HAIG OFFERS CHALLENGING ASSESSMENT OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140001-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140001-4
Haig Offers Challenging Assessment of International Affairs
"I did not favor covert actions in Nicaragua." former
Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., acknowledged
at AFIO's winter luncheon. "I asked the President,
please, not to do it. Is it because I am against covert
action?" he asked, then responded quickly, "God forbid,
we are entitled to conduct covert action just as long as
there is no international regime prohibiting it which oth-
ers subscribe to."
Noting that "covert action is a contradiction in mod-
ern Washington," Haig recalled, "I said, Mr. President,
your staff will be briefing the press before the ink is dry."
"And," he continued, "they were, and I can tell you who
they were!" There was another reason, Haig recalled. "I
said, Mr. President, its a cop-out which enables you to
go to bed every night saying, 'Well, I'm doing something
against those Nicaraguan Marxists' and get up every
morning and still be loved by the American people."
"I believe that the issues are so black and white in
Central America - Cuban interventionism, Soviet invol-
vement," the former Secretary of State said, "that the
American people understand that and they should be
given that message and they will support actions, not
covert, that are necessary ..."
Suggesting that current policy invites escalation
and confrontation with the Soviets, Haig insisted, "If its
worth one drop of American blood, then we must go in
with a scenario that visualizes victory, and early on, or
best we stay out. Now that's not a criticism of covert
action; it's just simply an expression of reality in this
city."
In his December 9th talk to AFIO at the Ft. Myer
Officers Club, Haig pulled no punches in addressing
other issues of the day, such as protectionism, economic
policy, terrorism, intelligence and the rumors he would
be a candidate for the presidency in 1988.
Of intelligence: "I would like to reflect the concern I
have had about American intelligence, and I remember
first touching upon it as early as 1965 when I sensed, at
least in the Defense Department, a tendency to move
away from the most important asset our nation has, and
that is the human element in our intelligence structure,
towaffds a preoccupation with modern technology. To
the point where at that time, and it continues very lar-
gely til this day, Presidents cannot accept a fact as a fact
unless they are provided with a satellite photograph or a
hard communications intercept." He had no illusions.
Secretary Haig
"As you know, that is a rebuilding job which I am
pleased that Bill Casey is acutely conscious of - that
must take place with all our intelligence community."
Haig specifically noted the necessity of building respect
for and the career development of intelligence person-
nel. Recalling criticism of the intelligence community in
the past, the former secretary of state noted, "And how
important it is to remember that whether it be govern-
ment or business, the human species is never perfect
and that qualified, capable people must be permitted a
misjudgment or two along the way, provided their track
record justifies the kind of overall confidence that the
right time and performance would justify."
The speaker then confided to the unwary audience,
"You can say you heard it first here today, but I had
lunch with Bill Casey the other day and got the lowdown
on Yurchenko. He wasn't a double agent. He didn't have
girl problems. It seems that Bill foolishly scheduled him
for the David Brinkley show the following Sunday, and
the guy just couldn't face Sam Donaldson."
Terrorism also drew the speaker's attention: "The
second area where the administration, I think, and in
fact every administration and most of the countries in
the free world have been confused is a clear-headed
approach to the phenomena of international terrorism ...
It has, with its ambiguity, created a means and metho-
dology for smaller states to achieve political change at
the expense of larger states."
Approved For Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140001-4
 Approved For Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140001-4
Haig Assesses International Affairs
(Continued from page 1)
He cautioned, 'We too frequently focus our atten-
tion on the blood-shed and the injustice to the innocent
victims of terrorism. We too infrequently ask ourselves,
'Is this terrorist act an effort to circumvent classic deter-
rents in order to achieve a political objective which is not
in the best interests of the American people. If we con-
clude that it is, then we have no alternative but to act."
Haig suggested we have been handicapped by four
misjudgments in recent months and years. "The first is
that in our decision-making circles we tend to be more
concerned about how our potential action will be received
by the American electorate here at home, rather than
how it will be perceived by the perpetrators of that
crime. If we continue to be dominated by such populist
notions, we're going to fail ... A second delusion has
been our tendency to believe that counteraction that
risks innocent lives somehow dirties our hands. Well,
the practical consequence of this has just achieved
increased credibility - this specious theory - as the
result of the high costs of the Egyptian action on the
airplane. But, you know the practical consequence of
being totally constrained by that concern is to raise the
perpetrator of the crime to the same moral plane as the
victims of the crime, and insures paralysis and lack of
action and continuation of the phenomena at greater
cost to the American people and to world resolve." The
clear-headed judgment to be made, he said is "whether
or not the risking of the lives of innocent hostages is
justified in the final analysis by the greater protection it
will provide to all Americans."
"The third fallacy," Haig said, "has been our ten-
dency to peel over or camouflage the active role of
known government support for terrorist activities, espe-
cially the recent event in Lebanon, because we feel that
if we label a terrorist government as such, we may put
in jeopardy a larger objective such as the peace process
in the Middle East. This is precisely what has dominated
our unwillingness on at least two particular occasions to
label Syria as the catechist, the logistician and the over-
all director of terrorist attacks against the American
people. I don't have to tell this group the cost we paid
when our embassy was destroyed in West Beirut ... I
don't have to tell you that there was no doubt in the
highest circles of this government that the government
of Syria was behind the attack. Instead, we've subli-
mated it, and tended to point our finger exclusively at
Iran."
"It was an easy calculation in Damascus," the
speaker continued, "to move from that attack to the
murder of over two hundred, young, brave American
peacekeepers. How important it is that we understand
more clearly that we cannot sit down at a peace table
with Syria and arrive at a negotiated settlement that will
have any credibility if we continually overlook violation
of accepted rules of law by that government."
"And, finally, there's a great tendency in our coun-
try with our sensitivity toward social justice and human
rights and values to view terrorism as a phenomena, too
frequently as a justified manifestation of a frustrated
quest for social justice by a legitimate cause, whatever it
may be. My friends, we are a nation of law. Our foreign
policy, our security policy, our intelligence policy must
always give utmost credence and recognizance to the
desirability of kneading it into the national consensus to
accept the rule of law and peaceful change rather than
bloodshed, terrorism and wars of liberation. And, how
important it is we get to the task of doing so to meet this
terrorist challenge."
Haig also spoke of his concerns of the growing cri-
sis of international economics and the nation's failure to
recognize that in an interdependent world everything
that the United States does at home has an immediate
impact abroad. "Therefore, before pursuing actions here
at home we should calculate what the price will be of
the impact abroad." He also spoke of a trend toward
"intellectual religiosity" (which he labeled "Haig-speak"),
and its tendency to rush through simplistic economic
theories such as supply side, monetarism, "and now the
legislation of economic morality as a panacea for our
economic recovery." The speaker warned of "hits" on
revenue, a "fiscal flabbiness we face today," as being
"like the Chinese water treatment, a steady dripping
which skewed the vitality and health of a balance eco-
nomic policy." He warned of trends toward international
protectionism, giving as an example recent textile pro-
tection legislation. That legislation, which it has been
estimated will cost the U.S. taxpayer some $28 billion,
has also resulted in Chinese cutbacks in purchase of
wheat from that economically strained sector of the
American economy and has resulted in significant air-
plane construction cutbacks. "The United States imports
abut 30% of the dollars necessary to service this hor-
rendous [national] debt we have created. And, if retalia-
tory action were taken by our friends abroad in Europe
or Japan, and that flood of money were snuffed out, the
impact here for investment in the growth of American
economy could be devastating." He noted, too, that U.S.
policy in Latin America has made it dependent on trade
with the U.S. to service the debt created by that policy.
"If we suddenly turn off that trade they are going to be
facing default and the growing attraction for the silent
call of Fidel Castro who has urged them to tell the Uni-
ted States to go to in terms of paying their debt obliga-
tions," Haig said.
In extended remarks about the recent Summit
meeting and Soviet perception of U.S. policy and will,
the Soviet so-called "correlation of forces," the former
Secretary of State noted that "I suppose that after 20
years of dealing with Soviet bureaucrats at one level or
another I have concluded irrevocably that the Soviets
don't give a damn about western rhetoric; all they care
about is objective reality." He criticized recent balanced
budget legislation as "an executive cop-out." The effect
of the bill will be sizable cuts in defense spending, he
noted. "Every calculation made in Moscow is going to be
dominated by the perception of whether or not the United
States' people are going to be willing to sacrifice for
these vital defense needs."
The question of Haig's candidacy arose early during
the question and answer session, and the speaker took
the high ground in response. "It is a disservice for any
aspirant for the presidency in 1988 to be in the hustings
campaign today ... it does a disservice to our president,
whoever he may be of whatever party. He has an
(Continued on page 31
Approved For Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140001-4
 Approved For Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140001-4
Stillwell Defends Polygraph as Essential Security Tool
Former AFIO president Gen. Richard G. Stilwell
(USA-Ret.), a former deputy undersecretary of defense,
and chairman of the Department of Defense Security
Review Commission, has responded to wide-spread and
ill-founded criticisms of the use of the polygraph as one
of the elements in screening government employees for
access to highly-classified, sensitive national security
information and intelligence data. In the following, which
appeared in the Washington Post of January 6th, he
takes exception to an op-ed by Amb. Jeane Kirkpatrick
which appeared in that publication on December 29th.
I have never before been at odds with the views of Ambassador
Jeane Kirkpatrick. But I must take issue with her categoric rejection of
polygraph examinations as a means of deterring and detecting spies.
The analysis underpinning her conclusion was short on fact, long on
assertion.
Kirkpatrick confuses the device known as the "polygraph" with
the examination process in reaching a verdict of unreliability. The
polygraph simply records three or more physiological reactions, as one
input to a trained examiner who makes provisional judgments of truth
or deception in the context of extended dialogue, before and after the
recording, with the individuals concerned. Humans are not infallible.
However, to cite the American Foreign Service Association as author-
ity for unreliability of the process is as bereft of credibility as relying
only on the American Polygraph Association in rebuttal.
A wide range of professional organizations and scientists have
pursued the subject exhaustively for many years. Assessments vary,
but the weight of evidence is that under regulated conditions the
combination of electro-mechanical instrument and qualified examiner
is a very useful investigative tool. On the basis of its intensive
research, the National Security Agency concludes that, conducted by
experienced personnel in a setting that assures quality control, the
reliability of the process is 90 to 95 percent. That's far from perfect;
and for that reason no action can be taken against any government
employee solely on the basis of the polygraph examination.
Polygraphers face their greatest challenge in working across lin-
guistic and cultural barriers. The case of Larry Wu-Tai Chin is illustra-
tive. There's a report circulating, which the aforementioned State
Department affiliate saw fit to repeat without checking, that Chin
passed numerous polygraph tests. Not so. He was administered a
single examination and that in 1970 before the establishment of the
sophisticated control procedures in effect today.
Actually, the better gunge of reliability - and therefore utility - of
the polygraph examination is comparison with other investigative
techniques. In the experience of the Central Intelligence Agency and
National Security Agency, the examination has repeatedly produced
information relevant to an individual's trustworthiness that failed to
surface in background investigations or by other means. It is unrealis-
tic to expect background investigations - on which Kirkpatrick would
place full reliance - to turn up evidence of espionage. Character
flaws, probably; vulnerability to blackmail, perhaps; but intent to com-
mit espionage, no. Yet, there are numerous cases on record where the
polygraph examination has unmasked persons seeking employment
for the purpose of espionage.
Moreover, one must take heed of the testimony of convicted spies
such as Christopher Boyce and William Bell that they would not have
Haig
(Continued from page 2)
agenda which is urgent ... and it's a diversion from the
energies and attentions of the American people for that
urgent agenda." He also noted that many young, bright
candidates will be seeking election in the congressional
races of 1986. They will need, Haig said, America's
resources, attention and the concentration of the appa-
ratus 'of the political parties for this campaign. "And I
think that for candidates to be running around the coun-
try looking for the '88 nomination is wrong, ill-timed and
I'm not going to do it."
even considered espionage if they had had to undergo a periodic poly-
graph examination. And why did David Barnett, Edward Howard and
Ronald Pelton allegedly not become spies until after they had left their
respective agencies and their value to the KGB was dramatically
reduced?
All this said, Kirkpatrick would apparently object to polygraph
examinations for counter-espionage purposes even if they were
adjudged to be errorless. Her overriding concern is that examinations of
even limited scope (confined to such questions as "Are you a spy?")
given to a limited community (say, 1 percent of those holding security
clearances) would represent a gross intrusion upon the privacy of
government employees, leading to the "institutionalization of distrust."
That perception is baffling. Certainly the conduct of background inves-
tigations, whose pervasiveness varies with the sensitivity of the posi-
tion to be occupied, is an intrusion upon privacy; yet employees are
routinely asked to consent thereto. Certainly, too, the reporting of per-
sonal information that may have security significance is an intrusion
upon the individual concerned; yet commanders and supervisors are
required to tender such reports on their subordinates.
Access to classified information is, after all, a privilege - not a
right. And, given its primary responsibility for ensuring that its citizens
and institutions survive in freedom, our government must have the
requisite means to assess on a continuing basis those to whom it
entrusts the secrets sought by nations with hostile interests.
My entire adult life has been spent in the service of the United
States, on and off the battlefield, with the West Point motto my con-
stant lodestar. Rank and record notwithstanding, I deem it mete and
proper for my government to ask me to confirm, via a limited polygraph
examination, that I have but one allegiance. It seems only prudent to
do so before giving me the capability, should I wish t exploit it, to do
our nation incalculable harm. Moreover, I am ready to be the first
volunteer to set the pattern for sergeants and secretaries, communica-
tors and engineers who will share the capability.
Prior to .1983, the polygraph had never been used for any purpose
in the United Kingdom. In the wake of an espionage case involving
convicted spy Jeffrey Prime that rocked Britain, the government con-
cluded that it had no choice but to institute polygraph examinations of
limited counter-intelligence scope. Prime Minister Thatcher personally
addressed the Parliament to explain this break with tradition:
"The polygraph is the only measure of which it could be said with
any confidence that it would have protected [government secrets] from
Prime's treachery, either because it would have deterred him from
applying to on or would have exposed him in the course of examina-
tion. The [government) recognizes that a polygraph examination would
be seen by some as an unwarranted invasion of their privacy, but we
are dealing with matters of the highest national security, and those
who have access to the nation's most sensitive secrets must expect to
be subject to the most rigorous vetting procedures."
No one could have put it better.
[The commission's report, which examines the security
posture and practices in the Department of Defense and
recommends corrective measures, is available from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Request "Keeping
the Nation's Secrets," stock number 008-000-00435-
8. The cost is $2.50 per copy.]
AF/0 Spring Luncheon
Monday, April 14, 1986
Officers' Club, Ft. Myer, Virginia
Speaker to be announced
A luncheon flyer will be sent to all
members in the Washington area
3
Approved For Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140001-4
 Approved For Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140001-4
On the Intelligence Bookshelf ...
Intelligence and Policy
Godson, Roy (Ed.) Intelligence Requirements for the
1980's. Intelligence and Policy. Lexington, Mass.: Lex-
ington Books, 1985.
One principal purpose of intelligence is to assist in the formulation
of correct and feasible policy. Yet, experience too often leaves those
who have dealt with national security matters with the feeling that the
connection between the two is, in many instances, hard to discern or
elusive. Consequently, any effort to tackle this relationship, as did a
colloquium held in November 1984 - and whose proceedings com-
prise this volume - is welcome, especially by those who recognize the
intrinsic importance of the connection to intelligence's raison d'etre.
For them, the Preface to this seventh and last volume in the series by
the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) does not exaggerate
in ranking the subject first in importance.
The end of the CSI series allows us the perspective to discern the
meaning of its effort and to identify and isolate any significant contri-
bution made. CSI's appearance was one of the events that both
heralded the change in the American climate of the 1970s toward
intelligence and helped change that climate in academia and in the
thrust of public discussion. It also brought together, helped to identify
and gave prominence to a new species: those this author calls the
"intelligence intellectuals," a relative of that post-World War Two
phenomenon, the defense intellectual.
It was the first concerted effort outside the confines of the intelli-
gence world to examine the elements and principal aspects of this
world, with particular reference to American experience and conditions.
CSI spurred the interest of the academic world in the teaching of and
research into the subject, one of its stated goals. And though there is
an absence of hard evidence that it contributed to the improvement of
U.S. intelligence (another of the CSI goals), it was not for lack of trying,
as some of the papers in this volume alone will attest.
The format follows those of previous volumes: an introductory
essay by the editor; major essays (five); discussion papers (ten); and
short summaries of the general discussions that followed each seg-
ment. As to be expected in a collection of this sort, the quality and
pertinence of papers vary. Surprisingly, the thinnest presentation is
that on foreign policy by Richard Pipes, formerly of the NSC and now at
Harvard. His paper was meant either to be provocative or is the conse-
quence of a heavy work schedule. In addition to the patent expertise of
the participants and contributors, certain items and themes stand out:
a rare treatment of and spirited discussion on the subject of U.S.
strategic deception in peacetime; insights into Soviet foreign policy by
a former member of the Nomenklatura; the favorable atmosphere
toward the Team B concept; vigorous criticism of the House intelli-
gence committee by one of its former staff members; and the high-
lighting of intelligence's failures and limitations. In regard to the latter,
lacking is sufficient treatment for that phenomenon familiar to the
intelligence profession - instances of failure of policy makers to heed
good intelligence. Noticeable, too, is the absence of any meaningful
career U.S. Foreign Service participation in the colloquium.
It is, however, the lead essay entitled "Intelligence and the Oval
Office" that immediately heightens one's interest and is worth the
price of admission due to its implications for the real world. The
author, Kenneth de Graffenreid, is with the NSC and deals with intelli-
gence matters. Consequently, what his paper conveys requires the
closest scrutiny since his views may adumbrate the present adminis-
tration's plans for dealing with and directing U.S. intelligence in the
future. de Graffenreid rejects the traditional view of the separation of
the intelligence community from the making of policy, and believes
that there is no such thing as apolitical intelligence. He also sees the
Oval Office more involved in matters of intelligence process and organ-
ization as a means of insuring the integration of intelligence policy
with national security policy. If what he postulates comes to pass, only
those who have not bothered to read his paper will be surprised. But,
read on, for it is the totality of these papers and their inquiry into an
important subject that make for a full plate.
George C. Constantinides
(George Constantinides is the author of the award-winning Intelligence
and Espionage: An Analytical Bibliography, published in 1983. Pres-
ently, he is a consultant to the BDM Corporation.)
Johnson, Loch K., A Season of Inquiry.- The Senate Intel-
ligence Investigation. Lexington, Ky.: University Press of
Kentucky, 1985.
When you pick up loch Johnson's history of the Church Commit-
tee investigations of U.S. intelligence, be prepared to shed a tear. No,
not for the foot-soldiers of intelligence subjected to probing interroga-
tion by the committee and its staff. No. not for the Intelligence Corti-
munity executives whose careers, and personal lives in several
instances, were shattered by the charges, leaks and innuendo spawned
by Congress' investigative bodies. In A Season of Inquiry.- The Senate
Intelligence Investigation, the victims are the poor, beleagured members
of the Church Committee staff.
alleged abuses by components of the Intelligence Community, princi-
and as a personal aide to Senate Church during that period, and
except for an occasional spurt of adulation for his mentor and a linger-
ing tinge of paranoia about U.S. intelligence, Johnson approaches the
topic with a remarkable degree of scholarly detachment. As he des-
cribes it, the committee had its own share of warts, including serious
problems stemming from the political aspirations of its chairman.
Johnson's recollections focus clearly on, as he describes it, "the
tangled lines of conflict and cooperation that stretch between the
executive branch and Congress. It underscores how jealously, friend-
ship, suspicion, pique, ambition, fatigue and other human traits inter-
vene in the affairs of man to alter the anticipated course of events. It
shows the difficulty of achieving any change whatsoever in a govern-
ment where power is fragmented among a large number of people
within the executive branch, the Senate and the House, where indi-
vidual policymakers respond to different constituencies and hold div-
ergent conceptions of the 'common good,' conflicting aspirations, and
varying time frames for the achievement of goals."
The human element remains in the forefront as the chronology
follows the committee's investigation, its headline-seeking public
hearings, the ill-fated presidential campaigning of its chairman, the
preparation of the most detailed report in this nation's history of the
activities and methodology of its secret services and crafting legislation
to provide for a permanent oversight body. To this is joined the
author's assessment of the committee's impact and what he sees as
the unfinished agenda of intelligence reform.
This is one of those works where it would be unfair for a reviewer,
particularly one who was not unaffected by the events of the time, to
summarize its content or to paraphrase the author's words. The his-
tory is too fresh, most of the players are still active participants in the
intelligence debate. The author's first-person account is an essential
adjunct to the committee's volumes, as the following excerpts
demonstrate:
Organization . . . Senator John O. Pastore (D-RI) introduced
Senate Resolution 21 to establish the investigating committee ...
Pastore called for the yeas and nays and, following the slow litany of a
Senate roll-call vote, the result was announced: yeas, eighty-two;
nays, four ... [Pastore] told a reporter that "this investigation, because
of the very nature of it, will have to be in executive session." It soon
become clear, though, that the chairman had a different conception.
Appearing on the show Face the Nation the following Sunday, Church
promised to hold as much of the investigation as public as possible. (P.
15)
Bill Bader (the Foreign Intelligence, or CIA, Task Force leader)
suggested ... the search for documents, perhaps reflecting his train-
ing as an historian. He had concluded that the first priority of the
committee was "to document and analyze the legislative and organiza-
tional history and practice of the CIA ... Fritz [F.A.O.) Schwarz was
interested in gathering as many documents as possible and as quickly
as possible, too, but his perspective was less historical than abuse
oriented . . . the difference in epistemology between Bader and
deep wedge into the staff . . . "The document requests. under
Schwarz 's influence became a grab bag," [Bader) recalls. "He wanted
everything. The requests were unstructured, rambling, unfocused. We
didn't know where we were, let alone where we were going." - .
Schwarz and his assistants, though, were not content to wade
4
Approved For Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140001-4
 Approved For Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140001-4
The Church Committee Investigations Reexamined
through agency histories alone. Gimlet-eyed, tireless, they pursued
practically every lead that came along in search of one major objective:
dramatic evidence ... (William] Miller preferred yet a third approach.
For him, the most promising pathway was the interview - and the
more civil, the better ... "Each document we were able to pry loose led
to more documents, more questions, more witnesses. it was like pul-
ling back the layers of an onion, each time we thought we had come to
the last layer, we discovered another" (Frederick Baron recalled]. (pp.
33-35)
Phi/lips and AR/O. The committee was also aware of the burgeon-
ing counteroffensive from the CIA. On March 22, 1975, for example,
chief of CIA Latin American operations David A. Phillips, retired from
the agency to rally former intelligence officers as private citizens to
defend the organization from outside criticism. Phillips' targets,
ostensibly, were former CIA officers who had written critical books and
articles on the agency, but his Association of Retired Intelligence
Officers (ARID) had all the earmarks of a grassroots lobbying effort
against any criticism, including that of our committee. (p. 36)
Suspicions. Troubling, too, were various editorials discussing the
high probability that intelligence officials would simply lie to the con-
gressional committees, rather than tarnish the image of their agencies
or take the chance of making revelations that could jeopardize the
security of the nation or of agents and informants in the field ...
Senator Church, for one, was already firmly convinced that former CIA
Director Richard Helms had committed perjury in 1973 before his
Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, which examined CIA
involvement with American corporate interests in Chile. How could he
now trust Helms to be truthful in this investigation, even under oath?
(p. 37)
The Honey Jar. [Bader] was so enthusiastic over some of the
top-secret paper relinquished by the White House, however, that he
could not resist literally underlining the importance of the committee
successes so far: "This is the first time that these classes of docu-
ments, namely the various NSC directives, NSAMs, NSDMs, NSC
Memoranda and reports have been turned over to a congressional
committee." ... The Bader CIA Task Force had asked for six thousand
pages drawn from case studies on covert action - the most sensitive
of all CIA programs. "Why does the committee want to go through
these old history books," the CIA liaison people complained ... To
Bader's researchers, who had a glimpse of the details in these histor-
ies, this question was like asking an advance party from the ant colony
why they wanted the honey jar. (p. 41)
The Rockefeller Commission Papers. For the committee, access
to these documents was equivalent to finding the Rosetta Stone: the
file on "Operation MONGOOSE" meant nothing less to the assassina-
tion phase of the investigation. MONGOOSE was the code name for
several covert-action schemes directed against Fidel Castro in the
wake of the Bay of Pigs fiasco, and the file contained a thousand leads
-names, dates, locations. These specifics were our lifeblood: the key
to new vaults, new files, new memoranda hidden somewhere within
the bowels of CIA ... The Church committee, in staffer Frederick
Baron's words, had "hit pay dirt." "From the cables," he remembers,
""we developed facts so dramatic that the CIA had to put them in
context. We would get a certain amount of information, then they had
to supply the missing link." (p. 48)
A Red Herring? My colleague on the White House Task Force,
Greg Treverton, joked over coffee one morning that "the only success-
ful CIA assassination plot has been against the Church committee
itself."" He hated to see our work pushed to the back burner for so long,
and strongly suspected this whole issue might be a diversion tactic by
the CIA to steer us off course. He was not alone in this viewpoint. 'The
assassination inquiry was a bottomless pit, remembers [Burton]
Wides, a committee staffer. "it became impossible to get the commit-
tee to focus on other subjects. We were mired down in the details of
the various plots, and time was running out. We were at the peak of
our powers in January on the day we were established; from that
point on, we were losing momentum. We had to act quickly, instead
we plodded along the assassination trail.- "It was a red herring," Bill
Miller concludes. Another key staffer thought it was a setup: 'The CIA
said, ""Oh, please don't throw us in the assassination brier patch?' and
that's exactly what we did - to their delight.'" A senior staffer told a
journalist: "By the time we finished the assassination report, we had
lost three things - the public's attention, much of our own energy and
will power, and our leadership. Quite candidly, we had lost Frank
Church." (pp. 54-55)
A House Divided. The normally loquacious senators, it seemed,
could no longer bear their own self-imposed rules against speaking
out on these issues; the steam building up in the committee kettle had
popped off the lid ... When the committee held a special meeting on
Monday, the air in S407 was tense. "We're beginning to polarize,"
warned Senator Tower. The selective leaking of findings on the assas-
sination plots, and the pubic exchanges between committee members
about the CIA-as-rogue-elephant, had irritated the vice chairman.
Senator Baker, too, was upset: 'We've got to stop making counter-
statements." Senator Goldwater complained that "all we've been
hearing is to protect Kennedy witnesses" ... Let's remove the gag rule
altogether," said Baker ... "Gary Hart said flatly: 'We must exercise
restraint. I take the contrary to Baker: We must keep our mouths shut.
I'll quit this committee if we all start talking out: it will tear us apart."
(pp. 57-58)
While the committee smoked, rumbled and sparked at the top like
a volcano coming out of dormancy, tremors of greater intensity -
undampened by the traditions of civility normally found among the
senators - erupted below at the staff level ... tensions seemed to rise
with the summer heat. Schwarz became more insistent about shifting
key responsibilities to a team of lawyers selected by him ... Rumors
rapidly circulated that Schwarz planned a showdown between the
lawyers and non-lawyers on the staff ... All eyes turned toward (John]
Elliff ... Elliff and his FBI Task Force - heavily staffed by attorneys,
several of whom had already been tapped for Schwarz's new group -
had evidently been won over to the Schwarz position before the meet-
ing. The alliance was understandable (though not everyone in the FBI
group endorsed the idea) since Schwarz and Elliff were chiefly inter-
ested in domestic abuses of the intelligence agencies . . . "[David)
Aaron could take no more: "This is a natural culmination of Schwarz'
statement about eight weeks ago about lawyers being the only ones
equipped to get this job done," he burst out ... As Schwarz rose, he
looked over at David Aaron and said, "For the first three and a half
months the task forces were fine, but ..." His voice trailed off. "But
now the task forces are not any good,"' finished Aaron. He turned to
Bader. "I guess we better look for another job." Glowering he left the
room. (pp. 65-68)
The Cave of Bugs. Preparations for the hearings on CIA poisons
took longer than Church had hoped ... Church grew alarmed about
newspaper leaks from 'White House sources" concerning the Cave of
Bugs. With the press nibbling away daily at the case, by the time the
16th [hearing date] arrived nothing would be left but a skeleton ...
Church felt he could wait no longer. "I regret to announce," he told the
press, "the Senate committee has evidence that quantities of biologi-
cal toxins of a highly lethal character have been retained by the CIA in
contravention of presidential orders that such materials be destroyed"
... Sensitive to the possibility (scientifically unwarranted) that talk
about shellfish toxin might create a public scare about eating shellfish,
Church nodded; "Let it be clear that they ought not be concerned
about the shellfish they buy." ... The cat was out of the bag. If it had to
happen before September 16, Church was going to make sure the
committee got the credit - not anonymous sources in the White
House. But the committee members were less than uniformly pleased
about Church's announcement and his efforts to build up the impor-
tance of the case. "Frank, what we have here," said [Charles] Mathias
on September 11, "is a rogue mouse." I later told [Gregory] Treverton
of Mathias' observation. "A rogue microbe is more like it," he sug-
gested. That afternoon I ran into Bill Miller near a Senate elevator.
"Church is wrong and the others are right."' he said. 'The chairman is
too abuse oriented." He told me that some thought this was Fritz
Schwarz 's influence; others believed Church was "dazzled by the kleig
lights" and was going for whatever would attract the cameras. The
senators were fed up with the assassination report, Miller told me, and
some were beginning to phase themselves out of committee activi-
ties" (pp. 74-75)
On the first day of hearings, Senator Church asked Colby for the
dart gun. The senators passed it among themselves, holding it up for
reporters to see. Cameras moved in, clucking and whirring like an
advancing army of mechanical insects. Here was theater to give life to
the hearings, as Church had anticipated ... Throughout the hearings,
designees passed notes to their senators suggesting possible ques-
tions. Daniel Schorr and other TV correspondents signaled "roll 'em"
(index finger moving in a circle) or "cut" (finger sliding across the
(Continued on page 6)
Approved For Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140001-4
 Approved For Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140001-4
Ten Years Later ...
(Continued from page 5)
throat) depending on their sense of what was newsworthy, and pho-
tographers circulated, snapping the shutters of elaborate cameras.
Sometimes the questioning grew rather strained as senators quickly
exhausted the limited subject of the shellfish toxin. Senator Mondale
belabored some obscure symbols that appeared on the label of one
bottle of chemicals. After discussing their possible meaning for a quar-
ter of an hour, the committee finally decided the symbols simply
referred to the room number in the building where the substance was
stored. Gary Hart sent a note down the table to Walter Mondale: "In
light of these startling discoveries, suggest extension these hearings
additional week to call label manufacturers, can manufacturers, vault
contractor, Public Health Service and GSA janitors at South labora-
tory!" (p. 76)
The Witnesses. Questioning (James Angleton), however, was like
trying to find a new planet through an earthbound telescope; it took
constant probing, a sensitivity to nuance, and a willingness to endure
vast oceans of silence. Angleton might begin an important story, then
let it trail out like a vanishing comet and disappear into a black hole of
ambiguity ... I wondered if Angleton's ploy was to lead the Church
committee into his "wilderness" [of mirrors] where everything revealed
reflected something concealed and the maddening multiplicty of
images spun dizzily in the mind. Angleton was not the only expert in
legerdemain at the CIA. He had his equal in Richard Helms ... I tried to
refresh his memory, but none of my papers of details from other
witnesses chased away the great, gray clouds drifting through Helms's
own wilderness of mirrors. (pp. 82-83)
The Spice of Hearings. Senator Church desperately wanted
something to spice up the hearings, as the dart gun had done the
week before. Fritz Schwarz came up with an idea only hours before
the second day of hearings. Why not use some of the startling findings
the FBI Task Force had been gathering for hearings on mail opening,
which were scheduled later in the year? The staff aide working on that
project objected to having his findings used prematurely, but his pro-
tests were overruled. Church opened the session with the announce-
ment (which made bold headlines the next day) ... As Church recited
the litany of names, the caucus rooms buzzed with excitement. (p. 86)
Adrift.... The committee was well into its "public phase" and
seemed on the surface, to be organized and prepared to lay out its
findings before the American people. Behind the scenes, though, lay a
different reality, for in fact, ten months after its creation, the Senate
intelligence committee was still in search of an agenda. The lack of
direction did not stem from an absence of blueprints ... The problem
was essentially one of uncertainty amongst the senators about which
topics would be most fruitful ... When the senators found out ... that
the hearings on the IRS didn't promise to be very 'sexy' they cancelled
all but one day of the scheduled IRS hearings, and weeks of prepara-
tion by the staff went down the tube (quoting from an interview of a
committee staffer in the Harvard Law Record] ... As the meeting
ended, I walked with one of the staff aides responsible for the IRS
investigation. "The only kind of hearing this committee is interested in
is pure theater," he said bitterly, "whatever will goose the public best."
(pp. 90-91)
More Disclosures. With Mondale's important support, Church
had won the initial argument over NSA public hearings by appealing to
his colleagues' faith in the ability of the committee to keep sensitive
secrets. This point, though, lost much of its persuasiveness with
committee members as Mondale hit the college lecture circuit over the
weekend ... In the course of his remarks, Mondale revealed previously
undisclosed testimony from the assassination report which, by com-
mittee agreement, was to have remained secret until officially released.
Senator Church appeared on ABC's Issues and Answers after Mon-
dale's speech and was asked to comment on Mondale's references to
the assassination report. He did, and perhaps at greater length than
necessary. Members of the committee fumed as they read press
accounts of Mondale's speech and watched their chairman on national
television; they had understood that no one could discuss the details of
the committee findings in public. Now, that agreement had been
broken - and only a day after the chairman had urged NSA hearings
on the grounds that members had proved their responsibility in main-
taining secrecy ...
Senator Goldwater, who had missed the meeting the prior week
when Church had received tacit committee approval for public hear-
ings on NSA. spoke ..."We're flirting with real trouble," he observed.
and asked for a formal roll-call on the question of public hearings ... I
was astounded: Gary Hart had supported the Goldwater position! ...
(the vote( was a victory for Church but a hollow one, as he knew The
fact was that his committee was badly divided - and in moments
things would grow worse .. On the way back to the auditorium, I
asked Rich Inderfurth about Hart's surprising vote. He said that Hart
was deeply troubled by the indiscretions over the weekend. The com-
mittee leaders seemed unable to keep the secrecy understanding on
the assassination report, what would happen if this carelessness
extended to the delicate operations of the National Security Agency? A
public hearing on the NSA, Hart feared, might just invite further unne-
cessary disclosures ...
The sense of drift permeating the Senate committee was noted by
Miller in early October. Part of the problem derived from the "natural
clash of egos and ambition," he wrote, especially as the result of the
"large group of aggressive litigators who are seeking in part glory and
are prone to the phototropism of televised hearings" .. .
The FBI Task Force attorneys in charge of the mail-opening hear-
ings had done a superlative job in marshaling the evidence. Everything
seemed to be in good order except for one missing ingredient: the
interest of committee members ... The chairman's lack of interest was
apparent on the opening day of the hearings ... His attention wan-
dered throughout the interrogation, and I could understand why. In the
first place, he was locked in a wrestling grip with the Ford administra-
tion over an acceptable format for the NSA hearings. Pressure was
building daily, and not just from the executive branch. The press was
steadily nibbling away at the NSA story, revealing in a piecemeal
fashion the very facts the Ford administration had feared might be
exposed through the Church committee hearings. Moreover, rumors
buzzed around the auditorium that either the Pike committee or the
House subcommittee chaired by Bella Abzug (D-NY) would go public
with the NSA story any day ... Together, these stories gave the
impression, first, that the committee members (even the most junior
ones) were now speaking out as individuals instead of through the
chairman (as in the past) and, second, that the panel had sprung a
serious leak. Would the whole assassination story, like the NSA find-
ings, begin the dribble out before the report was published? (pp. 92-100)
NSA Hearings. The chairman explained to the public why the
arguments against a SHAMROCK open hearing were insubstantial.
The arguments said, first, that the disclosure of the identities of the
companies would make other corporations hesitant in the future to
cooperate with the intelligence community; second, that disclosure
would embarrass the three companies that had aided the government
in the SHAMROCK program. In rebuttal, Senator Church observed,
first, that corporations indeed should be hesitant to comply with the
government's requests - at least long enough to assure themselves
that such requests were lawful and ethical: that "fairness to the com-
panies themselves requires that the facts be fully and fairly stated." (p.
Hallway Security. Cheered by having SHAMROCK off his chest
and by these spirited legal exchanges, Church walked with a new
spring in his step after the hearing. As we strode down the corridors
toward his car, I told him about the voluminous information the staff
had assembled for subsequent hearings and asked him how he
wished to absorb this material... "Just walk me over to the hearings,
and we can discuss the issues on the way," he said. "That's the best."
I was flabbergasted by this response. All the weeks that were poured
into the production of these briefing books, and the chairman wanted a
quick review as we walked to each hearing . . The two or three
snippets of information that could be imparted in a peripathetic brief-
ing would become, presumably, concise cues for the direction of the
hearing ...
David Aaron and I were out of breath for another reason - the
chairman was racing along at a near jog. He was headed for the next
committee meeting with the buoyancy I had not seen for weeks. The
meeting was a closed session on the use of secret agents ... to gather
intelligence - usually referred to in the trade as "human intelligence"
or, simply, "humint." With Church's request in mind ("Just walk me to
the hearing") I had asked Aaron to come along, since he had been
studying the subject. The "briefing" turned out to be about what I had
expected: between standing in elevators, striding down hallways, sit-
ting in the Senate subway car, and admiring the rotunda - all
crowded by tourists and other non-committee people - Aaron had
about eight minutes to convey, in hushed tones, some information
about the hearing as we rushed toward S407. (p. 114)
Bush Nomination. The nomination of George Bush to succeed
Colby disturbed [Church] and he wanted to wind up the speech by
opposing the nomination. I was sorry to hear this. The speech was
designed to be a balanced critique of the Agency's performance as an
intelligence gatherer; now it would become political . . . Inside
6
Approved For Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140001-4
 Approved For Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140001-4
Senate Investigations Reexamined
(Continued from page 7)
feverishly wrote chapters on various topics for possible inclusion in the
final reports. Then, on December 23, 1975, the committee was struck
by a bolt of lightning that, in essence, sheared off its mast and made
further progress close to impossible. Two days before Christmas.
Richard S. Welch, CIA station chief in Athens, Greece, was gunned
down in front of his home by masked assassins . . . Immediately
rumors and allegations arose that the Church committee was to blame
for the death ... Nothing in the entire sixteen months of the Church
investigation was more unfair than this and similar pronouncements Whether or not it was orchestrated in order to turn public opinion
against the investigation, the ceremony surrounding the Welch burial
had that effect. (pp. 151-162)
Whether or not attributable to the White House public relations
work, by January 1976 the simple fact was that both of the congres-
sional intelligence committees was less than highly regarded by the
public. In December 1975, a Louis Harris survey had asked Americans
how they would rate the job being done by the two committees. The
results for the Church committee were 38 percent positive, 40 percent
negative, and 22 percent unsure. For Pike, 36 percent positive, 40
percent negative, and 24 percent unsure. Even at that date, the image
apparently held by the public was extremely disappointing. Our long
hours and careful research to uncover and guard against abuses by
the intelligence services seemed to go largely unappreciated or mis-
understood. And to see ourselves rated virtually neck-and-neck with
the House committee, even though we had avoided most of its pitfalls,
was truly disheartening. Moreover, the image had no doubts grown
worse, since the poll had been taken before the Welch 51 murder and the
presidential flag-waving at Arlington Cemetery. (pp.
The foregoing only skims the first half of the book, and no doubt a
reviewer more inclined toward the committee "s efforts would have
for
cited excerpts other than those displayed here - there is meat every taste. On only one theme throughout the work will there be
some unanimity, the author's continuing criticism of the parallel inves-
tigation in the House of Representatives (the Pike Committee) and the
avalanche of leaks flowing from it. Johnson's objections are carefully
explained; it is not simply a case of the pot calling the kettle black.
The committee's efforts, over Administration objections, to release
ts reports illustrates effectively the never-ending struggle
the executive and legislative branches, a struggle not confined to the
intelligence arena. This proves true, as well, in Johnson's narrative of
the conflicting interests of members of the Senate in bartering and
concessions which brought forth the successful resolution establish-
ing the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
The book is not without howlers stemming from the author's
suspicions of the intelligence establishment. Two will suffice here.
In discussing Senator Church's reelection defeat in Idaho, John-
son notes: "While several influences contributed to this loss, he was
often thrown on the defensive during the campaign by (in his hi intelli-
gence words) the 'hit-and-run attack' against him by opponents
investigation. Conservative groups financed 'speaking engage-
ments' during the campaign, bringing to Idaho former intelligence
officers ..." Methinks he overestimates the political clout of the valiant
corps of former intelligence officers. popular SSCI appointment
Another, in the same vein, addresses a punder its chairman, Senator Barry M. Goldwater: "One of his first
decisions as chairman was to appoint as staff director, John F. Blake,
previously a high-ranking officer in the CIA and president of the Asso-
ciation of Former Intelligence Officers. With the chairman of the
Senate Intelligence Committee holding the door, the fox suddenly
found himself in the henhouse. The CIA had achieved one of its most
notable penetrations." (1)
There is little to chuckle about, however, in reviewing Johnson's
reflections on the unfinished agenda of intelligence reform which
"calls for uncommon dedication." Among the issues he addresses are
the insertion of the Congress into the decision process for covert
action, "not simply to receive reports on these operations but to help
determine in advance whether they should go forward." One proposal
discussed is that all paramilitary operations, including hthos of a
"common garden-variety," would require the specific
Congress, presumably in secret sessions of both houses. The only
exception would be for those secret military operations the President
determines to be "essential in order to meet extraordinary circum-
stances affecting the vital interests of the United States -
Such a secret vote in Congress, with all the high probability for
leaks that a debate among 535 individuals would entail," admits
Johnson, would effectively bar all paramilitary operations short of
those absolutely essential "or lead to a devaluation of the word 'essen-
tial' by the executive branch in order to bypass congressional debate."
Another proposal discussed by feautt or would ban covert financing
ing
from the Contingency Fund approved by the two intelligence oversight committees.
Johnson also faults present legislation limiting the number of
legislators briefed by CIA, and suggests briefings of a wider scope. He
is also concerned that present legislation seems to condone non-
reporting of sensitive collection programs "intended solely for obtain-
ing necessary intelligence." In the author's view," ... this clause
subtracts significantly from the principle in an earlier provision calling
for reports on 'all intelligence activity'." To these, Johnson adds other
"challenges" to force change in the intelligence community.
The "unfinished agenda" is perhaps the most chilling portion of
this book. This is the stuff of current headlines. Congressional options
of dissuasion and control of the purse seem to have given way to
"media veto" whenever a Presidential Finding on covert action
reaches the intelligence committees. Sensitive information and views
briefed in closed session of the Senate oversight committee are dis-
cussed openly by senior members. Despite the consitutional authority
of the President to "manage the business of intelligence in such a
manner as prudence may suggest" (The Federalist, No. 64], the lead-
ership of the present SSCI appears hell-bent on usurping it, The com-
mittee's chairman has stated publicly that he seeks a long-range
"plan" of intelligence operations in contemplation. Even the operation
in which U.S. fighters forced down the airliner carrying the Achilles
Lauro terrorists has drawn the chairman's fire because it was carried
out with "secrecy and despatch" [also urged as necessary in The
federalist], and not in advance consultation with his committee.
It is for these reasons that Loch Johnson's chronicle of the Senate
intelligence investigation takes on increased meaning. It is not just a
worthy companion volume to the Church Committee reports. Rather, it
serves as a warning that, a decade later, there are those who rather
than learning from the lessons of the Church Committee, seem intent
on emulating it.
(Edward F. Sayle, the editor of Periscope, served as Curator, Historical
Intelligence. CIA, during the period of the Church Committee in-
vestigation.)
Notes from Here and There
Denver's Hal D. Seward has signed a contract with
Paladin Press of Boulder, Colorado, to publish SsNbook
Spies l Have Known or How to Become a Spy.
who has authored five books, is a frequent contributor to
major military journals.
The Lee Constitution, published in Fort Myers, Flor-
ida, has reprinted in pamphlet form a series of editorials
written by Herman 0. Sly. Bly, a veteran of 25 years
with the FBI and 5 years with CIA, addresses such
issues as internal security, US-USSR relations, national
defense, foreign policy, "secular humanism," and the
media, and offers his comments on several noteworthy
espionage cases. Members who wish to add the pam-
phlet to their libraries or speakers' kits may write: The
Lee Constitution, 390 Pondella Road, Suite 5, North Fort
Myers, FL 33903. The pamphlets cost $1.25 per single
copy, $6 for 5 copies, $10 for 10 copies.
Those with a Cl bent might be interested in the
latest word regarding the book Industrial Espionage, co-
authored by Norman R. Bottom, Jr. of Miami. After it
was reviewed in Periscope, the Soviets purchased
Russian-language rights from the U.S. publisher. your
Bottom, "Now look what's happened.
publication is read thoroughly in Moscow!"
Approved For Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140001-4
 Approved For Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140001-4
Senate Investigations Reexamined
Church's office I was introduced to Jeff Shields. Later I asked a friend
on the staff about the new face. "Haven't you heard?" he answered.
"Shields is supposed to be helping put together a presidential cam-
paign" ... On Face the Nation (CBS correspondent George] Herman
asked a tough question. If Church wanted to disqualify Bush as CIA
director on political grounds, then "should the investigation of the CIA
and other intelligence agencies be headed by a man whose aides say
he is 80 percent certain to enter politics and run for the presidency?"
Church seemed to blanch, then replied that he had "done everything a
man can do" to keep himself and the committee out of presidential
politics. "I've said it again and again," he stressed," that until the
active investigation has ended, which will come sometime in Decem-
ber, I will not be a candidate." I smiled at the phrase "active investiga-
tion." Church used to say "until the investigation is ended"; now an
important modifier had been added, allowing him to enter the cam-
paign after the final public hearings but long before any windup meet-
ings or the writing of the final report had been completed ...
On November 11, I walked Church to the Senate floor. On the
way he was stopped by reporters who quizzed him about his first
major speech on intelligence, which he was about to give. Also, for the
hundredth time, one correspondent wished to know if Church still
stood by his "earlier assessments that the CIA acted like a rogue
elephant." Without noticeable annoyance, Church replied: "Of course
... you will find, as I said originally, much evidence in certain cases
that would suggest that higher authority was not fully advised in a
timely way of the activities that were going on." The Senate floor was
virtually deserted - as usual except for a vote ... "Our objective has
never been to wreck the intelligence agencies, but to reform them
where necessary," Church began with his deep, rich voice. "As the
weeds are pruned from the garden, so the garden flourishes" .. .
Church said he remained undecided whether it was appropriate for
him as chairman of the intelligence investigation, to lead the fight
against the confirmation of Bush, "but these are the reasons," he
asserted, "why I will certainly vote against his nomination." (pp.
111-120)
The Chairman Angers. Church clenched the arms of his chair.
"Why do you do this to me?" he said, a mixture of anger and frustra-
tion in his voice. "No one listens to me. They get locked in, and they go
ahead and do what they want. We'll never get all our work done.
We've only got a month to go." Schwarz and I winced, stared at our
shoes and wished we were somewhere else ... The next day 1 accom-
panied a group of the FBI Task Force to Church's office for a briefing
about plans for a hearing on domestic intelligence abuses. Church
took the opportunity to vent his spleen once more. "The only public
hearing we've been prepared for was on the shellfish toxin,- he said,
scornfully, then looked at me and added, "and the Huston Plan." the
last phrase was so obviously an afterthought that I drew little comfort
from it. He ordered the staff to reduce the number of days planned for
the FBI hearing, and urged us again to do whatever we could to bring
public television coverage back to the hearings. Cynics viewed this last
request as a further indication of presidential publicity-seeking. A
more charitable interpretation was that Church strongly believed
reform would come only through public pressure, and public pressure
would arise only if stimulated by extensive media coverage of the
committee's findings. I was reasonably sure that the elements of both
perspectives entered into the chairman's calculations in an alloy only
he could assay with certainty. (pp. 121-122)
Releasing a Report. The assassination report had been ready for
over a week and required only one last minute change. United States
District Court Judge Gerhard Gessell had agreed with Church commit-
tee attorneys that the name of the CIA scientists in charge of the
shellfish toxin (as well as the poison for Lumumba) should appear in
the report ... The CIA attorneys immediately appealed the decision ...
through fear of further delays the committee (at Church's direction)
decided to do an abrupt about-face on the scientist's name so as not to
jeopardize the plans to release the report on November 20. Any delay
would have postponed the release of the report until December, since
the Thanksgiving recess was about to begin. The choice between
holding out for one name and possible postponement was easy for the
chairman ... The Massachusetts primary was only fifteen weeks
away and "Draft Church" groups had already formed ...
We came to the Senate on the morning of November 20 with
nervousness over the fate of the controversial report. Only a dozen
secret sessions had taken place in the Senate since World War It. At
nine o *clock the heavy doors of the Senate chamber swung shut ...
One o'clock had come and gone. The assassination report had been
laid before the Senate and the Senate had taken no meaningful action
on it ... The scene at the entrance to the Dirksen auditorium was one
of bedlam. Reporters from all over the country and around the world
crowded into the lobby where harried committee secretaries were
handing out copies of the report to a field of grasping hands. The
minute the secret session ended at one o'clock, the committee staff
had been instructed to give out copies to anyone with press creden-
tials. It was a masterful tactic on Church's part, though one that failed
to endear him to many of his colleagues who - as the debate amply
revealed - did not enjoy being on the receiving end of a fait accompli.
Church was determined to issue the report. If the Senate voted, fine; if
it didn't vote at all, that was fine, too. Only if the Senate had voted to
delay or curb release would the chairman be forced to hold it back -
and even then, since it was already printed, the chances of a copy's
"escape" to the press would have been high. (pp. 130-136)
The Non-Campaign Continues. Immediately following the Chile
hearings, Church boarded a plane for Massachusetts and addressed
three hundred people at one meeting in Lincoln and another five
hundred at Boston College - peculiar behavior, some observed, for a
non-candidate ... Speaking before the World Affairs Council a few
days later, he struck a presidential stance. If he were president, he
told the luncheon group of over five hundred people, he would take the
covert operations wing out of the CIA, reduce its personnel by 90
percent, and place the remaining 10 percent in the Department of
State, "where it would be subject to the overall policy considerations
of our government in connection with the conduct of our foreign pol-
icy." In a neat bit of semantic legerdemain, Church told reporters in
Los Angeles that he was about to form an exploratory committee on
the presidential race the next week, when the "investigative work" of
the intelligence committee would be completed ... this was the first
time I'd heard that phrase. It was true that by the next week the public
hearings would be over, culminating in three final days on the FBI.
Church had ingeniously decided to call this the end of the investigative
work, despite the fact that each of the task forces had several investi-
gations underway (some in mid-stream), and some committee
members strongly supported the completion of these important projects.
Visions of the White House danced in the heads of other commit-
tee members, too. Later in the campaign session, Senator Schweiker
would become the vice-presidential candidate for the GOP ticket led by
Ronald Reagan ... Howard Baker, by all accounts, longed for (and
almost achieved) the vice-presidential slot on the Ford ticket ... After
Church, though, the most audible presidential noises were those of
Senator Mathias ... as a "third force" independent candidate. (pp.
150-151)
The Final Hearings. On December 8, only two junior members
appeared in S407, and they soon departed ... The next morning we
had a larger complement of senators ... As a general rule, the more
well-known the witness, the greater the attendance of committee
members (a phenomenon related to the increased numbers of media
representatives as well on such occasions.) This time the witness was
FBI Director Clarence M. Kelley ... The FBI Task Force gathered its
documents from the hearing table. Bulging briefing books had lain
there for three hearings, untouched by most of the committee
members. Question after question written on three-by-five cards, yel-
low legal pads, and hastily torn scraps of paper were scattered where
senators' elbows had rested. Placed there by staff, these suggestions
for the most part perished on the green baize sea like so much dis-
carded flotsom. The senators were hesitant to ask staff questions
when they themselves had failed to prepare thoroughly, uncertain
where the dialogue might lead ...
The good ship Church Committee labored ahead sluggishly
through these heavy December seas, tossed by powerful waves of
opposition from the executive branch, plagued by internal dissension
among the crew, the captain distracted by thoughts of buried treasure
in the primary states, blown off course by strong crosswinds (like the
Bush controversy), her sail torn by periodic blasts of cold air from
critical journalists, and now caught up in the angry maelstrom of
Hurricane Angola. Members and staff alike looked uneasily toward the
lifeboats as the ship began to founder ... The perception that their
constituents cared little about the committee further depleted energy
and interest among the members ... So the ship continued to pitch
about, uncertain of its course. Below decks the crew worked on an
oversight bill to create a permanent committee on intelligence, and
(Continued on page 8)
Approved For Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140001-4
 Approved For Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140001-4
Senate Investigations Reexamined
(Continued from page 7)
feverishly wrote chapters on various topics for possible inclusion in the
final reports. Then, on December 23, 1975, the committee was struck
by a bolt of lightning that, in essence, sheared off its mast and made
further progress close to impossible. Two days before Christmas.
Richard S. Welch, CIA station chief in Athens, Greece, was gunned
down in front of his home by masked assassins . . . Immediately
rumors and allegations arose that the Church committee was to blame
for the death ... Nothing in the entire sixteen months of the Church
investigation was more unfair than this and similar pronouncements
... Whether or not it was orchestrated in order to turn public opinion
against the investigation, the ceremony surrounding the Welch burial
had that effect. (pp. 151-162)
Whether or not attributable to the White House public relations
work, by January 1976 the simple fact was that both of the congres-
sional intelligence committees was less than highly regarded by the
public. In December 1975, a Louis Harris survey had asked Americans
how they would rate the job being done by the two committees. The
results for the Church committee were 38 percent positive, 40 percent
negative, and 22 percent unsure. For Pike, 36 percent positive, 40
percent negative, and 24 percent unsure. Even at that date, the image
apparently held by the public was extremely disappointing. Our long
hours and careful research to uncover and guard against abuses by
the intelligence services seemed to go largely unappreciated or mis-
understood. And to see ourselves rated virtually neck-and-neck with
the House committee, even though we had avoided most of its pitfalls,
was truly disheartening. Moreover, the image had no doubts grown
worse, since the poll had been taken before the Welch murder and the
presidential flag-waving at Arlington Cemetery. (pp. 185)
The foregoing only skims the first half of the book, and no doubt a
reviewer more inclined toward the committee's efforts would have
cited excerpts other than those displayed here - there is meat for
every taste. On only one theme throughout the work will there be
some unanimity, the author's continuing criticism of the parallel inves-
tigation in the House of Representatives (the Pike Committee) and the
avalanche of leaks flowing from it. Johnson's objections are carefully
explained; it is not simply a case of the pot calling the kettle black.
The committee's efforts, over Administration objections, to release
its reports illustrates effectively the never-ending struggle between
the executive and legislative branches, a struggle not confined to the
intelligence arena. This proves true, as well, in Johnson's narrative of
the conflicting interests of members of the Senate in bartering and
concessions which brought forth the successful resolution establish-
ing the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
The book is not without howlers stemming from the author's
suspicions of the intelligence establishment. Two will suffice here.
In discussing Senator Church's reelection defeat in Idaho, John-
son notes: "While several influences contributed to this loss, he was
often thrown on the defensive during the campaign by (in his own
words) the 'hit-and-run attack' against him by opponents of his intelli-
gence investigation. Conservative groups financed 'speaking engage-
ments' during the campaign, bringing to Idaho former intelligence
officers ..." Methinks be overestimates the political clout of the valiant
corps of former intelligence officers.
Another, in the same vein, addresses a popular SSCI appointment
under its chairman, Senator Barry M. Goldwater: "One of his first
decisions as chairman was to appoint as staff director, John F. Blake,
previously a high-ranking officer in the CIA and president of the Asso-
ciation of Former Intelligence Officers. With the chairman of the
Senate Intelligence Committee holding the door, the fox suddenly
found himself in the henhouse. The CIA had achieved one of its most
notable penetrations." (1)
There is little to chuckle about, however, in reviewing Johnson's
reflections on the unfinished agenda of intelligence reform which
"calls for uncommon dedication." Among the issues he addresses are
the insertion of the Congress into the decision process for covert
action, "not simply to receive reports on these operations but to help
determine in advance whether they should go forward." One proposal
discussed is that all paramilitary operations, including those of a
"common garden-variety," would require the specific authorization of
Congress, presumably in secret sessions of both houses. The only
exception would be for those secret military operations the President
determines to be "essential in order to meet extraordinary circum-
stances affecting the vital interests of the United States ""
Such a secret vote in Congress, with all the high probability for
leaks that a debate among 535 individuals would entail." admits
Johnson, would effectively bar all paramilitary operations short of
those absolutely essential "or lead to a devaluation of the word 'essen-
tial' by the executive branch in order to bypass congressional debate."
Another proposal discussed by the author would ban covert financing
from the Contingency Fund of amounts over $2 million unless
approved by the two intelligence oversight committees.
Johnson also faults present legislation limiting the number of
legislators briefed by CIA, and suggests briefings of a wider scope. He
is also concerned that present legislation seems to condone non-
reporting of sensitive collection programs "intended solely for obtain-
ing necessary intelligence." In the author's view," ... this clause
subtracts significantly from the principle in an earlier provision calling
for reports on 'all intelligence activity'.- To these, Johnson adds other
"challenges" to force change in the intelligence community.
The "unfinished agenda" is perhaps the most chilling portion of
this book. This is the stuff of current headlines. Congressional options
of dissuasion and control of the purse seem to have given way to
"media veto" whenever a Presidential Finding on covert action
reaches the intelligence committees. Sensitive information and views
briefed in closed session of the Senate oversight committee are dis-
cussed openly by senior members. Despite the consitutional authority
of the President to "manage the business of intelligence in such a
manner as prudence may suggest" [The Federalist, No. 641, the lead-
ership of the present SSCI appears hell-bent on usurping it; The com-
mittee's chairman has stated publicly that he seeks a long-range
"plan" of intelligence operations in contemplation. Even the operation
in which U.S. fighters forced down the airliner carrying the Achilles
Lauro terrorists has drawn the chairman's fire because it was carried
out with "secrecy and despatch" [also urged as necessary in The
Federalist], and not in advance consultation with his committee.
It is for these reasons that Loch Johnson's chronicle of the Senate
intelligence investigation takes on increased meaning. It is not just a
worthy companion volume to the Church Committee reports. Rather, it
serves as a warning that, a decade later, there are those who rather
than learning from the lessons of the Church Committee, seem intent
on emulating it.
Edward F. Sayle
[Edward F. Sayle, the editor of Periscope, served as Curator, Historical
Intelligence, CIA, during the period of the Church Committee in-
vestigation.]
Notes from Here and There
Denver's Hal D. Seward has signed a contract with
Paladin Press of Boulder, Colorado, to publish his book
Spies l Have Known or How to Become a Spy. Seward,
who has authored five books, is a frequent contributor to
major military journals.
The Lee Constitution, published in Fort Myers, Flor-
ida, has reprinted in pamphlet form a series of editorials
written by Herman O. Bly. Bly, a veteran of 25 years
with the FBI and 5 years with CIA, addresses such
issues as internal security, US-USSR relations, national
defense, foreign policy, "secular humanism," and the
media, and offers his comments on several noteworthy
espionage cases. Members who wish to add the pam-
phlet to their libraries or speakers' kits may write: The
Lee Constitution, 390 Pondella Road, Suite 5, North Fort
Myers, FL 33903. The pamphlets cost $1.25 per single
copy, $6 for 5 copies, $10 for 10 copies.
Those with a Cl bent might be interested in the
latest word regarding the book Industrial Espionage, co-
authored by Norman R. Bottom, Jr. of Miami. After it
was reviewed in Periscope, the Soviets purchased
Russian-language rights from the U.S. publisher. Says
Bottom, "Now look what's happened. Obviously your
publication is read thoroughly in Moscow!"
Approved For Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140001-4
 Approved For Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140001-4
The following list of new members since the last issue is incomplete in that it does not include those who requested
that their names be kept restricted.
Mr. Charles J. ALLEN
P. 0. Box 418M
3 Oakridge Way
Shrewsbury, MA 01545
Mr. Lloyd D. BURTON
733 Kline Street
La Jolla, CA 92037
Mr. John E. GERLING
5921 West 215 Street
Fairview Park, OH 44126
Mr. James A. ANDERSON
4400 East West Highway,
#903
Bethesda, MD 20814
Col Jack W. AUGUST
USAF(Ret.)
18919 Crooked Lane Road
Lutz, FL 33549
CDR Douglas A. BATEMAN
USNR
Box 610125
Houston, TX 77208
Mrs. Harriot C. BEGOLE
134 Monroe Street
Denver, CO 80206
Mr. William H. BELT
456 E. Gladys Avenue
Hermiston, OR 97838
Mai Eugene C. BERG
USAF(Ret.)
1330 Winding Ridge Tr.
Colorado Springs, CO
80919
Mr. Paul C. BISHOP
209 Alder Street
Liverpool, NY 13088
Mr. Robert C. BLOOMING-
DALE
209 Worcester Road
Framingham, MA 01701
Col William T. BONNER
Jr. USAF(Ret.)
8485 Middle Run Dr.
Springfield, VA 22153
Mr. Edward S. BRAZAS
7726 Lisle Avenue
Falls Church, VA 22043
Mr. Axel M. CHRISTIANSEN
6352 S. Eudora Way
Littleton, CO 80121
Mr. Ron L. CLARK
P. 0. Box 2569-SS
Westport, CT 06880
Mr. Thomas J. COOK
9537 Dudley Drive
Westmnster, CO 80020
Mr. Floyd R. DILLON
12400 Lexington Ave.NE
Albuquerque, NM 87112
Col Paul E. DUPLESSIS
USAF(Ret.)
P. 0. Box 626
Oakton, VA 22124
Miss Ann M. FALLON
82 Ivy Street, #2
Brookline, MA 02146
Mr. Robert G. FANNIN
P. 0. Box 112007
Salt Lake City, UT 84147
Mr. Thomas N. FARRELL
337 West Caroline St.
Fenton, MI 48430
Mr. Jose A. FIERRO
Box 2434
APO New York, NY 09283
Mr. Thomas D. FOX
614 Laura Drive
Falls Church, VA 22046
Mr. Thomas J. GERARD
SFPD/Intel.Div.
850 Bryant Street,
Rm 532
San Francisco, CA 94103
Mr. Robert H. GRIFFITH
1036 George Avenue
Rocledge, FL 32955
Mr. John Manning GRINNAN
5526 Dyer St, #131
Dallas, TX 75206
Mr. Judson B. GRUBBS II
1001 Wilson Boulevard,
#607
Arlington, VA 22209
Mr. Lunsford Otto HEALY
410 Artemis Blvd
Nerrit Island, FL 32953
Mr. Robert A. HEBER
200 Cold Spring Drive
Rocky Hill, CT 06067
COL Albert F.P. JONES
2 Wingate Place
P. 0. Box 689
Palm Coast, FL 32037
Mr. Anthony V. KROCHALIS
P. 0. Box 11009
Alexandria, VA 22312
Mr. Nino John LO SCHIAVO
P. 0. Box 1221
Redwood City, CA 94063
Mr. Charles M. LYDY
7401 W. 83rd Street
Los Angeles, CA 90045
Mr. Joseph J. MACIEL
785 Old Best Road
North Attleboro, MA
02760
Mr. Charles R. MAYER
5835 Bartow Road South
Highland City, FL 33846
Approved For Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140001-4
 Approved For Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP9O-00806ROO0100140001-4
Mr. Luke F. MAYER Jr.
1007 N. Pitt St.
Alexandria, VA 22314
LtCol Donald B. McBRIDE
USAF(Ret.)
9549 Elvis Lane
Seabrook, MD 20706
Mr. Bert H. McGILL
Box 5
Amherst, NH 03031
Mr. George C. MOORE
6715 N 27th Street
Arlington, VA 22213
Mr. William B. MUIR
4100 N. Calle Del Risco
Tucson, AZ 85745
Mr. Robert E. NELSON
4102 Mt. Hukee Avenue
San Diego, CA 92117
Mr. Edward J. O'MALLEY
8707 Crystal Rock Lane
Laurel, MD 20708
Mr. Lester G. PALDY
6 Setalcott Place
Setauket, NY 11733
Col Joe W. PARRIS
USAF(Ret.)
77 East Andrews Drive,
N.W., #167
Atlanta, GA 30305
Mr. David R. PICKERING
1739 S. Dayton Place
Kennewick, WA 99337
COL Rodney K. ROBERTS
7005 Springfield Vlg.
Court
West Springfield, VA
22152
Mr. Ben RUSSAK
3 E. 44th Street
New York, NY 10017
Mr. Robert F. SANDERSON
406 Willow Valley
Lamar, CO 81052
Dr. James M. SCHNEIDER
2748 Elm Drive,N.E.
Palm Bay, FL 32905
RADM Donald Mac SHOWERS
3829 N. 26th Street
Arlington, VA 22207
LtCol Burton SLOANE
USAF(Ret.).
109 Oxford Boulevard
Great Neck, NY 11021
Mr. Gene S. STEIN
11 Parkwood Dr.
Garnerville, NY 10923
LtCol Sherman R. STRAND
USAF(Ret.)
2231 N. Chelton Rd.
Colorado Springs, CO
80909
Mr. Howard T. STUMP Jr.
1024 Guadalupe del
Prado, N.W.
Albuquerque, NM 87107
Mr. Arthur H. SULLIVAN
4613 Harling Lane
Bethesda, MD 20815
Mr. Willis L. THOMAS
11804 Enid Drive
Potomac, MD 20854
Dr. M. Christine
TORRINGTON
211 Sutter Street, #318
San Francisco, CA 94108
Mr. John J. TRAVESKY
9125 Copper NE, #706
Albuquerque, NM 87123
Mr. George UREKE
3604 Tallwood Terrace
Falls Church, VA 22041
10
Mr. Ralph E. WEBER
7420 Grand Parkway
Wauwatosa, WI 53213
COL Norman S. WELLS
USA(Ret. )
5707 N. 9th Road
Arlington, VA 22205
Approved For Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP9O-00806ROO0100140001-4
 Approved For Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140001-4
Vice President Dedicates
CIA Headquarters Expansion
Vice President George Bush, who served as DCI a
ecade ago, returned to Langley, Virginia, November 1 st
dedicate a major expansion to CIA's headquarters
3cility Speaking at the cornerstone ceremony, the Vice
resident reflected on the quarter of a century that had
assed since President Eisenhower dedicated the site:
"It's a pleasure to be here this morning. It always
ives me a great deal of pleasure to come out here. I
ave so many good memories of my days as DCI ... so
iany friends in the agency . . or who are by now
lumni of the Agency. And I have such respect for surely
ne of the greatest DCIs of all, your current director, Bill
asey.
''And something else. I have so much respect for
)e work that all of you are doing for our country . . .
?spect from my first hand experience here a decade
go . . . and respect because I see so much of your
roduct or hear about it every day. And in so much of
that you do, you produce some of the best work being
one in the government today You set the standard,
ou lead the way.
"Arid so, as I say, it's a pleasure to come here.
"Today is 26 years, almost to the day, since President
isenhower laid the cornerstone for the main building.
"It's been a turbulent quarter century for the Agency,
s well as for the country. Challenges have arisen both
)road and at home. For a while the CIA -- together
ith others in the national service whose jobs are to
'otect our liberties - came under greater and more
itical scrutiny than even our adversaries.
"A principle objection of mine was that a lot of hill
affers came arrogantly charging out here showing no
>ncern for classified material, determined that they
ere ferreting out wrong-doing. And in the process
hat they did was insult the patriotism and dedication of
e entire intelligence community. It was insulting and
called for.
"Another change in the last quarter century has
yen the expanding scope of the intelligence challenges
ru must address. Terrorism, theft of technology, narcot-
s trafficking, Third World debt, nuclear and chemical
eapons proliferation . . . these are just some of the
sues that weren't even on the radar screen, or were
st faintly there, in the late '50's.
AFIO's Larry Houston briefs Vice President Bush and
DCI Casey on the "secret" concerning President
Eisenhower's cornerstone ceremony for the original
CIA building.
"These new challenges require new kinds of analy-
sis, and new and more searching application of both old
and new disciplines. And, as I said, I've been impressed
again and again that you are meeting these challenges
and meeting them superbly.
"So much has changed since the first cornerstone
was laid. But there's much reason for satisfaction and
for confidence in the future. For me that confidence
comes most of all because one thing hasn't changed .
and that's the truth of the words President Eisenhower
spoke when he stood not far from here all those years
[In the world of intelligence] 'Success cannot
be advertised; failure cannot be explained. In the
work of intelligence, heroes are undecorated and
unsung, often even among their own fraternity.
Their inspiration is rooted in patriotism -- their
reward can be little except the conviction that they
are performing a unique and indispensable service
for their country, and the knowledge that America
needs and appreciates their efforts. [And, he con-
cluded,] the reputation of your organization for
quality and excellence of performance is a proud
one.
"It was then. It is today. May each of you and this
new building long serve the cause of America and of
peace."
onored Guests: former DCI Richard Helms, former DDCI Amb. Vernon A. Walters (LTG, USA-Ret.), former
Cl William E. Colby, former DCI VADM William F. Raborn, Jr. (USN-Ret.), and former DDCI Hon. Frank C.
arlucci. Unavoidably, former DCI Hon. John A. McCone had to return to the West Coast prior to the ceremony.
11
Approved For Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140001-4
 Approved For Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140001-4
Chapter Activities
Arizona Chapter. The chapter met on Saturday,
November 16th at the Airport Central Inn in Phoenix.
Eighteen members plus guest Jack Bryant and the
speaker, Mrs. Helen Corbin, wife of the State Attorney
General, were on hand. Mrs. Corbin, whose topic was
"The History of Drugs," is the author of eight books. Her
presentation was provocative and left the audience with
a sense of caution and greater awareness of the ongo-
ing drug war.
During the business session, a slate of nominees
for office next year was selected. Chapter president Ed
Barley also presented an update on other topics of inter-
est concerning the intelligence world.
California
San Diego Chapter. The speaker at the chapter's
October meeting was Deputy Sheriff Mike Williams
who, with five other deputies, is responsible for collecting,
evaluating and disseminating intelligence within the
Sheriff's Department and to other law enforcement
agencies. He told the gathering how his mission is
accomplished and who the target groups are. Specifically,
he cited the Hell's Angels motorcycle gangs as a prime
example of organized crime.
Once viewed as just a ""hell-raising bunch of beer-
swilling rowdies," the Hell's Angels have lately entered
into the immensely lucrative field of drug production and
distribution, specializing in metaamphetamines, some-
times called "designer drugs" because they are manu-
factured from easily obtained chemicals, and for their
appeal to the Yuppie generation as well as street people.
Williams also stated that the Hell's Angels, like the
Mafia, is investing its ill-gained wealth from drugs in
legitimate businesses, often using intimidation and
strong-arm methods to eliminate the competition. Unlike
the Mafia, however, the Hell's Angeles eschew three-
piece, $1,000 suits, preserving a rough, motorcyle hool-
igan image, perhaps as a cover for entrance into sophis-
ticated crime.
Mike Williams' talk preceded the October 31st raid
on the "Rich Man Poor Man Limousine Service" office
which served as a legitimate front for the distribution of
metaamphetamines by the local chapter of Hell's Angels.
While Williams did not hint that such a raid might be
forthcoming, an astute intelligence person might have
gathered as much.
More than sixty persons attended the November
22nd meeting at the Admiral Kidd Navy Officers' Club to
hear Don Perry speaking about the Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI) and the High Frontier organization. We all
left with a better understanding of these projects.
The chapter held its annual Christmas party aboard
the ferryboat Berkeley on December 18th. Don Perry
served as auctioneer for the oldies but goodies, raising
funds for the chapter's expenses during 1986. Fun, sing-
ing and general harrahing it up was accompanied by
Charlie Chaucer at the piano.
Announced for upcoming meetings: Charles Wiley
of Accuracy in Media, January; Admiral Bill Richardson
speaking on the "code breakers," February.
San Francisco Bay Area Chapter. The chapter met
on November 13th at the Magic Pan restaurant. Follow-
ing a no host cocktail hour, President Roger McCarthy
called the meeting to order and led the Pledge of Alle-
giance. Father Tom Dowling offered the convocation.
Vice President Ed Rudka led tributes to the Hon.
Janet Aitken who passed away unexpectedly on Novem-
ber 8th. Miss Aitken was a strong supporter of AFIO and
an active member of the chapter's board of directors. A
third-generation lawyer, Miss Aitken served in the office
of the Navy general counsel in Washington during WWII
and for twenty years was assistant district attorney in
her native San Francisco. In 1967, she was appointed a
municipal court judge by Gov. Reagan, and later was the
first woman to be appointed an assistant U.S. attorney
in Northern California.
Following dinner and introductions, Dr. Alvin Buck-
elew treated members and guests to his version of a
mini-profile of Roger McCarthy. Col. Charlie Hayden, Dr.
Buckelew and Don Davis were appointed to serve as a
nominating committee to propose a slate of officers for
1986 at the January meeting.
Vice President (Programs) Rudka introduced the
speaker. Cdr. Milton Croom (USN-Ret.). A resident of
North Carolina, Cdr. Croom spoke of his recent travels in
West Germany. Cdr. Croom said it is his impression that
the West German people he met did not want their
country led into the Soviet sphere of influence. Cdr.
Croom displayed examples of the political handouts used
by the political factions in that country. He suggested
that such people do not want the communists, but do
not trust the united States' ability to defend them.
During the question and answer period, several
guests took the opportunity to provide their own analy-
ses of the political climate in West Germany.
Kudos were extended to Jim Quesada for his
address to the Ignacio Valley Republican Women's Club
in November. A six-line announcement in a local paper
was sufficient to bring out a group of "US-Out of Latin
America" protesters, complete with signs, press cover-
age and a photographer. The protesters were well-
organized and ensuing media coverage abbreviated
Jim's talk on Nicaragua but the news photograph was
predictably large enough for readers to read the protes-
ters' signs.
The nominating committee offered, and the mem-
bership elected, the following slate of officers for the
new year: Capt. William Greene (USN-Ret.), president;
Col. Edward Rudka [SMRL vice president (programs);
Thomas J. Dickson, vice president (membership); Mrs.
Jean Wright, secretary; Gonzalo "Jim" Quesada, treas-
urer; and Roger McCarthy, Mrs. Sue Davis, LTC Ema-
nuel (Max) Peters (USA-Ret.), and Col. G. Russell Wiley
(USAR), executive board.
Two history-making chapter meetings were
announced. Following the January meeting, at which
Dr. William B. Shuler, deputy director of the "star wars"
program spoke in advocacy of the program, the February
speaker is Vladimir Lomotslev, deputy counsel general
of the USSR consulate who will speak in opposition.
New England
New England Chapter. The chapter met January
11th at the Stamford Plaza Hotel, Stamford, CT., to hear
Peter Crooks of the New Haven FBI regional office. He
briefed the members on the Bureau's "development of
12
Approved For Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140001-4
 Approved For Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140001-4
counterintelligence awareness" (DECA) program which
is used to heighten awareness of defense contractors to
the nature of the threat posed by hostile intelligence
services as well as to address the problem of technology
transfer at the source.
The method approach was used at the individual
level of analysis, first examining in detail the William
Bell-Marian Zacharski espionage case to explain the
recruitment process. It was noted, generally, that the
motivations and "danger signs" are applicable through-
out the defense industry.
Crooks' program was illustrated with slides and
video excerpts from the CBS "Sixty Minutes" program.
Texas
Gulf Coast Chapter. The chapter held its organiza-
tional meeting on November 25th and elected the fol-
lowing officers for the new year: Richard Partch,
president; Miss Shelly Lea Bennett, vice president; Wil-
ford L. Kimble, treasurer; M. A. Ruebright, secretary.
Outgoing president Fred Rodell expressed his hopes that
AFIO will continue to grow and prosper.
Special Report
Clearing the Waters in Vermont
The New England Chapter of AFIO has drawn on its
talented membership to mount successful public dis-
cussion of the role of intelligence in society, efforts
which might serve as a model for other chapters in
developing similar programs.
From initial contacts at the University of Vermont,
Jeff Kingry brought together the heads of the History
and Political Science departments with Dr. Winn Taplin,
a professional historian and former career operations
officer with CIA. The result was Taplin's popular course
"U.S. Intelligence and Foreign Policy." Throughout the
course, for guest lectures Taplin was able to draw on the
chapter's resources: Michael Speers, Frank Binder,
Bruce Lawlor and Col. Robert Evans. The first meeting of
the Fall semester course was standing room only, sur-
passing both enrollment and the classroom.
Another program on the university campus was the
"American Intelligence Symposium" arranged by Kingry
with the cooperation of the university's Church Street
Center for Community Education. Each Thursday night
from the end of September to the first of November,
AFIO members lectured and responded to questions
from the audience. The individual presentations drew
from 35 to 50 people, who paid a $10 fee. The fee
served two purposes, both to assist the non-profit Cen-
ter to defray expenses (including advertising the series)
and to act as a screening device to discourage those
who had only incidental or antagonistic interest.
The audience was a mixed group, changing in
makeup from week to week. There were extreme left-
thinking radicals and some extreme right-wingers, but
in the maih the listeners were students, teachers and
interested children. Although the Church Street Center
had received some critical phone and telephone mes-
sages threatening disruption if the series was not can-
celled, the reception was polite and very respectful, and
everyone behaved well. The speakers found it particu-
larly gratifying to be able to reach some of the leftmost
radicals with meaningful discussion. Although it is
doubtful any of them were converted, it gave the acti-
vists an opportunity to discuss certain intelligence issues
rationally with speakers who knew what they were talk-
ing about.
Several of the speakers made their presentations at
great personal expense. "Jan DeVries," aka Bob Van
Beever, drove up from the coast during a hurricane, sick
with the flu, delivered his presentation, then returned
home the same night. One AFIO member noted that if
AFIO ever gave a medal for service above and beyond
the call of duty, Van Beever deserves it; his topic covered
the problem of collaboration. The only draw-back in giv-
ing the talk, he indicated, was his inability to deal with
some of the sensitive questions asked from a personal
standpoint. As with other speakers, recalling what was
or might continue to be classified remained a problem.
Col. Robert Evans, from Stowe, VT., spoke on the
history, culture and personality of the Russian people
under the Soviet system. His command of the Russian
language permitted a unique insight into Russian think-
ing, and his predictions, on the eve of the Summit,
proved accurate. The open discussion was both spirited
and interesting.
Frank Binder, from Montpelier, VT., an extremely
colorful OSS veteran, spoke on "Eastern Europe: Legacy
of Lost Opportunity," during which he noted that "the
best intelligence, analyzed and presented in the most
timely and graphic manner, can never take the place of
national political will." Binder chronicled the methodol-
ogy of Soviet assumption of power in the power vacuum
of post WWII eastern Europe. Unfortunately, he said,
"the most loyal lovers of American-style freedom and
liberty were those eastern European nationalities that
were given by default to the Soviets in 1945."
Mike Spears held forth on the use of foreign aid in
the Third World. To this he linked the intelligence side of
the equation: some of the practical problems associated
with helping, overtly or covertly, a nation to become
self-sufficient and strong amidst the pressures of
world-reality.
Col. Edmund Thompson's presentation, "Counter-
terrorism," was timely and well-received. With the
hijacking of the Achilles Lauro and the bombings in
Paris, the difficulties associated with gathering counter-
terrorism intelligence were a clear issue, ably dealt with.
Gen. Thompson, at some personal sacrifice, made the
journey from the coast of Maine to Burlington to partici-
pate in the series.
The last lecture in the series, presented by pub-
lisher John Quirk, dealt with "Soviet Disinformation in
the Publishing Industry." Quirk, who is credited with
one of the best lectures of the series, offered some eye-
opening revelations. Item: The KGB makes massive pur-
chases of books favorable to Soviet communism or
policy as a means of stimulating the market to produce
additional works favorable to the Soviet cause. Item: The
KGB publishes an annual plan of topics the USSR would
like to see written and published in the West. Quirk,
recalling conversations with the KGB agent at the
Frankfurt International Book Fair last summer, noted
13
Approved For Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140001-4
 Approved For Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140001-4
Durenberger and Hollings Pay Tribute to Intelligencers
Two prominent members of the Soviet Select
Committee on Intelligence have made it known that the
current contest over management of the nation's intelli-
gence does not diminish the esteem they hold for the
men and women of intelligence.
Speaking November 7th, Sen. David F. Durenberger,
chairman of the oversight committee said:
"As you are aware, the CIA has come under a great
deal of public and congressional scrutiny in the past
decade, and certainly in the past week. Unfortunately
what you are not seeing or hearing are the thousands of
actions they are doing right on a daily basis. In particu-
lar, we are consistently demanding that our intelligence
officers abroad provide more and more information on
hostile intentions, especially those of terrorists. This
involves risks. More and more of our CIA field personnel
are being subjected to threats and abuse. Two years ago
we witnessed an example of this when a number of
them were killed by a terrorist bombing of the U.S.
Embassy in Beirut. And as their assignment became
more hazardous and demanding, the special mental and
physical requirements necessary of the intelligence
officer increase dramatically.
'To meet this standard the CIA must continually
replace its officers overseas with younger personnel
whose identities are not known and who can stand up
to the stresses of their environment. Our intelligence
Clearing the Waters
(Continued from page 13)
that the call had gone out for books critical of the Gen-
eva Summit slated for the following November. Soviet
policy, as early as summer, he said, was to depict the
Summit as a failure and KGB efforts to influence the
western press were already in evidence.
Mike Jacobs acted as chairperson for the series,
introducing the speakers and, more importantly, keeping
the lively seminars on time. Copies of AFIO monographs
and Dave Phillips' Careers in Intelligence were donated
by Jeff Kingry and given away to enrolled members of
the seminars.
Further opportunities have appeared as a result of
the seminars. One of those enrolled was Serge C. Gart,
coordinator of the university's Conferences and Insti-
tutes. He was impressed by the series, and has explored
the possibility of a university-sponsored educational
conference on intelligence. As conceived, the scope
would be much greater than done before and would be
supported through either the history or the political
science department. Chapter president Mike Speers and
Dr. Winn Taplin have held preliminary talks with Gart for
a New England Conference of Intelligence, History and
Political Science Scholars.
Kingry notes that "Great oaks from little acorns ...
and suggests that other AFIO chapters might find it
rewarding to work with the continuing education depart-
ments at their local colleges to develop similar courses,
symposia and lectures on intelligence matters. "There is
plenty of talent and experience out there and, in most
instances, there is also a public thirsty for first-hand
knowledge," he said.
officers face hazards unknown to other overseas or law
enforcement personnel. They and their families must
lead their lives undercover, never telling friends and
acquaintances of their true mission and responsibilities.
In a world filled with terrorism, their very safety and lives
are at stake if their cover is revealed. Most of these
officers also work two jobs - their cover employment
and their agency duties. And, finally, the nature of this
work is very exacting, dangerous and difficult. In short, it
is unlike any other work in government ... there is a
great need for a strong and effective human intelligence
service in today's international environment. My service
on the Select Committee on Intelligence has made me
well aware of how much we depend on the fine men
and women of our intelligence community. Their respon-
sibilities are unique and their contribution is unpar-
alleled."
He was joined by Sen. Ernest F. Hollings, who noted:
"The men and women who serve in the Central
Intelligence Agency are some of the finest we have in
public service. They are first class in terms of expe-
rience, expertise and special skills. Their responsibilities
are difficult, unique and often life-threatening. And,
their successes are never publicly acknowledged. They
are truly the front line of a 'silent war' against terrorism,
subversion and attacks upon the United States and its
allies ... our overseas intelligence officers face hazards
unknown to the Foreign Servie or law enforcement per-
sonnel. They and their families must lead their lives
undercover, never revealing their true mission to friends
and acquaintances. If their cover is ever revealed, their
very safety and lives are at risk. At this moment there is
a memorial at Langley for over 70 intelligence officers
who have given their lives in service to their country.
More names will be added as a result of the Embassy
bombing in Beirut and other recent acts of terrorism.
And, finally, most of these officers work two jobs - their
cover employment and their agency duties.
"In short, the work of an intelligence officer is very
exacting, difficult and dangerous. It is unlike any other
work in government. Yet the Government cannot offer
top salaries to this talented and highly skilled group of
professionals. Instead, we have to largely rely on their
sense of duty, loyalty and idealism."
Varounis Warns About
Writer Inquiries
AFIO member John Varounis calls reader attention to a recent
letter in the Air Force Magazine. In it, the author of the recently
published expose, U.S. Intelligence Community, solicits information
on U.S. intelligence operations directed against the USSR between
1945-1960. The writer indicates an interest in "hearing from anyone
involved in airborne peripheral photography or electronic reconnais-
sance missions during those years plus anyone who was involved in
'Collection Operations' concerning Soviet nuclear testing."
Varounis cautions that responding to this type of solicitation
could lead to unauthorized disclosure since the information requested
may still be classified or be subject to Department of Defense security
review prior to release. Responding to such requests, reminds
Varounis, leaves one open to expanded questioning in areas beyond
the author's claimed scope of interest and could be a means by which
the researcher can confirm hints, clues or information from other
sources.
Approved For Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140001-4
 Approved For Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140001-4
Intelligence Issues
Keeping Eyes on Spies:
An Unresolved Friction
by Roland Powell
Washington - Leaks to the press have long played a major role in
governing here. Leaks are used:
? As trial balloons designed to test the measure of public response
and therefore determine whether an idea should be pursued or
dropped.
? To make a case in public for an idea which has been scorned by
higher-ups in a department, agency or Congress.
? To attack, in a behind-the-back manner, some official or some
idea - one of the least socially acceptable approaches to a civ-
ilized nation.
And quite often there are leaks just because this place leaks.
There is a penchant by many for sounding off on this or that subject
because they are unable to keep quiet.
A mixture of about all those reasons appeared in recent "leak"
battles involving William Casey, the CIA director, on one side and the
ranking members of the Senate Intelligence Committee on the other ...
The give-and-take comments by Mr. Casey, Sen. David Duren-
berger (R., Minn.), chairman, and Sen. Patrick Leahy (D., Vt.), the rank-
ing Democrat, of the Intelligence Commitee, involved the simplest and
most important conflict between the agency and Capitol Hill.
The CIA likes to do things in secret. Members of Congress argue
that this has caused serious problems in the past, that Congress must
keep an eye on the spy agency and go public when it feels the national
Henry J. Hyde
U.S. House of Representatives
My concern about Congress' current intelligence oversight arrange-
ment was heightened by the furor last year over the mining of the
Nicaraguan harbors. Whether one supported this action or not, that
episode illustrates a problem of overwhelming importance. Specifi-
cally, one must ask how capable Congress is of practicing responsible
oversight of intelligence activities once those activities are viewed as
an integral part of a foreign policy that has become controversial and
the subject of partisan debate.
After Vietnam and Watergate, both Houses of Congress decided
to establish select commitees on intelligence following extensive
investigations of United States intelligence activities by panels headed
by then Congressman Otis Pike and the late Senator Frank Church.
Early on, both of these committees appeared to conduct their business
in an amicable and bipartisan manner with little evidence of politiciza-
tion. Unfortunately, such a turn of events was too good to last, and in
recent years congressional oversight has become increasingly politic-
ized ... It appears the only way to mount a successful covert operation
these days is for such an activity to have the nearly unanimous sup-
port of both intelligence committees and the involved agencies of the
Intelligence Community. Anythiwg short of that is doomed to failure, as
opponents can selectively leak material to their acquaintances in the
media with the express purpose of torpedoing the operation. Moreover,
you can count on a flurry of those leaks just before anticipated con-
gressional action on the issue in dispute.
What is especially disturbing is that those who are doing the
leaking probably never stopped to think what the short- and long-term
implications of their revelations will be with respect to United States
intelligence efforts, let alone to United States foreign policy. They are
so preoccupied with scoring political points that they do not begin to
realize how their actions may impact on the lives of United States
intelligence and foreign service personnel overseas ... We cannot
afford to allow what presently masquerades as congressional intelli-
gence oversight to continue any longer. With politics intruding so
heavily on the process, more debacles are inevitable. While nothing
equaling the sensationalism of the mining disclosures has occurred
since, I am personally aware, as a new member of the House Intelli-
gence Committee, of subsequent leaks that damaged United States
intelligence interests in Asia, the Middle East and Central America.
Overriding security concerns preclude me from elaborating any further.
I is certainly time, therefore, for a major overhaul.
interest requires.
Basically, the determination of the national-interest need is made
by three men: Senator Durenberger and Senator Leahy, who operate
in tandem on the Senate side, and Rep. Lee Hamilton ID., Ind.), chair-
man of the House Intelligence Committee, a respected lawmaker who
rarely is heard in pubic talking about or criticizing the CIA. Hence, it
was Casey vs. Durenberger-Leahy.
The whole idea of some senators and representatives keeping an
eye on the CIA is not popular at the agency. Intelligence people, by
their nature, apparently, assume that their successes and failures
shouldn't be known to the outside works ...
The CIA's handling of Vitaly Yurchenko - the reported Soviet
defector, and his fingering of Edward Lee Howard, a former CIA
officer, as one who gave the Soviets sensitive information about U.S.
intelligence gathering - came under harsh criticism, especially from
leaders of the Senate Intelligence Committee.
This led Mr. Casey to charge that the committee leaked like a
sieve and no wonder the CIA was reluctant to take the committee into
its confidence.
On the other side, Senator Leahy said there were many occasions
when the committee learned about things from leaks, that is, stories in
the press which he suggested had to come from CIA.
In short, everybody leaks, but "my leak is good for the country,
yours is not." ... The question is, in general. is the nation better off?
There is no simple or easy answer.
[Roland Powell is with the Washington Bureau of the Toledo Blade.
This analysis is excerpted from a longer article which appeared in that
publication.]
David F. Durenberger
United States Senate
There is, unfortunately, no sure-fire system for preventing un-
authorized disclosures of intelligence information from either the legis-
lative or executive branches. The record of the intelligence committees
in protecting the sensitive information imparted to them has been
excellent, and there certainly is no doubt that many more unautho-
rized disclosures have come from the executive branch then from the
Congress.
The Senate Intelligence Committee meets in a hearing room that
is state-of-the-art in protection against hostile penetration. Document,
physical and communications security is impressive on both the
House and Senate sides. In some cases the precautions taken exceed
anything done within the Intelligence Community. This is not to say
there is no room for improvement - we always can try to do better ...
Congressman Hyde perceptively asks whether Congress is capa-
ble of practicing responsible congressional oversight of intelligence
once those activities are viewed as an integral part of a foreign policy
that has become controversial and the subject of partisan debate. I
believe the answer is yes, and that we do not have to dismantle an
oversight system that is basically effective and beneficial to the Intelli-
gence Community. Instead, what we need to do is ensure that we
keep the distinction between foreign policy and intelligence firmly in
mind and not allow contentious foreign policy issues to be fought out
over implementing mechanisms in the context of intelligence oversight.
To this end, we should agree on the following basic principles
and, working with the executive branch, do our best to ensure that
they are followed:
(1) The role of the Intelligence Committee is to provide impartial
information and analysis upon which knowledgeable foreign policy
decisions can be made, and to serve in certain circumstances as the
instrument of United States policy when special activities are required
for policy implementation;
(2) The role of the intelligence committees of the Congress is to
provide congressional oversight necessary to ensure that budgetary
resources are efficiently allocated and that the Intelligence Community
is effectively accomplishing its mission with due regard to the rights of
Americans;
(3) Neither the Intelligence Community nor the intelligence com-
mittees of the Congress are, or should be, responsible for the formula-
tion of United States foreign policy.
[The statements by Rep. Hyde and Sen. Durenberger are excerpted from longer presentations which appear in
A Joint Committee on Intelligence? published by the Nathan Hale Institute, 422 First St. S.E., Suite 208A, Washington, D.C. 20003, $2.50.1
Approved For Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140001-4
 Approved For Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140001-4
Nicholson Memorial Fund
Established by S-CIC-R
The Senior Counter Intelligence Corps Retired, Inc.,
meeting in annual reunion at San Antonio, Texas, has
announced establishment of the Lieutenant Colonel
Arthur D. Nicholson, Jr., Memorial Scholarship Fund.
The proceeds will be used as scholarship assistance for
Nicholson's daughter, now nine years old. Nicholson, it
may be recalled, was murdered by a Soviet guard on
March 24, 1985, while performing his official duties in
East Germany as an Army member of the U.S. Mission
at Potsdam. He was posthumously promoted to the rank
of lieutenant colonel in a special ceremony conducted by
Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger at the
Pentagon.
Marion R. Panell, chairman of S-CIC-R's board, has
invited tax-deductible contributions to be mailed to: Cor-
poration Treasurer, Custodian of the Nicholson Memor-
ial Scholarship Fund, Frank L. Perkins, 2048 Keyes
Lane, Deltona, FL 32738.
A Letter From the Deanery
Dr. Walter L Pforzheimer. the dean of intelligence bibliophiles,
writes of his embarassment at a recent thumbnail sketch of himself in
Washingtonian magazine. In it, the reporter described Pforzheimer as
the "pink-faced dean of Washington's retired intelligence corps." Wal-
ter assures us his complexion is -ruddy," not "pink-faced." but sees
the remainder as an affront to "the real deans of the retired intelli-
gence profession who have carried the load while I have been collect-
ing books." While many of us have had to deal before with inaccuracies
in the press, he writes, in this case "I hasten to apologize for the
unpardonable error of the press and retreat to my possible claims as a
book collector in the intelligence field."
DONATIONS
The following members have generously contributed
an amount equal to or exceeding one year's annual dues.
Miss Mildred S. BRANNAN
Falls Church, Virginia
The Honorable Hugh S. CUMMING, Jr.
Washington, D.C.
Mr. Joe Wilson ELLIOTT
Los Angeles, California
Mrs. Jeanne B. GRIFFITH
Evanston, Illinois
COL Walter S. HAMMOND, USAF(Ret.)
Melrose, Florida
Mr. Otto T. HESS
Bradenton, Florida
Mr. Robert L. KEUCH
Carlisle, Pennsylvania
Ms. F. Catherine RIGSBEE
Saluda, North Carolina
Eleanor Madge STEIN
In memory of:
Margaret George KENNA and
COL Clair S. KENNA
New Life Members
Charles J. ALLEN
Shrewsbury, Massachusetts
LTC Gale LOVE, MI, AUS(Ret.)
Martinez, California
CPT Richard G. BERLIN, AUS(Ret.)
St. Petersburg, Florida
COL George Combs BERGER, USAF(Ret.)
Alexandria, Virginia
Robert C. BLOOMINGDALE
Framingham, Massachusetts
COL Daniel M. COLLIER, Jr.
New York, New York
COL Owen L. GREENBLATT USAF(Ret.)
Alexandria, Virginia
COL William T. HORNADAY, AUS(Ret.)
Bonita Springs, Florida
Robert A. JOY
San Rafael, California
COL Herman W. LANGE, USA(Ret.)
Ft. Lauderdale, Florida
LCDR Eston D. LAWRENCE, USN(Ret.)
Santa Barbara, California
Edward F. McGRATH
Vienna, Virginia
Joseph F. McMANUS
Columbia, South Carolina
COL Edgar T. MARTIN, USAR(Ret.)
Arlington, Virginia
Joseph D. OBUCINA, Jr.
Maitland, Florida
Mrs. William R. REED (Ellen)
Bordentown, New Jersey
Michael J. ROLLERI
San Francisco, California
Donald O. SHAW
Walnut Creek, California
Gene STEIN
Garnerville, New York
Middleton TRAIN
Washington, D.C.
16
Approved For Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140001-4
 Approved For Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140001-4
Nominations for the Board of Directors
Major General Richard X. Larkin, (USA-Ret.) has
en named Chairman of the nominating committee for
1986 elections to the Board of Directors. The follow-
1 members' terms expire this year: Ann Caracristi,
wrence R. Houston, Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., David
lee Phillips, John Anson Smith, Dr. Louis W. Tordella,
d W. Raymond Wannall. It is our goal to have at least
elve names on the ballot which will be sent to all
10 members with the Summer issue of Periscope. In
ler to nominate an AFIO member it is necessary to
ve the member's written permission as well as a
ck and white picture and biographic data. The com-
ttee will edit all biographies so as to make them of
ial size to fit on the ballot. it is our desire to have
embers nominated to the Board who have actively
)ported the goals of AFIO. It is through the nominat-
process that the voice of the members is heard. We
guest that nominations be sent to AFIO headquarters
ore April 1, 1986. This deadline is required in order to
to the ballot presented and approved by the Board of
actors at the AFIO Spring Luncheon on April 14, 1986.
The following is a list of members who have served,
well as those currently serving, on AFIO's Board of
ectors:
ROSITZKE. Harry
SCATTERDAY, Mr. George
SMITH, Mr. John Anson
STEWART, MG Richard R., USAF(Ret.)
STILWELL GEN Richard G., USA Ret.)
STORER, E. Barbara
TAYLOR, VADM Rufus, UUN(Ret.)'
THOMAS, MG Jack E., USAF(Ret.)
TIGHE, LG Eugene F., Jr., USAF(Ret.)
TORDELLA, Dr. Louis W.
WALLER, Mr. John H.
WANNALL, Mr. W. Raymond
WARNER, Mr. John S.
WATSON, MG Harold, USAF(Ret.)
WEINBRENNER, COL George R., USAF(Ret.)
WIGGINS, Mr. Lloyd George
WILSON, LTG Samuel V., UUA(Ret.)
In Memoriam
LT Janet AITKEN, USNR(Ret.)
Belvedere, California
Mr. Richard L ARMSTRONG
Honolulu, Hawaii
BOARD OF DIRECTORS LIST
ORY, Mr. Robert F., Jr.
'ES, CAPT Richard W., USN(Ret.)
SELL Mr. Richard M.
JKE, Mr. John F.
OM, Mr. Cecil
tACRISTI, Ann
-ROLL, LTG Joseph F., USAF(Ret.)
-TER, LTG Marshall S., USA(Ret.)
tY, Mr. George
EY, Hon. William J.
IE, Dr. Ray S.
.BY, Hon. William E.
HMAN, GEN Robert E., Jr., USMC(Ret.)
/IS, LTG John J., USA(Ret.)
K, Helen Priest
OLS, Mr. Lee E.
ER, COL Carl F., AUS(Ret.)
NNERY, Mr. James E.
-HAM, LTG Daniel 0., UUA(Ret.)
IAMAN. BG Harry T., USMC(Ret.)
FERN, Mr. Samuel
AMOND, COL Walter S., USAF(Ret.)
ILFINGER. VADM Frederick J., II, USN(Ret.)
)STON, Mr. Lawrence R.
FNER. Mr. Donald G.
AN, ADM Bobby R., USN(Ret.)
,PATRICK Mr. Lyman B.
KIN, MG Richard X., UUA(Ret.)
Mr. Derek'
E, The Honorable Clare Booth
JRY, Mr. John M.?
:R, Mr. Newton S.
is, LTG W. Ray. UUA(Ret.)
RY, Mr. Donald W.
RZHEIMER, Dr. Walter L
LIPS, Mr. David Atlee
LIPS, Mr. Stanton V.
E. CMDR Robert B., USN(Ret.)
DCKI, Mrs. Anita A.
CAPT Richard F. COOPER, USN(Ret.)
Rochester, New Hampshire
CAPT Edward H. C. FREDERICKS, USN(Ret.)
San Diego, California
Mr. Thomas B. JONES
Clifton, Virginia
RADM J. 0. KINERT, USN(Ret.)
San Diego, California
Mrs. Sarah C. MESSER
Virginia Beach, Virginia
CDR Raymond H. NICKERSON, USN(Ret.)
Cambria, California
LT John S. SALZER, USNR(Ret.)
Tampa, Florida
LTCOL Sammy V. C. SNIDER, USAF(Ret.)
Wellsville, PA
Employment Opportunities
Freelance writers wanted in the U.S. and abroad to
report on activist movements and their pressures on
business for the monthly newsletter International
Barometer. Arlon N. Pattakos, the publication's execu-
tive editor, advises that it will pay $50 to $150 per 750
words of text used. For more details write him at 1120
Connecticut Avenue N.W., Suite 330, Washington, D.C.
20036.
17
Approved For Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140001-4
 Approved For Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140001-4
From the President's Desk
I heartily recommend that each of you read the
excellent report of the Stilwell Commission "Keeping
the Nation's Secrets" which reviews the DOD policies
and procedures in light of recent security incidents. Go
to your Government Printing Office and get a copy. It
puts a lot of light on the U.S. Security problem where
there has largely been only heat.
Succinctly, the U.S. in its very fortunate position of
being able to acquire vast amounts of information via
classified means has not been very efficient at determin-
ing how much of this information needs to be classified.
Most of it is classified not for what it says but because of
how it was acquired. The challenge is simple, then:
1) Establish the means of classifying only that very
important information that deserves very expensive
and extensive protection.
2) Disseminate the material only on the strictest "need
to know" basis and only to trusted personnel.
3) Make sure the classified material is properly pro-
tected by an adequate administrative force and
secure environment.
This oversimplified approach to security requires
that only information, the loss of which will truly harm
the United States, as an institution, be protected. In my
experience the least discipline in our security system is
found in the hands of those who wield the various clas-
Notes from National
One of the main functions of the AFIO headquarters
has been to respond to requests from the media when
news stories have developed concerning intelligence;
Some of the more recent have been in response to
inquiries about defectors, spies against the United States
and espionage trials. We feel that AFIO is performing an
educational function for the American people in respond-
ing to these queries, and are pleased that the TV net-
works and national news magazines continue to call us
on a daily basis for information and referrals to members
for interviews. If any AFIO members are interested in
participating in this effort, please let us know your area
of interest. In granting such interviews, residual security
obligations remain an individual responsibility.
In furthering our education program, I gave two
presentations in November. The first was an address to
the Brookings Institution Seminar for Senior Govern-
ment Officials at Williamsburg, Virginia. The second
was to a study group at the Kennedy School of Govern-
ment at Harvard University. At the latter session I found
it surprising that the greatest interest of the students
was in the chance of gaining positions in the Intelli-
gence Community.
The AFIO Directory, included with this issue of
Periscope, was prepared in our office through the dili-
gent keyboarding efforts of Mrs. Gretchen Campbell and
Miss Suzanne Phillipe who programmed the project for
our IBM PC. Their work has increased the accuracy and
speed in preparing the Directory. We are truly grateful
for their efforts.
AFIO is much in need for proposals and manu-
scripts for additional pamphlets in the Intelligence Pro-
sification stamps. It just seems easier to stamp than
worry. Thus, the extraordinary volume of classified data,
most of which stays forever in our vaults and files - to
be inventoried by over-burdened clerical personnel;
occasionally stolen by venals prowling for a fast buck.
As priority number one, the Secretary of Defense
will do well to direct the reduction of classified data held
throughout the DOD, raw and processed, by at least
80%. The necessary discipline imposed, then, on the
system that continually adds to that remaining library of
20% will allow proper security for real secrets.
Happy New Year
Eugene F. Tighe, Jr.
fession Series. At the present time we do not have any
material in pipeline for the series.
For AFIO members who might like to accept some
part-time consulting work we are fortunate that a new
Life Member, Gene Stein, has made an offer which
should help. Gene is the Senior Partner in HR Consul-
tants Resource, 301 Route 19 North, Rutherford, New
Jersey 07070, telephone [phone]. The firm
maintains a database of the qualifications of potential
consultants, as extracted from a registration form sup-
plied by the company. Gene has generously agreed to
accept the registration of AFIO members at no charge
(the normal registration is $68), if they identify them-
selves as such. All inquiries should be directed to the
company at the address, above, and not to AFIO head-
quarters. Please remember that the data furnished
HRCR must be unclassified.
The deadline for submission of chapter reports and
photographs for the next issue of Periscope is April 5th.
- John K. Greaney
PERISCOPE is published quarterly by the Association of
Former Intelligence Officers, McLean Office Building,
6723 Whittier Ave., Suite 303A, McLean, VA 22101.
Phone[phone].
Officers of AFIO are:
LG Eugene F. Tighe, Jr ................ President
Dr. Walter L. Pforzheimer ............ Vice President
Robert J. Novak ......................... Treasurer
Charlotta P. Engrav ...................... Secretary
John K. Greaney ................. Executive Director
Edward F. Sayle ............... Editor of PERISCOPE
Approved For Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140001-4