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October 14, 1988
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STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800160006-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800160006-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800160006-0 1 October 1988 AFIO NEWS COMMENTARY Most of the intelligence-related developments in the news since we sent you the last News Commentary were less than dramatic. Soon after an Army sergeant had been convicted of attempted espionage, a former Navy enlisted man turned up on Moscow television, obliging his hosts by spreading anti- American propaganda. A Silicon Valley computer specialist received a prison sentence for his part in a scheme to sell sensitive data to the Soviets. Former Navy analyst Samuel Morison, who had given classified material to a British publication, found the U.S. Supreme Court unwilling to let him stay out of prison pending further appeal. Canada, meanwhile, closed its doors to a total of 19 Soviet diplomats for attempted naval espionage, a move which met with relatively mild Soviet retaliation. There appeared to be no letup in the KGB's worldwide disinformation campaign, and, as CIA Director William Webster indicated, Soviet attempts to recruit U.S. sources had been increasing. His deputy, Robert Gates, also noted that the KGB had not been affected by current Soviet reform programs. Terrorist incidents were on the rise on several continents, and Libya's Qaddafi, seemingly having recovered from the American air raid of April 1986, was believed to be a major helper and instigator. A Greek terrorist group claimed responsibility for the murder of a U.S. military attache near Athens - the third such assassination there in recent years. It may be symptomatic of our era that, after an aircraft explosion had killed President Zia of Pakistan, the U.S. ambassador and military attache and many others, few Western observers were ready to exclude the Afghan secret police and its KGB backers from the list of suspects. Soviet espionage, and our attempts to cope with it, are among the primary topics of this issue. The ramifictions of the Soviet-inflicted death in March 1985 of then-Major Nicholson in East Germany, for which the Soviets were said to have apologized during this year's Moscow summit, are the subject of a lively discussion. One of our domestic adversaries, the so-called Christic Institute, gets its share of attention. Several articles deal with the British and German intelligence systems. Computer security continues to interest our readers. And we have a new subject: the implications of the drug program. We thank all our contributors, old and new, for sending us such a rich supply of material. Please take note of the attached one-page membership application form. As you know, our president is greatly interested in membership recruiting. The form is designed to facilitate it. We hope everyone will try to get at least one new member! Hans Moses Editor, News Commentary Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800160006-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800160006-0 THE LAST WORD BY RICHARD STARR ? ". Shielding KGB's Right to Know Gennadi E Zakharov, a U.N. official who moonlighted as a KGB agent, or vice versa, was arrested in 1986 by the FBI for purchasing classified documents. The case is a celebrated one, because it prompted Mikhail Gorbachev's operatives to frame an American reporter in Moscow, Nicholas S. Daniloff. The spy and the journalist were then traded after Zakharov pleaded no contest in a pro forma trial. Less celebrated is the story of a college student from Guyana who moonlighted for 31/2 years as a double agent for the FBI and did Zakharov in by selling him the documents. The saga of Leakh Bhoge was told by Michael Daly in fascinating detail in the April 6, 1987, New York magazine. Bhoge, a student at Queens College in New York at the time, went to work for Zakharov in 1983. The KGB agent posed as a professor with the "Moscow Institute" and at their first meeting asked Bhoge to do research for him at various libraries. The student agreed, though he had immediate suspi- cions. In fact, he contacted the FBI within two weeks of taking the job. Shortly thereafter, as New York tells it, "Zakharov asked Leakh to photocopy magazine articles from the microfiche files at the Queens College library. Zakharov advised Leakh to take certain precautions. 'He told me to put wrong name on call slip, wrong Social Security number,' " the student later recounted. Bhoge began making more and more photocopies, at Zalcharov's request. Indeed, the amount was so great that it attracted attention. He told other students that he was working on a book and parried the joking comments of a library guard: "The guard would say, `Here comes the little spy.' I would GAZETTE TELEGRAPH Soviets spying on U.S. libraries, FBI report says Associated Press WASHINGTON ? The 8Iciitiet Union has directed a massive espionage operation against U.S. libraries in an effort to gain sen- sitive technical knowtedge and i?ecruit agents, an FBI report . Said Tuesday. , The report said a 26-yetar.So- Viet operation has targeted the . Library of Congress, along with cienti fic and technical sections bf pub:ic libraries, specialized tiepartments of university li- braries and large information clearinghouses. smile and laugh a little. I say, 'You must be kidding me.' " Sometime later the KGB agent asked his young charge to begin stealing from the library. Bhoge did this and was eventually given other assignments. Among these was pro- viding Zakharov with a map of Princeton University's engi- neering library. In the end, with FBI help, Bhoge obtained a job with a defense contractor and the documents that snagged Zakharov. According to the FBI, the methods the KGB used in hiring and training Leakh Bhoge are fairly typical. According to America's librarians and civil liberties experts, the methods the FBI uses in tracking the likes of Zakharov violate our constitutional right to privacy and, in the words of Duane E. Webster, executive director of the Association of Research Libraries, have a "chilling effect on the life of the mind?' The proximate cause of outrage is that among those FBI methods is an effort of several years' standing known as the Library Awareness Program, which is under investigation on Capitol Hill and the target of a lawsuit. The FBI's program involves teaching librarians to recognize possible intelligence agents from Soviet bloc countries and then volunteer informa- tion on the activities of these patrons. Unfortunately for the FBI, such activities collide, head-on with the ethical codes and self-image of the major associations of professional librarians. Among other things, the librarians point out that laws in 38 states require records of patrons' borrowings to be kept confidential. The official position of the American Library Association, for example, is that librarians should provide no information unless the FBI obtains a court order. Unofficial statements are more interesting. Washington has a small library, the National Security Archive, on whose behalf the was e archive rr 18 yo fildeclassified docu- ments, obtained under the Freedom of In- formation Act. "We want the Soviets to come in and use our information and find out about our government:' its director has said. Then there was the fascinating exchange on ABC's "Nightline." An FBI official de- fended the program as a way of helping to establish which of the thousands of Soviet bloc officials in this country are actually spies. Something is probably amiss, he said, if an agricultural expert from Bulgaria spends his spare time poring over technical publications outside his field. A librarian responded that she would only draw the conclusion that this person was interested in understanding "other aspects of our society?' At times like this, one wonders if the joking library guard at Queens College would have been fired had he reported any suspicions to the FBI. And one wonders at the fact that the FBI has been cast as the morally obtuse party to this dispute. WEDNESDAY, MAY None of the information is classified, but the Soviets try to recruit some agents at libraries who are first asked to obtain public information, and later re- guested to turn over classified material, the FBI said. .1, - The FBI said the Soviet effort even targets term pgper s nnd theses written by U.S. stuaents. ? The report, 'The KGB and the Library Target 1962-Present," was released as FBI Director William Sessions defended the bureau's Library Awareness Program ? a counterespionage operation against the Soviet col- lection effort. : The 50,000-member American Library Association has strongly criticized the FBI operation, in which the bureau attempts to gain the cooperation of librari- ans in helping identify Soviet agents. _ AFI0 COMMENT: The FBI's Library Awareness Program ' :las been widely condemned in the national press. We glad to give you the other side of the argument. ' oth entries on this page were part of the large volume of clippings received from Henry N. Schladt of Colorado Springs, CO. You find a related clip- i ping in today's Comic Corner. Many thanks!) The Last Word is personal commentary on issues of the day. Starr is the assistant managing editor/news of Insight. - 2 - INSIGHT / AUGUST 1,1988 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800160006-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800160006-0 szafre Itoaoliinftton rtmeo EDITORIAL THURSDAY, JUNE 30, 1988 The left in Disneyland 47 a The Christic Institute was one of the because of negative publicity. The taxpayer lesser stars in the orbit of the American left also took a drubbing, with court costs until 1986, when it hit the big time with a amounting to about $2 million over the past lawsuit against 29 individuals, some of whom two years, and the scars on the reputations were connected to the Iran-Contra business, of some of the defendants may never be Accusing them of murder, kidnapping, brib- healed. _try and drug-dealing and of constituting a Aside from the damage done to innocent sinister conspiracy that came to be known as men, the Christic Institute's fairy tales seem the "Secret Team," the Washington-based to have been swallowed whole by many of its foundation got lots of publicity and backing cohorts on the left. As publicity about the suit ? until last week, when a federal judge in mounted, the institute gathered the dona- Miami threw its bizarre $24 million suit out tions of some leftish high rollers, including of court. But much of the nation's liberal musician Jackson Browne and actress Jane establishment seems to remain enamored Fonda, who no doubt will some day apologize. with the fables concocted by the Christic It forged relationships with such groups as mystics. ? Americans for Democratic Action, the Na- The centerpiece of the plot imagined by tional Organization for Women and the the institute was a supposed covert group of Southern Christian Leadership Conference, bad guys who it alleged had spent 25 years and its literature now sports endorsements trying to wipe out communism with assas- from Jesse Jackson and Richard Gephardt. sinations, to take over U.S. foreign policy and Sen. John Kerry's staff is reported to work to help arm the Nicaraguan resistance closely with Christic personnel in trying to through drug trafficking. The "Secret Team," prove that the Nicaraguan resistance is in- the institute claimed, was a "powerful crim- volved in drug smuggling. The "Secret inal network, fanatically right-wing, fi- learn" theory, as the left-wing .monthly nanced by drug profits and closely con- Mother Jones noted, is "fast becoming the nected to the Reagan administration." official explanation of the Iran-Contra events Most of the "evidence" for the grand in progressive circles around the country." conspiracy consisted of what attorney Theo- Historian Richard Hofstadter once wrote dore Klein, who represented some of the de- about what he called "The Paranoid Style in fendants, calls "a hodge-podge of dead infor- American Politics:' referring to those politi- mants, lost witnesses, character actors with cal causes that throughout American history first names only and assorted shadow fig- have launched crusades against imaginary ures who shriveled when exposed to the dark forces conspiring against the Republic. light." All the witnesses named by the in- Hofstadter saw political paranoia as being stitute recanted or denied statements attrib- largely the property of the right wing, but it uted to them, and U.S. District Judge James recently seems to have migrated leftward. Lawrence King finally dismissed the suit as Conspiracy ideologies such as the Christie being without merit. Institute's Secret Team theory, as Insight's The defendants?some of whom now face David Brock has written, attempt to financial ruin as a result of the institute's "criminalize foreign policy differences!' The litigation ? included former CIA Deputy Di- far right has used such tactics in the past to rector Theodore Shackley; Maj. Gen. John portray liberals as tools of the Trilateral Singlaub, Maj. Gen. Richard Secord, Nicara- Commission or other bogies, while the politi- guan resistance leader Adolfo Calero and cal left exploits such demonology to try to ? conservative activist F. Andy Messing of the discredit anti-communists in and out of gov- National Defense Council, among others. A ernment. later affidavit filed in the case charged Pres- Such radical intolerance is reprehensible ident Reagan, the late CIA Director William in any form, and is especially dangerous Casey and Attorney General Edwin Meese when groups use nuisance suits to destroy III with directing the Secret learn. the lives and wreck the finances of theirpo- Gen. Singlaub says he has spent about litical opponents. The judge was right to dis- S500,000 to fight the suit, and Mr. Messing miss the suit and protect a framework of says some of his group's donors fell away civility for the public discourse. (A-Yios pretty well summarizes What the Christic I Institute is all about. With its unsubstantiated allegations, the grOupj developed a credibility gap even in liberal quarters. it nevertheless appears to be successful in raising funds, and its spokesmen have won applause on some college campuses. Its strident assaults on covert ac- tion, and on the ,people connected with it, make it a subject of our con-1 t inuing interest !and attention. - Many thanks to Capt. J. E. Dolan of It. Garrett Park, MD, for a wealth of information on this institution. ) -'3 npriacsified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800160006-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800160006-0 Star Tribune Thursday/May 12/1988. A Soviet murder rampage? Not quite Like other Americans, we were angered three years ago when a Soviet sentry in East Germany killed Arthur Nicholson Jr., a U.S. Army major. The anger remains. But recent reports suggest that Nicholson was carrying out an assignment with far higher risk and far higher stakes than portrayed at the. time. If those circumstances do not excuse Soviet conduct, they do help explain how Nichol- 'So.n. became a Cold War casualty. The gory event.?:Nicholson bled to death ? alerted Americans to intelligence practices of which few were -.aware. Under an _ agreement among World War II victors, Western allies for four ' decades have maintained military liaison missions in East Germany; the Soviets have recip- rocal rights in West Germany. Intelligence officers of each side use the opportunity to learn what they can about military installations of the other. Sen- tries of both sides stop overeager learners who get too close to restricted areas, but not until 1985 had a military observer been killed. ? Further insights come this week from Newsweek magazine's account of the East-West tank race. It is :an unending competition to develop stronger armor, more lethal antitank _ shells to pierce the _ stronger armor, still stronger armor to resist the stronger shells. In the 1980s the United States began producing a new tank, the M-1. Now the Army evidently is withdrawing its 1,400 M- Is and 4,000 older M-60s from Europe as fast as newer and more powerful M-1s can be built. The rapid exchange is necessary, according to the Army, because of faster-than-expected Soviet develop- ments. As a result, most U.S. tanks are vulnerable to new Soviet tank guns and most U.S. antitank .weapons are unable to penetrate new Soviet ar- mor. The one-year cost to upgrade American tanks is about $5 billion. U.S. officials confirmed in 1985 that Nicholson had been photographing military equipment. Now Newsweek says that he had been pressed to deter- mine whether Soviet T-80 tanks had new armor; that he had photographed one T-80 from inside it; that he was shot while breaking into a Soviet tank garage. In a column on these pages soon after Nicholson's death, George Will called it evidence of the Soviet "murder rampage." If Newsweek's account is correct, different terms would be more appropriate. Nicholson fell victim to tank-devel- opment warfare whose intensity 'only now is be- coming widely known. ./ Star Tribune/Saturday/May 28/1988 Liaison officer's killing unjustified ,Your May 12 editorial concerning the shooting of Major Arthur Nichol- "son by a Soviet soldier seems to imply some possible justification for the Soviets killing Nicholson. I have not read the Newsweek article to Which you refer, but I examined thor- oughly the complete reports of the 'incident, the reports of our investiga- ction of the incident and the reports of the negotiations with the Soviets re- sulting from the incident. The plain facts are these: II Nicholson was a member of the U.S. Liaison Mission in the Soviet Zone of Germany. He was in an area in which he was authorized to be and he Was doing'what he was adthorized to do (he was observing Soviet mili- tary forces) in accordance with our agreement with the Soviets for the conduct of the liaison missions. He .:was not trying "to break into a Soviet --tank garage" or trying to get into a :restricted area or trying to do any- "'thing not permitted by the agree- ? He was shot by a Soviet soldier on sentry duty and was permitted to bleed to death while an array of Sovi- et noncommissioned officers and commissioned officers kept Nichol- son's driver and assistant (who, inci- dentally was a very experienced non- commissioned officer) from-helping. -? They seemed to be more interested in trying to create an excuse for the incident than in saving a life. In fact, one senior Soviet officer tried to bad- ger the U.S. sergeant into admitting that he had shot Nicholson. ? The Soviet Liaison Mission in the U.S. zone has been observing U.S. military operations for the 40 years the agreement has been in effect. In typical Soviet fashion, they've pushed the agreement to the limits and beyond; they have frequently been apprehended inside restricted areas. None of their members has ever been shot or shot at! The U.S. Forces, as well as the forces of the other NATO countries, have the pro- cedures, training and discipline to be, able to deal with the Soviet mission members without killing them, even when they are not complying with the agreement. We may never know whether Nichol- son's death was a mistake by an untrained, undisciplined sentry or an ordered-murder:Just asin the case of the Korean airliner shot down in the Far. East, the Soviet authorities seemed to be unable to face up to the facts when addressing such incidents with the rest of the world. One point is clear: He did not fall victim to tank-development warfare. He fell victim to a senseless, unjustifiable Soviet bullet. Whatever the Soviet problem, Nich- olsop's death was a tragic loss. We are now trying to work out more complicated interactions with the So- viets in conjunction with thevINF Treaty verification measures.-I hope they can get their act together Gen. John W. Vessey, Garrison, Minn. Retired chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. (AFIO 'COMMENT: Many thanks to fellow Member Hugh 0. Strawn of Hopkins, MN, for sending us the Star Tribune editorial and Gen. Vessey's quick and convincing reply. One wonders how this attempt to explain the killing ever got started.) ?4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800160006-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800160006-0 aII)Norniag Friday, July 8, 1988 Mum's the word with the British LONDON ? It is always a curiosity, and usually a learn- ing experience, to see how other counties deal with gov- errunental secrecy. That is particularly true when Amer- icans are exposed to journal- ism in Great Britain, where SAM our sort of national obsession with openness often is held up to ridicule. And right now it is more interesting, because even the staid, conservative British government of Margaret Thatcher, is proposing the elimination of I some secrecy provisions that date back to 1911. . Mrs. Thatcher's government won't do away with the Official Secrets Act, to be sure. Nor would she have the government adopt a public-access presumption similar to the federal and state laws of the United States. But the current Thatcher pro- posal at least would bring the British statute into the modern (and real) world. For a perspective on the difference between , current laws in the two countries, one need only know that the British system is essentially the op- ? posite of ours: Whereas U.S. law generally makes information about governmental activities public, .! then lists exceptions, the Official Secrets Act makes ' everything in the nature of governmental informa, tion confidential. . - And the further rod up the beck is that not only is it illegal for a government official to disclose;. secret information, it also is illegal for a news me- dium even to receive ? much less publish ? infor- mation that is covered by the Official Secrets Act The giver or receiver of secret information can be sent to prison. Again, for perspective, one need only know that even the most trivial information is covered by the law. As the peppery nmes of London recently noted, even the color of the carpet in the Foreign Office and the menu in the Ministry of Defense cafeteria would be regarded as "official secrets." And under the current law, even the publication of information that had been published elsewhere could be punished under British law. It is true that the law is not often imposed *on the news media, except in clear-cut national secur- ity cases. Legitimate whistle-blowing by civilgerv- (AFIO COMMENT How has British democracy The answer is: very nicely. - Many thanks KINCH JR. ants is not Usually prosecuted, either:, especially where the whistle blower is performing a public service. But the harshness of the possible penalty for vi- olation and the all-encompassing breadth of the Of- ficial Secrets Act combine to make it a formidable barrier to the free flow- of government-related in- formation that American society has come to re- gard as routine. Some prominent British political commentators and satirists have suggested, in fact, that far from suffering under the Official Secrets Act, journalists have hidden behind it ? as an excuse to avoid hard-hitting reportage on the inner workings of kovernment. The law as written is not simply A censorship tool for after-publication determination of penalties. It acts as a prior restraint precisely because it makes an offense out of receiving infor- mation that is officially secret. . Attempts have been made in the past to open up some of that information. The last Labor govern- ment, then on its final political legs, tried a decade ago. And in 1979, Mrs. Thatcher's initial reform at- tempt floundered largely because it would have' allowed allowed government ministers (akin to our Cabi- net members) to decide whether disclosures could be made _about matters within their own depart- ments. In its latest configuration, the Thatcher pro- posal more nearly approaches the current law in federal and state governments in the States. The mere receipt of unauthorized information 'no longer would be an offense. A judge and jury would decide whether informants and publishers threatened national security or otherwise would' harm the public interest. And the burden would be ? on the prosecution to show that the informant and publisher knew or should have known the harm that could be caused. Further, the information covered by the catchall clause of the Official Secrets Act would be reduced to specific categories covering de- fense, security and intelligence, international re- lotions, information useful to criminals, etc., Those categories are broader than but similar to those in US. federal la*. (The US. Supreme Court ruled in the Pentagon Papers case that pre-publi- cation restraint, even in the name of national se- , curity, is unconstitutional; that concept is for- ' eign to British law.) London newspapers did not greet the newest Of- ficial Secrets Act reform proposal with uniform en- thusiasm, obviously. There is not, for example, a public-interest exception for a civil servant leak- ing to the news media information about internal government misdeeds. And it clearly is not a pro- posal that would guarantee public access to govern- mental information as, with statutory excep- tions, federal and state laws in the United States routinely guarantee. But the Thatcher government's Official Secrets Act proposal is an interesting development to watch in the country from which many of our laws. and political traditions came. Sam Kinch Jr. is editor of the political newsletter ' Texas Weekly in Austin and a regular contributor to Viewpoints. survive U without First Amendment protection? to our most generous Dallas, TX, contributor.) -5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800160006-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800160006-0 THE (LONDON) SUNDAY TIME WEEK IN REVIEW May 15 1988 Espionage: boom business e secrets MOST OF the charismatic anti-) , heroes of late 20th century es-, pionage a, dead. So, too, are many of their contemporaries, the spycat- chers from MI5, MI6 and the CIA, the friends and assorted lovers who were essential sources in the cre- ation and evolution of enduring leg- ends, writes Simon Freeman. Blunt, Burgess, Maclear., and now Philby, are history, closing another chapter, albeit intriguing and evocative, in the long and dis- honourable story of spying. The business, however, is booming. Superficially at least, espionage bears little resemblance to the world of eccentric double-agents which Philby joined nearly half a century ago. Computer and sat- ellite technology allows the Ameri- cans to eavesdrop on the car phone conversations of a Soviet Politburo member general in Moscow, or the Soviets to read the insignia on uni- forms of troops exercising on US military bases. But, a? spy pundits constantly remind us, nothing is ever quite as it seems in_ "the world of mirrors". Intelligence 'agencies still vane the services of the :human ages*, the person who can steal a document or. describe the atmosphere of:a' scientific publications or books- or level meeting, above-the .p_hoto-.` it is so obvious that tbe Kremlin graph which reveals .the :, eiact range of a missile. The sprawling bureaucracies of the intelligence, community ? the CIA', FBI; KGB, GRU, MI6 et al ? have been forced ' over the years '. to -rely: 1 increasingly on electroniesurveil-, lance. But they remain, at heart, traditionalists, convinced that a hu- man spy on the ground is worth many satellites in space. : ' Nobody is sure how many people are involved in espionage . world- - wide, but one recent estimate puts the figure at nearly 1.5m: Nor is anyone sure how much it all costs. Ten billion pounds annually is a conservative guess. The? biggest ' spenders are the Americans and the Russians, although Countries such as Britain, anxious to retain their own independent agencies, ' spend hundreds of millions of . pounds. ? ' ...Critics of the Western intelli- gence agencies ? argue ? that it is mostly wasted effort. They contend 'that there are only a few genuine secrets ?such as the routes used by The 'West's nuclear submarines or )Nato's battle plan.' , The rest is either known through ,the:Westm media, specialist and already knows it. Few members of 'the i Cast-West intelligence community would ag- ree. Western agents argue that the i Russians are as committed as ever to ? undermining capitalist* F,The Russians areinsatiable; they want to know everything because, they believe information is power. The Kremlin, for its part, is still haunted by the fear that the West- ern agencies are'plotting revolution In Eastern Europe and in the Soviet ? Union.' And both sides agree that in regional conflicts' ;'-;, such as Al-I ghanistan; Central America, or the Middle 'East ?old-fashioned spy71 ing pays dividends. 47 -' ? ? ' The f undamentali of espionage: might',''not!) have':' changed since Philby. firsilearnt his craft. What has changed, without doubt, are the sort of peoplewho become' the ? pawns and the Victimshi the game. There are few ideological traitors ? in the West. In,4merica, the 1980s have seen 'a spate of espionage tri- als, but all those 'convicted of spy- ing for 'thea Soviet Union were motivated solely by money and/or a perverted sense?of adventure. ' ' Many of these spies'were middle ! or low-grade technicians in the Military or inclustry,-, proof of the Russians appetite for technological Information and -the shrewd re- alisation that the most likely trai- tor is not the fulfilled, highly-paid person at the top of an organisation but the resentful subordinate." The British can, at least, claim a spy in the ignoble tradition of) ? Philby. 'Michael Bettaney was a I ..senior MI5 officer who decided to ?betray his country because he no longer believed in the West. But Bettaney, who is now serving a 23- year'jail sentence in near-total isolation, was a sad, rather than a dramatic figure, described in court as "puerile", who seems unlikely to ',warrant more than a footnote in the 'history of espionage. " In Wept Germany the espionage business is even more depressingly, low-key." Although there was a briefkilurry or excitement in the early '1980s with the defection of Hans4oaChim Tiedge, a heavy- 'drinking senior officer in the West Gerinan intelligence service, most 'Soviet spies turn out to be spinster secretaries seduced into giving in- formation by male agents in the guise of,' lovers. Only the Israeli' ,Mossad continues the traditions of flamboyant and dramatic covert operations.' ' ' The future for spy enthuasists looks bleak.- ? : On May 11 1988, when Moscow announced the death of british-born KGB spy Kim Philby, AFIO member Irene U. Boubli4 of McLean, VA, happened to be in England and picked up stacks of Phil- by-related news coverage. The item selected offers _a broader perspective than most.) -DAIJAS MORNING NEWS Spy 'NEST 27 August 1988 Maximum penalties must be pressed Once again, Americans are reminded tlicif _ spies are real creatures, not just the fig. The Conrad flap should first remin ments of fiction writers' imaginations. We, eVerY American that the smiling face o &lasnost notwithstanding, there are enemi in the world who are prepared to do us an our allies harm_ also are reminded that spies usually do no d'pme with the classic trench coat, or wit James Bond wit and style. The United States latest alleged traitor is basically middle-?'- The ? Conrad Hari Also. raises the questiod for the coin of their civilization: money. 1 American, former Army Sgt. 1st Class Clycil 'as to how a low-level, noil:commiSli.ukied of l The death penalty is not used in Germany,1 Lee Conrad. incer could.iumegotteriaccess td-super-sensi where Conrad is being charged, so if found Mr. Conrad's alleged activities appear to: cive files for so long withoul his cOpduc uilty, he will not have to forfeit his life for have included passing secrets that could se! . being . regularly monitored by intellige6ce'eopardizing the life and safety of millions.1 riously compromise the ability of the Northildgencies. e military bureaucracy h at's regrettable. The Conrad case is a re-1, Atlantic Treaty Organization to defend Eu allen down on the job. -, inder that the death penalty should be ap- rope against a Soviet invitation. He ili Above all, the C#1 wad flp, raises the ques licable in peacetime as well as during a de- accused of selling the location of NATO mis- tion of why a prbfessional military ma lared war. The world is a precarious place siles, the route of a super-secret pipeline and would betray his country. The answer a ven during peacetime; having tactical and plans for blunting a Warsaw Pact thrust into pears to have been handsome sums ofstrategic information sold to potential ene-, central Germany. ,. _ 1, money. If so. iLtuay serve as fresh evidencemies makes peacetime all the more fragile. (AFIO COMMENT: A-hard-hitting editorial, sent in by our anonymous source in Dallas, TX. Many thanks:)i I that the United States hes become too wor- shipful of dollars, and too condescending toward patriotism, honor and duty. If a man lacks the respect of his countrymen for the job he does, he may feel free to betray them - 6 - nne-InccifiPrl in Part - Sanitized Coov Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800160006-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000800160006-0 L0pON IFINANCI,AL_TIM ES WEDNESDAY AUGUST 3 1988 David Mar?h interVieWs the head of West German's counter-intelligence service An open door to secrecy In Britain, Mr Gerhard Boedeni would - officially at least - sim- ply not exist. The stocky, 63-year? , old head of West Germany's count- er-intelligence agency, the Bundesaint fuer Verfassungsschutz (BfV), is, how- ever, alive and well and can be inter- viewed in his well-protected office building in Cologne. Mr Boeden is in charge of the West ; German equivalent to Britain's MI5,. which is wrapped in official secrecy like ! MI6, the foreign arm of the UK intelli- gence services. Britain's Parliament has. been debating - a recent government White Paper that would shroud the security service in even greater secrecy. In the Federal Republic, as a reaction against the crimes of the Third Reich, the intelligence services set _up by the post-war state are discreet, but open to scrutiny. In fact, they insist on it. After a long career in the police.force, anti-terrorism and counter-espionage work, Mr Boeden took over the Cologne agency in April last year. Set up in 1950, the BfV's name literally means "Office for the Protection of the Constitution". Its task is to collect information on for- eign spies :and on left- and right-wing extremists. These are all people deemed to represent a threat to the country's 1999 Basic Law or constitution and thus to the stability of the country. , . Apart from foreign spies, the agency has to keep tabs, at the latest count, on 62,000 members of extreme left-wing organisations, above all the German Communist. Party, and 25,200 radical right-wingers grouped in neo-Nazi and other organisations. The figures' are given annually in public reports, nearly always accompanied by self-congratula- tory pronouncements from the Interior Minister that democracy during the" year in question "remained stable". . ? Mr. Boeden wants to be thought - of more as a kindly uncle rather than big brother. He says it is "terribly impor- tant" that his agency, which employs about '2,300 people and comes under the jurisdiction of the Interior Ministry, should have "a human face". Indeed, i his job is partly one of public relations. I He needs to convince West ,Germans ! mindful of the Nazis' misuse .of power,' that the BfV is not, as he says, full of' "shady characters. in slouch-hats and! dark glasses who 'want to keep every-1 one under control". . 1 Against this unique German back- ground, the BfV's work is becoming more challenging and complicated. East-West detente and the much greater flow of East Europeans travelling to West Germany increase the opportuni- ties for4East bloc spying. At the same ' ? time; pstr Kam ow ,the. longer term the 1 ..t.., rece-dinEthreat to the Federal Republi , ...? .,,, caused by the manifest ebbing of th ' . Cold War could lower public support fo ?,A the agency's work. , - . Yr 13oetlen-iz adamant about the pepd . (AFIO-GOMMgNT: Many thanks to Col. Richard L. Temple of Santa Barbara, CA, for sending us this - to' learn from the lessons of the past. "Our citizens should know that this institution was founded, after our bitter experiences, to protect one of the most liberal constitutions that Germany has ever had from-a situation where politi- cal forces - either from the right or the left - could try to abolish parliamen- tary democracy," he says. The BfV is answerable to a Parlia- mentary Control Commission to check sensitiye cases and operations. A spe- cial committee of the Bundestag has to approve interception of mail and tele- phone tapping since this contravenes Article 10 of the Basic Law. - There are two other arms of the intel- ligence service. The foreign arm is the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) or Fed- eral Intelligence Service, run by Mt -Hans Georg Wieck, a high-powered dipl lomat. The Militaerischer Abschirmi dienst ?(MAD) or Military Intelligence Service is responsible for security _within the armed forces. None of the t three have police powers. BfV officials cannot Arrest k,interrogate suspects or search premises, but instead have to hand over these-matters .to the federal - -police-or publiclirosecutor. - ,Thei WV even Tuts out a brochure, .carefully translated into English, on the -basic tenets oOts operations. Under !'intelligence methods", it informs read- ers .that these include: "The 'infiltration or recruitment and handling of agents in extremist- oretterrorist organisations; the stuveillanc of suspects; secret pho- tography; interception of post and tele- communications; other measures to , conceal certain BfV operational activity by the use of non-attributable vehicle ? registration numbers or identity cards with cover names." ,It is hard:to,lmigine MIS being so helpful, even if heOfficial Secrets Act , was abolished. 1%1: , Mr Boeden talks with almost exagger- ated politeness !about the people he is up against. Most espionage in West Ger- many is carried 'out by the East German :.Ministryftir State Security. Not surpris- ; ingly,;Mr Boeden.lhas never met Mr. ,? Erich -Mielke, the legendary 80-year-old East ,German--Minister .for State Secu- rity; who has been East' Berlin's chief spymaster for more than 30 years. ? "I know him very well," says Mr Boe- den, "and I imagine he knows me too. , This has always been my method, also I ??? its ,rls hoaorm7eylircet to opponentunderstand officer i-s . totryThis ani sdt o evaluate necessary.f ind out. ? him better." ? Perhaps as many as 3,000 eastern "agents" of various kinds may be oper- ating on West German soil. This would range from professional spies to a much larger number of small-fry "collectors" of information. "Eastern services, in our experience, in times of detente have a special desire for information. They want to know more, and they want to know it earl,' says Mr Boeden. Additionally, opportunities for spying tend to increase at a time of political thaw. This year, about 160,000 German- national emigres from the Soviet Union ? and eastern Europe are expected to set- tle in West Germany. Although the i Bonn government welcomes the sharp increase in arrivals, the emigre stream I also provides. a golden. opportunity for the East bloc to bring in spies. 1 "We have a system, although it is not perfect, for registering when emigres f have been approached and asked about" procuring information," says Mr Boe-1 den. "The numbers have been growing. "We cannot and do not want to say' that each German-origin emigre is sus-. pect. The people who come to us are! German by constitutional right. This:': gives us a special problem comparedi? with other western counter-intelligence? service's." - Although he says that not too much meaning should be attached to the increase; 34 -people -were arrested in West- Germany up to mid-July on auspi-1 cion of spying. This is the same numberk as in the whole Of last year. ?, The most spectacular coup this year was the detention of seven Men. inj _ ; March on suspicion of working for the KGB. Charges have yet to be preferred.. ThP first court case comes up later this ! month. Several of the suspects are Soviet emigres who had settled in- the I Federal Republic. . The spate of arrests has helped "underpin the BfV's claim that it . has succeeded in making good damage done by the defection to East Germany in -1985 of one of its top apylhunters, Mr ?Hans-Joachim Tiedge. Mr 'fledge fled .after the INV failed to help him sort out his.drink and debt problems. Mr Boeden says he has introduced a system under ,which any employee in similar personal 'difficulties can come in and talk things. over. He sees about three people a week on this basis. "It is inevitable that in-an institution like ours, -employees can have problems," he says. . - The KGB clamp-down in March came a week after the BfV was reminded of another constant preoccupation, with the arrest in Bonn of Ms Elite Falk,' a 43-year-old secretary working for the Development Ministry. Ms Falk is alleged to have passed on information from her jobs in various government offices to a "romeo" East German Agent with whom she fell in love,. About a dozen "secretary affair" .have come to light in the past 10 years, confirming Mr Mielke's passion for setting loose his agents on single, middle-aged . Bonn women. Mr Boeden says these cases are "tragic". He uses the Falk affair to underline a security point. He says it confirms the need for a new vetting system introduced this summer which allows the intelligence services to inves- tigate the personal friendships of gov- ernment workers. "If it had been possible to investigate Frau Falk's man-friend, we would have established that he had a false identity. At the beginning of the affair, that would have saved Frau Falk a lot of pain - and the state a lot of damage." revealing article on German intelligence, a subject not often disouated hereabouts. While the author no mnares German with British intelligence, you might view it in the context of our system.) - 7 - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800160006-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000800160006-0 June 26. 1988 Post on guard against colinputertamperin4 Viruses, hackers can be stopped but spies pose another question BRODIE FARQUHAR Staff Writer - _ Computer espionage, viruses, sabotage ? these are the ongoing concern a of Col. Preston Holtry, deputy chief of staff for Intelligence' at at the U.S. Army Information Systems destroy the virus before it can spread through the system. Command at Fort Huachuca. i; All software is kept underlock and key, "booted up" on in- Holtry and his staff have devised a formidable system to, dividual machines, then locked back up. Since no copying or protect the Army's worldwide information management and communications systems. While -university, business and government computer systems around the world have been attacked by skillful hackers, malcontent eniployees and even spies, Holtry notes there are,significasit differences in security between his organizatiw alit) Qthe17s. ' ould-be spy. - ? ? Personnel procedures. "As we develop greater technical roficency, we become more dependant on personal trust nd accountability. People are our greatest strength and eakness,'.' said Col. Holtry. ISC places a great deal of emphasis on personal account- ability, so that each individual is responsible for what hap- ! ens to or with his personal computer. While Holtry has not g ntubri )1i -R.taff f mrn ennimunicatine with comuuter bulletin boards, they know the risk of picking up a hidden virus, and I have the software and procedures to detect, quarantine and According to Associated Press reports, -viruses hay within the last year, "infected" computers at NASA, the Na tioual Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,informatio -systems on Capitol Hill, George Washington University. an Hebrew University in Jerusalem. Tactics that can he used to disrupt computer operations Include : , " - ? Viruses, which are 'essentially small programs that can hide' in the computer's operatng system, giving orders that range from a relatively benign message that flashes on the screen to destruction of data files or erasure of disks. A virus differs from other sabotage in that it, ,clones itself and spreads. ? "Trojan horsei,"%prokramS that look'aiid aCt like norma ones but contain hidden comniands 'that eventually take ef fect and cause havoc. ? "Logic bombs," small sets of instructions surreptitiousl entered into other software. 'where they remain undetecte bootlegking of software Is allowed, the spread of. viruses is , kept to a minimum. Given the -above set of defenses, Col. Holtry-believes the ISC enjoys "an acceptable level of risk.". - "There is no such animal as 100 percent protection. Given , the -resources, any *Stem -can be penetrated. I sleep very I well at night, because I think we're -99 percent secure, using a very expensive, coniplex..abciirity; system. The ,question, is, how much are you willing to'Spend to get that extra 1 per- cent? that could cost again; What We've spent already," said oltry. While hackers occasionally "knock on the front door, rattle he windows and try the back door," said Holtry, no one has , ver gotten hito "the inner sanctum". University or even,. government ,research computer ystems- are much easier to get into and sabotage, simply edause they are in a knowledge sharing business. The Army s a "need to know" organization, so the security is more , omplex, noted Holt*. ' "Hackers keep us on our toes, ' even though they are an ir- ritant," said Holtry. What he deeply worries about, is not the show-off hacker, but the insider who has sold out his country, for money.- "This guy is deadly, because we- don't know he's there, accessing information and selling it," said Holtry. Spies such as the Falcon and the Snowman or John Walker have taught the defense establishment that espionage is now and inactive -until the computer arrives ata certain result normal computation. a growth industry, in which Americans with access to mill- duringtary information are now seeking out the enemy and selling' secrets to make a buck. , ' "We've learned that we have 'to look more carefully, and more frequently, at .our personnel. We're not Big Brother,' ? 44Time bombs," which go into action at a set date and time. The supersecret National Security Agency, based at Fort Meade, Md., is responsible for safeguarding the security of the Na- with cameras in every room, but we are emphasizing securi- U.S. government computer systems.. It has set up ty awareness. If you see a janitor driving a Mercedes, you! tional Computer Security Center at Fort Meade to help the should do more than wonder about it," said Holtry. military, defense contractors and other private companies Col. Holtry is well-equipped to deal with the technical and tope with software warfare and other threats to vital com- puter systems. 't the human aspects of computer system security. A graduate of Virginia Military Insitute and Boston -University, Holtry At ISC, Col. Holtry's computer system protections include: ? Passwords and password controls. has a liberal arts education and is a career military in- ' , telligence officer. ? Software Control frnm, the vendor to customer. "Some- times, vendors will leave a 'trap door' for future updates and' "I've had to become technically adept in order to ask the right questions and make sure I was getting the right an- maintenance. The trouble is, if a vendor built it, a hacker can swers," said Holtry. He recognizes his own limits in corn- find and open it. This is why control is so important to us. We puter science, yet credits his liberal arts background as he exhaustively analize all software so there are no surprises, deals with the human equation. All our software can deny access and has an audit trail ca- For Col. Holtry, the ISC security systems are not a corn- pacity, soil someone tries to get into the system, we know when it happened," said Holtry. Plete answer to the challenges of hackers and spies. "We have no answers to some questions, and we don't even have ? Hardware devices. ISC security includes dial back delay( and filtering systems. If someone makes even a small pro- all of the right questions. Technology is evolving faster than our ability to secure it," he-said, emphasizing again that se- cedural error in getting into a system, security can monitor, curity is a people problem. trace or, even feed phony Information to the hacker or Many thanks to -fellow member Edmund C. Jilli of Sierra Vista, AZ, for sending us this inforlative follow-up.) (AFIO COMMENT: Our last Is-sue'included two items on computer security problems. - 8 - in Par - RAnitiZed Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800160006-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000800160006-0 ready for Soviet spies , June 27, 1988 That's precisely what the Soviets will . I attempt to do, U.S. intelligence officials say. The Soviet teams will inchicle'agents from the military-intelligence agency, known as the GRU, and they are certain most sensitive military installations, to have been instructed to collect other . gaining access to the innerniost recesses, ? military and industrial intelligence at and ' where they snoop eagerly for secrets. near the base. High on the Soviet priority The twist? This time, the Soviet spies are list will be the location of major research- invited by Washington. ,Any reputable and-development facilities, the configu- publisher would reject such a plot out of rations of sensitive weapons systems? hand as just too implausible. Yet start- and even mere confirmations of their ing July 1, a team of highly trained Sovi- existence. "The Soviets will be expertly et agents, under the aegis of their Penta- trained," says Peter Zimmerman, a for- gon hosts, will be swarming all over U.S.i mer official of the Arms Control and bases. The Soviets have been given this Disarmament Agency, "to look at what right, just as U.S. teams will have the they're not supposed to see." right of access to Soviet missile bases, , tti bugs and body searches. The risks for under terms of the Intermediate-Range the U.S. go way beyond what the Soviets Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) signed re- might see here, however; intelligence offi- cently in Moscow by Ronald Reagan cials say that, regardless of the Precau- and Mikhail Gorbachev. but now the . tions taken, the value of on-site visits U.S. must make sure the Soviets who I cannot be overestimated. The Soviets will come here don't walk away with more I be allowed to bring into the U.S. a few, And despite official Pentagon protesta- than was bargained for. 1 measuring and detection devices, subject ; to American inspection and control. tions to the contrary, there are serious Though all Soviet luggage can be questions about how ready the Defense checked, American officials will not be Department is, according to the findings .allowed to conduct body searches. Offi- of a U.S. News inquiry. To prepare for cially, the Pentagon has been playing Soviet arrivals, the Pentagon has run a down the threat, but counterintelligence series of 30 mock inspections over the specialists within ' the Pentagon say it past four months at U.S. missile sites, would not be impossible for the Soviet with "Soviet" teams played by Russian- inspectors to plant small bugging devices speaking U.S. inspectors. The exercises or delay-activated equipment that could be triggered months or years later to spy on workshops or other sensitive areas. i Whenever the Soviet monitors are visiting : such sensitive areas, precautions will have ; to be taken to prevent them even fiom i making physical contact with sensitive materials, especially things like coatings' on advanced weapons systems. "Unless) they have gloves on," says Zimmerman, "the Soviets will be able to collect intelli- gence through their fingernails." White a specialized Army unit, the classified Offensive Counter-Intelligence Opera- , tions Program, can handle some of the load, a program I that is critical to it lacks nec- essary manpower, Pentagon REEORT intelligence units U S NEwS & WORLD overseas. Pentagon sources say they need at least 30 TSCM agents to provide adequate security for the Soviet monitors here, but it's unclear where they'll come from: It takes at least eight months to train new TSCM agents. Another problem, defense sources say, involves a sensitive, and very costly, op- eration to camouflage and transfer sever- al major weapons and research programs not pertaining to INF on military sites without triggering Soviet satellite disclo- sure. Though mutual satellite reconnais- sance of each country's bases is accepted as a key method to assure compliance , with the INF Treaty, defense experts are deeply concerned , about the extent to which Soviet inspectors, through obser- vation on the ground, could enhance or refine' intelligence?on areas other than INF?collected by satellite reconnais- sance. San. retired Col. Calvin Sasai, a veteran military-intelligence officer and president of RDR, Inc., a firm that spe- cializes in pinpointing vulnerabilities and designing security systems for gov- ernment programs: "The Soviet visual inspections will easily be able to analyze our R&D [research and development] and military capabilities." The threat is more acute at some sites than others. Redstone Arsenal, a missile base in Huntsville, Ala., is not only home for an elaborate research-and-develop- ment project for future battlefield nuclear weapons but it is also the headquarters for production and launch plants of the National Aeronautics and Space Admin- istration. A third program involves the testing and replication of secretly ob- tained non-American weapons systems. Though the Soviet monitors will have no rights under the INF Treaty to view areas housing any of these programs? and are entitled to see only a minute fraction of Redstone's 38,000 acres?the anxiety among U.S. officials is understand- ably high that no slipups occur that could result in a breach of security. Reporters shown the , inspection at Redstone last I week saw no security lapses. If there is any consolation for the U.S., it is that the So- viets?who are required to open five times as many sites as the U.S.?are going to face the same type of problems as the Americans. U.S. inspec- tors no doubt will be just as aggressive there as their Sovi- et counterparts here in col- lecting intelligence. "At least their headache," says one De- partment of Defense special- ist, "is just as big as ours." II ? Devotees of espionage fiction no doubt would recognize it as the only plot that hasn't been spun out yet in paper- back: Soviet agents infiltrate America's have been mostly successful, though some mistakes?not entirely ..upexpect- .ed?have occurred. Nine hours' noUce. The 0-reparation, , for the Soviet visit are being orchestrate( by specialists from a brand-new Penta- gon outfit known as the On-Site Inspec- tion Agency. It is the job of these hastily assembled experts to coordinate the U.S.' inspection of some 133 Soviet-bloc mis- sile sites and oversee the Soviet inspec- tion of 26 sites in the United States and Western Europe. To say that the agency has its work cut out doesn't begin to get it: The logistics of its job are nightmar- ish. The Soviets, like the Americans, will be permitted to station permanent teams of 30 inspectors. But scores of other in- sources say. The program, spectors will be allowed to make adch- called the Technical Surveillance tional visits?on as little as 9 hours' no- . Counter-Measures Program?TSCM in tice?at missile facilities around the U.S. ' the Pentagon's acronymic parlance?has With so little time to prepare, the U.S. been cut back so severely in recent years may not be ready for the Soviets just yet. that it may take up to a year before an It was only in the past few weeks that the adequate technical counterintelligence On-Site Inspection Agency completed its operation is safely in place. For years, final selection and training of the 200 TSCM agents have conducted electronic inspectors who will travel to the Soviet countersurveillance at U.S. military in- Union. But there are potentially greater stallations to protect them against pene- problems for the estimated 400 agents tration by hostile intelligence agencies. who will escort the Soviet monitors com- But in the past six years, government ing here. Although the escorts will have officials say, the number of TSCM to deal with every possible contingency, agents has been cut back from 160 to 32. ranging from defection ,to accidents, one Fewer than 10 are in the U.S. today, the of their most important tasks will be to rest having been assigned to military- make sure the Soviets do not see any more than they're allowed under the treaty. (AFIO COMMENT: Thanks to Henry N. Schladt, Colorado Springs, CO, and Howard E, Steen, Au? rora, CO, for this timely article, slightly abridged here. Also see chart on next page.) by Steven Emerson with Orli Low - 9 - 1-N.,,--1,eeifiar4 in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000800160006-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000800160006-0 72 BUSINESS WEEK/AUGUST 1, 1988 COVER STORY HOW UNCLE SAM'S CLOAK-AND-DATA BOYS ARE FIGHTING-BACK Breaking into computer systems might be a lark for hackers. But penetraltion of government com- puters?particularly military sys7.- terns?is a deadlY- serious mater for the National Security Agency (NSA) and for 'Counterintelligence _agents at the Federal Bureau of Investigation. After all, who's to say whether a break-in is s hacker's harmless prank or an at- tempt by Soviet spies to steal defense _secrets? "The superseciet NsA,t. _ _ _ _ an arm of _the Pentagon that icirjmanyi years, didn't -didn't even -exist Official-- F: ly, has, ?Jouble-edged mission -It gathers :elee:- tronic intelligence the Soviet blo-c-hydriten? cepting ..and decoding -1,elecoinniuniCationsitraf-'-_-; - fie, _including isgnal senf-'5, from spy.isatelliteslAnd to ,preV-entAforeigq,viSS tionsfn- ?_`,.?-?41-oing same to the NSA spends Aintold Mil- portant clue. That's why the Soviet missions in Washington, New York, and San Francisco bristle with anten- nae. They pick up phone conversations and data transmissions relayed by cel- lular -radio and microwave links. In Cuba, a giant KGB-operated dish pulls in signals beamed down from satellites to any point in the lower 48 states. And Soviet snoop ships monitor both coasts communicating with ships or planes. So the NSA has developed elaborate cryp- tographic ciphers for turning English into digital gibberish. These codes are so convoluted that-any given string of characters, such as this sentence, would never yield two identical series of encoded characters. The cipher is changed frequently, so that the digital code for an "e" in one word might mean "k" in the next. To decode such sage, you need the key: the starting =cipher plus the formula for Switching to .the next variant. For. computers :that -handle - the most sensitive infor- mation, crypt?, keys are created ,in pairs, then_de- ? livered by courier to the. _twoLeoinputer -sites., So even if .the _key:for- the -linkhetwew the -Yenta?- gon:and spartietilar base -- copied, it won't help de-. code:traffic between any alier lions devising.sophisticat-,wAsajamoN nothing offers to- ' r ed cryptographic codes ? ? 4aLprotection. Just as pri-_, . . and trustworthy computer systeml, ,.._ ? . . inl just Outside' U; S. -territorial wa- vat,eLsector- computer rcrime is-,:isuallz--:-.- Protecting governmenteomputer. 1ters." One intelligence expert estimates .," traced i to?.-employtes;;;the-.NS400korst systems as-hecoming,inCieaSinglyAax that the Soviets listen in on more than fearls:that;turneoits will Sell,,-*ypio-_ , ing. Intelligenc4Organizations, the mil: half of ''all 'T. S. 'telecommunications ' _ '_- ,,.. graPhie,sec_reti:.Pl,rypto tetail's'A-re-SO itary, and er federal agencies -now traffic, one or_another s? cret, at eventhe names ;.used , to.. ' operate, more.- '-SFOOK-PROOF., Because, almost any classifTtheni_ire-classified.j.That's why,: sites?most with ',multiple jcomputers ' transmission runs a high risk of being federal officials say that former Navy and ComniunicatiOnsAinks,31any thou- . intercepted,- Washington goes to great radiomen Jerry A.:..Whitworthand John' sands ofidditionaliComputers used hy ., lengths to protect its secrets. Its most A. Walker. Jr.,. who, years. passed - defense contractorsand high-tech man- secure lines are fiber-optic cables bur- top-secret czyPtO.;:paterials to the KGB, ' ufacturers hold,dati"..that the?,:',Adminis-, led deep below the surface and sealed did more harm than any other spies in tration doesn't want leaked., : ',in_ gas-filled pipes. There are no connec- decades.:$01ficials?*stimate ,.., that :the The Soviets leave no stone unturned : iltions to outside phones, so no hacker Kremlin used its ill-gotten gain to de- . in their hunt for:, the-thiiestlnoriels of. .:.' can gain access. If a spy cuts a pipe to code il Jnillionoilitary,pessageti': That,. information:". Even a.routhielelectronic ' ? tap the cable, the drop in gas pressure Could make A the coniputer!crime?.of-' mail message ibetween: s. defense sup,- Anstantly sounds an 'alarm. - : ., . the century?so 40 - -fari, ., plier And ,a bank 'tnight:piovide'an im- : But buried cables are of no use in - ,? !:?,:.,ciLlfi,,Ryi.p.2.,i8:poitata: ork ? . ..., , -_,.....-..44.-.....-- - ---...---, - ... ----9---_ AFIO COMMENT: Many thanks to Capt. John R. Lengel of Strongsville, OH, for ant.herl__ follow-up on computer security.) (AFIO COMMENT: This chart came with the U.S. News & World Report article titled "Getting ready for Soviet Spies," printed in abridged form on page 9 of this issue.) KEEPING TABS ON THE SOVIETS U.S. bases the Soviet monitors will visit. Some sites have other sensitive Installations that the Soviets will have to be prevented from seeing 1. San Diego, Calif. 2. Magna, Utah: 63 United States firms working on defense contracts in the Immedi- ate area; production site for mis- sile-guidance systems. 3. Dugway Proving Ground, Utah. 4. Davls- Monthan AFB, Arlz.5. Fort Hua- chuca, Ariz.: Army Intelligence base and Army Communications Command. 6. Pueblo Army Depot, Colo. 7. Fort Sill, Okla:. Army field Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24 artillery headquarters. 11. Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant, Tex. 9. Redstone Arsenal, Ala.: Re- search-and-development center for battlefield nuclear weapons; production site for National Aero- nautics and Space Administration. 10. Middle River, Md. 11. Titusville, Fla. 12. Cape Canaveral, Fla.: Launch sites and assembly facili- ties for military test flights. ? 10 - CIA-RDP89G00720R000800160006-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800160006-0 ihralIa Ponting)fielwg Monday, June 6, 1988 DRUG BATTLEs United States must take lead International drug trafficking is fast which the United States has minimal relal shoving communism aside as the world's tions and provides no aid. I most destabilizing influence. It is not just na- The National Drug Policy Board has emi tions that are threatened with the instability phasized eradication programs in drug-pro- created by multibillion-dollar drug cartels. ducing countries. But they have had virtu- The international banking system is af- ally no effect. When an eradication program, fected by the massive sums of money being was undertaken last year in Peru, whose' laundered. Panamanian banks alone laun- crop for cocaine is believed to be the world's dered $275 million emanating from the Co- largest, only 850 of the 100,000 acres were de- lombian cocaine trade in three years. The stroyed. money laundering points out a systemic The administration now faces an even ' problem in that nation, where the drug in- more embarrassing issue. How much should 1 dictment of Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega is it expect impoverished countries to sacrifice just One element in the entangled web of when the administration's efforts to era& been helped by polls showing that_the public! Panamanian drug dealing. cate marijuana growing in the U.S. have feels the Democrats are handling this prob- 'The Reagan administration has succeeded flopped? Legislation to require U.S. compa? lem more effectively than are Republicans, a in interdicting more illegal shipments than nies 'to license chemicals used in cocaine matter of no little importance now that the any, _other administration. Its reward, how- Manufacturing is held up in Congress while drug issue -has emerged_ as :the public's ever,: has been increasing sophistication of the State Department is pressuring other na? choice as the country's most pressing prob- tions to draft laws that would do the same. lem. . -U.S. drug policy is not working. In the Vice President George Bush wisely has/ United States alone, estimates of the gross begun distancing himself from the presi-; revenue generated by all narcotics sales dent's efforts to drop drug charges against' range from $60 -billion to $120 billion. The Gen. Noriega in return for his leaving Pani White House can be faulted for focusing toe ama. And Mr. Bush has beefed up his anti- Otteh?onitildirdictFon and tot 'enough on do drug positions by proposing that businesses mestic demand 'for drugs. But Congress als( establish programs t6discourage drug use in has emphasized tougher stances agains the work place, a hemispheric drug summit, n( an international drug-eradication task force drug-producing nations while offering coherent statement on domestic drug use and wider testing of people responsible for Similarly, a recent New York Times/CBS ?1public safety. He also has supported the use, of the military in combating drug dealers found the public believes, 50 to 35 percent that government should concentrate more and capital punishment for dealers of lethall on reducing the supply of drugs than on get? ting people to stop using illegal drugs. But we need more debate on how to re- ting people drug war will not be won through duce the demand side of the equation. Do we, ? The drug problem, quite rightly, has be- come one of the hot- test issues of the presi- dential campaign, thanks largely to the I emphasis Jesse Jack- son has given the is- sue. Massachusetts Gov. Michael Dukakis has the traffickers. , , First lady Nancy.. Reagan has become a leading anti-drug"( crusader, motivating the ' formation of nearly:10,000 clubs for kids learning to with-' stand stand peer pressure for drug use. But nei- ther the administra- tion nor Congress, which has made a $2 billion budget com- mitment to law en- forcement this year, can hide the fact that orug even small victories facile initiatives, excess melodrama and the we improve more effective anti-drug nee tional can na have been elusive. The State Department P 'whiff of hypocrisy suggested by such pro os- * cently -reported that the production of coca als as sending in the Marines to destroy c programs in public schools? Do we need a, marijuana and opium poppies in most drug crops in Latin America while imposing no cabinet-level "drug czar"? producing countries has grown substan such action to get rid of California's man- If the United States is to retain its position tially this past year. Juana crop. as a global leader, it must evolve a compre- a a year in t e Reagan hensive policy on drugs. Curbing the de- The White House has been rightly criti Th still cized for acting too lethargically in the past, term; it is not too late to press a firmer fed- mand for drugs must take on a greater sig- on evidence of drug trafficking, especially' nificance than attempts to solve the problem among friends and allies. The certification process by which Presi dent Reagan determines which major drug producing or -trafficking countries are coo erating to fight drugs and are therefore eli gible for aid has been severely criticized: The administration has tended to decertt only countries like Iran and Syria, wit mg. to ft. (AFIO COMMENT: An intelligent discussion of a problem that is both difficult and important. are obliged, once again, to our fellow member from Dallas, TX, who does not wish to be named.) drugs. pp a strictly through halting trafficking. would escalate educa- The world is looking to the United States tion as a means of for leadership in a war as destructive is any curbing domestic de- that have menaced the globe in this uncer- mend for drugs while continuing law en- forcement efforts against drug traffick- tain nuclear age. Given the destructivel power of illegal drugs to wear down the in stitutions of a country, the US. cannot afford, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800160006-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000800160006-0 Noalo news March/April 1988 3 FOR HEAVEN'S SAKE ,ACT! Earlier this year, the Toronto Star ran a series of articles about Trinidad and Tobago's role in the immensely profitable international drug trade. The gist was nothing new: that this country, like many others in the region, is now being csed as a trans-shipment point for heroin and cocaine on its way to North America, and is developing as a drug market in its own right. But the Canadian paper was able to send two reporters into Trinidad to interview people who they identified as drug barons, photograph them, quote them, describe their homes and the arms they were carrying and the bodyguards they had around. And in spite of this publicity, nothing happened. Well, not quite nothing. The Prime Minister denounced the articles in Parliament for giving us a bad name. He said discussions had been going on, collaboration was occurring with North American police forces, an expert was arriving to advise us on white collar crime. The local press reported that a special team of police had gone "underground" to crack the drug business, that "top-level" -meetings had been taking place. The Defence Force plunged heroically into the bush to burn marijuana trees, taking some adventurous journalists with them. But nobody touched the man who graciously granted an interview to the Canadian reporters; he boasted that nobody could touch him, and he was right. An investigation by the Sunday Express produced the same boast from plenty of other dealers. The reason is obvious, and there's no point glossing it over. The drug trade produces so much money, and therefore so much power, that it can buy off silence, intimidate, or in the last resort eliminate anyone who seriously stands up to it. It can pay producers far more to grow marijuana or coca or whatever than to produce mere food; it can pay pilots and sailors far more than they could dream of earning from airlines and fishing; it can buy the protection of police and the power of judges; it ,:an buy whatever high technology is necessary to keep a hundred jumps ahead of ill-equipped police forces. In Colombia, one of the three main cocaine producers, the death tally includes 62 judges, a Justice Minister and an Attorney General. In Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and Mexico, production cannot be controlled with any real success; the appetite of the outside world is simply too big. The US market is said to be worth US$110 billion a year. When the New York cops closed in on a modestly successful Jamaican operator this year ? it took 40 of them, wearing bullet-proof vests he was said to be grossing $100,000 a day; 12 year old kids in New York get US$150 a day as lookouts. In the US, one in six Americans is now a drug user; there is scarcely a family which is untouched by addiction ? broken parents, battered kids, whole neighbourhoods terrorised by the cocaine gangs, executions, urban violence at an all-time high. The police won an emergency grant of $1.7 billion and have been arming themselves with hot pursuit jets, machine guns, helicopters, high-speed patrol boats, radar balloons.Last year, US authorities seized 35,000 kilos of cocaine, an increase of 1,800% in six years, and barely a quarter of consumption. The Caribbean has been sucked into this war because its poorly policed and often under-populated islands make perfect way ? stations for entry into the US. Government officials from several regional countries have been jaded ? Belize, Suriname, the Chief Minister of the Turks and Caicos Islands ? and plenty more have been accused (Cuba, the Bahamas, Haiti). Jamaican businessmen are screaming for better policing before their US trade is mortally wounded; Air Jamaica has paid millions in fines because of smuggling, BWIA has slapped an extra charge on passengers for more rigorous security, the Cayman- based Kirk shipping line was fined US$103 million for a haul of ganja. But the region is essentially unpoliceable; and the drug barons are generously paying their dealers in kind, so that the Caribbean becomes a market as well as a transit area. In this country, cocaine arrests soared from 3 in 7978 to 619 in 1985, and seizures from an eighth of an ounce to 16 kilos, but it mode no impact. Thousands of people know who the big dealers are and how the drugs are moved; but nobody can touch them. Meanwhile the stories multiply --. kids in school, contaminated sno-cones, laced drinks at kids' parties, amusing games like Blue Star using tattoos soaked in LSD. There are heroic efforts by such bodies as New Life Ministries and Samoan House; but so far the response of those authorities with any real power has been utterly pitiful. The Scott Drug Report came and went; there are sporadic ganja raids, a few minor arrests, periodic official assurances and flurries of top-level meetings. But the big boys go about their business confident that they are untouchable. In the US, the Customs Department is clamouring for the confiscation of the passport of any American merely found carrying a joint; slowly it is dawning on people that this is a national security threat far more dangerous than communists, and that America's huge appetite for drugs guarantees that production will continue to expand. US grants to the big three cocaine countries for anti-drug programmes last year was merely $48.8 million, less than half the Contras got. Here at home, we talk earnestly about changes in bail regulations, the legality of property seizures, ways of cutting out court delays. We fiddle while the country burns, while the kids are entangled, while the pay-offs multiply. This is no party or partisan Issue; it's a national emergency with widespread support for a return to law and order. Mr. Attorney General, Mr. Police Commissioner ? for heaven's sake, for pity's sake, some real action! (AFIO COMMENT: The intelligence connection in this case is indirect, but nonetheless real: Not only is the narcotics trade a subject of interest to various intelligence agencies, but adversaries have frequently tried to link our intelligence personnel to narcotics traffic. This outcry in a Caribbean publication deserves our attention. Many thanks to the sender, who does not wish to be named.) - 12 - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800160006-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800160006-0 THE BOSTON GLOBE 14 May 1988 CENTERPIECE Trying to put the CIA on '88 agenda By Leonard Bushkoff Special to The Globe ? ' CAMBRIDGE ? Something is miss- ing thus far from the presidential campaign: the CIA. ; Even Jesse Jackson has shunned an issue over Which rival candidates have, either stumbled or soared since the mid- 1970s. In 1976. Carter proposed a reformed and restrained CIA; in 1980, Reagan de- manded an aggressive and unleashed CIA; and in 1984, Mondale used the contra con- flict to denounce C1A-sponsored undeclared wars. By contrast this election promises bipartisan discretion on the _intelligence front. It won't last if John Stockwell and the other members of ARDIS (Association for Responsible Dissent) have their way. They see the CIA as the operational arm of an "invisible government" whose members, they allege are running American foreign policy as they choose, independently of Congress and the public. Stockwell, an ex-Marine officer and for- mer CIA case officer in sub-Saharan Africa, contended in a recent interview while in' Cambridge for a speaking engagement that "the CIA poses theultimate threat to de- mocracy, and should be dismantled for the good of the United States and the world." He does not exempt CIA intelligence-gather- ing: "It is necessary and legitimate, but is tainted by the association with covert oper- ations, which continues to dominate the CIA." Stockwell served in the CIA for 13 years;i he perceives it now as a self-perpetuating' power elite, dedicated to controlling the Third- World, and ? in some cases ?' to ... .. feathering its own nest. He cites retired CIA bigwigs who immediately Join companies they have backed while in the agency, and others who allegedly dip into the till: "When you're involved in a really big operation ? as I was in Angola in 1975 ? there's a lot of money floating around, all in cash. Say you have family problems, and one way out is a psychiatrist, or a big vaca- ijOrl, or a fancy Swiss boarding school for the kids. It's pretty hard not to Cake some of that cash, which you're handing out any- way to crooked provincial chiefs or officers who just scribble an illegible receipt in re- turn." One answer ? of sorts ? is the lie detec- tor, but Stockwell has doubts. "The Soviets and Cubans have courses in how to beat the box, and I've seen perfectly innocent people who were so nervous that they threw it out of whack. When I was a case officer, I sweated to get my accounts abso- lutely right, because I never knew when I was going to be 'boxed.' But you just don't 'box' a top guy with 30 years service. It's ,the old liouble standard: the higher you go. Ihe-less-flief'check-on ' - So Stockwell and ARDIS are working to get the CIA ? especially covert operations ? back on the political agenda. "We've been going to states where primaries were under way, trying to get candidates to publicly discuss the CIA," said Stockwell.. "All the Republicans have refused, though the staff people were willing to talk with us." The Democrats were somewhat more re-1 sponsive. "Gore and- Gephardt were against contra aid, but wouldn't commit themselves on the CIA; they wanted a case- by-case approach. The Simon people sent a staffee to several public forums in New Hampshire, and his position was that the covert action mechanism should be pre- served, but used very sparingly." The Jack- son camp refused to commit itself, citing the need to reinforce its moderate image. Stockwell finds that Dukakis strongly opposes big covert operations such as over- throwing the Guatemalan government in 1954 and conspiring against Allende in Chile during the early 1970s, "Dukakis was a student in Peru in 1954," Stockwell said, "and he felt the backlash from the Guatemalan coup." And Dukakis position papers demand strict control and account- ability for all intelligence operations, with' prosecution for anyone breaking the law. Stockwell.- who-has- been publicly- criti-1 cizing the CIA since he resigned in 1977,1 wrote- "In Search of Enemies," an autobio- graphical account of CIA operations in,An- gola, and went on the lecture circuit. He speaks to about 100 audiences a year, pri- marily at universities, but also to business and other groups in central Texas. where I he lives. "I had a lecture in 1984 before an Air Force group, about 50 or so pilots and oth- ers," he remembers, "and I thought they were going to eat me alive: you know. for- mer CIA guy turned lefty. So they started throwing tough questions at me, and threw answers right back, and we kept at It. went on for hours, and some of those fel- lows said I really made them think, gave them a different view of things. And that it-lade me feel great." ? ? The birth of the Association for Respon- sible Dissent in June 1987, resulted from Stockwell's lecturing, "You go around the country, and you meet people, and they say to you, 'John, you really should help get people together, do something about the contras and the AngqIa fighting.' So I final- ly did." ? 4:1; tylx- Stockwell appro foe:groun of 30 well-known politica *fists, many of whom had been part of Ihe foreign policy system but had turned against it: Daniel Ellsberg; David MacMichael, a former CIA analyst; Charles Clemens, a Vietnam veter- an-turned-doctor in El Salvador; Brian Willson, who gained national prominence when struck by a military train while pick- eting in California; Wilbur Crane Eveland, a government Middle East specialist in the 1950s and after; and Philip Agee, the high- ly controversial ex-CIA officer. Stockwell of- fers no apologies for backing Agee, whose close Cuban connections disturbed some ARDIS members. ARDIS also has attracted 1,500 support- ing members, particularly after a well-re- ported press conference in Washington during late November that brought inquir- ies from more than 100 former CIA officers who have been questioning their service. (AFIO COMMENT: This interview/article is unintentionally revealing. Stockwell has now been on his anti-CIA crusade for eleven years. While he continues to preach to the choir in aca- demic institutions, the political winds have shifted direction, and no serious political fig- ure will have anything to do with him. So, having no other place to go, he remains at the fringes of political discourse. - Many thanks to the sender, Lt. Col, W. W. Buhl, Syracuse, NY. - 13 - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800160006-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized, Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800160006-0 Note: :.rtist Rejects Commission DENVER POST ? 2 July 1988 The detail i are' sinrseeret, but - what's known is that the CIA is ex- panding its headquarters in north- ern Virginia, with new offices cov- ering 1 million square feet. The CIA agreed to commission art for the new digs7-7'_one?artist to adorn the new lobby, one to beautify the grounds outside. _ . But Mullican approached the is- sue just as an artist would ? which is to says Impressionistically. "It's like, when think CIA, I think Wherr.J..7qt I see a .g1W*4reak out. . (AFIO COMMETIT His brush .)yrobably wasn't bullet - proof . - Thanks to How- ard E. Steen of Aurora, CO, and Rinehart S. Potts of Glassboro, NJ. "Whispery" Secret ALBUQUERQUE JOURNAL 26 July 1988 WASHINGTON ? Psst! Tucked away on the sixth floor of a down- town Washington office building is a bookstore for spies where you, can learn how to change your identity, determine if your tele- phone is bugged, look inside the, KGB or get some self-help guidance, on becoming an agent. But you almost have to engage inj espionage to find the National In- telligence Book Center, which specializes in books, magazines, computer software and tapes on spies, cryptography, surveillance, the CIA, the KGB and spooks of all kinds. It is one of Washington's secrets, ' this whispery one-room shop.; (AFIO COMMENT: Not onryt , did they discover the "se- crdt" book center, but the director and her customers were interviewed and pic- tures were taken. Such genius! Well, we hope it helps busihess. - We can't hame all contributors; the clipping we used came from Lt. Col. William F. Frick of Tucumcari, NM, and Lt. Col. A. Lipp of Sao Paulo sent a Portuguese version! LCOMIC CORNER/ All items on this page are excerpts. From a Letter to A Soviet Editor - NEW YORK TIMES 12 June 1988 . "A permanent commission concerned with internal affairs and state security should be organized in the Council of Ministers. It would be required to conduct , mandatory reviews of the Ministry of internal Affairs and the Committee for State Security (the K.G.B.). "Democratic Perestroika Club" Komsomolskaya Pravaa, June 7. (AFIO COMMENT: The sender, Joseph C. Goulden of Washington, DC, wonders If we alight be seeing the first stir- -rings of a "Churchski Committee." IC:: 'a delightful thought. Supporters of pur Church Committee should sign on!)] Libertarian Librarians _ ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS 25 August 1988 LIBRARIES may be for sleeping, but they certainly are not for. spying. - _ _ It never occurred 03 the millions of us who charged out of the schoolhouse door daily to enter these portals of pensive- ness that sleuths and saboteurs lurked around the Dewey decimal system. We now are told, however, that in this modern world of microfiche and retrieval systems, the Russians are coming, the Russians are coming. They are coming to absorb, copy, photograph, recruit, subvert ? and anything else stack operatives do. No less an austere body than the Federal Bureau of Investigation is asking librarians to keep a sharp eye out for suspicious-looking characters, to monitor what they read and checkout, and then to tell all to the bureau. Judith Krug, director of the American Library Associa- ? tion's Office for Intellectual Freedom, says this type of FBI request is in direct contradiction to what the Library Association stands for." She adds that it is a misuse of library records, which are private and confidential. Krug points out that 38 states have statutes making it illegal for librarians to make public the names of individual users and what materials they are using. (AFIO COMMENT : We've wondered when it would come to this: Telling the FBI is the same as telling the public! - Thanks to our top contributor, Henry N. Schladt of Colorado Springs, CO.) _ , Penetrating Nicaraguan 1 ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS 20 May 1_988_ MANAGUA, Nicaragua (AP) --The -government newspaper quoted Interior Minister Tomas Borge yesterday as saying a Nicaraguan journallit penetrat- ed the CIA as a Sandinisth agent. ? The reporter was identified as Marla Lourdes Pal- lais Checa, a graduate of Columbia University in New York. She is a niece of the late Anastasio Somoza, the Nicaraguan dictator overthrown by the Sandinistas in ' July 1979.Barricaa, the Sandinista newspaper, quoted Borge) as saying Pallais was "a counterintelligence aged who worked in enemy ranks." It said he made th remarks Sunday during a tour of Nicaragua's remot ? Caribbean coast. (AFIO COMMENT: What about the re- ) putation of Nicaraguan journalism? Doesn't anybody care? - Again, many thanks to Howard E. S teen. ) -Wi---ightfully Bored PUNCH MAGAZINE 22 April 1988 Anyway, my friend Mr Dickin- son who runs the Bear Hotel in Devizes, the finest watering-hole in the West, secreted me a copy of Spy- . catcher the other night, having . smuggled it hack from Australia '1 (we're way behind the times down here in Wiltshire) and I've come to the conclusion after just a few pages ' that old Peter Wright and company are just as boring as the spies they never seemed to catch. (AFIO COMMENT: He's got a point. - Thanks again to Howard E. Steen of Aurora, CO.)( Where was George? DALIAS TIMES HERALD 20 July 1988 WASHINGTON -- A'Teportl that Vice President George Bush worked for the Central Intelligence Agency in the, early 1960s as an operative ap- pears to be a case of mistaken identity, the CIA said Tues- day. The agency has identified a George William Bush, who worked at CIA headquarters during that period and who is apparently the one mentioned in a recently discovered FBI memorandum, said ,..CIA spokeswohiln- Sharron' Baso. (AFIO COMMENT: Good .thing the other Bush was only CIA Director: Many thanks to our a- nonymous Dallas, TX, contributor . ) ? A Book -Review PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER 1 August 1988 This book is highly tendentious; its. data is shaped and manipulated to bolster Casey's rationale for strong intelligence systems, and pot to in, vestigate what the OSS actually ac- complished.. . (IO COMMENT: In making a case for strong intel- ligence, Casey was clear- ly out of line - Thanks ; ,to Rinehart S. Potts of IGla ssboro , NJ.) - lil - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800160006-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800160006-0 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF AFIO It is my pleasure to invite you to join the Association of Former Intelligence Officers. Our Association was organized in 1975 by David Atlee Phillips and former intelligence personnel from the Federal military and civilian agencies. AFIO: Provides a forum for former intelligence people to continue to serve. Promotes public understanding of the need for strong U.S. intelligence. Has about 3400 members nationwide and 20 local chapters. Promotes education programs explaining the importance of intelligence and provides over 90 college professors with the opportunity to receive books and monographs relating to intelligence and, if requested, provide speakers. Distributes a quarterly journal news, views and book reviews related to intelligence, and a quarterly digest of current intelligence news commentary. Responds to congressional requests for AFIO views and proposed legislation. Through local chapters, provides speakers to civic, academic and professional groups. Responds to press queries and suggests participants for radio and TV programs on intelligence and national security issues. Holds an annual convention with distinguished speakers and panelists. As an educational foundation it is tax expemt [IRS 501(c)(3)]. Annual dues ($25.00) and donations are tax deductible. MEMBERSHIP Full Membership is available to U.S. citizens who have served with any U.S. Government intelligence or counterintelligence organization. Only full members have the right to vote. Associate Membership is available to U.S. citizens who have not served as intelligence personnel but do support the aims of AFIO. Life Membership is available for Full and Associate members for $250.00 and is tax deductible. AFIO Directors and Officers Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000800160006-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800160006-0 APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP Mr. NAME Mrs. AFIO 6723 Whittier Avenue, Suite 303A McLean, Virginia 22101 Telephone: (703) 790-0320 Miss (Last) (First) (MI.) 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