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December 16, 1987
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Q Next 18 Page(s) In Document Denied Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 ! I'r ;. I I I L, .11111111.. p ~llll' 1 I I I I__~ _Wllil I I Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 ~ YORK TIMES,- WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1987 kn,~ee+` . ":. ...o, _..-.------ -~--~ - Once the target companies brtn[ .;;;d their'equipment to the Soviet Union far. _. exhibition, the report said, Soviet otM ~ cials put pressure on them to sell It. "A.. ..? _~ former Soviet military attache has rn y~ ported tharWestern businessmen t~"s? aften been drawn into negotiations or ~ the sale of sensitive equipment:': _~ added. ;;~l ~":".r :~ ..,, ~ . Quotation of the Day d" - page 2, every day,`'~.~; _ . in the News Surnmary? - " The New York 71meS? ~ ~ ,e t:apabilities of obl -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 A Government . .1 document says one-third of the . officials are spies. . un~ ornrne~ce n t , _.: ~ a By CLYDE H. FARNSWORTH Speaal to Thc New YorN Times WASHINGTON, Oct. 27 - A State Department report, based on classified Central Intelligence Agency data, as- serts that the U.S.S.R. Chamber , of Commerce and Industry is headed by a KG.B. lieutenant general and is sys- tematicallyengaged in commercial es- pionage in the West. It is the first time the chamber, which is housed in the former Moscow stock exchange at?Gfitsa Kaibysheva 6 and represents itself as the. Russian equivalent of Western chambers of commerce, has been officially branded by the United States as a center of in- dustrialspying. The document says that of 140 offi- cials identified with the chamber, about one-third are known or suspected intelligence officers, of whom a few are from the G.P..U., or military intelli- gence,and the rest from the K.G.B., the main Soviet intelligence organization, known by its Russian initials for the Committee on State Security. The report did not get much attention when it was put out for what State De- partment officials said was "limited" distribution last August. But it reached the Soviet Union and, according to sources here, was believed to have an- ~, gered Soviet officials, including the Soviet leader, Mikhail S. Gorbachev. executive committee or? governing board of the U.S: U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Counciha foivm for impro~?- ing commercial exchanges between the two countries. The chamber "exploits and mis- leads" Western business and govern- ment leaders by systematically using international trade exhibitions and seminars for collection of economic data, the report contends. State Department Document "Hosting over 200 trade exhibitions and about 100 Western business delega- tions annually and inspecting thou- sands of goods each year give its em- ployees extraordinary access to im- ported equipment and uncounted con- tacts with foreign companies," accord- ing to the State Departmene document. Cited as principal collection priori- ties are robot technology, marine tech- nology, including that dealing with sub- marines doing deep sea research,,and industrial chemicals. Officials here said the document The chamber was also accused of might have been on Mr. Gorbachev's "falsifying" end-user documentation desk during his meeting with Secretary during inspection of Western equip- of State George P. Shultz last week that ment coming into the Soviet Union, ac- failed to set a date for a summit meet- cording to the report. ing For example, when a Western com- Albert V. Melnikov, Commercial. Pany producing goods for a civilian in- Counselor at the Soviet Embassy, said, dustry in the Soviet Uniori requests a "1 have no comment on" the commer- quality control inspection, the chamber cial espionage allegations. usually prepares a declaration of in- The report identified the chamber's spection for the equipment. chairman as Lieut. Gen. Yevgeny P. When Soviet officials wish to hide the Pitovranov of the K.G.B., who is on the true identify of the Soviet user, the re- Was It on Gorbachev's Desk? Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 y ~ tricks' f ire upsets Soviets orbachev angered by U.S. report on disinformation By Terry Atlas Chicago Tribune WASHINGTON-At the low point in his talks last week with Secretary of State George Shultz, a suddenly angry Mikhail Gort~achev pulled from his stack of papers a month-old. State Department report on Soviet disinformation and other "dirty tricks" to influence foreign public opinion. The report was "all mazked up; ' Shultz said afterward, and the Sovi- et leader "seemed to resent the fact that there were critical comments in it." Kathleen Bailey, author of the re- port, said Monday that she was not altogether surprised by Gorbachev's reaction. "You would anticipate they :vould be upset atxiue it'-yes; be=? cause we've exposed what they've done," she said. Ironically, Shultz at the time had not seen the 90-page nepon, which documents a vanety of Soviet "ac- tive measures," such as a disinfor- mation campaign that contends the A1DS virus is the result of Ameri- can germ warfare experiments. By Monday, Shultz had a copy of the unclassified report. Bailey, former research director at the U.S. Information Agency, is deputy assistant secretary of state for research, specializing in Soviet c(forts to influence world public opinion through deception and lies. The report was the work of an inters enc overnment rou that raves on o icials rom intclh cn agencies. rom t Statr? snit n,. ense dcoartments and th t 1 c to formation Agency. Partly in response to pressure from the political right, the State Department a year ago established, under Bailey, an Office of Active Measures Analysis and Response to monitor such Soviet activities and to plan U.S. steps to counteract them. The study, requested by Congress, looked at the way the Soviets use disinformation (deliberately false or misleading information), forgeries, front organizations and other covert measures to advance Soviet foreign Policy and to damage the U.S. in: the eyes of the world. "The Soviets have been pickin up their activities in this area signif~ icantly;' Bailey said, despite Gor- bachev's calls for more openness and better relations with the West. JcfTrey Richelson, an intelligence specialist at the Brookings Institu- tion, said there is no question that the Kremlin directs such undercover activities. If the Soviets are planting false stories, then "it's certainly legiti- mate to try to find out about them and to try to show they're not true," he said. The report documents Soviet ef- forts to spread false stories that, for instance, the U.S. supplies chemical weapons to the anticommunist Af- glean resistance fighters and that-fhe U.S. has developed an "ethnic . bomb" that selectively kills nonwhites. The report traces the AIDS story, a disinformation campaign that has particularly angered American ofl5_ cials. Last month, Shultz com- plained about it to Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, who reportedly said Moscow would try to stop spreading the story. In addition, the report cites the World Peace Council and its Amer- ican branch, the U.S. Peace Coun- cil, as Soviet front organizations that promote the Kremlin's defense and disarmament proposals. The group is said to be directed by the intcmational department of the. Soviet Communist Party, which is headed by Moscow's former am- bassador to the U.S., Anatoly Dobrynin. The report covers what it says are Kremlin efforts to use Soviet reli- gious leaders to influence their counterparts around the world and damaging forged documents that seem to be the work of Moscow or its allies. The official Soviet news agency Tass, in a story Sept. 30 about the report, said cntically: "The authors of the publication seemed to be guided by two simple rules: Any pualic organization opposed ~to Washington's. o(Iicial directives was a 'front' for the Russians, while any The Washington Post ____ _ _ The !dew York Times _ Th W _ __ _ e ashington Times __ __ __-__ The Wall Strsei .:ournal _ _____ The Christian Science Monitor New York Daily News USA Today _` The Chicago Tribune $E - ~, b Date Press report. damming to U.S. pres- tige;;was Soviet disinformation." Shultz, recounting his conversa- tion with Gorbachev, said he gave no ground. to the Soviet leader. "There was son: of an attitude [by Gorbachev) of how could anybody be critical. of the Soviet Union " Shultz recalled. "And I said really it's very easy. "After all, You invaded Afghani_ sue, ~ you shot down that Korean airliner and then Mr. Gromyko [then !'Soviet foreign minister] went to Madrid and said that they'd do it again;" Shultz said he .told Gor- bachev. "And then you've been spreading all this bum dope about AIDS;! so_youu can see that it's pi~s- sible to be upset." rent .. ; . ~ ; ~, ,. _, Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 United States Department of State Intelligence Collection in the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Intelligence Collection in the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry This paper was prepared for the Department of State for public distribution. It is based on a classified study initially done by the Directorate of Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency for US Government officials. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Intelligence Collection in the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry Key Judgments The USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry plays an important role in I~t/ormation available the Soviet effort to collect Western economic information of value to Soviet as oj2 January /987 industry. It carries out that role while acting as a trade promoter and was used in this report. facilitator with excellent access to Western firms. Among other things, the chamber: ? Introduces Western firms to Soviet foreign trade and industrial organizations. ? Provides foreign trade data to Soviet agencies. ? Carries out official trade functions, including hosting exhibitions and facilitating patent work. ? Maintains representations in at least 14 countries. Of the chamber's known staff of 140, about a third are KGB officers. The chamber also maintains ties to the GRU. Some of the chamber's trade promotion activities involve exploiting or misleading Western business and government leaders by: ? Systematically using international trade exhibitions and seminars for economic collection. ? Falsifying end-user documentation during inspection of Western equipment coming into the USSR. The chamber's collection priorities-if it has any-are unknown. However, since at least the 1960s, it has tried-often successfully-to collect information on a wide range of Western technology, including: ? Robot technology. ? Marine technology, including that dealing with submarines doing deep- sea research. ? Industrial chemicals. The chamber's contribution to the overall Soviet effort to collect informa- tion on Western technology is difficult to gauge. However, its trade promotion activities-hosting over 200 trade exhibitions and about 100 Western business delegations annually and inspecting thousands of goods each year-give its employees extraordinary access to imported equipment and uncounted contacts with foreign companies, particularly US or US- afiiliated firms. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 I II II I I I I I I I Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 L _ - - - - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Key Judgments iii Setting the Scene 1 Collection Targets 2 Links to Soviet Intelligence 2 Inspection Methods 3 The Inspectors 3 Destination-Defense Industry 4 Trade Exhibition Tactics 5 Targeting Displayed Equipment 5 Collecting Technical Information 5 Reaping Seminar Benefits 5 Access to Commercial Data Bases 5 Acquiring Western Patent Information 9 Soyuzpatent Association 9 Foreign Patent Applications 12 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Figure 1 Structure of USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry ? Joint Secretariat Ibr Arbitration ? Goads Inspection Administration ? Insurance Department 0 0 111 117 1 S S I OI1 ? Farcign C-xhibits ? Juridical l7etaartment in the USSR Admini?tration - Commercial Shipping and - Foreign 'trade Mtiritima Lew Section Arbitr:uion ? Soviet Exhibits Conunission Abrostd Administration ? Supplies Department - ~Inritimc Arhitration Cnnunission - Iturcau of Avorrge Adjusters ? lnCormntion and I?ublications Administration ? ~ranSlatlUnS Administration - 'fmnslations SCrvice ~ laCrSOnnv'1 Adn1lniStrfitlan. - West Europetn Ucpaetm::nr' ; - Prptoeol Department Ae~artnient - American and rtsidn Coagtries I~ep.tinmen[ Administration ? Marketing Section ? Sayuzpatent Association ... __ n Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 - - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Intelligence Collection in the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry Setting the Scene The Soviet program to acquire militarily significant Western technology is well documented. The effort consists of two programs that use both legal and illegal means. The first, managed by the Military- Industrial Commission of the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers, seeks one-of-a-kind military and dual-use hardware and blueprints to improve the technical levels of Soviet weapons and military equip- ment. The second, run by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Soviet intelligence services, diverts dual- use manufacturing and test equipment into the pro- duction lines of weapons industries. Along with the organizations that spearhead these technology-transfer programs, other agencies aid the process. This publication focuses on how one of the most important of these agencies-the USSR Cham- ber of Commerce and Industry-creates and uses opportunities for legally acquiring information of value to Soviet industry and, in doing so, misleads Westerners about certain chamber activities. The chamber collects economic information-in it- self, alegal activity. It does this while assisting major Soviet foreign trade actors in exhibiting goods, host- ing seminars, and translating commercial documents. It easily gains access to such information because it is a frequent contact for Western companies doing business with the Soviets. For example, US business- men who need information or procedural assistance on trade matters can contact the chamber's representa- tive at the New York office of the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council. When Westerners arrive in Moscow to sell their products, the chamber introduces them to the appropriate Soviet foreign trade organiza- tion or industrial customer. At various stages in the commercial process, the chamber steps in to encour- age negotiations and help solve problems between Soviet industrial clients and their potential Western suppliers. According to its charter, the chamber is a public agency. However, it works closely with-and is prob- ably secretly subordinate to-the Ministry ojForeign Trade: ? The chamber's predecessor organizations operated openly under the People's Commissariat jor (now the Ministry o,~ Foreign Trade. ? Many chamber employees originally worked in the Ministry and graduated from its Academy ojFor- eign Trade. ? Some chamber officials use the services ojthe Ministry's personnel administration when traveling abroad, and their visas state that they are Minis- try-not chamber-employees. The chamber probably disavows its o,~cial govern- ment connection in order to cortJorm to the organiza- tional structures of Western chambers of commerce, which operate independently of their governments. Like many Western corporations, the chamber has a headquarters o,~ce and subsidiary associations, which are divided into jams and departments. The chamber even has its own version ojshareholders: in return jor a membership jee, about 4,500 Soviet industrial enterprises, scientthc research institutes, public health and cultural organizations, construc- tion and transport agencies, andloreign and domestic trade organizations can draw upon chamber services. However, some of the chamber's functions involve deception. In the USSR, it helps inspect Western equipment, some sold legally to civilian industries but destined from the first for defense-related organizations. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 KGB Lt. Gen. (Res.) Yevgeniy Petrovich Pitovranov has been an o.,~icer in the chamber since 1966. He is on the Executive Committee (governing board) ojthe US-USSR Trade and Economic Council. Pitovranov has studied at the Moscow Electrome- chanical Institute jor Railway Transport Engineers. He,loined the Communist Party (CPSUJ in 1938. From the late 1930s until 1951 he served in the People's Commissariat ojlnternal AB"airs and successive intelligence organizations. In 1951 Pitov- ranov began an 18-month imprisonment during then General Secretary losil'Stalin's purge ojintelligence o..~cers who had associated with secret police chief Lavrentiy Beriya. ~QJ'ter the post-Stalin regime re- leased him, Pitovranov served as Deputy High Com- missioner in Berlin (1953-54), KGB resident in the Embassies in Berlin (1955-58J and Beijing (1959-61 J, and head ct/' the KGB Training School (1962-64J. He then attended the CPSU Higher Party School; upon graduation, he,loined the chamber as a deputy chair- man. He was promoted to first deputy chairman in 1972. His responsibilities in his.hrst two chamber posts included supervising international exhibitions and registering patents and trademarks. Pitovranov, 71, speaks German. He is not believed to speak English. He and his wife, Yelizaveta Yasil'yevna, have three grown children. Collection Targets The chamber's collection priorities-if it has indeed set any-are unknown. However, during the past two decades it has often succeeded in collecting informa- tion on a wide range of Western equipment. The following examples are typical: ? A Soviet in the Franco-Soviet Chamber of Com- merce tried in 1983 to collect technical data on Western marine technology, including computer software packages and information on deep-sea research submarines. ? A chamber official in West Germany attempted during the late 1960s to obtain data on secret chemical-processing procedures. ? The chamber sponsors trade fairs to which it rou- tinely invites Western manufacturers whose prod- ucts fit Soviet industrial needs. Invitations have been extended to, among others, a Japanese indus- trial robot association and a Western producer of calibration equipment for precision electronics. ? At Expo-70 in Tokyo, chamber personnel solicited from a Japanese trading firm reports containing data extracted from a technical paper, information on Western applications for patents, and informa- tion on Mitsubishi's technical research funds. ? The chamber routinely requests several copies of technical publications provided for seminars given by Western businessmen. In one case, the chamber seminar coordinator asked a Western electronics manufacturer to send him all construction, manu- facturing, and design standards relating to the product and its specific industrial applications. Links to Soviet Intelligence The exact number of chamber employees is unknown. Of the approximately 140 officials who have been identified, about a third are known or suspected intelligence officers, of whom a few are GRU (mili- tary intelligence) and the rest KGB. Analysis of the Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 ----- ~-- _ _ - - l - - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Gennadiy Fedorovich Solntsev Chief; Fenno-Soviet Chamber oJCommerce, Helsinki (since 1984) Age 65 ... agiliated with the KGB ...1949 graduate ollnstitute oJForeign Trade ...first secretary in Embassy economic section in Austria 1956-60 .. . commercial attache, Soviet trade mission, Canada, 1967-71 ... joined chamber in about 1976 as deputy chiej'oj'Foreign Exhibitions Department ...deputy general director of V/O Ekspotsentr during 1977 and 1981-84 ... worked in United States as deputy chairman of Kama River Purchasing Commission 1978-81 ... low-key, polite, knowledgeable ... de- scribed as ejlective with US businessmen ... in late 1970s tried to coax US diplomat in Moscow into sending him technical literature jrom a seminar .. . speaks good English. career patterns and activities of the remaining offi- cials suggests that the actual number of KGB and GRU officers is higher. KGB use of chamber cover appears to be quite broad: ? KGB staff officers fill about half of the senior management slots in the chamber's Moscow appara- tus and thus are in a position to have considerable policymaking authority. In most other Soviet ad- ministrative units, intelligence officers hold lower level positions and concentrate mainly on intelli- gence operations. ? Some of these senior managers have had extensive experience in clandestine operations. ? KGB oflicers are found in almost every chamber component; in most government agencies, they tend to congregate in only one or two components that deal with foreigners (like foreign trade organizations and foreign relations or protocol departments). The chamber conducts intelligence operations both at home and overseas. Overseas, it maintains representa- tions in several countries. A representation may be Central Arbitration Laboratory, Moscow Goods /nspection Administration part of a Soviet trade delegation to a country or a separate, bilateral chamber, such as the Italian-Soviet Chamber of Commerce in Milan, the Franco-Soviet Chamber in Paris, or the British-Soviet Chamber in London. In the United States, the chamber is repre- sented on the US-USSR Trade and Economic Coun- cil in New York. Judging by their activities, it appears that the KGB fills the top slots in these overseas organizations. They conduct regular chamber work to gain credibility, establish business contacts, and lay the foundation for future collection. Firms whose products are of techno- logical interest to the USSR are contacted for infor- mation on manufacturing processes and technical specifications. Soviet foreign trade representatives may then follow up on these leads with offers to develop a market for the company's goods in the Soviet Union or simply with ofTers of cash. Inspection Methods The Inspectors. When the USSR purchases some- thing from a foreign source, the product must be inspected to ensure that it meets specifications agreed upon at the time of sale. This is done by quality control inspectors (also called acceptance engineers),' ' Acceptance engineers can be found in other Soviet organizations, such as the State Committee for Science and Technology and industrial enterprises that have economic dealings with the West. All quality control inspectors operate in the same way. ~ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 I II II I I i l 1 11 I I i i i Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 InspectionOB"icials Yuriy Maksimovich Levin Chamber Inspector, Nissho-Iwai, Japan Age 47 ... servingfor,fifth time in same post with this,firm (previous tours have been less than a year) ...known KGB ct,~"iliation ...uses State Committee for Science and Technology credentials ...has often contacted Japanese manufacturers to request techni- cal details on equipment Soviets purportedly interest- ed in buying ...has played on manufacturers' eager- ness to make sales to obtain technical specifications and procedures. Vladimir Ivanovich Gornostayev Chid; Goods Inspection Administration (since about 1968) Age 73 ... possibly involved in GRU illegals opera- tions ...director of Soviet industrial and trade exhibitions in Australia 1961 and in Turkey 1963-65 ...described as reserved, rather unsocial, di~cult to ir~uence, and ambitious but not conniving. Doctoring the Documents When a Western firm producing goods for a civilian industry in the USSR requests a quality control inspection, the chamber usually prepares a declara- tion of inspection for the equipment. That document includes the name of the inspector, the name ojthe Soviet organization that is the customer, and the names of two customer representatives. In cases in which the Soviets wish to hide the true identity of the Soviet user, o,~cials may doctor the document so that theloreign supplier may never suspect that he has sold his product to a closed facility probably involved in military production. results. Acceptance engineers routinely initiate con- tact with firms other than the one to which they are assigned in order to obtain technical details on equip- ment that the USSR is supposedly interested in purchasing. They may also target Western engineers and scientists for recruitment as agents to pass along technical information or trade secrets. Destination-Defense Industry. The Goods Inspec- tion Administration helps funnel foreign goods ac- some of whom serve in the Goods Inspection Adminis- quired by the USSR into defense or other classified tration of the chamber. Among their legitimate re- facilities. It does this in a variety of ways. For sponsibilities are preparing invoices and other docu- example: ments that accompany goods, witnessing certificates of origin, and conducting laboratory tests. The position of quality control inspector provides an excellent cover for Soviet intelligence officers trained in S&T collection methods. These inspectors go abroad frequently; they can be assigned to a Western factory for several weeks or for months. Most will be able to return for several tours if the host country has no objection. Acceptance engineers are not normally subject to travel restrictions and surveillance imposed on diplomatic personnel and thus are able to gather technical information more easily than can embassy or consulate officials. Observers of Soviet commercial personnel abroad note that acceptance engineers sometimes wander into off-limits areas on the pretext of inspecting equipment or looking at equipment test ? Its personnel can conceal the identities of Soviet military or defense end-users from Westerners who have legally sold equipment to what they thought were nonstrategic facilities. They can accomplish this by preparing false certification documents dur- ing quality control inspections. ? It inspects and forwards imported items that have arrived in the USSR. There is reason to believe that half or more of the imported equipment inspected by the Moscow branch of the chamber ended up in defense-related facilities. According to the Soviet press, as of 1982 the chamber had conducted over Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 1.6 million inspections of imported goods, and the volume of services had risen by 250 percent since 1969. These figures suggest that much equipment that is not export controlled is nevertheless of value to defense-related organizations. Trade Exhibition Tactics One of the chamber's two foreign trade organizations, V/O Ekspotsentr, organizes international trade fairs and exhibitions. Ekspotsentr annually handles more than 200 exhibitions in the USSR and about 25 Soviet expositions abroad. It establishes special booths~alled commercial centers-for Soviet for- eign trade and scientific specialists to use as a home base while they assess advanced technology exhibited at the fairs. In 1983 a senior expert with the Main Engineering and Technical Administration (GITU), a component of the Foreign Trade Ministry, was named director of an international exhibition center in the chamber. The presence in the chamber of this official, as well as of other GITU officials, indicates close coordination between the two organizations in facili- tating the assimilation of foreign equipment. Targeting Displayed Equipment. The chamber clear- ly views exhibitions as opportunities to gather indus- trial intelligence. It has been successful in gaining the participation of Western countries, even those that belong to the Coordinating Committee (COCOM), and in persuading them to exhibit sensitive electronic, instrument-making, engineering, and other equip- ment. Once the targeted companies bring their equip- ment to the USSR for exhibition, Soviet officials- probably including chamber exhibition representa- tives-pressure them to sell it. A former Soviet military attache has reported that Western business- men have often been drawn into negotiations on the sale of sensitive equipment. Collecting Technical li~/ormation. At exhibitions chamber officials collect any industrial information they can. Several sources have noted the enthusiasm with which they gather up unclassified handouts on equipment manufactured in the West. Western visi- tors to exhibitions in the USSR believe KGB officers have entered locked display rooms at night to copy design information from equipment, but this charge cannot be independently confirmed. Reaping Seminar Benefits The other chamber foreign trade organization in- volved in industrial collection efforts is V/O Sovint- sentr, which runs the International Trade Center in Moscow as well as various hotels and office buildings in the city. Each year Sovintsentr's hotels accommo- date thousands of guests-including US Government officials-from Western industrialized countries. Sovintsentr also sponsors seminars in Moscow for foreign businessmen who wish to brief Soviet officials on their products. In 1983 alone, it organized about Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Figure 2 Exhibition Sections and ndusEry S!Ftrminforrnreklam'a .-re V/O: Ekspotsentir Adm~nisttr~~ ~~~'_P,roviOcs mformuuon and adver4smg services prepares ,' ~ Arranges and holds international exhibitipns in the USSR.. promouorial`~ma c i.tl on~internaUOn~l und&foreign exhibit's =- ~tnd expositions at mternattonal eont,resses. Exhibits. ~hc~Id~n~thcUSS~~`~,~ ~ ~ r x ~ ~ arivnlve;seJer.rl'eoun'trics and;thomos. ; Fu rri` Tiransc~~po ~ ~~ ~~ , ~ ? Ftrm inovystavka r~ ~~ ~ ~~~ ~ ~tspnrts and lorwards erh bnion' c,argots assembles and E?Fepares andtholds exhibns fpr ~ sm le country or For-. Jisn'`ianiles t~hi6us~'s~s"+~~g"~?w~~ ~ ~ ~ iritlrvidual rompaniesaon th?e same theme; supplies lists ~~~{~ ~ ~~ ~ ~} t ~ ` ;~ of services and rcgulfitionil ~tsa~'~i x 1 II ?, ~ `~ "~ ~ ~ 1i7~r Dest~ntn~~uid,Arran~,inl,~Del>tr[ment ? F,oretgn~Relattonc~Department~ ~...,.. .~ ~.a.~,?~.,~ ~? Qlb QStrn,7IItrd) C~.G[LTQDa "9YJe~T~~Y ~b~., ~io~1.+r ,E~1 ~Qj 0~ (~z~ u?r_~ fix, ~ OE3f~ ~7:LC~ 00-410 trr?~s~' (t,TL~rrQtSSYI ~L~ncra ?~~a;13ff~a G1~,ca~ ip ~;7[tLaz=itz~j" ~J ~D l~l ~C,,L=l,'tt OA J art ~Lli G+U ~i~?FK~ ~r~rcr, ~u+XJ rrr~~c~rx~cx.? r (~.r:_ cat~~Ga?x~, urn 'LeaX~xttr?~ `.~b~ti`1 ~c~t,, (uYt~a,i, ~10;xn~ l~~~G1 Q`J Q~ CrL~' ^,JLJC~ ~I o c _'CrYI~ ' t o u tf~JfC"~~YQ o n ~G1CJ IXiYLln-1[~'ltU/CrJSY'~ ~1(~ 1~ r o o ' ,aX~ CYK~i ~a7ti~c 3 6~@kA%C~~YI 6~0~'~(l ~ 1_~7n1~~, C~jtrtrt ?-~Ko~(IJ ~YL'nl ' n n " ', o~.~*~ Oo Q ~ c n o n~ ~ ~r~S.l 71: a r o 0 0 ~~o~^O ~It GCI u n ov-'G~YoJ Ofi'~ CX',,n7C"d UfVIC-~ ~ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Marlen Khorenovich Akopov Director of Soviet Exhibitions (since about 1976) Age 46 ... suspected KGB ciliation ...served in Embassy in Nepal as interpreter during 1961-62 .. . joined chamber as translator in about 1971.. . worked in Exhibitions Abroad and Foreign Relations Administrations ...representative to Board of Inter- national Expositions in Paris since 1966 ... has often traveled to United States for negotiations on exhibi- tions and 1982 World's Fair ...friendly, gregarious, and able to draw people out ...cultivates relation- ships with US ogicials who have high-level political contacts ...described as shrewd and tough .. . speaks excellent English. Konstantin Fedorovich Afanas rev Deputy General Director, V/O Ekspotsentr (since at least 1981); Director, Firm Inovystavka, Ekspotsentr (since at least 1983) Khachik Gevorkovich Oganesyan Former Deputy General Director, V/O Ekspotsentr (1978-84) Age 72 ... retired in 1984 ... supervised all Soviet agents in Tehran during 1946-SO as second secretary and consul ...assigned to Vienna as chief of an illegals section of Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVDJ 1950-53 ... deputy chie,/; MVD Counterintelligence Section, East Berlin, 1954-59; there he ran illegals and handled sabotage operations and for most of the time was attached as adviser to East German Minis- try of State Security ....first identified in chamber in 1969 as deputy chief of Foreign and.tnternational Exhibitions Department ...advised US companies on types of equipment chamber wanted them to display ...described as cordial and helpful on exhi- bition administrative details. Ivan Luk ~anovich Rozhkov Director, Firm Irsformreklama, V/O Ekspotsentr (since about 1983) Age 66 ... KGB colonel ...probably responsiblelor S&T matters ...served in trade mission in Cologne as stc'employee during 1957-60 ... was rP/'used visa for second tour in 1962 because of prior activities and contacts ...during 1964-68 was just secretary at trade mission in Vienna ...joined chamber in about 1969 as deputy director of specialized foreign exhib- its ... speaks.fluent German; good French and English. Age 67 ... suspected GRU o.,~icer ...was held army radio operator and then captain in engineer corps during World War Il ...foreign trade representative in Italy 1964-67 ....first secretary in Bolivia from 1970 until he was declared persona non grata in 1972. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Cottection Service Data Processing Center V/O Sovintsentr 150 seminars at the Trade Center. Seminar sponsor- ship constitutes Sovintsentr's largest and one of its most successful information collection efforts. At these professional gatherings, Sovintsentr officials attempt to collect technical intelligence and to moni- tor the activities of foreign business representatives. They display literature that suggests that businessmen who are losing trade because of government restric- tions on selling high-technology items to the Soviet Union should lobby against such sanctions. The chamber informs businessmen before the seminar that they are not permitted to keep Soviet calling cards, and it attempts to confiscate all cards they may already have collected. Access to Commercial Data Bases The chamber has a computer center, which contains a new automated storage and retrieval system operated by Sovintsentr. The center provides information to the chamber's members on world market prices, interna- tional trade and finance, patent and invention specifi- cations, and stock exchanges. It includes a library, a microfilm storage area, and an S&T data bank. The center uses IBM 370/ 148 and PDP 11 /70 computers, which the United States exported legally to the USSR in 1978. V/O Sovintsentr O,~cials Aleksandr Fedorovich Khlystov Deputy General Director, V/O Sovintsentr (since at least 1980) Age 53 ... administrator oj'International Trade Cen- ter ...probably KGB colonel ...translator at New York World s Fair in 1959 ... foreign trade employee in London 1961 fi5 ... adviser and counselor at Soviet pavillion at Expo-70 in Tokyo ...deputy division chiPJ'in chamber in 1974 ... drinks heavily. Gennadiy Nikolayevich Tapeshko Director, Firm Interkongress, V/O Sovintsentr (since April 1985) Age 46 ... suspected KGB o.~cer ...employee (non- diplomatic), Office of Commercial Counselor, Em- bassy, Colombo, 1963-64 ... became Inturist repre- sentative in Trade Mission, New Delhi, 1968.. . while driving an automobile in 1972, killed Indian bicyclist; lacked diplomatic immunity and leJ't India abruptly ...joined chamber in about 1976, probably as chiPf'oJprotocol in V/O Ekspotsentr ...served in Soviet-Belgian Chamber of Commerce, Brussels, from about 1977 until /981 ... became deputy direc- tor, Firm Interkongress, in about 1982. The computer center is part of Akademset, a data- ?transmitting network for Soviet scientific institutes. The institute appears to control other network mem- bers' access to the data bases. It is reasonable to assume that Sovintsentr's computer center supple- ments its economic collection activities by tapping into Western online information services through VNIIPAS. VNIIPAS currently has access to unclas- sified military-related data. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Figure 3 Hotel and Seminar Operations Provides advertising and information Runs four hotels and provides s In their rush to disseminate the Nikolayev article, Soviet officials at the Novosti bureau in Nicosia, Cyprus, included an English-language version in an Apri13, 1987, weekly compilation of articles from the Soviet press. All other articles included in the weekly were translated into Greek. 17 See also Radio Moscow (January 30 and March 31, 1987); Radio Peace and Progress (November 29, 1985); TABS (November 5, 1986; February 16 and March 14,1987); Izuestiya (January 25 and March 9, 1987); Souyetskaya Rossiya (January 23,1987). 18 For example, Literaturnaya Gazeta IMay 7,1986) warned specifically against contact with Americans. is At the April 1985 International Conference on AIDS in Atlanta, a Soviet study was presented suggesting that Soviet experts had not detected AIDS in the U.S.S.R.. Dr. Rakhim M. Khaitov, deputy director of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Health Institute of Immunology in Moscow, in a paper entitled "Search of AIDS Cases in Secondary Immunodeficiency Patients in the U.S.S.R.," reported the results of a study in which 500 persons, suffering from illnesses that could possibly have been AIDS related, were identified; a subgroup of 10 patients was selected and studied in more detail using immunologic tests. The findings were not suggestive of AIDS. (It is unclear whether antibody testing for the virus was used in Dr. Khaitov's study.) For an abstract of Dr. Khaitov's paper, see Official Program, International Conference on AIDS, April 14-17, 1985, Atlanta, p. 36. Five months earlier, Dr. Zhdanov told Radio Moscow (November 29, 1984) that although no AIDS cases had been registered in the U.S.S.R., Soviet officials were investigating "all cases that arouse suspicion." 20 Valentin Pokrovskiy, recently elected president of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Medical Sciences, told the May 6, 1987, Soviet building industry newspaper Stroitelnaya Gazeta that 30 "foreign students" residing in the U.S.S.R. had been diagnosed as AIDS carriers. They have been deported from the U.S.S.R., according to TABS (June 10, 1987). 21 For more information on the U.S. contribution to international efforts to combat AIDS, see Confronting AIDS: Directions /or Public Health, Health Care and Research, Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences; National Academy Press, Washington DC, 1986, pp. 274-277. '2 For a more complete description of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Health Committee session, see KHS News, Public Health Service, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Washington, D.C., April 17, 1987. -? Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 l II Il I I i I III I I I ~ i Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Appendix A A Note on the Patriot The New Delhi Patriot is apro-Soviet daily with a circulation of about 35,000. It has long served as a vehicle for Soviet disinformation. According to Ilya Dzhirkvelov, a former KGB officer who defected to the Westin 1980, the Patriot was set up by the KGB in 1962 "in order to publish disinformation."' Official Soviet media frequently cite stories appearing in the Patriot that the Soviets originally placed in the newspaper, sometimes as articles, sometimes as paid advertisements, from which the Patriot derives a substantial share of its revenues. [n 1983, for example, Patriot published the so-called Kirkpatrick Plan for the "balkanization" ofIndia (January 25, 26, and 28); the "plan" itself was a forgery. Patriot has promoted numerous other disinformation themes, including stories alleging U.S. attempts to assassinate former Indian Prime :Minister Indira Ghandi and U.S. support for Sikh terrorists. ' Details concerning the origins of the Patriot emerged during an 8-week trial in London's High Court of a libel suit brought against The Economist magazine's Foreign Report newsletter by Greece's most popular daily newspaper, To Ethnos, which the Foreign Report accused of being a Soviet propaganda mouthpiece. See The Economist, April 18, 1987, pp. 19-22. Excerpts from Dzhirkvelov's testimony were published in Disinformation: Souiet Actiue Measures and Disinformntion Forecast, Summer 1987. Appendix B What We Know About AIDS 1 HIV-I (the AIDS virus) is structurally and genetically. related to a group of retroviruses, called lentiviruses, that are found in domestic farm animals, including sheep, goats, and horses; more recently, they also have been found in monkeys and cattle. VISNA virus was the first lentivirus discovered (c. 1932) and isolated. 2 Since that time two other well known lentiviruses, equine infectious anemia virus and caprine arthritis encephalitis virus, were discovered and characterized. These viruses are sometimes euphemistically called "slow viruses" because of the relatively long delay (2 years or more on average) in the onset of debilitating symptoms after infection. Although the diseases caused by each lentivirus species may differ greatly, some similarities in disease state and biology may be found le.g., they infect cells of the immune system and cause encephalopathyl. The lentiviruses, like other retroviruses (some of which cause cancer), are RNA s viruses that replicate in the host cell via a DNA a intermediate. The RNA (or DNA) genome s contains three major structural genes called gag, pol, and env (or envelope) and a few smaller but significant coding regions. The gag gene is situated at the 5 prime (first in order of place) most end of the genome and codes s for the core proteins of the virus. The pol gene is situated intermediate to the gag and envelope genes and codes for the enzyme reverse transcriptase ~ which is unique to all retroviruses. The envelope gene is found at the 3 prime most end of the genome. The envelope gene codes for the exterior protein shell, which defines the host species that can be infected and helps the virus bind to its target cell. The envelope gene appears to be the least conserved of the three major genes mentioned. Although these lentiviruses, including its human cousin the AIDS virus (HIV-I1, are genetically related, they have considerably diverged at the DNA level. That is, they all may have all come from a common ancestor (probably thousands of years ago) and, at present, they still show some significant homology s but have changed enough at the DNA level to enable one to distinguish them by analyzing their DNA sequences. s In fact, similar comparisons can distinguish them from the more distantly related oncogenic (cancer causing) retroviruses. The DNA sequence for the human oncogenic retrovirus, HTLV-I, and the lentiviruses (HIV-I and VISNA virus of sheep) genomes are known. By comparing them it is apparent that HI V-I is more closely related to VISNA virus than it is to HTLV-I or to any other oncogenic retrovirus. Moreover, the greatest homology, as expected, is found in the pol gene. Sequence comparisons of the envelope genes ofHIV-I and VISNA virus clearly show that even though common characteristic sequences can be found, the DNA (and amino acid) sequences are so greatly diverged that they are readily distinguishable. It would have been impossible to have recently substituted all or part of the envelope gene of VISNA virus for that of HTLV-I in order to make HIV-I and still not be able to identify it. In addition, the envelope genes of these viruses are so species- specific in binding that VISNA virus is not capable of infecting human cells, nor is HIV-I capable of infecting sheep cells. Furthermore, HIV-I contains an additional coding sequence overlapping the 3 prime end of its envelope, called the 3 prime orf, whose function is unknown. The 3 prime orf is not present in HTLV-I or VISNA virus. This is yet another distinguishing feature that shows that HIV-I is not a chimeric to of HTLV-I and VISNA virus. HTLV-I was first cloned 11 in the United States in early 1983 in the laboratory of Dr. Robert Gallo, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda. The first sequencing of HTLV-I was reported in June 1983, in the laboratory of Dr. Motoharu Seki et. al., Department of Viral Oncology, Cancer Institute, Kami- Ikebukuro, Toshima-Ku, Tokyo, Japan. VISNA virus was first cloned in 1983 by Janice Clements in the laboratory of Dr. Opendra Narayan at the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore. VISNA was sequenced in 1985 in the laboratory of Pierre Sonigo et al., France. HIV-I was cloned in the laboratory of Dr. Gallo in 1984. Another AIDS virus known as LAV was cloned in the laboratory of Dr. Luc Montangier, also in 1984. These were the first molecular clonings of the AIDS virus, carried out to understand its structure as well as to develop vaccines for it. The sequences of both HIV-I and LAV were reported in January 1985. These were the first reports on the molecular clonings of these viruses, and they came nearly two decades after serum samples, later tested and found to contain antibody to HIV-I, were taken. 1 The information contained in this Appendix was provided to the U.S. Department of State by Dr. Matthew Allen Gonda, Laboratory of Cell and Molecular Structure, Program Resources, Inc., NCI-Frederick Cancer Research Facility, PO Box B, Frederick, Maryland 21701. For further information, see Matthew Allen Gonda, "The Natural History of AIDS," Natural History, Vol. 95, May 1986, pp. 78-81; Robert C. Gallo, "The First Human Retrovirus," Scientif c American, December 1986; "The AIDS Virus," Scientific American, January 1987. Also, see Confronttng AIDS: Directions for Public Health, Health Care and Research, Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences; National Academy Press, Washington D.C., 1986, for bibliographies of scientific and medical papers discussing various aspects of the AIDS virus. The definitive resource for information on genetic engineering techniques and methodology is Molecular Cloning: A Laboratory Manual, Thoman Maniatis, Cold Spring Harbor, New York,1982. 2 Isolate: to separate from another substance so as to obtain pure or in a free state. s RNA (ribonucleic acid): any of various nucleic acids that contain ribose and uracil as structural components and are associated with the control of cellular chemical activities. 44 _? Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 ~ _ _ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 a DNA !deoxyribonucleic acid): any of the various nucleic acids that are localized especially in cell nuclei and are the molecular basis of heredity in many organisms. s Genome: one haploid set of chromosomes with the genes they contain. s Code: to specify the genetic code. ~ Reverse transcriptase: the enzyme which makes the identical DNA copy of the RNA genome after infecting the cell; it is the coding sequence most conserved (i.e., maintained constant during a process of chemical change) in the evolution of retroviruses and upon which evolutionary relationships are mainly, but not entirely, defined. s Homology: likeness in structure between parts of different organisms due to evolutionary differentiation from the same or a corresponding part of a remote ancestor. 9 Sequence: genetic code; to determine the sequence of chemical constituents. io Genetic Chimera: an individual, organ, or part consisting of tissues of diverse genetic constitution. ii Clone: an individual grow n from a single somatic cell of its parent and genetically identical to it; a segment of DNA representing all or part of the viral genome needed to produce a virus. Appendix C Fort Detrick Fort Detrick is a military compound that today rents space to various military and civilian governmental agencies as well as private research organizations engaged in cancer and defensive medical research (aimed at developing vaccines for biological warfare agents). Two independent governmental organizations situated on the Fort Detrick compound-one military, the other civilian-are conducting research to find a cure for AIDS. The U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (U.S.AMRIID) is conducting an antiviral drug development effort that includes the evaluation of ribavirin, a compound with proven anti-viral effectiveness, for efficacy against the AIDS virus. U.S.AMR_ID's entire research program is unclassified and all information is appropriately reported in medical literature. The National Cancer Institute, Frederick Cancer Research facility (NCI-FCRF), an internationally recognized institution for interdisciplinary research on cancer, its causes, biology, diagnosis, and treatment, also is located there. Aside from conducting research on countering and preventing A[DS, NCI-FCRF scientists produce HIV-I, samples of which are supplied through the Centers for Disease Control ICDC) in Atlanta, Georgia, to medical experts all around the world, for research aimed at finding a cure for the virus. In late 1986, at the request of visiting Soviet virologists, the CDC provided the U.S.S.R. with HIV-I samples for the Soviet AIDS research program. 1 Production ofHIV-I began at NCI-FCRF in iviay 1984, shor ly after Dr. Robert Gallo of the National Institutes of Health discovered the virus. From 1943 to 1969, Fort Detrick was the U.S. Army's biological warfare research and development center. However, no offensive biological warfare research has been conducted at Fort Detrick since 1969. Then, the facilities formerly used for biological warfare research were turned over to research on cancer and research for defenses against biological warfare the latter emphasizing the search for vaccines against, and antidotes for, diseases such as chikungunya, anthrax and Rift Valley fever. The United States is party to two international arms control agreements affecting chemical and biological weapons. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibits the use in war of chemical and bacteriological weapons but not the development, production, possession, or transfer of such weapons. Most major states party to the protocol, including the United States, have recorded reservations retaining a right to retaliate in kind if such weapons are used against them. The U.S. also is a party to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. This Convention bans development, production, stockpiling, or possession and transfer of biological agents or toxins "of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, and other peaceful purposes" and also the weapons, equipment, and means of delivery of agents or toxins. The U.S. is in full compliance with both the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. 1 The Soviet foreign affairs weekly New Times (#25, June 29,1987) acknowledged that the U.S.S.R. Institute of Virology "borrowed the first AIDS pathogene from abroad" to enable Soviet experts to study the virus. New Times did not specify the date, however. Appendix D The Soviet Biological Warfare Program 1 One reason Moscow has promoted the AIDS disinformation-and in recent months given the false charges an arms control twist-maybe its attempt to distract international attention away from its own offensive biological warfare program, which the United States and others have monitored for decades. A number of Soviet installations capable of producing disease agents and toxins on a large scale and of placing them in munitions and delivery/dissemination systems have been identified. These installations were established by the Ministry of Defense and are under its control. One such facility, in Sverdlovsk, has had a long history of biological warfare research, development, and production, with emphasis on the causative agent of anthrax. In early April 1979, an accidental release from that facility ofanthrax-causing substances caused many casualties and very likely a high death rate among exposed Sverdlovsk citizens. At the time the Soviets admitted only to some public health problems, which they said were caused by the illegal sale ofanthrax-contaminated meat. Soviet leaders have never acknowledged that the Sverdlovsk facility is a biological warfare facility. In addition to anthrax, the Soviets are believed to have developed tularemia, plague, and cholera for biological warfare purposes, as well as botulinum toxin, enterotoxin, and mycotoxins. 1 For more information, see Soviet Military Power, 1987, U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. j~ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 I II Il I I I I 1 11 I I i ~- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Appendix E 1 Appearances of the Disinformation Internationally:1983-86 Antigua, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Finland, France, Ghana, Greece, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Kenya, Kuwait, Liberia, Mauritania, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Spain, Tanzania, U.K., U.S.S.R., Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 1985 Brazil, Dominican Republic, E1 Salvador, Finland, France, India, Nicaragua, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Sweden, U.K., U.S.S.R. 1 The following lists incorporate information that the U.S. Government has been able to monitor and collect as of July 10, 198?. Appearances of the Disinformation Internationally: January-July 1987 Country City Egypt Cairo Peru Lima India Calcutta Jamaica Kingston L'.S.S.R. Moscow Bulgaria Sofia Yugoslavia Belgrade Uganda Kampala Ghana Accra U .S.S. R. Moscow India New Delhi Greece Athens U.S.S.R. Moscow Barbados Bridgetown Argentina Buenos Aires U.S.S.R. Moscow U.S.S.R. Moscow Sudan Khartoum Bangladesh Dhaka U.S.S.R. Kiev Pakistan Lahore U.S.S.R. Moscow West Berlin Costa Rica San Jose Kuwait Kuwait Cameroon Douala U.S.S.R. Moscow Argentina Buenos Aires U.S.S.R. Moscow Albania Tiran Senegal Dakar Philippines Manila Panama Panama City Brazil Rio de Janero Belgium Liege Libya Tripoli Congo Brazzaville Grenada Grenada U.S.S.R. Moscow U.S.S.R. Moscow U .S.S.R. Moscow U.S.S.R. Moscow Bulgaria Sofia Malta Valletta AI-Ahrar Extra Aajkaal Daily Gleaner Za Rubezhom Narodna Armiya Politika Ekspres Weekly Topic Ghanaian Times Souyetskaya Rossiya Patriot Rizopastis Izuestiya Daily Nation Diario Popular New Times TASS SUNA News Agency Daily News Prauda Ukrainy Viewpoint Souyetskaya Rossiya Tageszeitung Libertad Al-Wotan Le Mont Cameroun Giteraturnaya Gazeta La Semarta Izuestiya Bashkimi Le Soleil Manila Times Critics Jornal do Brasil La Wallonie Tripoli television Mweti Indies Times Za Rubezhom Novosti Military Review TASS Selskaya Zhizn Zemedelsko Zname Ziminijienta January 5 January 8 January 8 Early January January 9-15 January l2 January 14, 15 January 14, 21 January l6 January 23 January 23-26 January 25 January 25 January 26 Februaryl February, #2 February 7 February 7 February 8 February 14 February 17 February 18 February l8 February 20-26 February 20 February 23 February 25 February 25 February 28 March 2 March 10 March 17 March 17 March 18 March 19 March 20 March 23 March 24 March 27 March 30 March 30 March 31 March 31 March Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Appearances of the Disinformation in Soviet Media: Pravda Sotsialisticheskaya Industriva June 14, 1986 June 14, 1986 October 1985-June 1987 Kommurzist(Tbilisi) TASS September 19, 1986 October 30, 1986 Pravda October 31 1986 Soviet Print/Wire Service Media Souyetskaya Rossiya TASS , November 2, 1986 November 13,1986 Literaturnaya Gazeta October 30, 1985 Novosti Za Rubezhom November 19, 1986 January 9-15 1987 Souyetskaya Rossiya Apri127, 1986 Souyetskaya Rossiya , Januar 23 1987 Literaturnaya Gazeta May 7, 1986 Izvestiya y , January 25 1987 Souyetskaya Rossiya June 8, 1986 New Times , February 2 1987 TASS June 8, 1986 TASS , February 7, 1987 Country City Source Date Finland Helsinki Kansan Uutiset A ril 1 Jordan Amman Ad-Dustour p Apri12 Morocco Rabat Al Bayarze Apri12 Costa Rica San Jose Libertad Apri13-9 Uruguay Montevideo LaHora Apri13 Ghana Accra The Mirror Apri14 Mauritius Port Louis Sunday Star A ri15 p U.S.S.R. Moscow TASS Apri16 U.S.S.R. Leningrad Leningradskaya Pravda Apri17 Cyprus Nicosia Novosti A ri18 Burkina Ouagadougou Sidwaya p Apri18 Pakistan Peshawar Frontier Report A ri18 U.S.S.R. Moscow Krasnaya Zuezda p A ril 10 Bolivia La Paz Aqui p A ril 11 U.S.S.R. Moscow Izvestiya p April 14 Iraq Baghdad Sainik Samachar April 14 Bulgaria Sofia Narodrza Armiya April 15 U.S.S.R. Moscow Novosti April 17 Zimbabwe Harare Herald Apri117 Indonesia Jakarta Observer April 18 Bangladesh Dhaka The Tide April 19 Cuba Havana Granma Apri120 New Zealand Wellington NZ Trtburze Apri122 Cuyana Georgetown Chronicle April 22 Chile Santiago Fortin Mapocho A ri123 p Philippines Manila Manila Journal April 23 Qatar Doha A[ Arab Apri123 U.S.S.R. Moscow Moscow News Apri126 Costa Rica San Jose Libertad May 1-7 Ecuador Quito National television May 8 U.S.S.R. Moscow Lesnaya Promyshlerznost May 12 Finland Helsinki Kansan Uutiset May 12 Bolivia La Paz Jornada May 21 Greece Athens Athens News Agency May 22 Bulgaria Sofia Orbita May 23 U.S.S.R. Moscow Souyetskaya Molodezh June 3 India New Delhi Patriot June 7 Cuba Havana Granma June 8 U.S.S.R. Kiev Rabochaya Gazeta June 10 U.S.S.R. Kiev Radyarzska Ukraina June 10 U.S.S.R. Vilnius Souyetskaya Litua June 12 Kenya Nairobi Sunday Times June 21 Mexico Mexico City Excelsior June 23 Senegal Dakar Le Deuoir July Nigeria Lagos The Standard July 2 3 Nicaragua Managua E[ Nuevo Diario , July 6 Sudan Khartoum SUNA July 10 Peru Lima La Voz July 12 ail Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 47 I Il I I I I 1 ~~ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Pravda Ukrainy Souyetskaya Rossiya Literaturnaya Gazeta Izuestiya Za R ubezhom Novosti Military Review TASS Selskaya Zhizn TASS Leningradskaya Pravda Krasnaya Zvezda Izuestiya Novosti Moscow News Lesnaya Promyshfennost Souyetskaya Molodezh Rnbochaya Gazeta Radyanska Ukraina Souyetskaya Litua February 14,1987 February 18, 1987 February 25,1987 February 28,1987 March 27-April 2, 1987 March 30,1987 March 30, 1987 March 31, 1987 Apri16,198? Apri17, 1987 Apri110,1987 April 14, 1987 April 17, 1987 April 26, 1987 May 12, 1987 June 3, 1987 June 10, 1987 June 10, 1987 June 12,1987 Appendix F U.S. Ambassador Hartman's Letters to Mr. Aleksandr Borisovich Chakovskiy, Editor in Chief, Literaturnaya Gazeta Radio Moscow World Service Radio Moscow Peace and Progress Radio Moscow to Turkey Radio Moscow World Service Radio Moscow Peace and Progress Radio Moscow Peace and Progress Radio Moscow Peace and Progress Moscow Television Radio Moscow to China Radio Moscow to Italy Radio Moscow to China Radio Moscow to China Moscow Television Radio Moscow to Czechoslovakia Radio Moscow to Southern Africa Radio Moscow to Iran November 29,1985 December 2,1985 December 26,1985 September 22,1986 November 13, 1986 December 13, 1986 December 25,1986 January 16, 1987 January 27, 1987 January 31, 1987 February 28, 1987 Apri12, 1987 April 6, 198? Apri123, 1987 I am sure that many thoughtful Soviet readers shared my sense of surprise and revulsion at an article in the October 30 edition of Literaturnaya Cazeta. The article, titled "Panic in the West or What Is Hidden Behind the Sensation About AIDS," included the allegation that the worldwide AIDS epidemic resulted from U.S. Army research into the human immunity system. In attempting to buttress this fantastic charge, the author drew heavily upon an article which allegedly appeared in the Indian publication, the Patriot. Mr. Zapevalov did not, however, provide the date or issue number of the Patriot in which this article allegedly appeared. In an effort to get to the bottom of what appears to have been a deliberate deception of your readers, we directly queried the editor of the Patriot as to whether such an article actually appeared in his journal. After a check of the Patriot archives, the editor, Mr. R. K. Misra, has told us that he could not find any article in his newspaper that made the AIDS allegation. I am sure that you will agree with me that any serious journal has an obligation to ensure that whenever material is used from another source, it is accurately reported and fully cited. It now seems obvious that Mr. Zapevalov's article does not meet either of these fundamental criteria of responsible journalism. Beyond this point of journalistic ethics, it is inconceivable that anyone who had done serious research into the AIDS problem could make the irresponsible and totally baseless charge contained in this article. Even a cursory review of the facts of the AIDS epidemic would have revealed that this disease has a complex epidemiological history and worldwide geographical distribution. Moreover, in the regions of the world hardest hit by the epidemic-Central Africa, Haiti, the United States, and Western Europe-different segments of the population appear to be the most severely affected. Serious medical research on this disease is going forward in the United States, the Soviet Union and many other countries. This intense worldwide research effort has not, however, turned up a single shred of credible evidence to support an alleged link between the AIDS epidemic and U.S. military research. I can only conclude that Mr. Zapevalov's charge was a transparent effort to deceive his readers and manipulate genuine popular concern about a dread disease for propaganda purposes. Unfortunately, the responsibility for this affair does not rest on Mr. Zapevalov alone. Obviously, a journal of the prominence of Literaturnaya Gazeta has an obligation to its readers to ensure that its articles do not deliberately misrepresent the truth. In this connection, I noted that the new edition of the draft CPSU Party Program states that "the party and the Soviet state will cooperate with other countries in tackling global problems" including "eradication of dangerous diseases." When articles 48 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 such as the one in question appear in the Soviet media, careful readers are entitled to question the seriousness of the Soviet Union's commitment to international efforts to eliminate dread diseases such as AIDS. I request that this communication be published as aletter- to-the-editor. population and to abuse a medical tragedy affecting people all over the world, including in the Soviet Union, for base propaganda purposes. In light of the protests of Soviet public figures over Western press coverage of the Chernobyl disaster, and constant complaints by the same persons about Western portrayals of Soviet citizens, such behavior on your part seems strange, to say the least. I request that this letter be published as a letter?to-the- editor. It is with a sense of sorrow and disappointment that I am again forced to write to you in regard to the bizarre treatment of the subject of AIDS in your newspaper-this time in a May 7 article, which repeats the absurd claim that AIDS is a chemical warfare agent developed by the CIA and the Pentagon. These assertions are as reprehensible as they are false. One would think that a journal representing itself as intellectual would make every effort to ensure articles are carefully researched and scientifically accurate. Yet the anonymous member of your staff who edited the offensive article in question seems to be ignorant even of Soviet scientists' views on AIDS. For example, Academician Viktor M. Zhdanov, known the world over as an eminent immunologist, stated in the December 7 edition of Souyetskaya Kultura that evidence indicates the disease originated in Central Africa, that it may be related to a similar virus found in monkeys, and that it may have existed for several hundred or even several thousand years, or may have evolved from another virus. In the April 1986 issue of Priroda, A. L. Liozner of the Institute of Immunology, and A. F. Bykovskiy of the Gamaleya Epidemiology and Microbiology Institute conclude that there are serious bases for considering that the disease has existed in Africa for a long time. As I have pointed out to you before, serious scientific research has found that AIDS affects different segments of the population indifferent regions of the world. This research, in which the Soviet Union is taking part, has never uncovered a single bit of evidence to support the assertion that U.S. Government agencies are somehow responsible for creation and dissemination of the disease. I can only conclude, based on a reading of the many objectionable articles appearing in your newspaper in the past several months, that these are nothing more than a blatant and repugnant attempt to sow hatred and fear of Americans among the Soviet (NOTE: Ambassador Hartman sent a similar letter June 25, 1986, to Mr. Valentin Vasil'Yevich Chikin, Editor-in-Chief, Souyetskaya Rossiya, where the AIDS disinformation charges appeared Apri127 and June 8, 1986.) Appendix G Soviet Interference in U.S. Efforts To Expose the Campaign The Soviets have interfered with efforts by U.S. Embassy officials to set the record straight and expose the Soviet disinformation campaign. For example, Literaturnaya Gazeta on December 3, 1986, castigated the Brazilian newspaper Estado do Sao.Paulo, which earlier in the year had run a retraction following its publication of the AIDS disinformation story. The Soviets have also interfered in Africa. The Brazzaville(Congo)dsily Mweti (March 23, 19871 published an article citing the Segal hypothesis that the AIDS virus was created at Fort Detrick, Maryland; Mweti subsequently published a letter from the U.S. Ambassador to the Congo, protesting the false charges and supplying information exposing the disinformation effort. Moscow's Novosti news agency then disseminated a report, dated April 17 and datelined Brazzaville, criticizing the U.S. Ambassador's letter to Mweti , calling on the West to put an end to the "anti-African campaign," and repeating the charges that the virus was created in U.S. military laboratories. ;;l Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 11 Il I l i I 111 I i ~ i Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Chapter VI Soviet Disinformation on Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW) The United States is party to two existing international arms control agreements affecting chemical and biological weapons: the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol of 1925) which prohibits the use in war of chemical and bacteriological weapons; and the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC). The latter bans development, production, stockpiling, or possession and transfer of biological agents or toxins "of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, and other peaceful purposes." It also bans the weapons, equipment, and means of delivery of agents or toxins. Despite the fact that the U.S. has strictly adhered to these agreements, Moscow and its allies have sought to identify the United States as a violator of the BWC and to portray the United States as ruthlessly pursuing offensive chemical and biological weapons (CBW) research. In part, the campaign may be designed to distract world attention from the U.S.S.R.'s CBW activities (see appendix). This campaign has entailed false allegations that the U.S. has: ? produced the AIDS virus as a result of biological warfare experiments; ~ provided the Afghan resistance with CBW; ? cooperated with South Africa and/or Israel in developing a so-called ethnic weapon; and ? caused outbreaks of deadly diseases worldwide. As in other disinformation campaigns, these charges have appeared in a variety of media worldwide but especially in Soviet and Soviet bloc newspapers. In turn, these allegations have been developed as press placements in several newspapers in Third World countries where the Soviets have good access. Last September, for example, the "unofficial" Soviet Radio Peace and Progress assailed the United States for "pushing through its work on the creation of bacteriological arms ... in violation of international conventions." In an April 1987 TASS interview, Veniamin Votyakov, a Soviet member of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, repeated the charge in a plea to physicians worldwide to "do their utmost for disrupting the horrifying plans of preparing a chemical and biological war designed by the U.S. military." A major component of the disinformation about alleged U.S. CBW activities concerns Fort Detrick, Maryland. 1 For example, Fort Detrick has been cited by the Soviets and their allies as the birthplace of AIDS. Some of the Soviet disinformation themes that have circulated recently are described below. Two key points are pertinent to all of them: the Soviet Union is directly involved in purveying the disinformation, and its repetition in media throughout the world lends credibility to the stories. Afghanistan Moscow and Kabul both published CBW disinformation throughout the past year. The foremost theme of this disinformation was the accusation that the U.S. supplied chemical weapons to the mujahidin. For example, the Soviet daily newspaper Prauda (December 2, 1986) asserted that "counter-revolutionary gangs" in Afghanistan were using chemical grenades marked "Made in the United States." At a press conference staged by the Kabul government in September 1986, the Afghans displayed chemical weapons and training manuals which they alleged had been manufactured in the U.S. and captured from the insurgents by the Afghan Army. To ensure widespread publicity for this false story, Soviet and Afghan media gave it extensive coverage on three separate days. This disinformation theme also has appeared in non-Soviet press. In mid-October 1986, the Indian wire service, United News of India (UNI), published accusations by Soviet General Nikolai Chervov, chief spokesman of the Defense Ministry, that U.S. chemical weapons were being used in Afghanistan; i~ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 the UNI item was picked up by India's pro-Soviet as well as mainstream press. Appearances in non-leftist press are particularly important to the viability of a Soviet disinformation campaign. A conservative daily newspaper in Helsinki, Uusi Suomi, carried the chemical warefare disinformation on June 26,1987. It cited a report from Moscow: "More than 200 American-made chemical mines were found re- cently at Surobi in Kabul Province, TASS said Thursday, quoting Afghan Army Colonel Moham- mad Khashem. The Afghan Chief of Staff ...said that French, West German and Egyptian-made chemicals had also been found in Afghanistan." On June 24, 1986, the Lahore, Pakistan daily Nawa-I-Wagtcarried aMoscow-datelined item alleging that the mujahidin were being given chemical weapons training in Pakistan by American advisers. The Soviets took this theme one step further by claiming in a September 28 TASS report that Pakistan-based li .S. instructors were accompanying the insurgents inside Afghanistan to provide advice on chemical warfare. All of the charges are false. Probably as a response to U.S. allegations of Soviet violations of chemical and biological agreements, the U.S.S.R. periodically has published charges that the U.S. has fabricated evidence of Soviet use of CBW in Afghanistan. The Soviet and Afghan presses frequently have run stories alleging that the U.S. instructs the mujahidin to use their "American-made" chemical weapons in such a way as to lay the blame on Soviet and Afghan troops. For example, the Soviet Defense Ministry daily Krasnaya Zvezda (September 30, 1986) claimed that the U .5., in order to obtain evidence of Soviet complicity in CBW use, ordered the mujahidin to "send to Peshawar [Pakistan] photographs of the people, animals, and plants they had poisoned and samples of water and soil from contaminated areas." Korea and Vietnam In a campaign similar to that of the alleged U.S. CBW activity in Afghanistan, Moscow and its allies continue to accuse the li .S. of having waged CBW during the Korean and Vietnam wars. These allegations often are cited as "evidence" to support disinformation about alleged present or future L'.S. CBW activity. For example, an August 1986 North Korean press article titled "In Pursuit of Chemical Warfare" declared: "It is no secret that the U .S. imperialists committed the heinous bestiality of massacring our people with biological and chemical weapons during the Korean War. Even now the U.S. imperialists are introducing numerous chemical weapons into South Korea and conducting military exercises in preparations for chemical warfare in this area." In February 1987, prior to the start of joint U.S.- South Korean military exercises, the North Koreans charged that the effects of an alleged epidemic of hemorrhagic fever, which "broke out in South Korea in 1950 in consequence of the germ warfare of the U.S. imperialists," still lingered. In October 1986, while discussing the need for a chemical weapons ban and assailing U.S. CBW policy, 2 Soviet media charged that the U.S. Army during the Vietnam war acquired great experience in conducting chemical warfare. (Radio Moscow International Service, October 3, 1986). Shortly thereafter, the Soviet monthly journal International Life (October 10) and Pravda (October 27) repeated old charges of U.S. use of chemical warfare during the Vietnam war. These charges coincided with the U.S. release in October of a Pentagon report detail-,~ ing Soviet development of chemical weapons. Diseases During the past year, a number of false stories surfaced in Soviet, bloc, and Third World presses alleging U.S. responsibility for the outbreak of a variety of deadly diseases throughout the world. Some of the accusations were crude and, to a sophisticated reader, unbelievable. Many were replays of themes from previous years. For example: The U.S.S.R.'s Radio Peace and Progress alleged on September 22,1986, that "Pentagon bacteriologists are provoking epidemics, hemorrhagic fever in Korea, dengue in Cuba, viral encephalitis in Nicaragua, and conjunctivitis in E1 Salvador." The September 17,1986, edition of Krasnaya Zvezda charged that the "epidemic of `dengue' fever which affected thousands of Cubans in 1981 was the result of a subversive U.S. operation.". Cuban President Castro first leveled this false charge in July 1981, and it has since been replayed by Cuban and Soviet media. On December 13,1986, Soviet Radio Peace and Progress asserted that in Lahore, Pakistan, "American experts conduct research on developing new types of - bacteriological weaponry, including those causing grave mental disorders. Local residents meanwhile are being used as guinea pigs by researchers at the Lahore center, with over 500 residents of Lahore who suffer from yellow fever, jaundice, and mental disorders falling victim to criminal experiments." The same broadcast Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 - -- -- ~_ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 resurfaced false charges that "Lahore has become the center for breeding particularly dangerous species of mosquitos to be used against the population in Afghanistan." A Soviet commentator, Iona Andronov, originated the "killer mosquito" story in a February 1982 article in the Soviet weekly Literaturnaya Gazeta. ? The Prague Tribunes, in Czech (No 19, 1987) carried an article titled, "Where the Death Bacteria Are Being Cultivated." It listed purported examples of U.S. bacteriological weapons, including a poisonous mushroom causing fever outbreaks, particularly among black people. It accused the U.S. Army of spreading smallpox at Washington National Airport in 1964-65, and repeated old allegations about attacks on Cuba, including blame for a plague that destroyed the Cuban sugar crop. Ethnic Weapon In 1986-87, the L?.S.S.R. continued its dis- informationcampaign alleging that the U.S. was involved in research on a biological weapon designed to kill individuals of a particular ethnic group or race. The charges varied, depending on the intended audience. For example, in Africa, the U.S. purportedly was working with South Africa to develop a weapon that kills only blacks; in the Middle East, it was said to be working with Israel to make a weapon effective only against Arabs. These false charges have appeared since at least 1980, when they appeared in People's World, a U.S. Communist Party newspaper. TASS, Novosti, Radio Moscow, and Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress featured the "ethnic weapon" story repeatedly during the 1980s. A partial listing of Soviet stories and broadcasts on this subject follows, to provide a sense of the continuity and persistence of Soviet endorsement of these themes: August 13, 1984: TASS charged that the U.S. and South Africa were developing "carefully selected pathogenic viruses which are practically harmless to whites and mortally dangerous to Africans, Asians, and `coloreds'." It also alleged that Israel was involved and that viruses were being tested "on Africans in prisons of the apartheid state and on Arab prisoners in Israeli jails." April 2, 1985: The Soviet daily newspaper Selskaya Zhizn repeated allegations about South African and Israeli cooperation on an ethnic weapon. July 13, 1985: Radio Moscow domestic service in Russian characterized the CIA and the Pentagon as "the initiators of the development of so-called ethnic weapons." October 8, 1985: The U.S. Embassy in Ghana reported that a recent issue of the People's Daily Graphic had featured an article charging U.S., Israeli, and South African research do ethnic weapons, which it attributed to "Soviet sources." November 15, 1985: TASS cited "reports in the press about the development of so-called ethnic weapons in laboratories in the Republic of South Africa and the U.S.A." December 27, 1985: The Soviet newspaper Krasnaya Zuezda carried a TASS item citing a report in the Malagasy newspaper Carrelour that the U.S. and South Africa were secretly working on an ethnic weapon. The TASS report mentioned a letter from a Dr. Tyner, director of the division of neuropsychiatry of Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, to a Defense Department official. The letter, a forgery, alleged U.S.-South African cooperation in drugs to be used in "special conditions." January 30, 1986: Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress in an anonymous report alleged U.S.- South African research on "ethnic weapons." February 5,1986: Radio Moscow in Zulu to southern Africa broadcast a report that "Lately there has been growing talk in Africa of the presence of biological weapons in South Africa that can discriminate on the basis of race. These are meant to selectively kill the black race and leave out the white race. Such diabolical weapons are being researched and manufactured with the aid of the United States." February 1986: Novosti cited a Senegalese newspaper, Teskusaan, alleging U.S. and South African research on "ethnic weapons." The report was published with a Novosti byline by the local writer Garba Inuwa in the February 12 issue of New Nigerian and the February 10 issue of Nigeria Voice. It charged "American and South African scientists are doing joint research on so-called ethnic weapons designed to kill only blacks." February 18,1986: Radio Moscow ran atwo- minute report alleging South African research on ethnic weapons. September 27, 1986: An article by an author who frequently uses Novosti as a source appeared in the Nigerian newspaper The Voice. He reiterated charges of Israeli and South African research on ethnic weapons. At the same time, according to the U.S. Embassy in Lagos, Novosti was distributing to :Nigerian newspapers a story titled, "Death at the Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 1 III Il I I I L I l l I I ~ ~ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Cellular Level: United States and South Africa Develop Ethnic Weapons," by N.U. Pogodi. November 18, 1986: Radio Moscow in English reported that South Africa had developed selected biological warfare that could eliminate blacks without harming whites. January 10, 1987: TASS reported on an interview given to the Soviet magazine New Times by Professor Yuri Rychkov of the General Genetics Institute, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences. The TASS account gave the impression that Rychkov was very concerned about alleged plans to create an "ethnic weapon." But a comparison of the New Times interview with the TASS account shows that several times TASS incorrectly portrayed information contained in questions asked to Rychkov as comments that Rychkov had made. For example, TASS said, "He [Professor Rychkov] notes that the South African army has a unit of biological warfare which studies the possibility of developing viruses and other microorganisms affecting only Africans." But, in the actual interview in New Times, it was the interviewer who said this, not Rychkov. On June 5, 1987, the Director of the U.S. Information Agency, Charles Wick, protested the ethnic weapon disinformation in a meeting with Novosti director Valentin Falin. The meeting was cut short when Falin asserted that the accusations were true. Less than one week later, in an interview printed in Moscow News, a joint publication of Novosti press agency and the Soviet friendship societies, Falin reiterated the Soviet claims, saying, "It is no secret that the United States has been working on various `exotic' weapons, including the so-called ethnic ones. These are biological and chemical agents with selective action against people of different races, populating the same areas yet having different genetic susceptibility or vulnerability to these agents. Such facts are widely known, too. Take the report, circulated back in 1974, by Dr. Hammerschlag, an expert of the National Medical Center in Duarte, California, which he delivered at the symposium held in Los Angeles by the American Chemical Society, and the materials published in the journal Abstracts on Hygiene (Number 55, 1980)."(sic) In actuality, Hammerschlag's work refuted allegations that the U.S. had conducted research on an "ethnic weapon." Hammerschlag concluded-in a report, "Chemical Weapons and U.S. Public Policy," published by the American Chemical Society-that "we have no `story'; no hard evidence that ethnic weapons are or even have been under consideration by the Department of Defense." Implications Moscow's CBW disinformation campaign illustrates two key elements of Soviet strategy: repetition of even the most unbelievable stories pays off in the long run, and even if a disinfor- mation theme has little or no immediate impact on its target audience, it can be replayed or surfaced at an opportune time in the future. Indeed, Moscow seems to have reaped some benefits from this approach. For example, in mid-Apri11987 an official Indian armed forces journal, Sainik Samachar, published a story under the headline, "The Diabolical Chemical Warfare." This article repeated the false charges spread by the U.S.S.R. that AIDS was developed at Fort Detrick, that the U.S. started a dengue fever epidemic in Cuba, and that the U.S. experimented with chemical and biological weapons in Vietnam, Korea, Laos, and Cambodia. At a U.S. Department of State-sponsored seminar on "Disinformation, the Media, and Foreign Policy" (May 1987), journalists representing newspapers in Latin America and Africa discussed the impact of such stories on readers in their regions. They noted that they themselves had seen disinformation regarding U.S: . involvement with biological and chemical weapons in their regional newspapers. Their consensus was that most readers-particularly those who are not well educated or widely traveled-would believe the stories. Although no public opinion data are available to gauge the extent to which CBW-related disinformation has had an effect, it is apparent that the U.S.S.R. finds the campaign useful enough to continue to devote resources to it. Also, the fact that non-leftist media occasionally repeat the stories demonstrates the extent to which they are becoming "acceptable." Footnotes 1 Fort Detrick is discussed in detail in Chapter V, Appendix C. From 1943 to 1969, Fort Detrick was the U.S. Army's biological warfare research and development center. No offensive biological warfare research has been conducted there since 1969, when the facilities were turned over to research on cancer and on defenses against biological warfare. 2 Soviet criticism of U.S. policies focuses, in part, on the U.S. decision to begin production of binary chemical weapons in 1987. The U.S. is currently in the process of destroying old, less stable stockpiles of chemical weapons. The U.S. continues to abide by the Geneva Protocol, which bans use, not possession, of chemical weapons. The U.S. has pledged that it will not use chemical weapons first, but will possess them for deterrence. 54 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 _ 1_ . I Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Appendix Soviet CBW Activities The Soviet disinformation campaign alleging illegal and extensive U.S. CBW activities may, in part, be aimed at diverting attention from massive and, in some instances, illegal Soviet activity in this area. The U.S.S.R. has "the most extensive chemical warfare (CW) capability in the world," according to the 1987 U.S. Department of Defense publication Soviet Military Power. This report says that "The types of chemical agents that the Soviets could be expected to employ in war ...include the following: ? "nerve agents Isarin, soman,and a V-series agent); ? "blister agents (mustard, lewiste, and a mixture of the two ); ? "a choking agent (phosgenel; and ? "one other agent not specifically identified that causes unconsciousness for an hour or more and has been widely reported as being used in Afghanistan." Both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are parties to the 1972 Bacteriological (Biological)and Toxin Weapons Convention, which bans the development, production, stockpiling or possession, and transfer of biological agents or toxins except for small quantities for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes, and the means of delivery for biological agents or toxins. The U.S. is in full compliance with the BWC. The President's March 10, 1987, report on "Soviet Non- compliance with Arms Control Agreements" concludes, however, that "the Soviet Union has maintained an offensive biological warfare program and capability in violation of its legal obligations" under the CBW. The 1987 edition ofSouietMilitary Power says that "In addition to anthrax, we believe the Soviets have developed tularemia, plague, and cholera for biological warfare (BW) purposes, as well as botulinum toxin, enterotoxin, and mycotoxins." The report details a suspected BW accident in April 1979 at a Soviet military facility Ithe Microbiology and Virology Institute) in the city of Sverdlovsk. The U.S. Government analysis of the incident concludes that: ? While bulk quantities of anthrax spores in dry form were probably being prepared, a pressurized system most likely exploded. ? As much as 10 kilograms of dry anthrax spores were released from the Institute. ? Within two weeks, a significant number of deaths occurred. Reports surfaced that hundreds of Soviet citizens died from anthrax inhalation within 7 to 10 days of the outbreak. Other reports stated that in subsequent weeks, 1,000 or more cases may have developed. ? Heavy military involvement, military casualties immediately after the accident, total military control within two weeks, and rooftop spraying of decontaminating solutions from aircraft are not consistent with public health measures for dealing with anthrax acquired by eating bad meat, which is the official Soviet explanation for the outbreak of anthrax. ;~l Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 1 I 11 li I I I I l I I I I i ~ ~ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Chapter VII . The Soviet Propaganda and Active Measures Campaign on Afghanistan ~~ The Soviet Union, from the onset of its intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979, has conducted a broad campaign to undermine inter- national support for the Afghan resistance (the mujahidin) and to minimize criticism of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. As in Moscow's other efforts to influence international perceptions of controversial issues, this Soviet program has blended diplomacy (particularly in the negotiations in Geneva), propaganda, and active measures, and is targeted at a host of foreign opinionmakers and international organizations. The active measures and propaganda associated with the campaign employ multiple themes designed to influence the opinions and perceptions of key foreign audiences. Some of these themes are discussed in this chapter, and examples of the specific active measures-principally disinformation-undertaken to exploit them are provided. Theme 1: "We Were Invited" This theme-that the U.S.S.R. entered Afghanistan at the invitation of the sovereign Afghan leadership-was initiated immediately after the Soviet invasion. Although no longer central to the propaganda campaign, it is still evident, particularly in Soviet public diplomacy initiatives in the Third World. The U.S.S.R. continues to portray the presence of its military forces in Afghanistan in terms of legitimate "fraternal assistance" which is limited in time, scope, and purpose. Ina 1980 interview with the West German newspaper Die Zeit, Babrak Karmal, the pro-Soviet Afghan installed to head the regime in Kabul after the invasion, indicated that the Soviets came "in response to an official and legal invitation." Karmal issued his invitation while he was in the Soviet Union. Two Soviet publications, The Truth About AFghanistan and Afghanistan Today, cite Soviet "military assistance" as valid and in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation (signed in 1978) and Article 51 of the UN Charter, which provides for collective and individual self- defense. After more than seven years of continuous presence in Afghanistan-now involving a force of 116,000-Moscow still asserts that Soviet forces? remain only at Kabul's behest. Moscow and Kabul argue that the decision to withdraw Soviet forces is a bilateral matter. The Soviets concede that "arrangements" for the eventual Soviet withdrawal may be discussed in the Geneva process, but that the decision ultimately rests with Moscow and Kabul. Theme 2: "Outside Interference Prolongs the Problem" A related theme intended to justify the Soviet military presence is alleged external interference by Pakistan, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia-all at the instigation of the United States. For example, a June 28,1987, TASS report claimed that Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) . army units had seized from the mujahidin large quantities of French 82mm and 40mm chemical mines as well as chemical weapons produced in Egypt and FRG. Criticism of France, such as the DRA protest of the French Foreign Minister's "irresponsible and provocative assertions" in support of the mujahidin, usually is reserved for domestic Afghan audiences. France, according to a Kabul radio broadcast on May 11, 1987, "like other imperialist and . reactionary countries ... is interested, through a so- called screen of democracy, in a continuation of war and bloodshed in the DRA, and in maintaining a conflict situation." The "external forces of imperialism" and their "accomplices" are said to include the United States, Pakistan, Iran, Japan, F.R.G., U.K., Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, according to a February 1986 issue of the Soviet publication Agitator Tadzhikistana. Foreign media reports supportive of this propaganda line are regularly cited by the Soviets to establish its credibility and legitimacy. For example, the Soviet dailies Prauda, Izuestiya, and i Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Trud in February 1986 cited such an article appearing in a leftist Egyptian publication, al- Ahali; the author of the item had visited Afghanistan at Kabul's invitation and reported the "truth" about the country-that life was proceeding normally on the whole, but was hindered by U.S. and other interference. Theme 3: `The United States Does Not Want Peace in Afghanistan" Closely related to the "outside interference" theme is the claim that Washington is unwilling to entertain any thought of compromise and that U.S. policy is to fight the Soviets "to the last Afghan." Further, Moscow wishes to create the perception that Washington controls Pakistani foreign policy and will veto any compromise that does not support U.S. "neo-globalist" aims. DRA Foreign Minister Wakil, in an interview with Pravda (March 19, 1987), contended that the Geneva talks could have been concluded if only Pakistan had been flexible, and asserted that U.S. "anti-Afghan policy" remained the chief obstacle to success. Theme 4: "The Mujahidin Are Bandits" Moscow's media campaign to portray the mujahidin as CIA-financed criminals, saboteurs, and murderers is intended to undermine domestic and international support for the resistance movement and portray Soviet forces as a stabilizing factor in the country. In order to distract attention from Western reports of Soviet and Afghan atrocities, Soviet media occasionally claim that the mujahidin dress in Soviet Army uniforms and stage massacres which are filmed for Western television (Izuestiya, January 14, 1986; Prauda, February 15, 1986). Soviet news stories, often repeated in other countries' media after being carried by TASS or Radio Moscow, portray the resistance as anti- Islamic. During a recent interview with Western journalists, DRA leader Najibullah cited the destruction of 25 mosques as evidence of the counter-revolutionaries' anti-Islamic orientation. In Afghanistan Today, the resistance is identified as "fanatics disguised as Islam's defenders" who murder patriotic clergy and destroy mosques. The Soviet media often cite stories from the Press Trust of India (PTI). The U.S. Government has learned from defectors that many PTI reports are Soviet-planted disinformation. For example, Radio Moscow referred to a PTI item (published in the Indian paper Hagat) which reported that 1,500 U.S. advisers, 300 of whom were said to be CIA agents, were providing chemical weapons training to members of the Pakistan-based Afghan resistance. A story in the Indian evening paper, News Today (April 10, 1986) claimed that Sikh terrorists were being trained in the,same CIA- sponsored camps. Distorted and fabricated reports also appear in Pakistani media. Agents of the Kabul government have infiltrated the refugee camps in Pakistan, planted bombs throughout Pakistan, and conducted other terrorist operations. Soviet-sponsored articles then appear locally, blaming the violence on refugees in order to generate hostility toward the refugee population. Moscow also expends considerable effort to portray U.S. support for the mujahidin as "state- sponsored terrorism." The increase in Soviet military aircraft losses in Afghanistan has prompted a new wave of bogus accounts of mujahidin terrorism. The downing of a transport aircraft was retold in the Hungarian News Agency's English-language Daily News. Identifying an Associated Press report (datelined Islamabad) as the source, the Hungarian daily recounted the shootdown of a "civilian" airliner. In fact, it was a Soviet-supplied military transport aircraft on a military mission. Theme 5: Najibullah: `~We Are Not Communists" In a recent interview with Die Zeit, DRA leader Najibullah vehemently denied he was a communist and stated that "Afghanistan is not now, nor has it ever been communist." He further described himself as a "son of my Muslim people," although last year he prided himself on being a "son of Lenin" upon assuming, in May 1986, the leadership of the People's Democratic (communist) Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Regime efforts to portray Najibullah as pro- Islam have been stepped up over the past year. The regime is now fronted by an acting chief of state, Haji Mohammed Chamkani, who uses the Mecca pilgrimage honorific Haji before his name. The regime media regularly extol the government's support for Islam, and the leadership attempts visibly to demonstrate its Islamic credentials. For example, three leaders-Karmal, Keshtmad, and Najibullah-participated in Eid-al Adha (Feast of Sacrifice) in Kabul's central mosque in August 1986. In February 1987, at the inauguration of the Islamic Studies Research Center at Kabul University, Najibullah emphasized the role of "patriotic clergy" in building a "progressive" Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Afghanistan. Additionally, a Ministry of Islamic Affairs has been formed. The Kabul regime widely publicizes its subsidies to religious institutions. It does not mention that they are paid out of the institutions' own endowments, which were seized by the state. It also institutionalizes the "patriotic clergy" and centrally controls the actions of these influential opinion-leaders. Entry to the colleges of religious jurisprudence and Islamic learning is strictly controlled by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Endowment and the Council of Ulema and Religious Leaders, both controlled by and responsible to the PDPA. To prove to the world that it is Islamic, not communist, the Kabul government is seeking' reinstatement in the 44-member Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC). In early July 1987, the Afghan Foreign Minister invited the Secretary General of the OIC to talk with Afghan clergy, see the Islamic Research Center, and discuss Kabul's participation in the OIC. A propaganda pamphlet-almost certainly produced by the U.S.S.R-titled "Islam and Liberation Struggle" was distributed in Burma in 1986. Its message: Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was undertaken in defense of Islam and against reactionary, imperialist-sponsored Muslim elements. The United States is portrayed as anti-Islam; readers are warned of danger to. Islam in Palestine, Jerusalem, and Lebanon, where "Muslims are being killed with American weapons." Moscow is unlikely to allow Islamic institutions to increase their role in Kabul's political activity without close controls. The recent law on political parties is indicative of Moscow's approach. Radio Kabul (July 4, 1987) reported that the Revolutionary Council had adopted a law allowing new. political parties-but only those that would agree to maintain close ties with the Soviet Union. This, in.addition to the requirement that the new parties would have to support a nonaligned Afghanistan and "the consolidation of the historic friendship with the Soviet Union" (Washington Post, July 6, 1987). The themes cited above are a mixture of propaganda and outright distortion. Some of the examples mentioned-such as brochure on Islam, which is probably Soviet in origin-constitute active measures. Others are not so clearly . identifiable as deceptive, but better fall in the .category of propaganda reflecting Moscow's vision or version of reality. Below are examples of major Soviet and DRA deception activities designed to manipulate public opinion: All were initiated after General Secretary Gorbachev came to power. Deception: The Sham Withdrawal The most flagrant attempt to deceive the West .was the October 1986 sham withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Afghanistan. This active measure, which coincided with the annual~UN. ,, debate and vote on the Soviet occupation, ., . underscored the U.S.S.R.'s intention not to degxade the military effectiveness of Soviet forces already actively engaged. In his televised speech from Vladivostok on July 28, 1986, Gorbachev announced: Before the end of 1986, six regiments-one tank regiment, two motorized rifle regiments, and three antiaircraft regiments-will be returned from Afghanistan to the homeland, with their authorized equipment and arms. These units will return to the areas of permanent deployment in the Soviet Union and in such a way that all The withdrawal began with fanfare on October 15 and was completed by the end of the month. Soviet military spokesmen insisted that the units withdrawn had been in Afghanistan for years. 'In fact, this was not the case. The withdrawn units were as follows: 1. Three air defense regiments, constituting half of the promised withdrawal package. This component illustrates the limited significance of the original Soviet proposal: Such units play no military role against the mujahidin,' ' who have no air force. ? 2. The only tank regiment in Afghanistan, stationed at Shindand. This regiment had been . severely understrength. In an effort to bring it to full strength for the withdrawal ceremonies, the U.S.S.R. sent additional tanks into Afghanistan in September and October. During the withdrawal ceremonies, Western correspondents noted that the vehicles paraded as part of this departing regiment showed few signs of wear and that the Soviet soldiers associated with the unit claimed never to have seen any mujahidin. In short, it was a trick. 3. Two motorized rifle regiments, the only true potentially combat-necessary troops. This was another trick. These troops were brought into Afghanistan shortly after the Vladivostok speech solely to be withdrawn with public fanfare and .without ever having been used against the mujahidin. The newly introduced motorized rifle regiments had markedly different equipment from that of the regiments they temporarily displaced at Shindand and Kunduz.~ Specifically, the units included truck-mounted infantry with towed artillery, whereas standard equipment for motorized rifle regiments in Afghanistan includes ;;, Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 1 1 11 Il I I I I II I i i ~~ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 armored personnel carriers and self-propelled artillery. After these two truck-mounted regiments were withdrawn, the motorized rifle regiments previously stationed at Shindand and Kunduz were returned to their respective garrisons. In effect, all motorized rifle regiments that were in Afghanistan on the day of Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech remained in Afghanistan after the alleged withdrawal. The October 1986 withdrawal was not the first incident in which the Soviets had sought to deceive the West with staged force reductions. In 1980, for example, Moscow announced a troop withdrawal from Afghanistan weeks before the Moscow Olympics. These troops, some 5,000, were not suited for the Afghan terrain and counterguerrilla operations. Even as the unwanted forces were being withdrawn, new and more useful units were being introduced. Deception: The Cease-Fire and Refugee-Return Inmid-December 1986, the Soviet leadership received virtually the entire Afghan leadership for four days of meetings in Moscow. This was the first such visit in six years. Several weeks later, Najibullah announced plans for a unilateral cease- fire and a proposal for a coalition government. Within days of this announcement, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and International Department chief Dobrynin led the highest ranking Soviet delegation to Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion. In an authoritative TASS report issued at the close of the visit, Moscow announced that the Soviet leadership totally approved of Kabul's initiatives. Shevardnadze added that Gorbachev had personally dispatched the Soviet delegation as part of the campaign to generate momentum and to display Moscow's desire for a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan. The main points of the "national reconciliation" 1 as proposed by Najibullah include: ? Implementing acease-fire; ? Refraining from armed struggle and bloodshed in resolving Afghan questions, now and in the future; ? Maintaining just representation in the political structure and economic life of Afghanistan; Granting general amnesty and refraining from prosecution based on past political activity; Protecting and consolidating national, historical, and cultural traditions; and Respecting and observing the sacred religion ofIslam. - . Apparently, the amnesty was used to increase the number of available fighting men. Many of the soldiers who deserted the Kabul ranks during June and July fighting have reported that they were released from prison and immediately pressed into the army. A news report in the Pakistani English- language daily The Muslim.(January 6,1987) alleged that three former Afghan officials were in Kabul the same time as Shevardnadze and Dobrynin to discuss participation in the proposed, national reconciliation process. The bogus story was picked up the following day by All India Radio, which identified the visitors as former Afghan Ambassador to India Abdul Rahman Pazhwak, former Afghan Prime Minister Dr. Mohammed Yusuf, and former Afghan Minister of Justice and li N representative Dr. Abdul Hakim Tabibi. Tabibi, who in fact resigned his diplomatic post in protest against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, publicly denounced the fraudulent account of the visit and insisted he had "not visited Kabul or participated in any negotiations with the communist authorities." Yusuf and Pazhwak also publicly denied the story. " This disinformation ploy was carefully timed to give substance to the sense of seriousness of Moscow's initiative, to minimize anticipated criticism of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan at the then-upcoming Islamic summit in Kuwait, and to generate a false sense of positive momentum for the February 1987 round of Geneva negotiations between Kabul and Islamabad. At the 'regional level, the purpose was to sow discord among the mujahidin political parties in Peshawar and to encourage refugees to return to Afghanistan. Last May, a Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman reported on the progress of the national reconciliation effort. He claimed that 1.,300 national reconciliation commissions had already been established, and 949 villages "peacefully liberated." In concert with the cease-fire and national reconciliation initiatives, Kabul has used deception to convince international public opinion that Afghan refugees are eager to return and that, when given the opportunity of the cease-fire, many are doing so. Kabul media, for example, claimed on July 6 and 7,1987, that more than 60,000 refugees had returned to Afghanistan in response to the Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 - - - - I -..-~--- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 national reconcil~iatiori campaign:- These claims,,. ~~ however, are highly exaggerated. : ~:=`~- ~..: In February1987, ~an Afghan tele`visiot~~"crew in Kabul delayed a scheduled Afghan'airlne~fli~ht to.?. film a faked. return of Afghan refugees fr>om India. The "returnees"actually were Kabul citizens .~ ,. . pretending to be refugees. The film"was~then aired on German television to lend credibility to and generate international support for the reconciliation initiative. To explain the limited numbers of refugees returning home, Kabul claims that Pakistan and Iran forcibly block many seeking to return. In an appeal to entice refugees to return and to persuade the mujahidin to lay down their arms, Kabul also has announced an amnesty for prisoners and "misled patriots." The Soviet and Afghan media regularly report the release of thousands of prisoners. One such prisoner release, on February 7, 1987, was arranged to ensure maximum media coverage. In addition to three Western journalists, Soviet and Czechoslovak correspondents were on hand. Although the DRA regime has announced that 1,300 prisoners have been released, Western journalists estimate the numbers to be in the range of 650-800. The regime implies this is a wide- rangingamnesty program for "estranged brothers," but upon closer examination, the prisoner releases and amnesty program specifically exclude mujahidin, who by definition are "professional murderers, spies, saboteurs," and not entitled to prisoner-of--war status. The prisoner amnesty . program in fact applies to only a limited number of candidates who fall into one or more of the following categories: 2 ? Over 60 years of age; ? Female; ? L'nder 18 at the time of commission of the crime; ? Incurable illnesses; ? A sentence of five years or less; and ? A sentence of seven years, of which four have been served. Deception: Forgeries The Soviets and the DRA Government have published forged letters attributed to the mujahidin. For example, two pamphlets containing forgeries were published in 1984: "Chemical Weapons: Who Resorts to Its Use?" and "Armed Intervention and Other Forms of Interference in the Internal Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan." Both pamphlets purport to have been printed in Kabul, but.the latter one, which is much more,professionally typeset, ~robably~was~ ~ ~ ~' printed in the.U.S S.R. The forgeries cited in the -~? '; pamphlets falsely claim that chemical' weapons '' have been used by the mujahidin. ' ' ` " ' '~? One forged letter bearing the letterhead of the Harakat-e-Inquilab-e-Islami-e-Afghanistan resistance group says: I m sendingto~yot~::..b~he~ ~:. chemical substances, which had been requested earlier. -You should hand the chemcaFs'over to the person, who had been introduced earlier..;,as soon as~ . possible, to be used according to the previous plan in envisaged places." Another forged letter purports to be from Sayed . Ahmad Gailani, leader of the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan resistance group. It says: "The poisoning chemical substances sent to you must be used very carefully, i.e., the time of usage during the operation must be chosen carefully not to harm the mujahidin, and in the case of unproper [sic] weather conditions, it is better to leave the place of operation. Afterwards, send all the poisoned people to Peshawar as soon as possible for the propaganda purposes." These letters are fairly crude, in some cases using incorrect words for common Afghan terms. For example, in one forgery, the word artiste was used for "army," which is proper usage in Iran or Soviet Tajikistan, but not in Afghanistan. In addition, the same typewriter was used for letters supposedly written by different resistance groups. Conclusion It is difficult to assess the precise impact and effectiveness of Moscow's deception initiatives in support of its military campaign in Afghanistan. Many people throughout the world remain skeptical of Soviet motives in Afghanistan. The continuing occupation remains a sore point in the U.S.S.R.'s dealings with Third World nations, members of its own bloc, and Western peace groups. A recent United States Information Agency survey of the world press found that Third World media continue to express condemnation of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. West European, Australian, and Canadian media consider Moscow's willingness to withdraw from Afghanistan a test of Soviet sincerity and credibility in other areas, including arms control. s It should be noted, however, that despite seven years of waging a brutal, high-technology war against a less developed, nonthreatening neighbor-a war that has drive one quarter of Afghanistan's population into exile-the U.S.S.R. at the most recent Nonaligned Conference again escaped condemnation for its actions. It is safe to assume that the International Department of the -? Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 1 I II Il I I i I III I I Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Central Committee will continue energetically to pursue what it must regard as a reasonably succe$sful active measures campaign on Afghanistan. Footnotes release of prisoners,.an amnesty, and economic assistance for returning refugees. . Z'"Text.of Najibullah News Conference of January 18, 1987," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, South Asia, Volume VIII, January 21,1987. ' s United States Information Agency, Foreign Media Analysis, "World Press Says If Gorbachev Is Serious About Peace He Must Withdraw From Afghanistan" (July 8,19871. 1 The plan is virtually identical to the reconciliation program launched under Babrak Karmal. In 1985, Karmal promised a government composed of all political groups, the Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 .Chapter VIII Soviet.Relations in Latin America This chapter is divided into two sections. The first is a report on the results of a conference on Soviet activities in Latin America. The conference, sponsored by the, Department of State on May 7, 1987, brought together nine scholars to discuss the. entire range of the U.S.S.R.'s interaction in the region. The report provides a useful context for the second section,'a discussion of Soviet cultural and information activities in Latin America. The second section was not a product of the conference. Neither section focuses on propaganda or active measures, but rather on legitimate international relations. This.chapter is included in this report to describe-using the example of one region, Latin America-the backdrop of diplomatic, economic, and cultural activities against which Soviet influence activities take place. The interaction ,. between these legitimate international relations and the deception activities that constitute active measures may be subtle. For example, a student scholarship program for study in the Soviet bloc is in the first, legitimate category. If that program is then used to prepare.agents of influence, for example, it encroaches on the realm of active measures. Likewise, international radio broadcasting is an acceptable means of disseminating information and propaganda; its use to spread disinformation, however, ties it to active measures. The views expressed in the first section of this chapter are those of the conference participants and do not necessarily reflect Department of State positions or policies. The conference participants were: Cole Blasier, University of Pittsburgh; Juan del Aguila, Emory University; Robert Evanson, University of Missouri, Kansas City; David Jordan, University of Virginia; Bruce McColm, Freedom House; Eusebio Mujal-Leon, Georgetown University; William Richardson, Wichita State University; Jiri Valenta, University of Miami; and Robert Wesson, The Hoover Institution at Stanford University. Section I: Diplomatic and~~~ Economic Interactions In the past two decades the Soviet Union has increased its diplomatic, economic, cultural, and political activities in Latin America. Although the area remains aloes-level priority for Moscow vis-a- vis the rest of the Third World, Latin America is viewed as an arena for competition with the U.B. Soviet interest in Latin America is due primarily to the region's political and strategic importance to the U.S. The priority of Latin America on the Soviet agenda may change; during.late 1986-early 1987, rumors have circulated of a Latin American visit this year or next by General Secretary Gorbachev. The Soviets follow two approaches to political relations with Latin America: state-to-state, involving the pursuit of"normal" diplomatic and economic ties with non-Marxist governments; and party-to-party, aimed at developing ties with the ', region's communist regimes, parties, and leftist groups. In 1960, the U.S.S.R. had diplomatic relations with only five countries in the region. Today, it has relations with 16 Latin American and Caribbean countries and engages in some economic activity with nearly all countries in the region. Communist party relations have been strongest with Marxist Cuba and Nicaragua where~Soviet influence has been most significant. The Soviets have expanded trade relations in Latin America partly by taking advantage of U.S. barriers to certain imports. U.S. quotas.are one reason for recent increased Soviet purchases of ? ?. sugar from Guyana and Caribbean countries. The U.S.S.R. now buys from Nicaragua bananas and other products no longer salable in the United States. Argentine President Alfonsin has said that unless the West opens its doors to increased exports, his country will be forced to trade mope with the socialist bloc. Trade relations have served to expand Soviet presence in Latin America, but have been costly to the U.S.S.R. The Soviets imported approximately three times what they have exported to the region. i~ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 As it has in the Middle East and Africa, the U.S.S.R. has sought to extend influence through the supply of weapons and military advisers. To date, military relations have been established only with ; Cuba, Nicaragua, and Peru. Most military assistance to Cuba and Nicaragua is given on a grant basis. Cuba has received $9 billion in assistance since 1960. Soviet sales and assistance to Peru since 1973 are valued at about $1.5 billion. Peru is currently deeply in debt to the U.S.S.R. The foundation of Soviet cultural relations with Latin America is exchange visits and scholarships for study in the U.S.S.R. The number of scholarships offered to Central Americans to pursue post-secondary degree programs increased sixfold from 1979 to 1983. Corresponding figures for scholarships provided by the U.S. Government to . Latin Americans remained relatively low and constant for the same time period. Despite its multifaceted presence in Latin America, the U.5.S.R.'s success in expanding influence has been limited. U.S. influence remains strong and widespread. Recently both U.S. and Soviet interests have been served by the return in many Latin American countries to constitutional government and civilian rule. Soviet Views of Latin America Throughout the 19th century, Russian scientists and travelers visited many Latin American countries. By the 1890s the Russian Empire had established official and economic . relations with Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. After the Bolshevik revolution, Soviet diplomats, trade representatives, and political advisers were sent to Latin America to extend those earlier relations, establish a Soviet presence, and set up local communist parties. Soviet attention to and relations with Latin America have fluctuated among countries and over time. The Mexican Communist Party was founded in 1919, and in 1924 Mexico became the first country in the Western Hemisphere to exchange ambassadors with the U.S.S.R. Disagreements between the two countries in the Comintern, however, led to a break in relations in 1930, a major setback for the Soviets with the Latin American country they knew best at that time. It was not until the German attack on the U.S.S.R. in 1941 and the subsequent anti-fascist military alliance of World War II that relations with Mexico and several other Latin American countries were restored. In the postwar period, the Cold War . strained many of the newly established diplomatic relationships. However, Mexico, U ruguay, and Argentina maintained relations with the U.S.S.R. During the 1950s and 1960s, Latin American studies began to be emphasized in the U.S.S.R. In 1961, after Castro's success in Cuba, Soviet interest was whetted, and the Soviet Academy of Sciences established an Institute on Latin America to train scholars and to provide guidance to policymakers. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Soviets concentrated on diplomatic, commercial, and cultural contacts. They encouraged exchange visits ranging from ballet troupes to government officials, setup Soviet reading rooms, and offered scholarships. The Soviet leadership scaled back support for revolutionary activities in countries. where conditions did not appear favorable for radical change. Attention was directed instead to improving relations with such "progressive" forces as Allende's Popular Unity government in Chile: More recently, the Soviets have been encouraged by the success of revolutionary forces in Nicaragua and the ability of the "united fronts" to bring together in political coalitions communist and noncommunist radicals in countries as different as El Salvador, Peru, and Uruguay. The Soviet Union probably perceives a weakening of the inter- American security system caused by: a decline of U.S. influence in the region; the Falklands/Malvinas War; a stronger sense of Latin American nationalism; and the emergence of such regional powers as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. The Soviets interpret these events as a shift in the correlation of forces in their favor. Soviet approaches to the region have been evolving over the past two decades. Although they have viewed most of Latin America as not ripe for revolutionary change, the Soviets have tried to take advantage of opportunities as they have arisen. In addition to state-to-state relationships based on diplomatic, economic, and cultural ties, the U.S.S.R. has pursued party-to-party relations. Although the U.S.S.R. will readily exploit such conditions as those that led to leftist Sandinista rule in Nicaragua, the Soviets' relations with the "new democracies" suggest they recognize there is much to gain from official state-to-state relations. State-to-State Relations The Soviet Union seeks to establish diplomatic, economic, cultural, and political relations with as many Latin American nations as possible. Through these ties, the U.S.S.R. exploits, whenever possible, deeply rooted Latin American resentment toward the United States. It plays to Latin American nationalism by encouraging self-assertiveness on the world stage, demands for better export prices, restriction of multinational corporations (MNCs), nationalization of MNC holdings, and refusal to repay debt. The Soviets also seek support for their positions on such broad themes as peace, disarmament, the militarization of outer space,. debt 64 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 - -~ _ 1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 relief, and independence vis-a-vis the U.S. The goal is weakening of Latin ties with the U.S. The 16 Latin American and Caribbean countries that have d;plomatic relations with the.., U.S.S.R. are Mexico, Cuba, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and all of South America except for Chile and Paraguay. Despite . these broadscale relations, no Soviet leader has . . visited the Latin American mainland. It is now rumored that Gorbachev may soon visit, perhaps in early 1988. In October 1986, Raul Alfonsin became the.first Argentine President to travel to the U.S.S.R. Also in October, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze traveled to Mexico, the first Latin American country other than Cuba to be visited by a Soviet foreign minister. In January 1987, Shevardnadze met in Moscow with ambassadors from Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Argentina, Peru, and Uruguay as members of the Contadora and support groups to express Soviet backing for the peace effort in Central America. Soon after, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Komplektov traveled to Mexico, Brazil, and Uruguay. A Brazilian official reported in May, 1987 that Shevardnadze would pay an official visit to Brazil in October. Economic Relations Trade has been a key factor in extending Soviet influence. The U.S.S.R. will trade with almost any country, regardless of politics. For example, in 1964, trade relations with Brazil continued despite the onset of anticommunist military rule. After the Cuban revolution, the U.S.S.R. picked up the slack in Cuban exports created by the loss of U.S. markets for sugar and other products. Since that time the number of Soviet trading partners in the region has increased steadily. For more than 15 years, the U.S.S.R. has traded with 8 of the 12 South American countries, Mexico, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua. The U.S.S.R.'s top Latin American trading partners are Cuba, Argentina, and Brazil. As a result of the 1980 partial grain embargo imposed upon the U.S.S.R. by the United States, the Soviets became Argentina's biggest customer in the early 1980s, purchasing 80 percent of Argentine grain exports in 1982. Despite subsequent declines, sales in 1985 still exceeded $1.5 billion. Trade fell in 1986, leaving the Soviets far down the list of Argentine trading partners. A recent agreement between the two commits them to high levels of trade through 1990. Soviet imports from Brazil, primarily foodstuffs, iron ore, and pig iron, rose from $226 million in 1979 to $864 million in 1983. In 1985, the figure declined to $495 million as a result of a drop in , overall Soviet food orders and Soviet disinclination to import from Brazil given its extreme bilateral balance-of--trade deficit. Brazilian imports from the U.S.S.R., primarily , oil, amounted to $91 million in 1985. Attracted by Brazil's large domestic market, the Soviets have been pressing hard to sell manufactured goods.. In . November 1985, the U.S.S.R. and.Braiil`signed a , $1.5 billion trade agreement designed to triple the 19851evel of trade between the two countries. In addition to trade, the U.S.S.R: ha's offered , technical assistance, for example, to biiild smelters for the metal industries in Bolivia and'for construction-especially hydroelectric-projects in Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina. The U.S.S.R. imports much of its tin from Bolivia and exports machinery, equipment, and technology. Trade between the two countries has fluctuated owing to changes in Soviet tin requirements and inconsistency in Bolivian production, but Soviet investment in upgrading Bolivia's mining sector indicates the relationship will persist. The Soviets have offered technological assistance in oil and natural gas, copper smelting, iron and steel heavy industry, and transportation-areas that could lead to Soviet sales of machinery and equipment. The Soviets will also build two textile factories in Chihuahua, Mexico. In turn, Mexico has expressed interest in the joint manufacture of tractors, will send workers to the U.S.S.R. for training, and will sell steel products, pipes, and oil drilling equipment for Soviet industry: Soviet trade with Mexico in the 1970s averaged about $9 million dollars yearly. This figure rose in the 1980s to $24 million, still a small amount..,In 1983, the two countries formed a Joint:Commission for Economic Trade and Coordination. The Soviet share of Latin American~trade remains small, totaling around 4 percent; the United States accounts for 40 percent of the region's trade. But although their share of Latin American trade is small, the Soviets import three times as much as they export. This is caused by several factors: the availability of substitute sources for Latin American imports, an anticommunist sentiment in many countries, the lack of complementarity between local economies and the Soviet economy, and a general Latin American conviction that Soviet products are inferior. To balance trade, the Soviets have sent delegations to expand markets for Soviet products and for joint development projects that guarantee use of Soviet equipment. Countertrade agreements with Argentina and Brazil-with which the Soviet deficits are largest-now require the trading partner to purchase a specific amount of Soviet goods or to include Soviet-manufactured products as a certain percentage of the partner's total purchases. ~ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/06 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2 I li Il I I I III i t ~