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Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140006-6 (SECRET 1981 SOUTH AFRICA DOCUMENTS COUNTER ]Ply The Magazine For People Who Need To Know Volume 5 Number 4 $2 U.S. and NATO Intervention in Africa Aug.- Oct. 1981 First MNC Intelligence Convention Honduras: Staging Area for Counter -Revolution FBI Cops in Puerto Rico Moonies: CARP British Columbia: Bourne Again RCMP South Korea: AAFLI Taken Hostage by its Own El Salvador White Paper Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140006-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140006-6 instead of an editorial June in d.c. the women being women came out (asking what is 9 x 8?) after the rain for flower heads are offed by ,June rains and the children silently saw their grassroots transfiguration while the men kept driving capitalist cabs (redlining SE) of coZby's, helms' and mcnamara's listening (while denying) to: "Be ready, teddy" Zest you miss IT when It comes or take the devil for It. by John Kelly Contents British Propaganda ............. 4 U.S.S. Nimitz .................. 5 FBI Cops in Puerto Rico ........ 8 Moonies: CARP .................. 9 El Salvador White Paper (Cont.) .......... 11 Honduras: Staging Area for Counter-Revolution....... 13 First MNC Intelligence Convention ................... 16 Korea: AAFLI Taken Hostage by its Own........... 21 No Budget Cuts for RFE/RL ..... 22 Warmongering: Council on Foreign Relations ........... 25 Afghanistan-Pakistan Update ...27 NATO Intervention in Africa ...30 U.S. and NATO Facilities in Africa .................... 40 Secret 1981 South Africa Documents .................... 48 British Columbia: Bourne Again RCMP ............ 57 From the Editors CounterSpy wants to thank our subscrib- ers and readers for their support in pub- lishing this issue. A number of articles were inspired by letters from readers. You have also helped to expand our cir- culation by contacting bookstores and news stands in your area. This has been essen- tial for CounterSpy, and with your help we have been able to keep production and dis- tribution costs to an absolute minimum. Special thanks go to the writers who have contributed articles for the first time, and to those who assisted in the production of the magazine, and, of course, to all of you who have given us financial support. It was especially nice to meet some of our subscribers at the CounterSpy litera- ture table during the May 3rd demonstra- tion against U.S. intervention in El Sal- vador at the Pentagon. We continue to need your support on a number of issues. It is getting more and more expensive to print and mail the maga- zine. The best way to contribute dollars to CounterSpy is to encourage your public library or your college library to sub- scribe to CounterSpy. That provides us with $20, and gives many more people ac- cess to CounterSpy. Or you could take CounterSpy to local news stands and ask them to carry the magazine. If you are willing to do that, we'd be happy to mail you sample copies. Also, if you have ac- cess to any publication that might be willing to run a CounterSpy ad for free (or at reduced rates), please Zet us know. The number of our paying subscribers and of copies printed increased again with the last issue. Hundreds of maga- zines, however, are sent free of charge to prisoners and to other countries where the exchange rates make it all but im- possible for working people to pay for a subscription to CounterSpy. Please be mindful of that when you renew your sub, and add a few extra dollars. THIS IS YOUR LAST ISSUE IF YOUR MAIL- ING LABEL READS "R54" OR "L54". PLEASE RENEW RIGHT AWAY, SO YOU WON'T MISS A SINGLE ISSUE. Finally, please send us your comments on this issue of CounterSpy. We Zook for- ward to hearing from you. Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140006-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140006-6 News NOT in the News Correction In the midst of the barrage of undocu- mented charges by the Reagan administra- tion against publications like CounterSpy, we feel the following note in the Washing- ton Post, printed as a correction of a preceding article, bears repeating. "An article in yesterday's Washington Post said that some U.S. intelligence agents have been killed as a result of the publication of their names. While such allegations have been made, they have not been confirmed." Washington Post, 2/27/81, p.A-2. Graham's CIA Petition E fficiut j2titicn to the United States Senate WHEREAS, revealing the names of America's secret agents has resulted in murder, and WHEREAS, allowing people without background chocks to handle secret documents has resulted in security leaks+, and WHEREAS, weakening our ability to launch secret missions against our enemies has resulted in the needless deaths of American servicemen. THEREFORE I, the undersigned, respectfully petition the United States Senate to safeguard America by: Punishing those who endanger the lives of America's secret agents by revealing their names; ICNIP Death Squad "You realize that if at any stage the RCMP find out that you have been a traitor that a special squad is to be set up to take care of that? And I have been ap- proached in that regard." This is what Leslie James Bennett, former head of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police's Security Service was told by a former RCMP col league. Bennett was forced to resign in 1972 after intensive interrogation, and has been living in Australia since then. (See CounterSpy vol.5 no.3) He told the Australian Broadcasting Commission in 1981 h h b lieved the fairly di- t e e Checking the backgrounds of people handling secret documents to keep out spies; Strengthening our ability to launch secret missions so we can better defend America against our enemies. A project of The Hale Foundation, named after Nathan Hale. our first secret agent to give his life for America. "I only regret that I have but one life to lose for my country." June L. a Daniel Graham, Director of the Defense rect warning that he would be assassinated if the RCMP were able to prove that he was Intelligence Agency for six years, has in fact a double agent. Bennett maintains close ties to the Reagan administration he never was a double agent but cautions (he served as defense policy advisor in that: "I don't think the RCMP officer the transition team), and is co-chair of or the Coalition for Peace Through Strength. was romanticizing in any way, shape accompa- Graham form"(when he told Bennett of the assassi- circulated this petition accompa- nation threat).Bennett should know what he nied by a letter written in the style of a - third grader, full of over-simplifications is talking about. After all, he was run- and ning the RCMP Security Service for years. wild distortions. Dear Friend, Please sign the Petition I've enclosed for you. ... Your Petition is part of a new campaign CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981 -- 3 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140006-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140006-6 of The Hale Foundation to make sure Ameri- DIIIIJII Propaganda ca never has another disaster like our "i"'~"' failed rescue of the hostages in Iran. ... Believe me, I'm not exaggerating when I say that your survival, your children's During the last hungerstrike of Irish survival and your grandchildren's survival Republican prisoners at the end of 1981, may very well depend on the success of our an M16 (British equivalent of the CIA) campaign. psychological operations group was set up Frankly, America is facing the very real to bolster Britain's image abroad, and to threat of another Pearl Harbor sneak at- promote anti-Republican propaganda. tack. Only this time the attack will be The Dublin Sunday Tribune recently re- with nuclear weapons. Stop. Think what that means to you and each member of your family. It would mean the end of America. That's why I'm urgently asking you to help my campaign to stop the liberal at- tacks on our CIA... You can help my campaign by signing the enclosed Petition in support of criminal penalties against anyone disclosing our secret agents identity. ... And my Peti- tion calls for an American ability to launch secret missions. ... Now let me tell you what we're up against. You know, powerful anti-intelligence groups like the American Civil Liberties Union and Americans for Democratic Action won't like my Petition. But, we've got to beat them. ... ...liberal Senators like Ted Kennedy want all of our national security secrets laid out in full view. They want America's secrets spread out before Congressional committees. They don't seem worried about Communist spies roaming the halls of Congress.... And here's the worst. The liberals in Congress want advance notice of any secret operation. ... And you can do something else to help after you sign your Petition. You can send The Hale Foundation your contribution for $15, $25, $50 or.more. ... Your check may make the one thing that stands between peace and a Russian nuclear attack. Please help. Sincerely /signed/ Lt. Gen. Daniel 0. Graham U.S. Army, Retired 4 -- Counterspy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981 vealed that the team was set up at the be- ginning of November 1980 by M16 chief Arthur Franks, General Jim Glover, who is security and intelligence coordinator for Northern Ireland and Francis Brooks- Richards, former intelligence coordinator in Thatcher's cabinet. The Foreign Office (FO) immediately as- signed fifteen PSYOPS (Psychological Oper- ations Group) specialists to the British Information Service in Washington to con- vince the Irish community in the U.S. that the prisons in Northern Ireland were among the best in Europe. Fifty thousand copies of a report entitled "H-Block: The Facts" were distributed to press media the world Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140006-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140006-6 over. Their version of the "facts" made FBI Trains British Cops H-Blocks sound like a holiday camp. At the same time, M16 agents were sent to British embassies in other countries The following British police officers to take charge of anti-Republican propa- been trained by the FBI at its National ganda. There has been a particularly per- Academy in Quantico, Virginia: sistent campaign against Arthur McCaig's David Joseph O'Dowd, superintendent, film "The Patriot Game," which has been West-Midlands Police, Birmingham. shown in France and Belgium. Attempts to Charles R. Ormerod, assistant chief con- discredit it were mounted by the Overseas stable, Devon and Cornwall'Constabulary, Information Department (OID) of the FO. Exeter. Apparently the FO is at the moment mak- Raymond White, superintendent, Hampshire ing its own film about Northern Ireland Constabulary, Hampshire. for foreign consumption. Richard Adams, chief inspector, Mersey- An OID officer was sent to Paris to try side Police, Liverpool. to damp down criticism of the British Henry Arthur Leslie, superintendent, Government's attitude on the hunger stri Metropolitan Police Department, New Scot- strike. French trade unions and other po- land Yard, London. litical organizations condemned the Brit- Michael D. Richards, detective chief su- ish government's treatment of the prison- perintendent, Metropolitan Police depart- ers, and even the leading daily Le Monde ment, London. published detailed articles which in- Ronald C. Steventon, deputy assistant furiated the British ambassador in Paris. commissioner, Criminal Investigations De- Up to the end of 1980,the OID was run partment, New Scotland Yard, London. by a high-ranking M16 officer, James Roy W. McClean, detective superinten- Allen,who was part of the British delega- dent, Nottinghamshire Constabulary, Not- tion that arranged the truce with the IRA tingham. in 1975. At the beginning of this year, Terence Watson, chief superintendent, Allen-became British High Commissioner in South Yorkshire Police, Sheffield. Mauritius where the British are playing an Master Sergeant Frank M. Harrell of the important role in secret operations U.S. Air Force Security Police who was/is against the Militant Mauritius Movement. stationed at the Royal Air Force base in The OID was set up during the Cold War Bentwaters, also took part in an FBI in 1947 with the aim of fighting communism training course. by propaganda. It was known at the time as the Information Research Department (IRD). Eighty percent of its employees were work- ing for M16, and it has been subsidized by + the CIA from the beginning. One of its U.S.S, Nirnitz chiefs, Sir John Rennie, became director of MI6 in 1969. In 1976 the Guardian re- vealed that, although it was officially a On May 26, 1981, during a midnight Foreign Office department, the OID was fi- training exercise 60 miles off the coast nanced from a secret fund for MI6. of Jacksonville, Florida, a Marine EA-6B (Peoples News Service, Oxford House, aircraft crash-landed on the deck of the Derbyshire St., Bethnal Green, London E2, super-carrier U.S.S. Nimitz. When the fire resulting from the crash was finally under England.) control 14 men lay dead and 48 had been SCIENCE FOR THE PEOPLE bimonthly Progressive views on science and technology -addressing elitism, sexism, racism- defining a people's science $10/year from Science for the People 897 Main St., Cambridge, MA 02139 f injured in what is being called the "worst peacetime accident in naval history." "This was not a peacetime accident," charged Gavrielle Gemma of the People's Anti-War Mobilization (PAM) in a press re- lease issued in New York the day after the crash. "It took place during a highly pro- vocative combat-type mission in which one of the most powerful warships ever con- structed was headed into a politically Counterspy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981 -- 5 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140006-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140006-6 sensitive area where no country is threat- ening the security of the people of the United States." Gemma also raised the pos- sibility of a much larger disaster that could have happened the night of the crash. "We have information," explained Gemma, "that besides its load of conven- tional weapons, the Nimitz may well have been carrying a complement of nuclear war- heads. Depending on the location of these" warheads, an accident of the type experi- enced by the Nimitz could well have led to a detonation of the conventional explo- sives carried in these bombs." To answer the questions raised by the accident a national PAM representative spoke with several Nimitz crew personnel, including members of the fire-fighting Crash Crew, in Norfolk where the ship was docked for a two-day rest stop before re- suming its Caribbean cruise. These inter- views revealed the following: 1) There were nuclear weapons on board the carrier at the time of the crash. They were stored below deck, below the water line. 2) While the nuclear weapons themselves were apparently in no immediate danger, on deck were two missiles of the powerful Phoenix class which were in danger of ex- ploding and had to be kept hosed down to protect them from the flames. According to Crash Crew member Andy Perkins, "If those Phoenixs would have gone up, most of the two-or three hundred men fighting the fire would have been killed and we'd probably have lost the bow of the ship." A convul- sion of that magnitude may have resulted in some damage to the metal casings of the nuclear weapons raising the danger of ra- diation leakage. 3) Although the Navy brass, including Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman, Jr. had flatly denied any major problems in the fire-fighting system, Perkins and oth- er crewmen charged half the deaths were directly related to serious malfunctions in that system. Those malfunctions in- cluded loss of pressure in the hand-held foam hoses, failure in sections of the deck foam sprinkling grid, and the mechan- ical failure of one of two P-16 fire- fighting vehicles. The second P-16 was buried under the fire. In addition, the sailors reported that the deck crew had been working 16 hours a day while the pilots had been working 12 hour shifts prior to the crash. Initially, 6 -- CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981 top Navy officers admitted the possibility of pilot-fatigue as a major factor in the crash, but now the cause of the accident is described solely as "pilot error." In a press release on June 17, the Vet- erans and Active-Duty Focus of PAM charged that the Navy was trying to cover-up other factors in the accident by "blaming the victims [the pilots] for the crime." The defective ship safety system, the grossly overworked crew and the possibility of a much larger explosion due to the on-deck presence of the Phoenix missiles and the nuclear warheads carried below, were never publicly discussed, and public attention was deliberately diverted away from the politically-provocative nature of the Nimitz "training mission" in the Caribbe- For more information, contact the Veter- ans and Active-Duty Focus of PAM, 234 7th Street, New York,.NY 10010; tel. 212-741- 0633. - by Phil Wilayto - a k Kill On May 6, 1981 the Air Force Armaments Laboratory at Eglin Air Force Base, Flori- da, sent out contract notices asking com- panies with experience in producing small arms and silencers for 9mm automatic pis- tols to contact the laboratory. Major John Toner, a spokesperson for the-labora- tory stated that the silencers are de- signed mainly for units specializing in "counterinsurgency and special opera- tions." The Atlanta Constitution (5/20/81) interprets this as "another in- dication that U.S. covert military opera- tions are back in favor." B-52s Al Australia Amidst numerous counter-demonstrations, the Australian government.of Malcolm Fraser decided to allow U.S. B-52's to use the Australian Air Force base at Darwin, and U.S. personnel will be stationed at the base. Fraser's foreign minister Tony Street and U.S. Secretary of State Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140006-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140006-6 Alexander Haig worked out an agreement that the B-52's will only be used for sea surveillance and training. However, the agreement also allows the B-52's to engage in "other categories of operations" with the specific approval of the Australian government. The biggest issue in the B-52 debate is whether they will be armed with nuclear weapons, and the U.S.-Australian agreement does not rule out this possibility. Clause 7 of the agreement only assures the Aus- tralians that "arrar}gements shall be made for consultation that the Government of Australia has full and timely information about strategic and operational develop- ments relevant to B-52 staging operations through Australia." But even that isn't assured given the history of U.S.-Austra- lian relations. During the 1973 Middle East "crisis," several U.S. facilities in Australia were placed on "Red Alert" with- out the knowledge of the Australian gov- ernment, let alone "consultations." ~av~ /~'-'r'~/U~SGn"~1k~ Notting to Sa/ restraint" in stationing nuclear mis- siles in Europe if the United States re- sumes negotiations on the weapons. For- mer U.S. Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, here Moscow] for an internation- al forum on disarmament, said the pro- posal appeared to indicate a shift in the conditions under which the Kremlin would negotiate on European missiles. Georgy Arbatov, a leading Communist Par- ty member participating in the inde- pendent forum, suggested the Kremlin would not deploy additional medium- ranged nuclear missiles in Europe until 1983 if talks resumed. He also said at a news conference that the Soviet Union would not insist that the United States stop producing similar weapons on its own, for possible deployment later. The Reagan administration apparently has not responded to this virtually unprece- dented offer by the Soviet Union. Indeed, Eugene Rostow, Reagan's nominee to head the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, told the Senate Foreign Relations Commit- tee on June 22 that it will take-the U.S. government nine months to know "what we are trying to achieve." He continued,"as of this moment I don't know anybody in this government with whom I've talked, who knows what it is we want to negotiate about." 'Aid" to Africa In spite of cuts in U.S. foreign aid programs, the Reagan administration is planning to institute military aid pro- grams to a number of African countries for the first time in fiscal year 1982. It won't cost much, according to the State Department's Congressional Presentation, and the results should be "great." The island nation of Cape Verde is sup- posed to get a "small grant" for an Inter- national Military Education and Training (IMET) program since it "has moved toward an increasingly non-aligned position in world affairs rafter having been]... On June 15, 1981, the following item ap- closely tied... to the 'progressive' wing peared in the Washington Post buried on of the Non-Aligned Movement." page A-25: An IMET program for the Congo, also a A senior Soviet official indicated the first, is "designed to further U.S. inter- Kremlin is prepared to show "unilateral ests by reinforcing the Congolese Govern- CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981 -- 7 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140006-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140006-6 .ment's non-aligned posture... The proposed FBI Cops in PW, w.t fD'co 7 W ? training will expose Congolese officers to FM I~IJ~JJ IT American institutions and ideals." Equatorial Guinea's IMET grant "is de- Given the fact that the FBI unleashed signed to further U.S. interests by rein- widespread COINTELPRO operations in Puerto forcing the new... Government's pro-west- Rico against countless citizens engaging ern stance... The investment climate is in legitimate political activities, it is ripe for U.S. firms..." in the vital interest of all Puerto Ricans The granting of an IMET program to to know that this same FBI has trained the Guinea Bissau is seen as an "opportunity following Puerto Rican police officers at to... strengthen Guinea Bissau's resis-. its National Academy in Quantico, Virgin- tance to Soviet influence... The recent ia. coup... which brought to power Joao Vieira Mato Rte: Braulio Donato Morales; Carlos Garcia Ortiz; may increase the influence of the mil- Munacao: Francisco Aosado Torres; itary in the Government, thus broadening Mayaguez: Juan B. Gonzalez, Luis Arturo'Rivera; San Juan: Israel Alameda-Ballester, Celestino Alejandro our U.S. contacts with the military Cruz, Rafael Alvarez Jimenez, Jose D. Burgos, Astol which could take on greater significance." Calero Toledo, Luis D. Camacho Ruses, Jorge Camacho An IMET program to the government of the Torres, Cesiderio Cartagena Ortiz, Arnaldo Castro Marrero, Gilberto Claudio Vazquez, Jorge L. Collazo Seychelles "which styles itself as social- Torres, Emanuel Cortes Davila, Reyes David Cruz ist... would... improve the atmosphere in Gonzalez, Roberto Cruz Itizarry, William Davidson, Angel which the [U.S. satellite] tracking stat U. Davila, Ruben Diaz Rivera, Israel Freytes Alvarez, Alfredo Fuentes Sosa, Jesus M. Garcia Aviles, Manuel A. tion operates." Garcia Graulau, Juan Gonzalez Delgado, Raul Gonzalez Other justifications for assistance pro- Fernandez, Francisco T. Gonzalez, Jose W. Hernandez to countries who have received U.S. Aquino, Jose E. Hernandez Rodriguez, Antonio Hernandez grams Navas, Jacinto Hidalgo, Rafael Irizarry Velez, Octavio military aid before, are equally revealing Jimenez Rosa, Samuel Lopez Torres, Andres Logo Coy, in their bluntness. Botswana, for example, Ernesto Lugo Mendez, Tomas Maldonaco Cruz, Luis is supposed to get $10.6 million in mili- Marreroco Trinidad, Fernando Marrero Colon, Manuel de J. tary assistance ($10 million of that comes Jesus Martino Martinez, Salvador Mass, Miguel Matos from the Economic Support Fund) to "con- Colon, Manuel Mauras Poventud, Jose Melendez Santiago, Ismael Mercado, Jose R. Morales Ortiz, Luis M. Murphy, tribute to our encouragement of Botswana's Jose Nazario, Angel J. Negron, Marcial Osurio moderate stance on southern:Africa issues. Rosario, Quirpa Perez Collazo, Luis M. Perez, Emilio Botswana will need a capability to control QUinones Guardiola, Jose A. Rivera Hernandea, Luis Rivera Rodrigues, Juan E. Rivera Santiago, Miguel A. infiltration of armed guerrillas... as Riveria, Mario Robles Cruz, Hector Rodriguez Cruzado, long as Namibia remains an active front of Victor M. Rodriguez Sambolin, Salvador T. Roig, guerrilla warfare and various liberation Valentin Roque Colon, Jorge Juan Ruttell Medina, Leanoro g Sanabria Cortes, William Santana Maiz, Benigno Soto groups seek to gain access to South Afri- Rodriguez, Armando Tapia Suarez, Nestor Torres ca." Rodriguez, Luis R. Torres Santiago, Luis E. Torres A main reason for security assistance to Colon, Angel L. Torres Lopez, Antonio Vazquez y Rodriguez, Jose A. Vazquez Sanchez, Felix Vega Malawi is "its consistent support for key Velazquez, Luis Velez Feliciano, Julio Vigoreaux Garcia, U.S. foreign policy objectives... Particu- Jose Ramon Zapata Rivera; larly in southern Africa, Malawi shares Santurce: Julio Bolivieri Munoz. with the U.S. a desire for... non-violent' men resolution of conflicts... The IMET pro- gram... provides a means of strengthening pro-American sentiment within the Malawi Gua~em~a Army and officer corps... which could be- ~] come a decisive force for stability in the future." The assistance program to Ghana Business International (BI), a corporate has given "key'members of the Ghanaian mouthpiece and long-term cover for CIA of- military... an understanding of and re- ficers (see New York Times, 2/27/77) re- spect for American values and institu- cently indicated that U.S. multinational tions. This reinforces their western ori- entation..." corporations (MNCs) and banks are extreme- ly unhappy with the progress of the Guate- malan revolution. According to BI's Busi- ness Latin America (4/22/81, p.126), ua- temala's once-robust economy is reflecting the effects of domestic and regional trou- bles. Indicators point to depressed 8 -- CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140006-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140006-6 growth, rising unemployment and a deterio- rating balance-of-payments position." Worse yet in the eyes of BI: "No new in- vestments of any significance have taken place in the past 12 months... Income from On Sunday, May 3, 1981 tens of thousands tourism totaled $130 million in 1979 but marched on the Pentagon against U.S. mili- fell to half that last year." (1980) Occu- tary aid to El Salvador. Many demonstra- pancy in hotels (largely U.S.-owned) was tors were confronted for the first time by "only at 55% capacity in 1980, compared an organization supporting military aid to with 85% in 1979, and so1ar in 1981 is El Salvador's ruling junta..The counter- off about 45%." demonstrators were members of CARP (Colle- Aggravating U.S. business even more is giate Association for the Research of that Guatemala's investment difficulties Principles, Inc.) which identifies itself peaked just when Texaco and Amoco discov- as the campus arm of the Unification ered oil in northeastern Guatemala in the movement founded by the Rev. Sun Myung same geological formation as Mexico's Moon."1 CARP claims to have members on Reforma fields in Campeche; and not only forty-five campuses - mostly large public have investment difficulties peaked but universities across the United States. Its also, according to BI, there are "no pro- paper, World Student Times, acknowledges spects for a significant improvement..." Sun Myung Moon as "the inspiration of The reason for the declining investment CARP."2 and profiteering in Guatemala is "the poor Most CARP members would deny that it is political climate" and the "political vio- a front or recruiting arm for Moon's Uni- lence" which "continues at a frightening fication Church. But the dividing line level" - business code words for the Gua- between the Church and CARP is very thin: temalan people's struggle against the mil- A 1978 Congressional report concluded that itary dictatorship of General Lucas. the many "religious and secular organiza- The Reagan administration is naturally 'tions headed by Sun Myung Moon constitute concerned with business losing trust in essentially one international organiza- the Guatemalan regime's ability to cope tion."3 That report was a response to the with a successful guerrilla struggle. In "Koreagate" scandal in which agents of the May 1981, Gen. Vernon Walters (ret.) went South Korean government (including agents to Guatemala as the personal representa- of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency) tive of Alexander Haig, and on June 5, were caught trying to buy influence in or- 1981 the administration quietly approved der to bend U.S. government policy to a $3.2 million sale of 50 2/ ton military their own interests. The Moon organization trucks and 100 jeeps to the Guatemalan was a part of the Korean government's ef- military. In order to make the sale legal fort. The Congressional study also found vis-a-vis laws restricting the sale of Moon to be a major weapons manufacturer such equipment to governments that are and dealer: "A Moon Organization business gross violators of human rights, the State is an important defense contractor in Ko- Department simply re-classified the vehi- rea. It is involved in the production of cles and put them on a list of equipment M-16 rifles, anti-aircraft guns, and other to be used for "control of regional secu- weapons. rity." State Department officials said Unlike genuine religious groups, the this re-classification was made not to Moon organization engages in deceptive, circumvent the human rights issue, but "to illegal tactics, and although "many of the stimulate. export sales of American-made goals and activities of the Moon Organiza- vehicles." tion were legitimate and lawful, there was The administration is also considering evidence that it had systematically vio- selling $2.5 million worth of spare parts lated U.S. tax, immigration, banking, cur- for Guatemala's UH-IH Huey helicopters; rency, and Foreign Agents Registration Act and Guatemala is a likely recipient of laws, as well as State and local laws... money from Reagan's multi-million dollar and that these violations were related to contingency economic support fund which he the organization's overall goals of gain- can use at his own discretion. ing temporal power..." 5 Minnesota Con- (Elizabeth Zanger is the pseudonym of a New England political activist.) CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981 -- 9 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140006-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140006-6 gressman Donald Fraser's House subcommit- armed guerrilla labelled "extreme right." tee produced that 1978 report ("Investiga- On the left side of the drawing is someone tion of Korean-American Relations") and in resembling Soviet President Leonid apparent retaliation, the Moon organiza- Brezhnev with an armed guerrilla bearing tion spent millions of dollars to defeat the hammer and sickle insignia. The cap- Fraser's re-election bid in 1978. A young tion reads "Caught in the Middle! Duarte man named Michael Smith, then part of a needs our support." 9 Moon front called the Freedom Leadership CARP claims that the United States it- Foundatiori, went to Minnesota to organize self is the "final target" for leftist other Moonies to help Fraser's'opponents.6 terrorism in this hemisphere. It also in- Michael Smith is now head of national sists that "Salvador is not 'another Viet- CARP, headquartered at Moon's Unification nam "' as an article in the April 3, 1981 Church Building in New York City. On April issue of World Student Times proclaimed: 14, 1981 national CARP claimed that stu- "El Salvador is, in fact, 'in our own dents "on more than 100 campuses recently backyard.' Texas and California are clos- joined together to form the CARP Committee er to El Salvador than to New York... It to Save El Salvador - a national campus would be foolish indeed for the United group which supports U.S. aid to the mod- States to let 'another Vieti~m' happen so UU erate centrist government of that embat- close to its own borders." tied nation."7 Michael Smith was named There are many unanswered questions chairperson of the CARP Committee to Save about CARP.11 Where does its money come El Salvador. from? What role does it play in the in- The CARP line closely follows the offi- ternational strategy of Moon's Unification cial position of the U.S. State Department Church? And, given CARP's echoing of the and the Reagan administration. According State Department line on El Salvador - are to the April 14 press release, "Michael there any tangible links between CARP and Smith, the chairman of the CARP commit- the Reagan administration? tee, emphasized that the group condemns extremism of both the left and the right FOOTNOTES in El Salvador and elsewhere. Smith ex- plained that, 'Until now only the left has 1) Press release of April 14, 1981; issued by CARP had a voice on the campuses on this issue. National Headquarters, 4 West 43rd Street, New York, NY 10036; phone 212-354-6531. It is time someone spoke up for the real 2) World Student Times (WST), 4/10/81, p.12. interests of the Salvadoran people' which 3) Investigation of Korean-American Relations, Re- he said are best represented by the re- port of the Subcommittee on International Organiza- tions of the Committee on International Relations, formist government of President Jose U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Congress, Napoleon Duarte."8 10/31/78, p.387. This spring CARP launched a leaflet dis- 4) ibid., pp.387,388. 5) ibid., p.388. tribution campaign on many campuses. 6) Robert Boettcher with Gordon L. Freedman, Gifts Their titles read, "The Castro Connection: of Deceit: Sun Myung Moon, Ton sun Park and the Ko- ~i rean Scandal, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, U.S.S.R. and Cuba out of El Salvador," and 1980, pp.323,324. "Duarte: man of the people." The latter 7) cf supra, #1. portrayed Duarte as a moderate Christian 8) ibid. Democrat who is "sincerely and successful- 9) WST, 4/10/81, p.l. 10) WST, 4/3/81, p.3. by implementing policies of both rural and 11) There are at least two non-profit organizations urban economic reform, including land re- that actively oppose Moon. One, Ex-Moon, Inc. is form..." According to the leaflet, it is headed by a former member of CARP. It publishes a g monthly newsletter (1712 Eye St. NW, Suite 1010, Duarte's very success in implementing re- Washington, D.C. 20006). The other is the American forms which "has spurred terrorist aCtiVi- Family Foundation. It publishes a bi-monthly news- paper from guerrillas of both reactionary called The Advisor and can provice tram ty $ y and scripts of public hearings, reports and court cases Marxist, persuasions, anxious to see these concerning the Moon organization and other cults [reform] policies fail." (P.O. Box 343, Lexington, MA 02173). The front page of the weekly CARP news- paper World Student Times on April 10, 1981 pictures a besieged Duarte wearing a button with the single word "Reform." On the right side of-the cartoon a cigar- smoking general keeps company with an 10 -- CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140006-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140006-6 El Salvador White Paper (Cont.) r_,r...-_--- . tt-t WttOtt t~-;N,/J 1KZ1 eF tile media . solve the Namibia question, the less South African presence will be required there. We will. reach a stage where internal forces in Namibia can militarily defeat SWAPO. Malan's remarks set stage for Botha to discuss SAG view of SWAPO. Botha noted that SAG thought it was important to U.S. to stop Soviet gains. But of you say SWAPO not Marxist, you move in same direction as previous administration. SWAPO's people are indoctrinated in Marxism every day. Savimbi considers SWAPO universally Marx- ist. SAG's bottom line is no Moscow flag in Windhoek. If U.S. disagrees, let sanc- tions go on, and get out of the situation. South Africa can survive sanctions. Even- tually South'Africa can get support of moderate black African states. Better to start U.S./SAG relations with lower expec- tations, than to disagree angrily later. At moment, U.S. doesn't believe SAG view of SWAPO; you're soft on SWAPO. SAG appre-, ciates U,S. firmness against Soviets, Botha continued., Even Africans now see you assuming leadership. But SAG worried that USG is moving toward Namibia plan SAG can- not understand.. As with Kissinger attempt,, on Rhodesia, it will be difficult to get consensus, especially with so many parties involved. SAG tried one-on-one approach with Angolans, but Geneva meetings side- tracked effort. SAG has tried Angolans several times. Each time, there is pro- gress, but then something intervenes. We're convinced Moscow controls-present government in Angola. We're convinced SWAPO is Marxist. Nujoma will nationalize the whole place, and cause upheaval and civil war, involving South Africa. We will have to invade Namibia, and other countries as well. We are pleading for you to see the dangers of a wrong solution in Namibia. It would be better to have a low- level conflict there indefinitely, than to have a civil was escalating to a general conflagration. If Nujoma governs as an Ovambo, the Hereros will fight. Also, Nujoma made promises to the Soviets. De- Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140006-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140006-6 fectors from SWAPO have revealed their plan to SAG -- first Namibia, then Botswa- na, Lesotho, and Swaziland, followed by the final attack on South Africa. SAG can't ignore this reality. We wouldn't justify that to our people. South Africa is a democracy as far as white voters are concerned. Even black leaders can criti- cize the government. South Africa has freedom, and can have more, but survival is the prerequisite. The BLS leaders agree with us. Even some Front Line leaders see the danger. We have twice saved Kaunda's life. and the quality of education under the present system, discrimination has been abolished by law, though it continues in practice. There is also the problem of the white ethnic Legislature vs. the black majority Council of Ministers. Crocker said that U.S. understands con- cern with constitutional rights. U.S. has inherited a situation with many parties but we must build a consensus in Africa that we are serious and not just delaying. We believe a Lancaster type conference won't work: We see a panel of experts, consulting all parties, writing a consti- The situation is not what you think. You tution, and then selling it through the think in global terms; we're not a global Contact Group. With SAG's help, we could power. We must safeguard our interests sell it to the internal parties. Botha re- here. Not just white interests. We see the ferred to reports of a French constitu- necessity of avoiding black-white polar- ization. But we see it as an ideological struggle. Developed moderate blacks are not communists. They will engage with us in common effort against communism. When whites see blacks as allies, whites will move away from discrimination. With more distribution of economic goods, more blacks will join us. But if we all come under Moscow's domination, that's the end. Crocker addressed ?Botha's expressed fears and concerns by first accepting the premise that Soviet domination is the dan- ger. But U.S. believes best way to avoid that danger is to get Namibia issue behind us. As long as issue subsists, we cannot reach a situation where U.S. can engage with South Africa in security, and include South Africa in our general security framework. If Namibia continues, it will open South/Central Africa to the Soviets. Simmering conflict in Namibia is not ac- ceptable. The ideas U.S. has in mind don't include Soviets in Windhoek. We believe we can get the Soviets out of Angola, and provide a guarantee of security whether Nujmoma (sic) wins or not. Botha said this is the nitty-gritty. Without Soviet support, others won't ac- cept Nujoma's rule. To satisfy others we need a political solution. Crocker agreed that a political solution is needed. Botha stressed the need to consult with leaders in Namibia. If U.S. can gain their confi- dence, and SWAPO's, and talk about minori- ty rights, progress is possible. People in Namibia are concerned about property, an independent judiciary, freedom of reli- gion, the preservation of their language tional plan. He said that he's against multiple plans. Botha stressed need for U.S. leadership, and emphasized need for U.S. to consult with internal parties in Namibia. He discussed SAG relations with internal leaders, and need to avoid leav- ing them in lurch in order not to be dis- credited with other moderate leaders in Africa. He tied this to possibility of SAG cooperating with moderate African states to deal with economic development prob- lems. Botha concluded by saying that SAG doesn't want to let Namibia go the wrong way; that's why South Africa is willing to pay the price of the war. We pray and hope for a government favorably disposed to us. The internal parties don't want us to let go until they have sufficient power to control the situation. We want an anti-So- viet black government. Following the substantive discussion, Botha conveyed to Crocker written communi- cations from the heads of Bophuthatswana and Venda. He explained that their ambas- sadors wanted to deliver the messages in person, but Botha decided to convey them to avoid appearance of trying to force U.S. hand. Then question of invitation to Botha to visit U.S. in May was discussed. Crocker stressed need for SAG to decide cooperation with U.S. was worth it before accepting invitation. Botha resisted set- ting any conditions for visit, and said he would prefer not to come if conditions are set. Crocker said there were no condi- tions, just a question of clarifying the spirit in which the visit would take place. Botha ended the discussion by not- ing that he would inform internal parties CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981 -- 53 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140006-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140006-6 about discussion immediately. He said he would tell Prime Minister Botha that SAG should explore question of constitution before an election in Namibia. He noted that a referendum on the constitution rather than constituent assembly elec- tions, would make matters easier. Docunent 3 The following document was leaked to the media in late May, 1981. This "Scope Pa- per" was drafted by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, for Secretary of State Alexander Hail to be used in his meeting with South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha on May 1.4, 1981. It provides unusual insight into the thinking of State Department planners and the real U.S. attitude toward the South African regime. Gen. Haig, natural- ly, found the leak "atrocious" and "ap- palling." CounterSpy is reprinting the document in full. TO: The Secretary FROM: AF - Chester A. Crocker SUBJECT: Your Meeting With South Afri- can Foreign Minister Botha, 11:00 a.m., May 14, at the De- partment - Scope Paper SUMMARY: The political relationship between the United States and South Africa has now ar- rived at a crossroads of perhaps historic significance. After twenty years of gener- ally increasing official U.S. Government coolness toward South Africa and concomi- tant South African intransigence, the pos sibility may exist for a more positive and reciprocal relationship between the two 'ountries based upon shared strategic con- cerns in southern Africa, our recognition that the government of P. W. Botha repre- sents a unique opportunity for domestic change, and willingness of the Reagan Ad- ministration to deal realistically with South Africa. The problem. of Namibia, however, which complicates our relations with our European allies and with black Africa, is a primary obstacle to the de- velopment of a new relationship with South Africa. It also represents an opportunity to counter the Soviet.threat in Africa. We 54 -- CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981 thus need Pretoria's cooperation in work- ing toward an internationally acceptable solution to Namibia which would, however, safeguard U.S. and South African tial interests and concerns. I. OBJECTIVES: -- To tell the South Africans that we are willing with them to open a new chap- ter in our relationship based upon strate- gic reality and South Africa's position in that reality and the continued explicit commitment of P. W. Botha's government to domestic change. -- To make clear to the South Africans that we.see the continuation of the Namib- ia problem as a primary obstacle to the development of that new relationship and that we are willing to work with them to- ward an internationally acceptable settle- ment which will not harm their interests. II. PARTICIPANTS: U.S. The Secretary Under Secretary Stoessel Assistant Secretary-Designate Crocker Assistant Secretary Abrams SOUTH AFRICA: Foreign Minister Botha Brand Fourie Ambassador Sole Ambassador Ecksteen III. SETTING The discussion with the South Africans will cover three discrete areas: Namibia, U.S.-South Africa nuclear cooperation and general bilateral issues. Pik Botha may touch on each of these during his 15 min- utes in private with you. Botha will prob- ably weave these questions into an over- view of southern Africa regional issues delivered in terms of his familiar "Africa is dying"/Soviet-onslaught-against South Africa" (sic) speech. The expanded meeting with you and the working lunch?on will fo- cus specifically on Namibia. OES Assistant Secretary Jim Malone will conduct separate discussions with Brand Fourie on the nu- clear issue. I will also conduct a sepa- rate discussion with Fourie on our bilat- eral relations with reference to the sev- eral specific issues now pending between us. This format will permit you to focus Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140006-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140006-6 on the Namibia issue. lated by them or to act as a smokescreen Our dialogue with South Africa over the for their actions and misadventures with possibility of a new and more balanced re- their neighbors. We must make it clear to lationship began with my visit to Pretoria the South Africans that we have a role in last month. As I reported to you from my rebuilding stability in southern Africa, meetings with Pik Botha and Defense Minis- that is a shared goal they cannot reach ter Magnus Malan, I found the South Afri- without us, and they cannot go it alone. cans to be in a testy mood. The substan- Our shared objectives require that our di- tial amounts of misinformation and disin- plomacy have a chance to operate and our formation which had appeared in the press interests be observed as well as theirs. since the November election had, I sus- We cannot afford to give them a blank pect, acted to bring to the surface in- check regionally. Moreover, SAG intransi- grained distrust. The South Africans are gence and violent adventures will expand deeply suspicious of us, of our will, from Soviet opportunities and reduce Western the 1975-76 experience and the Carter pe- leverage in Africa. In turn, they may com- riod. They claim that they can go it alone plain about our performance in the past in the region--an attitude which is partly and voice doubts about our constancy and bluster, partly an opening bargaining po- reliability in the future. sition with us. TALKING POINTS South African truculence (which can be coated with great charm) is compounded by -- WE WANT TO OPEN A NEW CHAPTER IN RE- the fact that, as an international pariah, LATAN WITH SOUTH AFRICA. the country has "had no meaningful, bal- -- WE FEEL THE NEW RELATIONSHIP SHOULD anced bilateral relations in recent memo- BE BASED UPON OUR SHARED HOPES FOR THE FU- ry". Thus, the South Africans deeply re- TURE PROSPERITY, SECURITY AND STABILITY OF sent being treated as an embarrassment and SOUTHERN AFRICA, CONSTRUCTIVE INTERNAL are not used to the give-and-take of prag- CHANGE WITHIN SOUTH AFRICA AND OUR SHARED matic relations. If the South Africans PERCEPTION OF THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION still want to vent their frustrations, I AND ITS SURROGATES IN THWARTING THOSE fear you will be subjected to Pik's rheto- GOALS. ric. Thus, it is in your interest to take control of the meeting from the beginning. -- WE CAN FORESEE COOPERATING WITH YOU IN A NUMBER OF WAYS IN OUR EFFORTS TO RE- IV. DISCUSSION OF OBJECTIVES: ESTABLISH REGIONAL STABILITY. -- U.S./SOUTH AFRICAN COOPERATION IS IN- 1. To tell the South Africans that we DISPENSABLE FOR THE SUCCESS OF THOSE EF- are willing with them to open a new chap- FORTS. FAILURE TO COOPERATE WILL ENCOURAGE ter in our relationship based upon strate- FURTHER SOVIET GAINS, AND JEOPARDIZE THE gic reality and South Africa's position in INTERESTS OF BOTH OUR COUNTRIES. that reality and the continued explicit commitment of P. W. Botha's government to -- WE WILL NOT ALLOW OTHERS TO DICTATE domestic change. WHAT OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH SOUTH AFRICA You will need to make it clear to Pik WILL BE AS EVIDENCED BY OUR RECENT VETO OF that we share the South African hope that SANCTIONS. BUT JUST AS WE RECOGNIZE YOUR , PERMANENT STAKE IN THE FUTURE OF SOUTHERN despite political differences among the states of southern Africa, the economic AFRICA, SO YOU MUST RECOGNIZE OUR PERMA- interdependence of the area and construc- NENT INTEREST IN AFRICA AS A WHOLE. tive internal change within South Africa -- WE MUST CONSIDER THESE INTERESTS IN can be the foundations for a new era of OUR SOUTHERN AFRICAN POLICY AND EXPECT YOU cooperation, stability, and security in WILL TAKE THEM INTO ACCOUNT IN YOUR DEAL- the re ion. We also share their view that INGS WITH US. THIS WILL REQUIRE RESTRAINT the chief threat to the realization of AND GOOD WILL BY ALL PARTIES. WE CANNOT this hope is the presence and influence in CONSENT TO ACT AS A SMOKESCREEN FOR AC-. the region of the Soviet Union and its TIONS WHICH EXCITE THE FEARS OF OTHER allies. STATES IN THE REGION, AND ENCOURAGE IM- PRACTICAL, EMOTIONAL PESPONSES (sic) TO You will also need to make it clear to REGIONAL-PROBLEMS. Pik that we are not willing to be manipu- CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981 -- 55 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140006-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140006-6 -- ALTHOUGH WE MAY CONTINUE TO DIFFER ON APARTHEID, AND CANNOT CONDONE A SYSTEM OF INSTITUTIONALIZED RACIAL DIFFERENTIA- TION, WE CAN COOPERATE WITH A SOCIETY UN- DERGOING CONSTRUCTIVE C1ANGE. YOUR GOV- ERNMENT'S EXPLICIT COMMITMENT IN THIS DI- RECTION WILL ENABLE US TO WORK WITH YOU. YOU MUST HELP TO MAKE THIS APPROACH CRED- IBLE. YOU ALSO SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT THIS PERIOD REPRESENTS YOUR BEST SHOT, A RARE OPPORTUNITY, BECAUSE OF OUR MANDATE AND OUR DESIRE TO TURN A NEW LEAF IN BILATER- AL RELATIONS. -- THE NEW SITUATION WE ENVISION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA WOULD ENTAIL MUTUAL REC- OGNITION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF INVIOLA- BILITY OF BORDERS AND NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS IN THE STATES OF THE RE- GION. -- OUR COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP WOULD ALSO RECOGNIZE THE KEY ECONOMIC ROLE PLAYED BY SOUTH AFRICA IN THE REGION AND THE MAJOR CONTRIBUTIONS WHICH COULD BE MADE BY SOUTH AFRICA TO COORDINATE RE- GIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. -- I UNDERSTAND THAT IN A SEPARATE MEETING HERE YOU WILL BE DISCUSSING PRAC- TICAL STEPS WE CAN UNDERTAKE TO BEGIN THE PROCESS OF IMPROVING OUR BILATERAL RELA- TIONS. Crocker in Pretoria, there is no point in fooling around,-dissimulation or miscommu- nication. Conversely, if the South Africans coop- erate: to achieve an internationally ac- ceptable settlement, this will reatl fa- cilitate efforts to deal effectively with the Soviet threat. We need to convey our seriousness about this strategic choice. A relationship initiated on a cooperative basis could move forward toward a future in which South Africa returns to a place within the regional framework of Western security interests. The South Africans will be anxious to explore the details of such future relationship. We cannot be ex- cessive in what we suggest to them, e.g. any implication that we can return to 1945 is unrealistic given firm international commitments such as the arms embargo. We can, however, work to end South Africa's polecat status in the world and seek to restore its place as a legitimate and im- portant regional actor with whom we can cooperate pragmatically. You will also need to respond with an artful combination of gestures and hints. The gestures would include, as described in the attached pa- per, small but concrete steps such as the normalization of our military attache re- lationship. 2. To make clear to the South Africans TALKING POINTS that we see U.S. SAG cooperation in re- -- THE CONTINUATION OF NAMIBIA AS A FES- solvin the Namibian problem as the cru- TERING PROBLEM COMPLICATES OUR RELATION cial first phase of our new relationship SHIP WITH OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES AND BEDEVILS and that we are willing to work with them OUR RELATIONS WITH BLACK AFRICA. IT COM toward an internationally acceptable set- PLICATES YOUR RELATIONS WITH THOSE tlement which will safeguard their inter- COUNTRIES AS'WELL AND PREVENT (sic) SOUTH ests and reflect our mutual desire to foreclose Soviet gains in southern Afri- ca. Namibia complicates our relations with AFRICA FROM IMPROVING ITS RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS. -- AS YOU TOLD CROCKER IN PRETORIA, THERE IS NO POINT IN DISSIMULATION AND our European allies and with blaCK Arrlca, MISCOMMUNICATION BETWEEN US.. and the interests of South Africa with those states as well. We cannot allow the -- WE SHARE YOUR VIEW THAT NAMIBIA NOT South. Africans to be disingenuous with us BE TURNED OVER TO THE SOVIETS AND THEIR over Namibia. If they have no intention of ALLIES. A RUSSIAN FLAG IN WINDHOEK IS AS .pulling out of the territory under circum- UNACCEPTABLE TO US AS IT IS TO YOU. stances reasonably acceptable to the in- ternational WE BELIEVE THAT A CAREFULLY CON- community at large, we will -- want to opt out of the negotiation process CEIVED AND IMPLEMENTED NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT rather than be subjected to an endless, WILL HELP TO FORECLOSE OPPORTUNITIES FOR meaningless charade. Contrary to what GROWTH OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN SOUTHERN AF- Botha will argue, UN involvement will be RICA, AND CAN,IN THE COURSE OF SUCH A SET- necessary to gain international acceptance TLEMENT, CONTRIBUTE TO THE LEVERAGE WE for a Namibia settlement. As he told NEED TO PRODUCE A WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET/CU- 58 -- CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140006-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140006-6 BAN MILITARY FORCES FROM ANGOLA. -- WE SEEK YOUR SINCERE COOPERATION IN DEVELOPING CONCLUSIVE CRITERIA FOR A SET- TLEMENT WHICH LEADS TO A TRULY INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA, WHILE ENHANCING OUR EFFORTS AGAINST SOVIET ENCROACHMENT AND SAFEGUARD- ING THE INTERESTS OF U.S., SOUTH AFRICA AND ALL THE PEOPLE OF NAMIBIA. -- THIS APPROACH CAN FACILITATE A DEEP- ENING OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS IN MUTU- ALLY BENEFICIAL WAYS. IT CAN ALSO BEGIN A PROCESS LEADING TO THE END OF INTERNATION- AL REJECTION OF YOUR COUNTRY AND GREATER 'ACCEPTANCE OF SOUTH AFRICA WITHIN THE GLOBAL FRAMEWORK OF WESTERN SECURITY. -- WE DID NOT INVITE YOU HERE TO SELL YOU SPECIFICS OF A NAMIBIA PLAN. RATHER kM WANT TO EXPLORE THE DEPTH AND SERIOUSNESS OF YOUR INTEREST IN A SETTLEMENT. -- WE ARE INEVITABLY BROKERS IN THIS EX- ERCISE. YOU MUST TELL US TWO THINGS. (A) WHETHER YOU ARE IN FACT PREPARED TO MOVE TO A SETTLEMENT NOW, TO COMMIT YOURSELVES TO IMPLEMENT A REVISED PLAN ONCE WE PIN DOWN SPECIFICS; (B) WHAT YOUR CONCLUSIVE LIST OF CONCERNS INCLUDES. WE WILL MAKE OUR BEST EFFORTS TO MEET YOUR CONCERNS BUT YOU MUST RESPECT OUR ROLE AS BROKER AND THE CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE OF AFRICAN ACCEP- TANCE. -- MY PEOPLE NEED TO BEGIN SHAPING RE- VISED PROPOSALS. OUR CREDIBILITY IS ON THE LINE. WE NEED TO KNOW SAG'S AUTHORITATIVE POSITION. British Coimbra: Bourne Again FICMP "WANTED TO LEAVE BRITISH COLUMBIA: ROBIN BOURNE, Newly Appointed Assistant Deputy Minister for Police Service, B.C. Attorney General's Department," says a poster op- posing the appointment of British Colum- bia's new police minister. Over night, hundreds of these bright yellow 17x11 posters with a nice photo of Bourne ap- peared in several cities in B.C. The post- er was produced by the Civil Liberties Ac- tion Security Project (CLASP) in Vancou- ver. According to the information compiled by CLASP and printed below, there are nu- merous reasons for getting Robin Bourne out of British Columbia. An old enemy of trade unions and the left has surfaced in Victoria. His name is Robin Bourne and he is the newly appointed Assistant Deputy Minister for Police Ser- vices in the Attorney General's depart- ment. He is now B.C. 's top police bureau- crat and his past history is something all of us should know. Robin Bourne is best known for his role as head of the Security Planning and Anal- ysis Group (later the Police & Security Planning & Analysis Branch) established in 1971, after the 1970 FLQ Crisis*, to moni- tor and collect data on "subversives" and organize countermeasures against them. From 1971 to 1979 when he left that job Bourne and his group spied on unionists and political activists, blacklisted civil servants, and planned covert actions with the RCMP Security Service aimed at dis- rupting radical activity across the coun- try. A chronology of these actions fol- lows. Bourne was born in England in 1930, lived in Shanghai where his father was Po- lice Commissioner until 1941 and was then educated in Ontario. He attended the Royal Military College in Kingston and served one year in Korea with the artillery. By 1968 he was a Colonel with service in de- fense intelligence. 1968 - He joined the Cabinet Secretariat for Foreign Policy and Defense. 1970 - In the summer of 1970 Bourne joined the newly formed Strategic Opera- tions Centre (SOC), an intelligence body * On October 5, 1970 the FLQ (Front de Liberation du Quebec), according to Jean Paul Brodeur, "abducted a British diplomat - James Richard Cross - from his home in Montreal. Five days later, another FLQ proceeded to kidnap ... Pierre Laporte, a minister of the provincial Liberal govern- ment of Quebec. In the days following those kidnappings, the federal government of Canada proclaimed that a state of "ex- pected insurgency" was existing in Quebec. The Canadian Army was sent into Quebec and the powers of the police were greatly en- larged under the Canadian War Measures Act. Massive waves of arrests followed and for several months Quebec lived under a form of martial law." (Jean Paul Brodeur, "Police Abuses in Canada," CILIP, West Berlin, Aug.-Oct. 1980) CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981 -- 57 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140006-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140006-6 for crisis management working directly to'have Paul Rose transferred to a spe- under the federal cabinet committee for cial security prison. crisis management. Its staff consisted of Sometime in late 1971 Bourne passed on Trudeau aides, Jean-Pierre Goyer (named to the Solicitor-General a list of 21 Solicitor General a few weeks later), and civil servants suspected by the RCMP of armed forces and RCMP representatives. wanting to overthrow the government, the CBC TV research for an October 1975 doc- so-called Extra Parliamentary opposition. umentary on the FLQ Crisis and Pierre Some of these people later sued and won Vallieres in his book The Assassination of judgements against the government for this. Pierre Laporte reveal that during the sum- blacklist. mer of 1970 war games were conducted at 1972 - Canadian Forces intelligence the National Defence College in Kingston spied on union leaders in the Confedera- to teach high-ranking officers how to re- tion of National Trade Unions and Quebec spond effectively to political kidnapings. Federation of Labor during the period of It now seems clear that the Liberal gov- the Common Front General Strike in Quebec ernment, acting through SOC and the RCMP in April. Information was processed and Security Service (S.S.), set yp the FLQ passed on to the cabinet by Bourne 's Crisis in order to attack the Parti Que- group. They produced estimates on how long becois and defuse the growing separatist the three union federations of the Common movement in Quebec. SOC had all sources of Front could hold out after analyzing fi- intelligence covered during the crisis and nancial information provided by the mili- information that investigating police did ta1975 - On February 25 in the House of not have. According to the Last Post, in y its September 1973 issue, a police offi- Commons, Mitchell Sharp admitted that cial by the name of R.B., knew the loca- Bourne had taken part in confidential "in- tion where Laporte was being held. formation sessions" for corporate managers 1971 - In September the Security Plan- in Montreal, Toronto, andllVancouver .to ning & Analysis Group was established. give background on labor subversives and Bourne had been offered the ,&b of heading national security. it the previous December bu/t did not offi- In Last Post (Feb.-March 1975) Ian Adams cially take up his duties until June. claimed that Bourne had a liaison with CIA Among his staff were'RCMP Security Service station chief Cleveland Cram, letting him officers and Lt.-Cot. Walter Dabros, later pore "over files of Canadian unionists, in charge of the armed forces intelligence politicians, academics, journalists, and and security directorate. The Group gath- so on." ered information from the RCMP S.S., Dept. 1976 - It was discovered that Bourne's of External Affairs, and Canadian Forces group in cooperation with the S.S. were intelligence. Its function as announced by screening civil servants for separatist Solicitor-General Goyer on September 21 tendencies. was: 1977 - Bourne was put on a committee of "1. To study the nature, origin, and high-ranking B.C. and federal civil ser- causes of subversive and revolutionary ac- vants to find ways of solving B.C.'s hero- tion, its objectives and techniques, as in problem. well as the measures necessary to protect Blacklists compiled by Bourne's group of Canadians from internal threats. members of the Canadian Union of Public 2. To compile and analyze information Employees, National Farmers Union, and Al- collected on subversive and revolutionary berta Indian Association were discovered. groups and their activities, to estimate It was also revealed that a file on Ed the nature and scope of internal threats Broadbent, leader of the NDP (New Demo- to Canadians and to plan for measures to cratic Party), was kept in Bourne's office counter these threats. and that files were'kept on members of the 3. To advise the Solicitor-General on Canadian Peace Research Institute, senior these matters." civil servants and urban affairs employ- Goyer described it as "a civilian anti- ees. subversive information service" to fight 1979 - It was revealed that Bourne had groups !'that are genuinely revolutionary been circulating a secret weekly bulletin and prepared to use violence in achieving on subversion. Bourne said that groups their ends." The Group's first action was were mentioned "if we felt their inten- 58 -- CounterSpy -- Aug.-Oct. 1981 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140006-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140006-6 tions were contrary to our interests." years of illegal openings. In May he left his job with the Police 1981 - In March, Bourne is appointed to and Security Planning and Analysis Branch the job of Assistant Deputy Minister for and in November testified before the Police Services in B.C.'s Attorney-Gener- McDonald Royal Commission investigating al's Department for a two-year period. He RCMP activities where he said "there might remains a part-time advisor to the federal be occasions where the security service, government on security matters. in order to do what it is expected to do, The question is, what is Bourne now do- may have to break the law." ing in B.C.? Officially all that has been 1980-81 - He served as Secretary to the announced so far is that he will coordi- Marin Commission of Inquiry Relating to nate the activities of the RCMP, municipal the Security and Investigations Branch in police forces and the Coordinated Law En- the Post Office headed by Rene Marin, the forcement Unit, CLEU, which he will com- author of the Security and investigations mand. This is a newly created job. With manual, and a personal friend of Bourne. his past history in police security work The resulting report is a whitewash of the what emphasis will he put on it here? Security and Investigations Branch that recommends that police be empowered to open personal mail legally after forty Produced by CLASP, P.O. Box 790, Station A Vancouver, B.C. Cont. from page 39 nia, Berkeley, 1978, p.10. 16) Africa Report, Jan.-Feb. 1981, p.12. 17) cf supra, 1115, pp.13,15. 18) ibid., p.13. 19) e.g. Navy International, June 1976, p.5; Wehrkun- de, May 1975 20) Los Angeles Times, 9/13/80, p.I-A. 21) Wehrpolitische Informationen, 5/8/76, as quoted in ISSA, March 1981, p.11. 22) cf supra, 1114, p.13. 23) WP, 5/29/81, p.A-21. 24) Africa, May 1981, p.15 25) Africa, Dec. 1980, p.43. 26) John Prados, "Sealanes, Western Strategy and South Africa," in U.S. Military Involvement in Southern Africa, ed. by Western Massachusetts Associ- ation of Concerned African Scholars, Tanzania Pub- lishing House, Dar es Salaam, 1978, p.79. 27) as quoted in The Observer (London), 5/19/74, p.7. 28) The Observer, 5/19/74, p.7. 29) New York Times (NYT), 5/16/77, p.8. 30) NYT, 6/21/78, p.18. 31) Statement by Special Committee Agas+et Apart- heid by Abdul S. Minty, 5/30/78. 32) Ronald A. Walters, "U.S. Policy and Nuclear Pro- liferation," in U.S. Military Involvement in Southern Africa, op. cit., p.183. 33) cf supra, 1120. 34) Wehrtechnik, April 1975, p.153; May 1975, p.210; see Der Spiegel, 6/28/76, pp.90,91. 35) See The Apartheid War Machine, the Strength and Deployment of the South African Armed Forces, Inter- national Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, London, April 1980. 36) Europaeische Wehrkunde, June 1977, p.275. 37) Africa Now (London), May 1981, p.45. 38) WP, 5/16/81, p.A-5. 39) Alexander Haig, during NSC meetings under Nixon "would quietly pretend to beat drums on the table as African affairs were brought up." (Roger Morris, Un- certain Greatness, Henry Kissinger and American For- eign Policy, Harper & Row, New York, 1977, p.131.) 40) cf supra, #16, p.11. 41) cf supra, 1137, p.81. 42) Harper's, Sept. 1978, p.22. 43) The Guardian, 1/21/81, p.15. 44) see Newsfront International, 5/1-15/81, p.6. 45) Orbis, Fall 1976, p.648. 46) Africa Report, Sept.-Oct. 1979, p.6. 47) Inquiry, 3/20/78, p.19. 48) cf supra, #11, p.16. 49) cf supra, #37, p.81. ---------------------------------------------- ...1.IV~JL~ rr/ ... u,,s,,L ?, d :s,_ ~Yare .... 6tf, IS ,.T iy ?1 Sif,.;I PERSIAN JOURNAL FOR SCIENCE. AND SOCIETY P.O.BOX 7353 ALEXANDRIA. VA. 22307 CONNEXIONS/PTS 4228 Telegraph Ave Oakland, CA. 94609 (415) 654-6725 Connexions presents the world from a woman's perspective : .NEWS .ANALYSIS ^ INTERVIEWS translated from the international feminist press. SUBSCRIBE NOW ! 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