DEFERRED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00980R000500150002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 53
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 1, 1986
• Content Type: PAPER

25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For R
NRO review(s) completed.
1. Office of Special Activities
0980R000500150002-2
The largest component of the Directorate was the Of-
fice of Special Activities headed by Brig. Gen. Donald H.
mid-1962 from the Directorate for Plans De-
Division, OSA experienced a more than 60
Ross. Formed in
velopment Projects
percent reduction in size.-- from a high of employees -- in
the late 1960s but was still the DST's largest entity with
positions and a budget of
reduction
aircraft
was a result of having put
This large manpower
its fleet of OXCART A-12
in permanent storage at Palmdale, California, in mid-
1968. OSA, however, was still in charge of a fleet of U-2Rs,
but these aircraft were considered to be a contingency cap-.
bility that could be called upon by the U.S. Intelligence Board
or higher authority for use in situations where the Air Force
U-2 fleet was not diplomatically acceptable.
mows
25X1 of
25X1
25X1
%we
OSA also continued to oversee the management and security
where both the U-2 and A-12 air-
craft were tested and pilots were trained. Although OSA assets
would be used with great effectiveness on several occasions in
the early 1970s, the rationale for the Office and its mission-.
grew more and more difficult to defend. " Ultimately, by the end
of 1974, it -would cease to exist and its assets would be turned-
over to the Air Force,
2. Office of Computer Services
By the late 1960s, OCS had almost trebled in size from
- its original 1963 authorized strength of
in 1969,- which made it the second
budget had grown in the same period from
this brief time span, the
25X1
to a complement of _ 25X1
largest DS&T unit. Its
Office had been through
two-complete generations of computer technology and Was embark--
- ing On the acquisition- of third-generation IBM 360 machines.
-OCS was-prOviding_support -to more than 250 computer projects
T. -2
r'r1, in r?, Approved For Release 200-74p/2&:?.91AFRDP8
Referral Review by NGA
9600980R000500150002-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved Forlt:q.-r9RAFTWA`43 : CIA-RDP89B 0980R000500150002-2
5. Office of Special Projects
As the newest of the Directorate's offices, OSP had
25X1 grown from a operation in ? 1965 to positions in 25X1
1969 with a CIAP hudget of just under Because
OSP's primary mission, under Director John J. Crowley, was to
oversee the development of satellite collection platforms, it
actually supervised the expenditure of 25X1
dollars on
belonged to the National Reconnaissance Program and not to the
Agency.
25X1
25X1
but the funds
OSP had inherited from OSA the responsibility for oversee-
ing the procurement of the KM-4A and KH-4B camera systems and
the return capsules for the nation's original photosatellite
effort, Project COR(JNA. This project was already more than a
decade old and was in the process of being phased out. CORONA
satellites, which collected broad-area search
to be replaced by.
photography, were
6. Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center
25X1
-FMSAC_was the second smallest Unit in the
Directorate
25X1
with employees and a budget of
It had
been 25X1
organized in November_1963 at the direction
of DCI John
A.-
Mc-
25X1
wrif?:4," F:Appreoved For Release 2007gq)114 RDP89
B00980R000500150002-2
25X1
Approved For
00980R000500150002-2
Cone specifically to pull together all analysis and interpreta-
tion of data concerning. missiles and space. Its founding di-
rector had been Carl Duckett, who came to the job from the
position as director of U.S. Army .Missile Intelligence Activ-
ities. Duckett had hand-picked the FMSAC staff and considered
it to be the best in the nation. In 1969 it was headed by
David S. Drandwein.
.Since its inception, FMSAC provided current analyses on a
24-hour basis and produced finished intelligence on foreign
strategic
pons) and
events..
weapon and space systems (except for defensive wea-
in-depth analyses on significant
missile and space
FMSAC focused primarily on Soviet missile and space
developments, but also followed Chinese efforts and, to a les-
25X6 ser extent, those of
publication, the Mtssile
25X1
decessor of today's
and other countries.
and Space Summary (MASS) was
Its daily
the pre-
Science and Weapons Daily Review
MASS was supplemented by articles in OSI's monthly SIDs
hoc STIRs. FMSAC analysts also responded to questions
(SWDR).
and ad
by pro-
gc.iontAfic Intejligence Memoranda, and coordinated on
current intelligence and estimates with Directorateof Intel-
ligence offices. In cooperation with OSI and DEL, FMSAC helped
direct .collection efforts in the -space and missile field. Dur-
ing the next five years, FMSAC. and OSI- Would be major- contribu
-tors of anall/ses used by the SALT Verification Panel in draft-
ing negOtiating positions for the talks in Helsinki and Vien-
na.
7. Office of Research and Development
Although the smallest of the Directorate's offices,
ORD-- by the
25X1 Ieiloyees
Agency's R&D budget which, at
25)1
?toi
end of the 1960s had grown to the point where its
oversaw the spending :of
thr-ee times the--.budget of OSA,
more than
the
half of the
was more_Iban
Directorate's largest of-
peApprpved For Release 200T/r9/2;crcslRDP89
B00980R000500150002-2
25X1
25X1
*ft,
No,
Approved For
00980R000500150002-2
B. Personnel Changes
Lloyd K. Lauderdale, the directorate's associate deputy
director
since early 1967, resigned his position at the end of
March 1969 to become corporate director of electronics for LTV
Corporation in Dallas, Texas. Duckett operated without an as-
sistant for six months before Dr. Donald H. Steininger arrived
on 2 November 1969 from his position as assistant to Presiden-
tial Science Adviser Lee A. DuBridge. Steininger's arrival
coincided with a number of changes in the Agency's hierarchy.
DOT Richard M, Helms named E. Henry "Hank" Knoche to . be deputy
director of Planning, Programming, and Budgeting, and John J.
Hicks was appOinted executive director of NPIC.
Alexander Flax
Reconnaissance Office
John L. McLucas. On 30 June, the Agency's
resigned as director of the National
on 17 March 1969 and was replaced by Dr.
signed as deputy director, NRC),
Robert Naka. Although not an Agency
25X1 for
familiar
25X1 January. 1970,-
re-
and was replaced.by Dr. F.
employee,
with most
Now'
Naka had worked
and was intimately
Early in
SIGINT offi-
of the Agency's overhead programs.
the Agency's
cer and Duckett's:special assistant, retired-. -
25X1
In mid-1970, the Director of Special PrOjetts, John J.
Crowley, announced his intention to retire. DDS&T Duckett
,AAproved For Release 200T/A4/240:7c9ATRDP89
B00980R000500150002-2
25X1
25X1
Approved For : CIA-RDP89B
Now,
Meanwhile,
25X1
time
to
the
lic
of
China
0980R000500150002-2
OSA's aircraft programs were limited at this
IU-2s along the coast of the People's Repub-
to collect ELINT. ? This effort, which had been
underway since 1961, was known as Project TACKLE. The Agency
also had a small fleet of U-2Rs based at Edwards Air Force
Base, California, which was being used less and less. Known as
Project IDEALIST, this
25X1 was to photograph the
25,
- v4100
effort's most
recent overseas deployment
On 20 December 1969, DDS&T Duckett accompanied DCI Helms to
a 303 Committee meeting, chaired by Henry Kissinger, which dis-
cussed the IDEALIST U-2 program in the light of a memorandum
from Deputy Defense Secretary Packard recommending the transfer
of CIA's remaining U-2 assets. to the USAF's Strategic Air Com-
mand. Duckett pointed out that cancellation
could lead to problems with
After a
of the program
30-minute discussion, all members present fa-
vored continuation of the program through. FY-71, with another
review before the FY-72 budget was prepared.
Kissinger- next brought up the question
Budget concerns about the mounting cost of
After. listening to Duckett's review
General John Mitchell and Kissinger
?"very strange that everybody but
important and necessary."a-
of Bureau of the
of the program, Attorney
both said they found ' it
BoB thinks this program is
- Despite the 303- COmmittee't U-2 decision and
President Nix-
on's endorsement of same, Deputy Defense Secretary Packard
continued :pushing for studies .on consolidation of the Agency
and SAC U-2 fleets, In a note to DCI Helms on 17 February
1970, Duckett: said: "r still believe the issue of our staying
in the U-2 businets is pridarily policy and not budget He
1 0,, ift-r11,?k
,itratv(1?
r'ettl)
25X1
25X1
recommended- that the Agency take no further action an the U-2 -ILLEGIB
matter.
Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP896009
OR000500150002-2
Too Secret!
Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP89600980R000500150002-2
Op( (TN
II. New Developments: Nixon, Kissinger, and SALT
President Richard M. Nixon's election in November 1968 set
in motion a chain of events which, over the next five years,
had a momentous impact on the Directorate of Science and Tech-
nology. Earlier in 1968, when President Lyndon B. Johnson's
administration was making a concerted effort to prepare for
arms-limitation talks with the Soviet Union, Duckett l. direc-
torate began expanding its role beyond that of simply contri-
buting to the National Estimates. Unlike his predecessors,
Albert D. "Bud" Wheelon and Herbert "Pete" Scoville, Jr., Duck-
v.v.-tr. c.v.- rafireNxt141?0----41k.: VVANr
ett was a unique 'combination of salesman and politic:iariA who
believed in lighting candles, not hiding them. He was in a
unique position to make major contributions to any discussions
about the Soviet missile threat.
Carl Duckett considered himself the Agency's No. 1 missile
analyst;- his successor as DDS&T, Leslie Dirks, referred to him
as the nation's "technical intelligence czar "1 Duckett. 's ex-
pertise was enhanced by his position in the bureaucracy. He
had at his beck and call on the FMSAC staff and in OSI's Defen-
sive Systems Division the most astute- missile experts in the
nation. It should be recalled that Duckett, as the founding
director of FMSAC, had personally chosen much of the FMSAC
staff, which at this time was headed by David _S. Brandwein.
When new pieces of intelligence about Soviet capabilities
- became available, Carl Duckett was anxious to bring them to the
attention' of those decision-makers who could put-them- to some
- use, be they on Capitol Hill or the White House. He strongly
believed that CIA had to "sell" its intelligence product if it.
hoped to have any influence in the corridors of power. -Duckett
was also keenly alert to the fact that Agency influence on Cap--
II-1
WORKING Palpfifbved For Release 200714130/28ecCIA0RDP89
B00980R000500150002-2
STAT
25X1
25X1
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP89B00980R000500150002-2
On 13 March 1969, Kissinger issued National Security Study
Nor Memorandum (NSSM) No. 28 requesting a formal interagency study
25X1
'gone
on "SALT Criteria." At'. the same time, he asked CIA to state
verifiability of each weapon limitation proposed in NSSM-
the
28. Work on verification had
since
ly
1968 involving
been going on within
FOSAC's Brandwein and
fication
had become
the Agency
OSR's
By late March 1969,
veri-
the--hub around which the planning for the
SALT effort would revolve and Carl Duckett was embarked on a
long-term and close association with Kissinger which involved
educating Nixon's assistant for national security affairs in
the intricacies of estimating Soviet strategic missile threat.
Before the year was out, Henry Kissinger would be referring to
Carl Duckett as "the professor."
However., early in 1969, CIA's analysis of the Soviet 88-9
mod-4 triplet left no one happy in the Pentagon or the White
House. Defense Secretary Melvin Laird insisted that the three
warheads on the mod-4 SCARP were the functional equivalent of
MIRVs and as such could overwhelm the U.S.- Minuteman offensive
shield. Kissinger, on the other hand, took the position that
the SCARP's. triplet "footprint" was designed to match the
placement of missiles in the Minuteman launch complex. He
hoped thereby to prove that the Minuteman shield was threatened
by the Soviets. Kissinger needed this "credible threat" in or-
der to justify development of an ABM system which he wanted to
use as a bargaining chip in' the forthcoming SALT negotiations.
In fact, President Nixon announced on 14 March 1969 his deci-
sion to proceed with the phased . deployment of an ABM system
called Sentinel, later renamed Safeguard.
The question of the Strategic threat posed by the SCARP
missile was the subject of a 24 March 1969 telephone request
ifrom PFIAB member General Maxwell Taylor -to John, Bross-, the
deputy to the DCI for Nat'ional-intelligence Programs-Evaluation
II--7
W pApprpved For Release 2007a3/28E5cglAtRDP89
B00980R000500150002-2
25X1
25X1
25X1 Top Secret I
Approved For RAIPaSP 7nn7infioR ? CIA-RINDR9R 10980R000500150002-2
*ow'
Safeguard and President Nixon met with Soviet Foreign Minister
Gromyko.
Early in February 1972, Carl Duckett suffered a heart at-
tack and spent nearly six weeks recuperating. During his ab-
sence, various staff officers filled in for Duckett on the
various committees and groups, while Donald Steininger, the
assistant DDS&T, kept the Directorate's machinery in opera-
tion. On 16 February, with Duckett in the hospital recuper-
ating from his heart attack, FMSAC Director Brandwein complain-
ed in a memo to ADDS&T Steininger that the DST Office chiefs
were not working as a team. He said each chief dealt with DS&T
management individually and, as a result, the Director was in
the hospital - exhausted from trying to meet all the challenges
single-handedly, the Assistant Director was putting in 12-hour
days, but most Office chiefs, like himself, had time to work
crossword puzzles.. :31 Not until Monday, 13 March 1972; did
Duckett resume his duties, and then only part-time. By the end
N.01 of March, he had more or less resumed a full schedule.
NNW
The first quarter of 1972 was a period of relative quies-
cence in SALT arena. Duckett attended no meetings of the Veri-
fication Panel until 27 and 26 April. In early May, the pace
quickened once again in preparation for President Nixon's trip
to Moscow.
H. ABM and SALT-I Agreements Signed
On Thursday afternoon, 25 May 1972, Carl Duckett was invit-
ed to the White House Conference Room to attend a ceremony
marking the signing in Moscow by President Nixon and Soviet
Party Chairman Leonid Brezhnev of a "Declaration on Basic Prin-
ciples- of Relations .Between the United States of America and
the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics" -that limited the
dep_loymeht of anti-ballistic missile. The next day Defense
- :1.1-2:3
WORF::: ENS PAppizoved For Release 200Ta9/Zfe:cQIAtRDP89
B00980R000500150002-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
Igp Secr
Approved For FI?e 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP89B
00980R000500150002-2
J. SALT-II, Verification, and the NRP Budget
With the transfer of the Office of Weapons Intelligence to
the Directorate for Intelligence in November 1976, the DS&T
role: in the SALT talks became less active. Unlike Carl DuCk7
ett, :Leslie Dirks was not interested in the analytical aspect
of the Directorate or in continuing the role played by Duckett
in advising the White House on SALT matters. :He was caught up
in the development of intelligence collection systems and the
reorganization of the nation's -covert SIGINT collection ef-
fort. - Although DST ceased contributing to the policy deci-
sion-making process, the Office of Development and Engineering
.was deeply ipvolved in the search for new systems of verifi-
cation.
?With the inauguration of Jimmy Carter as President in Janu-
ary 1977, a, new push began for reaching an even broader accord
with the Soviet Union on limiting strategic arms. Once again
the .debate within :the_administration and the Congress revolved
around this nation's ability to verify any agreement - When
NASA's Dr. Hans Mark became Director-of_the National Reconnais-
sance,Office-.inAugUst 1977, his major concern was to :determine_
11-28
WORK T. NO RAPPP:wed For Release 200T/A3/218ocelet4RDP8
B00980R000500150002-2
25X1
25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP89600980R000500150002-2
Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP89600980R000500150002-2
25X1
Tnn RPccet
Approved For Release 2067/03/28 : CIA-RDP89B
Now'
25X1
25X1
25X1
New
State of the Directorate, 1970
0980R000500150002-2
At the beginning of the decade of the 1970s, the Director-
ate had
seemed to
reached a plateau at which both its budget and manpower
stagnate.
In fact, the FY-70 CIAP budget of
less than the previous year, whereas
its personnel strength had increased by .a modest six - percent to
In April and May, the topic of SALT verification was taken
up at DCI Helms' morning briefings. On 1 April the pros and
cons of releasing satellite photography were debated. In mid-
May Helms asked that a verification briefing be prepared which
avoided a direct input by Art Lundahl's NPIC in order that the
role of photography not be overstated.
Office of Special Activities, headed b.)/ Colonel _Donald F.
Ross, remained the largest DST entity with a staff of up
25X1 by positions
25X1 -percenttol t ?SA's major U-2-efforts were the
ject I
from FY-69, but its budget declined by 10
7.1or
Pro-
known_ as Project TACKLE which _made
flights along the periphery of the People's Republic
The Office continued to manage the
occasional
of . China-.
and.parti-
wnPvimn r.,,Appr;oved For Release 2007r/W2Lk.4,-4RDP89 00980R000500150002-2
STAT
25X1
25X1
o ftP
WA')
ter)
25X1_
25X1
25X1 Topae,_'
zoo//03/21! . CIA-RDP89600980R000500150002-2
Approved For Flelease
25X1 .
Noe
gisr"
25X1
Early in the year, a memo to DCI Richard
Helms from Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard raised the
issue of the Agency consolidating its U-2 assets with the Air
Force. Throughout 1970, DS&T officials marshalled their argu-
ments for retaining the U-2 programs.
Office of Computer Services, headed by
budget
office. ?
with a complement of
The
Acting Director 177
employees and a
the largest DST
was tied with OSA as
unit had grown steadily in manpower and budget
since its establishment and would continue doing so until it
was transferred to the Directorate of Management and Services
in 1973. John D. lams was named Office director in September.
Office of Scientific Intelligence, still headed by Dr. Don-
ald Chamberlain, remained the third largest
25X1 manpower,r----lots, and its budget, had -contin-
ued_ to decline. Karl Weber remained Dr. Chamberlain's deputy.
unit, but both its
25X1
1 that OSI ana-
lysts Were unable to keep up with it for lackof personnel;
wnPvTmm PAPPrpved For Release 200ppp/2?.APAIRDP89
1920-2
B00980R000500150002-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP89600980R000500150002-2
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP89600980R000500150002-2
25X1
NIO"
To Secret
Approved For Fie lease 2007/03/28 : CIA-RflPR9IL0098OR0005001500022
itol Hill meant money for CIA's technical collection programs,
which were expensive.
A. Beginnings of SALT During Johnson Administration
As early as March 1968, Duckett was asked by State Depart-
ment's General Jack Davis what methods this nation could use to &A
determine which missiles the Soviet Union was deploying in
:*and 88-4 silos. - At the time. General Davis was preparing a
paper on the subject of strategic armaments for Secretary of
State Dean Rusk. In his reply, Duckett expressed reservations
about this nation's ability to detect the conversion of inter-
mediate-range and medium-range missile silos for use by inter-
continental ballistic missiles. He also commented on the ab-
sence of a U.S. capability for determining the technical dif-
ferences between several Soviet anti-ballistic missile (ABM)
systems.2
Ten weeks later, in May 1968, Duckett began devoting more
attention to the political aspects of the weapons race between
.the Soviet Union and the United States. This change in direc-
tion was brought about partly by Dr. Ruben Mettler, president
of TRW Corporation and the new chairman of the Agency's Stra-
tegic. intelligence Panel. In the spring of -1968, Dr. Mettler
suggested .reorienting his panel's membership from its emphasis
dn technical aspects of strategic weapons to the political as-
pects. Although Duckett feared that such a reorientation might
challenge the Board of National Estimates, he appreciated Met-
.tler's_ concern that -scientists become .involved in the issue of
compliance verification.-?
Indeed, Duckett's involvement in the strategic-political
-arena was to become so intense in the early 1970s that his in-
tentions became suspect among high-ranking offidials of the
Directorate of Intelligence who felt he was usurping their_ - pre-
_vow rogatives. His stint as adviser to Henry Kissinger, President
? I I-2
WORK I NG PepOrT6ved For Release 200f/eit2PUR-IRDP89
B00980R000500150002-2
25X1
25X1 Top Secret I
Approved For RP PACP 21107/113/28 ? CIA.R.D.R89BC0980R000500150002-2
No/
President Johnson, to falter. As a result, NatiOnal Security
Adviser Kissinger's involvement in the arms limitation arena
intensified before the .month was over.
At the center of the stormy period set in motion by the
strategic arms limitation effort was the question of the Soviet
ICBM known as the 55-9, mod-4 triplet, or SCARP. This large,
liquid-fueled missile was believed by some analysts within the
Intelligence Community to be equipped with three warheads that
were multiple, independently-targeted, reentry vehicles
(MIRys). Others, particularly Agency -analysts, believed the
SCARP had only three multiple reentry vehicles (MRVs). The
difference between the two views was that MRVs could not be
targeted individually, but merely resulted in a three-burst
cluster.
All analysis done throughout the government was based on
25X1 work accomplished by
analyst who worked for
under a CIA contract known as
ysis was based onl
25X1
25X1
25X1
the
1960-63
a very clever telemetry
FMSAC Chief Brandwein had worked with!
period when
both were employed by
to Brandwein, was a very
less permitted his conservative,
competent analyst
anal-
2
According
who never the-
rightwing politics to color
his Aultimate '_conclusions.6 FMSACs stable of analysts included
three men who had worked with Duckett at Huntsville --
and M. Corely Wonus. Brandwein believ-
more about the SS-.9 than anyone else in the
25X1
ed that l 'knew
25X1
25X1 _ FMSAC -analysts.
United States and that
tountry.7 The
25X1
was the finest trajectory ana-
Huntsville trio along with - other
and R. Evans Hine-
man were convinced that the
results (..)f the
as it wastalled, could not be used
to prove that the missile's warheads were independently target-
25X4., ed. In addition to
basic research, _FMSAC's 39-9 ana-
WORK:INS PAPE
Apprroved For Release 2007TH2e8r4DP89B
00980R000500150002-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Too Secrpf I
`ter'
Approved For RLease-20.0210.31284_CIA.R.DP-89E00980R000500150002-2
IV. James Schlesinger: Five Months That Changed CIA
In Agency folklore, DCI James R. Schlesinger is considered
a "scourge" whose "ruthless" efforts in reorganizing the CIA
and reducing its staff might best be compared with the activi-
ties of Attila the Hun. After more than a decade, the impact
of the changes wrought by Schlesinger seem. much more benign and
even far-sightful. If anything, the resentment was engendered
more by Schlesinger's management style and philosophy than by
any actual harm to the Agency's structure. His personnel cuts
were less severe than those under DCI Stansfield Turner and his
reorganization more considerate and less radical than the Na-
tional Foreign Assessment Center experiment also under Turner.
Unlike the dismantling of NFAC and reestablishment of the Di-
rectorate of Intelligence, very little of Schlesinger's reor-
ganization has had to be undone.
Without a doubt, the major beneficiary of Schlesinger's
activities was the Directorate of Science and Technology. It
grew and prospered during Schlesinger's five-month reign. And
it did so because Schlesinger had a concept that involved con-
centrating the scientific, research, development, and engineer-
ing efforts of CIA under central management. This plan L was
carefully thought out before Schlesinger was even offered the
job by President Nixon. Of all the DCIs whb came from outside
the Agency, it is apparent that James Schlesinger Was the. one
best acquainted. with the Agency and its role within the Intel-
ligence Community.
A. White House Study: "Intelligence Community Review"
STAT
25X1
In December 1970, President Nixon -appointed dames Schle-
singer!, who was, at the time, the assistant director of the
newly established Office. of Management and .Budget (OMB), to .
IV-1.
WORK INS Ffmu'AP-rprtved For Release 200f/W2eFerk-itIDP89
00980R000500150002-2
25X1
25X1
? Top Secret I
Approved For Fielease-241.0.71031284-CIA.RDP-89E00980R000500150002-2
NNW'
sticking point for several senators and Colby was reluctant to
serve as DCI until he had been confirmed. The DCI-designate
went on extended leave between the time the Senate voted to
confirm him, on 2 August, and his swearing in on 4 September
1973.
The Acting Director for Central Intelligence during this
period was the DDCI, Army Lieutenant General Walters. Unlike
previous DDCIs, General Walters refused to assume responsi-
bility for the day-to-day operations of the Agency and spent
lengthy periods traveling abroad acting as President Nixon's
personal ambassador. As a result, during the two-month hiatus
between Schlesinger and Colby, Duckett became the unofficial
Executive Secretary of the CIA Management Committee. For al-
most three years, from July 1973 through April 1976, Carl Duck-
ett performed-this function.12
By default, Carl Duckett had become the third-ranking of-
ficial of. the Agency as well as the head of CIA's only verti-
cally integrated intelligence directorate. Duckett believed
that his position had been reinforced by Schlesinger's and
Colby's confidences that he might be next in line for the DDCI
appointment. Duckett's was a position of power experienced by
few Agency employees before or since. Its demands proved
greater- than the man and. contributed to his departure in the
spring of 1976, but not before he had served as A deputy direc-
tor longer than any person in Agency history.
Schlesinger's
tenure as DCI also had. a significant impact
Ii
25X1
on the. Agency's -organization. Shortly after -naming Harold
Brownman-to sUcceed.-John Coffey as Deputy Director for Support,
Schlesinger authorized the transfer of the Office of Computer
Services (OCS) from the DST to the -newly renamed Directorate
of .Management and Services (DMS). This move, which became
effective on 1=April 1973, was :the -first step- in a program
IV-8
vim< Ni3 F,,fsmoved For Release 2007F/R2gieg14-BDP89
B00980R000500150002-2
25X1
25X1
? Top Secret
Approved For FIZelease 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP89Lb00980R0005001500022
floor where Schlesinger personnally signed them. Headquarters
notices are usually signed by the Deputy Director for Manage-
ment and Services, but in this case, the DCI felt he could not
wait for Drownman's return.16
The movement of NPIC into the DS&T had been under discus-
sion since early 1971 when
it became apparent that major
changes had to be made at NPIC
25X1
25X1
Such changes demanded technology of
25X1
the highest level and
in invest-
*of
ment. The. DI was not equipped to handle programs of such mag-
nitude and expense and, thus, transfer of NPIC from the DI to
the DST was only logical. NPIC_Director Lundahl was amenable
6 F. pc, s-ca 4 , -11-14.-1A Peat-cc-LI- ki
to this_dhange; DDI Edward Proctort?however,-kt was not. He Was
ihol* would
concern ool 1-e-s4'. Nthe loss of NPIC from his directorateAcause a
gap in photo-intelligence expertise. Although he agreed with
the reorganization, -Lundahl realized that the challenge Of upY-
gr?ading NPIC would require greater physical and mental effort
than?he could._ muster. He had suffered for years from arthri-
tis, which by this time was becoming incr'easingly more debili-
tat-ingi After almost two decades of service to the nation, Art
Lundahl chose to retire, h?+kpu('Ali hi W/V4k.i4ik NP.Td. +.
t.f-S (C-tr1,? 6(k-kittOP 11A-CAA-4-14-k. Cap(k4) ft fL QICJ frt.wi
j) y Lu 06.(0,11 vutcl tAA-c LA.Alyit. iv 4 tLc.,CCC ,
Iv..-i1
woRK I NE; App,rpved For Release 2007i/10/2a(ba4RDP89
25X1
B00980R000500150002-2
25X1
25X1 TOO Secret
Approved For R lease 2007/03/28: CIA-RDP89 00980R000500150002-2
25X1
VI. NPIC Moves to DS&T,. Gets 21st Century Technology
By 1973, the National Photographic Interpretation Center
(NPIC) had grown to be the largest and most expensive component
Within the Directorate of Intelligence with a complement of
employees and a budget of
From its modest be-
ginnings in 1952-53 as the Photo Intelligence Division
Igts -
(PID) of the old Office of Research, this important activity
A
had evolved .into a national-level, multidepartmental component
of the Intelligence Community.
eve /Vat
Under Arthur C. Lundahl's deft guidance, PID first orertated
into the Photographic Intelligence Center (PIC) in 1956 and
ultimately- into NPIC in January 1961. In the beginning, PID
worked primarily with captured German Wo-X-) and Japanese +a-xl
photography from World War II and some tactical phot s acquired
l'
11
. 1 t, ,A
,, ,so et-ploifectlASAP-ack
erioSiNciNrplictovitiLAI
io CLevivcil 0A-PeA-q41"
during the Korean War. A With the advafft Etof the -2 aircraft,
thri7s--fac44-ityArapidly assumed national iffiportance as the 944-
.v-et?voiced _ Lundahl ,began briefing President Dwight D. Eisen-
) Caiq 1 iieR e ift c a 1., . 5efrCir-ta i4LCA4ibtis Cru.ktf-4-, 71-4,, tt 1.62 c1,44, of (V I CV 4t 1144. 1 c va-tt klutiVIS
hower alter every U-2 mission. o '
A
'
STAT
25X1
f.A.ALI-4,
((Cflt1 4U
yvtr SSie-1(
As new reconnaissance systems came on line, NPIC had to
_ -gear up to handle the differing types of imagery. In the sum-
mer of 1960 NPIC began interpreting the 70mm photography col-
lected by the first successful photosatellite system called
CORONA and its succession of KH-1, -2, -3, and -4 cameras. In
-1963, NPIC began handling the high-resolution 9-inch film from
25X1 the camera. Almost simultaneously it
began preparing_ to
formats planned for cameras in the Agency's superfast OXCART
A-12 aircraft as well as yet a fourth format from the camera
being built for the Air For'ce's SR-71 airplane.
Nor'
interpret three different -.film sizes and
VI-1
WORKING pApproved For Release 2onvigadled7A-Rop89
00980R000500150002-2
25X1
25X1
25X1 Tnn qPrrimtl
25X1 Approved For 7flfl711L1I7R00980R000500150002-2
Nirre
Noe
A. Growing Demands, Diminishing Funds*
In
were to
25X1 imagery,
contrast to its predecessors, whose primary missions
collect 'either order of battle
or strategic-economic
had a unique and demanding mission for _which
it was .specifically designed verification of Soviet strategic
iil forces. All of this made Lundahl keenly aware that,
while quantum leaps were being made in collection technology,
owing to budget restrictions NPIC had not kept pace with new
developments.
. . . . .
-
fX.p Yot-t ,)-LkA o Cat( 'WU/ V6IVV.14"( lvtAP Ciet' tti- "k- 41- d ct tr
_
By the early 1970s, NPIC needed improved light
optics, More -accurate mensuration equipment, and advanced com-
puter systems in order to provi-d 7erif-ication of Soviet com-
pliance with the SALT agreementS. - Being-the largest part of
the DirectOrate of _Intelligence,' NPIC had to fight hard for
financial resources_ just -to keep its head above water. Al- -
VI-2
WORKING PkifiFeved For Release 203&-RDP89
00980R000500150002-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP89B 0980R000500150002-2
though NPIC had managed tb exploit
25X1' RONA,
25X1
the modest amounts of CO-
OXCART, and SR-71 film in monitoring Soviet
strategic deployment 1Df ICBMs, long-range bombers, anti-bal-
listic
Center
missiles (ABMs),
and ballistic-missile submarines, the
It needed more and better
trained personnel, upgraded equipment, and larger facilities.
Lundahl recognized that these objectives could never be
attained with the limited resources afforded within the con-
straints of the DI
25X1 the
about
NNW
Awe
budget. In the DWI., which was overseeing
there was also concern
to handle the imagery. DDS&T Carl Duckett
NPIC's ability
was convinced that the transfer of -NPIC to his directorate
would facilitate better management of the millions of dollars
in contracts necessary for insuring that advancements in ex-
ploitation technology would be commensurate With those in col-
lection technology.1
Deputy Director for intelligence Edward Proctor, however,
was not so sanguine. He was concerned lest his directorate's
loss of NPIC -could result in the loss of Agency leadership in
substantive photo-intelligence expertise. At this time there
was considerable -skepticism about the nation's capability to
monitor strategic arms limitation agreements using satellite
photography. When he was DCI, Richard Helms was particularly
concerned about the effect of the "Potemkin village factor" in
using satellite photos to detect Soviet violations, of SALT
. agreements.
Discussion As to which- of the two directorates wasthe
25X1
- optimum location for NPIC continued through the end of DCI
Helm-s' administration and into that of DCI James Schlesinger.
Lundahl had tried to convince Helms and DDT Proctor that the 2001
gains in- photo-intelligence capabilities to be derived -from
transfer-of- NPIC- to the_ DS&T f7ae outweighed any danger of
V I --3 -
WORKING PIQPER-
o
-Apprved For Release airireAK t14-RDP89
300980R000500150002-2
25X1
Nee
25X1
vale'
?
Too Secret'
Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP89
0980R000500150002-2
potential losses. It 'was not until Schlesinger's regime,
however, that a decision was taken on the matter and NPIC
became part of DWI. on 21 May 1973.
B. WIC Moves to DST; Lundahl Retires; Hicks Takes Over
Al+Iucusit WitA X
Notnray--was A LundahlA fully agreeable to transferring his
Center to the DWI, -Wok he was a4e.Q--p.aiaLIAl1y aware that the
physical and mental demands of the next few years were greater
than he could muster. The crippling effects of his arthritis
were worsening and he knew he would not be able to oversee the
14=4
41141 of ttis beloved. NPIC. After 20 years of superior
service to his country, Arthur Lundahl retired in June 1973 and
was replaced by John J. Hicks.
Hicks was no newcomer to the arena of photographic inter-
pretation. He was an experienced military intelligence analyst
who had gained an appreciation for the total intelligence pro-
cess in the DI's Office of Current Intelligence and as deputy
to Bruce Clarke in the Office of Strategic' Research. Hicks had
made important substantive contributions to a number of Nation-
capabili-
al Intelligence
ties
Estimates on Soviet strategic
and space programs, and had been
weapons
At the time of his appointment,
serving as NPIC's Executive Director.
Hicks was
25X1
Under Hicks' leadership, NPIC entered an entirely new era
in photo intelligence, both analytical and technical. The. en-
hanced duality and quantity of imagery derivedfrorvincreasing-
ly sophisticated collection systems demanded new exploitation
and reporting procedures. Hicks assumed the reinsof-NPIC at a
uniquely, important time: the joint U.S.-USSR Strategic Arms
Limitation- accords had just been signed on 21 June 1973. .That
. sici he0i.ec.)
agreement hinged. onAt-144e-roW-s ability to verify 4Ww.i.e.k. com-- )(25X1
pliance through- the. use of -satellite imagery, The existing -25X1
imagery interpretation rating scale- used by the nation's photo-
. VI-4
WORKING Php2pruF-F-1-ved For Release 20113/?Eta-RDP89
00980R000500150002-2
Almost-immediately?the NIIRS -scale--W-a-dopf6d by
for evaluating simulated
During 1975, all NPIC photo-interpreters were
trained and certified for proficiency in using NIIRS. This new
scale has since become_ a basic criterion for decompartmenting
imagery-derived intelligence produced in the late 1970s and
still provides a universal language and common denominator for
intelligence and imagery analysts as well as collectors
.throughout the Intelligence Community.
. . V I -5
WORK I NO FAVeruved For Release 20(TRO3/2/FeaRDP89E
25X1 Top Secret'
Approved For Felease 2007/03/28 :
interpreters
0980R000500150002-2
was purely. subjective -- it used such descriptors
as excellent, good, fair, and poor
was outmoded, and was
totally inadequate. A national rating system was needed that
was independent of the collection system and was applicable to
both search and surveillance imagery. It had to be designed to
insure consistency in judgment by the photo-interpreters, di-
rectly relatable to specific intelligence problems and exploi-
tation requirements, and be compatible with computer-based re-
cording systems.
Hicks appointed an a0 boc SALT Accountability Task Team
set to work defining the problem and designing a new sys-
By March 1974, the Task Team had developed a refined
Intelli-
Interpre-
which
tem.
scale
gence
tation
of categories
Community.
Rating Scale
44-4.44-gough- -9 for use throughout the
It .was called the National Imagery
(NIIRS) and was tested against
25X1 before it was accepted by COMIREX signatories
and promulgated by the U.S. Intelligence Board in September
Nape 1974.
25X1
25X1
NNW
00980R000500150002-2
25X1
,25)(1
25X1
25X1
25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP89600980R000500150002-2
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP89600980R000500150002-2
25X1
NOWle
Top Secret
Approved For Ritlease_20M3/28_:_ag-RDEuB00980R000500150002-2
the mid-1970s, NPIC Director Hicks had to deal with such sub-
stantive intelligence concerns as the continued monitoring of
the Middle East Disengagement Agreement, Soviet adherence to
04 h ok
theASAL1-I1 treat)r,ithe Korean Demilitarized Zoneft, and Soviet
infiltration of Third World revolutionary movements in Libya,
Ethiopia, Angola, Cuba, and Southeast Asia. Incidental to
these major issues, NPIC also used overhead imagery to assess
haf-tivtA Uttticfrriohe5 suai AA,
the damage caused bYA the Februafsy 1976 ear thquake in Guatemala
25X1 and the Tangshan earthquake in China in August 1976.
Noe
'Nem,
if
FOOTNOTES
1. - Duckett interview.
2. -Executive Order-11826 of 4 January 1975.
VI-3
WORKING PARFPOved For Release 2061963altza-RDP89
25X1
B00980R000500150002-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
New
Approved For e
ret
: CIA-RDP89B
30980R000500150002-2
Office of Technical Service, formerly the Technical Ser-
vices Division of the Directorate of Plans/Operations, with its
25X1 3f which were contract positions) and budget of
became the second largest unit in the Director-
ate when it was moved to the DWI in May 1973. John McMahon,
INV the Director of ELINT, was moved to South Building to head the
new organization on the very day of its transfer into the
DS&T. TSD's former
25X1 1973 and his deputy,
under McMahon.
25X1
Nue
chief,
Sidney Gottlieb, retired on 1 July
continued
in that post
25X1
Office of Computer Services, when it was transferred to the
Directorate of*Management and Services in April 1973, had the
largest number of slots in the DST, employees, and a 25X1
budget. Director John Earns and his deputy,
transferred with their unit when it became
the Office of Joint Computer Services.
Office gi Special Activitieg was still headed by Brigadier
General Wendell Bevan. Its decline was less precipitate in FY-
73 but DNRO John McLucas- would eventually win out in his effort
to -,have CIA's -U-2 program transferred to the Air Force.- On 21
November 1973, the NRP ExCom agreed to give OSA'S U-2 assets to
the -Air Force- at the _end of FY-74 and decided that no monies
h377'77
hinpv ron r.?,Approved For Release 2007rinn 4 iriliAIRDP89
B00980R000500150002-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
torate
Approved For
00980R000500150002-2
National Photogranhic Intenretation Center continued making
preparations for
d. DirectorA141Clz named Rutledge P.
azzard to Fe direc or of
NPIC gained contract slots in FY-75, increasing
its author-
ized strength to and got a modest budget increase to
During FY-75, NPIC employees led the Direc-
and the Agency in making suggestions and collecting
$9,340 in awards.
Office of Technical Service, having survived its public ex-
posure during the Watergate investigations of 1974, was in the
public view again during 1975. It was thrust into the lime-
light in January when DCI Colby testified- before the Church
,-Committee that'CIA had been involved in mail-intercept activi-
ties' in New York from 1953 to 1973 and that TSD/OTS was the
Agency unit responsible for assisting the FBI. Later in the
summer, after the discovery of MKNAOMI's shellfish toxin and
_other poisons in a disused laboratory in South Building, OTS
was again in public view. ADDS&T Stevens and DCI _Colby testi-
fied before the Senate Select Committee on the matter.-_ The
toxin was eventually transferred to the Food and Drug Admin-
25X1 - istration
: In FY-75, _OTS Director_ David Brandwein and his deputy,
25X1 I Isaw their Office budget reduced byl
Nue
and its staffing cut byl
T lAppf,pved For Release 2007/10L-b,4-.RDP89
00980R000500150002-2
1.1.AtfC4
1.11, att OVA..
6441 t
e
r fe. 40,
tcgq.,
OD4.6 .
de e-fc,
? 25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP89600980R000500150002-2
Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP89600980R000500150002-2
25X1
?
Too SPCrPf I
Approved For Fie lease 2007/03/28: CIA-RDP89B 0980R000500150002-2
Dirks urged DDCI Carlucci'to issue an Agency notice no later
%we than 1 October committing CIA to an incentive bonus plan analo-
gous to the Federal SES. bonus. In a separate memo to the Di-
rector of Personnel, Dirks said he was fearful lest the new
system destroy the flexibility he had for hiring highly tech-
nical specialists as SPS officers without regard to supergrade
ceilings. He also took exception to limiting bonuses to the
Lop 50 percent of SIS cadre. A week later, Dirks complained
about plans to include his SPS managers in the SIS schedule
which he felt would jeopardized his headroom.
National
Photographic
Interpretation Center
Director Rut-
ledge Hazzard
had
a budget of
for FY-79 and a
25X1
staff of
down one from
FY-78.
In addition
to continuing
the upgrading
of
the NPIC Data System,
Hazzard
set in
motion
25X1
the
studies
to define
future
requirements
for
mensuration, collateral
reference,
and
compu-
ter support.
Work was also underway on the engineering
model
of the Imagery Interpretation Station (IISEM) which encountered
25X1
problems with its stereo performance. The requirement for dig-
ital soft-copy imagery exploitation was revalidated by an IDEX
working group. The challenge
would be compatible with
by 1985-06.
was to develop
a system that
In April, the Soviet Union shot
South Korean airliner over the Kola Peninsula.
ed the downed.
25X1 Carter
25X1
25X1
NNW'
down a
imag-
aircr-aft and NPIC delivered prints to President
In August and September, the Center began
reporting on a buildup of military facilities and supplies at
Termez and Kushka near the border with
late autumn, photo interpreters
borne regiment activity
December. The Soviet
Afghanistan. In the
saw an increase in Soviet air-
in that area which intensified in early
invasion of Afghanistan began on Christ-
avelvilrotvits
Iranian e-t,.tt4efft-s stormed the
seized 69 U.S. hostages.
mas Eve 1979. On A November,
American Embassy in Tehran and
NPIC analysts began
Embassy. situation. The presence
monitoring of the
of a Soviet brigade-size unit
1979-4
WORKINGP.AA.pEEproR-ved For Release 200f/M/2%91R.-RDP8
9600980R000500150002-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
Zfikl
25X1
25X1, in Cuba
Name
25X1
Too Secret
Approved For R lease 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP89B00980R000500150002-2
I NPIC, in cooperation wi71-5-1
the Di's Office of 'Imagery Analysis and DIA, made an exhaus-
tive search of imagery
to determine how
long the brigade had
been in Cuba. it was de-
termined that the Soviet unit adbath Cuba since the Octo-
ber 1962 missile crisis.
1979-5
WORP: I NO Papproved For Release 200116P/213eda1/k4RDP89
B00980R000500150002-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP89600980R000500150002-2
Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP89600980R000500150002-2
25X1
25X1
Noe
25X1
Too Secret /
CIA-RDP89B
0980R000500150002-2
level. After five
reached a plateau of
25X1
25X1
Approved For qlease 2007/03/28:
nislots bringing it up to the
years of decline, the Office of
the DS&T
slots and an FY-80 budget of
lore
National Photographic Interpretation Center began covering
the Iran-Iraq War in September and overhead imagery was the
primary source of information on the war. A large earthquake
shook southern Italy in late November causing widespread deva-
station. The Italian Government appealAko the United States
in determining the extent and magnitude of the de-
for help
struction.
area and
President Carter ordered
NPIC provided Italy with
tographic enlargements showing the
dered increase in food
numerous strikes and the
prices in
formation
U-2 photo coverage of the
a damage assessment and pho-
damage.
Poland
of the
A government-or-
ill June resulted in
free trade union
"Solidarity." By September, Polish unrest reached such a state
that WIC analysts began detecting signs of increased Soviet
and bloc military activity around Poland. By December, there
were signs of Soviet preparations for an invasion and NPIC
began preparing a "Summary of Soviet 'Reaction to the Polish
Crisis." The crisis abated and the Soviet forces stood down by
the beginning
throughout the
House on the
of 1981. Beginning in early April and continuing
summer, NPIC prepared reports for the White
Mariel Boat Lift from Cuba that brought thousands
25X1
25X1
of Cubans to Florida.
-Director
Hazzard
s FY-80 budget grew by
a modest three percent
25X1 to
but NPIC's manpower
remained
constant at
for
the
fourth
consecutive year.'
25X1
A
New'
WORKING
1900-2
mea
PNEPoved For Release 200f/M/2PUVRDP89B
00980R000500150002-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25Xiir
25X1
25X1
-vow'
Top Secret I
Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP89B 0980R000500150002-2
State of the Directorate, 1981
Another major change occurred in the Agency in January with
the arrival on the seventh floor of President Ronald Reagan's
campaign manager, William J. Casey, as the new DCI. He was
joined. in February by a new DDCI in the person of Admiral Bobby
R. Inman, who
DDS&T Dirks'
of a staff of
The Office
moved over from his position as director of NSA.
fifth year on the sixth floor found him in charge
with an FY-81 CIAP budget of
of the Director grew by one slot to nand
had a budget of
National Photogranhic Intergyetation Center in FY-81 got
its first
manpower increase since FY-77 with the addition of
new slots, boosting its complement to
Rutledge Hazzard also got a bigger
positions.
budget, up
Director
to
an abrupt
The new Reagan administration caused
change in U.S policy vis-a-vis the Palisario revolutionaries
in the Western Sahara. Under President Carter, arms sales to
Morocco, the object of the Polisario attacks, were restricted.
Following King Hassan's appeal for U.S. helps President Reagan
immediately ordered U-2 overflights, known as SENIOR LOOK mis-
sions, of the Polisario areas and removed the Carter_
bargo.- NPIC analyzed the U-2 imagery and prepared reports
Polisario activities
arms em
iet armor, guns,
The Reagan
the area as
ploitation of the Nicaraguan imagery
November, WIC analysts discovered a new
1-also -salled 77-the, BLACKJACK, at the Ramenskoye installa-
tion. NPIC assigned a full-time imagery analyst- to the Inter -
on
and
Early
in the year, Cuba began sending Soy-
other military equipment to Nicaragua.
administration ordered SR-71 and U-2 missions
well as satellite imagery when
possible.
NPIC
over
ex-
In
Soviet
bomber, the
1981-1
WORKING PAPPRoved For Release 200/19F3/219061414RDP89
STAT
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
STAT
25X1
B00980R000500150002-2
STAT Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP89600980R000500150002-2
Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP89600980R000500150002-2
25X1
To Secret
Approved For ease is s
8 : CIA-RDP89E
00980R000500150002-2
replaced John W. Coffey as Deputy Director for Support; Colby
replaced Karamessines as
for a brief period and was
Nelson; and Schlesinger's
retary of Defense the
Committee'-also: changed.
Deputy Director for Plans/Operations
replaced, in turn, by William E.
own sudden departure to become Sec-
composition of:: the CIA Management.
Schlesinger leftjor the Pentagon on 2
'July 1973'. but William Colby, his replacement, ran into diffi-
culties --during A protracted series of hearings before the Ben-
ate Armed Services Committee which had to ''cihrjrm
ment His involvement in the Phoenix Program in
sticking-peint for several senators'and Colby-7,
f.5W"Orrl
serve as DCI until he had been senfl-rmed,..
Went, on extended leave between the time the
confirm him, on 2 August,
1973.
his appoint-
Vietnam was a
was reluctant to
The DCI-designate
Senate voted to
and his swearing in on 4 September
The Acting Director for Central Intelligence during this
per:iodl was the. DDCI, Army Lieutenant General Walters.
r
previous DDCIs, General Walters ,,rugAW:e to assume
bility for the day-to-day operations
Unlike
responsi-
of the Agency and spent
lengthy periodstraveling abroad acting as, President. Nixon's
personal ambassador.. As a result o during the two-month hiatus.
between Schlesinger and Colby, Duckett7-1#247unofficial
Executive Secretary of the CIA Management Committee A3P-s-A17
:77-Aost-:A.hr-ege_-yea.Gs---f.TT'O411 ? ni -
'-e_tty4IST-m.e....d.--f-urf-ct-ion. 13
utm, 0
25X1
By defaUlto Carl Duckett had become-theAthird-ranking of-
ficial of the Agency as well as the head of: CIA's Only verti-
cally 'integrated intelligence
directorate. Duckett. believed
.,that his position had been reinforced by: Schlesinger 's and
Colby's confidences that he might be next inline'for -the DDCI
appointment. Duckett's was 'a position of power experienced by
-few Agency -employees before 'or- since. Its __demands prbyed
greater than the man and contributed to ,his departure in the
Approved For Release 2007/OVZO. CIA-RDP89
T--
B00980R000500150002-2
25X1
NNW
Tnn Rimrrgit
Approved For. Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP89
00980R000500150002-2
search, FMSAC,' and OSI's Defensive Systems Division, to be
headed by David Brandwein. Duckett also envisioned a Net As-
sessments Staff to be h6aded by
and a Mission Anal-
ysis and Advanced Design Staff headed by Leslie Dirks.15
25X1
Duckett's- letter suggested moving into the DWI the Intel-
ligence Directorate's NPIC, OSR, and
From the Operations Directorate,' Duckett wanted the Design and
Engineering part of the Technical Services Division, Foreign
Intelligence and the Air Operations part of Special
Operations Division', Not even the new Directorate of Manage-
ment and Services escaped Duckett's wish list. He wanted the
Office of Communications' R&D unit and its Technical Operations
group.:
While.: he Hnever succeeded in convincing Schlesinger as to
the wisdom of- creating the three staffs, within a matter of
months. Duckett had gotten control of much ofhis wish list.
Just two:weeks after receiving Duckett's letter, DCI Schler-
singer.transferred to the DS&T the Technical Services Division
from the newly renamed Directorate of Operations and the Na-
tional Photographic Interpretation. Center from the Directorate
of Intelligence.
Schlesigger.'s seemingly precipitate action :late in the af-_:
ternoon of Friday, 4 May 1973 had considerable thought behind
it. He had learned during the first weekof May _about the pos-
'sibi:lity::_of a Congressional investigation _ into Howard Hunt's
Watergate activities. The DCI was aware of TSD's involvement,
:through :-Hunt and 0.-G rdan Liddy, with the:RApublican National
Committee's "plumbers" g pana realizea the Agency would
CC 441--weae. .v.Ar.ra..4 via 1"4-19.71 _
eventually be pulled into the vortex of any Congressional ac-
tion He did not want any Agency reorganization to appear to
be part:of a coverup and was anxious that the TSD and NPC
IV-10
WORKING PAPPtoved For Release 2001ra3/2fetekeiRDP89
25X1
STAT
25X1
ert
25X1
B00980R000500150002-2
25X1
NNW
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2007/03/28: CIA-RDP89
0980R000500150002-2
IV. James Schlesinger: Five Months That Changed CIA
25;
In Agency folklore, DCI James R. Schlesinger is considered
a "scourge" whose "ruthless" efforts in reorganizing the CIA
and reducing its staff might best be compared with the activi-
ties of Attila the Hun. After more than a decade, the impact
of the changes wrought by Schlesinger seem much more benign and
even far-sightful. If anything, the resentment was engendered
more by Schlesinger's management style and philosophy than by
any actual harm to the Agency's structure. His personnel cuts
were less severe than those under DCI Stansfield Turner and his
reorganization m6re considerate and less radical than the Na-
tional Foreign Assessment Center experiment also under Turner.
Unlike the dismantling of ?NFAC and reestablishment of the Di-?
rectorate of Intelligence, very little of Schlesinger's reor-
ganization has had to be undone.
Without a doubt, the. 'major beneficiary of Schlesinger's
activities was the Directorate of Science and Technology. It
grew and prospered .during Schlesinger's five-month reign. And
it did so because Schlesinger had a concept that involved con-
centrating the scientific, research,- development, and engineer-
ing efforts of CIA _under. central management,- This plan __was
carefully thought out before Schlesinger was even offered. the -
job by President Nixon'. Of all the DC_Is who came from outside
the Agency, it iS apparent that James Schlesinger was the one
best acquainted with the Agency and its role within the Intel-
ligence Community.- -
A. White House Study: "Intelligence Community Review"
December 1970, President Nixon .apointed Jambs Schle-
singer, who-waS,-at the time,. the assistant director.H-of 'the
:newly established Office .of Management and_ Budget (OMB), to
Iv-1
WORKING PAPER
Approved For Release 200-fR8/2r7IZIR0
P8
9600980R000500150002-2
Approved For R
Too Secret I
elease 2007/03/28: CIA-RDP89
00980R000500150002-2
head a special-study group to look into the agencies and. organ-
ization of the Intelligence Community. The group's preliminary
report, titled "A Review of the Intelligence Community," was
issued in late March 1971. DDS&T Carl E. Duckett reviewed the
document and set down his observations and recommendations in a
12 April memo to DCI Helms. He noted that "a number of conclu-
sions and assertions regarding the performance of the Intelli-
gence Community are incorrect and misleading, but I believe it
would be unwise to.attack the paper." Nonetheless, he listed
two points that needed to be addressed.1
The first was the assertion that the Director of the Na-
tional Reconnaissance Office was "unable to control a large
part of his program which is run by the Deputy Director for
Science and Technology in CIA." Duckett said this was over-
drawn because "the guy who controls the purse strings is in
fact controlling the program."
Duckett's second point was that the suggestion for turning
over to NSA the DST's relatively smalr,Office of ELINT, which
had been a major contributor to the _national collection pro-
:gram, should be resisted. "This is proposed despite a clear
recognition in the report that there are serious management_
problems in various DoD.. intelligence programs, particularly
NSA," -
? .
Duckett's memo Went on to suggest"establishment of A sep-
arate independent'agency.to manage intelligence collection" to.
assume responsibility for all national intelligence collection,
with a provision that tactical Collection responsibility be
' returned to the military serVices.---Healso suggested that the
NRO Executive Committee (ExCom) oversee the entire apparatus. -
- -Among the.recommendations- made by the Schlesinger
-
?
and implemented by: the DOD was the creation of the Post of 11-s-,
sistaht Secretary of .Defense (Intelligence)- (ASD/I). At the
WORKING P4PER
Approved For Release 20017tP.3/kFffit-RDP89
25X1
B00980R000500150002-2
25X1 Too Secret
?Approved For ? - 00980R000500150002-2
-\ same time, President Nixon abolished the position of the Spec-
ial Assistant to the President for Science and Technology.
-These two developments had a profound influence on the NRO Ex-
Com concept -- since 1965, the ExCom had been comprised of the
Deputy Secretary of Defense (DepSecDef) as chairman, the DCI,
and the President's Science Adviser. By replacing the DepSec-
Def with the new ASD/I as the DoD representative on the ExCom
and making the DCI chairman of this two-man. panel, President
Nixon totally altered the character of this advisory body.. Not
only was the ASD/I lower in rank than the DepSecDef, but he did
not have dpower of the purse as did the Deputy Secretary, who,
. as ExCom chairman, was able to back ExCom decisions with DoD
funding. In addition, without the participation of the Science
Adviser, the ExCom 'lacked a White House representative. Up to
this:, time, the Science Adviser always brought with him a repre-
-sentative of the Budget Bureau, who also, had power of the purse
and could speak authoritatively on the topic of funding the ex-
pensive collection systems. When Schlesinger worked at the Bu-
reau of the Budget, it was he who accompanied Science Adviser
Lee'DuBridge to NRP ExCom meetings.
?
The Agency's response to the Schlesinger report was pre-
pared by Executive Director-Comptroller Lawrence White on 15
April 1971. -Duckett's review of White's paper was critical
because he felt the response did not address strongly enough
the Agency's role in technical collection. Duckett stressed
that CIA should hold the line against any attempt to get the
Agency Out of reconnaissance .2
25X1
In a -Apr-il 1971 note t?olonel White, ?Duckett suggest-
that the agendafor an upcoming deputy directors' meeting at
_ -
laddress'two -points. The first- was "for each Deputy
to explain his _view .of the White House study." The second was..
to replace a scheduled discussion f: the- .National Intelligence
Resources Board with "a little soursearching as to'the ob-jec-
I V-3
IoRKING PApproved For Release 200711a3/00.ce1AtRDP8
B00980R000500150002-2
25X1
25X1 Top Secret
Approved For Release 2007/03/28: CIA-RDP89 00980R000500150002-2
tivity and accuracy of oui,.current intelligence publications as
well as NIEs and other documents."3
While the Schlesinger report was critical of the Agency as
,a whole, it had complimentary things to say about the DWI%
The report cited expensive technical intelligence collection as
worthwhile because it produced better information than old-
fashioned political intelligence. Schlesinger .later told Duck-
ett_that he believed DST was the ,best managed directorate. in
.the Agency.4
B. Duckett and Schlesinger.-- Old Friends, New Circumstances
DDS&T Carl Diackett first met James Schlesinger in the late
1960s at NAP ExCom meetings when Schlesinger, a Bureau of the
- Budget official, accompanied Presidential Science Adviser Du-
Bridge to advise him on program costs. Duckett and Schlesinger
got to be "on a friendly basis during that period" until Schle-
singer left the Office of Management and Budget to become
chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. *-
25X1
New'
In the middle Of -these- negotiations ,' -PreSident:1 Nixon:
. _ .
- re-
lieved .DCI Helms of his job and named Schlesinger to replace
,
IV-4
WORKING PUSR
Approved For Release 200-9?8/APF8111-RDP8
9600980R000500150002-2
25X1
25X1
Tom Sprret 1
Approved For ? - 00980R000500150002-2
him on 2 February 1973. When Duckett learned of -Schlesinger's
appointment, he called the DCI-designate at his AEC office and
said: "I'm not saying FAm happy to see Dick Helms leave, but
I'm happy that you've been chosen. I want you to be assured
that I'm anxious to do whatever I can to help." Duckett of
to provide the new DCI with any information or briefings he
needed.5
IV-5
IAIORK NG PAP1PrOved For Release 2007103/23qoa1AtRDP8
9600980R000500150002-2
25X1 Too Secret
Approved For !lease 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP8913 0980R000500150002-2
Duckett began by Saying the term Clandestine Services
*.10 should be abolished from the Agency's lexicon because too many
of the employees of -,,the Plans Directorate believed their mis-
sion was to be clandestine and not to conduct operations. In
Jact, to make the point clear, Duckett suggested changing the
directorate's name from Plans to Operations. Schlesinger liked
the idea and on Thursday, 1 March 1973) hesigned a directive
renaming the directorate.7
25X1
The 14 February Headquarters Notice also
announced the
es-
tablishment of the CIA Management Committee. This was an idea
fostered by Executive Director-Comptroller William E. Colby.
.Membership on this committee was limited to the DCI as chair-
man, the DDCI, Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters, as vice
chairman, Colby as executive secretary, and the four deputy
'directors.. The Office of the Executive Director-Comptroller
was suspended.
After his return from London, Schlesinger set. out to reduce
the size of the Agency. He began this task by calling on Carl
Duckett in mid-March to come up with a list of marginal DS&T
employees. The DCI began by telling Duckett he believed OBI
was inhabited by a bunch of old, tired OB-15s. Duckett told
Schlesinger that was untrue, adding that the -DCI had probably
been told that by former DDS.11(T Wheelon. Schlesinger admitted
- _
that Wheelon was the source of the information. Duckett then
. -
stated that OSI chief Donald Chamberlain had conducted -a cam-
paign over the past several years to have the youngest "branch
chiefs in the Agency and had succeeded. Next, the DDS&T said
he had a list of
employees he thought shoUld--.
be released, reti_red, -.or demoted 'which had been prepared-foe.-
him by his birectorate's Career ServiCe Board.
,
-At a Morning. Meeting a short time .qaterl- DCI Schlesinger: :
held 7 Up- Duckett's list of names and said: -111 have already made
_ clear to all of you. that I think the DST is the best Director-
- -
. IV-6
WORKING PAPER
App roved For Release 200TflewieMat-RDP8
9600980R000500150002-2
.25X1
Upon his return from the White House meeting with President
Nixon, DCI Schlesinger stopped at DDS&T Duckett's sixth floor
office to tell him .about this new development. Schlesinger
also confided. to the DDS&T that the President had specifically
told him to tell Carl Duckett that SeneralfWalters would not be
in the DDCI slot forever and that there was nothing in the law
which said that the DCI and DDCI.could?not both be civilians.
Duckett took this to mean-that-he was next-in line for the DDCI
position, Several weeks later, DCI-designate Colby related the
same story to Duckett-11
?
With the -dRastic changes: that took Place within the JAgency
during the spring and summer. Of 1973t- Harold .L. Brownman had.
replaced John W, Coffey asDeputy :Director for Support;: Colby:
replaced Kar:amessines as _Deputy Director for Plans/Operations
for a brief period and was replaCed,'. in. turn, by William E.
-:Nelson; and 'Schlesinger's own sudden departure to become Sec-.
retary..of-Defense the composition of the CIA :Management:
-
Committee also changed. Schlesinger left for the PentagOn-on2
July 1973,: but William Colby., his replacement,; '-ran
diffi-
culties during a protracted SerieSTof.:hearings-beforetheSen--
_
:ate Armed- Services Committee_ which had to confirm 'his-'appoint-
ment. ? His involvement - in the Phoenix Program-in Vietnam- was- a
=
IV-7
WORK.ING PACkifflitoved For Release 2001n08/21PraktRDP89
25X1 Top Secret
Approved For !release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP89
11100'
00980R000500150002-2
ate we have. These are the numbers Carl has provided so I
wouldn't like to see you other deputy directors come up with
any smaller numbers than these, percentagewise. u10
C. Schlesinger Moves to Pentagon; Colby Succeeds Him
In early May, the DCI was called to the White House and in-
formed by President Nixon that he wanted Schlesinger to become
Secretary of Defense when Melvin Laird departed 61y. At
the time, Schlesinger had been at Langley only three months.
As Schlesinger's replacement, the President chose the Agency's
current Deputy Director for Operations, William Colby.
B00980R000500150002-2
25X1
25X1
Too Secret I
Approved For elease 2007103128: CIA-RDP891300980R000500150002-2
sticking point for several senators and Colby was reluctant to
imme serve as.DCI until he had been confirmed. The DCI-designate
went on extended leaye between the time the Senate voted to
confirm him, on 2 August, and his swearing in on 4 September
1973.
The Acting Director
period was the DDCI, Army
previous DDCIs,.:. General
bility for the day-to-day operations of the Agency and spent
lengthy periods traveling abroad acting as President Nixon's
personal ambassador. As a result, during the two-month hiatus
between Schlesinger and Colby, Duckett became the unofficial
Executive Secretary of the CIA Management Committee. For al-
most three years, from July 1973 through April 1976, Carl Duck-
ett performed this function. 12
for Central Intelligence during this
Lieutenant General Walters.
Walters . refused to
Unlike
assume responsi-
By default, Carl Duckett had become the third-ranking of-
ficial of the Agency as well as the head of CIA's only verti-
cally integrated intelligence directorate. Duckett .believed
that his position had :been reinforced. by Schlesinger's and
Colby's confidences that he might be next in line for the DDCI
appointment. Duckett's was a position of power experienced by
few Agency employees before or since. Its demands
greater than the man- And _contributed to his ,departure
-
spring of 1976, but not before he had served as a deputy
tor longer than any person in Agency history.
proved
in the
direc-
Schlesinger's tenure as DCI also had a significant impact
on the Agency's organization. Shortly after _naming _Harold
Brownman to succeed John Coffey as-Dep-utyDirector for Support,
Schlesinger authorized the -transfer of the Office of Computer
Services:(0CS) from the DS&T to the newly. _renamed Directorate
of Management and Services -(DM'S) ._ _ This move, which became
effective on i April 1973, was the first step _in .-a -program
.IV-8-
WORK INO PAM:Moved For Release 200Vt02/23EtlIDIALRDP8
9600980R000500150002-2
25X1
25X1
?f
Tnn Rperet 1
Approved For Release 2007/03/28: CIA-RDP89 00980R000500150002-2
aimed at centralizing ll of the Agency's computer resources
Nino' into a new Office of Joint Computer Services (OJCS).
Three weeks later, the new DCI abolished the Office of Spe-
cial Projects which had been headed by Brownman prior to his
becoming the DDM&S. Headquarters Notice
of 20 April 1973
? announced the establishment of the Office of Development and
Engineering (OD&E) within the DST effective 23 April. OD&E
was' ,given the :responsibility for engineering. and system devel-
opment in general support of Agency activities. Schlesinger
named Leslie C. Dirks to be OD&E's first director and gave him
,the additional responsibility of performing those analyses ne-
cessary for developing an overall Agency R&D strategy and
plan.13
D. Duckett's Blueprint for an Empire
-N Carl Duckett's rapport with James Schlesinger was such that
?1110, he felt secure in making suggestions for rather extensive
changes in the Agency's organization. Although his more gran-
diose plans were never realized, enough parts of these ideas
came to fruition that the result was almost the same. For
example, in an informal letter to DCI Schlesinger on 19 April
1973 Duckett .suggested creating three staffs within his Direc-
torate. He wanted to set up a Strategic Studies and Future
Threat Staff, Comprised of the DI's Office - of Strategic Re-
Search, FMSAC, and OSI's Defensive Systems Division, to be
.headediby.Dayid..Brandwein. Duckett also envisioned a Net
sessments- Staff.. to be headed by and a.MissiOn? Anal-
ysis .and Advanced Design Staff headed by-Leslie%Dlrks. 14
Duckett's-letter -.Suggested moving into the DS&T
- ligence Directorate's NPIC,
From the Operations Directorate, Dt:ickett-wanted the
the
Intel-
Design
and
Engineering 'part: of the _Technical Sericee. Division,_Foreigh
and the ?Air..OperiItions. part of Special
25X4?, Intelligence
IV-9
WORKING
Approved For Release 200T/10/2?7d1ZRDP89
PQPER
_ -
B00980R000500150002-2
25X1
25X1
STAT
25X1
25X1 Top Secret
Approved Forkelease 2007/03/28: CIA-RDP89 00980R000500150002-2
Operations Division. Ndt even the new Directorate of Manage-
ment and Services escaped Duckett's wish list. He wanted the
Office of Communications' R&D unit and its Technical Operations
group.
While he never succeeded in convincing Schlesinger as to
the wisdom of creating the three staffs, within a matter of
months Duckett had gotten control of much of his wish list.
. Just two weeks after receiving Duckett's letter, DCI Schle-
singer transferred to the DS&T the Technical Services Division
from the newly renamed Directorate of Operations and the Na-
tional Photographic Interpretation Center from the Directorate
of Intelligence.
:Schlesinger's seemingly precipitate action late in the af-
ternoon of. Friday, 4 May 1973 had considerable .thought behind
it. He had learned during the first week of May about the pos-
sibility of a Congressional investigation into Howard Hunt's
Nor'. Watergate activities. - The DCI was aware of TSD's involvement,
through Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy, with ':t.h*e', Republican National
:Committee's ."plumbers" group and realized, the Agency would
eventually be pulled into the vortex of any Congressional ac-
tion. He did not want any Agency reorganization to appear to
.
be
part of a- coverup and was anxious that the TSD and NPIC
-transfers be effective before any formal developments could
" -
take place on Capitol Hill.15
This was the thinking behind Schlesinger.'s insistence that
-DDS&T Carl Duckett get the headquarters notices, prepared for
his signature before he left Headquarters that evening. Duck-
-
ett discoVered that DDM&S Harold Brownman _was. out-. of
? -
his assistant, . Robert 'Wattles, was in
25X1 participating in the annual- CIA golfer's'
-
ties returned to Langley immediately, prepared
-town
and
25X1,\- Cing T$D)s'transfer and announcing
_both effective that day, 4 May, and tool- them to the seventh
:outing. Wat-
announ--
WORKING PAPER Too Secret
Approved For Release 2007/U3/28 : CIA-RDP89
B00980R000500150002-2
25X1
25X1
??? .
Top Secret
Approved For 4Iease 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP89B 0980R000500150002-2
floor where Schlesinger personnally signed them. Headquarters
notices are usually signed by the Deputy Director for Manage-
ment and Services, but in this case, the DCI felt he could not
wait for Brownman's return. 16
The movement of NPIC into the DS&T had been under discus-
sion since early 1971 when it became apparent
changes had to be made at NPIC
Such changes
that
major
demanded technology of
the highest level and in invest-
ment. The DI was not equipped to handle programs of such mag-
nitude and expense and, thus, transfer of NPIC from the DI to
the DST was only logical. NPIC Director Lundahl was amenable
to this change; DDI Edward Proctor, however, was not. He was
concerned lest the loss of NPIC from his directorate cause a
gap in photo-intelligence expertise. Although he- agreed- with
the reorganization, Lundahl realized that the challenge of up-
grading NPIC would require greater physical and mental effort
Noe than he could muster. He had suffered for years from arthri-
tis, which by this time was becoming increasingly more debili-
tating. After. almost two decades of service to the nation, Art .
Lundahl chose to retire.
25X1
25X1
.1V-11 -
WORKING ?PaRgalovedForRelease2OUnWHOIARDP
B00980R000500150002-2
25X1
Too Secret
25X1 1. Approved For R ? - 0980R000500150002-2
FOOTNOTES
1. C.E. Duckett memo for DCI R.M. Helms, 12 Apr 71; Duckett
Chrono File.
2. C.E. Duckett memo to Executive Director-Comptroller, ti-
tled: "Remarks About 'Comments on a Review of the Intel-
ligence Community,'" dated 16 Apr 71, Top Secret; Duckett
Chrono File.
Duckett note to L. White, 22 Apr 71; Duckett Chrono File.
4. . Duckett interview.
5.
6.
25X1 7.
Duckett interview.
Duckett's desk calendar.
"Organization Change," 14 Feb 73.
25X1
S. Irons had been Schlesinger's secretary at the AEC Duck-
ett interview.
25X1 9. Duckett interview;
torate of Plans," 1
10. Duckett interview.
11. Duckett interview.
12. Duckett interview.
25X1 13.
logy."
14. C.E. Duckett letter to DCI Schlesinger _dated 19 Apr 73;.
Duckett ChPono File.
Mar
73.
"Redesignation of the Direc-
20 Apr 73, "Establishment of Office of Development
ngineering of the Directorate of Science and Techno-
15. Duckett interview.
16. Duckett interview.
- IV-I2
WORKING PRF ERAPproved For Release 200Tfl613/F8at-RDP
25X1
89600980R000500150002-2
25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP89600980R000500150002-2
Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP89600980R000500150002-2
25X1
?
Tao Secret
Approved For Illease_2001/113/2&_cadmen9030980R000500150002-2
25X1
---Islots bringing it up to the
years of decline, the Office of the DST
Nome
25X1 [slats and an FY-80 budget of
Nue
25X1
25X1 to
for
level. After five
reached a plateau of
National Photographic Intergretation Center began covering
the Iran-Iraq War in September and overhead imagery was the
primary source of information on the war. A large earthquake
shook southern Italy in late November causing widespread deva-
station. The Italian Government appeal to the United States
for help in determining the extent and magnitude of the de-
struction. President Carter ordered U-2 photo coverage of the
area and NPIC provided Italy with a damage assessment and pho-
tographic enlargements showing the damage. A government-or-
dered increase in food prices in Poland ib June resulted in
numerous strikes and the formation of the free trade union
"Solidarity." By September, Polish unrest reached such a state
that NPIC analysts began detecting signs of increased Soviet
and bloc military activity around Poland. By December, there
were signs of Soviet preparations for an invasion and NPIC
began preparing a "Summary of Soviet 'Reaction to the Polish
Crisis." The crisis abated and the Soviet forces stood down by
the beginning of 1981. Beginning in early April and continuing
throughout the summer, NPIC prepared reports for the White
House on the Marie' Boat Lift from Cuba that brought thousands
of Cubans to Florida. 1
Director Hazzard's FY-SO budget grew by a modest three percent
25X1
Nome
but NPIC!s manpower remained constant at/
the fourth consecutive year.
1980-2
WORKING PksRp'pri.0-Rved For Release 200/6"k2FEr/f-hDP89B
30980R000500150002-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP89600980R000500150002-2
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP89600980R000500150002-2
25X1
Nue
25X1
25X1
25X1
25r
25X1
25X1
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2007/03/28: CIA-RDP89B
State of the Directorate, 1981
0980R000500150002-2
Another major change occurred in the Agency in January with
the arrival on the seventh floor of President Ronald Reagan's
campaign manager, William J. Casey, as the new DCI. He was
joined in February by a new DDCI in the person of Admiral Bobby
R. Inman, who
DDS&T Dirks'
of a staff of
moved over from his position as director of NSA.
fifth year on the sixth floor found him in charge
The Office
had a budget of
'with an FY-61 CIAP budget of
of the Director grew by one slot tol \and
STAT
National Photographic Interpretation Center
in FY-81 got
its first manpower increase since FY-77 with the addition of
Director
new slots, boosting its complement to positions.
Rutledge Hazzard also got a bigger budget, up
The new Reagan administration caused
change
in the Western Sahara. Under President Carter, arms sales to
Morocco, the object of the Polisario attacks, were restricted.
Following King Hassan's appeal for U.S. help, President Reagan
immediately ordered U-2 overflights, known as SENIOR LOOK mis-
sions, of the Polisario areas and removed the Carter arms 'em-_
-
to
an abrupt
in U.S policy vis-a-vis the Palisario revolutionaries
bargo. NPIC
Polisario activities
analyzed
let armor, guns,
the U-2 imagery and prepared reports on
Early in the year,. Cuba began sending Soy-
and other military equipment to Nicaragua.
The Reagan administration ordered SR-71 and U-2 missions over
the
area as well as satellite imagery when possible.
ploitation. of the Nicaraguan imagery
November, NPIC analysts discovered a .new
NPIC ex-
In
the
Soviet bomber,
also called the BLACKJACK, at the Ramenskoye installa-
tion.= NPIC assigned _a full-time imagery analyst to the Inter-
1981-1
WORK iNS F'APPRDved For Release 200140/28ENC4IDP89
B00980R000500150002-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
STAT
25X1
25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP89600980R000500150002-2
Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP89600980R000500150002-2