are now as, old as the pilots who fly them. SALT II limits the num- ber of warheads per MIRVed ICBM, but each side is to be permitted an en- tirely new ICBM and to improve its existing ones within limits that mayl or may not permit fundamental ad- vances. There are no limitations of significance. . Once again,. a second negotiation, took place back in Washington. The result was the MX. Recall that a grin- cipal American objective in SALT. I was to prevent the Soviets from. building any more heavy missiles, which they pro- ceeded to do regardless. Again, no re- duction in modern heavy missiles could be agreed to; thus SALT II provided that the Soviets should continue to have 308 and we should. continue to~ have none. Opponents of SALT II make much of this "imbalance." But, as Am- Ralph Earle II, chairman of ! bassador the American delegation to SALT, told the Senate Foreign Relations Commit- tee in July, the MX, while not a heavy missile, does have as much "equivalent effectiveness as Soviet heavy ICBMs." In a word, the MX is a counterforce missile. And that is what the issue hasi been from the first. The United States' RQPcg4M`d90A0-what we vowed we would never do. And so SALT II pro-) duced precisely the advance in counter--! might, for example, have been told in 1969 that this would be a wholly un- attainable goal. That we would out- spend them two to one. That we would still be spending when they were bank- rupt. But this was a threat we could' not make, even though,. ironically, it is one we could have carried out. I fear that those may. turn' out to have been the days when the peace of the world was irretrievably lost. cessor. In fact, Trident I missiles can be 'HEY did not seem so. Nixon fitted in the launchers of the Poseidon, deeply desired that a SALT II submarine. (This is now being done,' agreement-a permanent treaty this with the result that .our submarine fleet time-would put an end to increases will have much greater megatonnage in nuclear weapons and possibly bring in its warheads- even before the new about actual decreases. But he fell) and Tridents begin to be commissioned.) negotiations made no progress. in that As one thought connects to another, direction under President Ford, al- I found my attention drifting away though he, too, was altogether com- from Secretary Brown's exhibit and mitted to the process. Then came the back to a sunny June day in 1977, my new Carter team, including many-old first. year in the Senate, with many faces from the Johnson years. They things still unfamiliar.' The Navy was were hopeful, even exhilarated by the launching a new submarine, the U.S.S. opportunity they now had, and they New York City-the first warship ever moved quickly with a bold proposal. named for our town-and I had been In March, 1977, the Carter Ad- asked to speak at the ceremonies in the ministration, in the person of Cyrus shipyard of the Electric Boat company, Vance; who had been Deputy Secre- in Groton, .Connecticut, where it was tary of Defense under Johnson and to be launched. I had done a spell. in was now Secretary of State, proposed the Navy at the end of the Second to Moscow a significant reduction in World War, and shipyards were famil- nuclear weapons. This Comprehensive iar. But as the official party walked Proposal would have reduced the num- along to the ways where the modest ber of launchers for MIR1'S (multiple New York City awaited us, a never independently targetable reentry ve- equalled leviathan hove in sight. There, hicles) from 1,320, which had emerged broadside to the river-for it would as the lowest level the Soviets would fair stretch to the opposite bank if accept, to between 1,100 and 1,200, launched in the conventional man- with a separate sublimit of 550 on the ner-was the hull of the first Trident number of_MlRVed ICBMs, the most submarine. There has never been such accurate and worrisome kind. (A a thing, and anyone who has been to MIRVed missile has more than one sea would know it. My U.S.S. Quiri- warhead, each of which can be inde- nus, 40-mm. gun mounts and all, pendently aimed at a different target, could have been taken on board as a As the "bus" travels through space, if ship's launch. James R. -Schlesinger, ejects first one warhead, then another, then Secretary of Energy, was walking in different trajectories and at differ- beside me. He had been Secretary of! ent velocities.) Five hundred and fifty 'Defense during the period when the1 is the number of MIRVed ICBMs the trident program was getting under United States has, deployed. , way,' and he recalled expressing mis- Paul Nitze, who has been officially givings about it, saying that the boats involved in arms negotiations under were too big, too vulnerable-that Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and smaller ones would have done better. Nixon -(there are not many qualified What had possessed us? I asked. It was / persons in this field, and careers show the price of SALT I, hApipbedred For ele QQ0&W1iFy: QA-RDR8$-6tMf And so an American buildup of sorts field of policy), has testified that commenced, ending the long freeze of Vance's 1977 proposal offered the So- force weaponry which SALT I had central but still important: (1) ratios of licence Agency, had the self-confi-I hoped to prevent. S) r lie surviv o elation and industr must , d rice to -lance. `'he1 1 11~VgOeW Fbr ele,?e 1/1,Z,er'dAvRQR860, a'1~R06VM0 l `~~ 3s Carter Administration in to stress States, and (2) the surviving military t'x+ r'ctsc iveil fo-tvard and was con- that the content of the treaty redly halance should remain in our f-i or.,.rf eluded. The B "Team made 1 powerful didn't matter much, that it' was the deterrence should fail, a favorable sur- case-more so than had been antici- process that had to he preserved. living military balance could make it rated. In October, word (f the exer- But if the process meant anything, it easier for us to negotiate an end to the cise leaked; in December, the 7'imes tear and limit further damage to the had to he one that protected assured reported the results. The B Team, destruction as a strategic doctrine. The [inlted States. headed by Richard Pipes, of Harvard, proposal to go ahead with the MX At this time, Schlesinger, still at had come to the conclusion that the, implied that we ourselves were aban- Rand, commenced to argue that the Russians .were seeking strategic sit-, cloning that doctrine. Of course, by United States could not allow the So- periority. 1979 assured destruction was already viets to develop an "asymmetric ca- The indignation in Washington wash in ideological danger in its own sane- picity against us." That is to say, they palpable. "Tlie very' sugE,estion was tuaries. Newhouse, likening much of should not have a counterforce eapa- greeted with horror, as will happen; the debate in the nineteen-sixties to hility greater than our own. For either when a doctrine grows rigid. The B' earlier debates about heresy, also notes side to have such a capacity would be Team members were near to anatbe-i that heresies somehow never the out. fatal to the doctrine of assured destruc- niatized. They had been invited to: However much orthodoxy always as- tion, properly construed; for both to challenge the conventional wisdom, sorted itself in the end, McNamara have it would be doubly fatal. Schles- but they had made too good a case.; continued to have doubts. In 1964, finger persisted, and in 1973, as Secre- Senator Malcolm Wallop suhsequently less than two years after his Ann Ar- tart' of Defense, he proposed that the observed: hor speech, he declared in a Defense United States develop a "heavy throw- While consciously refusing to entertain; Department "posture statement" that weight" missile to offset Soviet Bevel- the Soviets' own conception of what they; "a damage-limiting strategy appears to opments. This missile became the MX, are about militarily, the authors of the; he the most practical and effective More to the point, in the course of NIE's over the years have evaluated So-1 course for its to follow." Such a strict- viet strategic forces using indexes.which the nineteen-seventies Pentagon offi- tend to stress our own doctrine of MAD. egy would involve trying to destroy cats began to talk openly of targeting - some of an adversary's missiles in order Soviet military facilities in terms of The 1976 N.I.E., Wallop noted, did that his retaliatory strike would not be "limited strategic options." The Tri- mention that the Soviets stein to think s+) devastating. (Of course, implicit in dent II missile, to he deployed aboard in terms of ability to will nuclear wars. this concept is the possibility that the the giant submarine, would verge upon Nevertheless, the estimates continued United States light, after all, strike a counterforce capability. (Submarine- to interpret both United States and So- first-in response, for example, to a So- launched missiles are still not as ac- viet forces according to the criterion ofI vict invasion of Europe.) At this time, curate as land-based missiles. Thus, assured destruction. But hc'w could this: I United States missiles were presumably while they are fully effective in an interpretation he reconcilecr with Soviet, aimed at Russian cities. McNamara assured-destruction mode-they can he conduct, By 1976, they were (as they acknowledged that a damage-limiting sure of hitting Leningrad, for exam- still arc) spending twelve to fours. strategy would require greater forces plc-they are less so in a counterforce per cent of their gross national prod,. than the "cities oil}" Strategy, but he mode; where the target is a hole in the on defense-the sign, if tie ninetee:, thought it would he worth it, especial-i ground ten or fifteen feet in diameter, thirties offer any evidence, of a corm- 1v with a Chinese nuclear force coming requiring that a warhead land within try planning to go to war. "Bureau- (in line. In 1966, he appeared to favor several hundred feet or so in order to cratic inertia" was an ex1:lanation Put~ an anti-Chinese ABM system. This "kill.") Nothing dramatic by way of forth, and it could well ae the right would be a "thin" system, designed to a great debate ending in a break with one, although "momentur.i" might be defend against only a few missiles. The previous policy occurred. Rather, as the the better term. But after a point kussian,s would know that such a sys- Soviets crept toward a first-strike ca- larger possibilities had to he confronted. tern was not directed against their large pability, American strategic doctrine In his 1978 annual report as Secretary i and growing force, simply because it slowly changed also. This was never of Defense, Brown said th it because of 1 would offer no effective defense. The really acknowledged, except in the "a substantial and continuing Soviet, proposal is worthy of note as an ex- edginess and growing- anxiety of those strategic effort," the strategic balance 1 ample of logic producing illogic. The who could sense the drift of events but "is highly dynamic." Altht~ugh puzzled reasoning that led to the decision was could not arrest them. as to "why the Soviets are pushing so I flawless, save that the Chinese had no An episode in the fall of 1976 re- hard to improve their strategic nuclear; missiles. McNamara soon enough re- vealed the depths of this anxiety. Once capabilities," he noted that "we cannon canted. In the middle of the Vietnam each year, the intelligence community ignore their efforts or assume that they War, lie could scarcely ask for more produces the National Intelligence are motivated by consideration either: nuclear weapons, but his doubts were Estimate, known Inc-illy as the N.I.E. of altruism or of pure deterrence.", ~ on record. H. was not clone- Then, A of grumbling began about , in May, 1979, in the com In the spring of 1968, just as the the relative optimism concerning Soviet meneement address at Annapolis, SALT talks were about to begin, Har- intentions and kept being repeated. Leo Brown asserted that Moscow had lungs old Brown, then Secretary of the Air Cherie, of the President's Foreign sought to threaten American land- IForce,- told the Senate Preparedness Intelligence Advisory Board, had the based ins-ssiles and would probably be Sullcolaimittec: inspired notion to set up competing :able to achieve this capability in tile! earl ' nincteen-eralitles. I;i an analysis i . t+, addition to theAl~lardvted ble elea Vt0109/lf1t12d. F l3F l13' 5 00(~#(} g-3 pt r,3kichard Burt, of the . pahility, our measurement of deterrence mate and one to challenge rt. i. eorge ,hnuld include two other criteria, less Bush, as Director of the Central Intel- ~ l inirs, a formidably well informed nnMMTNTTED sntal well 'connected journalist, offered the judgment that 13 lyto)dl P'Cjr cepted the B Teams analysis. As perspectives on .Soviet conduct began to change, American conduct began to be seen in different light also. Was it the case that the Soviets were "catching up"' Were we "falling be- hind"? It must be understood that these were new questions. In the -I4Ic- Namara era, it had been assumed that American strategic superiority was as certain as was the validity of American strategic doctrine. But now it began to be noted that while the United States budget for strategic arms had been level for a decade and a half, that of the Soviets had continued to rise. In rough terms-they can only he that-the Soviets since 1969 have been outspending the United States in strategic forces by a margin of two to one. I)r. Perry reported to the For- eign 'Relations Comtriittec that current United States spending on strategic forces is about $12 billion a year, while the Soviets spend on the order of $25 billion. (More recently, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency re- ported that the Soviet Union spent a total of $140 billion on all its armed forces in 197 7-almost one-third of all military spending in the world. The United States spent $101 billion. Wohlstetter calculates that American strategic spending, in constant dollars, actually peaked hack in fiscal 1952.) The Soviet buildup has been steady over a generation now, leading an -:control expert from the Kennedy arms era to remark recently that if the fa- miliar man from Mars were to he pre- sented with a chart showing the rise of Soviet weaponry over the past three decades and told that somewhere dur- ing that period an arms-limitation agreement was signed with the United States, the visitor would be quite un- able to pick the year. The result is to he seen. in numbers of warheads. If plotted, it would he seen that the Soviet curve has been steeper for some time now-up from a more than five-to-one disadvantage in 1967 to less than two-to-one today, on to parity in 1985 and to superiority thereafter, if the trends persist. Number of warheads, however, is not the only measure of nuclear pow- er. Size matters, and accuracy matters even more. It is not a question of pro- jecting a time when the Soviets will have attained superiority; they have already done so. In this area, Nitze's estimates are mdtspens4h~uhtd or cause they are his and be~clt I ise t ltey are public. In thrr~owweight-the pounds in place by that Administration, while 1 - Rele spZ~Td O17'1I I 'l - > 0-0 3 5R those who supp,orted Johnson in Viet ttze estimates tRat t e Avlets y 44RQyt ~ib~v to be suspicious of 1977 had an advantage of 10.3 million SALT.) pounds to the United States' 7.6 mil- lion, this being the effect of the Soviet heavy missiles. By 1985, he projects a widened gap: 14.5 million for the So- viets, eight million for the United States. The gap is even more dramatic in the critical category of explosive power-in what is called "equivalent megatonnage." Nitze gives the Soviets a nearly three-to-one advantage for 1977: 9,319 equivalent megatons for the Soviets, 3,256 for the United States. For 1985, he projects a slightly widened gap but not greatly increased amounts of megatonnage on either side. HOW did this come about? As near an answer as we are likely to get is that a synergistic-relationship devel- oped between the doctrine of assured destruction and the combined restraints on the United States imposed by. the experience of Vietnam and the hopes aroused by detente. If this seems com- plicated, let it be said that nothing simple is likely to explain how the world's most powerful military nation lost its advantage over an economically and technologically inferior competitor in the course of a decade-and with almost no one noticing. The doctrine of assured destruction, as I have noted, holds that the curve relating numbers of weapons to stra- tegic power flattens out at a fairly early stage. One of the virtues of the as- sured-destruction doctrine was that it permitted the civilians in the Pentagon and in the Bureau of the Budget to form an estimate of what the military really needs. How many warheads, for. example, were required to insure that fifty per cent of the industrial capacity- of the Soviet Union would be de- stroyed in_ a.second strike? The doc- trine fitted in surprisingly well with the management ethos that McNamara and others brought to defense issues. It suited .even better the needs of the gov- ernment leaders of the later nineteen- sixties who, while seeking strategic- arms limitations, were also waging war in Vietnam. Holding back expenditure in the strategic area eluded the fury ,that would have arisen had they pro- posed otherwise, and may have mod- erated opposition to the war. (An in- teresting aftermath: those most bit- ter about the Vietnam policies of the ' Johnson era are today likel . to be most e Btr~&B t11{4 pstrs c h-pi These considerations were, if any- thing, even more intensive in Nixon's first term. Certain defense intellectuals of the Johnson era began to assert that Soviet strategic behavior was basically imitative of ours-two apes on a tread mill, as the image went-overlook- ing, presumably, that the fondest hope of the community in the early sixties was that Soviet behavior would, be- come imitative. In any event, this was presented as an argument against increasing American forces. Then Nixon embarked on the policy of de- tente with the Soviets, which added further. grounds for allowing United 'States force levels to remain frozen. 'And that is what happened. The irony of all this was nicely il- lustrated in an article in The New Rebublic, in August, 1979, by the journalist Morton Kondracke: At the end of July, Henry Kissinger had testified before the Foreign Relations Committee, declaring himself not so much opposed to SALT II-he allowed he would have initialled the treaty- as in favor of great new military ex- penditures to prevent a further weak- ening of the United States of a sort that, he said, had brought about a "crisis situation threatening the peace of the world." Kondracke interpreted this as'the familiar (although puzzling) charge that Democrats are somehow soft in these matters. He seems to have taken the charge personally. In any event, he retorted with some vehe- mence: According to Kissinger, when the US left Vietnam, the Republican administra- tion of which he was a part planned to build major new strategic weapons sys- tems: the. B-1 bomber by 1981, the MX missile by 1983, the Trident submarine and missile by 1979, and various kinds of cruise missiles in the 1980s. These weap- ons would have reversed the trend toward Soviet superiority, "but every one of these programs has been canceled, de- layed, or stretched out by the current administration." Kissinger's version of history scarcely squares with the facts or with Pentagon figures. Far from trying to reverse the strategic doctrines of the Johnson ad-,I ministration, Kissinger and President ! Nixon accepted them completely. The US land-based missile force was not in-1 creased by a single launcher during eight ! years of Republican administration. In i fact, the Nixon and Ford administrations cut back on strategic spending from the' levels reached in- the closing Johnson I years. Johnson's last budget called for b 1tl bh# e e ouays,ut te 1 `~t r~tinistrations aver-I R aged $10 billion a year in comparablet dollars. Some cuts were imposed by Con- manner, the Soviets have acquired, or States and Western Europe '-against, tiress, but most were calledpp,,~~y~~,, ~' ~r R@f@ 'c0~P5fflq' ': fit- 31 SR69t)4t;OdO'6 23 strategic nuclear lord budgets. It's true, few llserats were p2bility a ainst our land-base) ? S. force primarily designed to wipe out impressed when Republican officials We hope tdo the same to theirs. Ev- Russian cities and factories rat)- r than boasted that they were continuously cut-1 Ling defense spending, but they really erything the SALT process was designed to strike at missile silos and other mili- were. to prevent has come about. tary targets. The policy of mutual as All true enough. The Nixon-Ford years were a time of unprecedented increase in social spending, and of decline in military spending. Rather like the Hitchcock film in which the diamond is hidden in the chandelier, this information was effectively con- cealed from the American people by publishing it in the budget. It may well prove that the historic mission (as Governor Jerry Brown might say) of the Carter Administration is to increase defense spending and cut social spend- ing. There is a mild law of opposites in American politics. Republicans fre- quently do what Democrats promise, and the other way around.. President Carter was the most dovish of candi- dates in 1976, promising to cut the defense budget by five to seven billion dollars a year. Nothing of the sort hap-, pened, however. Social spending was. effectively frozen, but defense-spend- ing began immediately to rise. In an address in Washington on September 27th of this year, Zbigniew Brzezin- ski, Assistant to the President for Na- tional Security Affairs, made a good deal of this: While our critics say they would have been strong for defense if they had- re- mained in office, in fact, defense spend-1 ing in constant dollars declined in seven; of the eight years of the Nixon-Ford Ad ministration. For the past decade, there has been a steady decline in the level of the defense budget in real dollar terms. We began to reverse that trend in the first three budgets of the Carter Admin- istration, and President Carter is the first President since World War II to succeed in raising defense spending for three straight years in peacetime. The Soviets did not do this by cheat- sured destruction had created P "para- ing or by startling technological break-i doxical world [in which] it is the lib- throughs. They did it by the steady eral, humane, progressive community' ( 'that is advocating the most bloa(:-thirsty accumulation of more missiles an ad- ditional thousand in the course of the strategies." It was absurd, lie con- nineteen-seventies) with greater accu- -tinued, "to base the strategy of the' racy, and more warheads with greater IVest on the credibility of the treat of explosive power. They aimed them, as mutual suicide." It was necessary fort evidently they have always done, at the United States to develop a new; our silos--in violation, that is, of our, nuclear "counterforce capability"'con-i doctrine that they should be aimed at! sisting of missiles designed to be used. our cities, so that they could retaliate against military targets rather than' with vast destruction in case we at- civilian ones. tacked first. They either now can or Herein resides' the final irony of soon will be able to take out our silos, the SALT process. Not only has it failed: leaving the United States with a much ~ to prevent the Soviets from de-reloping reduced second-strike capability. Not: a first-strike capability; it now lead enough, it is generally thought, Be-1 the United States to do so. The process , has produced the one outcome it was sides, Nitze writes, the Soviets now' I have -a third and fourth strike-an designed to forestall. And so we see ability to deter our retaliatory strike by ;policy in ruins. threatening our surviving cities and: - population. If it is all unthinkable, the: W must are we to do? First, we. Soviets seem nonetheless to have been ' YV must try to get some agree thinking about it. ment - on what our situation is. Is i As have we. Heresy and recantation wrong to think that something of the, abound, and one of the more striking sort is emerging? The %Vashington1 events of the SALT n debate so far is Post noted on August 1st, "Here it is that both Secretary Brown and Kis-1 barely midsummer, and a growing singer appear to have joined Schlesin- chorus of important voices (w'tose op- ger. In his testimony before the For- position had been most feared) is say- eign Relations Committee on July, ing that the treaty itself is nc villain, 11th, Brown said that the Administra- that its ratification is almost r matter tion's primary goal was maintaining es of indifference, that the fundamental sential equivalence with Moscow in nu-' strategic problems that most concern clear forces, but that to do it "we need them are in fact beyond the Fower of to show the Soviets that they do not the treaty, as such, either to remedy have an advantage in attacking military or even make much worse." _. targets-that we, too, can do so." And Jimmy Carter is the exception. On he elaborated a bit, in response to a July 31st, the same day Kissinger tes- question from Senator George McGov- tified before the Foreign Relations ern: "It is not a matter of us pushing Committee, the President dec ared, in Brzezinski was not just taking -the Soviets into being able to destroy our:: Bardstown, Kentucky, that >ALT IT credit for increasing defense spending. silo-based missiles. They have gone that will "stop the Soviets' buildup." It will He was asserting that his Administra- route." Brown stressed that the mobile :not do anything of the sort. Nor does; tion, unlike its predecessors, was awake MX missiles, in addition to being able :anyone in the Carter Admiristration to the Soviet challenge. It has been a to survive attack, had another attribute: I who is in a position to know ague any; quiet development, this emergent chat- "Because of their accuracy and their longer that it does. Last spring and lenge. Those who espy some special warhead capability they will be able to summer, the joint Chiefs of Staff, tes-I cunning at work have a difficult case hit Soviet silos, and that will, indeed, tifying before the Senate Arned Ser-i to make. The plain fact is, as Van give the Soviets a motive for going - vices Committee, were unanimous in Cleave testified in 1972, that the So- away from silo-based missiles." their conclusion that Soviet strategic; viets never gave any indication that A month after testifying before the, power, under the agreement, would: ~ they accepted assured destniction as a Foreign Relations Committee, Henry expand beyond what it is noaF. At the strategic doctrine and would not seek Kissinger spoke in Brussels at a meet- July 11th meeting of the Foreign Re-1, nticlear superiority. How does the prov- ing of military experts. As reported, he lations Committee, the Chairman of erb go? The fox knows many things, said he now believed that successive) the joint Chiefs, General David C.1 United States Administrations. includ-, Jones, said, "Some may conclude that; one thing their bedg,Oggo eF~It'Rel#iigg"2&3 11 :rf/'fi A ~'$'-c 15 (~ ~ 1 rse trenrs in So- seemed to know is that more is better., Irons, were wrong in tin i10 t ?}d viet strategic forces- including current!, So they kept getting more. In thisl could adequately protect the Hite s nctir mTlvUE`~ and' projected qualitative improve- ments. This is simply nApplTOV.eGt FAnd later: "Similarly, the focus on constraining what the Soviets could do without a SALT agreement had ob- scured the more fundamental recog- nition of what they have done, are doing, and can do within the SALT framework." The director of. the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, George M. Seignious II, has stated that the Soviets will continue to en- gage in a "relentless" strategic-arms buildup with or without the SALT If treaty. We can hope that the President now knows he has been wrong. If this is so, we can hope he will say so. The SALT II treaty is' in trouble, because many senators feel it has been misrep- resented. A profound change could take place if the President were simply to say that it is a chilling agreement but the best he could get, and that it is in our interests only if SALT III brings true reductions. Secretary Vance, in his letter of June 21, 1979, submit- ting the treaty to the President for transmission to the Senate, said, can- didly enough, "For the first time, we will be slowing the race to build new and more destructive weapons." If the President were to say only as much-that we are at most slowing the race-things could be different. If he does not, there is no alternative save to oppose him on the facts, and try to develop a national policy without him. This is not easily done with a Presi- dent engaged. But, in my view, it must be done. For those in charge of Ameri- can strategic policy-including the President, whether or not he has thought it through-are now advocat- ing a course of action which, if suc- cessful, will bring about the very nu- clear face-off that not ten years ago was unhesitantly defined as the worst- case condition. This is to say that the United States and the Soviet Union will be confronting each other know- ing that both have the capacity to at- tack and destroy the other's land-based missile forces, and can do so in forty- five minutes. If still further irony is desired, it may be noted that, in the most explicit way, American behavior has turned out to be imitative of the Soviets. This was implicit in the aftermath of SALT 1, when the Trident submarine and the B-1 bomber were agreed to. But these weapons were at least compatible with an assured-destruction doctrine. The price of SALT II, negotiad~e Administration before the y reaty . was even signed, was the MX missile. From the time Schlesinger first proposed it, r Rdle?iabez00131o1I2oa G A F;[9F 6- 6 oh a counterforce missile. In other words, after only two rounds of negotiations, acquiring a counterforce capacity has become the condition of salvaging the, very negotiations that were begun with the object of preventing either side from obtaining a counterforce capacity. In any event, the world is sure! to be different for the United States,. and considerably less secure. Within' months, the Soviet Union will have the capacity to destroy the Minutemen, our land-based deterrent. These are the missiles that were meant to deter; superiority and that we can learn to 315 1)0#4100'33Cf0 31aubt we can. But will anyone assert that in such circum- stances we will not be living difterent- ly? And if one is drawn to the un- happy conclusion that the SALT process has not limited the number of weapons in the United States and the Soviet Union, what are we to think about the nature of world politics when many nations possess the nuclear weapon? What will be their views---the views of India, Pakistan, South Korea, Israel,, South Africa, Libya, Argentina, Bra-1 zil, perhaps others-on deterrence, as- sured destruction, and the rest? Kis- 1 J v the Soviets from initiating any nuclear' singer suggests that once the present exchange. Following such a first strike state of affairs is understood, "panic" by the Soviets, an American President will spread through the world. could send in bombers and launch our submarine missiles. No one can esti- That decisive technological event mate the horror that would follow in that led to the shift in the balance the Soviet Union and then, of course, of power, it seems to me, was the de- in the United States. It may be that; ployment. of MIRVS-a term first used this prospect will be sufficient to deter; in public in 1967. Packing a number; the Soviets from launching a first' of warheads on each missile no doubt strike, whatever the degree of provo-' seemed an elegant and economical solu- cation or panic. But is there reason-to! tion to the problems that the Johnson suppose that nuclear supei;':rity willi Administration faced. (In the United have no effect on their iril~''rnational States, development of MIRY began in behavior? Certainly men suc}i as Nitze 1965. The first flight tests took place think otherwise. He writes: on August 16, 1968. The first Soviet To some of us who lived through the test took place five years later, in Au- Berlin crisis in 1961, the Cuban crisis in gust, 1973.) But it profoundly trans 1962, or the Middle East crisis in 1973, formed the significance of the Soviets'( the last and key judgment in this chain of huge rockets, with their tremendous) reasoning-that an adverse shift in the ; strategic nuclear balance will have no 1 throwweight. Once the Soviets could political or diplomatic consequences- install MIRVS, they were bound to be comes as a shock. In the Berlin crisis of "ahead." As viewed in hindsight,- it 1961 our theater position was clearly un- might have been perceived that the favorable; we relied entirely on our stra- MIRV technology would work ulti- tegic nuclear superiority to face down Chairman Khrushchev's ultimatum. In mately to the Soviet advantage. If its Cuba, the Soviet Union faced a position were the case that the American in- of both theater inferiority and strategic i terest in `IIRV* was related to a desire inferiority; they withdrew the missiles ; to overcome a putative ABM system they were deploying. In the 1973 Middle ; in Russia. the elimination of ABM East crisis, the theater and the strategic nuclear balances were more balanced; should have argued simultaneously for both sides compromised. the elimination of nrIRV as well. But It is hard to see what factors in the this assuredly did not happen. So long future are apt to disconnect international i politics and diplomacy from the under- as no one had a defense, deterrence ( lying real power balances. The doctrine tended to ignore the prolifera-' nuclear balance is only one element in the over- tion of offensive weapons. _ all power balance. But in the Soviet view,; In what sense, it is asked, do the it is the fulcrum upon which all other Soviet heavy missiles mean that the levers ito ~linflue ce--military, economic, Soviets are "ahead"? This is the ques- ~ In any international crisis seriously tion with which adherents to assured raising the prospect that the military! destruction automatically respond when I arms of the United States and of thell the Soviet superiority is mentioned. USSR might become engaged in active, President Carter, in his 1979 .State and direct confrontation, those directing; of the Union Message, reported that U.S. and Soviet policy would have to give' ust one of our relatively ativeI the most serious attention to the relative just Y invulner- strategic nuclear capabilities of the two able Poseidon submarines ... carries sides. enough warheads to destroy every Unequal accommodation to the Soviet large and medium-sized city in the Union would then have resulted not in ,Union would bu f e th- Soviet Union." His roposal that the r R~# ~~ ~05/~1~ -031 3fi PQ4Q0364th19- missiles be de- It has been said that the Soviets have ployed on a race-track system was learned to live with American nuclear) tr.o-g,ll ULD openly a response to thRRs~ee who +~ 'r tion whether suhmarinesr'~lif(cQ~Vo`lic ~, ,_., _.. c_-__r_. t _ ~?__.__ .r amtnist.ration-s I98U budget, "UnI September 1 1 th, stated that "President) Falk, of Princeton, who does not at all, Sdefense receives a real increase in fund- approve, has called "a mood of biptrti- Carter's choice of a new basing s3 s-1 ing." He said these increases should be n tern to make American missiles mo-! san militarism." Senator Ernest F. Hof-' i given the closest scrutiny; linos said: bile and invulnerable to surprise at-,' a tack removes the only real obstacle? First, in the strategic field, we should The SALT hearings did have a shock- to ratification of the SALT treaty not reorient our defense posture more ? ing effect on this Congress and or the to fight a nuclear war than to prevent it. Phis is, of course, the Administrations people of the United States..." Rather We should not develop weapons systems I view also; as long as a second strike that increase the 'threat of nuclear war. than a disarmament arms Iimitatior:, we r had, in contrast, rearmament hearings is assured, received strategic doctrine We should not buy weapons to appease and a rearmament conference and a re- remains valid, and technicalities such the opponents of SALT. armament treaty between the America as the size of an adversary's forces are Here our number one concern ought to. people and our leadership. be the MX missile and its basing system." not relevant. This is to say that if the The Administration plans to spend nearly In the course of all this, the SF.-nate Soviets are "ahead" merely in the sense $1 billion in the FY 1979 Supplemental doves of a sudden found themselies S. n in that they have more, it just doesn't and the FY 1980 budget. This billion is the SALT I matter that much, but a foot in the door for many addi- a hawk trap. In 1972, ~ And what happens if we don't, tional billions. Eve.-i without cost over- ABM treaty passed easily, by a vote runs, the system will cost us at least $30 of 88 to 2, but by the autumn of 1979 fact, build the MX? The deference billion to build and deploy. ,it was, hard to count thirty-five vote structure that previously surrounded The MX missile is highly- accurate and J or SALT IT. If a resolution of ra vfica- nuclear strategy is no more. (ZVito devastating. It is so threatening to Soviet reacting this article, can remember nuclear forces that it could tempt Soviet lion were to pass, a great many ttnde leaders to strike us first in a crisis. The !tided votes would have to'be obtained noting that the Johnson Administration result tvill be unparalleled destruction to I and many of these set as their prce an had decided to develop a multiple in- both societies. 1inerease in defense spending. Bloom! dependently targetable reuntry vehi- But President Carter went ahead in ;Nunn called fora true increase of five cle?) In a nation where nuclear pow- any event. And then went beyond that, per cent per year for the coming; five er plants can no longer be built, does Carter had accepted increases in de- year period. On September 1$t'i, the anyone seriously suppose that the gov- fense spending; he now began to ad-' Senate, by an overwhelming 'r8-19 ernment can dig up Utah and Nevada h ` to put vocate t agreed to a true increase of three em. Public-opinion polls vote, to put in place our largest missiles ____ _ r--_I h for t e ----? r statement Fed- for SALT 11 was that it would improve I '(Kennedy voted for the increase, and of which the ment of the Fed- our strategic position. The public felt ;has come out in favor of development, erasion of American Scientists is mere- to th -r e fense spending if there was a newt Next, by a surprising 55-42 sore, a Alaska pipeline will he recaecalllleed d' a key SALT treaty, and many seemed to, , flue-per-cer;t true increase was ?greed' amendment protectin the i eli g p p ne think the right course was to have' to for fiscal years 1981 and 1982. The tafrom ts Passed chaelleenSges enatto e tied one thirty- ey one voen. both--SALT It and a bigger defense 1982 defense appropriation would be The Air Force has identifi budget. Whatever the case, SALT 11 in the neighborhood of $170 billion.1 have was no more than sined when the o The total outlay for fiscal 19,6 was eight federal laws that could have president-"to the g consternation of $87.9 billion. bearing on the MX and on the vast network of shelters that will have to be liberals," as the political scientist 4ViI- A case can be made for this f ill's in hide it. an to ar- creases. (I supported both.) Tut not; dug in Utah and Nevada in order to !tarn Schneider observes-beg Wild gue that the new treaty allows for high- for the blindness with which tie Ad- (This list eBurro o er United States military spending in ministration and its supporters are go-1 , Free-Roaming Horse and Br order to reach parity with the Soviet ing about it. The dominant mood in! Act of 1971.) In Washington, it is all. Union. More immediately, a number the last Congress was to bring a halt too plain that a considerable body of d of senators such as Sam Nunn be an- to increases in federal spending. This! opinion is remaining muffled on the ' g -' MX so as not to jeopardize SALT II. to state that they could not support an}?' culminated in an amendment to a taxi treaty unless there was such an increase cut bill in 1978 which was sponsoredop 051 Once SALT IF is adopted, this - in military spending. The Administra- by Senator Nunn and Senator Lawton' lion will beco me open, and will ll find Chiles, both Democrats. The amend-! leadership in the political world from meet, which was passed by the Senate' prominent, even dominant figures such but failed of adoption in the House,! as Governor Brown, who has opposed would have required that total federal the MX with special intensity. outlays as a proportion of the gross na-I If environmental obstacles fail, op- bona! product decline by stated inter-! position will-surely arise to the spend vats from 22.5 per cent in 1979 toI ing involved. Indeed, it already has 19.5 per cent in 1983. Very simply, if ~ arisen. Early in the debate onSALT 11, the country wants the over-all budget; it was reasonably safe to assume that ceiling to come down- and the mill there was a high correlation between tary budget floor to rise, social, spend support for the treaty and opposition toy ing will be crushed. A pretty price for; defense spending. The correlation was. an arms-limitation treaty that increases' not perfect, but it was significant.' arms. Thus, on January 26th, Senator Ed-' t, of social end-i ward M. Kennedy, a depe t rev vor Release 2005/01/12: CIA-RDP88--113150 area 35~YPf~ Auential as those 31 0 3 W g_%5& long the Stir" T who want to see military outlays in-' creased. The record over the decade, as Dr. Brzezinski's speech of Septem- ber 27th suggests, is 4 rgwwd Be more powerful. There is every reason to think that once SALT I[ is ratified they will withdraw their support for the military increases, having realized what such costs-the defense budget would about double, to $250 billion by fiscal 1985-will mean to domestic There is room for much mis- outlays . understanding and not a little bitter- And if these pressures are not suf- the Soviets will surely launch ficient , a determined propaganda campaign. The MX, they will say-have said!- Those who supported SALT will bt rallied to oppose this abandonment of SALT principles. In 1978, the Soviets demonstrated that they could reverse said that it is these limits which make and industries of both countries many i ^t< the MX viable. If the Soviets went times over, while deliberately denying! Relga",20 OM1)3e~~sI f2D1 818r0r! 15ib1 1 ~1~ty of a defense.... They b, ., ,, 'a multl#:~Y assured destruction the size of their heavy missiles per- they would effectively have a mits , first-strike capability against the MX. Tom Wicker, writing in the Times, states: Without the limit of 10 warheads per l missile ... the treaty would impose, the: Soviets could put so many warheads on! their giant SS-18 missiles that not even the mobile MX missile system could be made safe. This, alas, is not the likely "scenario." When the Soviets announce that they are increasing the number of warheads per missile, as they will be permitted to do once SALT II expires at the end of 1985,' the President of the United States, whoever he is, will announce that in view of this Soviet action our reaction must be to double-the size of the M.X. Whereupon the Soviets will announce that they are putting mobile missiles on highways. (A trench system will be too expensive for them.) SALT II will have effectively brought an end not only to the hope of arms limitation but to the SALT process itself. S there no hope? There is some, if not much. We should be clear that we are in for a very bad time, and that the longer we put off recognizing our condition the worse it will be- come. It may just be possible to join hawk and dove, liberal and conserva- tive (hopeless, deceitful terms!) in recognizing that we have held to - a strategic doctrine that. cannot be sus- tained. It would work only if the Rus- sians shared it, but evidently they do not, and neither do a growing number of Americans. The physicist Freeman Dyson has argued most vigorously that only, defense weapons are moral in a nuclear world, making the nice point that we don't have such defenses in part because there is no elegance in''. their development. In his memoir, "Disturbing the Universe," some of which originally appeared in this maga- zine, Dyson writes, "The intellectual arrogance of my profession must take a large share of. the blame. Defensive weapons do not spring, like the hydro- gen bomb, from the brains of brilliant professors of physics. Defensive weap- ons are developed laboriously by teams of engineers in industrial. laboratories." Engineers! Dyson continues: is that the certainty of retaliation will stop anybody from starting a nuclear' war. Dyson is a believer in damage limi-I tation: The ground on which I will take my l stand. is a sharp moral distinction be-' tween offense and defense, between of- fensive and defensive uses of all kinds of weapons. The distinction is often diffi- cult to make and is always subject to argument. But it is nonetheless real and essential. And at least its main implica- tions are clear. Bombers are bad. Fighter airplanes and anti-aircraft missiles are good'. Tanks are bad. Anti-tank missiles are good. Submarines are bad. Anti-sub- marine technology, is good. Nuclear weapons are bad. Radar and sonar are good. Inter-continental missiles are bad. Anti-ballistic-missile systems are good. Just as Dyson's views were being published in The New Yorker, thee political scientist Karl O'Lessker was making almost precisely the same point in The American" S pectator, an. organ of pronounced conservative views: decision to deploy the neutron bomb- the "capitalist" bomb that "destroyed people but not property." The MX missile will certainly. arouse yet fiercer passions. For two decades now, the doctrine of` deterrence has led us to believe that strategic superiority doesn't matter. "What in the name of God is stra- tegic superiority?". Kissinger asked. There is a simple answer. Strategic su- periority is the power to make other people do what you want them to do. Already, the Soviets, approaching a palpable strategic superiority, give signs that it is their intention to control our defense policy. They set out to block the deployment of the neutron bomb in Europe, and they did. They evi- dently intend also to try to prevent our deployment of intermediate-range Per- shing II missiles in Europe. They have given plain notice that they will not permit the United States to deploy an MX missile that would in fact be an "invulnerable" counterforce weapon. In the best of circumstances, the mis- the nineteen-eighties. SALT II, if rati- expires in 1985.. By, then, the fied , Soviets will know all there is to know about the capabilities of the new Amer- ican weapon. They know enough al- ready to be certain that it is a counter- force missile, and we do not pretend otherwise. It will have a combination of yield and accuracy that gives to each warhead a kill probability against a So- viet silo without precedent in our mis- sile force. In response, the Soviets need only say that if we go ahead they will have to abandon the "fractionation') limits of a maximu rMWA -Older readers will recall that most notorious of all presidential campaign television commercials, the one in .1964 that showed a little girl plucking. the petals from a daisy while the voice-over recited the countdown to an all-obliterat- ing nuclear explosion. 'Paid for by the Democratic. National Committee, it was designed to impute to Senator Barry Goldwater a degree of recklessness, bor- dering on insanity, that would, were he to, be elected President, in all likelihood lead to a nuclear holocaust killing tens of millions of little children around the, world. The ghastly irony of that com- mercial is that at the very time it was receiving the personal approval of Presi- dent Johnson, his own Secretary of De- fense, Robert McNamara, was fixing in concrete an American military strategy, that had no options other than'this na- tion's surrender or the indiscriminate slaughter of countless millions of civilians here .and. in the. Soviet Union in a mili- tarily pointless nuclear exchange.. What makes it all the more appalling is that the Russians,'by contrast, were then elab- orating a strategy designed to gain vic- tory by destroying Western, armed forces while minimizing civilian casualties: an application of classic Clausewitzian doc- trine. . It is this reality that underlies the anti- MAD, anti-SALT partisans' call for the development of city-protection systems, from fallout shelters to.anti-ballistic mis- siles. And it is one of the sovereign ironies of our age that the proponents of MAD ' have succeeded in portraying the anti-SALT camp as being indifferent to the horrors of nuclear war, while in point of fact it is MAD, and MAD alone, that postulates the nuclear annihilation of Mutual assured destruction is. theni great cities as the logical culmination to strate that has led the United Statesi international conflict. lease 2 0 fO1I1 i!ofIA-RDP88 fh1 offensive forces of nuclear bombers and missiles, sufficient to destroy the cities R00R993?'I.h4, a fervent support -I er of SALT II, in a review of Dyson's per land-based missi a which are im- posed by SALT H. President Carter has book in the Washington Post, made a! destruction is the kind of idea thati says any new treaty will have to 'include r "to f1 # have come similar point. Sakharov rc w"vAIE r FR$ qQQWJn{12 fa yRARa8F .131pe Ot0? words "Somewhere between the Damage limitation, h y contrast, is in-= ep te t c ri eep cuts" } I But Pe for for malting "deep cutcfie test; pel of nonviolence and the strategy stinctive-the idea of defending oneself of any new agreement, he says, "we've of Mutual Assured Destruction there is easy to grasp. got to get our arms control constituency thinking in a more sophisticated and ma must be a middle ground on which I a" reasonable people can stand-a ground UT, above all, is it not possible to. G luelb way andoot these things. and other analysts point to the that allows killing in self-defense but return to the simplicity of the. need to look more closely at elements forbids the purposeless massacre of in- idea that nuclear arms should be con- within the over-all total of strategic' nocents." Sakharov then comments, trnlled? \'l nhlstettcr has remarked of weapons, such as agreements that would "With all my heart and soul, I sup- SALT that it is a problem posing as a: help keep missile submarines safe. I j - Within government, thorough exami- port port this thesis," adding his agreement solution. Part of the problem has been' nation of these questions has only recent- ` with George Kerman that first-strike the attachment of the process of nego-, ly begun. There is no expectation of nuclear weapons are both amoral and,1 nation to the specific assumptions of a; breakthrough negotiations next time.' in the West, can lead to, in Sakharov's' strategic doctrine that only one side; The next SALT agreement will indeed i y be modest," said one knowledgeable Pen- words, "dangerous complacency with entertained. Yet further problem has' i tagon official. a regard to conventional weapons." (Hel arisen from the unreal notion that there Is it truly not possible to propose to: refers to the decline of Western con- is somehow a distinction between "stra- the Soviets that some reductions be ventional a-ms.) - tegic" nuclear weapons and other kinds. negotiated forthwith? So that the' Moving and humane as such a com- The Pershing II missile, which the world, ourselves included, will know ment may be, it ignores the fact that, United States would like NATO to de- that the time is coming when the' in principle, assured destruction was ploy in Western Europe, is as much al l strength of our respective fore s will not an offensive strategy. Cities wouldl strategic weapon as far as Britain and at last begin to decline? And if the be levelled only- as a response to ag- Holland are concerned as is the Tri-t Russians refuse then at least we will, gression: the very terribleness of the1 dent in the United States. Almost the know what we are in for. response to aggression was supposed best case for SALT II' is that SALT III A senator can take refuge it what to prevent it. It were well that, before could engage the whale panoply of na- the body calls the "pending business.." abandoning the doctrine, we remember tion-busting nuclear arms. The United And that is the SALT II treat). The why we adopted it in the first place. States and the Soviet Union today have debate over its ratification ought to be! But that, in a way, is the most telling far ton many nuclear weapons. They an opportunity for the illurnina-:ion ofl point. It is hard to remember just why ought not to have any. Yet while the our situation, an opportunity to ex-1 we did it. As a set of ideas, deterrence other does, both will. But need we amine the quality of the ideas th:'t have, theory was perhaps not very complex; have more and more? Need we sign brought us to our present pass. On Au- but it was too complex. treaties to legitimate an arms race that gust 1st, I proposed an amendment to Political ideas must be simple., neither side might be willing shame- the treaty in the hope that it might Which is not to say they must be facile. lessly to go forward with unilaterally? prove clarifying. I have taken the lan- To the contrary, the most profound An agreement on principles accom-I guage about "significant and snbstan- propositions are often the simplest as: panning SALT Ti asserts that it is the : tial reductions in the numbers of stra-1 well. Whitehead's rule to "seek sim-; intention of the parties to achieve in tegic offensive arms". from the Joint plicity and distrust it" is appropriate-` SALT III what are called "significant Statement of Principles and Basic, ly cautionary, but he did first of alll and substantial reductions in the num- Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations say: seek simplicity. Imagine explaining hers of strategic offensive arms." But which accompanies the-treaty end in- assured destruction to a rally. There! already the Carter Administration- serted it-as the last paragraph of the was a time when no one had to do this strangely ambivalent Administra- treaty and 'specified that unless such that, when the essential information! tion whose pronouncements Senator reductions are agreed to by Deccmber~ was held in a few hands and a defer- Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., has de- 31, 1981, the treaty terminates. ence system made it possible for de- scribed as "an antiphonal chorus of ( . This date corresponds to the period visions to be made without much being,, hawk and dove"-has been warning ff + of a protocol accompanying the treatyquestioned. That was the political situa- us not to expect anything of the sort. (which prohibits either side- frcm de- tion in which assured destntction was. Gelb, in his Foreign Policy article, Iploying mobile ICBM latinchers-an adopted as national strategy. That noting that "many -people insist that !MX, for instance-or deploying sea- situation no longer exists. We will only through reductions can one launched or ground-launched cruise never knowingly agree to start build- achieve `real anus control,"' warned missiles with a range in excess of sixi ing the MX merely as a bargaining chip, against "a fascination with reductions." hundred kilometres, of the sort we! as some have suggested, intent on stop- Not many weeks after the article ap- riow contemplate placing in Western 1 ping as soon as a bargain is reached. peared, this became a distinct Adrninis-. Europe. The Joint Statement of Prin- A shift in American strategy to de- tration line. When the Foreign Rela- ciples provides that these issues will bell fensive modes that the Soviets could tions Committee began in mid-October discussed in SALT IlL But on October! not think aggressive or destabilizing to "mark up" the SALT if treaty, 26th President Carter assured Senate would now require an open debate on "highly placed" sources were all over; Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd that strategic doctrine of the kind we have Capitol Hill warning against the very l he was utterly and irrevocabI ' cam- not had. For what it may suggest, thought that SALT III might produce' mitted to going forward with bath the: let me note that after a year's im- arms reductions. Vernon A. Guidry,' MX and the cniise missiles and would; mersion in the subject I have no t. Jr., reported in the Washington Star: l never bargain them away in return view of my own, save . ppdbltsdi . r Release 2005/Q11/12 : CIA- P88-0l31kRQOARQ. And so it has', Une key . Al. analyst stil in govern= to think that political ideas, in order- eat, who did not want to be named,' come to this. Determined above all else! to be viable, must be simple. Assured r~n-KT11:U' Ij Approved For Release 2005/91/12 : CIAlRDP88-01315RO004003500119-3 . ___ [?___._ _-1 F r o frpntvi t_ _L_ 1:1_ with arms limitation in the title, a! President pledges himself never to limit arms but rather to raise them to un- precedented levels. This, of course, will mean the collapse of SALT III---unless .we agree now that by a time certain in the near future actual reductions will be agreed to. This is to say, before the MX momentum is so great that the Russians shift into a yet higher gear in order to outrace us, while we become I ever more panicky as the realization spreads that two decades of deterrence have left us. desperately exposed to Soviet threat.- - I expect all manner of criticism of my particular initiative. It will be argued, by defenders of 'the SALT process, that two years is too short a time to complete the task. I will be told that wisdom dictates that the pace of - arms-reduction negotiations not be forced. Yet one wonders whether such objections by defenders of the process do not 'indict that very process-byl pointing out the futility of trying to make it do what it is supposed to. I will be reminded that the Soviets re- sisted the proposals for armed reduc- tions offered by Secretary Vance in March of 1977. If they would not agree even to discuss them in 1977, why should they do so now? I believe this question needs to be answered, and as soon as reasonably possible. I think it best that the SALT II treaty itself oblige the Soviets to give us their answer-one way or the other---so that we are no longer able to delude ourselves about our prospects. -WVe did delude ourselves after SALT I. An amendment by Senator Al- an Cranston to the joint Resolution of Congress that endorsed the Interim Agreement called on the President at the earliest practicable moment to be- gin "Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (sART)" with the Soviet Unicn, the People's Republic of China, and other countries. In a prescient speech on the Senate floor on September 14, 1972, Cranston said: endless series of escalators broken only by occasional landings which lead in turn to other escalators. A partial limitation I will be followed by a new build-up, which may in turn be limited by a new, freeze and superseded by new and so-! phisticated forms of escalation. And so it will go. An amendment by Senator Edward S. Brooke declared: Congress considers that the success of the interim agreement and the attain-, nient of more permanent and compre-~ pensive agreements are dependent upon; the preservation of longstanding United States policy that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States should seek - unilateral advantage by developing a first- strike potential. Clearly, neither expression of congres- sional intent and desire had the least effect on the outcome of SALT Ii. But have we -ever probed deeply into Soviet feelings on this matter? We have never asked them to face, directly, the intellectual dilemma of an arms-limitation negotiation that pro- duces arms expansion. Or is this what the Soviets have wanted all along? Surely, they have prospered militarily and geopolitically during the life of the{ SALT negotiations. Has that been their! purpose? We have nothing whatever' to lose if we trv to find out. At the least, I have been convinced that the SALT process is not self-corrective, and that, accordingly, the energy necessary to change its present direction must be generated from outside the SALT process. It is a process grown unreal, producing results opposite to those intended but thereupon defended as valuable in their own right. Gibbon has been described as detecting a "leakage of reality" in - the late Roman Empire. There was a Pope then, and- it didn't help, and it may not help that there is one still. But John Paul II certainly had a point when he said,;;at they United. Nations, that the nuclear build-1 up shows there is "a desire to be ready] for war, and being ready means being! able to start it." -DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHANM Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350019-3