NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00091R000500300001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 17, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/21 : CIA-RDP88T00091 R000500300001-9
Central
Intelligence
Director of
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j D
National Intelligence Daily
Friday
17 April 1987
CPAS N1
17 April 1987 25X1
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Contents
Argentina: Army Mutineers Challenge Alfonsin .......................... 1
China-India: Possible Chinese Actions ........................................ 2
Kuwait: Progress Toward Protecting Shipping ............................ 4
USSR-Afghanistan: Shevardnadze on Costs .............................. 5
Mauritania-Morocco: Friction Growing ........................................ 6
Poland: Shakeup in Leadership .................................................... 6
China-UK-Hong Kong: Harsh Words From Deng ......................
Special Analyses
Lebanon: Shias Move South ........................................................ 9
Greece-Turkey: Tension Over the Aegean .................................. 11
Chad-France: Continued Military Dependence .......................... 13
South Korea: New Focus on Succession .................................... 14
Tnn Spr_rpt
17 April 1987
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Top Secret
Defiance of Authority by Argentine Military
San Miguel
de Tucuman. Regiment possibly
offering asylum
ChiW
ao
Regiment
in rebellion
? .Cordoba
Regiment * Las
offering asylum Heras
BUENOS
F IV AIRES
Argentina
oCo%dao I V
South
Atlantic
Ocean
Falkland Islands
(Islas Malvinas)
(administered by U.K..
clamed by Arrdenfina)
-Army Corps boundary
0 200 400 Kilometers
0 200 400 Miles
aoendo,, rea~osemeuon Is
necessarily eumomeu.o.
not
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17 April 1987
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Tee Secret
ARGENTINA I Army Mutineers Challenge Alfonsin
An Army regiment in Cordoba is harboring an active-duty officer
who refuses to testify on human rights violations; President
Alfonsin has ordered military police to arrest the officers
involved.
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f?iewsaf t~e-A yis-Mf ores-in6C-or-doba dne y-declared-local
~eateet-a-colleague wh"efused-to
r-ings-on-human -iz h~t-s=vl~olations 25X1
About 17 officer are involved, inc u ing
some assigned to other III Corps units, and they are supported by
other officers posted throughout the Army.-According to the press,
the III Corps commander and other senior military leaders have tried
unsuccessfully to persuade the mutineers to surrender, forcing
Alfonsin to direct federal police to cordon off the regiment and to 25X1
send in Army police to stand by to arrest them on his order0 25X1
at least three and possibly four 25X1
additional Army regimental commanders probably have promised to
grant asylum to officers who refuse to report to civilian courts.) 25X1
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Thousands rallied outside the National Congress building es
to denounce the military's actions. Alfonsin and other political leaders
may travel to Cordoba to deal directly with the mutineers.
Comment: This first instance of overt defiance of judicial authority by
an active-duty officer challenges both the civilian leadership and the
military high command. The rebellious officers probably hope to force
Alfonsin to end the human rights trials by declaring an amnesty for
military personnel. The President, however, will be reluctant to make
such a politically unpopular move before the Congressional elections
in September unless he has legislative backing from both his own
party and the Peronist opposition
Declaration of a state of siege endorsed by Congress, however, would
send a strong signal to the military that the Alfonsin administration
enjoys broad support and that the mutineers would be politically
isolated if they move against the government. Alfonsin probably
would prefer a peaceful settlement rather than resorting to force, but
he may have to act quickly to prevent other Army units fro
similar actions and to preserve the government's authority
Top Secret
1 17 April 1987
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Tnn Apt--rraf
Soviet Union
:tonom.ods Region ,
Xizang: ' .
?( , r ;`~ /, `Chencidu.aM litarv
Lhasa.. i'=tiofj cdntro]
lA d~snufe''.
V"1 KATHMA ,6) rte. r..,i
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Top Secret
25,
17 April 1987
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Top Secret
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likely to react strongly to even a minor provocation.
China may be preparing to provoke isolated incidents along the
Indian border to portray New Delhi as the aggressor; New Delhi is
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New Delhi is occupying large tracts of Chinese territory.
A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman on Wednesday rejected
Indian accusations of border intrusions and reiterated claims that
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negotiations would result in Indian troop withdrawals and stated that
China would have few options but to resume patrolling the disputed
area, although Chinese troops would not fire first. He predicted that
China would not be read to return t the negotiating table until the
second half of the year.
a Chinese Foreign Ministry officialpressed pessimism that
The Chinese Ambassador to Indiatiwill leave for Beijing shortly,
m i(His scheduled
replacement, the current Chinese Ambassador to Nepal, is not
expected to report to New Delhi soon, r -4be-l bzss}
in-Kath~man 1, i -T-#ie-? asst'-in-Nepal-neted hatthe replacement is
an exert on border s, especially the Chinesg Indian border.
later indicates Beijing eventually hopes for a negotiated settlement.
Comment: The Chinese Foreign Ministry official's reference to new
patrolling-and lack of interest in immediate negotiations-suggests
that Beijing may move to increase tensions. The departure of the
Chinese Ambassador from New Delhi at this time sends another
signal of rising tensions, but the intention to send a border expert
forward positions.
Beijing may choose to begin aggressively patrolling Indian-controlled
areas near the Chinese outpost on Wangdung Ridge. This probably
would be intended to draw Indian troops into a provocation that
China could use to portray India as the aggressor and to demonstrate
to New Delhi Beijing's resolve in seeking an Indian withdrawal from
continued
Top Secret
17 April 1987
7cyl
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Too Secret
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o ent Arhere is no evidence to indicate Beijing desires
hostilities on the Sino-Indian border. Beijing has emphasized its wish
to settle the border dispute through negotiations, rs tion-rreit _==
i- ,although it does warn that
hostilities are possible if a peaceful solution is not found. There is no
evidence of any troop movements to reinforce its exposed position in
the disputed sector, where Chinese forces are badly outnumbered,
and Beijing is unlikely to provoke hostilities without being ready to
cope with Indian retaliation. Forces garrisoned in the area are not
sufficient to counter a large Indian response, and it would take
approximately three weeks to move additional forces into the region,
not including acclimatization of the troops to the high altitude. Any
hostilities before the summer monsoons are therefore unlikely. If
Beijing chooses to increase patrolling, it would send a signal that New
Delhi might regard as provocative but would "t necessaril
a deliberate effort to precipitate an incident.
Top Secret
3 17 April 1987
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Ton Secret
KUWAIT: Progress Toward Protecting Shipping
The Kuwait Oil Tanker Company is moving rapidly to implement its
plan to protect shipping in the Persian Gulf. According to the US
Embassy, an initial inspection of the three ships that will be put under
the US flag identified few problems
China will probably provide one to three tankers as a token gesture.
France has no tankers available to lease and does not want Kuwaiti
ships under the French flag.
Comment: Kuwait is eager to finish the reflagging inspections. It
probably expects the US to overlook minor deficiencies in the Kuwaiti
ships. Although local officials were hopeful that all five permanent UN
Security Council members would participate directly in protecting
Gulf shipping, the absence of France will not impede Kuwait's
strategy. Kuwait has agreed to lease three ships from the USSR; a
similar agreement with the UK is being negotiated. US offers of
assistance continue to win praise from Gulf leaders
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Top Secret
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Foreign Minister Shevardnadze told Soviet party members in East
Berlin last month Moscow's 25X1
international prestige would suffer unless the Soviet presence in
Afghanistan were reduced in the near future. He said that Soviet
military involvement was costly and that troops should be withdrawn,
but only after Soviet civilian advisers had been recalled to allow the
Kabul government to become more independent. He claimed Moscow
would agree to the establishment of a neutral Afghanistan.
Comment: Shevardnadze's remarks accord with many recent
statements by Soviet officials that Moscow is increasingly concerned
about the various costs of involvement in Afghanistan and intends to
end or reduce it. He and other Soviets, however, have told Pakistan
and the US that any political compromise will have to be built around
the current regime and that, without such a settlement, the Soviets
will stay the course. The Kabul regime would be unable to survive a
Soviet withdrawal in the near term
Top Secret
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Tnn Cot-rat
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MAURITANIA-MOROCCO: Friction Growing
The dispute over Western Sahara may lead to a-realignment of
Mauritania's foreign policy and the fall of President Tava.
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The US Embassy in Nouakchott says senior Mauritanian 25X1
officials are concerned that Morocco will try to occupy the Western
Saharan town of Guera, currently held by Mauritanian troops.
Nouakchott says it will use force to resist Moroccan encroachments.
Comment: Taya's two-year-old regime had favored Morocco rather
than the Algerian-backed Polisario guerrillas challenging Rabat for
control of Western Sahara. An attempt by Morocco to seize Guera,
which is near Mauritania's principal economic center of Nouadibou,
might force Taya to seek military support from Algeria and the
Polisario. Mauritania has no capability to confront Morocco militarily.
POLAND: Shakeup in Leadership
Warsaw announced yesteFday several leadership changes intended to
revitalize its stalled economic reform program. Zdzislaw Sadowski,
chairman of an important economic advisory commission, replaced
Zbigniew Gertych as Deputy Premier. Janusz Pawlowski was named
to succeed labor minister Stanislaw Gebala, and Aleksander
Legatowicz, who is not a Communist Party member, was appointed to
the State Council. Both Sadowski and Legatowicz are members of the
Social Consultative Council, an advisory body created by General
Jaruzelski last year to air alternative views.
Comment: Sadowski, the new Deputy Premier, is a longtime
proponent of reform who earlier this month announced broad new
reform proposals being considered by the regime. He was brought in
to overcome resistance to reforms within the Council of Ministers. In
appointing Legatowicz-a leading lay Catholic activist-Jaruzelski is
the first Bloc leader to heed Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev's
injunction to appoint competent people irrespective of party
membership. The appointment of Sadowski and Legatowicz to top
policymaking positions increases the legitimacy and influence of the
Consultative Council. Legatowicz's elevation may also be a further
signal of the regime's willingness to entertain the Catholic Church's
calls to broaden the political dialogue; it could serve to isolate
opposition figures not willing to work within the system
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Top Secret
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CHINA-UK-HONG KONG: Harsh Words From Deng
Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping yesterday cautioned the joint
Y",
Chinese-Hong Kong committee, which is drafting Hong Kong's future
constitution, that any move toward greater democracy in Hong Kong
should be implemented gradually to ensure stability. Qualifying
Beijing's earlier pledge not to interfere in Hong Kong's internal affairs,
Deng asserted that China would reserve the right to intervene in
certain unspecified matters. The current meeting of the constitution
committee in Beijing is focusing on which Chinese laws will apply to
Hong Kong after 1997, a subject of controversy in the territory. 25X1
Comment: Deng probably wants to warn the British to move
cautiously with their plans to introduce greater democracy. Beijing
views such plans, which are expected to be announced next month,
as interference in the drafting of the constitution. Although Deng
affirmed that Hong Kong would retain its current political and
economic system, perhaps even beyond the 50 years guaranteed in
the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984, his statement implying
possible Chinese interference may create new unease in Hong Kong's
business community. Deng also may have been playing to Chinese
Communist Party traditionalists who have never been entirely
with the Hong Kong agreement. 25X1
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Ten Secret
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In Brief
South Korean police anticipating student demonstrations this
weekend marking student revolt that overthrew Syngman Rhee ...
Seoul appears confident it can prevent rallies ... tion
of constitutional revision may spark violence.
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L J/~ I
Near East
Europe
Deng Xiaoping hinting Zhao Ziyang will be confirmed as China's
party chief next fall ... says Zhao cannot continue as both premier,
acting party chief and that part osition more important ... no
word on choice for premier
Pakistani F-1 owned Afghan SU-22 that had
Afghan plane downed in less than three weeks
penetrated Pakistani territory, according to US Embassy in
Islamabad ... pilot may have bailed out over Pakistan ... second
reportedly shaking confidence in technical capabilities.
cost overruns on Tornado radar and loss of Nimrod AWACS
Technical problems with UK's new air-launched antiradiation
missile delaying entry into service until late 1988... follows delays,
government will continue to assume ships do not carry nuclear
Norwegian Parliament reaffirms policy on naval ship visits ...
leftist motion for no-nuclear-weapons declaration rejected ...
weapons ... no effect on US policy
x
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Top Secret
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Top Secret
Contending Militias in Southern Lebanon
Objective
Amal Nabih Bard Maintain position as strongest militia in the
south, remove Army of South Lebanon, avoid
major increase in Israeli presence, keep ties to
Syria, prevent Palestinian buildup in refugee
camps.
Hizballah Shaykh Fadlallah Develop stronger infrastructure in south, attack
Israeli targets inside security zone and Israel
itself, help Palestinians.
Fatah Yasir Arafat Rebuild presence in south, especially around
Sidon and Tyre, attack Israel.
Popular Nasirite Mustafa Saad Defend Sunni Muslim interests in Sidon,
Organization maintain close ties to Palestinians.
Army of South Antoine Lahad Defend Christian interests in southern Lebanon,
Tog) Secret
weaken Shias and Palestinians, maintain close
ties to Israel.
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raise the general level of violence.
Special Analysis X
fighters, while
still defending their stronghold in Beirut's southern suburbs, have
also sought to escape the Syrian intervention by moving south. Their
competition with Amal for the support of the local Shia population will
of Barr! supporters south will help nullify Hizballah gains
power. The US Embassy in Beirut reports Amal's former military
commander in the south, Daud Daud, maintains a large and loyal
following and continues to challenge Barri's supremacy. The shifting
A leadership struggle in the south has plagued Amal's attempts to
restore its position and wrest support from Hizballah, eroding Barri's
organization
Top Secret
Hizballah is successfully
improving its military and civilian organization and infrastructure.
Hizballah leaders claim Iranian Revolutionary Guards personnel are
now serving in the area: they may be helping Hizballah develop its
men to adopt more ruthless tactics,
Shias last week killed two Israeli soldiers and wounded two more. The
attack is the latest in a surge of Shia violence against Israeli or Israeli-
backed forces. Israel has responded to the recent incidents with air
and artillery strikes; the Army of South Lebanon is encouraging its
which will further alienate local Shlas.
continued
Top Secret
17 April 1987
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Ton Secret
The greater numbers of Amal-Hizballah fighters in the south will
almost certainly provoke more intense Israeli military action to help
the Army of South Lebanon. Tel Aviv has refrained from striking at
Hizballah support centers in the Bekaa Valley because of concern
about US hostages, but Israel will continue to disrupt Hizballah
activities in the south.
As Syrian security forces curtail militia activity in Beirut, both Amal
and Hizballah will continue to redirect their efforts to the south.
Larger Israeli retaliatory operations there would drive the local
nnnulace to sunnnrt still mnrp inti_Icraeli attacks
Top Secret
10 17 April 1987
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Top Secret
Territorial Waters and Continental Shelf Dispute in the Aegean
Tav?an Ada/ari
(Rabbit Islands)
Be Q
Zca
Ada
ATHENS ;Nilm
Aegean
Tkka
Nlsrfoos
Present Greek-claimed territorial water (6 nm)
Limit of potential Greek territorial water
(12 nm)
Line reflecting Greek position on continental
shelf (median line measured from low-water
coastline)
Line reflecting possible Turkish position
on continental shelf (limit of Turkish
petroleum concession)
0 25 50 Kilometers
0 25 50 Nautical Miles
Top Secret
17 April 1987
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Top Secret
Special Analysis
GREECE-TURKEY: Tension Over the Aegean
Greece and Turkey, shaken by their brush with war last month
over mutual misperceptions about exploration for oil in disputed
Aegean waters, are taking steps to tone down their rhetoric and
to improve communication. Prospects for a solution to the
emotional and complex dispute, however, remain slim. The
recent f/areup underscores the vulnerability of US and NATO
bases in the region to Greek-Turkish rivalries.
Greek and Turkish intransigence regarding their Aegean and Cyprus
disputes is such that the possibility of a miscalculation leading to
conflict is always present. The risks may even be increasing; although
the relationship has been marked for years by alternating periods of
crisis and relative calm, tensions have remained high since last
summer. The main issues over the past year have been the
delineation of the continental shelf, continued militarization of the
Greek island of Limnos, designation of air corridors, normalization of
Turkish-EC relations and modernization of Turkish tanks on Cyprus.
Greek Prime Minister Papandreou rejects the Turkish demand that
Aegean issues be settled in bilateral talks; Ankara is equally set
against the Greek proposal to submit the dispute to the International
Court of Justice. An ostensible agreement in the 1970s that tried to
combine these approaches foundered because the Greeks wanted to
discuss only terms of reference for submitting the issue to the Court
while the Turks wanted a bilateral accord that the Court would
essentially ratify
The recent crisis has led to mildly encouraging exchanges between
Turkish Prime Minister Ozal and Papandreou about international
adjudication, but without substantial outside pressure the talks
probably will quickly grind to a halt. Already, hardliners in Ankara
appear to be backing down from Ozal's offer to go to the Court, while
Papandreou is again hinting strongly that any dialogue must be
limited to drawin u terms of reference for international
adjudication
11 17 April 1987
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Top Secret
The Aegean Dispute
Greece argues that history, precedent, and its possession of about 2,800 Aegean islands
entitle it to the lion's share of sea, air, and continental shelf rights in the Aegean. Athens finds
support for its claims in the 1958 and 1983 Law of the Sea Conventions, which enshrine the
principles that nations have a right to a 12-mile territorial sea and that islands have a
continental shelf. The Greeks' main fear, in addition to being deprived of the shelf's presumed
resources, is that Turkey would eventually parlay any rights to the shelf beneath Greek islands
into limits on Greek sovereignty. The Turks contend that the eastern half of the Aegean shelf
is a natural prolongation of the Turkish mainland and that a 12-mile territorial sea around
Greek islands would effectively cut off the Turkish Aegean coast from the high seas.
Both sides can find ample legal basis to defend their positions credibly, but the Greeks believe
that the general thrust of existing law favors them, and they have therefore continued to insist
on international adjudication. The Turks have favored trying to resolve the case bilaterally,
presumably because they fear they would be shortchanged by the International Court.
17 Ap
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Top Secret
Turkey's application to the EC may provide the next flashpoint in
Aegean relations. Papandreou will doubtless use the threat of
blocking Turkey's entry into the EC-which is frought with difficulties
even without Greece's opposition-to press Ankara for agreement to
international adjudication or other major concessions. Ozal may have
broached the idea of going to the Court as a maneuver in preparation
for Ankara's EC bid. The combination of domestic political pressures
and the two sides' inherent inflexibility, however, may lead them to
another major confrontation, particularly if the Turks see Athens as
the sole obstacle to EC membership.
Implications for the US and NATO
Athens apparently still wants to negotiate a new base agreement to
replace the one expiring next year, but Papandreou's distrust of the
US executive branch and the latest Greek-Turkish flareup will incline
Athens to take a particularly tough line on control of the bases and of
US activities on them. Moreover, the Greeks will probably insist on
explicit assurances by the US to maintain the military balance in the
region and on a substantial increase in aid to guard against US
circumvention of the traditional, Congressionally mandated
7-to-10 ratio of US military assistance to Greece and Turkey,
respectively
Ankara, meanwhile, has responded to growing domestic outrage over
US Congressional efforts to cut back and to condition aid to Turkey
by suspending implementation of the recently renewed defense
cooperation agreement- pending an "improvement" in relations.
This decision will not affect the current level of US military operations
in Turkey, but, if Ankara believes the US has not sufficiently
addressed its concerns, it might lead to the blocking of further
military cooperation as provided in the new accord or ultimately to its
renegotiation
Too Secret
12 17 April 1987
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Chadian forces
0 garrison
French forces
o garrison
Faya?Larg uea
Chadian convoy
qp4-' staging area ~-~.. Fada
Siltou Bao Bilia
16th parallel Koro Toro,&
Oum Chaloubab Bir Kala t
Kouba Olanga'jt~ [y C _
naiv ,'~.~\\\` a?Zigey
.*
seaso \
h~ghwa ~ , ~,
Lake`
Chad
N'DJAMENA
b~Q
Nigerian
Cameroon
0 200Kilometers
0 200 Miles
Top Secret
_ Sudan
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Top Secret
Special Analysis
CHAD-FRANCE: Continued Military Dependence
N'Djamena remains dependent on massive US and French
assistance in its effort to drive the Libyans out of Chad, despite
the bonanza of Libyan equipment recently captured. Supply lines
are lengthening as the action moves farther north, and foreign
material and logistic support-crucial to Chadian victories at
Fada and Oaudi Doum-will become critical as Chad begins its
offensive to recapture the Tibesti region and the Aozou Strip.
Nearly all of Chad's military budget comes from external sources, and
combat, severe environmental conditions, and long supply routes
take a heavy toll on N'Djamena's equipment, sustaining the demand
for more. The US Embassy reports that Chad needs additional heavy
trucks, spare parts, technical services, ammunition, and fuel to
conduct operations in Tibesti and to preserve gains in the north.
France delivered to Chad almost $82 million worth of equipment and
supplies, including antitank weapons and transport vehicles, before
the attack on Oaudi Doum. France continues to maintain bases at Bir
Kalait and Abeche that provide mechanical and medical services to
Chadians at the front. French technicians
equipment,
N'Djamena will be able to use some of the vehicles, ammunition, and
light arms left by the retreating Libyans,
that the government lacks the support facilities, trained
personnel, ammunition, and spare parts to take advantage of
captured armor. Chad hopes to move the Libyan tanks and armored
cars to N'Djamena for display and to defend strategic points in the
capital, according to the defense attache, and may seek training from
Egypt and Iraq
Chad will become increasingly dependent on French logistic support
during the planned offensive in Tibesti. The French were heavily
involved in rapidly airlifting equipment, fuel, and supplies to Chadian
bases along the 16th parallel before the attacks on Fada and Oaudi
Doum. Chad's new US-supplied C-130 transport aircraft will give it
only limited airborne resupply capabilities, and the French may
increase resupply sorties to Siltou-a Chadian convoy staging area
144 miles (90 kilometers) above the 16th parallel. Despite his heavy
dependence on the French, Habre appears determined to proceed
with his planned offensive to take Aozou, even though French
opposition to such a move may slow resupply and push back his
timetable for a full-scale offensive
13 17 April
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2bx1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/21 : CIA-RDP88T00091 R000500300001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/21 : CIA-RDP88T00091 R000500300001-9
Top Secret
Special Analysis
SOUTH KOREA: New Focus on Succession
South Korea's President Chun appears to be linking his abrupt
abandonment of constitutional revision to public efforts to
suggest that ruling party chairman Roh Tae Woo will succeed
him, but informed opinion in Seoul is skeptical that Chun has
settled on a successor. Opposition politicians are obviously off
balance because of Chun's postponement of constitutional
reform, but security officials and other Korean observers believe
his action has increased the chance of organized protests this
spring. Progovernment media efforts to portray US support for
Chun' hat any protests will have an anti-US
cast.
The press is giving wide play to Chun's commitment to make other
"reforms," including changes in the election law and the basic press
law, and to hold a convention of the ruling party in June to select
a presidential candidate, but many in Chun's camp and in the
opposition remain deeply skeptical of his intentions. Some members
of the ruling party have told the US Embassy that Chun's haste in
taking action may scuttle Roh's chances, despite stories in the
progovernment press promoting Roh as a "shoo-in" to succeed
Chun.
The manner in which Chun scrapped constitutional revision has
reinforced these doubts
contacts of the Embassy report Chun's decision to act now was
closely held. Only a few around Chun-not including Roh-evidently
were privy to his thinking,
If Chun wants to maintain political influence after 1988, electing a new
president under the current Constitution would make it more difficult
for him to do so. Without a declaration by the new president that he
would serve a shortened term, the new leader would serve seven
years and wield virtually unfettered authority. Under those
circumstances, Roh's personal following in the military and his
reputation as a leader would make him less attractive to Chun than
other choices such as Prime Minister Lho Shin Yong, who is
susceptible to manipulation by Chun.
Top Secret
14 17 April 1987
K
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/21 : CIA-RDP88T00091 R000500300001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/21 : CIA-RDP88T00091 R000500300001-9
Ton Secret
Zeroing in on the Opposition's Disarray
The breakup of the main South Korean opposition party last week
appears to have accelerated the timing of Chun's move. According to
the Embassy, many South Koreans view Chun's action as a step to
prevent opposition leaders Kim Young Sam and
using constitutional revision to rally their forces. 25X1
the government is trying to hinder the new party's efforts 25X1,
to organize by harassing the party's members and by attempting to
undercut Kim Young Sam through public smears. 25X1
Chun's decision was accompanied by an intensified crackdown on his
opponents, including the "indefinite" house arrest of Kim Dae Jung,
which has isolated him from virtually all outsiders. Press reports say
the government is again arresting dissidents and has ordered riot
police to prevent demonstrations
Internal squabbling in the new opposition party is aiding the
government's efforts.
backers of Kim Dae Jung are clashing with Kim Young Sam's more
moderate faction over whether to admit dissidents groups into the
new party
Public reaction to Chun's move-including a thinly veiled rebuke
by Catholic prelate Cardinal Kim-suggests there will be more
antigovernment activities. The US Consul in Pusan reports the move
will probably increase the turnout at coming student protests. The
security services are worried about the potential for domestic turmoil.
The government's attempt to suggest that the US supported Chun's
decision seems likely to aggravate anti-US sentiments. The Consulate
in Pusan reports dissident activists and radical students have voiced
suspicion of Washington's role. The new opposition party is likely to
shy away from a strategy that centers on street rallies, fearing its
vulnerability to charges by the government that it was responsible for
clashes between protesters and riot police.
15 April
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/21 : CIA-RDP88T00091 R000500300001-9
i nn secret
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/21 : CIA-RDP88T00091 R000500300001-9