NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY TUESDAY 19 JANUARY 1988

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T00113R000100140008-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 18, 2013
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: January 19, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Tuesday
19 January 1988
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--Yarseepa,
CPAS Nb D 88-014JX
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19 January 1988
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Contents
Haiti: Low Voter Turnout
1
Central America: Summit Demands Immediate Compliance
2
Argentina: Army Rebels Surrender
3
Taiwan: Political Developments
4
Afghanistan: Views on Possible Soviet Initiatives
5
Iran-Iraq: Developments in the Ground Fighting
6
China: Officials Debating Farm Problems
7
Notes
Israel: Relative Calm Over Weekend
8
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Mozambique: Expanding Military Ties to West
9
Ethiopia-Sudan: Relations Deteriorating
9
USSR: Further Restructuring of Foreign Trade Sector
10
Bangladesh: Parliamentary Elections Rescheduled
10
In Brief
11
Special Analyses
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Egypt-Jordan-Syria: Reaction to Gaza, West Bank Unrest
14
Cambodia: Diplomatic Maneuvering Intensifies
15
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HAITI:
Low Voter Turnout
Voter participation was minimal during the presidential election
Sunday in which the military appears to have backed centrist
candidate Leslie Manigat, but the result may not be known for
several days.
Press reports estimate voter turnout at about 5 percent
US officials in Port-au-Prince say the election
was characterized by widespread disorganization and apparent fraud.
The military and police presence in the capital and other areas was
heavy, and few incidents of violence were reported
the police in some places escorted
busloads of voters to polling stations.
Comment: Fear of violence probably contributed to the sparse voter
participation as much as opposition calls for a boycott, despite
government efforts to provide security and to encourage voter
turnout. The heavy presence of security forces may have discouraged
Duvalierist and leftwing extremists from attempting to disrupt the
balloting. Nevertheless, tensions probably will remain high at least
until the inauguration of a civilian president on 7 February.
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In the event no candidate wins a majority of the vote, a runoff election 25X6
between the two top contenders is scheduled for 31 January.
a runoff seems unlikely.
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Key Results of the Central American Summit
Summit Joint Communique
Provisions
Comment
Immediate and total compliance with peace
accord, especially on dialogue, cease-fires,
amnesty, and democratization.
Rejection of Nicaragua's attempt to condition
compliance on verified end to US aid to the
insurgents.
Honduran obligation to cut aid to
anti-Sandinistas implicit in demand for
full compliance.
No criticism of US aid to Nicaraguan
guerrillas or joint appeal to US to respect
agreement.
Central American Foreign Ministers to review
report of International Verification
Commission and have principal role in future
verification.
Contadora countries removed from
verification role because of the
pro-Sandinista slant of their presummit
report; no progress on creation of border-
monitoring force; no dates for review of
compliance.
Importance of Central American parliament
underscored.
No timetable given for elections to
parliament.
Commitment to deal with arms levels and
foreign military advisers.
Topics probably received scant attention;
joint meeting with Contadora countries next
month on security issues.
Nicaragua's Announcement
Nationwide state of emergency suspended
immediately.
No comment yet on other communique
demands including total press freedom and
end to special tribunals; arrest of internal
opposition leaders intended to discourage
ties to insurgents.
Government to participate in direct cease-fire
talks with rebels in San Jose.
Not following Salvadoran example of
high-level talks with insurgents in national
capital; foreigners probably will still form part
of government team.
Broader amnesty to be implemented on
cease-fire accord; if no agreement, prisoners
will be released if US or non-Central
American governments accept them.
Contrasts with approach of democracies,
which immediately released prisoners; Duarte
says Nicaraguan plan not in compliance.
Central American parliament elections
"within previously established time limit."
Probably means by mid-1988, target date in
peace accord; Sandinistas probably hope to
force attention on election while dragging out
cease-fire talks.
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CENTRAL
AMERICA:
Summit Demands Immediate Compliance
The democracies have put Nicaragua on the defensive by
Insisting on immediate compliance with the peace accord, but
the Sandinistas calculate their concessions will be enough to
help defeat renewal of US aid to the insurgents.
US Embassy and press reports indicate Salvadoran President Duarte
and Honduran President Azcona took the lead in opposing extensions
of the deadline for compliance. The summit communique issued
Saturday underscored the need for full democratization without
conditions or excuses. Nicaragua, which previously had maintained its
commitments were contingent on verification that US aid to the
insurgents had ended, announced it was lifting the state of
emergency, ready to begin direct talks with the rebels, and willing to
release all political prisoners.
The communique did not call on the US to end aid to the
anti-Sandinistas. Nicaragua, however, has warned that approval
of additional funds will kill the peace agreement.
The five Presidents also decided to strip the International Verification
Commission?dominated by the Contadora countries?of principal
responsibility for verification, assigning that role to the Central
American Foreign Ministers. The summit, however, set no new date
for evaluating compliance and made no progress toward creating a
border-monitoring force.
Comment: Although Nicaragua probably entered the meeting ready
to make concessions to influence the vote on aid to the insurgents,
pressure from the democracies probably forced more rapid changes
than the Sandinistas wanted. Nevertheless, Managua's gestures on
cease-fire talks and amnesty fall far short of measures San Salvador
has taken, and recent detentions of Nicaraguan internal opposition
leaders suggest the regime does not intend to relax all political
restrictions.
The democracies may not issue a joint evaluation of Nicaraguan
compliance before the US aid vote. For the long run, however, they
have increased their prospects for holding Nicaragua to account by
removing the Contadora group from verification.
Nicaragua probably will try to keep the spotlight on Honduras, which
is obligated to end aid to the anti-Sandinistas. Azcona, however,
probably believes that his offer to allow inspections and the delay in
creating a border-monitoring force will give his government breathing
room.
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Military Units in Rebellion, 18 January
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ARGENTINA: Army Rebels Surrender
Although Army rebels led by Lt. Col. Aldo Rico surrendered
yesterday, President Alfonsin must move quickly to reimpose
his authority over the armed forces to prevent additional
disobedience.
The clash between Rico's group and government forces at Monte
Caseros lasted several hours and resulted in casualties on both sides.
Four other rebel units scattered throughout the country capitulated
yesterday without incident, as did a group of Air Force commandos
who briefly seized control of a Buenos Aires airport. The government
has announced it will court-martial at least 13 officers from the
21st Mountain Infantry at Las Lajas; it is holding Rico?and several of
his followers?at undisclosed military installations pending a decision
regarding prosecution.
The US Embassy reports rumors continue to circulate that other
units?including some at the large Campo de Mayo installation in
Buenos Aires and the 22nd Infantry regiment at Marquesado?may
attempt additional acts of insubordination. The Embassy adds that
the government is closely monitoring these units and has readied
troops to quash any further uprisings. Press reports indicate that
representatives of all of Argentina's major political parties, along with
labor and business organizations, have given their support to Alfonsin
and the democratic system.
Comment: Alfonsin's success in mustering troops has strengthened
his hand, but civil-military tensions will remain acute over the next few
days. Many officers?although not Rico supporters?probably harbor
resentment against the Army Chief of Staff for using force against his
own troops. Moreover, the issues of greatest concern to the military
institution, such as the continued threat of human rights trials and
budget grievances, remain unresolved.
The government must move quickly to reestablish its authority and
prosecute at least the instigators of the rebellion, the second major
challenge in a year. Disgruntled officers would probably view
concessions by Alfonsin as a sign of weakness and might again
confront the administration.
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TAIWAN: Political Developments
Taipei remains quiet as funeral arrangements for the late
President proceed, but the conviction of two oppositionists for
sedition over the weekend could heighten tensions with the
Democratic Progressive Party.
The Kuomintang announced Saturday that Chiang Ching-kuo will be
buried 30 January, and his body will lie in state at the Martyrs Shrine
in Taipei until then.
The American Institute in Taiwan reports Premier Yu Kuo-hua will
submit his resignation to President Li Teng-hui. Li has said, however,
that Yu will be asked to stay on. At the same time, the Kuomintang
Central Standing Committee has decided not to name an acting party
chairman but will elect Chiang's replacement at the Kuomintang
Congress in July. Leading candidates for the job reportedly are Yu, Li,
party elder Huang Shao-ku, and Secretary General Li Huan.
Meanwhile, Chief of Staff Hao Po-ts'un and Defense Minister Cheng
Wei-yuan have pledged to support the new President.
A Taipei high court Saturday convicted two opposition members for
10 and 11 years, respectively, for sedition for supporting Taiwan
independence. The Democratic Progressive Party has protested and
promised new demonstrations but said it will not violate the ban on
protests until the official mourning period ends 12 February.
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Comment: Premier Vu's resignation is an attempt to strengthen his 25X1
own standing in political maneuvering by securing President Li's
endorsement now. The decision not to name an acting party chairman
works to Li Huan's advantage because he will continue to run the
Kuomintang on a day-to-day basis and oversee the arrangements for
the congress.
The Democratic Progressive Party probably decided to delay any
demonstrations to avoid a confrontation with the security services.
More radical members of the opposition may use the visit of US
Congressional delegations this week to protest the convictions.
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AFGHANISTAN: Views on Possible Soviet Initiatives
The Afghan insurgents would talk directly to Moscow about a
political settlement of the war, but they almost certainly would
reject any plan that did not include a short withdrawal schedule
and the abandonment of the current Kabul regime.
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According to the US Embassy in Moscow, the Soviets may increase
their direct dealings with the resistance in the effort to find a
face-saving political settlement. They have talked with various
insurgents since 1979, and the guerrillas consistently claim they want
to meet the Soviets.
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze recently told the US Ambassador
that Moscow is considering plans for province-by-province troop
withdrawals. Kabul's media have repeatedly claimed the Soviets
will leave pacified provinces. Moscow says it has left 12 of the
29 provinces in Afghanistan
The Soviets, according to US officials in Moscow, may see their
recent spate of economic agreements with Kabul as, in part, a way to
buy insurgent cooperation during a withdrawal with promises of aid
for postwar reconstruction. Moscow and Kabul have recently
concluded accords on trade, agriculture, and energy.
Comment: Neither the insurgent political leaders in Peshawar nor
their commanders believe Moscow is sincere in its oft-stated desire to
leave Afghanistan. And the resistance will accept none of Moscow's
rhetoric until the Soviets come up with a short timetable and actually
begin to withdraw.
Soviet efforts to conclude province-by-province cease-fires with the
guerrillas probably would not succeed. Although some field
commanders would make deals with the Soviets, the fragmented
nature of the insurgency makes it difficult for a single commander to
guarantee tranquility in an entire province. Moreover, Afghan feelings
are such that commanders could not prevent attacks on the
withdrawing Soviets by some of their men intent on revenge.
Most insurgent leaders who are aware of the new Soviet-Afghan
economic accords probably regard them as a sign that Moscow will
stay in Afghanistan. Although an insurgent regime in Kabul would
seek proper ties to the USSR, it almost certainly would declare that it
was not bound by any agreement the Afghan Communists reached
with Moscow.
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IRAN-IRAQ: Developments in the Ground Fighting
Iran has increased its joint operations with Kurdish rebels in
northern Iraq over the past few days, probably as a prelude to
more intensive attacks on the southern front where preparations
for a large offensive continue.
Iran claims its forces, assisted by Kurdish guerrillas, captured several
hundred square miles of new territory and killed or wounded more
than 1,000 Iraqi soldiers in fighting on the northern front over the
weekend. Iraq denies the claim and says it has contained all the
Iranian attacks.
Comment: Iran's limited gains on the northern front are unlikely to
pose an immediate threat to Iraqi strategic interests there, and
Baghdad almost certainly will be able to contain the Iranians without
committing many of its reserves or moving a large number of forces
from the south. The Iranian attacks probably signal the beginning of
more intensive?albeit still limited?fighting in the ground war,
however, as a prelude to a large offensive.
the main
thrust of Iran's offensive this year will again be on the southern front.
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CHINA: Officials Debating Farm Problems
The somber tone of the Agricultural Minister's yearend report to
the Standing Committee of China's parliament Saturday and the
overdue annual party document on rural policy indicate officials
are grappling with tough choices in agriculture?once the
showpiece of reform.
The Minister's report highlighted the failure of grain and cotton to
meet production targets and the return to rationing of sugar and
pork?which accounts for more than 85 percent of China's meat
consumption. He blamed below-market state prices for the
production shortfalls as well as stepped-up consumer demand.
As a result of the farm problems, China's top party agricultural
advisor has spearheaded a move to transfer land-use rights, which
will allow farmers to purchase rights from other peasants and to
benefit from larger scale operations. Beijing hopes this will allay
peasants' lingering doubts about the permanence of rural policy and
increase their stake in the land's upkeep. Moreover, the US Embassy
reports the Chinese are debating a proposal that calls for a rise in
state procurement prices to improve grain's profitability over cash
crops. To counter chronic fertilizer shortages, the proposal also
recommends spurring domestic production by about 25 percent over
the next few years while supplementing current stocks with imports.
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Comment: The Agricultural Minister's report and the absence of the
party's annual farm policy guidelines?issued early this month to local
officials and farmers?indicate Chinese leaders are undecided about
how to proceed with rural reforms. The transfer of land-use rights
almost certainly will generate ideological controversy because of its
capitalist overtones and may be resisted by peasants who work in
rural industries but guard their land-use rights as insurance against
shifts in rural policy. In addition, only marginal price hikes for grain
are possible this year because of the current budget deficit, and state
investment in the countryside will probably see only a small increase.
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ISRAEL: Relative Calm Over Weekend
Israeli security enforced strict curfews on most of the West Bank and
Gaza Strip over a weekend marred by violent clashes on Jerusalem's
Temple Mount on Friday. Several Palestinians were wounded, and
tear gas was used at Muslim holy shrines?the Dome of the Rock and
the AI-Aqsa Mosque. By yesterday, however, disturbances
throughout the territories had subsided, allowing some Palestinians to
return to jobs in Israel proper and UN food deliveries to Gazan
refugee camps, according to press reports. Scattered commercial
strikes continued in the occupied territories and East Jerusalem.
Comment: As a result of the violence in Jerusalem, Israeli Arab
citizens have decided to increase humanitarian aid to Palestinians in
the occupied territories and also plan sympathy demonstrations on
Saturday. Concern over the effects of continuing unrest may have
prompted the Israeli army decision yesterday to begin gradually
replacing regular troops with reservists. Israeli commanders are
clearly concerned that military readiness has already suffered from
disrupted training cycles as regular units have been diverted to police
duties in the occupied territories.
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8 19 January 1988
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MOZAMBIQUE: Expanding Military Ties to West
France will soon provide nonlethal military assistance to Mozambique
and may send several civilian security advisers, according to the US
Embassy in Maputo. Spain recently agreed to train Mozambican
police and militia units, and Portugal this month is dispatching a
delegation to discuss military cooperation, including logistic support
and training, according to Embassy reports. The UK, which has been
training a small number of Mozambican military personnel in
neighboring Zimbabwe for the past two years, last month promised
$900,000 in nonlethal military aid to improve security along
Mozambique's Nacala and Limpopo rail lines.
Comment: West European governments want to encourage President
Chissano's pragmatic policies, especially his efforts to reduce
Mozambique's dependence on the USSR. The relatively small scale of
Western military aid, however, suggests Maputo is likely to remain
militarily dependent on Moscow for the foreseeable future. Last year,
Moscow provided approximately $140 million in equipment and some
800 military advisers to support the struggle against the RENAMO
insurgency.
ETHIOPIA-SUDAN: Relations Deteriorating
Relations between Addis Ababa and Khartoum are increasingly tense;
according to diplomatic reporting, Ethiopia's President Mengistu is
unwilling to negotiate his differences with Sudan's Prime Minister
Sadiq. A senior Ethiopian official contends Addis Ababa refused to
participate in bilateral talks last week because of Khartoum's "vicious
propaganda," but most senior
Sudanese officials believe Ethiopia wanted to embarrass Khartoum.
Comment: Addis Ababa's avoidance of serious talks with Khartoum
reflects in part Mengistu's anger at Sudan's continuing support for
Ethiopian rebels. Mengistu considers the Sadiq regime vulnerable
and hopes his backing for Sudanese insurgent leader Garang,
which has included cross-border artillery support and aerial
reconnaissance, will help topple it. Recent military successes by
Sudanese rebels in the dry season?usually a time for government
advances?will probably encourage Mengistu to provide additional
training, equipment, and logistic support. The Ethiopian famine will
further complicate relations. Thousands of refugees, primarily from
areas supporting anti-Mengistu rebels, are likely to cross into Sudan
seeking food.
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USSR: Further Restructuring of Foreign Trade Sector
TASS reports the USSR has abolished the Ministry of Foreign Trade
and the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations?which
administered foreign aid?and created the Ministry of Foreign
Economic Relations to replace them. Konstantin Katushev, Chairman
of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations since
November 1985, was chosen to head the new ministry. The
announcement gave no indication as to the new ministry's authority.
Comment: The restructuring probably is designed to prepare for
further decentralization of the foreign trade sector by improving high-
level coordination and trimming the bloated bureaucracy. The latter
would allow foreign trade experts to be reassigned to ministries and
enterprises with severe shortages and would give the leadership the
opportunity to eliminate personnel who are foot-dragging on
implementing reforms. A reorganization of the sector in 1986
established the State Foreign Economic Commission, which oversees
all foreign economic activity, including supervising the Foreign Trade
Ministry and the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations. It
also ended the Ministry's monopoly over trade by transferring some
of its foreign trade associations to ministries and other central bodies
and granting more than 20 ministries and 70 enterprises the right to
engage directly in ir7orting and exporting activities.
BANGLADESH: Parliamentary Elections Rescheduled
The five-day postponement of parliamentary elections by the
Bangladesh Election Commission to 3 March should buy President
Ershad more time to split the opposition and give some credibility to
the elections. Ershad is currently offering concessions to moderates
of the Awami League and the Bangladesh National Party, two major
opposition parties, to break their cohesion.I
Comment: The rescheduling of elections probably is an attempt by
Ershad to undermine opposition strikes scheduled for this week. The
Awami League and the BNP will continue to press for Ershad's
resignation and the supervision of the elections by a caretaker
government. Ershad claims he would win a presidential election, but
he is reluctant to step down to become a candidate. The Army,
however, might pressure him to take this drastic step if he is unable to
co-opt enough opposition moderates to participate in the March
polling.
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19 January 1988
Gulf of Aden
50 IGIornelem
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I VP oeuret
In Brief
Middle East
East Asia
? US Embassy in Sanaa reports discovery of two more oilfields in
North Yemen ... further drilling required to determine size ...
likely to boost Sanaa's oil reserves by 250 million barrels to
800 million barrels.
? Shia Amal announced end of two-year siege of Palestinian camps
in Lebanon in support of Palestinian unrest in Israeli-occupied
West Bank, Gaza... Syria probably behind gesture. . more than
2,500 killed in camps struggle, renewed conflict likely.
? South Korean forces on alert as Seoul implicates, threatens
North Korea in airliner bombing ... move to reassure public,
intimidate North ... Olympics, political transition, senior officials'
comments suggest military retaliation a long shot.
? China asking Japan for $13 billion in seven-year concessionary
loan?triple last loan?with disbursement in 1991 vice 1989 ...
Tokyo, at most, will double loan and disburse in 1990.
? China and Portugal exchanged documents of ratification Friday
for Macau's return to Chinese rule in 1999 ... joint groups now
begin hammering out technical details ... revising legal system,
localizing civil service may be difficult.
Europe
Africa
? French Prime Minister Chirac announced candidacy for president
Saturday ... probably hopes to exploit strong campaign skills,
increase pressure on others to enter, talk specifics ... reflects
growing concern about his low popularity.
? Algerian President Bendjedid apparently unable to get Tunisia to
accept Libya joining treaty linking countries ... Tunis reportedly
demanding Tripoli end support to Tunisian dissidents ... Qadhafi
postponed visit while US 6th Fleet Commander in Tunis.
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Domestic Implications of Unrest in the
Occupied Territories
All three states face domestic constraints on their reactions to the
Palestinian violence. Syria's President Assad, for example, will need
to ensure that his strong public approval of the unrest does not
provoke pro-Arafat protests in Syria that turn against his own regime.
US Embassy reporting suggests that his control over 250,000
Palestinians in Syria will continue to be sufficient to discourage such
protests.
Jordanian officials and the public are strongly In sympathy with
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, according to the US
Embassy in Amman. Government statements have been crafted to
reflect righteous anger, but media coverage has stopped well short of
urging continued unrest. Although Jordan hopes the disturbances
signal the beginning of serious Palestinian resistance in the occupied
territories, Amman fears the violence might strengthen PLO support
on both banks of the Jordan River.
Jordan will continue to impose implicit limits on permissible ways of
showing Palestinian solidarity in order to balance public support with
internal control. A few, mainly symbolic demonstrations have been
permitted, but Jordan's security forces arrested most of the leaders
of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine late last month to
prevent them from staging an unauthorized rally.
The Palestinian uprising has again made relations with Israel a focus
on domestic protest in Egypt, especially on campuses and around
mosques. According to Embassy reporting from Cairo, the violence
has given ammunition to radical shiekhs and student leaders trying to
turn Egyptians against the government. So far, the disturbances have
been easily controlled, but Egyptian officials fear that pro-Palestinian
demonstrations might catalyze protests of economic grievances.
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Special Analysis
EGYPT-JORDAN- Reaction to Gaza, West Bank Unrest
SYRIA:
Syria Is using the continuing violence in the occupied territories
as a propaganda weapon against Israel, while Jordan and Egypt
are trying to avoid damage to the peace process. All three states
are attempting to prevent pro-Palestinian sympathies among
their own people from spilling over into antigovernment
demonstrations.
Syria argues the violence vindicates its hard line on Arab-Israeli
peace issues, and Damascus has tried to encourage the unrest by
giving it full media play.
? Syria's Palestinian surrogates nonetheless have little influence
in the occupied territories.
For both Egypt and Jordan the violence underscores the need for a
revived peace process, including an international conference, but
neither appears to be contemplating foreign policy initiatives to
address the problem. Instead, Cairo and Amman will look to the US to
urge Israeli Prime Minister Shamir to be more accommodating on
peace negotiations and a workable plan for disposition of the
occupied territories. The violence adds new urgency to President
Mubarak's peace agenda when he visits Washington this month.
Egypt almost certainly will not sever relations with Israel?despite
official embarrassment and harshly critical comments in both the
establishment and opposition papers?as long as the violence does
not intensify beyond current levels.
? Cairo might consider recalling its Ambassador, but it wants to
preserve lines of communication with Tel Aviv.
? Egypt will have to balance its relationship with Israel, however,
with the need to maintain close ties to its Arab benefactors,
who are almost certain to increase pressure on the Egyptians
to take action.
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Special Analysis
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CAMBODIA:
Diplomatic Maneuvering Intensifies
Hints that Vietnam may be willing to withdraw from Cambodia by
the end of the year without a political settlement are the latest in
a series of moves by Vietnam, the USSR, and China to test the
diplomatic waters and to improve the negotiating environment.
Much of the maneuvering is tactical, and Prince Sihanouk and
Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen face a number of unresolved
issues as they resume talks this week.
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Vientiane, with Hanoi's approval, agreed
last month to
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exchange ambassadors with China for the first
Sino-Vietnamese border war of 1979. Beijing
time since the
believes the move
signals Vietnam's desire for better relations with China and possibly
Thailand, according to US diplomats. Vietnam last month also
announced a pulling back of troops from the
except near guerrilla bases in Thailand, partl
Thai-Cambodian border,
in response to
Bangkok's claimed withdrawal from the area.
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Soviets Seeking a Settlement
the Soviets have
begun to prod the
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Vietnamese more energetically to seek a political
settlement. They are
asking Vietnam to temper its objectives in Cambodia,
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the Soviets are emphasizing their growing
impatience with
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the stalemate in Cambodia and the economic burden on Moscow of
Vietnam's occupation. The Soviets seem ready to continue logistic
and financial assistance for the talks between Sihanouk and Hun Sen
in France.
China Showing Flexibility
China has adjusted its position in the past few months to demonstrate
a willingness to compromise. China's press is offering tentative
support for Sihanouk's efforts, and Chinese officials have not tried to
restrain him. Beijing has indicated it no longer supports the Khmer
Rouge as the "main body" in a future government, although it does
want the group to be represented. In other moves, China has eased
military pressure on Vietnam's northern frontier and, according to the
US Embassy in Bangkok, has discussed with Thailand ways to
negotiate a settlement in Cambodia.
continued
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Near-Term Objectives
Vietnam and the USSR want a political solution in Cambodia,
but they also have in mind more
immediate objectives. Vietnam almost certainly wants to press the
ASEAN nations and China to curb support for the resistance effort,
which is spearheaded by the internationally detested Khmer Rouge.
Hanoi also hopes to divide and isolate the Khmer
Rouge itself, particularly its most radical elements.
Moscow wants to convince Beijing that it is trying to overcome the
primary obstacle to better Sino-Soviet relations; it hopes diplomatic
pressure on Vietnam and highly visible efforts to promote
negotiations will suffice. The Soviets do not appear to be willing to
risk strained relations with Hanoi through more coercive action such
as threatening to reduce aid or adopting positions that undercut
Vietnamese interests
The Chinese reportedly want to appear interested in a political
settlement in part because they believe their control over Sihanouk
has diminished; they worry he might try to negotiate a separate peace
with Hun Sen if he concludes Beijing is intransigent. They also want to
stay close to ASEAN's position to avoid isolation and to preserve
close relations with Thailand, which are based largely on compatible
policies on Cambodia. Beijing also will continue to press Moscow to
edge Vietnam toward withdrawal as a precondition to improved
Sino-Soviet relations.
Effect on Negotiations
The recent moves probably will not produce a breakthrough in the
next round of talks between Sihanouk and Hun Sen, but the two will
be under pressure to show some results in order that the process
does not appear to stagnate. Moreover, the probing and subtle shifts
by the key players might eventually move them toward compromise. A
more flexible Vietnamese position on early withdrawal from
Cambodia would help accelerate the process, although Hanoi is not
likely to follow through without guarantees that the Khmer Rouge will
be neutralized and that outside support for the guerrillas will cease.
Moreover, the limits are vague on how much political control over
Cambodia that Vietnam is willing to relinquish for a settlement.
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