CHECKLIST OF US-SOVIET ISSUES: STATUS AND PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R000100050004-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2008
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 18, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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CHECKLIST OF US-SOVIET ISSUES:
STATUS AND PROSPECTS
START: Status. Soviet deferral of resumption reaffirmed by
Gromyko in Stockholm, but with Vice President, Chernenko called
nuclear arms control major area for positive US-Soviet discussion.
Soviets know we have new things to say on START in restricted
channels (Dobrynin pressed Hartman to volunteer Thursday).
Prospects. If Framework presented to Soviets soon, some possi-
bility of getting detailed confidential discussion underway over
next few months - (though they may continue to insist on something
on INF/FBS as precondition to serious talks).
INF: Status. Soviets continue fixated on U.S. INF, and refuse
resumption without some expression of U.S. "willingness to return
to the situation that existed before deployments;" in Stockholm
Gromyko shied away even from quiet discussions in restricted
channels. Prospects. Near-term chances of renewed separate INF
talks minimal. Gromyko pointed toward inclusion of U.S. INF
systems in any resumed START talks, was informed that any negotia-
tion dealing with GLCMs and P-IIs must also deal with SS-20s.
MBFR: Status. Talks to resume March 16. President's letter to
Chernenko said we are prepared to introduce some new ideas and to
be flexible on data if Soviets flexible on verification.
Prospects. Difficult to be too optimistic on these long-running
talks, but some forward movement seems possible by summer
assuming early Allied agreement on new proposal enabling us to
respond to Soviets soon.
US-SOVIET CBMs:? Status. January session moved us forward on
upgrade of Hotline, but Soviets most reluctant on some of our
more ambitious proposals. Soviets appear interested in principle
in nuclear terrorism discussions. We are now coordinating USG
proposal with Allies before going to Soviets. Prospects. Follow-
on session on communications CBMs tentatively set for April;
basic Hotline upgrade agreement possible by early summer. Could
talk with Soviets on nuclear terrorism within a month assuming
Allied support firms up; would not move multilaterally until some
agreement with Soviets.
CDE: Status. Early sparring in Stockholm with basic NATO and
Soviet approaches still far apart, and Soviets pushing declaratory
measures such as Non-Use-of-Force Treaty; NATO seeks substantive
notification measures. Prospects. We should pursue private
dialogue underway in Stockholm. Realistic compromise proposals
may be months or even years off without high-level political
decisions, i.e. a package with points satisfying both sides.
State Dept. review completed
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NON-PROLIFERATION: Status. Third round' of highly technical: and . .
essentially non-political bilaterals' just concluded in Vienna;
both sides see them as valuable mechanism for policy coordination
in this area. Prospects. Soviets have proposed and we are ready
to agree to another session for December.
CHEMICAL WEAPONS: Status: Secretary Shultz announced to the CDE
that we will be presenting a draft CW treaty in coming months;
once State and ACDA competing versions are reconciled, a text will
be submitted for interagency clearance. OSD opposes concept of
such a treaty, but has proposed US-Soviet bilateral verification
discussion. Prospects: Final treaty will not be ready for CD
submission before April at the earliest; we may wish to pick up
bilateral discussion proposal in interim.
NUCLEAR TESTING: Status: Soviets have turned down our proposals
to discuss verification before ratification of 1976 TTBT treaty
every time, and believe they have the propaganda high ground in
calling for discussion only after it is ratified. Prospects: An
interagency group is studying further approaches to the Soviets.
One option involves ratification of TTBT in exchange for Soviet
consent to on-site verification of a few nuclear calibration
tests. Some agencies oppose any change in our position on basis
of our non-compliance report to Congress.
ASAT ARMS CONTROL: Status. Soviets probably intend to make this
major issue and Tsongas Amendment may prevent our testing the U.S.
ASAT system absent talks with Soviets. Basically very little
possible on this now until fundamental verification problems
resolved. Some confidence-building measures are now being
discussed within the USG and could be proposed for discussion
with Soviets. Prospects: Proposals for CBMs or prohibiting
certain acts could be discussed once USG study completed, but
would be of less interest to Soviets than ASAT ban.
MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS: Status. Little dialogue between
military establishments except in Incidents-at-Sea context, and
we have held back from proposing regular exchanges between Wein-
berger and Ustinov or Chiefs of Staff. Prospects. A proposal of
a Weinberger-Ustinov or Vessey-Ogarkov meeting could be made when-
ever we deem appropriate. Ex-CJCS David Jones plans to visit
Moscow as member of Dartmouth Group delegation in March. Soviets,
however, are likely to be extremely cautious until some progress
made on other issues.
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I1. REGIONAL' ISSUES
MIDDLE EAST: Status. Talking with Soviets here and Moscow, and
Soviets negotiating with French on UN role in Lebanon.
Prospects. Soviets unlikely to do much to help us in Lebanon,
but-nervous about Syrian-impelled confrontation with us. Could
acquiesce in UN role and. possibly eventual Syrian withdrawal in
return for commitments on U.S. and Israeli forces. Further
discussion in Shultz-Dobrynin and Hartman-Gromyko channels could
be useful to avoid miscalculation.
AFGHANISTAN: Status. Soviets dug in for long term, but feeling
pressure. Talks under UN auspices may resume in April. Pakistan
welcomes US-Soviet bilateral contacts as supporting its efforts,
but last US-Soviet "experts'" talks in Moscow in July 1982.
Prospects. As pressure on the ground rises, Soviets may look to
further cross border incursions on Pakistan, to UN process and/or
to direct talks with us as safety valve. We could make some
points about role of guarantors in overall settlement that
included withdrawal timetable if we wished to probe their longer-
term intentions and prove we support UN process.
SOUTHERN AFRICA: Status. Steady progress now on South African
disengagement from Angola, and discussions on shape of final
settlement continue with some prospect for success, but Soviets
could still block either through SWAPO or in Luanda. Chet
Crocker talked with Soviets three times in 1982, but not since.
Prospects. Sending Hartman in with an update could give Soviets
a better feel for the dilemmas they face.
KAMPUCHEA: Status. Soviets combine support for Vietnamese
occupation of Kampuchea with more active policy vis-a-vis ASEAN
states, and item has not ranked high in bilateral dialogue.
Prospects. No immediate prospects of inducing the Soviets to
decrease aid to Hanoi.
EMIGRATION/ANTI-SEMITISM: Status. Decline in levels of Jewish
and other emigration continues, with last year's Jewish total
about 3% of 1979 figure. Perennial topic in high-level meetings
since 1981; latest "representation lists" on divided families and
spouses and U.S. nationals handed over to Gromyko's deputy in
Stockholm; Secretary raised anti-Semitism with Dobrynin after
Stockholm; Bronfman visit to Moscow now uncertain.
Prospects. Return to large numbers unlikely, but Soviets could
make some gestures -- through quiet diplomacy or to public
figures -- in election year, and numbers could rise slightly as
function of overall atmosphere in relationship.
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SOVIET DISSIDENTS: Status. Andropov era saw rounding up and
sentencing of all but a handful of Soviet dissidents. We raise
these issues at regular intervals, including at Stockholm, but
Sakharov still.in Gorkiy, Orlov is going to internal exile after
finishing seven-year sentence, and Shcharanskiy is still in jail.
Prospects. Again not good, although, again, gestures are
probably more possible under Chernenko, and we should encourage
through quiet diplomacy.
MARITIME BOUNDARY: Status. We offered a 50-50 split in the
disputed territory in the Bering Sea. January negotiations in
Washington complicated by unacceptable new Soviet position
claiming additional areas for their exclusive economic zone and
continental shelf rights. Prospects. New round is expected but
not yet scheduled for near future. If Soviets move off their new
position, an agreement woul'c be possible within a few months at
most. If they dig in, there will be extended negotiations.
KAL SAFETY MEASURES: Status. Discussions have begun in Montreal
with Soviets and Japanese on installation of beacons, improved
communications, and designation of emergency landing fields in
the Soviet Far East along KAL 007 route. Prospects. Soviets
have proposed US-Soviet-Japanese experts' group and signalled
willingness to take concrete air safety steps under the ICAO
umbrella. Action should be possible, but Soviets will remain
wary of accepting even implicit responsibility for shootdown, and
results could take months.
KIEV AND NEW YORK CONSULATES: Status. Advance teams preparing
for the formal opening of consulates under 1974 agreement were
withdrawn as an Afghanistan sanction; now we have no official
presence in Ukraine, while Soviets continue activities in New York
out of their UN Mission. Last summer both sides agreed to move
forward again, but progress ended with KAL; Secretary reiterated
agreement in principle to Gromyko in Stockholm, noting timing
must be right. Prospects. A negotiating strategy is awaiting
NSC approval; Soviets say they are ready to open consulates at
any time; talks could resume immediately; agreement could be
reached and TDY advance teams could perhaps be in place by summer.
Detailed arrangements could delay formal opening for some years.
EXCHANGES AGREaIENT: Status. We allowed US-Soviet cultural
exchanges agreement to lapse after Afghanistan. Programs dropped
off in both directions, but Soviets can arrange tours through
private U.S. organizations, so we cannot exact reciprocity in the
absence of agreement. We cannot mount USIA travelling exhibits
in the Soviet Union, and Soviets now blocking Hartman's efforts
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to run cultural programs out of his residence. Two sides agreed
in principle in July to begin negotiations, but movement stopped
with KAL; Secretary reiterated agreement in principle to Gromyko
in Stockholm. Prospects. Draft proposal is far advanced, but
would require high-level approval. It would probably take some
months to negotiate agreement, but might be completed this year.
CONSULAR REVIEW 'IrALKS: Status. First round of talks aimed at
alleviating some of our ongoing visa and other consular problems
with Soviets recessed in May after FBI refused to agree to
additional entry point by sea at Baltimore (in addition to San
Francisco) in return for two new points offered by Soviets (Brest
and Nakhodka). Prospects. If FBI lifts veto on Baltimore, talks
could resume at any time and produce balanced package of useful
.small housekeeping steps.
SIMULATED SPACE RESCUE: Status. Proposed to Soviets in late
January. They have yet to respond. Prospects. Soviets have not
appeared enthusiastic to date. We need response soon if there is
to be any hope of making simulated rescue flight this summer.
COAST GUARD SEARCH AND RESCUE TALKS: Status. Soviets agreed just
before KAL to discuss S&R procedures with senior Coast Guard
officials, looking perhaps toward an agreement on coordination of
search operations in Bering Sea. They deflected our December
efforts to set up a meeting. Prospects. Soviets would probably
agree now. Discussions and a possible agreement could be
impressive following our well-publicized frictions during the KAL
search and rescue operation.
PRIVATE/CONGRESSIONAL CONTACTS. Status. Already an upsurge of
interest in expanding people-to-people contacts; some in Congress
want to invite a Supreme Soviet delegation this year.
Prospects.* To limit exploitation by Soviets, we might encourage
tougher-minded experienced groups like American Council of Young
Political Leaders to visit. Supreme Soviet visit could attract
major Soviet figure to U.S.
LONG-TERM ECONOMIC AGREEMENT RENEWAL: Status. 10-year agreement,
which has some utility in facilitating U.S. business efforts in
Moscow, expires in June. Prospects. U.S. could propose renewal.
in the next few weeks. The Soviets would probably accept.
JOINT COMMERCIAL COMMISSION: Status. A scheduled meeting was
cancelled as an Afghanistan sanction, and this official, cabinet-
level body has thus not met since 1978. Prospects. We could
propose meeting later this year, assuming we have had a positive
response on other economic steps. .
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FISHERIES AGREEMENT RENEWAL: Status. Extended twice under this
Administration and up for renewal in July, this agreement has
allowed a joint fishing venture that benefits U.S. fishermen.
Soviets have not been allowed to fish directly in U.S. waters
since Afghanistan. Prospects. Approval of an'18-month extension
would permit improved planning by U.S. fisherman. USG could
consider giving the Soviets a direct fish allocation at any time.
CURRENT AGREEMENTS: Status. There are US-Soviet cooperative
agreements in force on the environment, health (including
artificial heart research), housing, and agriculture that have
functioned at low levels, partly because of the political
atmosphere and partly because of restrictions on high-level US-
Soviet contacts. Soviets interested in reviving these exchanges
and giving them appropriate leadership. Prospects. Agreements
could be given additional content by USG side with the
participation of higher-ranking U.S. officials.
NEW BILATERAL AGREEMENTS:' Status. A number of agreements were
allowed to lapse after Afghanistan, some of which would be in our
favor to renegotiate. They include the areas of space,
transportation, and basic sciences and engineering.
Prospects. Soviets are on record as favoring renewal and
expansion of agreements, and these cases, affected agencies also
new agreements. Transportation could be renewed by exchange of
notes we had partially carried out before KAL. Others would take
some time to develop proposals and negotiate agreements.
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