Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 28, 2011
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
July 24, 1985
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP88B00443R000903780006-2.pdf973.87 KB
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP88B00443R000903780006-2 Directorate of Intelligence Office of Central Reference 24 July 1985 NOTE FOR: Y"' DD/OCR SUBJECT: Wallop's Statement on Nicaraguan Bios This excerpt from the Congressional Record of 3 October 1984 evidently is the one mentioned by Senator Wallop. It contains biographic material on the Nicaraguan contra leaders, as well as some background material on the opposition to the Sandinistas, and was introduced into the Record by Senator Wallop. The biographies were produced by State Department (Office of the Coordinator for Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean) and were based on reports OCR prepared in December 1983 (for Assistant Secretary Motley) and on data obtained by Public Diplomacy from contra organizations. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP88B00443R000903780006-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP88B00443R000903780006-2 S 12866 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE October 3, 1984 down that street in th , wrong direc- tion. Either this country stands for, and seeks for, and will support, legitimate aspirations to freedom, or it is not the country that I think It is, and this is not the Senate that I hope it Is. Mr. GOLDWATER..,.One additional question, and I shalTit down: The decision in these matters in my opinion and according to the Constitu- tion rests with the President, the Com- mander in Chief. The Commander in Chief has seen an ultimate threat to our freedom on borders 800 miles away. I might suggest that is the clos- est we have ever come siii`ce the attack on Pearl Harbor to hi.ting our free- dom threatened. I might add that because I live on the Mexican border, I might feel a little more closely associated with this threat than others who live a greater distance away. But does the Senator from Wyoming not feel that regardless of what word- age we might adopt on this floor in the form of an amendment, ultimately it is the Commander ht Chief who is going to have to make ut, our minds or we are going to have to amend the Constitution, and I frar cly think that this might be a good tes , for the Presi- dent to try his case, 1 ecause before this Constitution of outs can survive and we can go along as a free people, in my opinion, we have to defeat the War Powers Act. I do n, t like to bring this in at this time, but I Just wanted to raise that one poin , before I sit down; that Is. It Is our 1 'ommander in Chief, not us, who has o make these final decisions, and mtt h as I dislike arguing with my friend from Hawaii, because I have the utmist respect for him-he is one of the great heroes of our World War II; he is tL man who is dedicated to our princip cs-but in this case, I have to agree a i th my friend from Wyoming that the language of this amendment should not be adopt- ed by this body. Ma WALLOP. I thank the Senator from Arizona. Mr. President, I made my case on the floor, and I will not r lake It again, for the strategic significance of this area. I have asked whetter this coun- try wants another Cubs. In this hemi- sphere, and whether it t; willing to live with the resulting eJ f !cts on the Panama Canal and on )ur southern border. Today, I wish t' concentrate on something a little d' f [erent, an es- sential issue that we love neglected. Whatever we do with re trd to Nicara- gua, our action or ini.< tion will re- dound to someone's beii'fit. If we do not support the contra:, then we sup- port the Communists. I war, there is no equivocation. What is going on down there Is a war wi red by people seeking their freedom, a id by Commu- nist tyrants trying to cn sh it. I have in my hand S mate Concur- rent Resolution 74 sign I by 70 Sena- tors of this body to enco gage and sup- port the people of Afgh: nistan, on the other side of the world, on the Soviet border., in their struggle to be free from Soviet domination. We all -know who we are, the cospon- sors of Senate Concurrent Resolution 74. and I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the list of cosponsors. There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed In the RECORD, as follows: Mr. TsoNGAS (for himself, Mr. ABDNOR, Mr. ANDREWS, Mr. ARMSTRONG, Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. BINGAMAN, Mr. Boscnw TZ, Mr. BRAD- LEY, Mr. BUMPERS, Mr. BYRD, Mr. CHILES, Mr. COCHRAN, Mr. COHEN. Mr. D'AMATO, Mr. DECoNcINI, Mr. DIXON, Mr. DOLE. Mr. DURENBERGER. Mr. EAGLETON, Mr. ExoN, Mr. FORD, Mr. GARN, Mr. GLENN, Mr. GRASSLEY, Mr. HART. Mr. HATCH, Mr. HEINZ, Mr. HUD- DLESTON. Mrs. KASSESAUM, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. LAXALT, Mr. LEVIN, Mr. LUGAR, Mr. MAT- TINGLY, Mr. MELCHER. Mr. MOYNIHAN, Mr. MURKOWSKI, Mr. NICKLES, Mr. PELL. Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. PRYOR. Mr. QUAYLE. Mr. RANDOLPH, Mr. RIEGLE, Mr. RUDMAN, Mr. SARBANES, Mr. SASSER. Mr. SIMPSON, Mr. SPECTER, Mr. STENNIS, Mr. WARNER, Mr. WILSON, Mr. ZORiNSKY, Mr. HOLI.tNGS, Mr. PEncY, Mr. JEPSEN, Mr. CRAN- STON. Mr. HEPLiN, Mr. DENTON, Mr. Symms, Mr. EAST, Mr. INOUYE, Mr: DODD, Mr. KASTEN. Mr. HECHT, Mr. McCLURE, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. WALLOP, Mr. HUMPHREY, Mr. TOWER, and Mr. LAUTE.NSERG) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Rela- tions. Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, I wonder what they see as the differ- ence, those who feel one way about Af- ghanistan and another about Central America. Sure, they will be saying that there are Soviet occupation troops in Afghanistan. But is not Cuba and the Soviet Union in effect an occupation force with the Sandinistas? Who In here thinks that the Sandinistas can oper- ate on their own independently and could trigger a free election if they wanted to without the permission of their Soviet and Cuban masters? Why would we vote to help freedom on the other side of the globe and to further the cause of the Soviet Union near our own border? Does anyone in here doubt that a victory over the Nicaraguan resistance would be a victory for the Soviet Union? Of course It would be. Why is it that there are some In this body so eager to give that victory to the Soviets and the Cubans? Do the Nicaraguan people have less right to be free than the Afghans? The resolution says: . It would be Indefensible to provide the freedom fighters with only enough aid to fight and die but not enough to advance their cause of freedom. Where are all my consistent fellow cosponsors? What is the difference be- tween people seeking freedom In the mountains of Central Asia or the mountains of Central America? Where are you? Why Is it that it is more important to be free there than in our own hemisphere? Perhaps here is the anwser. The res- olution says: That it should be the policy of the United States to support effecitvely the people of Afghanistan In their fight for freedom; ... Perhaps these cosponsors are willing to say such things when there is little chance of achieving them, but when a real choice is before them, Instead of backing freedom, in effect they are backing a Soviet victory in our own hemisphere. How good Is It to have votes on clear Issues? How clear can you get? The choice is absolutely there. Voters can cast their votes and decide between sincerity and hypocrisy. Both of those causes are worthy of the support of a free people proud of freedom, and this I hope to God In America is still one. Mr. President. lest there be any doubt as to the nature of the leaders of the contras, I ask unanimous con- sent that the biographies of the contra leaders, showing them to be freedom- loving people, many of whom formerly were Sandinistas, be printed in the RECORD at this point. There being no objection, the mate- rial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: INTRODUCTION The Sandinistas are waging an Intensive propaganda campaign to discredit their op- ponents as counter-revolutionaries. They de- nounce the leaders of the armed anti-Sandl- nista organizations as henchmen of former President Somoza. But the facts show that nearly all the so-called "contra" leaders were actually staunch opponents of Somoza. Many fought against Somoza and contribut- ed to his defeat. Subsequently, they became disillusldned when they saw that the demo- cratic revolution for which they had sacrl- ficed so much was being transformed by the Sandinistas Into a Marxist-Leninist dictator- ship. This paper provides an overview of the reasons many Nicaraguans turned against the Sandinistas and examines the composi- tion of the groups that form the armed op- position. WHY THE OPPOSITION DEVELOPED The Sandinistas' victory In 1979 depended largely on the spirit of rebellion against Somoza which had developed during the 1970's. Political parties-including the Con- servatives, who were the traditional opposi- tion force, dissident Liberals, Social Chris- tians. and Socialists-all clamored for an end to Somoza's total domination of the na- tion's political system. Businessmen, farm- ers, ranchers, and professionals-united in the Supreme Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP)-struggled against Somoza's con- trol of Nicaragua's economy. Independent labor confederations fought for workers' rights and an end to repression of the orga- nized labor movement. The Catholic Church. under the leadership of Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo, became an outspo- ken critic of the-Somoza regime and advo- cated freedom and Social Justice. The Per- manent Commission on Human Rights ex- posed the abuses of the Somoza government to the world. The Independent daily La Prensa spearheaded the crusade against Somoza: In early 1978, the assassination of the paper's editor, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro Cardenal. Sparked the revolution. The Sandinistas concluded that by deem- phasizing their Marxist-Leninist Ideology and forming a tactical alliance with the broad spectrum of organizations opposed to Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP88B00443R000903780006-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP88B00443R000903780006-2 October 3, 1984 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE Somoza, they could seize power. According- ly. they appealed to all Nicaraguans to Join their revolutionary movement and pledged that the pillars of the new government would be pluralism, a mixed economy, and nonalignment. The Nicaraguan people came to view the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), the major armed anti- Somoza organization, as the only viable al- ternative to Somoza's continued rule. Plac- ing faith in the FSLN's promises, Nicara- guans from all walks of life and all political persuasions rallied round the Sandinistas banner and joined In the popular revolution that triumphed in July 1979. The Sandinistas determined to maintain the appearance of a broadly based popular regime. The original junta of the new Gov- ernment of National Reconstruction (GRN) contained moderates as well as Sandinista militants, and the cabinet included non-San- dinistas. Even the key post of Defense Min- ister was given to a defector from Somoza's National Guard, Colonel Bernardino Larios. However, the Sandinistas viewed this merely as an interim arrangement that would facilitate the consolidation of their power. In September, the FSLN National Directorate held a secret strategy session which produced the "72-hour document," a blueprint for the creation of an FSLN-con- trolled Marxist-leninist State in Nicaragua. As the Sandinistas labored to consolidate their power, groups that had struggled so long against Somoza became increasingly opposed to Sandinistas policies and actions. These groups found themselves confronting a regime far more formidable and doctri- naire than its predecessor. Activists in oppo- sition parties were harassed and their op- portunities to proselytize were limited by law. Members of the private sector saw the government take over the lion's share of the economy and impose rules greatly restrict- ing their ability to manage their own firms. Independent labor leaders were frequently persecuted, and strikes were outlawed while the real wages of workers declined. The leadership of the Catholic Church was at- tacked by the FSLN for continuing to speak out on Issues such as human rights, church unity. Individual freedom, and the right to a religious education. The Permanent Com- mission on Human Rights was persecuted for revealing Sandinistas human rights vio- lations, and its president was driven into exile. La Prensa was muzzled by a harsh censorship law, and on numerous occasions the paper did not publish because virtually all the day's hard news had been prohibited by government censors. Defense Minister Larios was replaced by a member of the FSLN's National Directorate, and he subse- quently spent more than two years in prison accused of being a counter-revolutionary; he still Is not permitted to leave the country. The Sandinistas have reneged on their promise to bring democracy to Nicaragua, and an ever-growing number of Nicaraguans see their revolution betrayed by the FSLN. Many have remained in Nicaragua thus far, trying to wage a civic battle with the Sandi- nistas. Others have concluded that the civic course was futile, and that the only way the Sandinistas would leave power was the same way they acquired it. through military force. In the past few years, a number of armed anti-FSLN organizations have emerged and initiated combat operations against the Sandinistas. These groups repre- sent widely differing constituencies within Nicaragua, reflecting the diversity of the groups that formerly had opposed Somoza. A lack of unity has hampered the effective- ness of the anti-FSLN efforts. In the summer of 1984, however, the three major exile organizations-FDN, MISURA, and ARDE-formed an alliance named the Nica- raguan Unity for Reconciliation (UNIR). THE ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS 1. NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC FORCE-FDN The FDN is the largest of the armed anti- FSLN organizations. It was founded in 1981 under the leadership of former National Guard officers. As the focal point for armed resistance to the Sandinistas, it quickly at- tracted many of those who had become dis- affected with the FSLN. Its ranks were swollen by influential political and business figures, by peasants from northern Nicara- gua who were fleeing Sandinista repression, and even by disillusioned Sandinistas them- selves. The Influx of new members led to a fundamental transformation of the FDN, and in December 1982 a new National Direc- torate was formed which was dominated by anti-Somoza civilians. The new civilian lead- ership purged any former National Guard members whose background was question- able. It retained other former National Guard members with clean records in posi- tions where their military expertise was needed. A further reorganization of the FDN occurred In October 1983, and Adolfo Calero, a prominent Conservative and busi- ness leader, assumed the position of Presi- dent of the National Directorate and Com- mander in Chief. The FDN's rapid growth has permitted it to field 42 task forces for combat operations. All but four of these units are currently led by civilians or ex- Sandinistas. Overall, less than 1% of the FDN's total strength were previously mem- bers of the National Guard, while about 15% were actually ex-Sandinista fighters. The FDN claims to have between 10,000 and 12,000 members. II. MISURA AND BLACK CREOLES MISURA evolved out the Alliance for the Progress of Miskitos and Sumos (ALPRO- MISU), an Indian organization founded in 1973 with the help of Protestant churches working in the Atlantic Coast region. The initial objective of the organization was to compel the Somoza regime to respect the rights of the indigenous Indian populations. Following the fall of Somoza, the Sandinis- tas renamed the organization Miskito, Sumo, Rama, and Sandinista Unity (MIS- URASTA). Gradually, Sandinista mistreat- ment of the indigenous population led MIS- URASATA leaders to criticize the FSLN and, finally, to flee into exile. By the end of 1981, Sandinista persecution and forced re- location of Indian communities prompted the beginning of a large-scale exodus of Mis- kito Indians from Nicaragua. The govern- ment officially disbanded MISURASATA, but the organization lived on as former members developed a center of armed resist- ance to the FSLN. This group was headed by Miskito leaders such as Wycliffe Diego and Steadman Fagoth. In 1983, it adopted the name MISURA. This organization claims to have between 1.000 and 2,000 members. III. DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY ALLIANCE- ARDE ARDE is a coalition of organizations led by individuals who took an active role in the revolution, including many who were initial- ly officials of the Sandinista government. ARDE was formed in exile in 1982. For a year, its leaders sought to restore the origi- nal course of the revolution through politi- cal means. In mid-1983, after peaceful politi- cal efforts proved futile, ARDE began mili- tary operations in southern Nicaragua. Since it was founded, ARDE has attracted thousands of former Sandinista fighters and civilians who have lost faith in the leader- ship of the FSLN. In 1984, a split occurred within the organization. The MDN, UDN/ S 12867 FARM, FSDC, end STDN-four of the com- ponent organizations which held the major political leaders of the alliance and a few hundred of Its guerrillas-entered a pact with the FDN end MISURA. The FRS and MISURASATA- which included most of the guerrillas and some of the civilian leaders- refused to aligr themselves with the FDN and have contin led to operate independent- ly. While these differences remain unre- solved, the two factions agreed in Septem- ber 1984 to coo( inate their activities when- ever possible. Tins following are the member organizations of .kRDE: A. NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT-MDN The MDN is a social-democratic party founded in 1978 It drew its support from middle class Nicaraguans, including many professionals, and it played an active role during the revolution. Its head, Alfonso Robelo, was One of the original members of the ruling GRN junta, but he resigned his position In 1980 In protest to Sandinista ac- tions. The leaders of the MDN, particularly Robelo, subsequently were subjected to heavy FSLN harassment and fled into exile in 1982. Robelo has emerged as a key civil- ian leader of ARDE. B. NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC UNION/NICARA- GUAN REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES-UDN/ FARN The UDN/FARN is a political/military ors ganization founded in 1981 by veteran anti- Somoza fighter Fernando "El Negro" Cha- morro. The UDN/FARN was one of the original groups of ARDE, but Chamorro pulled his group out in the spring of 1983 and worked with the FDN for several months. In the spring in 1984, his differ- ences with ARD $ were overcome and the UDN/FARN rejc ned the alliance. C. CHRISTIAN DEM' CRATIC SOLIDARITY FRONT- FSDC The FSDC wat formed in 1983 by Chris- tian Democratic !eaders who had fled Into exile. It is led by figures such as Roberto Ferrey who were long-time opponents of Somoza. D. NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC WORKERS' SOLIDARITY-STDN The STDN was founded in 1983 by labor leaders such as Zacarias Hernandez who were forced into exile by Sandinista perse- cution of the Independent labor movement. They had been steadfast opponents of the Somoza regime. R. SANDINO REVOLUTIONARY FRONT-FRS The F'RS, headed by Sandinista hero Eden Pastore, was created in 1982 by disillu- sioned Sandinista militants, many of whom had fought alongside Pastors. on the South- ern Front during 1979. The FRS was a founding member of ARDE, but it severed its ties when the leaders of other ARDE groups decided form an alliance with the FDN and MI RA. Many of ARDE's combat troops chose to follow Pastora. The FRS claims to have more than 5,000 mem- bers. F. MISKITO, SUM'), RAMA, AND SANDINISTA UNI'I Y -MISURASATA MISURASATA ii the other Indian organi. zation that evolv:(1 out of ALPROMISU. As noted above, the. Sandinistas renamed the Indian organized )n MISURASATA, and later officially disselv'Ad it when its leader- ship become highly cirtical of FSLN actions. In 1982, Miskitc? leader Brooklyn Rivera Joined with other MISURASATA members in the south anc commenced operations against the Sandinistas. This group retained the name MISURASATA and acted inde- pendently of MISURA forces in the north. MISURASATA h aders have collaborated Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP88B00443R000903780006-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP88B00443R000903780006-2 S 12868 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE October 3, 1984 closely with Pastora's forces, and MISURA- totally disillusioned with the FSLN and the educated in Catholic schools in Nicaragua SATA joined with the FRS in refusing to minor role it allowed other political parties, and the United States. During the revolu- form an alliance with the FDN and Calero went Into exile to join the FDN. He tion, the Satazars collaborated with the MISURA. was appointed to the FDN's National Direc- FSLN and harbored Sandinista militants A< Sandinista propaga ida seeks to portray the leaders of the arried opposition groups torate and In October 1983 elevated to the who were being sought by Somoza's forces. post of President of the National Director- Her husband, a top official of COSEP. ate and Commander in Chief of the FDN's played a key role in the civic opposition to Armed Forces. He serves as the FDN's rep- Sandinista policies in late 1979 and 1980. He t tl th Di rectorate of UNIR. was a progressive leader whose popularity graphical sketches show the contrary: that resen a ve on a most were arden opponents of the Somoza Enrique Bermudez Varela. Member of the was rising when Sandinista security agents regime. FDN National Directorate and Chief of set him up and shot him allegedly for par- Enrique / Adolfo Calero Portocarrero. President of firer who graduated from the Nicaraguan _gua and subsequently joined the FDN. , C the National Directorate and Command- Military Academy and attained the rank of(4. Marco A. Zeledon, Member of the FDN Na- er in Chief of the Armed Forces of the colonel In the National Guard. He was not - tional Directorate cr\u Adolfo Calero was a prominent business- man and a lifelong p litical opponent of Somoza. He received pat of his education In the United States, graduating In 1953 from the University of Notre Dame and later doing graduate work In Industrial manage- ment at the Univer. ity of Syracuse. He holds a law degree from the University of Central America In Nicaragua. In the late 1950s he became a major stockholder in and manager of the Coca-Cc-la Company of Nica- ragua. His views on social and economic r,uuwcaily 7tUblve aim regarueu mmsen as a professional soldier. Bermudez spent much of his career abroad. He attended military training courses in Brazil and the United States. He served with the Inter-American Peace Force in the Dominican Republic in 1965, and was head of the Nicaraguan dele- gation to the Inter-American Defense Coun- cil. During the years preceding the revolu- tion. Bermnde? was Nicaraguan Defense At- tache in Washington. After the revolution, he helped organize other exiled National Guard officers and was a founder of the issues translated into tangible benefits for FDN. his workers, such as profit sharing, pay ex Alfonso Cal!ejas Deshon, Member of the reeding the minimun wage by 60%, and FDN National Directorate scholarship programs. He served as a direc- tor of the Chamber of Commerce and was a member of the Nicaraguan Developmental Institution (INDE) and the Nicaraguan De- velopmental Foundat.i. ?n (FUNDS), and a co-founder of the Hur.,an Development In- stitute (INPRHU). In the early 1370s, he was the dean of the faculty of Economics and Business Adminstrztion at the Universi- ty of Central America. Calero began his po: tical career in 1453, when he joined other mti-Somoza activists including Pedro Joaq An Chamorro Car- denal (the editors of La Prensa a>sassinated In 1979), Rafael Cordo,r Rivas (currently a member of the ORN junta), and Reynaldo Antonio Tefel (curren.ly a member of the GRN cabinet) in forming an opposition youth movement. Late ? in the 1950s, he became an activitist in the Conservative party, the traditional c pposition group to Somoza. In 1959, he helped organize mana- gerial strikes in support of the "Olama and Wycliffe Diego is a Miskito Indian leader from the Atlantic Coast town of Puerto Ca- bezas. Ile was a Moravian pastor and an active member of ALPROMISU, eventually attaining the office of Coordinator. In 1974, he was jailed by Somoza for allegedly being a Communist. Like many other Miskitos, Diego initially supported the revolution but became increasingly critical of the FSLN's treatment of his people. In 1981 he fled into exile after the Sandinistas arrested numer- ous Miskito leaders. Although the FSLN of- ficially disbanded MISURASATA, Diego Los MolleJones" insurrection headed by collaborated with other members of the Nicaragua after the revolution, and al- movement in transforming MISURASATA Chamorro. though he was reportedly investigated and into an armed anti-Sandinista group. Ile was Calero's stature within the Conservative cleared of any wrongdoing, his properties gravely wounded in an assassination at- party grew during the 1960s, and in 1970 he were confiscated. He subsequently went tempt in 1982. He represents MISURA on was offered a seat as an alternate In Con- back into exile. the directorate of UNIR. gress as part of a part between Fernando jndalecio Rodriguez Alaniz, Member of th teadman Fagoth Muller, Member of Aguero (Conservative party head) and FDN ,,_.,_ --------- nal that Aguero's actions amounted to a sellout to Somoza. Instead, Calero joined other party members, such as current conserva- tive leader Mario Rappaccioli, and founded the Authentic Conservative Party. He became the party's coordinator In 1977. Following the assassination of Chamorro In 1978, Calera, was it principal leader of the strikes and civic activity that shook the Somoza regime. He subsequently served as his party's representative In the Broad Op- position Front (FAO), an umbrella organiza- tion of opposition groups. He and other FAO leaders were jailed for a month for ini- tiating a general strike. Following the fall of Somoza, Calero lnl- Alfonso Callejas was trained as a civil en- gineer at the University of Santa Clara in California. After working for several years with the Standard Fruit Company, he founded his own business and eventually had Interests in cattle, bananas, and cotton. Marco A. Zeledon was a prominent busi- nessman who played a leading role In pri- vate sector organizations. He has held key positions, such as president of the Nicara- guan Chamber of Industry, and served as member of the Board of Governors of the Central American Institute of Food Market- ing and of the Financial Committee of the developmental organization FUNDE. He was a progressive businessman who was one of the first to promote constructive forms of interaction in decision-making among the private sector, the government, labor unions, and community organizations. He became Increasingly active In anti-Somoza politics during the 1970s, and participated in a private sector initiative to persuade Somoza to Implement policies that would result in a more equitable distribution of wealth. Zeledon went into exile after the Sandinistas confiscated his cereal business. He held various local and national offices In 1 II. MISURA AND BLACK CREOLES his capacity as an engineer, and headed thjWycliffe Diego, Coordinator of the Political National Office of Water Resources in the Commission of MISURA early 1960s. He sewed as Minister of Public Works and later was named Vice President of the Rcpt.hlic under Somoza. He became disenchanted with the Somoza regime, how- ever, and In 1972 resigned as a public protest to Somoza's efforts to maintain himself In power. He was a member of Somcza's Na- tional Liberal Party (PLN), but he was it leader of a group of dissidents who sought to restore true liberal values to the party. In 1978, he organized a PLN grassroots move- ment designed to force Somoza to resign. He Indaleclo Rodriguez is a veterinary doctor who served as a professor and President of the University of Central America in Mana- gua. As the son of a prominent anti-Somoza figure, he became politically active at an early age. He participated In an opposition youth movement, and became active In the Independent Liberal Party (PLI). He was jailed twice in the 1950s for his anti-Somoza political activity, and went Into exile In 1960 where he became Involved for a time with the newly formed FSLN. After several years abroad, he returned to Nicaragua to accept a position at the University of Central America, and he remained there during the revolution. By 1981, he had become disillu- tially attempted to cooperate with the stoned with the FSLN and abandoned his FSLN in rebuilding Nicaragua. He was most to go into exile. leader of the Democratic Conservative ucia Cardenal de Salazar, Member of the Party which was forget' during the revolu- FDN National Directorate tion by uniting the pre% ous divided conserv- Lucia Cardenal de Salazar Is the widow of at.ive movement, and hi was selected to the prominent Nicaraguan businessman Jorge key position of politica, coordinator for the Salazar Arguello, murdered by Sandinista party. By the end of 1782, having become security forces In November 1980. She was Steadman Fagoth, a Miskito Indian leader, was an active opponent of Somoza. While studying biology at the National Au- tonomous University of Nicaragua In the early 1970s. he was arrested twice for his po- litical activities. He became a member of the ALPROMISU organization which defended Indian interests. Following the revolution, he became a leader of the Sandinista-spon- snred successor to this group, MISURA- SATA. He was that organizations's first rep- resentative on the quasi-legislative Council of State. Fagoth began to criticize Sandi- nista mistreatment of his people, and In February 1981 he was among a group of Indian leaders arrested for "counter-revolu- tionary activity." He was also accused of having been an Informant for Somoza during his university days, but MISURA- SATA Insisted that his collaboration had been at the behest of the FSLN. In May. Fagoth was released on the condition that he accept a lengthy scholarship in a Soviet- bloc country. He managed to flee to ilondu- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP88B00443R000903780006-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP88B00443R000903780006-2 October 3, 1984 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SEN4TE I) ras where he joined other MISURASATA members who were fighting against the Sandinistas. In 1982, he was wounded in an assassination attempt. Roger Hermann, Member of the Political Commission of MISURA Roger Hermann, a young Indian leader from Puerto Cabezas, became active in MIS- URASATA in 1979 in the labor field. Two years later, when the FSLN attempted to coerce him into working for the secret police (DGSE), he chose to go into exile in- stead. He was elected to MISURA's Political Commission in 1983. 111. DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY ALLIANCE- ARDE Democratic Front. In his law practice, he specialized in labor' cases and frequently acted on behalf of unions affiliated with the Christian Democratic-oriented Latin Ameri- can Workers Central (CLAT). Because of this involvement with strike actions, he was jailed several times by the Somoza regime. He become a key figure in the Social Chris- tian Party, and went into exile in 1976 to participate in the struggle against Somoza. After the revolution, he returned to Nicara- gua and became a legal adviser in the new Ministry of Justice. In July 1983, he re- signed his post and moved to Costa Rica where he joined the FSDC. NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC WORKERS' D . A. NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT-MDN Alfonso Robelo Callejas, Political Coordina- j1 SOLIDARITY-STDN for of ARDE, Head of the MDN I acarias Hernandez, Secretary General of Alfonso Robelo was trained as a chemical the STDN engineer and served as director of the Uni- Zacarias Hernandez was a veteran labor versity of Central America in Nicaragua leader of the dockworkers union at the Pa- during 1970-72. He subsequently became a cific of Corinto. He had contracts with orga-(~I~onaid Castillo leader in the private sector and was presi- nizations such as the International Confed dent of the Nicaragua Chamber of Indus- eration of Free Trade Unions and the AFL- Donald Castillo was a principal labor tries until 1975. For the following three CIO, and the Somoza regime repeatedly ar- leader and held key positions in Social years he headed the developmental institute rested him for his efforts to promote free Christian-oriented labor confederation, the INDE. trade unionism. After the revolution, the Nicaraguan Workers' Central (CTN). He Rebelo's work with progressive, non- Corinto union joined the Sandinista Work- was a staunch opponent of Somoza and ac- Somoza private sector organizations led him ers Central (CST). The dockworkers grew tively supported t: n?; FSLN during the 1970s. to a growing political role in the anti- dissatisfied with the CST, but when they at- In 1976, he was expelled from Guatemala Somoza movement. Following the assassina- tempted to switch their affiliation to a for arms smuggling. After the revolution, he tion of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro Cardenal Social-Democratic confederation, Hernan- became the CTN'e delegate to the quasi-leg- in early 1978, Robelo founded the Nicara- dez and other union officials were subjected islative Council of State. He became increas- guan Democratic Movement (MDN), a polit- to a campaign of harassment and intimida- ingly disillusioned by the Sandinistas' ical party of businessmen, industrialists, and tion. Hernandez fled into exile where he unfair labor practices, and in mid-1981 profession created to pro?'ide leadership for' became a co-founder of the STDN. served as the coordinator of a civic opposi- the opposition to the Somoza regime. As SANDINO REVOLUTIONARY FRONT-FRS tion group which held a dialogue with the head of the MDN, he became an activelr i. FSLN in an unsuccessful effort to resolve member of the Broad Opposition Front Eden Pastora Gomez, Leader of the FRS national problems. He subsequently went (FAO). Eden Pastors was the FSLN's most re- into exile where he became a co-founder of One of the original five members of the nowned revolutionary hero and a senior of- the STDN and ;oined ARDE. When the GRN junta, Robelo resigned In April 1980, ficial of the GRN until he broke with the STDN supported the decision to form an al- publicly stating his opposition to the Marx- Sandinista leadership in 1981 and eventual- liance with the FDN, Castillo left the orga- Ist-Leninist tendencies within the FSLN- ly took up arms against his former col- nization and colli,borated with Pastors's dominated government and to the strong leagues. Pastore was reared in a conserva. FRS. Cuban influence. His efforts at civic opposi- tive Catholic family, and his father was F. MISKITO, SUMO, RAMA, AND SANDINISTA tion provoked severe harassment by the killed in 1042 by the National Guard for al- UNITY-MISURASATA FSLN, including Sandinista mobs vandaliz- leged subversive activities. In the 1950s. he,113rooklyn Rivera Bryan, Leader of MISUR ing his home. Robelo fled into exile In 1982 studied medicine in Mexico, but later re Ac ATA ARDE. He serves as ARDE's representative on the Directorate of UNIR. B. NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC UNION/NICARA- GUAN REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES-UDN rills struggle against Somoza. By the 1970s Brooklyn Rivera, a mathematician, is a he was in charge of logistics for the FSLN Miskito Indian leader from the Sandy Bay insurgents operating from Costa Rica and area of Nicaragua i Atlantic Coast. He ini- was the leader of the Sandinistas' Southern tially supported the revolution against FARM Front. Fernando "El' Negro" Chamorro Rappac- Pastors, had gained wide fame in August cioli, Leader of UDN/FARN, Command- 1978 when, as "Comandante Cero," he led er of ARDE's Military Forces the Sandinista unit that seized the National Fernando Chamorro was a prominent Palace in Managua. That operation gained anti-Somoza figure since the 1940s. He par- the release of 59 political prisoners, but its ticipated in numerous military operations real significance was that It captured the against the regime, and he was repeatedly imagination of the Nicaraguan people and exiled or imprisoned by Somoza. During the allowed the Sandinistas to become the revolution, he executed a spectacular rocket symbol of resistance to the Sodnoza regime. attack on Somoza's bunker from a room in During 1979, Pastore led Sandinista troops the nearby Intercontinental Hotel. In 1979, fighting on the Southern Front. he fought on the Southern Front. After the Following the Sandinista victory in July Sandinistas took power, Chamorro retired 1979, Pastors, became Vice Minister of Inte- to private life. In 1981, he went into exile rior. In January 1980, he was reassigned as d feed th UMW/FARM In Q. tern- Vice Minister of Defense and Chief of the r n e S 12869 Jose Davila studied economics at the Na- tional Autonomous University of Nicaragua and went on to do advanced work in eco- nomics and development in West Germany. He was active in student politics and later became a senior officer of the Social Chris- tian Party (PSC), one of the main opposi- tion groups to Sor .oza. Following the revo- lution, he served . s the PSC's delegate to the quasi-legislati? e Council of State. In 1981, he became se :retary of the civic oppo- sition umbrella on anization, the Democrat- ic Coordinating Bc ard. The following year, he went into exile .tnd helped form the Nic- araguan Assoclaticn of Democratic Unity (ANUDE). In 198), this group split and Davila went with the faction that founded the FSDC. That September, the FSDC for- mally joined ARDE. When the FSDC elect- ed to join other AIDE groups in entering a coalition with the FDN, Davila left the FSDC to work witl Pastora's FRS. Somoza and was a founding member of MISURASATA wl en it was established by the Sandinistas in 1979. He grew increasing- ly disenchanted w th the FSLN and began to protest Sandinir is, repression of Indians. In February 1981. he was among the Indian leaders arrested, accused of "counter-revolu- tionary activity." He was released after two weeks, but he continued to criticize FSLN efforts to national?ze Indian lands and cul- turally assimilate the Indian population, and he was forceo go into exile later that year. In 1982, he ecame the leader of Indi- ans who organs a separate MISURA- SATA faction in the south. GLOSSARY ga p National Militia. He became Increasingly ber 1882o be, he joined in founding ARDE, but over the radical policies ample- , ALPROMISU-A-1lance for the Progress he pulled out in 1983. He rejoined ARDE in disgruntled the heavy foreign of Miskitos and Su nos. 1984, and became the commander of its mill- mented the FSLN and it e FSLN revolution, especially heavy foreign ANUDE-Nicaraguan Association of tary forces when Pastore withdrew that b Democratic Unity. summer. thousands of Cubans that permeated the ARDE-Democratic Revolutionary Alli- C. CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY FRONT- posts s and government. went Jnly abroadd. . I, In A A rpril l 188298 2, he hie ance. p and In 1 rsDC publicly denounced the FSLN leadership for CLAT-Latin American Workers Central. Roberto Ferrey, Secretary General to the betraying the revolution and organized the COSEP-Suprerie Council of Private En- FSDC FRS. That September, he helped to found terprise. Roberto Ferrey studied law at the Nation- ARDE. The following spring, he became the CST-Sandinista Workers' Central. al Autonomous University of Nicaragua and military leader of ARDE's forces when it CTN-Nicaraguar: Workers' Central. went on to do postgraduate work at South- initiated military actions in southern Nica- DGSE-General Directorate of State Se- ern Methodist University in Texas. During ragua. He has opposed any alliance with the curity. his university years, he became a founder of FDN. FAO-Broad Opposition Front. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP88B00443R000903780006-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP88B00443R000903780006-2 S 12870 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE Oetober 3, 1984 FARN-Nicaraguan Rt :olut.ionary Armed Forces. FDN-Nicaraguan Democratic Force. FRS-Sandino Revolutionary Front. FSDC---Christian Democratic Solidarity Front. FSLN-Sandinisto National Liberation Front. FUNDE-Nicaraguan.. Developmental Foundation. GRN-Government of National Recon- struction. INDE-Nicaraguan Developmental Insti- tute. INPRHU-Human Detclopment Institute. MDN-Nicaraguan Democratic Movement. MISURA and Black Creoles. MISURASATA-Miski.o. Sumo, Rama, and Sandinista Unity. PLI-Independent Llb(r~l Party. PLN-National Liberal flarty. PSC--Social Christian rty. STDN-Nicaraguan Democratic Workers' Solidarity. UDN-Nicaraguan Democratic Union. UNIR-Nicaraguan Ur ity for. Reconcilia- tion. Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, the distinguished manager of this portion of the legislation is on the floor, as Is the chairman of the :elect Committee on Intelligence. I would like to direct a question, preceded by a statement. May I say to the Senator from Alaska that we are discussing on the floor of the Senate classified matters of the greatest sensitivity. That Is to say, statements about classified mat- ters are being made which this Sena- tor believes to be incorrect. But to debate such matters fully In the open would be to reveal what we are bound not to reveal. And that puts at a disad- vantage those who disagree with some of the statements being made. Mr. President, if tie Senator from Alaska could just turn my way for a moment, a quarter turn. Mr. STEVENS. I am listening. Mr. MOYNIHAN. I have here the report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence accompanying the in- telligence authorization bill for fiscal year 1985. It is labeled "Top Secret, Codeword." Now, this report has teen filed for sometime now. We have hoped we would have an authorization bill, as we have had each year since 1979. For the first year since then, there is no bill. The distinguished chairman and I both wrote the leaders this morning asking, "Are we not tc have an author- izat ion bill?" But, I say to th-? Senator from Alaska, I do not kn(-w how I am to debate the contents o this measure at the moment. And t'zat is what we seem to have chosen t) do. Mr. WALLOP. W li the Senator yield for a question? Mr. MOYNIHAN. I tin happy to. Mr. WALLOP. I k now of nothing that has been classified that the Sena- tor from Louisiana said nor that the Senator from Hawaii has said. Since only one other person has spoken. I assume the Senator from New York 1s referring to the Senator from Wyo- ming. I wonder if you can enlighten me as to what you mean. Mr. MOYNIHAN. This is the prob- lem I raise. I have some disagreement with some of the statements made by the Senator from Louisiana. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will refrain for 1 moment. The Senate will be in order. Mr. MOYNIHAN. Would the Senate have the kindness to pay attention? I would disagree with some of the statements made by the Senator from Louisiana. I would have more specific disagreements with the Senator from Wyoming. But to make my case con- trary to their statements, I would have to discuss matters in a top secret report to this body, which I cannot do because we are here in open session. Mr. STEVENS. Will the Senator yield? Mr. MOYNIHAN. I am happy to, yield. I hope I am yielding for some resolution. Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I might suggest this is not the place to debate the report of the Intelligence Committee. Is the Senator saying that the com- ments that are In the RECORD so far are classified beyond that report? Mr. MOYNIHAN. I am saying that representations have been made as to the nature of our involvement In the area we are discussing which do not comport with the specific content of this report. Yes, I am saying that. Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, the Senator addressed the question to me, and I would just say this: It appears to me that, in order to discuss an item which places a, limitation on a classi- fied program, It is necessary to skirt quite closely to classification. I have in my hand a completely sanitized ques- tion and answer response so that this Senator would not go beyond classifi- cation In responding to any question you want to ask about Nicaragua. I think the Senator from Wyoming has a similar concept in terms of what he has done: The mere fact that the subject matter that is discussed In that report that the Intelligence Committee has classifed is discussed in these com- ments which are totally not classified by those that have the authority to classify documents, is, in my opinion, no reason to say that there has been classified material discussed on the floor. As a matter of fact, the Senate of the United States does not have the authority to classify documents. We do maintain classification that Is given to us by the executive branch. But right now we are talking about limita- tions raised by the Senator from Hawaii, and legitimately so, saying that there should be a phasing out of moneys that are contained In a classi- fied portion of this bill that is before us. He has raised it In an honorable way without disclosing any classified material. This Senator has not heard any- thing yet on the floor of this Senate that has invaded the sphere of classifl- cation. And I have tried to listen. Though I may not look at everyone, I do try to listen to what is going on be- cause this is touchy. And I think we have done our best. I would urge the Senate to realize that we are dealing with classified areas. They could affect the lives and certainly the future of a great many people. Therefore, I would urge the Senator to address the issue of the Senator from Hawaii's amendment and not the issue of classification be- cause I disagree with the Senator as far as the extent to which we have gone today. Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I hope the Senator from Alaska Is not suggesting that I misrepresented my views on this matter or spoke in a way that would not be warranted by the facts as I understand them. Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, the Senator from Alaska Is saying to the Senator from New York that his un- derstanding of what is classified is I feel colored by the classification of the report of the Senate Intelligence Com- mittee. And I am responding by saying that everything I have heard on the floor so far Is contained In Information we have asked for and received from those people who are involved in the classification process concerning the questions that are before us. They have been sanitized and they contain no classified material. I would be happy to show the Senator if he would like to see them. Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President. I see the Senator from Hawaii has arisen. I will yield the floor, but I will accept the offer of the Senator from Alaska. But I would like the Senator from Alaska to understand that we have taken the affairs of this commit- tee with great care and solemnity. We have prepared on time our materials. We have asked to come to the floor. We have been prepared for a closed session. I do not say this has been denied its, I simply say this has not happened. That leaves those who will represent things as being other than I think they are the opportunity to say that and denies this Senator the op- portunity to reply. Several Senators addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. WALLOP). The Senator from Hawaii. Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, In order to clarify and clear the air, may I suggest that we go into a quorum call very briefly, protecting the right of the Senator from New York, as far as his right to the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum. Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I do not think the Senator from New York has the floor. Mr. INOUYE. I have the floor now. Mr. KENNEDY. Will the Senator withhold that so I would be able to ad- dress the amendment so we may at least be able to proceed with the debate and discussion? I have some Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP88B00443R000903780006-2 Jai IILILCU % UUpy /--XNNIUVCU IVI RCICcI LU I I/U I/LO . l~l/~-RVrOO~VV?+?+J1\ JU'UJ/ OV JUU-L October 3, 1984 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 12871 comments that are not directed not do that? We have read news re- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The toward the issue which has been ports suggesting that there were as- Senator from North Carolina. raised now between the Senator from sault teams being supported by the Mr. EAST. Mr. President, I appreci- New York and the Senator from Libyans that were going to attack the ate the opportunity to speak briefly in Alaska. President of the United States. That opposition to the Inouye amendment Mr. INOUYE. This clarification will seems to me to be more outrageous with all due respect for the very dis- Just take a few minutes. We have the than even the violations of human tinguished Senator from Hawaii. classified document. rights or the violation of church rights First, as regards the remarks of the Mr. KENNEDY. I Just wanted to in Nicaragua. Senator from Massachusetts, I would make some general comments, if I What about undermining the Syrian remind him that F'-anoe did help us in could. Government? They are sheltering the the American Revolution, and he que- Mr. INOUYE. I yield to the Senator. terrorists, who may be responsible for ries why we do not -- Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I blowing up the marine barracks in hope the Members of this body will Lebanon according to the administra- Mr. KENNEDY. The French helped support the amendment of the Sena- tion. Why are we not undermining the patriots in Massachusetts? Mr. tor from Hawaii. I intend to do so, be- that government with Its record of Senator, that is a new note in history. cause I believe this amendment will heinous activities and the righteous- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The meap an end to the covert war, the ness of our particular cause against Senator from North Carolina has the President's war in Nicaragua, I had in- those who were involved in the brutal- floor. tended to offer the Senate with my ity, the terrorism, the violence, and Mr. EAST. I have the floor, and I colleague, Senator BINGAMAN, from the assassination of brave young would like to comment. The Senator New Mexico, a similar amendment Americans? Why are we not doing that was suggesting thr.t no one helped us that would also terminate funding for this afternoon? Why are we not in our efforts, an 1 I was simply re- the secret war. having a street war in Iran after their minding the Senator as a matter of I do not intend, to delay the Senate humiliation of the United States in historical fact that France did help a great deal to debate this issue. So I holding the 53 brave Americans, all of the United State., during the French would like to make some comments on whom returned safely to the United Revolution as well as some other Euro- that in support of the Inouye amend- States I might add? Why are we not pean powers. ment, and I think that would support supporting a war there? Why are we Second, the Senator raises the inter- the amendment the Senator from New not conducting a secret war in Cuba esting point, why are we not doing Mexico and I would have offered. for all the reasons that have been out- something perhaps to undermine the Make no mistake, the Senator from lined by those that have spoken Government of Qaihafl or undermine Hawaii's amendment will put an end against the amendment of the Senator the Government In Syria, or to under- to this illegal war. from Hawaii this afternoon? Why is mine the Government in Cuba. I Mr. President, In listening to this there not ample justification for all of would agree with the Senator. It is debate this afternoon, if one were not those? Why are we not sending Ameri- probably a good idea. Let us put this entirely familiar with the Inouye cans and American taxpayers' money in a little broader perspective. Under amendment, one might think that we all over the world trying to police the Marxist-Leninist thinking, the ration- were passing a sense-of-the-Senate res- world? ale goes like this. This is the dimen- olution commending the Sandinista I thought we had learned, Mr. Presi- sion that Lenin added. He said the rev- government. We have heard the Sena- dent, that lesson in recent times. olution will not take place in the for from Louisiana discuss the recent Mr. President, it has not been an ef- major industrial powers as Marx envi- history of the repressive activities of fective policy and the logic of their ar- stoned it in the United States and denial l of of freedom the Sandinistas . assembly, the gument cannot stand any fair evalua- Western Europe, but In the Third reedom of on. Wthe tion of the facts. World. This is u here the protracted heard the freedom attack of on the he Sandinista have This war ought to be ended, and it conflict will take place and that the government t respect the ought to be ended now. I applaud the motherland of the revolution, the Bol- fre edo o of the e failing Th h n we heard amendment of the Senator from shevik revolution in Russia under frem press. o en we heard Hawaii in ensuring that we will see an Lenin in 1917, wi:l find proxies in the hnptherpening Senator in enator Nicaragua, what is end to the support for the Contras, underdeveloped or soft underbelly of happening issagua, with what is many of whom are not as interested in the world, as they put it, to take this Mr. happening President, , the the issue e is American fighting for freedom as they are in protracted conflict through wars of involvement in overturning an indige- plundering their countryside. We hear subversion. Then v ,hat you are to do is nous government in Nicaragua. That is talk about how we had to fund free- take the soft underbelly, and then the basically and fundamentally wrong. It dom fighters in Nicaragua. Who was ripe fruit of N )rth America and is wrong under international law. It funding freedom fighters in the Europe-the majo industrial powers- concerns activities which this body has United States at the time of of the would fall. That is precisely the strate- not yet approved, it is a policy which is American Revolution? Who was fund- gy they have used. The Soviet Union ineffective because It strengthens the ing them? But we have to pour out uses the PLO and Syria as surrogates repressive forces in Nicaragua, and it American taxpayers' money on a war in the Middle E t. They use their sur- has not been successful in achieving which is illegal, on a war which has rogates in Afric They are using in what those who have supported this been ineffective, and a war which has Cuba in Africa I d Central America. measure have felt that its purpose actually strengthened those that we and they are usinrr. Vietnam in South- was; namely, interdicting the arms find are perpetuating the greatest east Asia. flow into El Salvador. kinds of violations of the kinds of To get back to the contra aid, I I daresay those who want to contin- values which we hold dear. think Senator JOHNSTON has stated ue support for the contras ought to be Mr. President, I say that enough is the case extremely well. making the positive case for continued enough on this issue and this war. We Here we have a very legitimate support rather than just reciting and have had an opportunity in April of effort of a broad-based group trying to repeating the repressions which exist last year where 30 Senators voted for reverse that trend, and for us to ignore in Nicaragua today, which all 100 peace. In June we had 43 Senators it in every circumstance I think is to Members would unanimously con- who voted for peace. Now is the last revert to the isolationism of the demn. chance for the Senate in this session 1930's. As Jeane Kirkpatrick said a Mr. President, if we were to follow to vote again for peace. little while ago, it is not a matter of the logic of those that have opposed I hope that the Senate will support being hawk or dove, but a matter of the Inouye amendment, we would be the Inuoye amendment. being an ostrich as to what is occur- funding a secret war in Libya. Why Mr. EAST addressed the Chair. ring in the world. in J Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP88B00443R000903780006-2