THE NARROWNESS OF THE SOVIET NEGOTIATORS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R000301140036-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2010
• Sequence Number: 36
• Content Type: MISC

Approved For Release 2010/08/30 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000301140036-7
ruary or March, with a Christmas break. They said
February or March of 1981, you understand. It did not
last four or five months, it lasted for three years, and we
didn't end this meeting until September 1983.
Let me also say in this connection that, in addition to
the thres years of formal meetings, I had during that
period the opportunity to spend more than 400 hours in
private discussions and negotiations with the Soviet del-
egates. So whatever conclusions and generalizations I
want to share with you about this process aze based on
that kind of experience.
Now I was not a novice to Soviet matters. At one
point I taught political science as well as law, and I
taught a course on problems of democracy and another
course on Marxism-Leninism. I wrote a book on the ef-
fort of the Communist party to capture the American
labor movement. So I didn't come to the issue as a total
novice.
The Narrowness of the Soviet Negotiators
I'd followed with care the Soviet Union's relationship
with other nations and its role on the world scene. But I
encountered two things I had not anticipated and that
frankly surprised me in my experience in Madrid. Al-
most everything else that I experienced was consistent
with my conclusions and observations, based on my
prior study and examination and my limited experience.
The two things that I had not expected to find were as
follows: First, I had not expected to find the degree of
commitment to Leninism that I actually did find in the
heads of the Soviet delegation. I am not prepazed to
generalize and to say that that degree of commitment
went through the whole delegation. I didn't meet every
member, or at least didn't have intensive conversations
with every member of the Soviet delegation. Nor am I
prepared to say this necessarily means that Leninism has
deep roots within the Soviet society. I do not know.
What I can say, however, is that I was surprised by the
degree of commitment to Leninism that existed in the
leadership of that delegation. When you aze spending
400 hours in conversations, and pazticulazly if you feel
you are a little bit familiaz with the concepts of Marx-
ism-Leninism, it isn't difficult to find yourself involved
in conversations about Marxism-Leninism. I expected
to find a more pragmatic view, maybe a more cynical
view.
The pragmatism was there but let me tell you about
the meetings I had with two different heads of delega-
tions of the Soviet Union. Both were deputy foreign
ministers-I think there aze a total of five deputy for-
eign ministers under Gromyko. One of them, when the
meeting stazted, was a 75-yeaz-old man, a very capable
man who had been a "survivor." He had his ups and
downs, but was at the time a member of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party, a very powerful
man. He had spent 11 yeazs as head of the negotiating
team with the Chinese. As the Chinese negotiations were
moved to the front burner, he was moved back into
those negotiations, and was succeeded at Madrid by an-
other man who was also a deputy foreign minister. He
was a man who our government told me was of consid-
erable importance within the system. In both of them I
did find this kind of commitment to the tenets of Marx-
ism-Leninism.
The second thing that surprised me was the degree of
lack of information about the United States and the
American people. Now, I am awaze of the fact that we
don't know enough about them. But we aze after all an
open society and I expected that they would know more
about how we function, how decisions aze made, and
about our cultural milieu in general. I was frankly very
disappointed to learn that they did not know as much as
I thought they knew. Included in the delegation were
obviously high officials of the KGB with whom I talked
and whom I certainly thought knew more about us than
it turned out that they did. Indeed, I expressed my dis-
appointment to them, particulazly to the head of the
KGB group there, that they did not know more about
us. This of course tends to complicate our relationships
with them.
A Deadly Serious Adversary
Now, let me see if I can bring both of these things to-
gether and shaze with you certain consequences that it
seems to me flow from them. We aze dealing with an ex-
tremely serious adversary. Its leadership cadre is serious
and relatively single minded. They have to be. These aze
people who have come up the hazd way in their system.
They have all been schooled in this hazd way-and you
don't survive this schooling unless you aze able to sur-
vive the toughness of the system. Whether people smile,
and whether they like jazz or don't like jazz really is
irrelevant. I don't think our press does us a great service
by this emphasis on irrelevancies. These aze serious peo-
ple. They're well trained. The training is vigorous. At
the outset, it is very much a theoretical training with an
emphasis on basic principles. Those who undergo this
training understand that it is not safe to deviate from
these principles.
I am also convinced that this is probably the most
deadly and the most serious adversary that we have
faced in our long history-and this for many reasons.
First is the question of their intent. The record of
their intentions does not inspire confidence in anyone
who believes in world order. The extent to which they
aze permeated with Leninist ideology, the extent to
which they do not know us, strengthens, I believe, an
attitude within the system and those who populate that
system in positions of influence. It strengthens an atti-
tude which believes in (a) an inevitable victory on their
part because they aze riding the wave of history, and (b)
a feeling on their pazt that there is a kind of corruption
in the West which undermines will and intent and which
has within it the seeds of its own destruction. They be-
Approved For Release 2010/08/30 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000301140036-7
 Approved For Release 2010/08/30 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000301140036-7
lieve this; the leadership, I am convinced, believes this.
The system depends on this belief-indeed I think it is
this kind of conviction which permits the system to sur-
vive its difficulties.
Objectively we can look at the Soviet Union and see
the many difficulties that confront the Soviet regime.
But we cannot ignore the faith in their own ultimate vic-
tory. Even though many scholars here might argue that
this conclusion is questionable, I would say that no pru-
dent society, and no leadership that wants to be respon-
sible can afford to rest its own security on an assump-
tion that runs contrary to the conclusion I have asserted.
To have your security depend on the good will, the good
intentions of the Soviet regime is to put our own society
at risk. This no prudent society and no responsible lead-
er should permit.
We know that the Soviet Union is a massive militazy
power and we know that it is a highly repressive police
state. These factors, of course, add to the element of
danger-which leads me to the conclusion I have stated
about the seriousness with which we must regard this
adversazy.
Our Soviet adversary has another facility of which we
must take note. They have the ability to use language in
a way which is designed to confuse people like ourselves
and undermine our will. This they do professionally and
effectively. They take a noble word like democracy and
adopt it as their own-as you know, they frequently
call their systems "people's democracies." This is a
total corruption of the term. It makes me think of the
Tower of Babel and the confusion that reigned among
the people involved in this Biblical story.
Words have different meaning. The Communists are
able to use these differences to promote their own
appeal, which they then use as an instrument of expan-
sionism or aggression. Their ability to use people and to
use democracy is an example of this talent. The Com-
munist appeal is essentially a humanitarian appeal.
They talk about justice being the end result. They at-
tempt to take advantage of injustice where it exists, and
in their propaganda they identify themselves and ally
themselves with efforts to achieve humanitarian goals
such as freedom or justice. In this respect, they aze un-
like the Nazis who had a negative appeal to civilized
people. This, of course, adds to the threat posed by the
Soviet Union.
Fortunately, of course, the gas has largely gone out of
their ideological balloon. Their own excesses have led to
the point where, as of today, their ideology has very lit-
tle appeal. They are identified as a result of their ex-
cesses as a repressive regime. What they do have going
for them, deliberately, is of course massive military
power. And that leads me, therefore, to another con-
clusion which I have azrived at as a result of my own
experiences, highlighted by Madrid, which is that what
they respect is power.
The Key Importance of Power
The extent to which their adversary has power of its
own adds an element of dignity to the azgument of the
adversary. We are respected because of our power, and
I therefore am a strong believer in American military
power, American military strength. I am convinced
there is no substitute for it.
Within the last few days I've had occasion to think
about the time when President Lyndon Johnson pro-
posed to the Soviet leadership that we get rid of anti-
ballistic missiles. He had been persuaded by the secre-
tazy of defense that this was a desirable objective. And
he proposed this to the Soviet leadership and the Soviet
leadership rejected the idea completely and decisively.
They simply said there is a threat to us, etc., etc. Now,
President Nixon made a proposal to the Congress for
the deployment of an antiballistic missile defense. The
Congress accepted this proposal, and it passed. And to
and behold the Soviets were suddenly prepazed to talk
about restraining antiballistic missile defense. We had
to engage in this display of strength before they had the
incentive to negotiate. I'm convinced that President
Reagan's Mazch 1983 proposal for a Strategic Defense
Initiative was an impelling move which has led to what
appeazs to be the new Soviet willingness to sit down
again and talk about azms control-this in spite of the
fact that they walked out of the Geneva azms control
talks last year. Again it was a manifestation of our seri-
ousness of purpose which provided the incentive to
them to move. I believe these lessons aze important for
us to understand.
Unilateral concessions by us aze not interpreted in my
opinion as acts of good will. I believe that unilateral
concessions by us are interpreted as a lack of will.
Western Unity in the Madrid Negotiations
Let me state some conclusions about my experience
in Madrid. We were there for three yeazs, and the pre-
pazatory meeting lasted for nine and one-half weeks
rather than 10 days. We had in Madrid the unique fac-
tor of total allied unity. Not only were we together, but
on basic issues the correctness of our position and the
strength of our position led the neutral countries to join
us when matters came to a crunch. And, indeed, towazd
the end, the strength of our position, as well as its rea-
sonableness, coupled with the unity of the West, led
some of the Eastern European countries to join us quiet-
ly and support our objectives.
Allied unity is essential to successful negotiations with
the Soviets. At Madrid we had NATO caucuses, for ex-
ample, aminimum ofthree times a week, and there were
times when we met four and five times a day. The
United States delegation decided there would be no sec-
rets from our allies-we would do everything together.
That gave us the strength which proved important in the
negotiations.
Approved For Release 2010/08/30 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000301140036-7
 Approved For Release 2010/08/30 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000301140036-7
I recall very eazly on in the meeting saying to my
Soviet colleague: "Look, I'm just telling you our po-
sition. It is not just the American position-it's the
Western position." Incidentally, one must be consistent
in the position one takes. This, I think, we were. The
Russians'called it stubbornness-but be that as it may.
We must do these things. To continue my story of my
conversation with the Soviet delegate, I remember say-
ing to him: "Look, you're skeptical about what I'm say-
ing to you. Fine. Don't take my word. Call in the
French, call in the Germans, the Dutch, the Norwegians
-talk to them. Don't just talk to me." Obviously he
was surprised by this. They would never say to me,
"Call in the Hungarians." Or, "Call in the Czechs."
When the Soviets did speak to the other Western dele-
gates, they learned that the West was completely united.
As a result of this I am able to say that the West got
everything that it asked for in Madrid-it took three
yeazs to achieve it, but on paper the West got every-
thing it asked for.
The Outcome of the Madrld Conference
In an unpublicized way we also got the gestures we
asked for in addition to the words. The Madrid conclud-
ing document, for those of you who aze international
scholazs, has tightened up some loopholes in the Hel-
sinki Final Act-which was in itself a document heav-
ilybased on humanitarian considerations-and took it a
step further. We included the essential ingredient of free
trade unionism, for example, based on the Polish exper-
ience-the Solidarity experience.
Now one could azgue that words by themselves don't
make much sense. As a matter of fact I used to azgue
with myself about this. What's the sense of the words if
the acts are not consistent with the words? Let me tell
you why I am prepazed to defend the words.
I think it is somewhat like the Ten Commandments.
One might azgue that at one time or another most of us
will violate one or more of those Ten Commandments.
And yet they are important standards that serve two
purposes. First, they are important standazds towazds
which to strive-and such standazds aze also needed for
a responsible international community. The Soviets in
this case have accepted the agreed upon standazds
which we must all strive to attain. Second, the standazds
we have agreed upon can be used to judge those states
that do not live up to them. I think one of the great
values of the Madrid meeting was that we took the Hel-
sinki standazds seriously. We did not let the Soviets get
off the hook.
Toughness and Persistence Do Pay Off
There hasn't been an international forum at which the
nature of the Soviet Union has been as thoroughly and
as fully described as it was in Madrid. I had one Western
foreign minister say to me and to the secretary of state,
after the meeting, that he was convinced that in his own
country the support for the emplacement of the inter-
mediate range missiles-the cruise missiles and the
Pershings-was very much the result of a public opinion
which had been bombazded by descriptions of the na-
ture of the Soviet Union and the violations of the Hel-
sinki agreement which served as a constant reference. I
was on European television practically daily in one
country or another. I was on BBC once a week, regu-
lazly on World News Service. The nature of the Soviet
Union was constantly under discussion. We asked the
Soviet Union: "How do you expect us to believe any
agreement you sign if you don't live up to the agreement
you signed in 1975 at Helsinki?" So the Helsinki stan-
dazds became very important in the on-going battle for
the hearts and minds of the people.
This is one reason why I say that the Madrid meeting
was so important, and why I must say to you now in
concluding my remazks that, as faz as the West is con-
cerned, successful negotiations with the Soviets must be
based on candor and honesty about the nature of the
opposition. For us to pussyfoot around because we
don't want to offend them is to me perceived as a sign
of weakness-and in reality it is a sign of weakness.
People have said to me, "How can you negotiate while
you're engaged in a policy of confrontation?" The
Soviets use that word all the time-"confrontation."
Let me answer this question by telling you that I was
confronting them. It was confrontation. I do not deny
that. Some lawyers will tell me that if you negotiate you
have to try to get along with the other fellow, you don't
confront. I say to you that in the business of our rela-
tionship with the Soviet Union, since the issues aze
serious, since the divisions aze profound, our differ-
ences are profound. For us not to engage in confron-
tation, for us not to be candid about our concerns, I
think does not make for an honest negotiation and can-
not lead to any kind of constructive results. It is noth-
ing but a chazade. So I believe in the most fundamental
way that one must be candid.
The press this week indicated that as far as the pres-
ident is concerned it is essential in our negotiations in
Geneva that we highlight the issue of Soviet violations
of existing azms control agreements. It is indispensable
that we do so. Even though they may yell like stuck pigs
-that's unimportant, they should yell. They choose
when they aze offended. They choose when they feel
good. They choose when they aze insulted. They choose
when they aze angry. These are all part of a serious
negotiating effort. The Soviet act must not dissuade us
from being honest and candid and consistent about our
position.
If we raise an issue 11 times and there is no response
or rejection of the issue and if it is important to us and
if we don't raise it the twelfth time-that becomes sig-
nificant to the Soviets. Because we have dropped the
issue, the Soviets conclude that it's not important for us
anymore. We must understand that, so we do not drop
Approved For Release 2010/08/30 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000301140036-7
 Approved For Release 2010/08/30 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000301140036-7
the issue the twelfth time. If it's an issue that is of real
concern to us, we must continue to raise it-patiently,
persistently, consistently. I am convinced of that.
If we can maintain the same kind of Western unity,
and if we can make the Soviets pay a price for trans-
gressing agreements-whether it's a price in public opin-
ion, or whether it's a price in benefits, or whether it's a
price in relationships-and if we can maintain our mil-
itary strength, I think we have a shot at entering into
some kind of constructive relationship with them. And
since the stakes aze so high, I think it's essential for us
to do everything we can to exploit that shot and to make
that shot available to us.
Question Period
Arnaud de Borchgrave: Max, the one thing I don't
quite understand is why it took so long to reach. these
conclusions. If you go back and read the Soviet theo-
retical journals in the eazly 1970s, they define peaceful
coexistence as a shift in the global correlation of forces
favorable to them, made irreversible by their growing
military power. Then when you were signing the Final
Act in Helsinki, they were already laying the logistics
for the introduction of Cuban proxy troops into Africa
and they were also going into production of the SS-20,
which was deployed two yeazs later. Why did it take un-
til the invasion of Afghanistan for people to reach the
conclusions that you have just set forth?
Kampelman: I can add another piece of evidence. It
has to be that at the time they signed the ABM treaty they
were planning the radaz installation in Siberia which is
in. violation of the ABM treaty we have been talking
about. Our experts tell us it would take about a dozen
yeazs to plan and engineer and construct to the present
point of construction. This is, of course, part of the na-
ture of the problem. Why is the problem not under-
stood? It gets discouraging.
First of all, newer generations like to leazn things for
themselves. They also think they can do things better
than their parents did. Pazents know this. This is similar
to the problem of how do you keep children's fingers
away from the fire, the candle, so that the child doesn't
get burned. Sometimes you can't succeed in persuading
them; they've got to burn themselves sometimes in order
to learn. This is one of our problems. But there is some-
thing else that I think is of great importance. Perhaps it
is also a tribute to Soviet effectiveness in trying to in-
fluence public opinion. That is, the Soviets have been
able to capture for themselves the rhetoric of peace. I've
never understood why we have permitted that to happen
-but we have permitted it to happen. Maybe some of it
has to do with the nature of our system.
Our Defense Department has to make an appeal to
the Congress because it can't do anything without mak-
ing its appeal to the Congress-that has to be public-
capture the rhetoric of peace. Knowing then that we
can't afford to let them capture that rhetoric, we some-
times feel that we have to be doing things in order to
identify ourselves with peace. And some of the things
we mistakenly do aze contrary to our interests, as I see
it, and that's an important consideration. But there is
also something else that I think is present. Our presi-
dents-it dcesn't matter which party it is-are generally
people who strive for peace and understanding and, of
course, a brave new world. This is part of the American
dream. They would like to go down in history aspeace-
lovers, whether or not they win the Nobel Peace Prize.
The temptation to them therefore to use their energies in
that direction is there. The desirability of the end result
is not in question. What is at issue is the means of
achieving that end result. Our own culture tells us that
to get along with our neighbors we must be prepazed to
turn the other cheek. So we extend ourselves. We take
initiatives. We aze nice. Culturally this is our way of do-
ing things. And that's frequently a mistake.
I want us always to be nice, let me say-in fact, even
when I was candid I always maintained good personal
relationships with the other side. But I really think our
presidents must always keep in mind-and that our sec-
retazies of state and our advisers on foreign policy must
always keep in mind-this is a system which forces Sak-
hazovs to go on hunger strikes, this is a system which
puts the Schazanskys in jail, this is a system which kills
Catholic priests who attempt to show any kind of inde-
pendence of thought and religious views, this is a re-
pressive society which has millions of people in labor
camps and in prison camps. We must never forget that.
This is why the human rights ingredient is so important.
This is a system which takes political opponents and
puts them in psychiatric hospitals as a form of political
reprisal. If we can keep that always in mind, and not the
Western dress and the smile, which may be there on a
personal level, then I think we will be able to keep our
eye on the ball.
John Wohlstetter: Jean-Francois Revel has just writ-
ten abook How Democracies Perish which suggests that
democracies have certain self-destructive tendencies. As
one example of this he cites the imposition of martial
law in Poland and the lack of what he called any effec-
tive Western response, which in pazt was predicated on
the fact that, instead of sending tanks, they simply hired
General Jazuzelski to do their work for them. Do you
think that we did have an effective response to the
Polish crisis in 1981, and if not, do you think Revel is
right that we are not capable of having one?
Kampelman: First, let me say that I think democracy
has certain weaknesses. But, so what? I mean, we know
that. I also think we have many strengths and I think
our strengths are a great deal more effective than our
weaknesses, if we pay attention to these weaknesses and
asking for so much for armaments. This then gets attempt to deal with them. Let me say this about the
played up around the world. This helps the Soviets to Polish experience. The Solidarity movement came into
6
Approved For Release 2010/08/30 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000301140036-7