CUBAN PRESENCE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00768R000300330001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 9, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Cuban Presence in
Sub-Saharan Africa
Secret
ALA 86-10034
August 1986
Copy 3 4 3
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Cuban Presence in
Sub-Saharan Africa
Leadership Analysis
This paper was prepared byl the
Middle America-Caribbean Division with
contributions from the Africa Division of the
Office of African and Latin American Analysis, the
and the Office of
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Middle America-Caribbean
Division, ALA
Secret
ALA 86-10034
August 1986
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Cuban Presence in
Sub-Saharan Africa
Scope Note This paper
D t discusses Havana's tools and tactics for achieving its objectives in
Sub-Saharan Africa. The benefits of and constraints on Cuba's activities in
the region are also addressed, including an assessment of Fidel Castro's
perspective on the current situation in southern Africa. Detailed informa-
tion on Cuba's involvement and numbers of Cuban personnel in various
Sub-Saharan African states are given in an appendix arranged alphabeti-
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cally by country.
Secret
ALA 86-10034
August 1986
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Summary
Information available
as of 15 June 1986
was used in this report.
Cuban Presence in
Sub-Saharan Africa
President Fidel Castro's campaign to promote Third World militancy
against the West has been most successful in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Havana's dramatic interventions in Angola and Ethiopia in the mid-1970s
marked Cuba's emergence as a major force in the Third World and greatly
increased Havana's value to Moscow. Prior to 1975, Cuba had diplomatic
relations with 20 Sub-Saharan African states and fewer than 2,000 civilian
and military personnel stationed there. Today the Cuban presence in Sub-
Saharan Africa totals some 49,000 military and civilian personnel, and
Havana has formal ties to 38 countries.
Havana has gained influence in Sub-Saharan Africa by focusing its efforts
on cooperation agreements and economic aid programs for smaller coun-
tries, providing security assistance to beleaguered regimes, and giving
limited political and material support to incipient revolutionary move-
ments. F_~
dozen countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Cuban military and security assistance is the largest and most influential
component of Havana's foreign aid program to Africa. Havana's assistance
in this area includes providing asylum and training in Cuba for guerrilla
groups; training in third countries; financial assistance and arms deliveries;
security training and personal bodyguards for selected leaders; advisory
cadres, which on occasion have participated in combat operations; and
combat forces for both defensive and offensive operations. To conserve
scarce economic resources, most of the military assistance Havana provides
to African countries consists of advisory personnel or troops. More than 80
percent of the Cuban presence in the region consists of combat troops or
military advisers. Cuban military personnel currently are serving in a
The presence of Cuban combat troops in Sub-Saharan Africa gives
Havana the ability to deploy military personnel rapidly to another country
in the region should an ally need assistance and presents Cuba with
opportunities to exert significant influence on the internal politics of the
host country. Cuban intelligence and security advisers stationed in numer-
ous African countries provide prime sources of information and influence
for Havana, and in at least two cases-Angola and the Congo-they have
helped stabilize pro-Cuban regimes. F__1
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Cuban military commitments to Sub-Saharan Africa have not been
without cost, however. increasing discon-
tent in both the Cuban military and the domestic population over Cuba's
11-year involvement in Angola. Moreover, worsening economic conditions
will probably contribute to Havana's reluctance to increase its commit-
ments to Ethiopia and Mozambique.
As with its military aid, Cuba's civilian assistance programs emphasize
sending Cuban personnel trained in such areas as medicine, agriculture,
construction, education, government, and mass organizations. Currently
there are about 8,500 Cuban civilians in 19 African nations. In addition to
these civilian assistance programs, Havana provides over 16,000 scholar-
ships for African students to study at the secondary and postgraduate level
in Cuba. Although such civilian assistance programs have generally been
successful in expanding Cuban influence in Sub-Saharan Africa, reporting
indicates that Havana's economic problems have led it to cut the costs of its
current programs, which may restrict its ability to finance new aid projects.
Havana probably will try to compensate for its economic constraints and
the stalemate in Angola by focusing greater attention on South Africa.
Castro, perceiving the United States as on the defensive from mounting
international criticism of South Africa, is working to rally black African
states against Washington and Pretoria, and to highlight Cuba's role as
leader of the struggle against apartheid. Havana is likely to score
significant successes in isolating Pretoria during the August summit of the
Nonaligned Movement, where Havana wields significant influence. Cuba
is using its influence gained from training and equipping ANC guerrillas in
Angola to urge the ANC to take more aggressive and violent action inside
South Africa. We believe, however, that Havana's efforts to aid SWAPO
will continue to be hindered by the disunity of this insurgent organization.
The Castro regime will continue to seek new opportunities for influence in
the region. Havana probably will emphasize sending personnel and offering
programs such as security training and scholarships for secondary students.
Excluding an unanticipated situation in South Africa, however, we do not
expect a significant expansion in Cuba's presence in the area. Havana
already has diplomatic relations with most Sub-Saharan nations, and few
seem inclined to permit a large Cuban presence. F__]
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Africa has given Castro the opportunity to become an important political
actor on a global scale. This, in our estimation, assures the continuation of
his meddling on that continent for as long as he remains in power.
Moreover, he apparently believes that the trend of events in southern
Africa is irreversible, and he sees a major Cuban role there as a means of
guaranteeing himself a prominent place in history. His commitment to the
struggle for "liberation" is fundamental and unyielding, and we believe he
cannot bear to be excluded from what he sees as a historic process that will
inevitably result in the elimination of apartheid in South Africa. His
struggle allows him to don the cloak of moral righteousness and gives him
leverage in international relations, especially in multilateral forums. He
seems willing to disregard the growing domestic disenchantment with his
Africa policy, probably in the belief that the eventual collapse of the
regime in Pretoria would give him a much-needed foreign policy victory at
US expense, and would justify his insistence on maintaining a massive
military presence in the region. F_~
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Scope Note
Cuban Objectives in Africa
Tools and Tactics of Cuban Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa
2
Diplomatic and Political Techniques
2
Aid Agreements
5
Health Programs
6
Military Assistance
7
Continuing Support for Angola and Ethiopia
10
Focusing on Southern Africa
11
Outlook and Implications
13
Cuban Involvement in Sub-Saharan African States: A Country Survey
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Cuban Diplomatic Relations in Sub-Saharan Africa
Libya
Niger
Khartoum*
Sudan
Zambia
Lusaka* .
,Bujumbura
Dodoma,
Tanzania
Harare*
imbabw
lawi
mgwe
ern
are
*Bamako
Btss u aR ort
Guinea l
Ka n
G'; Kissidougou
Ivory
Coast
Abidjan,
Algeria
Save
have oniobolo
Lorn ~*.Lagoa
~l Po
Cotanou Novo
alaho~
Equatorial Guinea
Sao Tome & Principe,/
Sio Toe
kAibreville
Gabon
j Central c
V African Republic
ameroon Bangui
*Yaounde\ r-^-{
Zaire Rwanda
Burundi
Angola
Uganda)
_*Aampala
AR. enn4l
Cape
Verde Amitcar
0 .Cabral
airport
Praia Dakar*.`Senegal
Bissadf-
Guinea-Bissauf
Monrovia"r*
Libe
South
Atlantic
Ocean
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Cuban Presence in
Sub-Saharan Africa
Since the early 1960s, most of Cuba's successes in its
campaign to lead the Third World struggle against
the West have occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Havana's dramatic intervention in Angola and Ethio-
pia in the mid-1970s signaled Cuba's emergence as a
major force in the Third World. Although Havana
has since reduced its forces in Ethiopia, the Cuban
presence in Sub-Saharan Africa has expanded from
less than 2,000 prior to 1975 to some 49,000 military
and civilian personnel in 18 countries. F__1
Cuban Objectives in Africa
Castro's goals in Africa have evolved over time, but
one tenet has remained constant-to lead the Third
World's struggle against perceived Western exploita-
tion. During the 1960s, the Cuban leader supported
liberation movements throughout Africa and Latin
America. By 1970, however, the guerrilla strategy
was discredited, Cuba was isolated internationally, its
economy was in a shambles, and the Castro regime
was under heavy pressure from Moscow to adopt more
pragmatic policies. As a result, in Africa, Havana
sought to end its isolation and-simultaneously-
better its ties to Moscow.F__1
The new approach met with considerable success.
Before 1970, Cuba had diplomatic relations with only
four Sub-Saharan African countries. By the end of
1974 this number had grown to 20 (see table 1).
Cuba's increasing respectability dovetailed effectively
with the Soviet policy of detente, and the tension that
had existed between Moscow and Havana was re-
duced. Havana's value as a Soviet ally soared, howev-
er, when the Cuban military interventions in Angola
and Ethiopia preserved pro-Soviet Marxist regimes in
both countries. By providing military support to the
two regimes and demonstrating "international prole-
tarianism," Castro enhanced his reputation in the
region. During the second half of the 1970s, 18 more
African nations established relations with Cuba.
Despite Castro's attempt to strengthen his influence
with Moscow, his goal of leading an anti-US struggle
by Third World nations remained paramount, in part
because of Castro's desire for a major role in interna-
tional affairs and as an affirmation of the Cuban
revolution. Given this outlook, but restricted by scarce
resources, the Cubans have developed assistance pro-
grams that emphasize sending trained Cuban person-
nel to help ideologically sympathetic governments and
revolutionary movements. These programs include:
political support in international organizations; medi-
cal and technical assistance in such fields as agricul-
ture, construction, and education; and help in organiz-
ing political parties, bureaucracies, and mass
organizations. F__1
Cuba's military assistance has been the most effective
in developing influence, however. Havana's programs
in this area include providing sanctuary and training
in Cuba for guerrilla groups; training in third coun-
tries; financial assistance and arms deliveries; security
training and personal bodyguards for selected leaders;
advisory cadre, who at times have directly participat-
ed in combat operations, and combat forces for both
defensive and offensive operations. There is no partic-
ular pattern in the way these programs have been
applied. Assistance has generally been tailored to
meet the needs and requests of the recipients.
STAT
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Date Type of Intergovernment Trade Civil Military Combat Civil Students
Relations Diplomatic Commission Agreement Aviation Advisers Troops Advisers Studying
Established Relations a for Economic in Cuba
Cooperation
Equatorial
Guinea
27 Dec 72
1
Ghana
Reestablished
May 74
1
1982
X
Guinea 1960
1
1979
Guinea-Bissau 1 Oct 73
1
1978
Ivory Coast
11 Feb 86
1
Mali
Reestablished
13 Nov 72
1
1982
X
Tools and Tactics of Cuban Policy credentials. Usually some type of foreign relations
in Sub-Saharan Africa cooperation agreement follows, occasionally accompa-
nied by trade and civil aviation accords.
Diplomatic and Political Techniques
Havana has made significant inroads in improving Relations with the target country are further cement-
diplomatic ties, usually the first step toward establish- ed by the visits of high-level Cuban officials, who
ing a Cuban presence in a host country. The Cuban offer a variety of technical assistance programs. The
approach typically begins with Havana pushing for extensive travels of Castro's special African envoy,
better diplomatic relations, often appealing to the
target country's interest in enhancing its nonaligned
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Cuban Presence and Ties to Sub-Saharan African States (continued)
Date Type of Intergovernment Trade Civil Military Combat
Relations Diplomatic Commission Agreement Aviation Advisers Troops
Established Relations a for Economic
Cooperation
Civil
Advisers
Students
studying
in Cuba
Niger 25 Apr 76 1
Nigeria 25 Jun 74 1
1981
Rwanda 6 Sep 79 2
Sao Tome and 11 Apr 76 1
Principe
50-70
50-70
300
Sierra Leone 24 Apr 72 1
X
60
Tanzania Jun 64 1
X
5
15
?
Togo 22 Jun 79 2
Zaire Reestablished 1
Aug 79
a 1-Ambassadorial level
2-Nonresident Ambassador
3-Status unknown
4-Embassy closed
5-Charge level
6-Embassy only
Jorge Risquet, underscore the high priority Havana
attaches to maintaining solidarity with its allies in
Africa. Press reports indicate that Risquet visited
Angola, Ethiopia, Benin, Ghana, and Burkina in the
latter part of 1985. This year Risquet headed a Cuban
delegation to Angola to discuss cooperation between
Havana and Luanda. At the conclusion of the meet-
ings, Risquet announced that Havana had agreed to
strengthen its cooperation with Luanda in the area of
defense, and reasserted Cuba's commitment not only
to the security of Luanda but also to the destruction
of apartheid in southern Africa. In the cases of those
countries that are wary of Cuban motives, Havana
frequently offers bilateral exchanges in politically
neutral areas. For example, Cuban sports and cultural
delegations have visited Nigeria several times since
the establishment of relations. in 1974.F___1
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As Cuban President Fidel Castro's special envoy in
charge of Cuban-Angolan affairs and Havana's over-
seer of Cuban activities in all of Sub-Saharan Africa
since the late 1970s, Jorge Risquet occupies one of
the most sensitive-and perhaps one of the most
powerful positions in the Cuban Government. A
member of the Cuban Communist Party Central
Committee since its inception in 1965, Risquet also
has held a seat on the party's Secretariat since 1973
and on the Politburo since 1980. He fought against
the Batista regime under both Fidel and Raul Castro,
the latter-because of their close relationship-re-
portedly using his influence to maneuver Risquet into
positions of importance.
Because he has extensive experience in African of
fairs as head of Havana's technical mission to Angola
(1969-79), and later as Chief of Mission (1978-79)
there, Risquet enjoys the confidence of Fidel and, as
such, is given a great deal of autonomy-especially
on matters related to Angola. Risquet, for example,
is reported to exercise authority over Cuban military
commanders in Angola-where he also outranks the
Cuban Ambassador-during his frequent visits to
that country.
Ghanaian leader Jerry Rawlings was accorded
lavish attention during his July 1984 visit to
Cuba, and was decorated with Cuba's most pres-
Havana also enhances its relations with African coun-
tries by inviting official delegations to visit Cuba and
witness showcases of the revolution. Such trips often
result in the two countries signing a limited coopera-
tion agreement and issuing a joint communique voic-
ing support for Cuban political objectives. For exam-
ple, the US Interests Section reports that the red-
carpet treatment Burkinan President Sankara and
Ghanaian President Rawlings received during their
visits to Havana in 1984 was a forerunner to expanded
cooperation between these countries and Cuba.
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Havana gains allies and cements relationships by
providing political and propaganda support in interna-
tional organizations for various African countries and
liberation movements. Cuba has provided substantial
rhetorical support for the African National Congress
(ANC) and the South-West Africa People's Organiza-
tion (SWAPO) as part of its commitment to "interna-
tional proletarianism" and the cause of Namibian
independence. Havana's experience with the politics
of international organizations is frequently used on
behalf of its friends in the UN and other bodies. In
exchange, Cuba is able to draw upon the assistance of
Third World nations on issues of importance to
Havana. For example, Cuba last year sponsored a
resolution condemning coercive economic measures
applied by developed countries against developing
Castro is probably
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Havana expends great effort in advancing shared
African and Cuban political goals in the Nonaligned
Movement (NAM). For example, Cuba's intensive
backstage maneuvers at the Luanda NAM ministerial
conference in September 1985 resulted in Zimbabwe
gaining chairmanship of the NAM, giving Havana
opportunities for manipulating the agenda and influ-
encing the August 1986 summit, according to US
Embassy reporting. Apparently concerned that the
favored contender, Yugoslavia, would propose moder-
ate declarations, Havana initiated a lobbying blitz,
dispatching senior official delegations to 13 Third
World countries to canvass support.F___1
Zimbabwe, inexperienced in hosting an international
event, has been receptive to Cuba's offer of assistance
in managing the summit.
g that it will render Mugabe indebted to
Cuba and thus more receptive to Cuban overtures.
Moreover, Cuban logistic support will present oppor-
tunities for influencing the NAM proceedings. Ac-
cording to US Embassy reporting, Havana's provision
of translators to the 1985 Luanda NAM ministerial
meeting enabled Cuba to greatly influence the word-
ing of the final declaration. We believe Cuba will
utilize this August's summit to focus international
attention on South Africa and bolster the positions of
the Frontline States and the insurgents battling
Pretoria.
Although we believe Castro views the conference as
key to his campaign of increasing Third World pres-
sure on Pretoria, Havana's severe economic difficul-
ties have apparently forced Cuba to severely cut its
budget for the summit.
Aid Agreements
The Cuban economic aid program is a major compo-
nent of Cuban policy in Sub-Saharan Africa, often
touted by Castro as exemplifying Cuba's commitment
to "international proletarianism." The aid pro-
grams-most in the form of civilian advisory assis-
tance as opposed to material or financial aid-involve
approximately 8,500 Cuban civilians serving in 19
Sub-Saharan African countries
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Cuban operation of the Marromeu Su ar Mill,
Sofala Province, Mozambique
Havana traditionally gains a foothold in these
countries by providing rudimentary medical and edu-
cational aid, as well as assistance in construction,
agriculture, and other technical areas.
we estimate that less than 25
Cuban medical personnel working in Cotonou
Hospital and University Center, Benin F_
agriculture. Cuba provides such technical assistance
on the basis of the recipient's ability to pay; generally,
Havana pays the salaries of its civilian advisers, while
the host country provides the necessary materials and
equipment, food and housing, a personal spending
allowance, and transportation for the Cuban person-
nel. Although most Cuban advisers possess rudimen-
tary skills by Western standards, the assistance they
provide is superior to that of most Sub-Saharan
African countries, and is relatively inexpensive.'
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percent of Cuban aid consists of grants of capital
goods and other materials.
The establishment of a joint commission for economic
and scientific-technical cooperation provides the
framework for the aid relationship between Cuba and
an African country and serves as the primary mecha-
nism for subsequent decisions on the provision of
Cuban personnel and other aid. Havana currently
maintains joint commissions with 15 Sub-Saharan
African countries. The commission is a permanent
body that meets annually to work out a formal
protocol detailing Cuban civilian assistance for the
year in such areas as science, health, education, and
Havana's medical assistance program is one of the
most successful elements of its civilian assistance
programs; medical personnel often make up the ma-
jority of the Cuban contingent in the host country.
Most of the more than 2,000 Cuban
medical personnel abroad are general practitioners,
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many providing routine care to the rural populace
that has infrequent access to medical services. Cuban
press reporting indicates, for example, that some 385
Cuban medical personnel serve in 13 provinces of
Angola.
By training more medical personnel than needed at
home, Cuba has developed a reasonably cost-effective
way to gain entry to Third World countries in desper-
ate need of medical assistance. Cuban medical contin-
gents abroad not only serve to promote Cuba as a
leader in the field of medicine, but also play a political
role in advancing relations between Cuba and the host
gram. Cuban press reporting indicates Harare will
send some 400 students this year to the Isle of Youth
for five years of instruction. US Embassy reporting
indicates Cuba is providing Harare 25 instructors this
year.
Cuba also offers a limited number of scholarships for
advanced study at its universities and technical
schools, particularly attractive to African countries
with no postsecondary educational institutions. For
example, Sierra Leone recently agreed to send stu-
we estimate that
Educational Assistance 2
In addition to civilian assistance programs, Cuba
offers numerous secondary school scholarships for
African students to study in Cuba. On Cuba's Isla de
la Juventud (Isle of Youth), the Castro regime has
established a group of 21 secondary schools for some
16,000 foreign teenagers-the vast majority from
Africa. Zimbabwean President Mugabe, apparently
impressed by Cuba's educational programs, recently
agreed to an ambitious educational exchange pro-
about 500 postsecondary foreign students are enrolled
in Cuban universities and technical schools.
roles.
Military Assistance
Cuban military and security assistance to established
regimes is the largest and most influential component
of Havana's foreign aid program in Africa. It consists
of combat troops-the largest component-military
and security advisers, and limited materiel support.
According to Castro's public statements, since 1975
over 200,000 Cuban personnel have served in Angola
alone, the majority in military or military support
The large Cuban combat presence in Africa also gives
Havana the ability to deploy military personnel rapid-
ly to another country in the region should an ally need
military assistance. For example, Cuban units in
Ethiopia have probably been involved in
out-of-country deployments. F
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Cuba: Schools for Foreign Students
on the Isle of Youth
One of the Castro regime's most successful showcase
programs is the education of some 16,000 foreign
teenagers at two dozen secondary schools on the Isle
of Youth. Havana portrays the schools as its unself-
ish contribution to resolving the education problem in
the Third World. Some 2,400 Ethiopian youths
orphaned by the war in the Ogaden in 1978, for
example, were given scholarships through junior and
senior high school, which in some cases amounts to a
stay of up to eight years. The schools have received
generous coverage in Cuban publications intended for
foreign audiences and are a mainstay on the itinerary
of showcases that Havana displays for visitors from
abroad. The influx offoreign students began after the
Cuban intervention in Angola in 1975, and today the
student body-Cuban and foreign-comprises well
over a third of the total population on the Isle of
Youth.
Each school is a self-contained unit comprising about
600 students, 50 teachers, and 20 support personnel.
The schools are surrounded by some 600 hectares of
citrus groves where students grow fruit as part of the
daily work-study program in effect at all Cuban
secondary schools in the countryside. The length of
stay on the Isle of Youth depends on each student's
previous level of education. Students who perform
well are selected for advanced education or training
at higher institutions.
Although unpublicized, several special facilities on
the island are used to provide foreign students with
small arms training and antiaircraft and field artil-
lery familiarization, as well as field experience in
camping, map reading, survival, and traversing rough
terrain
Some of the estimated 2,600 Angolan students
studying in Cuba. This group stands at attention
Training at these facilities
lasts anywhere from a Jew
months to a year. oreover, each secondary school,
in addition to its conventional academic departments,
has a military department that provides classes in
basic military subjects
Virtually all foreign student groups, at one time or
another, have been involved in incidents of unaccept-
able behavior, and many youths have been sent home
short of graduation as punishment. Culture shock
and the rigid Cuban discipline appear to be the
primary causes of student discontent. A senior Ethio-
pian official admitted to a US diplomat that Cuban
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Foreign Student Enrollment
on the Isle of Youth in 1984
Number of
Schools
Number of
Students
Sahara Democratic Arab Republic
(Polisario)
1
580
547
313
e foreign students on the Isle of Youth present-
ly number over 16,000, as a result of new contingents from
Burkina, Sudan, and Zimbabwe as well as increased enrollment of
Angolans.
b Uses the same schools as students from Guinea-Bissau.
training is accomplishing the opposite of what was
intended-returning students were embittered at the
Ethiopian Government and at Communism in gener-
Despite the problems, the schools are an effective
vehicle for creating an image of revolutionary Cuba
as an altruistic society superior to that of Western
countries and worthy of emulation elsewhere in the
Third World. The list of Third World leaders who
have been taken to see them includes such luminaries
as dos Santos, Sankara, Nyerere, Mugabe, Kaunda,
Mengistu, UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar,
and ANC chief Oliver Tambo. The trip to the Isle of
Youth has become a ritual for virtually every visiting
African leader or any education official from a
country with little educational infrastructure faced
with the problem of training its young people. More-
over, many of the foreign students are the children of
high government or party officials, who thus have a
personal stake to consider when weighing their coun-
try's relationship with Cuba.F_~
In bearing the expense of these schools, Havana
believes it is forging lasting links to the future leaders
of the Third World, and most likely views the schools
as an investment that-in addition to immediate
propaganda benefits-is bound to pay handsome
dividends within one generation. Despite disclaimers
from some governments that send students, the
schools' curriculums contain strong doses of political
indoctrination, according to students who have de-
fected, and visitors who have observed the library
holdings of the schools report that little is
available other than standard Marxist political and
economic textbooks and research materials. The
Cubans clearly hope to gain political advantage
through training students who may become influen-
tial elements of the next generation, shaping the
political and economic future of their respective
homelands.
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In those countries where Cuba has a substantial
military presence, Havana is in a position to exert
significant influence on the internal politics of the
host country. For example,
he Cuban military played a role in counter-
ing a coup attempt against the Neto regime in Angola
in May 1977. In addition,
a Cuban-manned Presidential bodyguard was
cre ite with preventing the overthrow of Congolese
President Massamba-Debat during an Army revolt in
mid-1966. The presence of Cuban personnel in key
sectors of the host country also provides prime ave-
example,
Presidents Castro and dos Santos sign a joint Cuba International
communique following the Angolan leader's
Cuba's advisory role to the Cape Verdean security
service gives it near-total knowledge of important
developments in that country. F-7
The Cuban Government has also placed Cuban mili-
tary personnel in Africa and ingratiated itself with
various African leaders through the provision of secu-
rity and intelligence assistance, particularly to leftist
leaders threatened by coups. US Embassy reporting
indicates Cuban security assistance helped stabilize
pro-Cuban regimes in Burkina and Ghana. F_
Following his seizure of power in a 1981 coup, Flight
Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings sought Cuban security
assistance to counter perceived threats to Ghana from
exiles in neighboring countries.
leaders have had Cuban military personnel in their
bodyguard forces for years-among them Congo's
President Denis Sassou-Nguesso and Guinea Bissau's
Continuing Support for Angola and Ethiopia
In some cases, such as Angola, the presence of Cuban
combat units is vital to the survival of the regime.
Although the Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola (MPLA) emerged victorious in March 1976
from among the three rival Angolan movements, the
regime has been increasingly challenged by South
African incursions and the growing threat from Jonas
Savimbi's UNITA insurgents. To meet these threats,
Havana has increased its troop strength in Angola
over the years, including substantial augmentations in
late 1981 and late 1983. Drawing on
we estimate
there are a total of 36,000 Cuban military personnel
in Angola, of which 28,000 are combat troops
assigned to air, air defense, and ground combat units.
The remaining 8,000 Cuban military personnel are
specialists, technicians, and advisers assisting the
Angolan Army.
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The Cubans sayl I that their
military role in Angola is to defend vital strategic
installations while the Angolan Army fights the war.
Cuban forces are
deployed primarily in the provincial capitals and
along the key supply lines. They guard the main
garrisons and provide essential support services, free-
ing Angolan troops for field operations. Cuban in-
volvement in combat operations has been limited to
piloting aircraft and helicopters, manning much of the
air defense system, driving armored vehicles, and
filling support roles.
Cuban President Castro apparently views the turmoil
in South Africa as presenting an opportunity to
expand Havana's influence in the region.
Havana is also attempting to intensify pressure on
South Africa by garnering the support of Frontline
States for Cuba's role in the region and through
increased aid to the insurgents. Castro was particular-
ly successful in generating propaganda against Pre-
toria through the visits of four Frontline States lead-
ers to Havana last year.
The Cuban Government's other major military pres-
ence in Africa is in Ethiopia. The Cuban combat
brigades were originally deployed to Ethiopia in late
1977 and early 1978 to help Ethiopia repulse the
Somali invasion of the Ogaden region. Since the end
of that fighting, the Cuban military contingent has
been confined to garrison duty, serving primarily as a
deterrent to another Somali invasion.
we estimate Havana
withdrew 5,500 troops and several hundred support
personnel from Ethiopia in late 1983 and early 1984,
primarily because of the reduced Somali threat and
Ethiopia's unwillingness to continue bearing the cost
for the Cuban presence. The Intelligence Community
estimates there are currently between 1,500 and 2,000
Cuban combat personnel in Ethiopia, and approxi-
mately the same number of military advisers and
lowing Angolan President dos Santos' visit last Octo-
ber, Castro publicly reiterated that the "new
strength" of Angolan and Cuban forces coincided
with the "irreversible crisis of apartheid" in South
Africa. In addition, Tanzanian President Nyerere
during his visit publicly thanked Castro for his contri-
bution to the survival of the MPLA regime. Nyerere
continued on to Angola after his Havana visit to
confer with Namibian insurgent leaders,
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In addition to his propaganda efforts, Castro
apparently is expanding Havana's support to
insurgent groups operating against the Pretoria
regime.
between the two are generally good, as recently
demonstrated by ANC President Oliver Tambo's
March visit to Cuba.
apparently hopes that the increased guerrilla activity
inside South Africa will force Pretoria to divert forces
from Namibia, allowing SWAPO forces to operate
Castro is
planning to use the NAM summit in Harare this
August to unite Third World nations against South
more freely.
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scenes to assure Harare the NAM chairmanship and
providing substantial technical assistance for
Zimbabwe to host the event, is in an excellent position
to push southern African issues to the forefront of the
NAM agenda.
Havana generally has had success in furthering its
political and military ties to smaller African countries
through cooperation agreements and assistance pro-
grams. Economic assistance serves as a tangible dem-
onstration of support to African leaders that lends
credibility to Cuban professions of commitment, and,
through the physical presence of Cuban technicians,
Havana transmits its views of domestic and interna-
tional issues to host-country nationals. Cuba's ability
to expand this program will be limited by its economic
problems. Havana
already is trying to cut the costs of its technical
assistance to some African countries
to
Cuban Government has refused to continue paying all
travel expenses for Cuban technicians traveling to
Burundi, and Havana requested additional allowances
for its technicians in Madagascar recently
Over the next two to
five years, we believe economic problems will continue
to restrict Havana's ability to finance aid projects
abroad and will limit the number of highly qualified
personnel Cuba can send overseas. We expect, there-
fore, that, as the number of Cuban civilian personnel
or "internationalists" increases, their level of compe-
tence is likely to decline. Over the longer term, such a
trend could undercut the positive image Cuba has
been able to create.
In the meantime, we believe Cuba will continue to be
frustrated by the military situation in Angola. The
improved performance of UNITA forces indicates
that there is no near end in sight to Havana's 11-year
involvement in the war. The deteriorating situation in
Angola has worsened morale problems among Cuban
troops, and, if Cuban casualties continue to rise,
Castro could face increasing discontent at home.
Moreover, worsening economic conditions in Cuba
will probably contribute to the reluctance of Havana
to increase its commitments to Ethiopia and
Mozambique. F_~
Havana probably will attempt to compensate for its
economic restrictions and the stalemated military
situation in Angola by increasing pressures on South
Africa. Castro, seeing the United States on the defen-
sive as a result of mounting international criticism of
South Africa, is working to rally black African states
against Washington and Pretoria and highlight
Cuba's role as an enemy of apartheid. Cuba's at-
tempts to isolate Pretoria probably will be successful
at the NAM summit where Havana wields significant
influence. We believe, however, that Havana's efforts
to aid SWAPO will continue to be hindered by the
disunity of this insurgent organization. F__1
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Appendix
Cuban Involvement in Sub-Saharan
African States: A Country Survey 3
Angola
Cuba's involvement in Angola began in the early
1960s when Havana began providing limited guerrilla
warfare training to the MPLA-one of the liberation
movements that fought Portuguese colonial rule.
Cuba also sent small amounts of arms, supplies, and
advisers to the MPLA bases outside Angola, trained
MPLA insurgents in Cuba, and provided propaganda
support. Revolution in Portugal in 1974 and Lisbon's
decision to cut free from its African colonies left the
three rival Angolan movements contesting for power.
The conflict flared into open war in March 1975 and
Cuba gradually increased its involvement by sending
advisers and military support personnel to assist the
MPLA. By early 1976, Cuba responded to increased
South African military pressure on the MPLA by
sending some 18,000 combat troops to Angola, which
led the way to an MPLA victory by March 1976.
Cuban Military Presence in Angola,
1975-85
estimated 36,000 Cuban military personnel in Ango-
la, of which 28,000 are combat troops assigned to air,
air defense, and ground combat units. The remaining
8,000 Cuban military personnel are specialists, tech-
nicians, and advisers assisting the Angolan Army.
In addition to their military presence, the Cubans
have an estimated 6,000 civilian advisers in Angola
providing humanitarian and economic assistance. Ac-
cording to diplomatic sources, Cuban civilians work in
all parts of the Angolan Government, performing both
advisory and functional tasks. Cuban civilians also
serve as teachers, doctors, construction workers, agri-
cultural experts, and economic advisers. F__1
' This appendix details the current state of relations between Cuba
and most of the Sub-Saharan African states with whom Havana
has diplomatic relations. It excludes nations where there are no
Cuban military or civilian assistance programs. For each nation
listed, we have estimated military and civilian personnel serving in
these countries
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Benin
Cuba does not have a military or strategic interest in 25X1
Benin, but finds Cotonou's socialist bent and member-
ship in the Nonaligned Movement attractive. Diplo-
matic relations were established in 1974, and Havana
maintains an embassy in Cotonou. In 1984, it was
staffed by 11 diplomatic personnel. At that time,
Havana provided Benin with some 30 medical and
area of cooperation is in education; some 200 Beni-
nese scholarship recipients are studying in Cuba,
according to press reports
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The visit of Benin's Foreign Minister to Havana in
October 1985 and the establishment of a joint cooper-
ation commission in December further cemented rela-
tions between the two countries. Havana probably will
press Benin for contracts on construction projects in
an effort to earn hard currency, and possibly for trade
in agricultural products.
Burkina
Although Cuba has not forged particularly close ties
to Burkina, Havana's access to Ouagadougou's intelli-
gence apparatus may allow it to influence the coun-
try's politics. President Sankara visited Havana in
September 1984, where he received the red carpet
treatment and was awarded the prestigious Jose
Marti medal. The two countries signed a technical
cooperation agreement in early 1985, but, according
to US Embassy reporting, no Cuban technical advis-
ers had yet arrived in Burkina as of January 1986.
The US Embassy also reports that there are four
Cuban military advisers attached to Burkina's inter-
nal security and intelligence service, which could give
Havana the opportunity to recruit anti-Sankara offi-
cers and possibly provide LIPAD-a Marxist group
that seeks to depose Sankara-with information on
the regime's strengths and weaknesses. Moreover, the
Burkinan security and intelligence service is headed
by Vincent Sigue, who received terrorist training in
Cuba, according to US Embassy reporting.
not begin until 1980.
Burundi
Cuba's presence in Burundi, never strong, and mini-
mal since 1983, apparently is expanding. The two
countries established diplomatic relations in 1974 and
signed a technical assistance protocol in 1976, but
cooperation in the areas of health and agriculture did
the Cuban presence decreased
and relations cooled following the 1983 departure of
the Cuban Ambassador
Cuban presence in Burundi has been limited to a
small diplomatic corps headed by a Charge and some
half dozen Cuban civilian advisers.
two countries-which essentially grants most-favored-
nation status-was ratified in 1984, but so far there
are no indications of a developing trade relationship.
Cape Verde
Cuba's interest in Cape Verde and its influence in the
government of this small group of islands off the
northwestern coast of Africa has been strong since
influence is largely a result o the tact that mos of the
government ministers of Cape Verde and many of its
citizens reportedly have received free educational,
political, and technical training in Cuba. The two
countries established a joint commission for economic
cooperation in 1979, and Cuban advisers
are active in nearly every
department of the Cape Verde Government. Cuban
influence is further evidenced by the fact that Cape
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Verdean laws appear to be co ied from the Cuban
model. the size of the
Cuban contingent in Cape Verde in August 1985 at
35 to 40 personnel-including as many as 19 military
and security adviser
Cuban influence in Cape Verde appears to be heaviest
in the military. US officials
report that Cape Verde's 300-man
security service has eight Cuban advisers, and that
three Cuban military advisers assist the 1,500-man
Army all Cape
Verdean military and police o cers go to Cuba for
training, and that the security services are closely
tailored after the Cuban model.
Havana's interest in maintaining warm relations with
Praia most likely stems from the need to protect the
Cuban airlink to Angola. All flights carrying Cuban
personnel to and from Angola make their necessary
refueling stops in Cape Verde. Although most of the
arms, ammunition, and other supplies destined for
Angola are now routinely flown or shipped in by the
Soviets, limited quantities of supplies-including
arms-evidently are still carried aboard Cuban mili-
January and February 1984, two Cubana military
flights passing through Cape Verde's Amilcar Cabral
Airport carried arms to an undisclosed location.
(S NF NC OC)
Congo
Congo was the first self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist
state in Africa, and since 1963 has patterned its
development on the East European and Cuban mod-
els. The Congolese sympathize with Castro's revolu-
tionary philosophy, and support many of Havana's
views on international issues. Cuba has provided
technical assistance to the Congo Government in key
economic sectors such as agriculture, animal hus-
bandry, public works and construction, industry, min-
ing and energy, transportation, and trade. Many of
these projects are presently stalemated, however, as a
result of Brazzaville's financial problems.F__1
For Havana, Congo's importance lies in its role as a
support base for Cuba's Angolan involvement. Since
1975, the Congolese port facilities and airfields at
Pointe Noire and Brazzaville have served as key
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ban forces in Angola's Cabinda Province. The US
Embassy reports that the Cuban military camp in
Pointe Noire is used as a holding area for troops 25X1
waiting to be transferred to Angola. This camp is also
used as a rest and recreation area for Cuban troops
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Press reporting over the past year indicates that Cuba
and Congo have a warm political relationship. During
1985, a large number of top Congolese officials visited 25X1
Cuba, including the National Assembly President,
Minister of Education, Forestry Minister, Justice
Minister, and Foreign Minister. In December, Jorge
Risquet met with Congolese President Denis Sassou-
Nguesso in Luanda to discuss the struggle of the
South African people against the apartheid
regime.
The relationship between the two countries, however,
has been characterized by occasional frictions. The
US Embassy notes that the poor behavior of Cuban 25X1
troops stationed in Pointe Noire has alienated the
local population. In addition, according to press re-
ports, Congolese President Denis Sassou-Nguesso oc-
casionally displays annoyance at Castro's messianic
view regarding socialism, charging that the Cuban
leader's attitude does not foster genuine solidarity and
harmony among socialist nations. F__1
Exclusive of the Cuban presence at Pointe Noire, the
US Embassy in Brazzaville places the Cuban pres-
ence at about 55 civilian technical personnel, with an
additional 10 to 15 Cubans advising Congolese securi-
ty forces. The US Embassy also reports there are six
Cuban diplomatic and consular personnel presently
listed in Congo.
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Equatorial Guinea
Cuba's influence in Equatorial Guinea has declined
dramatically since President Obiang took power in
August 1979 and expelled the large Cuban military
and civilian contingent. Since then, the Obiang re-
gime has allowed military and economic agreements
with Havana to lapse. According to the US Embassy,
Havana currently provides no military aid to Malabo,
and there are only some 10 Cuban personnel, includ-
ing six doctors, serving there.
Ethiopia
Cuba and Ethiopia established diplomatic relations in
July 1975, almost a year after the Ethiopian military
overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie. Ties between the
two countries are strong, cemented by the close
relationship between Castro and Ethiopian Chairman
Mengistu and Havana's provision of troops to help
Ethiopia repulse the 1977 Somali invasion. Although
the Cuban military presence in Ethiopia has been
reduced considerably in recent years, civilian advisers
and technicians continue to be active, according to the
US Embassy.
The relationship between the two countries started to
develop shortly after February 1977, when then Lt.
Col. Mengistu Haile-Mariam became Chairman of
the Military Council after a bloody power struggle.
Castro visited Addis Ababa in March 1977, and later
that month attempted to mediate the Ethiopian-
Somali dispute over control of Ethiopia's Ogaden
region by chairing a meeting between Mengistu and
Somali President Siad. Although the talks failed,
Castro came
away impressed with Mengistu's "revolutionary
credentials."
that was intended to supplement the regular
Army. The number of Cuban advisers more than
doubled after the outbreak of the Ethiopian-Somali
war in July 1977. Later the same year, according to
US Embassy reporting and academic studies, Ha-
vana, Moscow, and Addis Ababa agreed on the
commitment of Cuban combat troops to Ethiopia. The
initial deployment began in late November, and by
April 1978 some 16,000 to 17,000 Cuban military
personnel, including pilots, had been deployed to
Ethiopia, where they were organized into combat
brigades and played a key role in defeating the
Somalis.)
We believe, on the basis
Embassy reporting, that the Cuban combat brigades
stationed in Ethiopia were reduced substantially dur-
ing a drawdown that began in late 1983 and was
completed by the beginning of 1984. The Cuban
presence was reduced from about 7,000 combat troops
to an estimated 1,500 to 2,000 combat troops by April
1986. We believe, on the basis of US Embassy
reportin tthat Ethiopian
units took overt a equipment an garrisons of most of
the Cuban combat brigades beginning in 1983.
most analysts in the Intelligence Community believe
that a Cuban mechanized brigade of approximately
1,500 to 2,000 troops remains at Dire Dawa. Some
analysts, however, believe that
can substantiate only
the presence o a motorized battalion-approximately
400 troops-and a small caretaker force. This unit
may have the protection of the Addis Ababa-
Djibouti rail line-an economic link between the
Ethiopian interior and a major port-as its mission.
We believe the Cuban combat troops in Ethiopia are
intended to be tangible evidence to Mengistu of the
Cuban commitment to the security of his regime.
We believe there are approximately 1,100 Cuban
economic technicians and other civilian personnel in
Ethiopia. According to US Embassy reporting, Cuban
civilian personnel are involved in the fields of educa-
tion, health, agriculture, industry, construction, and
water resources. Cuban-Ethiopian trade is negligible,
according to the US Embassy. In 1982, the last year
for which statistics are available, Havana imported
less than $350,000 worth of linseed from Ethiopia
while exporting $26,000 worth of spare parts, screws,
and trailer parts to Addis Ababa.
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from exiles in neighboring countries.
Ghana
Cuba resumed diplomatic relations with Ghana in
May 1974 after an eight-year hiatus following the
overthrow of President Kwame Nkrumah. However,
significant interaction between the two countries did
not take place until Flt. Lt. Jerry Rawlings seized
power in a 1981 coup. At that time, Rawlings sought
Cuban security assistance to counter perceived threats
Havana's economic woes and Ghanaian nationalism
probably limit a greater Cuban influence and pres-
ence for the near term. Cuban economic influence in
Ghana is minimal, and we do not expect it to increase
significantly. The US Embassy reports that Havana
has been providing only limited technical aid and
training to the Rawlings regime for some time, mainly
in the areas of agriculture and health.
Although some 600 Ghanaian
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students currently are studying in Cuba, press reports
indicate the Ghanaian Government has had to con-
tend with student complaints of mistreatment by their
hosts. The US Embassy in Accra reports that exten-
sive rumors of death, ill health, and student unrest at
the Isle of Youth circulate in Accra, and that the
educated public remains skeptical of the value of a
Cuban education.
We believe Rawlings is wary of Cuban intentions, but
there is potential for Havana to make inroads through
its close ties to Ghana's radicals, particularly Kojo
Tsikata, the government official responsible for secu-
rity and foreign affairs. Numerous reports have de-
scribed Tsikata's efforts over the years to strengthen
A Cuban medic serving in Kankan Hospital,
Guinea[
We believe Rawlings is
vulnerable to the manipulative Tsikata, who apparent-
ly is working hard to convince Rawlings that Cuban
military assistance is needed to provide the necessary
security against perceived internal and external
threats.
Guinea
Relations between Cuba and Guinea are not as close
as they were under the regime of Ahmed Sekou
Toure, largely because under President Lansana
Conte Conakry has turned to the West for economic
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During the late 1970s there were some 400 to 600
Cuban advisers in Guinea. Now the number is onl
about 35.
Press reports indicate a
Cuban team is constructing the Kissidougou-Kankan
road in the eastern part of Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Cuba provided extensive military assistance to
Guinea-Bissau in its fight to gain independence from
Portugal and has maintained close ties since 1974.
Guinea-Bissau has provided support over the years for
Cuban political objectives, and President Vieira dem-
onstrated solidarity with Havana by attending Cuba's
Third Party Congress last February. President Vieira,
who has been in power since 1980, has a personal
affinity for Cuba; he received training there in the
early 1970s, and Havana provides him an all-expense
paid vacation on the island every year, according to
US Embassy reporting. F_~
Havana's primary interest and area of influence is in
Guinea-Bissau's military. Since its creation in the
early 1960s, the Army has been principally trained,
equipped, and advised by the Soviet Union and Cuba,
according to US Embassy reporting. There are an
estimated 140 military advisers in Guinea-Bissau.
The presence of Cuban and Soviet advisers in the
military establishment presumably provides Havana
and Moscow early warning of any coup plotting.
President Joao Bernardo Vieira of Guinea- Granma
Bissau arrives in Havana ~1~
Fidel Castro, March 1982
The Cuban civilian presence in Bissau is estimated to
include some five diplomatic personnel and 100 tech-
nical advisers, according to US Embassy reporting.
The Cubans are involved in aid projects in such fields
as education, construction, telecommunications, agri-
culture, and public health. In addition, according to
Cuban press reports, some 300 Guinea-Bissauan stu-
dents are studying at secondary schools on Cuba's Isle
of Youth. Although Cuba's assistance has been gener-
ally well received, US Embassy reporting indicates
that Cuban medical personnel completing their last
year of medical training in Bissau have been a source
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of friction. The Bissauans reportedly feel the Cuban
medical students are practicing on them,
Mozambique
Cuba moved quickly to establish diplomatic relations
with the Machel regime shortly after Mozambique
gained independence from Portugal in 1975, and the
first cultural agreement between the two countries
was signed the following year. Cuba initiated econom-
ic relations with Maputo in 1977 and sent civilian
advisers to help rebuild Mozambique's deteriorating
sugar refineries. Today, Mozambique has the third-
largest number of Cuban personnel in Africa after
Angola and Ethiopia.
there are
labout 1,000 Cuban economic
advisers and civilian technicians providing assistance
in the areas of fishing, construction, and medical
services. Cuban press reports indicate that, as of 1984,
some 2,300 Mozambican students were studying on
Cuba's Isle of Youth.
Since at least 1977, Cuba and the Soviet Bloc coun-
tries have supplied Mozambique with military advis-
ers to help organize its Army and direct the fighting
against an increasingly effective insurgency. We esti-
mate that there are currently about 600 to 800 Cuban
military advisers and technicians serving in Mozam-
bique. Cuban advisers are present in some Army
units, principally motorized infantry and artillery
units, at battalion level and above
Sao Tome and Principe
Havana and Sao Tome have maintained close ties
since establishing diplomatic relations in 1976, and
Cuban military advisers continue to play a key role in
the development of the Sao Tomean Army. Although
press reports indicate that several hundred Cuban
military personnel are stationed on the islands,
50 to 70. Cuba's most significant security role is the
training of President Manuel da Costa's Presidential
Guard. According to the US Embassy, in 1984 da
Costa wanted to ask Havana to provide 300 Cubans
for his Presidential Guard, an idea apparently suc-
cessfully quashed by the Minister of Defense and the
Chief of Security. US Embassy reporting indicates
that Sao Tome's new Defense Minister, Raul
Braganca Neto, received at least some of his military
training in Cuba.F--]
Cuba also has a significant civilian aid program in
Sao Tome, particularly in education. Given the coun-
try's relative poverty-Sao Tome has no university-
level facility of its own-the Cuban option is particu-
larly attractive. According to Cuban press reports,
some 300 Sao Tomeans are currently studying in
Cuba, and an unknown number of Cuban teachers
instruct in Sao Tome. Even though Embassy reporting
from time to time suggests Sao Tomean disillusion-
ment with Cuba's education aid, we see no indications
that da Costa will request the teachers' departure.
The US Embassy also reports that Cuban officials
serve in the Ministry of Planning as well as in other
government posts, and that Cuban advisers are active
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in developing Sao Tome's ruling party organization.
Moreover, da
Costa requested Cuban assistance in increasing the
party's ideological penetration of the masses. Havana
also provides an estimated 50 to 70 civilian advisers
and technical personnel in the agricultural, fishing,
and health sectors-it is estimated that every third
doctor on the islands is Cuban.
Southwest Indian Ocean Islands
Havana has met with some success in developing its
ties to the island states, but the Cuban presence in this
region remains limited. Cuba provides technical assis-
tance to Seychelles and Madagascar but has no
advisers stationed in Comoros or Mauritius.)
In Seychelles the Cubans have some 15 to 29 civilian
technicians advising the government's ministries and
providing medical aid, as well as four Cuban military
advisers
The two governments' party organizations
signed a two-year cooperation agreement this year.
Press reports indicate that 50 Seychelles students are
presently studying in Cuba; however, the US Embassy
indicates that those sent in the past have been ap-
palled by the living standards in Cuba. If this is true,
Havana may have difficulty in expanding the pro-
gram.
In Madagascar, the Cuban presence is limited to a
few agricultural and medical technicians and a small
diplomatic contingent.
Madagascar's Minister
of Foreign Affairs visited Cuba in late 1985 and
signed several agreements on scientific and technical
cooperation. According to press reporting, one area of
aid will be the sugar industry.
Cuba's efforts to expand its influence among the
island states will continue to be constrained by the
small scale and low technical level of its aid. In
addition, these governments have found Cuban assis-
tance to be expensive, and, in some cases, language
barriers have hampered Cuban activities. Moreover,
here is a perception among some
southwest Indian Ocean leaders that the Cubans are
merely doing Moscow's bidding.
Tanzania
Havana established diplomatic relations with Dar es
Salaam in 1964 and has provided technical assistance
in the health, education, and agriculture sectors since
the early 1970s.
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Zambia
Cuban-Zambian relations have been largely influ-
Cuban presence in his country.
during the 1970s the Zambian leader's
desire to help topple the white minority Rhodesian
government led him to permit some 60 Cuban mili-
tary personnel to provide material and advisorial
Havana's offer to station Cuban troops in Zambia,
Zambia during this period. Kaunda, however, refused
bia. The Cubans also trained SWAPO forces in
support to the Zimbabwean guerrillas based in Zam-
and sharply limited Cuba's civilian presence in his
presence in Angola. The Zambian leader visited Ha-
line States has lent public support for the Cuban
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personnel, and is likely to remain at these levels,
because of Kaunda's concern over alienating Western
sources of economic support.
Zimbabwe
Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, angered by Havana's
past support for the rival ZAPU party, has over the
years refused numerous offers by Cuba of technical
assistance. However, Havana has made some head-
way in recent months toward improving relations-
formally established in 1980-with this important
Frontline State. An exchange of high-level visits
beginning in late 1985 resulted in agreements to
expand bilateral cooperation.
US Embassy reporting indicates that
Havana will send some 40 doctors to Zimbabwe and is
developing an ambitious educational exchange pro-
gram with Harare.
Havana may also make inroads in its relations with
Harare through Zimbabwe's hosting of the NAM
summit. Cuba's intensive backstage maneuvers at the
Luanda ministerial meeting of the NAM resulted in
the appointment of Zimbabwe to the chairmanship of
the NAM. As a result, Havana will have ample
opportunities for manipulating the agenda and influ-
encing the outcome of the summit. Zimbabwe, be-
cause of its inexperience with hosting an international
summit and the cost, apparently is receptive to Cuban
assistance.
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