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Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Cove INFORMATION BULLETII\ Number 26 Special: Includes Index $5.00 U.S. Sponsorship of Terrorism Chomsky on the Libya Attack Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Editorial The Reagan administration has raised perversion of the language to new heights with its campaign against "terror- ism." It has managed to convince much of the public, and a large part of the media, that terrorism is simply the actions of our enemies. Moreover, as Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky explain in this issue, the administration has focused the discussion on retail terrorism, to the exclusion of wholesale terrorism; rarely does anyone call the government to account for supporting, and in large part operating, the most extensive terror network in history. It is difficult to define ter- rorism, so the "experts" define it however they want. The report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Ter- rorism is a case in point; it says terrorism is "the unlawful use or threat of violence against persons or property to further political or social objectives." [Emphasis added.] The prob- lem is who decides what is "lawful" and what is not. "International terrorism" is not the struggle of the Blacks of South Africa and Namibia for national liberation; it is not the fight of the Palestinians for their ancestral lands; it is not the battle of the Nicaraguans to bring democracy to their country after 50 years of dictatorship. International terrorism is the U.S. bombing of Libya; it is the Israeli invasion of Lebanon; it is the South African invasion of Zimbabwe, Angola, and Mozambique; it is the contra war in Nicaragua: and it is the death squads in Chile, El Salvador, and Guatemala. More Secrecy and Intimidation While we continue our struggle to bring you information you cannot find in the mainstream media, the administration is expanding its campaign to restrict the flow of information and to intimidate the media. We warned years ago that the In- telligence Identities Protection Act was just the tip of the iceberg, and that it was not just aimed at stopping this maga- zine, but at chilling the establishment media. Recent CIA pro- nouncements indicate that such intimidation remains a prior- ity. In May the Agency announced that it thought the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Washington Times, Time, and Newsweek should be prosecuted for revealing details of the Ronald Pelton case. While the idea that the administration would ever prosecute Arnaud de Borchgrave's sleazy Moonie rag is preposterous, the other publications were, despite their public indignation, scared. The Post actually censored a lead story. Then in June the CIA attempted to obtain prior review of forthcoming publications not written by former employees. And in July, Casey began to push for the "You Spy, You Die" bill, not only preventing convicted spies from keeping the pro- ceeds of their activities or selling the rights to their stories, but also authorizing the government to seize the assets of news- papers or other organizations that might be found guilty of violating the law they threatened to use against coverage of the Pollard case. The CIA is making a push for more power than it has had in decades. As a State Department official told the New York Times (July 12, 1986), "Casey is dying for it [operational re- sponsibility for the contra war-which he was given]. If we can win, he can walk away with an agency that is rehabilitated to the best days of the cold war, able to conduct wars and throw governments out." Rightwing fanatics set up organizations like the "RAMBO Coalition," whose members include Alpha 66, Tradition, Family and Property, and a host of other extremist organiza- tions. Retired General John Singlaub, head of the U.S. Council for World Freedom, announces that the way to deal with ter- rorists is to "rubblize" the camps where they live. The times are definitely perilous Table of Contents Editorial Vernon Walters: Crypto-diplomat By Ellen Ray and William Schaap The Semantics of Terrorism Israel and South Africa By Jack Colhoun Israeli Spy Targeted? By Louis Wolf 36 By Edward S. Herman News Note 38 Who Is a Terrorist? By Philip Paull Libya in U.S. Demonology By Noam Chomsky New Contra Leader By Ellen Ray, William Schaap, and Louis Wolf 25 Costa Rican Media By Howard Friel and Michelle Joffroy The Duarte Myth By Dennis Hans Film Review: "Salvador" By Allan Frankovich Index to CAIB Nos. 13-25 I-1 Nicaraguan Democracy U.S. Sponsored Terrorism By Edward S. Herman By Michael Parenti Cover photo: Vernon Walters at the United Nations; ? 1985, Brian Alpert, Keystone Press Agency, Inc. CoveriArtion Inlormation Bulletin, Number 26, Summer 1956: published by Covert Action PuhIicationn, inc.. it Di,Otrict otC'olumhia Nonprofit Corporation: Post Office Box 50272, Washington DC 20004: (202) 737-5317, and Co /Sheridan Square Publications, Inc.. 145 West 4th Street, New YOrk NY 10012, (212)254-1061. Typography by YourTrjw. New York NY: printing by Fm uffi Press. Brooklyn NY. Staff: Ellen Ray, William Schaal), Louis Wolt, and William Vornherger. Indexed in the Alternative Press Incler. ISSN 0275-309X. Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 The Modern Mithridates: Vernon Walters: Crypto-diplomat and Terrorist By Ellen Ray and William Schaap In 120 B.C., Mithridates VI of Pontus inherited the throne at the age of I I , and was immediately targeted for assassination by most of his relatives. He fled to the mountains and spent some years training himself to be his own master spy, combin- ing "the cunning of the spy with the anxieties of the brutal des- pot whose intelligence he collected," and while in exile, he "mastered twenty-two languages and dialects, traveling over Asia Minor-at the age of fourteen-disguised as a caravan boy. He visited many tribes, learned about their customs and spied upon their military strength."' Mithridates returned to Pontus, and, after murdering his mother, his sister (whom he had married), and his sons, spent eighteen years terrorizing the likes of Sulfa, Lucullus, and Pompey. He was, even for his times, singularly brutal, respon- sible for the massacres of hundreds of thousands of people in the far corners of the known world, "one of the most formida- ble opponents Rome ever had."' Except for the family problems,' there are interesting paral- lels between the affairs of Mithridates the Great and Vernon Anthony ("Dick") Walters, the current United States Ambas- sador to the United Nations. For one thing, Walters is a well known linguist who speaks eight languages and many dialects and "likes to slip into a country unannounced before a meeting with a head of state so he can ride the buses around and pick up the local slang and intonation."More to the point, Walters, like Mithridates, is linked to countless coups, wars, and mas- sacres around the world. But while his role as linguist is widely publicized, his high stature as Grand Master of state terrorism, his decades of ties to wholesale butchery in Iran, Brazil, Guatemala, Chile, Argentina, and most recently, Nicaragua, do not appear in the State Department press releases or the raft 1. Richard Wilmer Rowan, The Story 0/ Set ret Service (New York: Literary Guild, 1937), pp. 9. 10. 2. Webster's Biographical Dictionary, Ist ed. (Springfield. MA: Merriam, 1971 ), p. 1031. According to Web.ster's, Mithridates committed suicide in 63 B.C.. at the age of 69, although Rowan says that one of his sons whom he had unaccountably neglected to murder brushed him from his throne with a powerful draught of poison.'' Op. cit. n. I, p. 12. 3. Walters, 69, a lifelong bachelor and a devout Catholic, lived with his mother until her death a few years ago and currently lives with his sister, Aho held the Bible when Vice President George Bush (his former boss at the CIA and it predecessor at the U. N.) swore him in as U.N. Ambassador. Jeff Stein, "Mystery Man of American Diplomacy," Boston Globe Magazine, August 29. 1982, p. 12. A shorter version of this article appeared as "Vernon Walters: Secret Agent," City Paper (Washington, DC), December 3. 1982. Michael Massing. ''America's Top Messenger Boy." New Republic. September 16. 1985. p. 22: U.S, Nevis & World Report, June 3, 1985, p. 13. His friends call him "asexual." He says he "married the U.S. government it long time ago." Wa.s/ioigton Post, December 16, 1985. 4. Stein, op. cit. n. 3, p. 12. Walters "has developed near-perfect imitations of Pope John Paul 11, Franco, and Castro. He is said to do a mean Augusto Pinochet." Wo.shin,gton Po.ct, December 16, 1985. of puff pieces about him in the mainstream media.` The Military Background Vernon Walters enlisted as a private in the U.S. Army shortly before Pearl Harbor." After the U.S. entered the Will, he attended infantry school and graduated as if Second Lieuten- ant in 1942, and attended the Military Intelligence Training Center at Camp Richie, Maryland. In October 1942 he "took part in the assault landing at Safi, Morocco." (This appears to be the extent of Walters's combat experience.) He then taught "Prisoner of War Interrogation" at Camp Richie. Although not mentioned in his official biography, Walters later trained Brazilian troops at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where lie be- came close friends with a young officer, Humberto ('astelo Branco, who, more than 20 years later, was to take power in the coup which overthrew President Joao Goulart and installed a long-lasting regime infamous for its brutality and torture of leftists, especially students and unionists.' Walters was aide de camp to General Mark W. Clark in Italy and then, until the end of the War, combat liaison officer with the 1st Brazilian Infan- try Division in Italy (living on the same floor with his friend Castelo Branco).' All the abovementioned countries are ones with which Walters was later to have significant tics. Walters spent more than 25 years in it succession of military assignments, usually as military attache or interpreter, and generally under the aegis of the Defense Intelligence Agency. He was in Brazil in 1945 with Secretary of State Marshall and President Truman, and attended the 1947 Pan American ('on- ference in Bogota, Colombia. This was his first brush with rev- olution and counterrevolution; the massive protests against the 5. The major media are extraordinarily kind to Dick Walters. See. for exam plc, "An Fnvoy Who Specializes in Sensitive Missions." it profile in tae Net, York Tinte,%, June 3, 1982, in which he is quoted as responding to his critics. "If I was it had man, I couldn't keep doing this.'' And. ''Reagan Nominates Walters To Be Ambassador to U.N.,'' in the Washington /', February 9, 1985, which highlights the "stern warning" he gave Roberto D'Auhuisson not to assassinate the U.S. Ambassador. Yet the Times piece notes that ''his she emphasis of the human rights issue" has on praise from conservatives, and the Post points out that "his strong anticommunist views . . have made hint it favorite of conservative Republican administrations.'' Walters refers to the 1953 coup in Iran, the 1954 coup in Guatemala, the 1964 coup in Bevil. and the 1973 coup in Chile as "revolutions.'' His perspicacity is tempered by his knee-jerk rightwing sentiments. In March 1986 he was quoted: ''I mean, how do we really know that Marcos is this unpopular'.' Marcos does have the sup port of the two largest parties in the Philippines M Magavine, Mauch 1986, p. 82. In another departure from reality. Walters is one of the less people IC-11 ill the world who still denies that the United States ever tried to kill Cuban Presi- dent Fidel Castro. Wa.shington Post, December 16. 1985. 6. The underlying data are from the State Department hiography of August 1981. 7. Stein, op. cit. n. 3, p. 28: Michael Massing. "Anerica's'lop Messenger Boy," New Republic, September 16. 1985. p. 22 8. Massing, op. (it. n. 7, p. 22. Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Conference were met with bloody retaliation which left more than 2,000 dead. Curiously, Walters received a medal for his service during this incident, leading to speculation about his role in the events. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Walters was all over the globe, most significantly, as we will see below, in Iran, Italy, Brazil, France, and Vietnam (only one month, in 1967, from which, presumably, he derived the experience to write his "Sunset at Saigon"). He spent three years in secret negotia- tions with the Chinese, and, in the words of his official biog- raphy, "smuggled Henry Kissinger into Paris on 15 different occasions to conduct such negotiations." His military promotions were unprecedented, considering his beginnings as a private. His Brazilian escapades in 1964 earned the Colonel a promotion to Brigadier General; his one month in Vietnam three years later got him his second star, as Major General; and when, in April 1972, he was appointed Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, he became a Lieuten- ant General. He retired in July 1976 and spent the Carter years in an action-packed civilian career. Then, shortly after Presi- dent Reagan entered office, Walters returned through the re- volving door and began four years' State Department service as Ambassador-at-Large, before becoming U.N. Ambassador. Prior to examining his post-military career, it is enlightening to review Walters's far-flung operations in the coup-filled years from 1953 to 1973. Early Dirty Work Walters admits, and associates confirm, that he was in- volved in the 1953 putsch which overthrew the government of Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran and reinstalled the young Shah.'? In the early 1960s he was military attache in Rome, actively blocking the Kennedy administration's "open- ing" towards the Italian left." Presumably Walters was in- 9 Ramon Jimeno and Marcela Caldas, "Vernon Anthony Walters: El Agente Secreto de la Diplomacia Silenciosa," in Zona (Bogota, Colombia), April 23, 1986, p. 46. 10. Claudia Wright, "Brass Knuckles for America," in New Statesman, February 8, 1985, p. 20. 11. Ibid. volved in the massive CIA campaign to fund lavishly the Christian Democratic Party in its otherwise risky electoral bat- tles against the Communist Party of Italy. While it is not known whether Walters knew CIA veteran Hugh Montgom- ery" in the 1960s, at present he and Walters do work together; Montgomery is Alternate Representative for Special Political Affairs in the United States delegation to the United Nations, with the rank of Ambassador, according to the current U.N. diplomatic list. Brazil In 1962 Walters was posted to Brazil as military attache. Al- though Walters insists he was nothing more than a "well-in- formed observer" of the events that followed," it is obvious that he was up to his neck in the plotting which culminated in the bloody coup of 1964. He was, according to Jan Knippers Black, the "linchpin, the one person all the officers would talk to while they were still afraid to talk with one another."" In- deed, he was such a good "observer" that he told Washington one week in advance the exact day the coup was to take place." Moreover, he breakfasted with Castelo Branco the morning after the coup began, urging him to assume the presidency, and he lunched with him the day after the inauguration." Walters never acknowledged Castelo Branco's consummate vicious- ness nor conceded the enormity of his regime's acts. In his au- tobiography he wrote: "I never saw Castelo Branco do a mean thing or heard him say a shameful word. The moral integrity of the man was beyond challenge."" And as to the installation of the brutal Brazilian military dictatorship, he wrote: "A regime basically unfriendly to the United States had been replaced by another one much more friendly. Some may regard this as bad. I do not. I am convinced that if the revolution [sic] had not oc- curred, Brazil would have gone the way of Cuba."" In fact, various government documents suggest that Walters played an extremely crucial role both in fomenting and in accomplishing the coup. In the year preceding the March 31, 1964 start of the coup, a series of CIA documents-some still classified, some partially released, and some fully declas- sified--describe a meticulous investigation into the attitude of the Brazilian military regarding the Goulart government. One, written in May 1963, notes that "Military becoming more anti- Goulart."19 Another, in July, worries about "Military's hesi- tance to overthrow constitutional regime. "'? Shortly thereafter, another document describes the "possibility of a rightist coup. "" During this period, the person best situated to sway the hesitant rightist military leaders was Colonel Vernon Wal- 12. Montgomery was with the CIA in Italy from 1965 to 1969 and returned there in 1975 as CIA Chief of Station until 1980. Steve Weissman, "Ecco La Cia in Italia," in La Repubblica. January 15, 1976, reprinted as "Hello Hugh Montgomery," in Philip Agee and Louis Wolf, eds., Dirty' Work: The C'/A in Western Europe (Secaucus, NJ: Lyle Stuart, 1978), p. 165; CA/B, Number 12 (April 1981), p. 41. 13. Massing, op. cit., n. 7, p. 22. 14. Jan Knippers Black, United States Penetration of Brazil (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977). 15. Massing, op. cit. n. 7, p. 22. 16. Ibid.; Stein, op. cit. n. 3, p. 29. 17. Quoted in The Progressive, April 1985, p. 10. 18. /hid. 19. Central Intelligence Agency, Summary of Declassified Documents, re- ference to: Office of Current Intelligence, Special Report, OCI No. 0278/63B, May 3, 1963. 20. Ibid., reference to: Draft National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 93-2-63, July 2, 1963. 21. Ibid., Information Report, TDCS-3/553, 860, July 19, 1963. Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 tern, who, as it happens, was promoted to Brigadier General within a year of the coup.22 Another set of declassified documents are equally damning. They detail a U.S. plan called "Brother Sam," which not only describes foreknowledge of the coup, but also notes the proba- bility of Castelo Branco's assuming its leadership, and indi- cates that if the coup appeared to be failing, the U.S. Navy was to intervene. These are the same documents which describe Walters's breakfast with his old friend, Castelo Branco.' Officially With the CIA Walter's friendship with Nixon, solidified in 1958 when he protected the then Vice President from the spitting, rock- throwing crowds in Venezuela, led to his appointment, in April 1972, as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, a post he filled under four Directors, Richard Helms, James Schlesinger, William Colby, and George Bush. John Dean testified during the Watergate trials that he had been told Walters "was a good friend of the White House and the White House had put him in the Deputy Director position so they could have some influ- ence over the Agency. "2' He served from 1972 to 1976, a sem- inal period in CIA history, which ran from Watergate through the overthrow of Allende in Chile to the Church Committee hearings, the intervention in Angola, and the planning of the assassination of Orlando Letelier. Vernon Walters played im- portant roles throughout this period. The Great Watergate Myth Part of the Walters mythology is his allegedly firm, moral, and indignant refusal to be a part of any cover-up of what came to be known as the Watergate scandal. Indeed, his autobiog- raphy paints a picture of incorruptible valor: "I looked [John Dean] right in the eye and said, 'Fire everyone connected with this.' "" The fact is that when Walters was first asked, by Nixon aide Bob Haldeman, to warn the FBI (falsely) that a strenuous investigation of Watergate would jeopardize ongoing CIA operations, he did just that. Within minutes of receiving those orders, he was on his way to FBI Director Patrick Gray." Several days later Walters was still stonewalling, advising John Dean that the then Director, Richard Helms, wanted to distance himself and the Agency from the growing scandal. They did not want to expose the administration's deep involve- ment; they just wanted to keep the Agency out of any further involvement. In fact, for all his posturing, Walters never re- tracted the phony warning he had delivered to Gray.' He con- nived with Dean on possible scenarios to use. Two weeks after his first, eager involvement, Walters realized he could not stall the investigation much further. When Gray, also anxious to protect himself, asked Walters if he could put the CIA's request in writing, Walters said he could not write such a "spurious" letter. The relieved Gray then understood that he could let the investigation, already with a momentum of its own, go on; Walters did not want to he in the position of wittingly covering up crimes, especially as so many people would know about it. Still, it was almost a rear later that he first informed the Department of Justice of his knowledge of the White House's efforts to have the CIA stop the FBI, and during that year he received the Agency's Distin- guished Intelligence Medal, for doing such a good job of keep- ing the CIA out of the Watergate morass.=" Yet, as Jeff Stein has pointed out, "Walters's recounting of the affair leads one to believe he was naive and misled. 'I had been in Washington for six weeks at this point and it simply did not occur to me that the Chief of Staff to the President might he asking me to do something that was illegal or wrong.' But at this point in his career, Walters had been engaged in various intelligence operations for more than thirty years.""' Indeed, his year of silence speaks more eloquently than his diffident autobiography. Chile, Allende, and Letelier One of the most controversial series of charges against Wal- ters involve his connections with the fascist opposition to the administration of Chilean President Salvador Allende, to the overthrow of Allende, and to the assassination of former Chi- lean Defense Minister Orlando Letelier. While DDCI, Walters was in charge of the close liaison be- tween the CIA and the Chilean intelligence services, which cooperated closely in the efforts to overthrow the Allende gov- ernment. They also reportedly received considerable help from Walters's friends in the Brazilian service. " But the most controversial allegation against Walters is that he was complicit in the assassination of Letelicr." In July 1976 the police in Paraguay had in jail an alleged CIA informant, it possible cause of considerable embarrassment to the U.S. At the same time, Conrado Pappalardo, the assistant to Paraguayan President Alfredo Stroessner, was pressuring the U.S. Ambassador, George Landau, to comply with a request made by Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet to Stroessner. Pinochet wanted two Chilean agents to travel to the U.S. on false Paraguayan passports, which Stroessncr had approved, but they now needed U.S. entry visas, and the two agents were in Paraguay waiting for the visas. When Ambassador Landau expressed concern and remarked that the request was rather un- usual, he was told by Pappalardo not to worry, that DDCI Ver- non Walters knew all about it and that the two men were to re- port to Walters when they arrived in the U.S. Landau was unable to reach Walters, who was on leave in Florida at the time, and after considerable soul-searching, he issued the visas. But he took some precautions, photocopying the passports before returning them, and sending a detailed 22. Massing, op. cit., n. 7, p. 22. Walters insists that none of the declas- sified material "shows any participation by me," which may be true as far as it goes, but hardly justifies John Goshko's assertion that "no evidence has been offered to support [the charge that Walters encouraged the coup]." Washington Post, February 9, 1985. p. A6. 23. Stein, op. cit. n. 3, p. 29; Washington Post, December 29, 1976. The Post article says that the part of the plan which called for the airlifting of small arms from a carrier off the coast was codenamed "Quick Kick." 24. David Wise, The American Police State (New York: Random House, 1976). p. 245. 25. Vernon A. Walters, Silent Missions (New York: Doubleday, 1978). 26. David Wise, op. cit. n. 24, pp. 243-44. 27. Ibid.. p. 245. 28. /bid., pp. 245-46; John Ranelagh, The A,gencr: The Rise and Decline o/ the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 529. 29. Stein, op. cit. n. 3, p. 35. 30. Ibid., p. 36. It is interesting that one of Walters's old chick, Averell Harriman, was, according to Thomas Powers, "lobbying for the hardest line against Allende.'' Thomas F. Powers. The Man Who Kept the Secrets (New York: Knopf, 1979), p. 231. 31. For the details of the account which follows, sec Jeff Stein, "Vernon Walters and the Death of Orlando Letelier," Boston Globe, August 29, 1982, p. 50; Taylor Branch and Eugene M. Propper, Labvrinth (New York: Viking, 1982), pp. I-14; John Dinges and Saul Landau, Assassination on I.,nibassv Row (New York: Pantheon, 1980), pp. 382-89; Donald Freed with Fred Landis, Death in Washington (Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill, 1980), pp. 184- 86. Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 memorandum to the State Department and the CIA. Landau as- sumed that the issuance of the visas related to some CIA- Paraguay deal to free the imprisoned agent. However, on Au- gust 4, Landau received a cable from Walters indicating that he knew nothing of the matter, that he had no plans to meet with the Chileans, and suggesting that Landau confer further with the State Department. Landau notified the Paraguayans that the visas were to be considered revoked and demanded the passports back. Shortly thereafter, Walters did travel to Paraguay, ostensibly on a mission involved solely with the captured agent. Despite repeated requests Landau did not get the passports back until October 29, and they were returned with the photo- graphs of the bearers removed. But Landau had photocopied the passports; later he was to learn that one of the two "Chi- leans" was Michael Vernon Townley, one of the men who planted the bomb which, on September 21, 1976--when he was awaiting the return of the passports-killed Letelier. It is almost impossible to believe, from all of the studies which have been published, and from the testimony of several trials and congressional hearings, that Vernon Walters did not have advance knowledge of a major Chilean secret police oper- ation in the U.S. being planned in July and August of 1976, but no directly incriminating evidence has been found. Walters vigorously denies any connection with, or foreknowledge of, the Letelier assassination, although he has admitted to many meetings with Colonel Contreras in his years as DDCI.;2 Walters's "Private Life," 1976-1981 Whatever his reasons for leaving the Ford administration well before the elections, Walters spent the Carter years close to the friends he had made over the past three decades. And playing upon those friendships proved no fiscal hardship. In 1980, for example, Walters made nearly half a million dollars, $300,000 of which was a fee from what may be one of the most misleadingly named companies in the United States, Environ- mental Energy Systems, Inc., of Alexandria, Virginia, which is, curiously, a major arms merchant. The money was a con- sultant's fee for assisting them in their efforts (apparently un- successful) to sell tanks to the King of Morocco. As the com- pany president told the New York Times, "We went to him be- cause he had the connections, he knew the King of Morocco. "33 In fact Walters has used his relationship with King Hassan through the years, ever since 1942, when he gave the then 13-year-old Crown Prince a ride in his Army tank. Walters's work with Morocco during this time period has even more ominous overtones. He was (and possibly still is) a general partner in a Vienna, Virginia organization called Morocco Travel Advisers. In a letter to the Senate submitted with his April 1, 1981 Disclosure Statement he said the com- pany "provides tours of Morocco for and at the expense of U.S. travel agents." But he also noted that it was involved in "the development of tourism in the far south of Morocco and 32. Letter, Vernon A. Walters to Al Larkin, Editor, Boston Globe Magazine, September 14, 1982, p. 2, responding to the Jeff Stein article cited supra, n. 3. Michael Massing (op. cit. n. 7, p. 23) says that Walters acknowl- edged two meetings with Contreras, but his letter denies discussing Letelier "in any of the meetings with Colonel Contreras," language which suggests rather a greater number of encounters. 33. Jeff Gerth, "Former Intelligence Aides Profiting From Old Ties," New York Times, December 6, 1981. This, incidentally, is one of the most informa- tive articles available on the subject. The income figures come from Walters's own disclosure statement filed with the Senate on April 1, 1981. in the contested area." Of course, "the far south of Morocco" is that portion of Western Sahara "given" by Spain to Morocco when it abandoned its colony known as Spanish Morocco, and "the contested area" is that portion given by Spain to Mauritania, abandoned by it, and claimed by Morocco. Both portions, however, comprise the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, whose people, led by Polisario, have been struggling for their independence for many years. Moreover, it was Walters, as DDCI, who convinced the Spanish to relinquish its colony to Morocco and Mauritania in the first place." If "Environmental Energy" means military equipment, we can only surmise what "Travel Advisers" means. It would ap- pear to be aimed directly at Polisario and the Sahrawi people. Walters's Ties to Guatemala Vernon Walters was perhaps President Reagan's most prom- inent apologist for the brutal military dictatorship of General Romeo Lucas Garcia of Guatemala. He visited Lucas Garcia three times; in a May 1981 press conference in Guatemala City, Walters said the U.S. wanted to help Lucas Garcia de- fend "peace and liberty."" When asked about Guatemalan human rights violations, Walters said, "There will be human rights problems in the year 3000 with the governments of Mars and the moon. There are some problems that are never re- solved."" A month later, U.S. aid for Guatemala resumed at a significant level. Walters had ties to Guatemala and its murderous leaders from his "civilian" interlude in the late 1970s. One of the clients he listed in his Senate disclosure statement was Basic Research International, S.A., "an international oil cartel scouting the fields of Guatemala." They paid him $1000 a day as a "consultant," to try to influence the Guatemalan govern- ment to lift oil production quotas. It has been charged that in this project, Basic Research issued exaggerated estimates of Guatemalan oil reserves which the State Department then used to justify continued U.S. support for the brutal regime. In fact, it has been reported that he continued to represent this com- pany unofficially even while in Guatemala officially, during the May 1981 trip noted above." Walters continues to flack for Guatemala. In 1985 he told an interviewer that the administration's "quiet diplomacy" really worked; the Guatemalan military is "not killing as many people as they did before."3" This faint praise was not even true; virtually all reports indicated that the Guatemalan govern- ment at the time continued to have the worst human rights re- cord in the area. Joining the Reagan Administration Walters was appointed a senior adviser to then Secretary of 34. According to Jeff Gerth's congressional sources, "One of Mr. Walters's last missions in the CIA was a trip in late 1975 to Spain, where in meetings with King Hassan 11 of Morocco and Spanish officials he convinced Spain to give up control of Western Sahara, a Spanish colony in Africa long sought by Morocco." New York Times, December 6, 1981 . 35. Massing, op. cit. n. 7, p. 24. 36. Ibid. Walters was accompanied on his May 1981 trip to Guatemala by Frank Ortiz, who had been removed by President Carter from his post as Am- bassador to that country because he was considered "too conciliatory" to the regime. Washington Post, May 13, 1981. 37. New York Times, June 3, 1982; CAIB, Number 13 (July-August 1981), pp. 45, 48; New Statesman, February 5, 1982. Washington Post, July 14, 1981; December 16, 1985. 38. Massing, op. cit. n. 7, p. 25. Number 26 (Summer 1986) Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 State Alexander Haig on April 1, 1981, just two months after Reagan took office. On July 22, 1981, after Senate confirma- tion, he was sworn in as Ambassador-at-Large. Among his ear- liest duties was a deep involvement in the administration's war against Nicaragua. In 1981 and 1982 he made numerous trips to Argentina to arrange for that government's training of con- tras and for their handling of various secret payments to contra leaders, particularly prior to the final approval of the CIA's original plans. Ironically, the Argentine regime was not well repaid for its clandestine help to Walters in supporting Reagan's Nicaragua policies. The New York Times was unusually frank: "In dozens of recent world missions, Mr. Walters has hurried six times to Argentina alone, most recently taking on the thankless task of telling his friends in the junta that, with war beginning in the Falklands, Washington had to side with Britain."Walters had a special role in the building up of the contra forces waging their brutal war against Nicaragua. According to the testimony of former contra leader Edgar Chamorro,"' Wal- ters was instrumental in consolidating the forces of the former members of Somoza's National Guard: "At that time, the ex-National Guardsmen were divided into several small bands operating along the Nicaragua-Honduras border. The largest of the bands, headed by Enrique Ber- mudez, a former Colonel, was called the 15th of September Legion. They were not an effective military force and repre- sented no more than a minor irritant to the Nicaraguan gov- ernment. Prior to the UDN's merger with these people, Gen- eral Walters himself arranged for all the bands to be incorpo- rated within the 15th of September Legion, and for the mili- tary government of Argentina to send several army officers to serve as advisers and trainers . . . the new organization was called the Fuerza Democratica Nicaraguense (National Democratic Force), or by its Spanish acronym, FDN." during the CIA's operations in Angola in 1975 and 1976, and had tried to get the Brazilians (unsuccessfully) and then the French (successfully) involved in the operations.42 Walters's presence in Africa is ubiquitous; nearly every year as Ambas- sador-at-Large he made whirlwind tours of numerous African countries. In one instance, Angola was bombed by South Af- rica just after he departed. Walters in for Kirkpatrick In February 1985, Walters was nominated by President Reagan to succeed Jeane Kirkpatrick as United Nations Am- bassador. Although most reportage continued to praise Wal- ters, reiterating all the old war stories, some of the journals were less than flattering. As Claudia Wright noted in the New Statesman, "Walters's candidacy for the U.N. post carries an unusual cachet: Directly or indirectly, he has been involved in overthrowing more governments than any other official still serving in the U.S. government."" And even U.S. News & World Report pointed out that Secretary of State George Shultz wanted Walters in the job, but without cabinet rank, "to signal a lowered U.S. appraisal of the worth of the world body."" Indeed, the downplaying of the role of the United Nations is a pillar of Reagan's foreign policy. And Walters is a staunch adherent of the Reagan Doctrine which, in its haughty disdain for international law, would just as soon see the world body destroyed. He has called the U.N. a "measured disappoint- ment," because it has "drifted away from resolution of con- flicts." Walters has promised to be "very tough," to "work very hard to change these voting patterns [unfavorable to the U.S.]."" His professed love for conflict resolution belies the administration's-and Walters's-contempt for the World Court, as evidenced by their refusal to participate in the case brought, successfully, by Nicaragua to challenge the contra war. Colombia and San Andres Island One of Walters's most significant achievements in his per- sonal war against Nicaragua was a secret agreement he negotiated with the then President of Colombia, Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala aimed at setting up a top secret U.S. military base on the Colombian island of San Andres, only 125 miles off the east coast of Nicaragua. Some $50 million worth of sophisticated tracking radar and anti-aircraft batteries have re- portedly been installed on the island and nearby keys." Forever Morocco Walters has remained intimately involved with Morocco for more than 40 years. Most recently he seems to have played a considerable role in the rapprochement between Algeria and Morocco, which led to a cooling of Algerian support for Polisario. Walters is said to be close to the number two man in Algeria, Prime Minister Abdelhamid Brahimi, who lived in the U.S. in 1976, and through whom Walters arranged for the first official visit of Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid to Presi- dent Reagan. Another likely Walters operation in Morocco was the use of that country, in 1981, for meetings between high U.S. officials and Angolan traitor Jonas Savimbi. Walters had been DDCI 39. New York Times, June 3, 1982. 40. Transcript, sworn testimony of Edgar Chamorro before the International Court of Justice, at The Hague, in Nicaragua v. United States ol'America: Mil- itarv and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua. 41. Jimeno and Caldas, op. cit, n. 9, p. 47. The Blackmailer Recent press reports note that Walters has been absent from his U.N. post nearly continually the past few months, traveling around the world on more secret missions. As usual, his trips go undocumented while incidents of U.S.-sponsored terrorism continue unabated. If all else fails, Walters is not above simple blackmail. U.S. News & World Report has described how he fended off a po- tentially hostile Senator during the Watergate hearings by dis- creetly threatening to bring up at the hearings the time the Sen- ator had asked Walters, then military attache in Paris, to ship some luxury items illegally through military channels for a group of junketing Senators.46 These are the kinds of moves Mithridates would have approved. ? 42. See CA/B, Number 13 (July-August 1981), p. 20; John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies (New York: Norton, 1978), pp. 184, 192. 43. New Statesman, February 8, 1985, p. 20. 44. U.S. News & World Report, February 18, 1985, p. 10. In fact, the dis- pute over cabinet status, in being leaked to the press, led to the agreement that Walters would have cabinet rank, but was followed by another dispute, whether Walters would automatically serve on the National Security Council. According to the New York Times (March 26, 1985, p. 1), Walters was "so distressed at not being asked to serve on the council that he submitted his resig- nation this afternoon." His petulance was short-lived; the next day it was an- nounced that Walters would accept the U.N. post even though it did not in- clude an automatic seat on the NSC. The President's press secretary did an- nounce, though, that the President had the "highest regard" for Walters and valued his counsel. (New York Times, March 27, 1985, p. A3.) 45. U.S. News & World Report, September 3, 1985, p. 29. 46. U.S. News & World Report, June 3, 1985, p. 13. Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Power and the Semantics of Terrorism By Edward S. Herman* For the average citizen of the West, the idea of the United States as a sponsor of international terrorism-let alone the dom- inant sponsor'-would appear utterly incomprehensible. After all, one reads daily that the United States is leading the charge against something it calls "terrorism," and it regularly assails its allies for dragging their feet in responding to ter- rorism. On the other hand, the U.S. government has organized a mercenary army to attack Nicaragua, and even provided it with a printed manual of recommended acts of sabotage and murder, which has been implemented by the proxy army, at the cost of well over a thousand Nicaraguan civilian lives. The U.S. government has given unstinting support to the apart- heid government of South Africa, which has invaded, and or- ganized its own mercenary armies, to subvert a string of frontline states, again at the cost of many thousands of civilian lives.' The western media, however, never refer to the United States or South Africa as "terrorist states," even though both of them have killed vastly greater numbers than Qaddafi or the Red Brigades.' The reason for the western misperception is that the power- ful define terrorism, and the western media loyally follow the agenda of their own leaders. The powerful naturally define ter- rorism to exclude their own acts and those of their friends and clients. "If I don't like it, call it terrorism." The current administration in Washington has found it possi- ble arbitrarily to designate any group or country which it op- poses as "terrorist," and this will be transmitted to the public by the mass media without serious criticism or laughter. In his speech before the American Bar Association on July 8, 1985, President Reagan named five states as engaging in serious state terrorism-North Korea, Libya, Iran, Cuba, and Nicaragua. The Soviet Union was presumably omitted because of the up- coming Summit meeting. The media reported that Syria had been spared as "a gesture of gratitude" to President Assad for his role in negotiating the release of 39 U.S. hostages in Leba- non!' The press failed to discuss the fact that South Africa and Guatemala (among others) were omitted, that Nicaragua does 1. As I argue in U.S. Sponsorship of International Terrorism: An Over- view," in this issue. 2. See Richard Leonard, South Africa at War (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill, 1983). 3. Qaddafi talks big, but carries a small terrorist stick. The U. S. leadership, by contrast, talks "anti-terrorism" and "counter-terrorism," but carries a gi- gantic terrorist stick. See Table I and the text below. 4. Bernard Weinraub, "President Accuses 5 'Outlaw States' of World Ter- ror," New York Times, July 9, 1985, p. 1. * Edward S. Herman is professor of finance at the Wharton School of the Uni- versity of Pennsylvania, and the author of numerous books and articles on U.S. foreign policy. His most recent book, with Frank Brodhead, is "The Rise and Fall of the Bulgarian Connection" (New York: Sheridan Square Publica- tions, 1986). Number 26 (Summer 1986) not murder its own citizens as South Africa and Guatemala have done on a large scale, and that Nicaragua has not invaded other countries or organized subversive forces to destabilize other countries, as South Africa has done in many places and as the United States does quite openly to Nicaragua itself. The ludicrousness and hypocrisy of the United States calling Nicaragua a terrorist state was entirely unnoticed and without effect on the objective reporting by the U.S. press. With if compliant mass media, especially in the United States but also among its clients, terror is what the powerful U.S. government declares to be terror. As it is now using the concept with auda- cious and arbitrary abandon, it is employing the "It 'l don't like it, call it terrorism" definition of terrorism. Exclusion of State Terrorism: Retail Versus Wholesale Terror In its semantic manipulation of terrorism and related words, a number of devices are used by the United States and its intel- lectual spokespersons to differentiate friends and self from "terrorists." Perhaps the most important is to confine the use of the word to non-state actors and actions: i.e., to define ter- rorism as the use of violence to oppose governments.` This de- parts from standard and traditional usage, according to which terrorism is a mode of governing as well as of opposing govern- ments by means of intimidation." By excluding governments, South Africa, Guatemala, and Israel are removed from the category of terrorist, while the Af- rican National Congress (ANC), rebel groups in Guatemala, and the PLO are automatically eligible. This is grotesque in terms of both numbers of victims and forms of violence em- ployed by state and non-state intimidators,' but it is extremely convenient in terms of western priorities and interests. The governments protected by this word usage are allies, clients, and self; the groups automatically made "terrorists" oppose 5. How President Reagan nevertheless refers to Nicaragua and other enemy states as "terrorist" will be discussed below under '' International terrorism' and its supporters." 6. The fifth edition of Webster's Collegiate Dictionar.r, for example, de- fines terrorism as "a mode of governing, or of opposing government, by in- timidation." The American Heritage Dictionarc defines it as "The use of ter- ror, violence and intimidation to achieve an end." This does not exclude gov- ernments, and the third accepted usage given is explicitly "A system of gov- ernment that uses terror to rule." In the past, terrorism was assumed to refer primarily to acts of government. According to a U.N. study of terrorism, "While at first it applied mainly to those acts and policies of Government which were designed to spread terror among a population for the purpose of ensuring its submission to and contx- mity with the will of those Governments, it now seems to he mainly applied to actions by individuals, or groups of individuals... ..The Origins and Funda- mental Causes of International Terrorism," in M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., Intel- national Terrorism and Political Crime., (Springfield. 111.: Charles Thomas, 1975), p. 5. The identification of terrorism with government receded with the rise of organized western state terror and modern public relations. 7. State terrorists use torture on a large scale: dissident groups rarely engage in this form of terror. See "U.S. Sponsorship of International Terrorism." in this issue. Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 these clients and western defense of the status quo." To focus more sharply on the absurdity of this definitional system, I use the concepts of "retail" and "wholesale" terror: Dissident individuals and groups kill on a retail basis (that is, on a small scale, with limited technological resources to kill, and with small numbers of victims); states kill wholesale. This fairly obvious but neglected point is displayed dramatically on Table 1, which compares the numbers killed by state and non- state terrorists in recent decades. It can be quickly observed that single incidents of state terrorism frequently involve many more killings than multi-year totals for non-state terrorists (not to speak of the vastly greater numbers allocable to state ter- rorists on a multi-year basis). In fact, one can see from this table that the multi-year aggregates for the Baader-Meinhof gang (a part of row 1), the Red Brigades (only a part of the re- latively small Italian total on row 2),' and the PLO (row 3)- the bogeymen of the western media-even when taken to- gether fall short of the totals for single episodes of violence by South Africa, El Salvador, and Israel. The table suggests that if we were to allow state (wholesale) terror to be included in our definition of terror and give it attention remotely proportional to numbers, El Salvador, Guatemala, Indonesia, Israel and the United States itself would be pushed to center stage,'? the Red Brigades and PLO would recede to the background. But this would not conform to the demands of western power. Terrorism Versus "Retaliation" A second important device allowing "terrorist" to be ap- plied only to the enemy is distinguishing between terrorism and "retaliation," and simply asserting that we and our friends only "retaliate" to somebody else's "terrorism." In a se- quence of violence, it is often very difficult to determine where the process began, and thus the distinction between terror and retaliation is often arbitrary and depends on the ability of one side to establish its claim by sheer power. Thus, when Israel bombed Tunis, killing 20 Tunisian bystanders as well as many more Palestinians, the Reagan administration and the West ac- cepted this as "retaliation," even though the action at Larnaca that allegedly elicited the Tunis attack was explicitly stated by its perpetrators to have been a retaliatory act against Mossad agents involved in Israeli hijackings of ships. A note found on the body of one of the Rome terrorists speaks of vengeance for the Israeli-sponsored massacres of Palestinians at Shatila and Shaba, but this was not taken seriously in the West as making the Rome attacks merely "retaliation" for a prior terrorism." As Israel is a client state of the United States, the West allows Israel to kill always in "retaliation," never as terrorism, whereas the 8. This usage is completely institutionalized in western discussions of ter- rorism. This is reflected, for example, in so-called "risk-assessment" analyses by professionals in that new field. Thus the U.S. consulting firm Risks Intema- tional, Inc., confines terrorism entirely to dissident violence and excludes state murders by, say, Pinochet's government in Chile, by definition. In fact, in a recent assessment, it finds that the leading victim of terrorism in 1984 was the state of Chile! Executive Risk Assessment, December 1985, p. 30. 9. The total number killed by the Red Brigades between 1969 and 1982 has been estimated by D. Della Porta at 90, which is about the same number as were killed in the single rightwing massacre at the Bologna railway station. Cifre Crudeli (Bologna: 11 Mulino [Istituto Cattaneo], 1984), Table 14, p. 61. 10. As Pol Pot was in his heyday of power, and as the Soviets have been in their attacks on Afghanistan since 1979. 1 I . The Tunis attack was of course directed at a PLO official residence. We may ask, however, whether if, immediately following the Beirut massacres of Palestinians, the PLO had successfully attacked the building of the Israeli Par- liament, killing dozens of Israeli officials, this would have been considered legitimate targeting and "retaliation." And if not, why not'' PLO and other Palestinian groups are never allowed to be retaliating; they only engage in terrorism.'2 Terrorists as Indiscriminate Killers Terrorists are also sometimes distinguished from non-ter- rorist perpetrators of violence by an alleged randomness or in- discriminateness in their attacks. This is presumably less moral than non-random killing, and the claim is used to lend an aura of evil to terrorists and benignness to the other (frequently state) killers. Well-targeted killing, however, is not evidently more decent than random killing, unless the targeted victims are thought to be deserving of their fate. If redheads, or school teachers were targeted, would this be morally superior to ran- dom killing? If, however, the targeted victims are alleged to be Communists or PLO officials, in the West this may give the re- quisite moral aura. Frequently, of course, the targeted victims are not the only casualties, as in Tunis, but the claim of having gone after a "legitimate" target helps justify the casualties that are allegedly unintended. As a question of fact, however, non-state terrorists such as the Baader-Meinhof gang and PLO, or SWAPO in Namibia, or the NLF in Vietnam, have not been more prone to indiscrimi- nate killing than state terrorists. Most non-state dissident acts of violence are carefully targeted at some symbol of abuse, and in the case of the NLF in South Vietnam, non-selective vio- lence was punishable as alienating the popular base sought by NLF strategy. Where dissidents take hostages, of course, the victims are often random, but neither the number of such cases nor the ensuing casualties have been large (the deaths have been a small part of the small retail totals on Table 1)." On the other hand, state terror also presents a mixed picture of targeted and indiscriminate killing. State terrorists in Latin America have deliberately sought out political activists and leaders and cadres of organized groups, but where the targeted groups are large and diverse, and the term "cadres" is defined broadly (e.g., active union members), the policies are reasona- bly described as indiscriminate. Furthermore, state terror is often very "generous" in attacking civilians at large where these are seen as a virtual enemy population. McClintock points out that "in the case of a mass-based insurgency, sec- onded by the vast majority of the population, the perception of the `innocent civilian' becomes obscured." He contends that in Guatemala and El Salvador in the mid-1980s, and in the last years of Somoza, the tactics of state terror "have taken on an almost random, mass-oriented form."'? The point applies to the U.S. assault on Indochina. The essence of U.S. policy in Indochina was the massive use of firepower in the countryside, based on minimal targeting information. Civilian deaths were seen as having the merits of reducing an enemy population, forcing an exodus into the cities, arousing intense fear, and oc- casionally even killing an enemy soldier. In the U.S. mass 12. What makes this system of words especially inappropriate is that Israel has gone to great pains to designate the PLO as "terrorist" in order not to have to deal with the Palestinians, except as a group to marginalize and exterminate. For a discussion of the fact that the Israeli government invaded Lebanon in 1982 to avoid the threat of political negotiations, claiming, of course, that they were cleaning out nests of "terrorists," see Noam Chomsky, "Libya in U.S. Demonology" in this issue. The U.S. media swallowed entirely the Israeli claim to be "retaliating" to "terrorism." 13. A significant proportion of hostages who have been killed have been victims of state efforts to recover the hostages by force. Those so killed are usually attributed to the dissident terrorists. 14. Michael McClintock, The American Connection. State Terror and Popular Resistance in El Salvador, Vol. I (London: Zed Press, 1985), p. 52. Number 26 (Summer 1986) Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Table I Killings by State and Non-State Terrorists: Numbers and Orders of Magnitude' Numbers As Multiples of German Non-State 'T'otal (N h-/,I) 1. German: Red Army Faction, Revolutionary Cells, and all other non-state, January 1970 to April 1979 31 I 2. Italian: Red Brigades and all other non-state, 1968-82 334 I I 3. PLO: Israelis killed in all acts of terror from 1968-81 282 9 4. World: All "international terrorists," CIA global aggregate, 1968-80 3,368 109 Single Incidents of State Terror 5. El Salvador: Rio Sumpul River, May 14, 1980 600+ 19 + 6. South Africa: Kassinga (Angola) refugee camp, May 4, 1978 600+ 19 f 7. Guatemala: Panzos, May 29, 1978 114 4 8. Israel: Sabra and Shatila, (Lebanon), September 1982 1,900-3,500 61-1 13 Larger Dimensions of State Terror 9. Argentina: 1976-82 "disappeared" 11,000 355 10. Chile: 1973-85 20,000+ 645 + 1 I . Dominican Republic: 1965-72 2,000 64 12. El Salvador: Matanza 1, 1932 30,000 968 13. El Salvador: Matanza II, 1980-85 50,000 + 1,613+ 14. Guatemala: Rios Montt pacification campaign, March-June 1982 2,186 70 15. Guatemala: 1966-85 100,000+ 3,226+ 16. 1ndonesia: 1965-66 800,000+ 25,806 + 17. Indonesia: Invasion and pacification of East Timor, 1980-85 200,000+ 6,452 + 18. Soviet Union: Afghanistan, 1979-85 200,000+ 6,452 4- 19. Libya: External assassinations of Libyans, 1980-83 10 + 0.32 20. Cambodia: Pol Pot era, 1975-80 300,000+ 9,677 + 21. U.S.-Sponsored Contras: in Nicaragua, 1981-85 2800+ 90+ 22. United States: Assault on Indochina, 1955-75 4,000,000+ 129,032 f Footnotes: I . Data from Hans-Joseph Horchem, "Political Terrorism: The German Perspective," in Ariel Merari, ed., On Terrorism and ('onnhanirn,s Terrorism. Proceedings of an International Seminar, Tel Aviv, 1979 (Frederick, Md: University Publications of America, 1985), p.63. 2. Data by Dr. Vittofranco S. Pisano, Terrorism and Security. The Italian Experience, Report of the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Senate Judician Committee, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, November 1984, p.63. 3. B. Michael, Ha'aret_, July 16, 1982, citing official police statistics. Some of the 282 were killed by Israeli forces in aticnipts to free hostages by force. 4. CIA, Panenn of International Terrorism: 1980, June 1981, p. vi. 5. Michael McClintock, The American Connection, Vol. I, State Terror and Popular Resistance in El Salvador (London: Zed, 1985), p. 306. 6. Richard Leonard, South Africa at War (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill, 1983), p. 67. 7. Marlisc Simons, "Massacre Shakes Guatemala," Washington Post, July 7, 1977. 8. The Lebanese government claims to have recovered 762 bodies and that 1,200 were privately buried by relatives: Noam (honiskv, T/1c I ate/ul Trian,c/e (Boston South End Press, 1983), p. 370. In a careful study, Arnnon Kapeliouk estimates between 30003500 murdered: Amnon Kapeliouk, Sabra ( Shatila: lnquirv inu, a Massacre (Belmont, Mass.: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1984), pp. 62-63. 9. John Simpson and Jana Bennett, The Disappeared and the Mothers of the Plaza (New York: St. Martins, 1985), p_ 7 10. Amnesty International, Report on Torture (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1975). p. 252. 1 1, Carlos Maria Gutierrez, The Dominican Republic: Rebellion and Repression (New York: Monthly Review, 1972), p. 11 12. Robert Armstrong and Janet Shenk. El Salvador. The Face of Revolution (Boston: South End Press, 1982). p. 30 13. Central America Historical Institute. 14. Amnesty International, Special Briefing, ''Guatemala: Massive Extrajudicial Executions in Rural Areas under the Government of General Efrain Rios Montt," July 1982. P. X. I5- "Bitter and Cruel . . .," Report of a mission to Guatemala by the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group, October 1984: C- Krueger and K . Enge. Itithout Se wits or Development: Guatemala Milinai:ed, a report submitted to the Washington Office on Latin America, June 6, 1985. 16. T. B. Millar. Australia in Peace and War (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1978), p. 539. 17. Noani Chomsky, Torrard.s a New Cold War- New York: Pantheon, 1982), pp. 341 and 470 (citing Father Leoneto Views do Rego and I athcr Francisco Nana Fernandez. 18. Numbers highly uncertain. A LIN Commission report estimated 35,000 civilians killed in 1985, considered a year of hcavy casualties' Elaine Sciohno. ''I I N Aide Seeks to End Impasse in Afghan Talks.'' New York Times, February 27, 1986. 19. Amnesty International, Political Killings by Governments, (London: Al, 1983); pp. 69-77. 20. Mid , P,24 21. Center for International Communications, Nicaragua: Deyeloprnent, the Counterrevolution, and Consequences (London: C'If', 1986). The cumulative official figure for civilian deaths, 1981 through 1985, is 2817. Paul Quinn-Judge. Far- Iiastern 1:conomic Review, October 11, 1984: Noam Chomsky, Turning the Tide (Boston: South End Press, 1985)_ pp. 21617 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 media, B-52 raids were generally reported to be directed at "enemy base camps," parroting the language of Pentagon press releases. This was partly true, in that the villages at- tacked did house a population supportive of the indigenous re- bels. Clearly, however, bombing addressed to an entire rural population is reasonably described as indiscriminate. This is reflected in the staggering casualty rates that were imposed on the defenseless peasant populations (see Table I, row 22). These policies have been brought to El Salvador where the United States is now carrying out, mainly but not entirely by a proxy army and airforce, a Vietnam-style anti-peoples war in the countryside.' Casualty levels are huge, but the western media have turned their attention to "terrorism." The same Salvadoran victim of U.S. napalm and white phosphorus bombs. points apply to Israeli bombing raids during the 1982 invasion of Lebanon and those currently being carried out against Shi'ite villages in Southern Lebanon, with heavy firepower di- rected at heavily populated civilian areas and therefore involv- ing essentially random killing. Again, the West is not aroused and does not talk about going to the "source" of these killings; they are not "terrorism." Terrorists as Manipulators of the Media Another basis on which western terrorism experts attempt to confine attention to individual and small group actions rather than the more massive state violence is by focusing on the al- leged manipulation of the media by terrorists. Terrorism may 15. Alexander Cockburn, "Remember El Salvador?," The Nation, June 1, 1985; Eva Gold, "The New Face of War in El Salvador: A View of Counterin- surgency Warfare," NARMIC. American Friends Service Committee, Febru- ary 1986. 16. Brian Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict (California: Crescent Publications, 1975); Gabriel Weimann, ''The Theatre of Terror: Effects of Press Coverage," Journal of Communications, Winter 1983, pp. 38-45. See also, Gabriel Weimann, "Mass Mediated Theatre of Terror: Must the Show Go On." and Edward S. Herman, "The Use and Abuse of Terrorism: A Comment," (a reply to Weimann), in Media and Terrorism, Discussion Document, Carleton Center for Communications, Culture and So- ciety (Carleton University, Canada), forthcoming. even be defined by the use of violence in conjunction with a search for media publicity.' Some retail terrorist activities are designed to attract attention to grievances, and the terrorists count on the media giving publicity to their hijackings and tak- ing of hostages. State terrorists, by contrast, do not rely on the media in their own processes of intimidation, because their ca- pacity for violence is sufficiently great to have the desired ef- fects without deliberate enlistment of publicity. In fact, the problem for state terrorists is keeping the media quiet, so that violence can be carried out without undue public reaction. As dissident terrorists seek publicity, while state terrorists shun it as interfering with their freedom to kill, it is obvious that a focus on the "theatre of terror" automatically serves an apologetic function. It also allows conservatives to berate the media for "encouraging terrorism" by giving the terrorists a great deal of publicity. This involves a double deception. One is the implication that the media treat dissident terrorists sym- pathetically. While the media occasionally do convey some of the grievances of the terrorists and allow them to appear in a human light, media coverage of terrorist events is still heavily dominated by official views and by a focus on the fate of the victims. In the aftermath of the actions these emphases and re- crimination against the terrorists are overwhelming. The second deception is more serious. The analysts of "ter- ror theatre" fail to see the important role that publicity about dissident terror plays in sanctioning state terrorism. It was not a coincidence that the great increase in western attention to "ter- rorism" has accompanied the Reagan arms buildup, placement of missiles in Western Europe, and more aggressive attacks by the United States and its surrogates against Nicaraguans, Lebanese, Angolans, and Salvadoran rebels. Reagan's explict shift in emphasis from "human rights" to "terrorism" was virtual acknowledgement of support for state terrorists and simultaneous diversion of attention to lesser terrorists." The great attention now given to the theatre of terror doesn't help the retail terrorists;" it strengthens the claims of those who only "retaliate" to the terror of others. The Reagan adminis- tration's manipulation of the Libyan threat, from the mythical "hit squads" of 1981 to the deliberately provoked encounters off the Libyan coast and recent direct attacks, have been desig- ned to shift attention from the assault on Central America, the Palestinians and assorted other Arab groups, and the frontline Israeli tanks abandon ruins after destroying Shi'ite village of Ma'arakeh. 17. Another Orwellism may be noted here: State terrorists don't engage in terrorism, they violate "human rights''; only retail terrorists "terrorize." 18. For example, the PLO's status has been greatly reduced in the 1980s. because while massive Israeli attacks on its infrastructure has aroused no seri- ous western recriminations at Israeli terrorism, as each PLO attack is "ter- rorism" it suffers a steady accumulation of moral deficits. Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 states of South Africa and to mobilize western populations for aggressive adventures abroad. The "theatre of terror" is man- aged from Washington to serve its perceived interests. My Terror as "Counter-terror" Another frequently encountered concept in western ter- rorism semantics is "counter-terrorism." As the United States and its clients, like South Africa, El Salvador, and Guatemala, do not (by definition) engage in terrorism, their attacks on their enemies require alternative words. One, as we have seen, is re- taliation. But retaliation implies a response to an immediately preceding act. We need a word that allows a more continuous assault on the bases and populations of "terrorists." The gap has been filled by the concept of "counter-terror." For us and our allies, immediate violent responses are retaliation; longer term attacks are counter-terror. Thus, South Africa's systema- tic assaults on its neighbors to induce them to refuse sanctuary to the ANC and SWAPO-''terrorists" in western semantics and political language"are counter-terrorism. Similarly, the massacres of peasants carried out by the Guatemalan state to root out any opposition (i.e., "terrorists") is counter-terror." In short, what in western terrorism semantics is called ''counter terror" is in reality a dressed up form of state (wholesale) terror. "International Terrorism" and its Supporters A final semantic adjustment is needed so that the western es- tablishment can tar certain disfavored states with the terrorist brush. This is done with the aid of the concept of an "interna- tional terrorist," who either kills across national borders or kills with the support of a foreign power. In western terrorism semantics, a state whose agents cross a border to kill is not en- gaging in "international terrorism," nor is aiding a state that employs systematic violence supporting international ter- rorism. Thus, if the United States aids Pinochet and Botha, this is not supporting international terrorism. On the other hand, aid to the ANC, or any other group opposing government is au- tomatically aid to international terrorists. This is enormously helpful to Botha, Pinochet, and Reagan. On this system of def- initions, also, aid by Nicaragua to the rebels of El Salvador makes the rebels international terrorists and the Nicaraguan government a "terrorist state." Attacks on both are "counter- terrorism." On the other hand, U.S. aid to the Sal vadoran gov- ernment is exempt from any such labeling, even though it was massive killing by the U.S.-sponsored regimes in El Salvador that literally forced a guerrilla movement into existence in the early 1980s.' As the West is generally trying to bolster up existing regimes against threats from below, a definitional sys- tem that renders all rebels and liberation movements terrorists by virtue of receiving aid, while not doing the same for aid to a government they are trying to unseat, is extremely convenient. A problem arises, of course, where the West itself supports 19. In an interview with the Johannesburg Financial Mail, November 18, 1983, Charles Lichenstein, the Deputy U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., stated that " destahilization will remain in force until Angola and Mo:,ambique do not permit their territory to he used by terrorists [sic] to attack South Africa." 20. In 1985 the Reagan administration requested $5 million for the Guatemalan police and security assistance as part of what it called a "counter- terrorism" package. 21. See Robert Armstrong and Janet Shenk, El Salvador: The Fact' of Rico- lution (Boston: South End Press. 1982), Chapters 4-6: Raymond Bonner, B and Deceit: U.S. Policy and El Sahrador (New York: Times Books, 1984), Part I; Richard Alan White, The Morass: United Slate, Intervention in Central America (New York: Harper and Row, 1984), pp. 132-34. rebel movements and alleged "freedom fighters," as in the case of the Nicaraguan contras and Savimhi in Angola. If the United States organizes and supports the contras, and South Africa (and the United States) do the same for Savimhi in An- gola, strict adherence to the West's own skewed definitions makes the United States and South Africa "terrorist states." How is this handled'? The answer is, once again, power defines terrorism: what we and our allies do cannot he terrorism, so that any incompatible definitions-even our own must he temporarily abandoned and special exceptions made. The system of terrorism semantics To summarize the western definitional system and its conse- quences: If the Soviet Union gives aid to the PLO, it is Support- ing terrorism and is a terrorist state, because the PLO uses force to oppose Israel. That intimidation is terrorism. It the United States gives aid to Israel, which invades Lebanon, im- poses collective punishment on West Bank Arabs, and homhs Tunis and assorted other PLO "havens," this is not supporting terrorism because Israel only "retaliates" or engages in ''counter-terrorism," as does the United States. If the United States aids the Salvadoran government as it slaughters several thousand civilians a year, this is not support of terrorism be- cause a state killing and torturing its own citizens is excluded from the western definition. Also, if some of the people being slaughtered are rebelling, they are "terrorists" and the allied government is slaughtering as ''counter-terrorism" (as in Guatemala). If the United States organizes and aids the ron- tras, and supports South Africa as the latter invades its neigh- bors and organizes subversive armies across its borders, this is not terrorism either because the victims are aiding "terrorists" (and we and our allies are again "countering'' terror), or by a special exemption to the especially virtuous who also happens to own the most guns and the biggest cash balance. ? Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman at the Symposium on State Terrorism in the 'T'hird World, Frankfurt, April 1986. Portions of this article were presented at that symposium. 22. There are, of course, rationalisations for the special exception As Chester Crocker explained in regard to Angola, its govcrnntent is illccitintate because it was put in place by a foreign I Sovict) power. (See ,Vann/,ia and Re giorral Destabilization in Southern Africa, Hearings before the Suhcommiucc on Africa of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, February I S, 198 3, p 43.) Only if a government is put in place h\ it,. or meets our appl'os it arc at- tacks on it by rebels terrorism. Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Who Is a Terrorist? By Philip Paull* Whether the media identify the same individual as a "soldier of fortune," "international killer," '"dangerous' murder sus- pect," or "terrorist" often depends on what government di- rected or paid for the killing. A recent aborted attempt by Ber- keley police to arrest a man wanted for murder, for example, was depicted by two Bay Area journalists, Michael Taylor of the San Francisco Chronicle and Vince Bielski of the Daily Californian as a straight local news story rather than one with far-reaching political dimensions, mainly, I assert, because the wanted killer had worked for the State of Israel, a Cold War ally of the United States. Had the wanted man been an agent of the Libyan government, the story would have made front page news in the New York Times. Bielski's June 6 Californian arti- cle was headlined "Cop bungles arrest of international killer; David Lee Williams, Israeli-American terrorist. Man escapes after shown own photo," and describes the al- leged murderer matter-of-factly as "an assassin who has oper- ated in the Middle East." Michael Taylor's June 5 Chronicle story, "'Dangerous' Murder Suspect Evades Manhunt in Berkeley," provides more details about the suspect: To wit, David Lee Williams, also known by his Israeli nom de guerre David Abrams, wanted by the FBI for a brutal double murder, has numerous handguns and automatic weapons and worked as house manager of Chabad House, a residence hall for Jewish students near the Uni- versity of California. He has been the target of an FBI manhunt since last February. Williams is a Vietnam veteran, a former U.S. Army paratrooper, explosives expert, and counterin- * Philip Paull is a contributing editor of Propaganda Analysis Review, a pub- lication of the Media Alliance, an organization of 300 Bay Area media per- sons. This article is to appear in the third issue of PAR. to be published in Au- gust 1986. For back issues ($1.00 each) and further information, write to Media Alliance, Bldg. D - Fort Mason, San Francisco CA 941 1.3. surgency warfare instructor. The suspect "popped up" in Is- rael in the early 1970s, and served in the Israeli Defense Force for one year. "In 1973, he became an officer in the national police force and served on the border patrol in occupied ter- ritories." He worked in the Jerusalem police force, and in 1983, presumably in reward for a decade of unspecified ser- vices rendered to the State of Israel, was granted Israeli citizen- ship (which also required conversion to Judaism). During this same period, according to unnamed FBI, U.S. Navy, and Israeli intelligence sources cited by Taylor, and from statements made by Williams to friends, he was also an "assassin in the Middle East," a "mercenary" (for the Is- raelis, presumably), and a "gunrunner" with "volatile" moods. The real story involves more than just a "bungled arrest," obviously. For a decade or more Williams served the Israeli defense and security services. Yet none of the news reporters sought to uncover what role, if any, the U.S. government played in this arrangement. Were U.S. intelligence agencies- always in close contact with Israeli intelligence-aware of this use of a U.S. national'? Neither story uncovered or even questioned the possible duties Williams/Abrams performed as a member of the Israeli armed forces and the Israeli national police, particularly duties performed in the Israeli-occupied territories. What were the duties that required the use of an American mercenary when Is- rael possesses the most highly trained military/intelligence per- sonnel in the world? Is it possible the Israeli government is en- gaged in activities they wish to keep secret from its own citizenry? Is this an isolated case or part of a pattern'? Whom did Williams actually assassinate "in the Middle East," and who directed and financed the assassinations'? How and where was Williams involved in gunrunning'? The local media coverage also missed the indirect but nevertheless significant connection between the Williams/Ab- rams case and the ongoing Pollard spy case. The Israelis have been saying that the 'c'ollard case represents an isolated rogue espionage caper and that no other Americans have been em- ployed by the Israeli security and intelligence services as spies for Israel. But what about employing Americans for Israeli- sponsored covert action "dirty tricks" operations involving as- sassinations and gunrunning? In the Pollard spy case, the Israelis created a new identity for Pollard which he would assume, together with a Swiss bank account and pension after a planned decade of service to the State of Israel. This scheme included the granting of an Israeli passport and Israeli citizenship. In the Williams case the same employment pattern is followed, casting doubt on Israeli de- nials that the Pollard case is unique. I would have headlined the original story, "Former U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Expert and Israeli Terrorist, Wanted for Double Murder, Escapes Police/FBI Dragnet. State Depart- ment and CIA Queried on Israel's Employment of U.S. Na- tionals as 'Middle East Assassins.' " ? Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Libya in U.S. Demonology By Noam Chomsky* St. Augustine tells the story of a pirate captured by Alexan- der the Great, who asked him "how he dares molest the sea." "How dare you molest the whole world?" the pirate replied. "Because I do it with a little ship only, I am called a thief; you, doing it with a great navy, are called an Emperor." The pirate's answer was "elegant and excellent," St. Au- gustine relates. It captures with some accuracy the current rela- tions between the United States and Libya, a minor actor on the stage of international terrorism. More generally, St. Augustine's tale reaches to the heart of the cynical frenzy over "international terrorism" currently being orchestrated as a cover for western violence, and illumi- nates the meaning of the concept in contemporary western usage. The term "terrorism" came into use at the end of the * Noam Chomsky is professor of linguistics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the author of numerous works on political theory and current events. His recent works include "Towards a New Cold War,'' ''Fateful Triangle," and "Turning the Tide." 18th century, primarily to designate violent acts of govern- ments intended to ensure popular submission. That concept, plainly, is of little benefit to the practitioners of state terrorism, who, holding power, are in a position to control the system of thought and expression. The original sense has therefore been abandoned, and the term "terrorism" has come to he applied mainly to "retail terrorism" by individuals or groups.' Whereas the term was once applied to Emperors who molest their own subjects and the world, now it is restricted to thieves who molest the powerful. Extricating ourselves from the system of indoctrination, we will use the term "terrorism" to refer to the threat or use of violence to intimidate or coerce (generally for political ends), whether it is the wholesale terrorism of the Emperor or the re- tail terrorism of the thief. 1. "Origins and Fundamental Causes of International Terrorism," UU.N. Secretariat, reprinted in M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., lrurraationaI Tcrrori.on and Political Crimes (Springfield, Ill.: Charles Thomas, 1975[_ An American missile lights up the sky over Tripoli as the U.S. commences its predawn bombing raid, Tuesday, April 15, 1986. Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 In the true sense of the term, Libya is a terrorist state: the latest Amnesty International Report lists the killings, through 1985, of 14 Libyan citizens by this terrorist state, four abroad, the major acts of terrorism plausibly attributed to Libya. In the course of the hysteria orchestrated to serve other ends, all sorts of charges have been made, but the record confirms the April 1986 statement of a senior U.S. intelligence official that "what happened a few weeks ago is that Khadafy, who previously had used his people primarily to assassinate Libyan dissidents, made a clear decision to target Americans."' Qaddafi's alleged decision followed the Gulf of Sidra incident, when a U.S. air and naval armada sank Libyan vessels with many killed, and is entirely legitimate, indeed much belated, under the cynical doctrines professed by the United States executive, as we shall see directly. Amnesty International reports that Libya's terrorist killings began in early 1980, at the time when Jimmy Carter launched the terrorist war in El Salvador with Jose Napoleon Duarte serving as a cover to ensure that arms would flow to the killers. While Libya was killing 14 of its own citizens, along with a handful of others, the U.S. client regime of El Salvador killed some 50,000 of its citizens in the course of what Bishop Rivera y Damas, who succeeded the assassinated Archbishop Rom- ero, described in October 1980 as "a war of extermination and genocide against a defenseless civilian population." The secu- rity forces who perform these necessary chores were hailed by Duarte, a few weeks later, for their "valiant service alongside the people against subversion" while he conceded that "the masses were with the guerrillas" when this exercise began under the Carter-Duarte alliance. Duarte expressed this praise for the mass murderers as he was sworn in as President of the Junta in an effort to lend it legitimacy and ensure the flow of arms after the murder of four American churchwomen, gener- ally regarded here as improper, though such partisans of terror and torture as Jeane Kirkpatrick and Alexander Haig, offered justifications even for this act. The slaughter in El Salvador is not mere state terrorism on a massive scale, but international terrorism, given the organiza- tion, supply, training, and direct participation by the ruler of the hemisphere. The same is true of the massacre of some 70,000 Guatemalans in the same years, when U.S. arms to the murderers flowed at close to the normal level contrary to what is commonly alleged, though it was necessary to call in U.S. proxies, the neo-Nazi Argentine generals and Israel, to imple- ment the slaughter more efficiently, and to construct an arms pipeline involving Belgium and other collaborators, under the illegal direction of the Pentagon and the CIA. Meanwhile Reagan and his associates extolled the killers and torturers for their human rights improvements and "total dedication to de- mocracy." "The striking feature of Libyan atrocities," two observers note in reviewing the Amnesty International study of state terror, "is that they are the only ones whose numbers are sufficiently limited that the individual cases can be enumer- ated," in striking contrast to Argentina, Indonesia, or the Cen- tral American states where the Emperor molests the world.' 2. William Beecher, Boston Globe, April 15, 1986. 3. Amnesty International Report-1985 (London, 1985); Political Killings by Governments (Al Report, London, 1983); Chris Krueger and Kjell Enge, Security and Development Conditions in the Guatemalan Highlands (Washington Office on Latin America, 1985); John Haiman and Anna Meigs, "Khaddafy: Man and Myth," Africa Events, February 1986; Allan Nairn, "The Guatemala Connection," Progressive, May 1986. References not given here and below can be found in my Turning the Tide (Boston: South End Press, 1985). U.S. international terrorism in El Salvador is hailed as a magnificent achievement across the mainstream political spec- trum in the United States because it laid the basis for what is called "democracy" in western parlance: namely, the rule of elite groups serving the needs of the Global Enforcer with the public occasionally mobilized to ratify elite decisions. In El Salvador, the United States organized what Herman and Brodhead call "demonstration elections" to pacify the home front, carried out in an atmosphere of "terror and despair, macabre rumor and grisly reality," in the words of the obser- vers of the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group.' The U.S. press lauded this demonstration of our passionate com- mitment to democracy, as Pravda does under similar cir- cumstances. Guatemala is also considered a success, for simi- lar reasons. When half the population is marched to the polls after it has been properly traumatized by U.S.-backed vio- lence, enlightened American humanists are overjoyed at this renewed demonstration of our love for democracy, untroubled by the rise in death squad killings after the elections (including at least 94 deaths and 35 disappearances in the weeks following President Marco Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo's January inaugura- tion), the open recognition by the newly-elected president that he can do nothing given the roots of actual power in the mili- tary and the oligarchy and that the civilian government are merely "the managers of bankruptcy and misery,"' and the fact that the reaction in the United States helps convert the elections into a means for the U.S. to participate more fully in state terror and repression, as in El Salvador. In fact, elections in U.S. terror states are often a disaster for the domestic popu- lation, for this essential reason. These two examples, of course, represent only a small part of the U.S. role in interna- tional terrorism during the 1980s, and the grisly record goes back many years. In short, Libya is indeed a terrorist state, but in the world of international terrorism, it is hardly even a bit player. "Their Side" Is Terrorist The pirate's maxim explains the useful concept of "interna- tional terrorism" only in part. It is necessary to add a second feature: An act of terrorism enters the canon only if it is com- mitted by "their side," not ours. Consider, for example, the public relations campaign about "international terrorism" launched in early 1981 by the Reagan administration. The 4. Edward S. Herman and Frank Brodhead, Demonstration Elections (Bos- ton: South End Press, 1984). They define this concept to refer to a device of foreign intervention in which elections are "organized and staged by a foreign power primarily to pacify a restive home population," discussing several other examples as well and showing in detail that they are no less farcical than elec- tions held under Soviet authority. Their term "demonstration elections" was borrowed and radically misused with reference to the election in Nicaragua by Robert Leiken (New York Review of Books, December 5, 1985), as part of his campaign in support of the terrorist proxy army established by the U.S. to at- tack Nicaragua from its Honduran and Costa Rican bases. See Brodhead and Herman's letter, published after half a year's delay along with others by British Parliamentary observers (June 26, 1986), and Leiken's response, tacitly con- ceding the accuracy of their critique (by evasion) while claiming that they de- signed their concept "as a way of focusing attention on Western imperialism while diverting it from Soviet imperialism . . . in line with their apparent be- lief that there is only one superpower villain." This is the standard reflex of propagandists whose deceit is exposed, in this case, requiring the suppression of Brodhead and Herman's harsh critique of elections in Poland along with much else. The remainder of Leiken's response and his articles themselves maintain a comparable level of integrity and merit careful reading for those in- terested in the workings of the U.S. ideological system. 5. Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Washington Report on the Hemisphere, April 16, 1986. Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 major text was Claire Sterling's The Terror Network, which of- fered an ingenious proof that international terrorism is a "Soviet-inspired" instrument "aimed at the destabilization of western democratic society." The proof is that the major ter- rorist actions are confined to the western democratic states, and are not "directed against the Soviet Union or any of its satel- lites or client states." This profound insight much impressed other terrorologists, notably, Walter Laqueur, who wrote that Sterling had provided "ample evidence" that terrorism occurs "almost exclusively in democratic or relatively democratic countries. "" The Sterling thesis is true, in fact true by definition, given the way the term "terrorism" is employed by the Emperor and his loyal coterie. Since only acts committed by "their side" count as terrorism, it follows that Sterling is necessarily cor- rect, whatever the facts. In the real world, the story is quite dif- ferent. The major victims of international terrorism' in the sev- eral decades prior to the Sterling-Laqueur pronouncements were Cuba and the Palestinians, but none of this counts, by definition. When Israel bombs Palestinian refugee camps kill- ing many civilians-often without even a pretense of "re- prisal"-or sends its troops into Lebanese villages in "coun- terterror" operations where they murder and destroy, or hijacks ships and places thousands of hostages in prison camps under horrifying conditions, this is not "terrorism"; in fact, the rare voices of protest are thunderously condemned by loyal Party Liners for their "anti-Semitism" and "double stan- dard," demonstrated by their failure to join the chorus of praise for "a country that cares for human life" (Washington Post), whose "high moral purpose" (Time) is the object of never-ending awe and acclaim, a country which, according to its American claque, "is held to a higher law, as interpreted for it by journalists" (Walter Goodman)." Similarly, it is not terrorism when paramilitary forces operating from U.S. bases and trained by the CIA bombard Cuban hotels, sink fishing boats and attack Russian ships in Cuban harbors, poison crops and livestock, attempt to assassi- nate Castro, and so on, in missions that were running almost weekly at their peak." These and innumerable similar actions on the part of the Emperor and his clients are not the subject of conferences and learned tomes, or of anguished commentary and diatribes in the media and journals of opinion. Not only is "terrorism" defined for ideological serviceabil- ity, but standards of evidence are also conveniently set so as to achieve the Emperor's goals. To demonstrate Libya's role as a state terrorist, the flimsiest evidence, or none at all, will suf- fice. The headline of a New York Times editorial justifying the terrorist attack that killed some 100 people in Libya reads "To 6. See my Towards a New Cold Weir (New York: Pantheon, 1982), for re- ferences and discussion, and for more on the topic, Edward S. Herman, The Real Terror Network (Boston: South End Press, 1982). 7. 1 exclude here outright aggression, as in the case of the U.S. attack against South Vietnam, then all of Indochina, the Soviet invasion of Afghanis- tan. the U.S.-hacked invasions of East Timor and Lebanon by its Indonesian and Israeli clients, etc. 8. Washington Post, June 30. 1985; Time, October 11, 1982; Goodman, New York Times, February 7, 1984. For recent discussion of the astonishing record of Israeli terrorism and the western response, or lack of it, see my pa- pers "International Terrorism: Image and Reality," delivered at the Frankfurt conference on International Terrorism, April 1986, and ' Middle East Ter- rorism,'' forthcoming in Rare & Class. 9. See references in note 6. And see Warren Hinckle and William Turner, The Fish is Red (New York: Harper & Row, 1981). And sec Edward S. Her- man, "U.S. Sponsorship of International Terrorism: An Overview," in this issue of CAIB. Save the Next Natasha Simpson," referring to the I I-year-old American girl who was one of the victims of the terrorist at- tacks in the Rome and Vienna air terminals on December 27, 1985; these victims entitle us to bomb Libyan cities "to dis- courage state-supported terrorism," the editors solemnly in- form us. It is only a minor defect that no evidence has been presented to implicate Libya in these actions. The Italian and Austrian governments stated that the terrorists were trained in Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon and had come via Damas- cus, a conclusion reiterated by Israeli Defense Minister Rabin. Four months later, in response to U.S. claims about Libyan in- volvement in the Vienna attack, the Austrian Minister of Inte- rior stated that "there is not the slightest evidence to implicate Libya," again citing Syria as the connection and adding that Washington had never presented the evidence of Libyan com- plicity it had promised to provide to the Austrian authorities. He also added the correct but-in the U.S.-inexpressible comment that the problem of Lebanese-based terrorism lies largely in the failure to solve the Palestine problem, which has led desperate people to turn to violence, exactly the result in- tended by U.S. -Israeli terrorism, a matter to which we return. "' If an individual implicated in a terrorist act once paid a visit to Libya, or is alleged to have received training or funds from Libya in the past, that suffices for condemnation of Qaddaf i as a "mad dog" who must be eradicated. The same standards would implicate the CIA in the murderous exploits of Cuban exiles, among numerous others. Keeping just to 1985, one of the suspects in the bombing of the Air India jumbo jet near Ire- land that was the year's worst terrorist act, killing 329 people, was trained in an anti-communist school for mercenaries in Alabama. The terrorist action that cost the most lives in the Middle East was a car-bombing in Beirut in March that killed 80 people and wounded 200, carried out by a Lebanese intelli- gence unit trained and supported by the CIA, in an effort to kill a Shi'ite leader who was believed to have been involved in "terrorist attacks against U.S. installations" in Beirut; the term "terrorism" is commonly used by foreign armies in refer- ence to actions against them by the local population which, as in this case, plausibly see them as an occupying force attempt- ing to impose a detested political settlement." By the standards of evidence used in the case of Libya, the U.S. is the world's leading terrorist power, even if we exclude the wholesale ter- rorism ruled ineligible by the propaganda system by the means already described. What the President calls "the evil scourge of terrorists" (in the specific western sense) was placed in the central focus of attention by the Reagan administration as it cane into office in 1981. The reasons were transparent, though inexpressible within the doctrinal system. The administration was committed to three related policies, all achieved with some success: (I ) transfer of resources from the poor to the rich; (2) a massive in- crease in the state sector of the economy in the traditional American way, through the Pentagon system--a device to force the public to invest in high technology industry by means of the state-guaranteed market fir the production of high tech- I0. Editorial. New York Times,April 20, 1985; ti'ashin,gton Past, January 11, 1986: Rabin, Boston Globe, January 25, 1986: I'a Pais (Madrid). April 2S. 1986. 11. Ness' York Times, June 27; Bob Woodward and Charles R Babcock, Washington Post, May 12; Philip Shenon, New York Times, May 14, 1985, lot CIA denial of involvement "disputed by some Administration and Congres- sional officials who said that the agency was working with the group at the time of the bombing." Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 nology waste (armaments), and thus to contribute to the gen- eral program of public subsidy, private profit, called "free en- terprise"; and (3) a substantial increase in the U.S. role in in- tervention, subversion, and international terrorism (in the true sense of the expression). Such policies cannot be presented to the public in the terms in which they are intended. They can be implemented only if the general population is properly fright- ened by monsters against whom we must defend ourselves. The standard device is an appeal to the threat of Reagan's "Evil Empire," what President Kennedy called "the monolithic and ruthless conspiracy" bent on world conquest, as he launched a rather similar program.' But confrontation with the Evil Empire can be a dangerous affair, so it is prefera- ble to do battle with safer enemies designated as the Evil Em- pire's proxies, a choice that conforms well to the third plank in the Reagan agenda, pursued for quite independent reasons: to ensure "stability" and "order" in our global domains. The "international terrorism" of properly chosen pirates, or of enemies such as Nicaragua or Salvadoran peasants who dare to defend themselves from our terrorist attack, is a far preferable target, and with an efficiently functioning propaganda system, it can be exploited to induce a proper sense of fear and mobili- zation among the domestic population. Qaddafi as Scapegoat Libya fit the need perfectly. Qaddafi is easy to hate and Libya is weak and defenseless, so that martial flourishes and, when needed, murder of Libyans can be conducted with im- punity. The glorious military victory in Grenada, a culmination of the extreme hostility and aggressiveness of the Carter- Reagan administrations after the Bishop government threatened to consider the needs of the poor population, served similar ends. The point is readily perceived abroad. American journalist Donald Neff, writing in a British publication about the March 1986 Gulf of Sidra incident, comments that "this Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi with his adopted daughter, who was killed in the bombing of his home. 12. Kennedy's program was limited to the second and third plank of the Reagan agenda; the first, which was enthusiastically supported by congres- sional Democrats under Reagan and indeed had already been proposed by Car- ter, in direct violation of the will of the public, reflects the decline in relative U.S. power in the intervening years. It is no longer feasible to pursue "great societies at home and grand designs abroad," in the words of Kennedy adviser Walter Heller, so the former must be abandoned. On public attitudes, see Turning the Tide, chapter 5, and Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers, Atlantic Monthly, May 1986. was less of a Rambo-style operation than a demonstration of the bully on the block picking a fight. It was typical of Reagan. In his five years in office, he has repeatedly got away with lording it over little guys. He did this time too."" It is an inter- esting fact about American culture that this regular show of cowardice and two-bit thuggery seems to strike a responsive chord. The public relations specialists of the Reagan administration understood the utility of the Libyan enemy and wasted little time in confronting this dangerous foe. Libya was at once des- ignated as a prime agent of the Soviet-inspired "terror net- work," and in July 1981, a CIA plan to overthrow and possi- bly kill Qaddafi with a paramilitary campaign of terror within Libya was leaked to the press." We might note parenthetically that by U.S. standards, this plan authorized Qaddafi to carry out acts of terror against American targets in "self-defense against future attack," the words of White House spokesman Larry Speakes presenting the official justification for the bombing of Tripoli and Ben- ghazi. The same justification was reiterated at the United Na- tions by Vernon Walters and Herbert Okun. The administration even had the gall to argue that this right, which not even Hitler claimed and which, if proclaimed by other violent states, would tear to shreds what little remains of global order and in- ternational law, is in accord with the United Nations Charter; no form of legal sophistry can bridge that gap, but Reagan's pronouncement was duly acclaimed by Anthony Lewis for its reliance "on a legal argument that violence against the perpe- trators of repeated violence is justified as an act of self-de- fense." The reason why the U.S. justified the attack "on the basis of pre-empting an attack, which could be seen as a form of self-defense, [rather] than as a retaliatory action" was explained by a State Department official, who noted that the U.N. Charter expressly forbids the use of force except in self- defense-in fact, self-defense against armed attack, until the U.N. acts after a formal request by the country that regards it- self as the victim of a sudden and overwhelming armed at- tack.' In August 1981, the anti-Qaddafi message "was reinforced by the trap laid for Libya in the Gulf of Sidra," a trap "elabo- rately planned on the U.S. side" with the intent of a confronta- tion in which Libyan jets could be shot down, as they were, Edward Haley observes in his bitterly anti-Qaddafi study of U.S. relations with Libya. One specific purpose, Haley plausi- bly argues, was to "exploit the `Libyan menace' in order to win support for steps [the administration] wished to take in pursuit of Secretary Haig's `strategic consensus' against the Soviet Union, and as an element in the arrangements necessary for the creation of a Rapid Deployment Force," targeted primarily at the Middle East. In November, the administration concocted a ludicrous tale about Libyan hit-men roaming the streets of Washington to assassinate Our Leader, eliciting feverish media commentary along with some limited skepti- cism. When questioned about the plot, Reagan stated: "We have the evidence, and [Qaddafi] knows it."" The story faded away when its purpose was served, and the press was suffi- 13. Middle East International, April 4, 1986. 14. See P. Edward Haley, Qaddafi and the U.S. Since 1969 (New York: Praeger, 1984), pp. 271 f. 15. Larry Speakes, national TV, 7:30 PM, April 14; New York Times, April 16; Associated Press, April 14; New York Times, April 15; Lewis, New York Times, April 17; Bernard Weinraub, New York Times, April 15, 1986. 16. Haley, op. cit., n. 14, pp. 8, 264. Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Composite sketches of alleged Libyan "hit team" which Jack Anderson distributed to press and TV networks. Later Anderson wrote that he had been set up by an unnamed intelligence agency. ciently disciplined so as not to report the exposure in the British press that the "assassins" on the official U.S. list, leaked in England, were prominent members of the (passion- ately anti-Libyan) Lebanese Amal, including Nabih Berri and the elderly religious leader of the Shi'ite community." Other tales included a Libyan threat to invade the Sudan across 600 miles of desert (with the Egyptian and U.S. air forces helpless to impede this outrage) and a plot to overthrow the government of the Sudan in February 1983--conveniently discovered at a moment when the administration's reactionary constituency was charging it with insufficient militancy-a plot so subtle that Sudanese and Egyptian intelligence knew nothing about it, as U.S. reporters who took the trouble to go to Khartoum to investigate quickly discovered. The U.S. re- sponded to the fabricated plot with an elaborate show of force, enabling Secretary of State Shultz, who had been denounced as too faint-hearted, to strike heroic poses on television while an- nouncing that Qaddafi "is back in his box where he belongs" because Reagan acted "quickly and decisively" against this threat to world order. Again, the episode was forgotten when its purposes had been served. There have been a series of simi- lar examples. The media have generally played their appointed role, with only occasional demurrers." The events of March-April 1986 fit the familiar pattern to perfection. The Gulf of Sidra operation in March was plainly timed to stir up jingoist hysteria just prior to the crucial Senate vote on contra aid, coinciding with a fabricated Nicaraguan "invasion" of Honduras as Nicaragua exercised its legal right of hot pursuit to expel from its territory U.S. proxy forces dis- patched by their master from their Honduras bases to sow ter- ror in Nicaragua prior to the Senate vote. The public relations campaign succeeded brilliantly as demonstrated by the enraged reaction of congressional doves and the media fairly generally, and the Senate vote. The charade also permitted the adminis- tration to provide $20 million of military aid to Honduras, which Honduras officially maintains that it did not request, and 17. New Statesman, August 16, 1985. 18. See my Fateful Triangle (Boston: South End Press, 1983), p. 210); Haley, op. cit.. n. 14, makes a praiseworthy effort to take the comedy seri- ously. which has no doubt been conveniently "lost" in the contra camps, yet another method by which the lawless band in Washington evades the weak congressional restrictions on their thuggery.' The Libyan provocation too was a success, en- abling U.S. forces to sink several Libyan boats, killing more than 50 Libyans, and, it was hoped, to incite Qaddafi to acts of terror against Americans, as was subsequently claimed. While the U.S. forces were successful in killing many Lib- yans, they were singularly unable to rescue survivors. The task was apparently not impossible, since 16 survivors of the U.S. attack were rescued from a lifeboat by a Spanish oil tanker.` Libyan ship burns in the Gulf of Sidra after being bombed by naval aircraft from the Sixth Fleet. The Americans refused to rescue Libyan sailors from several sinking ships, and more than 50 died. The official purpose of the U.S. military operation was to establish the right of passage in the Gulf of Sidra, perfect non- sense, since dispatch of a naval flotilla was hardly the neces- sary or appropriate means to achieve this end; in fact, under in- ternational law, a public declaration or the commencement of court proceedings would have sufficed. Since there was plainly no urgency, it was possible to resort to legal means to establish the right of innocent passage. But a violent terrorist state will naturally observe different priorities. The U.S. position is dubious on narrower grounds. The press continually speaks of "the law of the sea," but Libya shot at U.S. planes, not U.S. ships, and "the law of the air" 19. "The Central Intelligence Agency, barred from providing military aid to Nicaragua rebels, secretly funneled several million dollars to the rebels for political projects over the past year, U.S. government officials sav,'' also al- lowing "the CIA to maintain a strong influence over the rebel movement, even though a Congressional ban existed from October 1984 through September 1985, prohibiting the agency from spending money 'which would have the ef- fect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua,' the officials said." One purpose of what U.S. officials described as "a major program" was to "create the aura that the contras] are an actual political entity among our allies in Europe." Congressman Sam Gejdenson stated that "We suspected that the CIA had never really withdrawn from the scene, but the extent of the agency's direct involvement in the Contra war may astound even the most jaded observer." UNO documents obtained by the As- sociated Press "show much of UNO's political money going to military or- ganizations allied with the umbrella group" established by the U.S., while some of the funds were used to pay off Honduran and Costa Rican officials "to enable the rebels to operate in those countries." Much of the money was fun- nelled through a Bahamas branch of a London hank. Associated Press, April 14; Boston Globe, April 14, 1986. The disclosures passed without comment. Subsequently, the Miami Herald reported that over $2 million of the $27 mil- lion provided by Congress for "humanitarian assistance" was used to pay Honduran officers "to turn a blind eye to illegal contra activities on Honduran soil" (editorial, Boston Globe, May 13, 1986). 20. Associated Press, March 27, citing El Pais. Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 barely exists. States make various claims in this regard. The U.S., for example, claims a 200-mile Air Defense Identifica- tion Zone within which it has the right to exercise "self-de- fense" against intruding aircraft judged to be hostile. There is no doubt that U.S. aircraft were well within 200 miles of Li- byan territory-40 miles, the Pentagon claims-and that they were hostile, so that by U.S. standards, Libya was within its rights to intercept them. The point was noted by the conserva- tive legal scholar Alfred Rubin of the Fletcher School at Tufts University, who commented that "by sending in aircraft we went beyond what we were clearly authorized to do under the Law of the Sea" in "an unnecessary provocation.'"" But for a gangster state, such matters are irrelevant, and the exercise was a success, domestically at least. The extent of the provocation in the Gulf of Sidra was made clear by Pentagon spokesman Robert Sims, who "said that U.S. policy is to shoot at any Libyan boat that enters interna- tional waters in the Gulf of Sidra for as long as the U.S. naval exercise in that region continues-no matter how far away the boat might be from U.S. ships." "Given the 'hostile intent' displayed by Libya when it tried to shoot down U.S. warplanes," Sims stated, any Libyan military vessel is "a threat to our forces. "22 In short, the U.S. maintains the right of "self-defense" against any Libyan vessel that approaches its naval armada off the Libyan coast, but Libya does not have a right of self-defense in airspace comparable to that claimed by the U.S. There is more to the story. David Blundy interviewed British engineers in Tripoli who were repairing the Soviet-installed radar system. One, who says he was monitoring the incident throughout on the radar screens (which, contrary to Pentagon claims, were not rendered inoperative), reports that "he saw American warplanes cross not only into the 12 miles of Libyan territorial waters, but over Libyan land as well." "'I watched the planes fly approximately eight miles into Libyan air space,' he said. 'I don't think the Libyans had any choice but to hit back. In my opinion they were reluctant to do so.' " The en- gineer added that "American warplanes made their approach using a normal civil airline traffic route and followed in the wake of a Libyan airliner, so that its radar blip would mask them on the Libyan radar screen. "" 22. Fred Kaplan, Boston Globe, March 26, 1986. 23. London Sunday Times, April 6, 1986. The Photos You Didn't See In the U.S. Media U.S. bombing of residential districts of Tripoli resulted in many civilian casualties and much property damage. The French Embassy after U.S. bombing raid of Tripoli. Libyan peasants surveying damage to what was their barn. Fragment of a body after the bombing. Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 No hint of this information appeared in the national press, to my knowledge, apart from a typically excellent report by Alex- ander Cockburn, playing his usual role of personal antidote to media subservience and distortion. Blundy's article was not mysteriously missed by the U.S. press. It was cited by Joseph Lelyveld of the New York Times, but with its crucial content entirely omitted." One likely consequence of the Gulf of Sidra operation was to elicit acts of Libyan terrorism in retaliation. These would then have the effect of inducing a state of terror in the United States and, with some luck, in Europe as well, setting the stage for the next escalation. The bombing of the La Belle discotheque in West Berlin on April 5, with one American and one Turk killed, was immediately blamed on Libya, and was then used as the pretext for the April 14 bombing of Tripoli and Ben- ghazi, with about 100 Libyans killed, neatly timed the day be- fore the expected House vote on contra aid. In case the audi- ence missed the point, Reagan's speech writers made it explicit. Addressing the American Business Conference on April 15, he said: "And I would remind the House voting this week that this arch-terrorist has sent $400 million and an arse- nal of weapons and advisers into Nicaragua to bring his war home to the United States. He has bragged that he is helping the Nicaraguans because they fight America on its own ground."" The idea that the "mad dog" is bringing his war home to the U.S. by providing arms to people the U.S. is at- tacking with its terrorist proxy army was a nice touch, which passed without notable comment, but the public relations oper- ation did not, for once, succeed in steamrollering Congress, though the bombing of Libya did enflame chauvinist passions. This consequence was largely attributable, perhaps, to the ram- pant anti-Arab racism in the United States and the absence of any sane reaction to earlier episodes of manufactured hysteria over Qaddafi's real and alleged crimes. The April 14 attack was the first bombing in history staged for prime time television. As the subsequently published re- cord shows, the bombing raids were carefully timed so that they would begin precisely at 7PM Eastern Standard Time-as they did; that is, precisely at the moment when all three na- tional television channels broadcast their national news, which was of course pre-empted as agitated anchor men switched to Tripoli for direct eyewitness reports of the exciting events. As soon as the raids ended, the White House had Larry Speakes address a press conference, followed by other dignitaries, en- suring total domination of the propaganda system during the crucial early hours. Difficult Questions One might argue that the administration took a gamble in this transparent public relations operation, since journalists might have asked some difficult questions, but the White House was justly confident that nothing untoward would occur and its faith in the servility of the media proved to be war- ranted. Questions could have been raised, surely. To mention only the most obvious one, Speakes stated that the U.S. knew on April 4 that the East Berlin Libyan "People's Bureau" had in- formed Tripoli that an attack would take place in Berlin the fol- lowing day, and that it then informed Tripoli that the La Belle 24. Cockburn, Wall Street Journal, April 17; also The Nation, April 26, 1986. Lelyveld, Ness' York Times, April 18, 1986. 25. New York Times, April 16, 1986. The hour of the attack: A grandfather clock in a Tripoli home near the French Embassy, stopped at 2 a.m., just when the home was destroyed. discotheque bombing had taken place, as planned. "Thus the U.S. knew on April 4-5-with certainty, the White House al- leged-that Libya was directly responsible for the disco bomb- ing. One might have asked, then, why the reports of U.S. and West German investigations from April 5 to the moment of the attack consistently stated that there were at most suspicions of Libyan involvement. In fact, every journalist listening to the administration story had in his or her hands-unless we assume the most astonishing incompetence on the part of the news rooms-a report from Berlin which came across the wires at 6:28 PM EST, a half-hour before the bombing, stating that "the Allied military command [in West Berlin] reported no de- velopments in the investigation of the disco bombing'' and that "U.S. and West German officials have said Libya possibly through its embassy in Communist-ruled East Berlin--is sus- pected of involvement in the bombing of the La Belle night- club" (my emphasis)."' Sonic journalist might have asked, then, how it is that just prior to the attack, the U.S. and West Germany still had at most suspicions of Libyan involvement as throughout the preceding period-while on April 4-5, ten days earlier, they had certain knowledge of it. But no embar- rassing questions were asked then, nor have they been since, and the relevant facts have been largely suppressed. Reagan stated on the evening of April 14 that "our evidence is direct, it is precise, it is irrefutable''-just as "We have the evidence, and [Qaddafi] knows it" in the case of the Libyan hit-men, not to speak of the Sandinista involvement in drug- peddling, their announcement of a "revolution without fron- tiers," the support of Helmut Kohl and Bettino Craxi for the Libyan attack (angrily denied by "shocked" officials in Ger- many and Italy)," and numerous other fabrications of an ad- ministration that has broken the usual records for deceit, but continues "to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat'' in the words of the titular leadership, referring to his Stalinist mod- els-to achieve its ends, confident that the occasional exposure in the small print, well after the fact, will not prevent the con- stant stream of lies from setting the terms of debate and leaving the appropriate impressions firmly implanted, exactly as it does. Beyond the borders, discipline does not reign. In Germany, a week after Washington had stated its certain knowledge ten days earlier of Libyan responsibility for the disco bombing, Der Spiegel reported that the famed telephone intercepts appar- ently do not exist and that West Berlin intelligence has only suspicions about Libyan involvement, also suspecting "rival groups of drug dealers" among other possibilities, including 26. Associated Press, April 14. 1986. 27. James M. Markham, Nets' York Times, April 25, 1986 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 neo-Nazi groups. Washington's war is "a means of politics," "insofar as the enemy is as small as Grenada and Libya-and the adversary is as ideal a scoundrel as Qaddafi," and no Euro- pean leader should have any illusions that Europe's concerns or interests will be considered if the U.S. decides to escalate in- ternational violence, even to the level of a final World War, editor Rudolf Augstein adds.28 In an interview on April 28 with a reporter for the U.S. Army journal Stars and Stripes, Man- fred Ganschow, chief of the Berlin Staatschutz and head of the 100-man team investigating the disco bombing, stated that "I have no more evidence that Libya was connected to the bomb- ing than I had when you first called me two days after the act. Which is none." He agreed that it was "a highly political case" and hinted at considerable skepticism about what "the politicians" were saying and would say about it.29 The U.S. press has concealed the doubts expressed by the Berlin inves- tigators, but the careful reader will discern them in the reports of the continuing investigation, as suspects alleged to have Sy- rian and other connections are investigated. For much of the world, the U.S. has become an object of considerable fear, as its "bizarre cowboy leader" engages in acts of "madness" in organizing a "band of cutthroats" to at- tack Nicaragua and playing mad bomber elsewhere, in the words of Canada's leading journal, generally restrained and quite pro-U.S. in tendency.70 The Reagan administration is playing on these fears. At the Tokyo Summit of the advanced industrial democracies in May, the Reagan administration cir- culated a position paper in which it stated that one reason why Europe would be wise to line up in the U.S. crusade is "the need to do something so that the crazy Americans won't take matters into their own hands again." The threat succeeded in eliciting a statement against terrorism mentioning only Libya by name." The reaction to the bombing of Libya at home and abroad was sharply different. Expecting the worst, the 12-member European Economic Community called upon the U.S. to avoid "further escalation of military tension in the region with all the inherent dangers." A few hours later, U.S. warplanes struck, as West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher was on his way to Washington to explain the EEC position. His spokesman stated that "We want to do everything we can to avoid a military escalation." The bombing aroused extensive protest throughout most of Europe, including large-scale dem- onstrations, and evoked editorial condemnation in most of the world. Spain's major journal, the independent El Pais, con- demned the raid, writing that "The military action of the United States is not only an offense against international law and a grave threat to peace in the Mediterranean, but a mock- ery of its European allies, who did not find motives for economic sanctions against Libya in a meeting Monday, des- pite being previously and without success pressured to adopt 28. Der Spiegel, April 21, 1986; the front cover features the phrase "Terror against Terror," a well-known Gestapo slogan, presumably not selected by ac- cident. See also Norman Birnbaum's article, same issue. 29. Text of interview provided by a journalist for Stars and Stripes in Ger- many. The bombing may, in fact, have been the result of gang warfare involv- ing nightclub ownership; other sources in Berlin raise the possibility that a neo- Nazi group or the Ku Klux Klan (which had verbally attacked the club) may have been involved. 30. Toronto Globe & Mail, editorials, March 28, 18, 5, 1986, referring spe- cifically to Nicaragua. 31. See Associated Press, International Herald Tribune, May 6, for exten- sive discussion; New York Times, May 6, 1986,a briefer mention, and the text of the statement. sanctions." The conservative South China Morning Post in Hong Kong wrote that "President Reagan's cure for the `mad dog of the Middle East' may prove more lethal than the dis- ease," and his action "may also have lit the fuse to a wider conflagration" in the Middle East. In Mexico City, El Univer- sal wrote that the U.S. "has no right to set itself up as the de- fender of world freedom," urging recourse to legal means through the United Nations. There were many similar reac- tions. The U.S. press, in contrast, was overwhelmingly favorable. The New York Times wrote that "even the most scrupulous citizen can only approve and applaud the American attacks on Libya," describing this as a just sentence: "the United States has prosecuted [Qaddafi] carefully, proportionately-and justly." The evidence for Libyan responsibility for the disco bombing has been "now laid out clearly to the public"; "Then came the jury, the European governments to which the United States went out of its way to send emissaries to share evidence and urge concerted action against the Libyan leader." It is ir- relevant, apparently, that the jury was hardly convinced by the evidence, and issued a "judgment" calling on the executioner to refrain from any action. Most governments also condemned the action, though not all. The government-controlled South African Broadcasting Corporation said the attack "underlines the commitment the leader of the western world has made to taking positive action against terrorism"; the U.S. was justified in attacking Qaddafi, "whose name is virtually synonymous with international ter- rorism." In Israel, Prime Minister Shimon Peres stated that the U.S. action was clearly justified "in self-defense": "If the Li- byan Government issues orders to murder American soldiers in Beirut in cold blood, in the middle of the night, what do you expect the United States to do? Sing Hallelujah? Or take action in her defense?" The idea that the U.S. was acting in "self-de- fense" against an attack on her forces in Beirut two and a half years earlier is an intriguing innovation, even putting aside the circumstances of that earlier act of "terrorism" against the military forces that much of the population saw as imposing the "New Order" that Israel had sought to establish: the rule of right-wing Christians and selected Muslim elites." In the U.S., Senator Mark Hatfield denounced the U.S. bombing raid "on a nearly deserted Senate floor," and in a let- ter to the Times. Leaders of several major Christian denomina- tions condemned the bombing, but Jewish leaders generally praised it, among them, Rabbi Alexander Schindler, president of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, who "said the U.S. government `properly and vigorously responded' to the `mindless terrorism' " of Qaddafi. Harvard international affairs professor Joseph Nye said Reagan had to respond "to the smoking gun of that Berlin thing. What else do you do about state-supported terrorism?"-such as U.S.-supported terrorism in Central America, for example, where the "smok- ing gun" is considerably more in evidence. Eugene Rostow supported the bombing as part of a "more active defense against the process of Soviet expansion," a step that was "in- evitable and overdue." The "forcible removal of the Qaddafi regime," he explained, "would be fully justified under the existing rules of international law," since he "has flagrantly and continually violated these rules." "That being the case, 32. Associated Press, April 14; survey of world press reaction, Associated Press, April 15; survey of U.S. editorial reaction, April 16; editorial, New York Times, April 15, 1986; Peres, New York Times, April 16. Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 every state injured by Libya's actions has the right, alone or with others, to use whatever force is reasonably necessary to put an end to Libya's illegal behavior. Libya is in the legal po- sition of the Barbary pirates." He urged NATO to "issue a de- claration on the responsibility of states for illegal acts commit- ted from their territory." A .fortiori. then, NATO should con- demn the Emperor, not just the pirate, and states from In- dochina to Central America to the Middle East, among others, should organize to use whatever force is necessary to attack the United States, Israel and other terrorist states." The U.S. bombing of Libya had nothing to do with "ter- rorism," even in the hypocritical western sense of the word. In fact, it was clear enough that the Gulf of Sidra operation and the bombing of Libyan cities would if anything incite such re- tail terrorism, one major reason why the likely targets in Europe pleaded with the U.S. to refrain from such action. This is hardly the first time that violent actions have been ex- ecuted with the expectation that they would incite retail ter- rorism. Consider the U.S.-backed Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, undertaken against the background of persistent U.S.- Israeli refusal to permit a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Is- raeli conflict." After the Israeli- initiated exchange across the Israel-Lebanon border in June 1981 with some 450 Arabs and six Jews killed, the border was "quiet" in the racist terms of American discourse, meaning that there was no PLO response to the many Israeli provocations (including bombing of civilian areas with many killed) undertaken in an effort to elicit a "ter- rorist act" that could be exploited to justify the planned inva- sion. Finally, Israel invaded on a pretext in June 1982, pro- ceeding to destroy the civilian base of the PLO in Lebanon and demolish much of what remained of Lebanese society. The goal was to establish a "New Order" under Israeli domination at least in Lebanon and to secure Israel's integration of the oc- cupied territories. It was clear at once that these acts could only have the effect of inspiring what the West calls "terrorism," and indeed, most terrorism, in the western sense, has since originated in the ruins of Lebanon. The real reason for the 1982 invasion was not the threat to the northern Galilee, as the sanitized history regularly offered to American audiences pretends, but rather the opposite, as was plausibly explained by Israel's leading specialist on the Palestinians, Yehoshua Porath, shortly after the invasion was launched. The decision to invade, he suggests, "flowed from the very fact that the cease-fire had been observed." This was a "veritable catastrophe" for the Israeli government, because it threatened the policy of evading a political settlement. "The government's hope," he continued, "is that the stricken PLO, lacking a logistic and territorial base, will return to its earlier terrorism; it will carry out bombings throughout the world, hijack airplanes, and murder many Israelis," and thus "will lose part of the political legitimacy it has gained" and "under- cut the danger" of negotiations with representative Palesti- nians, which would threaten the policy-shared by both major 33. Associated Press, April 21; New York Times, April 20; survey of religi- ous reactions, Associated Press, April 17; also April 19, reporting a news con- ference of 14 religious and community groups in Seattle condemning the bombing in contrast to support for it by the Western Washington Rabbinic Board; Nye, Boston Globe, April 16; Rostow, New York Times, April 27. 34. On the actual record, very different from the fabrications that dominate U.S. discussion, see Fateful Triangle, chapter 3. For a detailed account of Is- rael's rejectionism under the Labor Party in the crucial 1967-73 period, based on the internal record, see Yossi Beilin, Mechiro steel Ichud (Tel Aviv, 1985); as this and other sources demonstrate, the story goes back to the early days of the founding of the state. political groupings---of keeping effective control over the oc- cupied territories." The plausible assumption of the Israeli leadership was that those who shape public opinion in the United States-the only country that counts, now that Israel has chosen to become a mercenary state serving the interests of its provider-could be counted on to obliterate the actual his- tory and portray the terrorist acts resulting from Israeli aggres- sion and atrocities as random acts of violence ascribable to de- fects in Arab character and culture, if not racial deficiencies. Victims of Israeli bombing of Beirut, 1982. Recent U.S. commentary on terrorism fulfills these natural ex- pectations with some precision. The basic points are understood well enough in Israel. Prime Minister Yitzchak Shamir stated over Israeli television that Is- rael went to war because there was "a terrible danger. . . . Not so much a military one as a political one," prompting the fine Israeli satirist B. Michael to write that "the lame excuse of a military danger or a danger to the Galilee is dead. " We "have removed the political danger" by striking first, in time; now, "Thank God, there is no one to talk to." Other Israeli com- mentators have made essentially the same point. In short, the goals of the war were political, the occupied territories being a prime target. The tale about protecting the border from terrorism is agitprop, eagerly swallowed by the docile western media. If Palestinian terrorism can be revived, so much the better. And if we can't pin the blame on Arafat, he can at least be stigmatized as "the founding father of contem- porary Palestinian violence,""' so that his efforts at political settlement can be evaded. The attack on Libya may also inspire retail terrorism, which will serve to mobilize domestic and for- eign opinion in support of U.S. plans at home and abroad. If Americans react, as they have, by general hysteria, including fear of traveling to Europe where visitors will he at least 100 times as safe as in any American city, this too is a net benefit, for the same reasons. U.S. Escalation Strategy The real reasons for the U.S. attack on Libya have nothing to do with self-defense against "terrorist attacks" on U.S. forces in Beirut in October 1983, as Shinion Peres would have it, or any of the other actions attributed rightly or wrongly to Libya, or "self-defense against future attack" in accord with 35. Ha'aretz, June 25, 1982; see Fateful Triangle, pp. 20(1 I_ for timber quotes and similar analyses by other Israeli commentators, and for a review of the events leading up to the invasion. 36. New Republic, January 20, 1986. Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 the astonishing doctrine proclaimed by the Reagan administra- tion to much domestic acclaim. Libya's terrorism is a minor ir- ritant, but Qaddafi has stood in the way of U.S. plans in North Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere: supporting Polisario and anti-U.S. groups in the Sudan, forging a union with Morocco, intervening in Chad," and in general interfering with U.S. efforts to forge a "strategic consensus" in the region, and to impose its will elsewhere. These are real crimes, which must be punished. Furthermore, the Libyan attack had the purpose, and the ef- fect, of preparing opinion at home and abroad for further acts of U.S. violence. The immediate response might be negative, but once absorbed, the level of expectation is heightened and the U.S. can proceed to further escalation. There are two major areas where such escalation is likely. The first is Central America. While the U.S. proxy army has succeeded in its major task of "forcing [the Sandinistas] to di- vert scarce resources to the war and away from social pro- grams," as explained in a rare moment of candor by adminis- tration officials," it is unlikely that it can "cut out the cancer"; hence the threat of successful independent development in terms that might be meaningful to the suffering population of U.S. client states will remain. Domestic and international pres- sures prevent the U.S. from attacking directly, as the U.S. at- tacked South Vietnam in 1962 and later all of Indochina; and the more indirect means of terror, while largely successful in El Salvador, may be inadequate for Nicaragua. It would be nat- ural, then, for the U.S. to move to an arena where it is more likely to prevail: international confrontation. The U.S. has suc- ceeded in cowing most of its allies into refraining from offering any meaningful assistance to Nicaragua, thus largely achieving the intended goal of forcing them to rely on the Soviet bloc for survival. The recent congressional battle over $100 million of aid is basically a sideshow; a lawless administration will find ways of funding its terrorist army somehow, whatever Con- gress legislates. What is important is a more symbolic victory: congressional authorization for direct CIA involvement and es- calation by other means. The obvious means are threats to Soviet and Cuban shipping. Nicaragua would not be able to re- spond, but the U.S.S.R. and Cuba might. If they do, the U.S. propaganda system can be counted on to react with outrage over this new proof of Communist aggression, allowing the ad- ministration to construct an international crisis in which, it may be assumed, the U.S.S.R. will back down, so that Nicaragua will be effectively blockaded. If they do not respond, the same result will be achieved. Of course, the world may go up in smoke, but that is a minor consideration in comparison with the need to excise the cancer. U.S. and European opinion must be prepared for these eventualities. The bombing of Libya turns the ratchet another notch. The second area where world opinion must be prepared for eventual escalation is the Middle East. The U.S. has blocked political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict at least since 1971, when President Sadat of Egypt made his first proposal for a full peace treaty (offering nothing to the Palestinians, and in almost precise accord with official U.S. policy as well as the 37. The first Libyan intervention followed the dispatch of French Foreign Legion forces, advisers and aircraft (Haley, op. cit., n. 14, p. 98), but French intervention in Africa is legitimate, indeed laudatory; as Business Week exulted, French forces help "keep West Africa safe for French, American, and other foreign oilmen" (August 10, 1981), and perform similar services else- where. 38. Julia Preston, Boston Globe, Feb. 9, 1986. international consensus). In the situation of military contronta- tion that results from U.S.-Israeli rejectionism, Israel cannot permit any combination of Arab states to approach its military power, since it will face the threat of destruction. The Camp David agreements succeeded in excluding the major Arab state, Egypt, from the conflict, thus allowing Israel to expand its steps towards integrating the occupied territories and to at- tack its northern neighbor. But Syria remains a growing threat, and sooner or later, Israel will have to act to eliminate it. There is substantial war talk in Israel today, generally alleging Syrian belligerency and threat, but concealing the Israeli intention- indeed, need, as long as a political settlement is averted-to strike to eliminate a possible military rival. The U.S. media follow along, as usual. Meanwhile, the U.S. government surely wants to leave its options open. It would make sense for an Israeli strike against Syria to be accompanied by U.S. bombing, the former pre- sented as a "pre-emptive strike" in "self-defense against fu- ture attack," the latter packaged for western consumption as "self-defense" against Syrian-inspired terrorism. The purpose of direct U.S. participation would be to warn the Soviet Union that a global war will result from any attempt on their part to support their Syrian ally. European and U.S. opinion must be prepared for such possible moves. The attack on Libya, and the subsequent propaganda campaigns, help set the stage, leaving the U.S. more free to consider these options if they are later deemed necessary. Again, the likelihood of a nuclear war is not small, but the U.S. has shown repeatedly that it is prepared to face this danger to achieve its ends in the Middle East, as elsewhere. ? Angry Libyans at funeral procession in Tripoli, April 18, 1986, for sixteen adults and four children, some of the victims of the U.S. bombing. Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Half a Billion Allocated: The CIA Chooses a New Contra Leader By Ellen Ray, William Schaap, and Louis Wolf There were two fantasies pervading Congress last month; one was the notion that the CIA was not directing the contra forces battling the Sandinista government of Nicaragua; the other was the belief that on/.v$100 million was being approved for that vile and illegal war. CAB has confirmed that both ideas are specious. Controlling the Contras The suggestion that the CIA has been cooling its heels for the past year or two would be fatuous, were it not for the excessive naivete on the part of so many legislators. Less than three weeks after the June 25 vote, the Reagan administration announced that, although the State Department "would have overall policy direction of the operations," the CIA was being given "day-to- day responsibility for managing rebels' military operations against the Nicaraguan government."' One would imagine this was a new assignment for the CIA. But the CIA has a history of avoiding congressional restric- tions, often quite deviously, and the contra war has been no exception. It is interesting, though, that in the case of CIA control of the contras, developments that were reported on the wire services, and in some newspapers, did not get mentioned in the Nest, York Times or the Washington Post, and most readers, and members of Congress, even if they saw the stories, did not understand the implications of what they read. At the outset, there were numerous reports in the press that the CIA had a major role in urging upon the various feuding contra personalities the formation of an umbrella organization, the Unidad Nicaragbense Opositora (UNO). Moreover, in March of this year, amidst allegations of rampant corruption in UNO, the CIA stepped in to control the feuding and the funds. According to an investigation by Robert Parry and Brian Barger of the Associated Press, first reported on April 5, 1986, the UNO appointed a "Secretary General" to coordinate polit- ical and financial operations, to "improve UNO's efficiency and increase the cooperation among the three directors," Adolfo Calero, Arturo Cruz, and Alfonso Robelo-whose bickering, cronyism, and graft were becoming major embar- rassments. Indeed, the UNO was being accused not only of a failure to achieve unity among the anti-Sandinista forces, but also of representing not the Nicaraguan people. but the U.S. government. The latter charge was, and is, particularly true. The news of the creation of the new position was kept quiet, according to the AP's sources, because "admission of existing problems could undercut President Reagan's request for $100 million in military and other aid." As it turned out, of course, neither these problems, nor very credible reports of massive drug dealing, graft, and illegal weapons trading by contra leaders,' had any effect on the Congress. Leonardo Somarriba, Agent The Secretary General is Leonardo Somarriba, an expa- triate Nicaraguan businessman who runs it photocopy store, Sir Speedy, on Brickell Avenue in Miami. The U.S.-educated Somarriba had been a spokesman for the Nicaraguan Business Council, "a group of conservative exiled business leaders'' in Miami. In January the council had privately circulated it paper criticizing in particular the sloppy accounting and record keep- ing of the UNO, defects which led to the February report of the General Accounting Office noting that more than $7 million of the $27 million voted by Congress for ''humanitarian aid" was missing. The next month, Somarriba took over as chief execu- tive officer, and a month later, the AP broke the story. Very few newspapers-and no influential major papers- carried the wire service report. Thus very fcw people learned that: "Several Nicaraguan exiles said Somarriba had it close working relationship with the CIA. Former FDN Nicaraguan Democratic Force, the dominant member of UNO leader Edgar Chamorro said when he was recruited by the CIA into the FDN's directorate in late 1982, Somarriba accompanied it senior CIA official to an initial recruitment meeting in Miami.'' CAB interviewed Chamorro at his home in Key Biscayne. He confirmed the AP report. "Somarriba was with the CIA in Nicaragua," he told us; "he is with the CIA in Miami no) ,\," he continued; "and he has been appointed Secretary General of UNO. That means the CIA is controlling that organiza- tion. . . . It means the CIA wants to control the organization politically, because they already control it militarily, with Ber- mudez and Calero. . . . This appointment means that the exec- utive decision making is in the hands of Americans. . . . the executive control of the group conies from Washington, from the CIA not just Washington, but from the CIA where this man Somarriba has been working very closely with them, that is what I see." During the first year of the Sandinista government, Somar- riba was close to Jorge Salazar, the leader of it business group opposed to the new government. Salazar was killed in November 1980 in a shootout with Sandinista police, who said he was caught with a cache of weapons. Soniarriba was then jailed for several weeks and left for Miami when he was freed. According to Chamorro, Somarriba was not only working fir Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 CIA mystery man Leonardo Somarriba. the CIA while still in Nicaragua, he was also working for Fidel Angel Chavez Mena, the Foreign Minister of El Salvador. Later, according to Chamorro, Somarriba worked for Chavez Mena in El Salvador as well, helping him to channel CIA funds to the 1984 election campaign of Jose Napoleon Duarte. Cha- vez Mena is still a member of Duarte's cabinet. The Chief EXecutive Officer In May Somarriba attended the week-long UNO strategy session in Miami. On Wednesday, May 14, Presidential envoy Philip Habib sat in, and appeared for the press with Calero, Robelo, Cruz, and Somarriba. Somarriba's presence was duly reported by AP, and duly ignored by the New York Times and the Washington Post. The point of all this, of course, is that the CIA, which supposedly does not control the funding of the contras, has installed its agent as the Secretary General in con- trol of the very funds in question. Somarriba's reformist zeal is limited. As he told the AP a few days later (April 13, 1986), "money was used as 'pay- offs,' to encourage support among exiles. Sofne of that is nec- essary," he said, "but we hope to be minimizing it in the fu- ture." From the beginning, Somarriba played down his role. He told the AP reporters that he accepted the characterization of his role as "chief executive officer," and that "better man- agement was needed if UNO was effectively to handle the large amounts of aid that Reagan is requesting." He wanted to create a structure within which the three UNO leaders could work together, but, he said, "I personally have no political ambitions. " CAIB has learned that there are reports of serious disputes between Somarriba and Calero, who has been angry about both the criticism of FDN and the appointment of Somar- riba since the beginning. He, for one, saw Somarriba's ap- pointment as a power shift, because Somarriba, as Chamorro told CAIB, has been identified with the more moderate opposi- tion, "a classic CIA technique." While Cruz and Robelo seem willing to put up with Somarriba, Calero's attitude has been described as "petulant, cocky, rude." Whether Calero's pow- erful position will force some changes remains to be seen. Slippery Language Putting aside the wrath of Calero, Somarriba's role and duties are only enhanced by the new law. While the administration has announced, as expected, that the CIA will oversee day-to-day operations, the law bars U.S. citizens employed by the govern- ment from working with the contras while inside Nicaraguan territory, but explicitly allows the liaison use of non-citizens working for the CIA-known in Agency jargon as Unilaterally Controlled Latino Assets, or UCLAs. (Such chauvinist hypocrisy is not unusual in Congress.) The July 7 issue of Newsweek magazine reported that the CIA has been unusually active recruiting Spanish-speaking agents, and CA/B has learned of such activity in Los Angeles and San Francisco, and in New York and New Jersey. More surprisingly, Newsweek reported that despite the bill's $100 million figure, the CIA "is preparing to provide the rebel forces with covert logistical support, training, communica- tions, and intelligence worth the equivalent of $400 million." The White House spokesperson, Larry Speakes, had "no com- ment." The State Department's representative, Charles Red- man, said, after a day of stonewalling, "The story is wrong." But if anything, the $400 million figure is somewhat mod- est. The CIA has had millions of dollars in special "con- tingency" funds in its contra pipeline ever since it organized the FDN in 1981. These funds have continued to flow through- out the operative periods of the Boland Amendment and other attempts to ban the overthrow of the government of Nicaragua. Congressional Ineptitude The House did not know what hit them this time. Rep. Chal- mers Wylie (Rep.-Ohio), who changed his vote after a lengthy call from the President, admitted he could not name the coun- tries of Central America. After some heavy arm-twisting, the White House won the key vote by the slim margin of 12 votes, 221-209, but there are lingering doubts that many of the mem- bers on the winning side grasped the implications of their votes. Virtually all national opinion polls indicate that a sub- stantial majority of the citizenry is opposed to the overthrow of the Nicaraguan government, and that they strenuously oppose the introduction of U.S. military personnel into the conflict, something Congress refused to prohibit in the bill which passed. Shortly before the final vote, Rep. David Obey (Dem.- Wisc.) tried to warn his colleagues: "If anybody really be- lieves this little war that will be conducted under the adminis- tration policy will be a minor, little pop-gun affair, I urge you, I beg you, to read the classified annex to this legislation which will describe in detail what kind of equipment and what kinds of activities will be carried out if the administration program prevails." Terrorism Wins Obey's warnings ran up against a stone wall. Soon the vot- ing was over. At a CIA-choreographed press conference, the victorious contra leaders brushed aside reporters' questions about allegations of continuing wholesale torture, murder, cor- ruption, and drug dealing. Cruz, Robelo, and Calero posed in "I'm a Contra Too" tee-shirts and vowed, "Now that Ameri- ca is behind us, we will win." A few days later, on July 5, President Reagan outdid himself. Of the vote to give $100 mil- lion to a band of brutal terrorists, he said, "I'm sure it put a smile on the face of the Statue of Liberty." ? Number 26 (Summer 1986) Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP9O-00845ROO0100170003-6 Index to CRIB Numbers 13 - 25 Compiled by Daniel Brandt. A Aaby, Peter 1843 Aaron, David 1310 Aaron, Harold A. 17:40 ABC newspaper (Spain) 18:13 ABC-TV 1648: 17:32,41,46 Abdallah, Ahmed 167 Abramowitz, Morton I. 1732 Abrams, Elliott 18:3-4,17: 20:6 Abs. Hermann J. 25:35 Abshire, David M. 14-15:3 Abzug, Bella 13:50 Accuracy in Media 13:48; 1627: 19:7,16: 22:31: 24:36 "Inaccuracy in Media: Accuracy in Media Rewrites the News and History" (Wolf) 21:24-38 Acheson, Dean G. 21:24 Ackerman, Mike E.C. 17:48 Acosta, Jorge 16:15 Acropolis Books 2126 Adams, Hank 24:20-21 Adams, Ian S. Portrait of a Spy 13:51 Adams. Nathan M. 19:10 Adams, Tom 16:16: 20:6-7,13-14 Adenauer, Konrad 25:6,27 Aderholt, Harry C. "Heinie" 18:48-50: 22:33: 25:37,52.56 Adkins, James Lee 14-15:7 Afghanistan 17:13,17 CIA in 14-152-3 Africa see also Southern Africa "Reagan and Africa: The Empire Strikes Back" 1334-36: resources for organizing 13:50-51: 17:47; 23:40 Africa News 13:50 Africa Now 13:20 Africa Report 13:13 Africa World Press Beirut' Frontline Story 1935 African National Congress 13:5,29-30.36; 18:54,56,62; 22:39 African-American Institute 13:13 African-American Labor Center 18:53 Afriyue-Asie 13:50-51 Agca, Adrian 23:10 Agca, Mehmet Ali 18:12-13: 19:13-21; 21:20; 23:3- 38; 25:30 Agee, Philip B. 14-15:4-5,12,14; 16:18,24,35; 17:28,47; 18:22,53; 19:7,33-34: 20:19: 21:34 "The Journalist Spy: A Friendly Interview" 19:33-34 Agent Orange 17:7; 18:58; 21:29-30 Aggett Neil 18:55; 19:22 Agnew, Spiro T. 21:29 Aguirre, Horacio 16:36 Ahmad, Feroz 19:19: 23:11,38 Ainsworth, Kathy 16:46 Air America, Inc. 16:51; 18:47,58; 20:27,40 Air Asia 20:40 Air Commando Association 22:33; 25:37,52-53,56 Aitken. Robert D. 14-15:7 Aivaiov, Todor 23:9,22-23 see also 1917 Aker, Frank 18:60 Akins, John 17:32 Akinyele (American in Grenada) 20:9 Alabama National Guard 22:18-19 Alabama Power Company 21 28 Albano (Italian prosecutor) 23:4,9,_24,20,3314,17 38 Albrecht, William, Jr. 24:28 Albright, Cliff 22:18-19 Alejos Arzu, Roberto 2530 Alexander, Brian 16:54 Alexiev, Alex 22:31 Alexis, Francis 2020 Algeria. CIA in 14-15:14 Alibux, Errol 20:6 Allavena, Giovanni 25.15 Allegrett Perez, Jose Ivan 22 13 Allen, Charles 2528 Allen, Richard V. 13:7.9: 16:5-6,57; 1749, 18:15 Allende, Beatriz 21.31 Allende, Salvador 16:37; 19:25-27,31; 20:3; 21:25,31 Allied Educational Foundation 21:28,35,37 Allied Trades Council 21:3536 Allis-Chalmers Company 13.5 Alpha 66 18:3; 21:3; 22:41 Altmann, Klaus (pseud.) 25.8-10,16-17 Alvarez Martinez, Gustavo Adolli, 18:8,27 2_8,111, 20:34,38; 2219,25-26 Alvaro de Portillo, General 18.12 Alvez Pacheco, Ludwig 25:19 Ambeva, Edward 1712 Ambros, Otto 25:28 American AfroAsian Educational Exchange. Inc 2215 American Association tilt the Advanccnunt of Science 16:11 American Bar Association Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP9O-00845ROO0100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Committee on Law and National Security 24:35 El Salvador: The Face of the Revolution 17:47 (Cody) 17:37-42 American-Chilean Council 22:15 Armstrong, William L. 22:31,33 Baron, Murray 21:24-27,32,35-38 American Civil Liberties Union 14-15:5; 22:3 Arnaldo, Prince 25:36 Bare, Raymond 25:38 American Committee for Aid to Katanga Freedom Arnold, Daniel Clay 17:32,34-35; 18:48-50; 22:33 BA)'?RIC'ADA International 21:40 Fighters 22:15 Amson, Cynthia 13:44 Barris, Paul 16:7 American Committee for Liberation from Arocena Perez, Eduardo Victor 22:35 Barton, John 19:7: 21:35; 23:29 Bolshevism 25:33 Arriba 18:13 Batlrow, Errol 20:13 American Conservative Union 21:26 Arron, Henck A.E. 18:63 Balton, Ramon 24:31-33 American Continental Corporation 21:28 Arrow Air 20:20 Batjzani, Mustafa 18:22 American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Arrupe, Pedro 18:12 Basov, Nikolai G. 24:29 Foreign Service 18:51 Arthur, David Bates, Brian 16:54 American Enterprise Institute 16:56; 18:6; 21:29; Constantine Menges: CIA Ideologue" 16:22-23 Batt, J.D. 17:38,41 22:5; 24:35 Aryan Nations 24:3 , Charles H. 16:58 B American Financial Corporation Foundation 21:28 Ashbrook, John 14-15:5; 16:27 t Ba han, Kudret 23:14 American Foreign Policy Institute 25:32 Ashby, Timothy 20:17 Be rden, Milton A. 14-15:11-12 American Friends Service Committee 18:51 Ashworth, Jim 20:19 Be kmann, Petr 21:35-36 American Indian Movement 18:24; 24:16-21 Asia, resources for organizing 13:51 Be kwith, Byron de la 16:46 American Institute in Taiwan 16:56 Asia Resource Center 23:40 Beebe, Michael 24:32 American Institute for Free Labor Development Asian Peoples Anti-Communist League 22:15 Begin, Menachem 20:35,37; 23:16 (AIFLD) 13:45; 16:22-23; 18:6; 20:4; 21:37; Asian Speakers Bureau 25:30 Behrhorst, Carroll 18:37 25:28,34 Aspinall, Edward 18:62 Behrhorst Foundation 18:37,39 American Legion 13:7 Associated Press 18:4-5; 19:34 Belaonte, Harry 24:23 American Liberty League 25:23-24 Association for Cultural Freedom 16:53 Belgium, CIA in 14-15:7 American Medical Association 21:28 Association of Former Intelligence Officers 20:37; Bell, Daniel 18:13 American Security Council 13:2,12; 18:24; 21:31,37; 24:35-36 Bell, Griffin 13:50 21:25,37; 22:33; Association for International Development Bellant, Russ 25:37,52 25:32,51 (Australia) 16:51 Belmonte, Giuseppi 23:21,26 American Security Council Foundation 19:31 Astiz, Alfredo 16:14-15; 17:3 Belmundo, Jose Ricardo 13:16-17 American Telephone and Telegraph 16:22 Astorga, Nora 20:39 Bender, Jay (pseud.) 19:34 American University (Cairo) 13:55 Atkins, Edwin Franklin 14-15:8 Bendetsen, Karl Robin 21:27,29 Americans for Indian Opportunity 18:24 Atkinson, Don 20:14 Benson, Paul 24:26-28 Americares Foundation 25:35-37,53 Atlantic Community 23:27 Bentsen, Lloyd M. 17:48: 1931; 20:4 Americas Watch 18:24 Attiyeh, Richard 17:49 Berenger, Paul 16:4 Amnesty International 16:15; 18:37,55; 21:15; Auberlin, Irene 18:48-50 Berenguer, Rafael 13:18-19 23:28; 25:21 Augsburg, Emil 25:8-10 Bermudez, Enrique V. 18:9 Disappearances: A Workbook 13:51; Torture in Austin, Hudson 20:5,9-10,13,39 Bernard, Joseph Charles 14-15:8 the Eighties 21:39 Australasian and Pacific Holdings, Ltd. 16:51 Bernard, Tom 20:41 Anagnostakis, Yiannis 25:48 Australia Bernays, Edward 19:4-5 Anagnostakis, Yiorgios 25:48 "The Australian Connection: Nugan Hand, the Berns, Walter 22:5 Andalien (Chile) 16:42 CIA Bank" (Grodin) 16:51-55; ASIO Bornstein, Carl 18:14 Anderson, Christopher Billy 13:25; 16:45-46 (intelligence agency) 16:53; Federal Bureau of Bertrand Russell Tribunal 25:21 Anderson, Jack 13:50; 16:25-26; 17:32,37,39,41- Narcotics 16:54 Betancur, Belisario 18:60 42,50; 18:64; 19:7; 20:28,44; 21:31,34,44; 22:32; Axioti, Melpo 25:44 Bethlehem Steel Corporation 21:28 25:32,50 Ay, Omer 19:18; 23:24 Better Business Bureau 21:26-27 Anderson, Jon Lee 22:32-33 Ayvazov, Todor 19:17 see also Aivozov, Todor Beyer, Joel H. 14-15:12 Anderson, Thomas P. 18:28 23:9, 22-23 Bianchi, Francisco 18:34 Andrews, Don 13:25; 16:44,47 Biko, Steve 18:55 Andronov Iona 23:30-31 Billings, Robert J. 13:7 , Andropov, Yuri 19:14; 21:20 B biological warfare see chemical and biological war- Angelini, Fiorenzo 25:31 Baader-Meinhof Group 24:5 fare Angleton, James Jesus 13:30; 18:12 Bacon, George III 17:45; 22:13,16 Bish, Milan 20:9 25:13-14,31-33,36 Bad Heart Bull, Sarah 24:20 Bishop, Maurice 16:21; 18:63; 19:31-32; 20:3-6,10- Angola 13:6,12,21,35,38; 22:37-40 Bagci, Omer 19:18; 23:12 13,21,24,39; 22:3,34,35 "Angola: Pretoria's Continuing War" 16:11-12; Bain, Fitzroy 20:11,21 Bissell, Richard 13:52 CIA in 18:53; 22:10,13,38; COMIRA 16:12; Bain, Noel 20:11,21 Bitterman, Chester Allen III 18:41,43 FNLA 13:10,16-17; 21:25; MPLA 13:16,32,38; Bains, Jim 16:49 Bittman, Ladislav 16:27; 19:5 19:7,32; UNITA 13:8-10,12,16-18,3I,34-35,38; Baker, Donald 24:21 Bizos, George 18:55 16:12; 18:53; 19:32; 21:25,42; 22:4,38,40 Baker, Howard, Jr. 17:13 Black, Edwin F. 16:52 Annenberg, Walter H. 21:29 Bamburg, James R. 17:8,11 Black, Ian 23:16 Anti-Apartheid Movement Bamford, James Black International 25:17-18 Anti-Apartheid News 13:51 The Puzzle Palace (review) 18:57-58 Black Legion 25:23 Anti-Imperialist Tribunal of Central America and Ban the Soviets Coalition 21:3 Black Liberation Army 24:5 the Caribbean (Soberania) 16:3; 1747 Banca Privata 25:35 Black Panther Party 13:50; 20:3 Antonov, Mrs. 23:25,34 Banco Ambrosiano 23:19-20; 25:34-35 Black, Stephen Don 13:24,27; 16:44-47 Antonov, Sergei Ivanov 19:17,22-24; 21:20-21; Banda, Hastings 13:31 Blackburn, Norman 13:20 23:3-4,9,18,23-26,32,34-37; 25:30 Bangladesh, CIA in 14-15:7 Blacks for Reagan 21:36 Apple, R.W. Jr. 19:24; 23:38 Bank of America 16:22; 21:18 Blackstone Rangers (Chicago) 24:5 Aquash, Anna Mae Pictou 24:17,19-21,24,27 Bank for International Settlements 25:24 Blanton, Walter "Cisco" 22:19 Aquino, Benigno 20:39 Banks, Dennis 24:20,22-24,28-29 Blatty, William Peter 16:38 Araujo, Richard 22:31 Banks, John 13:53-54; 17:50,52 Blewett, Jane V. 18:51 Arazi, Yehuda 20:36 Banzer Plan 18:17 Bloch, Jonathan Arce Gomez, Luis 25:18,20 Baraona Urzua, Pablo 18:14 "The Militarization of BOSS" 13:30-33; "The Arellano, John G. 24:21 Barasch, George D. 21:35-37 Passport Racket: Papers for Cash" 13:20-21 Arens, Moshe 20:37 Barbados 16:16; 17:47; 20:4-7,13 Bloch, Jonathan and Fitzgerald, Patrick Argen Information Services 13:20-21 Barbie, Klaus 25:2,5-10,15-20 British Intelligence and Covert Action 23:44 Argentina "Klaus Barbie: A Killer's Career" (Hermann) Blome, Kurt 25:26 "Argentina Activates International Death 25:15-20 Bloomingdale, Alfred S. 17:49 Squads" (Ray) 16:14-16; AAA (Anti-Communist Barettella, Mark B. 20:14 Boehringer Company 25:8 League) 23:18; advisors in Central America Barger, Sonny 17:42 Boettcher, Robert 20:38 16:3,14-16; 18:8; SIE (intelligence agency) 25:18 Barmine, Alexander 19:24 Bogdanich, Walt (and Frolik and Jensen) Arias, Monsignor 18:17 Barnard, Neil 13:32-33 "The CIA Ties of World Medical Relief"18:47- Arkin, William M. Barnes, Michael 16:19 51 Research Guide to Current Military and Strategic Barnes, Scott T. Boidock, John 18:56 Affairs 17:47 "Agent Exposes Secret Mission" 17:32-33; Bokassa, Salah al-Din Ahmed 13:31 arms sales 13:15; 20:34-37 "Excerpts from CAIB-Scott Barnes Interview" Bolan, Thomas 25:38 Armstrong, Robert and Janet Shenk 1733-36; "Scott Barnes: Spook or Spoof?" Bolivia 18:44-45 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Bolivia Joven 25:18, CIA in 14-15:7: 25:19-20: Bulletin Info-Turk 17:47 Chile Netcc/eper 23:40 Nazis in 25:15-20 Bulletin lithe Atomic Scientists 25:7.23 ('aselton, Peter 18:62 Bolton, Pete 17:25 Bumpers, Dale 17:24 Casey. William Joseph 13:7.9.52,56: 14153.14. Bonassoli, Aldo 21:42 Burchett, Wilfred 16:2,22-2326,30,57: 17:50, 188,1(/,15,56. Bonner, Raymond 16:17: 21:13,32-33 The China-Cambodia-Vietnam Triangle 21:39 19:37: 20:3.524. 215 6.29: 21:2- 3,7,'7,35 39, Boone, Pat 18:64 Burck, Gordon 1719 25:13,27,37 Borge, Tomas 16:20: 19:28: 20:30: 21:4: 22:27 Burgess, Dwight Spaulding 13:48 Cassin, Rene 2142_ Borghese, Valerio 25:14,31,34 Burgstaller, Eugen F. 14-15:8 Castillo, Nestor 1712 Bormann, Martin 25:4,11,17 Burnett-Alleyne, Sydney 13:24 Castle and Cooke 21:18 Bornemisza, Geza 25:34 Burnham, Forbes 20:13 Castro, Fidel 16:2_5: 18:68: 19?.5.9.11,26,31,38, Bosch, Orlando 16:20: 2241 Burns, Arthur F. 13:50 2021-22: 2 1 : 3 7 : 22X 15 Bosco Vivas, Bishop 18:17 Burt, Richard R. 13:6: 17:8-11,23-24 Castro. Raul 19:9-I0 Botha, Pik W. 13:8-9,14,30-32,36-41: 18:53 Burton, Joseph Alfred 24:5 Casusc, Larry 24:2)) Botha, Roelof 13:12,14,37-41 Burundi, CIA in 14-15:7 Catholic Action 25:31-33 Botnick, A.I. 16:46 Bush, George 16:35: 17:13: 18:56: 19:8,10.29,31: Cato Institute 18:14 Bouchey, Lynn Francis 22:31-33 20:3,14,24: 23:16: 25:35 CAUSA International 203839: 230.32: 24:34: Bourne, Geoffrey 20:8-10 Bush, Prescott 25:35 2519-20 Bourne. Peter G. 20:5,8-9 Butcher, Willard Carlisle 21:29 CAUSA USA 22:33: 2434 Bouterse, Desi 18:63: 20:6 Butler, Darelle Dean ''Dino'' 24:23-25,29 CAUSA World Services 24:34 Bowdler, William P. 13:44: 16:22 Butler, Larry 22:31 Cavallero, Roberto 23:17 Bowers, Samuel Holloway 16:46 Butler, Smedley Darlington 25:24,30 CBS Corporation 16.48. 21,14 Boyce, Christopher John 16:53 Byelorussian Central Council 25:52 CBS News 2129 Boyd, David 2430-33 Cekada, Anthony 2536 Bo er Daniel 21:42 Celehi, Musa Cedar 19:18: _2324 y , Brackman, Arnold C. 16:39 C Cc cc, Frederick 17 9-10 Brady, Nicholas F. 25:30 Cable News Network 24:36 Celenk, Bekir 23:6.14 Braunberg, Rudolf 20:40 Cable Splicer 24:8-9 C'clik, Oral 23:9,11-12.2_2-24.36 Bravo, lose Ernesto 18:19 Calero, Adolfo 22:27: 25:51,53 Center of Concern 18:51 Brazil 18:46 Calero, Mario 22:19,32 Center for Constitutional Rights I8:1)) CIA in 14-15:7: DOPS (intelligence agency) California Specialized Training Institute 24:6-7,9 Fight the Right 1351: The Senate Suhconuniticc 2521 Calisher, Charles 17:30-31 on Security and Terrorism I3.5I Brazil, torture in Callaway, Howard H. 17:18 Ccntcr for Defense Inli,rmatiun 1719 -. 'In Brazil the Women Boast About Their Callejas Deshon, Alfonso 22:19 Center for Development Policy 18:25 Plastic Surgery' '' (Cohen) 25:21-22 Callis. Jerry J. 17:17 Center for International Policy 1343 Brennan, Earl 25:31 Calloway, Howard ''Bo'' 1718 Center for Research and Documentation of the Brennan, Joseph 25:35 Calvi, Roberto 23:19-20: 25:34 Atlantic Coast (CIRCA) Brewster, Robert George 14-15:10 Cambodia 1712 Trahil Nasa Ilisturira) Baek,wnund and ('urrs'rtt Brezhnev, Leonid 21:19-20 Cameroon, CIA in 14-15:7 Situation oil the Atlantis' Coasf o/ Nis'alagua Brigade 2506 25:51 Campaign for Political Rights 23:39: Waits 2339 Briggon, Barry Francis 22:17 Bugs, Taps and Infiltrators: What to 1)o About Center for Strategic and International Studies Bright, Bill 18:34 Political Spring 13:51 13:2,13,53: 14-15:3. 18:15,63, 23:2_9,32_. _24:36 Brink, Pfaff and Partners 18:62 Campbell, Duncan 20:40 Central African Republic. CIA in 13:47 Britain see United Kingdom Campbell, Lumberto 22:29 Central America Brodhead, Frank 23:37-38 Camper. Franklin Joseph 13:23,27: 1645,49 "Central America Ignites: The U.S. Order of "Darkness in Rome: The 'Bulgarian Connection' Campos Menendez, Enrique 18:15 Battle'' (Klepper) 13:42-46. "Washington's Revisited" 23:3-38: "The KGB Plot to Campus Crusade for Christ 18:34 Proxy: Israeli Arms in Central America" Assassinate the Pope: A Case Study in Free Canada (Lusane) 20:34-37: resources for orgauring World Disinformation" 19:13-24 CIA in 13:47: Royal Canadian Mounted Police 13:51: 17:47: 21:39-41: 23:39-40,44 Brodie, Ben 19:36 13:50-51: 18:60: 19:35 Central America Resource Ccntcr Broman, Barry M. 14-15:8-9 Candia, Alfredo 25:17 Central Arm'ris'a Bulletin 23:4)1: Central -I mrr ra Brooks, William 18:50 Capell, Frank A. 25:36 Writers Bulletin 21:41: Dirernerv of Central Bross, John A. 25:10 Capital Legal Foundation 21:26 Ame'riea Organizations _2339 Brown, Harold 17:24-25 Capps, Fred, Jr. 17:38 Central American Defense Council 20:525-26,28: Brown, Jerry 24:23-24 Carballo, Bismarck 18:4,18-20 216 Brown, Robert Kenneth 22:12-24 Carbone, Emilio 25:17-18 Central American historical Institute ''Soldier of Fortune's Robert K. Brown'' Carboni. Flavio 23:20 IENVIO 2139 (Churchill) 22:12-21 Cardenal, Ernesto 20:39 Central Intelligence Retirees Association 21 34 Brown, Sam 13:53 Cardenas Mallo, Manuel 25:19-20 Centro Bcllarmino 18:17 Brownfeld, Allan C. 21:36-37: 22:31 Caribbean Basin Report 21:40 Centronics Data ('otnputcr Corporation 13:5_2,56: Brzezinski, Zhigniew 17:23: 19:24: 23:16,27,32,27- Caribbean, resources for organizing 17:47 16:57 28,32 Caribbean Community (Caricom) 20:7 Cerna, Lenin 1819 Buchanan, John H. Caribbean Educational Association 21:36 Cerra, Ronald 1.. 14-15.7 "Congressional Testimony: The Prospects of Caribbean Publishers and Broadcasters Association Chafee. John H. 16:56 War Between Honduras and Nicaragua" 18:25- 19:31 Chatfanpon, Arnaud and Flavigny, Bertrand 28 Caribbean Southern Corporation 13:25-27 Galimard Buchanan, Patrick J. 18:4: 21:38 Caritas Internationalis 25:13 Ordres it Contre-Ordrs's de (he'valeris' IS: Its Bucher, Lloyd 21:36 Carl Byoir & Associates 1934 Chalfont, Allen 225 Buckley, James L. 16:20: 18:15: 25:27 Carlos Pel'legrini Foundation 16:15 Chamberlain, Greg 2)) 21) Buckley, Priscilla Langford 25:38 Carlucci, Frank C. 16:31 Chamberlain, William Henry 2533 Buckley, William F. 18:4,14-15: 19:22,27.31: Carmichael, Stokley 24:16 Chambers, George 20.13 2044: 21:31: 22:15: 25:27,38 Carpenter, Colonel 13:17 Chamorro, Edgar 25:51 Buell, Edgar ''Pop'' 18:48 Carr, Steven 25:51 Chamorro, Fernando 2079: 1:19 Buendia, Manuel 22:2 Carrigan, Ana Charnorro, Pedro Joaquin, Jr. 16:35 La CIA en Mexico 22:2 "Salvador Witness: The Life and Calling of Jean Chamorro, Ruben J- 16:15 But-etc International 13:20-21 Donovan" 23:44 Champion International Corporation 21 27 Bufkin, David Floyd 22:16-17 Carrington, Lord 13:13 Champion Spark Plug Company _2128 Buitrago. Ann Mari and Immerman, Leon Andrew Carroll, Earl H. 24:14 Chancellor, John 2133 Are You Nom, or Have You Ever Been in the FBI Carry, Howard F. 25:30 Chandler, Robert W- 21 I5 Files:' 13:51 Carter. Billy 23:20 Chancy. Verne 25:52 Bukovsky, Vladimir 22:5 Carter, Hodding 17:23 Chapin, Frederick 18 14 Bulgaria, and shooting of Pope Carter, Jimmy 19:37: 23:27: 2436 Charles, Ed 17:48 "Darkness in Rome: The 'Bulgarian Connection' Carthage Foundation 21:27-28 Charles. Eugenia 13:22,_24 26 27. 16:44 45.48,50, Revisited" (Brodhead, Friel and Herman) 23:3- Carto, Willis 25:32,34,36 20:5,15 38: ''The KGB Plot to Assassinate the Pope: A Carver, George 13:52 Charles, Hubert 1647 Case Study in Free World Disinformation" Casa Oscar Romero 24:13 Chase Manhattan Bank _ 1 29: 25:24-25.30 (Brodhead and Herman) 19:13-24 Casa Chile Chavez, Lydia 21.11 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP9O-00845ROO0100170003-6 chemical and biological warfare 17:2-31; 18:58-59; Citizens For America 25:50 Conservative Caucus 20:17; 22:30-31 21:29-30; 22:16,35; 25:3,7,26: see also Agent Ciuntu, Chirila 25:52 Conservative Political Action Conference 22:30 Orange, Yellow Rain Civil Air Transport 20:40 Consultants International, Inc. 25:32 "Sources and Methods: Germ Warfare Civilian Military Assistance 22:2,6,8,18-19,31; Contact Group 13:5-8,12-13,39 Disinformation" (Lawrence) 16:60,58; "The 25:51 Control Data Corporation 20:33 History of U.S. Bio-Chemical Killers" Civilian Refugee Military Assistance 22:19 Coogan, Kevin 25:52 (Lawrence) 17:5-7; "The Pentagon's Other Clair, William Joseph 13:47 Coors Foundation, Adolph 21:28 Option" (Wolf) 17:8-25; "U.S. Biological Claris, Babis 25:48 Copley News Service 16:35 Warfare: The 1981 Cuba Dengue Epidemic" Claris, Thanassis 25:48 Corbett, Jim 24:13 (Schaap) 17:28-31;in Afghanistan 17:13,17,28; Clark, Dick 13:10 Corbridge, Leith 21:37 in Cuba 17:28-31; 22:35; in Korea 17:6-7; in Clark, General Mark W. 25:31 Cornwall, Rupert Laos 17:12 Clark, Jim 24:3 God's Banker 23:38 Chemical Research Foundation, Inc. 21:36 Clark, Mark 24:20,26; 25:54 corporate interests, in Latin America 21:18 Cherenkov, Pavel A. 24:29 Clark, William P. 16:57; 18:15; 20:8,24 Corrigan, James Lawrence 14-15:7 Cherne, Leo 23:27 Clarke, Oliver 16:35 Corson, William R. 19:37-38 Chervasi, Frank 25:45 Clarke, Philip C. 21:37 CORU 16:20 Chevron 21:28-29 Clarke, Terrence 16:54 Corydon, Jeff 111 13:47 Chey, Edward Entero 25:52 Clarkson, Fred Costa Rica 13:46 Cheysson, Claude 22:29; 25:28 "Behind the Supply Lines" 25:56,50-53; and Israel 20:37; Contras in 18:8-9; 21:5 Chiang Kai-Shek 21:35 .' 'Privatizing' the War" 22:30-33; "Arnaud de Council Against Communist Aggression 21:26 Chigi, Prince 25:27 Borchgrave Boards Moon's Ship" 24:34-35 Council for the Defense of Freedom 21:26; 22:31 Childs, Jack 19:38 Clarridge, Duane R. "Dewey" 25:51 Council for a Free Asia 22:31 Childs, Morris 19:38 Clay, Lucius 1). 25:8 Council for Inter-American Security 16:15; Chile 13:12 Clements, Charles 21:11,40 22:31,33 "CIA Media Operations in Chile, Jamaica, and Witness to War: An American Doctor in El Council on Hemispheric Affairs 18:35 Nicaragua" (Landis) 16:32-43; CIA in 16:42-43; Salvador 23:44 Human Rights in Latin America: 1983 21:39 18:14-15; 21:31,34; 24:37; 25:5; DINA Cleveland Plain Dealer 18:47 counter gangs see pseudo gangs (intelligence agency) 18:14; resources for Clinard, David M. 17:11 counterfeiting organizing 23:40 Cline, Ray S. 16:53; 19:37-38; 21:26; 22:24; "Economic Destabilization: The Counterfeit Chile la Verdad 21:25 23:16,32; 24:35 Kwanzas" 13:21; "The Passport Racket: Papers China, CIA in 14-15:7 Coalition for a Democratic Majority 18:6; 23:16 for Cash" (Weir and Bloch) 13:20-21 Chindgren, Marvin H. 14-15:12 Coalition for Peace Through Strength 21:37; 22:33; counterinsurgency, theory and practice of 23:44; Chivite, Alcido Marcos 13:28 25:32 24:3-5 Chomsky, Noam 17:47 Coalitions for America 22:31 CounterSpy magazine 19:34 Chou En-Lai 20:39 Coard, Bernard 20:5,9-13 Courtney, William P. 22:19 Christian Anti-Communism Crusade 25:38 Coard, Phyllis 20:5,10 Couvaras, Costa G. 25:44,48 Christian Broadcasting Network 18:35,39; 22:32; Cockburn, Alexander 20:12,41; 22:31 Covington, Harold 13:25 25:37-38,53 CODEL 18:51 Coward, Fred 24:28 Christian Patriots Defense League 13:27; 22:22; Cody, Edward 20:7 Cox, Ronald L. 16:47 25:53 Cody, Kevin Craig, David 16:47 Christian Science Monitor 23:4-5 "Scott Barnes: Spook or Spoof?" 17:37-42 Craig Foundation, E.L. 21:28 Christie, Stuart Cohen, Pamela 21:40 Crane, Kent B. 16:54 Stefano Delle Chiaie: Portrait of a Black Cohen, Robert Cranston, Alan 13:53 Terrorist 22:44,41-42; 23:38; 25:31,36 " 'In Brazil the Women Boast About Their Crawford, John 22:20 Churba, Joseph 16:57 Plastic Surgery' " 25:21-22 Craxi, Bettino 23:19,35 Church of the Complete Word 18:34 Cohn, Roy M. 19:8; 25:38 Creel, George 19:3-4 Church, Frank 13:50; 18:58; 21:33; 23:27 COINTELPRO see FBI Creft, Jacqueline 20:11,17,21 Church World Service 18:51 Colby, William Egan 13:49,52; 16:35,53; 17:52; Crewdson, John 21:32 Churchill, Ward 18:12; 19:8,37; 20:9; 22:4 Critchfield, James H. 24:40 "Correction" 25:54; "Sidebar" 24:29; "Soldier Coleman Foundation 21:28 Crocker, Chester A. 13:7,12-13,34-41; 16:12,25; of Fortune's Robert K. Brown" 22:12-21; "The Coler, Jack R. 24:25,29 22:40 Covert War Against Native Americans" 24:16- Colombia 18:41,44-46 "Crocker and the CIA" 13:13 21; "The Strange Case of 'Wild Bill' Janklow" M-19 movement 18:41; Movement for the Crocker, Gary 17:20 24:22-24 Defense of National Culture 18:41 Cromwell Research Foundation 21:36 Churchill, Winston 17:6; 25:13,40,44-45 Colt Industries 13:15 Cronkite, Walter 21:30,32,34 CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) Commentary 18:6; 19:8 Cronwright, Arthur 18:55 and broadcasting 19:6; 23:27; and Khrushchev's Committee for a Free Afghanistan 21:37; 22:31 Crossette, Barbara 20:10 speech 19:37-38; and mercenaries 22:6,10; and Committee for a Free World 24:35 Crouch Paul 19:24 Nazis 25:9-14; and publishing 19:6-7; and Committee to Help the FBI 21:34 Crowley, Patrick E. 25:30 religion 18:2-6,11-20,34-51,66,68; and sniffer Committee of One Million 21:25 Crozier, Brian Rossiter 13:4-5; 21:37; 23:16-17; planes scandal 21:42; and torture 25:22; and Committee on the Present Danger 23:16,32 25:38 weather modification 17:30; estimates of Soviet Committee on Public Information (1917) 19:3-4 Cruz, Arturo J. 1632,41-42; 22:29 arms expenditures 14-15:3; 21:14; Operation Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Cruz, Jesus 24:14-15 Black Moon 22:28; Operation CHAOS 13:3; 14- Salvador (CISPES) Cuba 15:4; 16:30-31; 24:2,4; Operation MKNAOMI El Salvador Alert 16:17; 21:41 "U.S. Biological Warfare: The 1981 Cuba 17:16; 25:3; Operation MKULTRA 13:3; 14- Committee on South African War Resistance Dengue Epidemic" (Schaap) 17:28-31; CIA in 15:4; 16:38; 17:14-16,28; 25:3; Operation Resister 13:51 13:21; 21:40; 22:35 MONGOOSE 18:68; 19:3; Project Resistance Commodity Trading Company 19:36 Cubillos, Heman 18:14 24:4; recruiting 17:49 Communione e Liberazione (Italy) 16:42 Cummings, Richard CIA, agents Communist Workers Party 13:25; 24:30-31,33 The Pied Piper: Allard K. Lowenstein and the "Where Are They Now?" (Wolf) 16:56-57 Comoros 16:6-7 Liberal Dream 23:44 CIA, and assassinations 22:8 Compton, John 20:10 Cummings, Sam 20:15 "Sources and Methods: CIA Assassinations-Part computer privacy 23:41 Cunningham, Myrna 18:10 III" (Lawrence) 17:52,50; "Sources and computers 25:3 Curie], Henri 19:15-16 Methods: CIA Assassinations--Part IV" Conason, Joe 25:28,52 Currie, Lauchlin 25:25 (Lawrence) 20:44,39 Condeca see Central American Defense Council Cushing, Henry B. 17:44 Ciba-Geigy Corporation 21:28 Conex, Inc. 18:36 Cyprus, CIA in 14-15:7-8 Ciegler, Alex 17:11-12 Conference of U.S. Catholic Bishops 18:11,20,37 Cyrus, Stanley 19:31 Cienfuegos, Camilo 22:15 Congo, CIA in 21:40 Citicorp 21:28 16:28 James B Conkling Cities Service 13:6,35 . , Conn, Stephen L. 14-15:14 D Citizens Committee for a Free Cuba 21:25 Connally, John B. 13:7; 16:45 Dada, Hector 18:25 Citizens Committee for Freedom in the Americas Connor, Eugene "Bull" 24:3 Daddario, Emilio Quincy 25:12,14 18:6 Consejo Superior de Investigacion Cientifica 18:14 Dahl, Kenneth 24:20 Citizens Committee for Peace with Freedom in Conservative Alliance 22:33 Dahmer, Vernon 16:46 Vietnam 21:25 Conservative Book Club 24:36 Daily Gleaner (Jamaica) 16:32-38,42-43; 19:31- Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP9O-00845ROO0100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 32,36; 24:38 Daily Telegraph (London) 13:48 Dale Carnegie School 1834 Dallas Times Herald 24:I3 D'Amato, Alfonse 19:8-I1; 20:8-9 Africa) 13:33 disinformation 19:2; 21:41; 24:35-38 "CIA Media Operations in Chile, Jamaica, and Nicaragua" (Landis) 16:32-43; "Deceit and Secrecy: Cornerstones of U.S. Policy" (Schaap) D'Amato, Anthony 20:18 16:24-31; "Disinformation and Mass Deception: Danet, Olivier 16:7 Democracy as a Cover Story" (Preston and Ray) Daniels, Jerrold Barker 17:33 19:3-12; "Sources and Methods: Germ Warfare "Yellow Rain Skeptic Found Dead" (Ray) Disinformation" (Lawrence) 16:60.58 17:43-46 disinformation, on American Indian Movement Danish, Paul 22:14 24:17 D'Auhuisson, Roberto 20:39; 21:21-22.32; disinformation, on CIA 22:18,20; 25:52 "Sources and Methods: The CIA Legend" David, Julian 13:25; 16:47 (Lawrence) 19:40,37-38 Davidson, Meyer 16:46 disinformation, on Cuba and Nicaragua Davis, Elmer 19:4 "White Paper II: Administration Stonewalls Davis. John 25:30 While Covert Operations Escalate'' (Schaap) Davis, Peter 16:19-21 "Amandla" 21:41 disinformation, on Cuba 19:9-11 Davis Foundation, Shelby Cullom 21:27-28 disinformation, on Grenada 19:29-32 Davis. Spencer 17:42 disinformation, on Libya 16:24-25; 18:12-13: Dawson. Ken 13:19 19:7,13 Dayan, Ambassador Moshe 20:36 disinformation, on nuclear freeze movement 19:9 de Borchgrave, Arnaud 13:10,48; 14-15:3; disinformation, on shooting of Pope 16:27,35; 17:47; 19:7-8,10,15; 21:30,35; 22:5; "Darkness in Rome: The 'Bulgarian Connection' 23:24,29.32; 24:34-36 Revisited" (Brodhead, Friel and Herman) 23:3- "Arnaud de Borchgrave Boards Moon's Ship'' (Wolf and Clarkson) 24:34-35 de Castro. Alvaro 25:17-18 de Feu, Croix 25:30 de Gasperi, Alcide 25:28 de Gramont, Sanche 19:38 De La Raix, Captain 13:17 de Lemos, Anita 13:20 de Lorenzo, Giovanni 25:34 de Marenche, Alexandre 25:27 De Rance Foundation 18:17 de Silva, Peer 1938 de Toledano, Ralph 21:31,36 Dean, John Gunther 17:13 Deane, Philip I Should Have Died 25:43 death squads 13:43-44; 21:21,32; 25:32,50,52 "Argentina Activates International Death Squads" (Ray) 16:14-16 Deaver, Michael 16:15 Decter, Midge 22:5; 23:16; 24:35 Deering-Milliken Foundation 21:28 Defense Industries International 16:54 Defoe, Daniel 19:13 Deger, Emin CIA, Counter-Guerrilla, and Turkey 23:15 Degolyer, James 18:34 Deindorfer, Robert G. 20:37 "Death Overtakes a Spy" (Lawrence) 19:34; "The Journalist Spy: A Friendly Interview" (Agee) 19:33-34 Del Monte Corporation 2118 del Valle, Pedro A. 25:36 Delgado, Patricia 22:27 Delle Chiaie, Stefano 22:41-42,44; 25:17-18,34 38; "The KGB Plot to Assassinate the Pope: A Case Study in Free World Disinformation" (Brodhead and Herman) 1913-24 disinformation, on Soviet Union 23:2,16-17,26 disinformation, on terrorism 14-15:3; 233,16-17: 24:10 "Pentagon Moves on 'Terrorism' '' (Ray and Schaap) 22:4-9 Disney, Walt 17:6 Dobbs, Michael 23:11,13-14,22-27,34-36,38 Dobson, Frank 13:20-21 Dodd, Christopher 16:22 Dodge Jones Foundation 21:28 Doe, Samuel 13:34 D'Oench, Russell 25:13 Doherty, Elizabeth 21:26 Doherty, William C. 18:6 Dolan, Terry 22:32-33 Dolge, James J. 14-15:13 Dolinchek, Martin 16:9-10 Dollfuss, Chancellor 2527 Domenici, Pete 25:38 Dominica 20:5 "Behind the Klan's Karibbean Koup Attempt, Part I" (Lawrence) 13:22-27; "Behind the Klan's Karibbean Koup Attempt, Part II" (Lawrence) 16:44-50,21 Dominica, Rastafarians in 13:24-25 Domville, Barry 25:36 Donchev, Ivan 23:27 Donovan, Jean 23:44 Donovan, John 22:17-20 Donovan, William Joseph 19:5; 25:14,30,38 Dooley, Thomas A. 25:52 Doran. Bernard 2538 Dellums, Ronald V. 18:10; 2221,34 DeL.oria, Vine 24:25 Democracy Institute 19:6-7,11-12 Denard, Bob 16:6-7,10 Derider. Jay (pseud.) 19:34 Dennis, Eugene 19:38 Denton, Jeremiah 13:2-3; 17:3; 18:12; 19:8: 22:9; Doman, Robert K. 17:32-42 Dos Santos, Jose Eduardo 13:21; 22:39 Douglas, Michael 16:44,48,50 Douglas, Rosie 16:50 Dow Chemical Company 17:16 Dozier, James L. 17:40 Draganovic, Krunoslav 25:8-10 234; 24:11 ; 25:38 Draper, Morris 13:34 Descoteaux, Norman M. 14-15:14 D'Escoto, Miguel 16:20,35-36,40; 20:28.39,44; Dresser Industries, Inc. 2128 Droege, Wolfgang Walter 13:23-24; 16:44-46 21:40; 22:27,29 Droge, Dolf 2137 D'Estaing, Giscard 13:36; 16:7; 21:42; 25:27 Du Droit, Sergeant 13:17 Deukmejian, George 24:24 Dexter, Evalyn W. 17:10 DeYoung, Karen 20:6 Dezza, Paolo 18:12 Diamond, Stanley 23:29 DiBella, Franco 23:19 Dickens, Samuel 22:31 Diego Garcia (Indian Ocean) 16:4 Diem, Ngo Dinh 18:46; 19:15; 21:25; 25:34 Du Plessis, Colonel 13:17 Duarte, Jose Napoleon 13:42-43; 21:13 Dubois, Father 21:42 Dubois, Josiah P. The Devil's Chemist 25:25 Ducote, Robert A. 14-15:9 Duffy, Peter 16:8 Dugway Proving Ground 16:58; 17:21 Duke, David 13:24; 16:21,44-45 Dien Del 17:12 Dintitrov. Vassilli 19:17 Dukes, Charles William 16:8; 22:17 Dulles, Allen Welsh 19:34,37; 20:41; 21:40; Dinges, John 18:23 25:31,33 Directorate of National Security (DONS) (South "How Allen Dulles and the SS Preserved Each Other" (Scott) 25:4-14 Duncan, D.K. 16:43 Dunn, Bertram F. 14-15:9 Dunn, Timothy 17:52 Duran, Julio Cesar 25:18 Durbrow, Elhridge 21:25; 25.32 Durenberger. David 21.6 Durham, Douglass 24.17-24.27 28 Dutton, John R. 13:32-33 Duvalier, "Baby Doc" 16 48 Duvalier, "Papa Doc'' 16:48 E Eagle, James T. 2425 Eagle Deer, Alfred 24:18 Eagle Deer, Jancita 2_4:18.2_0,222t Eagle magazine 133 Early, John 22:17,23 East Timor 1922 Eastman Kodak 21:18 Eaton Company 21:18-19 Eaton. Robert 25:26 Eaton, Wendy 24:20 Ecevit, Bulent 23:29.31 Echanis, Michael 22:1314,16 Echeveria, General 25:18 Economist (London) 13:48: 24.37 Economist's Foreign Report (London) 13 48 , 198 Ecuador 17:50: 18:42-43,45 CIA in 14-15.8 Ecumenical Program for Intcrancrican Communica tion and Action (EPICA) 1344 Death o/ a Rerulutiore An Analysis o/ the Grenada Tragedv and the U..S. Invasion 21 40 Eddy, Bill 18:45 Edens, Ralph G. 22:17,20 Edison, Charles 22:15: 25:33 Edmund Burke Society 16:47 Edwards, Trevor John 13:16-17 EFE news agency (Spain) 18.13,15 Egypt 13:34-35 CIA in 14-15:8 Eichrnann, Adolf 25:4,7 El Diario de las Americas 10 36 El Mercurio (Chile) 16:32-43, 1814: 19:31 El Salvador 13:42-44: 1860 ''Interview: Salvadoran Deserter Discloses Green Beret Torture Role" 16:17-18; and Israel 20:35: CIA in 16:18: elections (1982 and 1984) 21 7- 13,32,40: 23:39: FMI.N 13:42-43; 20:25: 21:6: 22:3: White Warrior Union 2_ 1_21 El Verbo (Guatemala) 18:34,37,39 Elder, Jack 24:13 electronic surveillance 18:57,64: 20:32-33,40 42 "Tetra Tech in Foreign Waters'' (Franklin) _244(1 Elena (Gage) 253,39 "Eleni: The Work of it 'Professional Liar' '' (Rap tis) 25:41-49 Elf-Aquitaine (France) 21:42 Ellam, Katherine T. 1347 Elliott, William Yandell 21:26 Ellis, George E., Jr. 13:24 Ellis, Ken 22:31 Ellison, Bruce 24:20,25 Elmore, Thomas P. 16.i6 Ember, Lois 17:22 Enders, Thomas Ostrom 16:19 2_0,23, 19:9: 2551 Englehart, Charles T. 14-15 8 Enloe, Cynthia Ethnic Soldiers 22 10 Epstein, Edward J. 23.38 Erdstein, Erich 254 Erlich-Manes & Associates 25:37 Escriva de Balaguer, Jose Maria 18 : I I -12 Eskelson, T. Edward 20:41 Espinoza Sanchez. Pedro Herman 22_28 Estevez Gonzalez, Mario 19: 10 11 Estrella Company 25:7-8 Ethics and Public Policy ('enter 13:13. 186: 19:1_2 Ethiopia 13:34-35 Evans, Medford Stanton 2231 Evans. Neil 16:51-52 Evans, Rowland 21.31 Evclegh, Robin Peace-Keeping in a Demo,ratir So, lets The Les Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 sons of Northern Ireland 24:7-11 Franco, Francisco 18:11; 21:25; 25:30,35,38 Gemetex Company 25:8 Evergreen International Airlines 22:28 Frank, Warren Ernest 14-15:10 General Aniline and Film 2525 Evers, Medgar 16:46 Franklin, Jane General Electric 21:19 Evren, Kenan 23:28-29 "Tetra Tech in Foreign Waters" 24:40 General Motors 21:19; 25:25 Excelsior (Mexico) 18:5 Frantome Company 13:5 General Telephone and Electronics 21:18-19 Exxon Corporation 16:22: 20:29; 21:18,28-29 Fraser, Malcolm 16:55 General Tire and Rubber 21:18-19 Ezcurra, Ana Maria Frawley, Patrick J. 25:38 Geneva Gas Protocol (1925) 17:5-6 Ideological Aggression Against the Sandinista Rev- Frederikse, Julie Genovese. Vito 25:34 olution: The Political Opposition Church in None But Ourselves: Masses vs. Media in the George, Clair Elroy 16:57 Nicaragua 23:39 Making of Zimbabwe 23:44 George, Richard Byrd 14-15:11 Ezz, Esmat 17:12 Free Angola Committee 22:31 George, Willis 1349 Free Congress Foundation 22:31; 25:51 Georgiou, Panes 25:49 Free Pacific Association 25:30 Georgoulas, Babis 25:45 F Freedom Fighter 25:51 Gerth, Jeff 2027 Faber, Dorothy 21:38 Freedom House 13:10; 16:58; 21:25-26; 22:24 Gervasi, Sean 13:6 Fagoth, Steadman 16:20-21; 18:8.23-24; 22:11; 25:53 Freedom Leadership Foundation 22:31,33 "Secret Collaboration: U.S. and South Africa Fairer-Smith John 13:20 freedom of information, resources for organizing Foment Terrorist Wars" 22:36-40 , Falk Richard 23:29 13:51; 17:47; 23:41 Gervasi, Tom 22:34 , Falwell, Jerry 18:34 Freedom Research Foundation 22:30-31 Getler, Michael 14-15:2; 16:25; 21:30 Farago, Ladislas 25:11 Freedom Studies Center 21:25 Getty Oil 21:28-29 Farrell. James A. 25:30 Freedoms Foundation 21:37 Geyer, Georgie Anne 18:23 Farrell. John 25:30 Frei, Eduardo 18:15,17 Buying the Night Flight (review) 19:25-28; Fatherland and Liberty 18:17 Frei, Frederick 16:37 "Uncle Sam's Georgic Girl" (Landis) 19:25-28 Fayne, James A. 25:30 Friedman, Milton 16:43 Ghana, CIA in 13:47 FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) 24:5,11 Friedrich Ebert Foundation 16:23 Gideonse, Harry David 21:26 and Black Panthers 24:26; and Communist Work- Friel, Howard 23:38 Giese, Paula ers Party 24:33; and JFK Assassination 19:38; and "Darkness in Rome: The 'Bulgarian Connection' "Secret Agent Douglass Durham and the Death labor movement 24:30-33; and Native American Revisited'' 23:3-38; "Media Manipulation: of Jancita Eagle Deer" 2418-19 movement 24:17-29; and sanctuary movement Covert Propaganda in Time and Newsweek" Gilhooly, John F. 14-15:9 24:12; COINTELPRO 13:3; 16:31; 19:4; 24:2.4: 21:14-23 Gillespie, Charles Anthony 20:14,17,20 Federation of Turkish Idealist Associations 23:12 Friends of the Americas Foundation 22:32 25:52-53 Gilligan, John J. 18:51 Federici, Federico 23:20 Friends of Free Asia 22:15 Gilmore, Don 2219 Fediay, Victor A. 16:6 Friends for Jamaica Giuffrida, Louis O. 24:6-7,9 Fefferman, Dan 22:31 Newsletter 23:40 Glass, Murv 17:52 Fellers, Bonner 25:36 Fritzsche, Hans 17:6 Glenn, Skip 24:20 Felt, W. Mark 19:27 Froehlke, Robert 17:14 Glibbery, Peter 25:51 Ferreira, Commandant 13:17 Frohman Foundation, Sidney 21:28 Glickman, Dan 22:19 Fertig Foundation, Inc., Lawrence 21:27-28 Frolik, Joe Globe Aero Ltd., Inc. Feulner, Edwin J., Jr. 16:29; 18:63 "The CIA Ties of World Medical Relief" 18:47- "Merchants of Counter-Insurgency" (Wolf) Fiebelkorn, Joachim 25:17-18 51 13:18-19 Bob 22:31 Fiedler Frutos, Manuel 25:52 Goebbels, Joseph 24:36-37 , Nick 13:54 Field Fuchs, Regina 20:19 Goering, Hermann 25:28 , Fielding, Fred 21:36 Fulbright, J. William 17:7 Goetz, Bernhard 24:3,5 Film Institute of El Salvador Fullerton, John 13:30 Gold, Theodore S. 17:18,20,22,24 "In the Name of Democracy: Life, Death, and Fulwyler, Niles J. 17:19 Goldberg, Arthur 22:5 Elections in El Salvador" 21:40; 23:39; "The Fund for Open Information and Accountability Goldberg, Don 22:32 Road of Liberty" 23:39 Our Right to Know 17:47; 23:41 Goldsmith, James Michael 13:48; 21:27,29 First Run Features Furuta, Takeshi 25:53 Goldstein, Martin 17:44 "Nicaragua: Report from the Front" 21:40 Goldstein, Thomas 22:9 Ruth 18:54 First Goldwater, Barry, Jr. 17:39 , Fisher, Jack 24:13 G Goldwater, Barry, Sr. 18:9; 21:35 Fisher, John M. 25:32 Gabriela Mistral Publishing Company 18:13 Goleniewski, Michael M. 25:36 Flaherty, James Michael 14-15:11 Gage, Nicholas 19:14,23-24; 21:21; 23:37 Gomer, Robert 17:17 Flaherty, Kathryn 24:13 "Eleni: The Work of a 'Professional Liar' Gomez, Leonel 13:44; 1825 Fleming, Ian 24:38 (Raptis) 25:41-49; Eleni 25:3,39 Gomez Montano, Carlos Antonio 10:17-18; 21:32 Fleury, Sergio Fernando Paranhos 25:21 Gairy, Eric M. 16:21,44; 19:32; 20:3-4,8,19 Gonzales, Frank 20:19 Flick Financial Group 25:28 Galbraith, Evan 20:13 Gonzales, Mario 24:22 Flick, Friedrich Karl, Jr. 25:28 Galtieri, Leopoldo 16:14-15 Gonzalez, Philip 22:20 Flick, Friedrich Karl, Sr. 25:28 Games Company 13:56 Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company 21:18,28 Flores, Baeza 16:38 Garber, Daniel H. 14-15:11 Goosen, Hennic 18:62 Flynn, Elizabeth Gurley 14-15:5 Garcia, Abibal 18:39 Gordon Fund 21:28 Flynn, Joe 16:53 Garcia, Enrique 25:16 Gorman, Paul F. 20:28; 22:25; 25:50-51 Fontaine, Arturo 18:14 Garcia, Guillermo 16:14 Goshko, John 20:13 Fontaine, Roger W. 18:15; 22:33 Garcia, Jose 13:43 Gospel Outreach 18:34-35,37,39 Ford Foundation 13:50 Garcia, Nestor 16:27 Gossens, Gerry Francis 14-1513 Ford Motor Company 21:19; 25:25 Garcia Meza, Luiz 25:17-20 Gottlieb, Sidney 17:15 Fort Detrick (Maryland) 17:12,14-17.28,30 Garcia Rodriguez, Felix 22:35 Goulden, Joseph C. 25:32 Fort Gulick (Panama) 20:36 Gardner, George (pseud.) 13:49 Gouws, Dolf 1.315 Fort Huachuca (Arizona) Garment, Suzanne 23:4 Grace, J. Peter 25:28,33-35,37 "Fort Huachuca Buildup: War Technology in the Gam, Jake 17:21 Grace, Joseph P. 25:30 Desert" 20:31-33 Garrett, Earl Norbert 111 14-15:8 Graham, Billy 18:34 Fort Leavenworth (Kansas) 24:10 Garrow, David J. 19:38 Graham, Daniel Orrin 21:38; 22:32; 25:32 Forum World Features 13:4; 17:46; 19:7; 21:27,37 Garwood, Ellen St.John 21:29 Graham, Solomon 24:14 Foundation for Full Service Banks 19:34 Garwood, William 21:29 Grand Union Company 21:28 Fourea, P.J. 13:17 Gatzoyiannis, Eleni 25:41-49 Grassini, General 23:18 Fourie. Brand 13:40 Gatzoyiannis, Nicholas see Gage, Nicholas Grassley, Charles 22:31 Fourtouni, Eleni Gayner, Jeffrey 22:31 Graves, Jim 16:6; 22:17,20-21,23-24 "An Introduction to the Greek Resistance" Gayre, Robert 25:31-32 Gray Wolves 19:13,18-19:233,6,10-15,24- 25:39-40 Gearhart, Daniel F. 22:13 26,29,31,35-36,38 Fox, Francis 13:23 Gebhardt, Karl 25:26 Graziani, Rodolfo 25:14 France Gedda, Luigi 25:31-33 Grealy, Robert F. 14-15:9 and mercenaries 22:10; CIA in 14-15:8-9: OAS Gehlen Organization 19:5; 25:5-14 Greece (Secret Army Organization) 16:6; 23:16; SDECE Gehlen, Reinhard 25:5-6,13,27,33 CIA in 13:47; 14-15:9; 22:42; 25:43,49; (intelligence agency) 13:10,32: 20:40 Gelb, Leslie H. 13:53; 19:5; 20:40-42; 23:27 Communist Party 25:40,45,48; EAM 25:39,44- Frances, Hector 18:8 Geller, Uri 21:44 45; ELAS 25:39-40.44-45; resistance movement Franchetti, Michael 24:9 Gelli, Licio 19:24; 23:18-20; 25:34 (1945-1949) 25:39-49 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP9O-00845ROO0100170003-6 Greeley, Andrew 21:38 A Higher Form of Killing 17:6,23 Hoge, Warren 21:13 Green, Christopher C. ''Kit" 1710-I 1 Harsco Corporation 21:28 Holdgreiwe, Dan 21:36 Greene, Robert (pseud.) 19:34 Hart. Gary 17:13,18 Holdridge, John H. 16:56 Gregg, David 17:38 Hart, Howard P. 14-15:12 Holland, Stuart and Anderson, Donald Grcig, David Noble 20:44 Hart, Jeffrey 18:14: 21:31; 24:37 Kissinger'y Kingdoms A ('oanG'r-Report nn Grenada 1614: 18:50-51; 19:29-32: 20:2-24; 22:35 Harvard University 13:50 r'rntral America 21-3') "Cuban Statements on Grenada" 20:21-24; Hassan, King 13:34 Hulmgren, Dale 1652 "Grenada. Airport '83: Reagan's Big Lie" Hatfield, Mark 17:21,23-24 Hulowach, Frank (Lusane) 19:29-32; "U.S. Crushes Caribbean Hauser, Gustav M. 13:7 "The NASSCO ('ass A Case Stroh in Jewel" (Ray and Schaap) 20:3-20; and news Hawkins, Joe Daniel 13:24-25; 16:45-47 nfiltration and F:ntrapntent'' 24 (0.33 media 20:14-I5; 21:33; 22:20-21; Democratic Hay, Alastair Hondros, John 25:39 Movement 20:19-20: resources for organizing The Chentiral ,Scythe: Lessons of 2.4,5-1 and Honduras 13:44-45 2140. 22:34 Dioxin (review) 18:58-59 "Documentation. The 11 S Military Role in Grenadian Von e 19:31-32 Hayes, Patrick Cardinal 25:30 Honduras" 18:29-33: and Israel 2(1.34-35: ('Ir\ in Greve, Frank 20:44 Hayward, Paul 16:54 16:18; 18:32:2_2_:25-29: MACHO 13:44: military Gribhen, Barry 16:8 Healey, Dorothy 19:38 strength 182_6-31 Griggs, Timothy S 14-15:13 Hearn. Edward L. 25:30 Honduras and Nicaragua 13:46 Grillnutier, Horst 19:18: 23:12,30 Hearst. Patricia 24:9 'Congressional Testimony: lie Prospects of \\ar Griswold, Donald M. 25:40 Hedervary, Karoly Khuen 2534 Between Honduras and Nicaragua'(Buchanan) Griti, James G. ''Bo" 1732-42 Hedgecock, David 24:19 18:25-28 Grodin. Nancy Heini. Henry John 11 2533 Honduras Inliirniation Center he Australian Connection: Nugan Hand, the Held, Richard G. 24:26-27; 25:54 Honduras ('/date 21:41 CIA Hank'' 16:51-55 Held, Richard W. 25:54 Honeywell Corporation 17:16: _'441) Grath, Daniel (pseud.) 24:26-27; 25:54 Hell C'hromacom 20:33, 21:21 Hong Kong, ('IA in 14-159 Groth, Manfred 14-15:13 Hell, Rudolph 20:33; 2121 Hood. William 23:38 Grumbacher, Major General 20:31 Helms, Jesse A. 13:13; 16:6,23.28; 18:60; 213(1 Hoover Institute 11:2, 20:17 Gruson, Sydney 21:32 Helms, Richard 13:50 Hoover, J. Edgar 16:57: 19:38: 2 1:30-31 .34. Guadalupe Martinez, Ana 2112 Helsinki Watch 18:24; 23:28 24:4,11: 25 6 Guanes, Benito 25:52 Hemispheric' Hotline 16:16 Mastc't:c of Deceit _24.4 Guardian Angels 24:5 Hemmings, Allen Bruce 14-15:10 Hopkins, Lance G 14-15:8 Guatemala 13:45-46: 21:18 Herupstone, Smith 24:35 Horizon Oil and Gas ('ontp:my 21 28 ''Evangelicals Support Guatemalan Dictatorship" Henckel von Donnersmark. Graf 2533 Horniats, Said 17:18 (Lawrence) 18:34-40; and Israel 20:36-37; Henderson Foundation 21:28 Horton, John R. 2_2:3 Organization of the People in Arms 18:36 Hennessy, John William 14-15:8 Hosenball. Mark 1934 Guderian, Heinz 22:24 Henze, Paul Bernard 19:23; 23:4-5,14-16,27-37 Hougan, Jim Guerra, Humberto 17:12 The Plot to Kill the Pope 23:14,37 Spooks 2538 Guevara, Ernesto Che 18:44; 19:26; 21:32,37: Herbert, Anthony 22:17 Hough, Mike 16:13 22 IS Soldier 25:52 Houghton. Bernard 16:51-55 Guggis, Chris 17:39 Heritage Foundation 13:2; 16:29; 18:62-63: 19:7-8: Howard University 19:31 Guillot, Jaime 19:10 2126-27; 22:31; 24:36; 25:37-38 Howe, Marvine 19:15.24 Guinea, CIA in 14-15:9 Herman, Edward S. 23:37-38 Howell, Mike 13:22: 16:21 ,45 Gulf Oil 13:5-6,35 " 'Objective' News as Systematic Propaganda: Hubble, Beverly 22:31 Guncs. Hasan Fehnii 2331 The New York Times on the 1984 Salvadoran and Huhhs, Charlie 213(1 Gung Ho magazine 16:6,49; 1748-50 Nicaraguan Elections" 21:7-13; ''Darkness in Hudal, Alois 25:10-11,13 Gurwin. Larry Rome: The 'Bulgarian Connection' Revisited" Hudson Institute 1620.11 The Calri A/fiar 25:35 233-38; "The Fascist Network" 22:44,41-42; Hugel, Max 14-15:14: 16:4.56-571 17:50 Guzman, Jaime 18:14 "The KGB Plot to Assassinate the Pope: A Case "A New ('lass of Spooks: Max IIugcl Gwertzman, Bernard 19:23; 21:13 Study in Free World Disinformation'' 19:13-24: Amateur" 13:52,56 The Real Terror Network 17:47 Herman Edward and Brodhead Frank Hughes Aire alt 1737-38,40 Hughes, Alister 2017 H , , Demonstration Elections: U.S.-Staged Elections Hughes, Ralph C. 14-15:1 ; Haas. Kenneth F. 14-15:12 in tite Dominican Republic, Vietnam and EI Hull. John F. 25.51 Habash, George 19:16 Salvador 21:7-8,13,39 Human Development Foundation _25.51 Habib, John S. 14-15:8 Hermann, Kai Human Events 13:50: 19:8: 21 i5; 12:3)) Hack], Alphons J. 21:26 ''Klaus Barbie: A Killer's Career" 25.15.2_(1 Human Life Foundation 25:38 Haddad, Saud 18:61-65 Hersh Seymour M. Hunt, F. Howard 16:40, 1915 Haecker, Paul 16:44 Chemical and Biological Warfare: Anwr-ica'S Hunt, H.I.. 25:30 Haig, Alexander M. 13:2-3,8,10,14,34,36,41,45- HidlenArsenal17:16-18,28,30; 19:28:2532 Hunt, Linda 25:23 H l Ed 2 46,48,53: 14-153; 16:3,14,19-20,26-27; 17:8-10; Hervei, Francoise (pseud.) ur ward N. ey, _5:30 1815,24,_26; 21:31: 22:5,38,41: 23:3,17,20,29; ''Knights of Darkness: The Sovereign Military Hurt, Henry H. 21:'_9 241(1,27; 25:27 Order of Malta'' 25:27-38 Husmann, Max 25:12 Hain. Peter M. 13:31 Heydrich, Reinhard 17:6 Hvalkof, Soren 1841 Haiti 1648 Hickel, Walter J. 25:38 Hynds, Patricia CIA in 14-15.9 High Adventure Ministries 18:64-65 'The Ideological Struggle Within the Catholic Hall, Jerry (pseud.) 17:45 Halliday, Robert 13:23 554 H ilt C d 24 17 2 High Eagle, Bob 24:20 Higham, Charles care of the Tradin With the Enemy. An Er o Church in Nicaragua'' I8.16 20 am on, an y : ; _ Hammer, Michael Peter 1622 g p . Na-r-Arm'ricart Monev Plot, 1913-/949 I Hammerschrnidt, John Paul 1721 25:13,25,30 I.G. Farben Company 25.1 124 25?8,35 Hammond, Stephen 16:47 Higham, Charles 25:35 Iacocca, [,cc 25_27 Hampton, Fred 24:20.26; 25:54 Higham. James A. 14-15:13 lenaga, Sahuru 1717 Hampton, Wade 24:3 Hillehrand, Chris 16:9 leng Sary 22:24 Hancock. Robert Lincoln "Bud'' 18:43 Himber, Robert 2214 Ikle, Fred Charles 16:20: 19:29: 2(1.28 Hand, Michael Jon 16:51-54 Himmler, Heinrich 25:13.28,43 Illinois Power Congr;uty 212 8 Hannaford, Peter 16:15 Hinckle. Warren and Turner, William Illucca, Jorge 20:25-26 Hanrahan, Edward 24:26 The Fish is Red 17:28,30.47 Inchauste, Fcrmmdo 2519 Hanson. C.T. 16:27 Hinckley, John 13:25 index Hanson, Chris 17:22 Hinkle, Charles W. 18:59 ''C'omplete CA16 Indev. Nos I 1 2'' ( 1sane) I I Ilartunian. M. William 1628 Hinton, Deane Roesch 21:9,22,32 15:1-36 Hare, Paul J. 13:39 Hoare. Mike 16:8-10; 17:3-4; 22:17,24 India. CIA in 14-15.9-111 Harcl, Iser 1938 Hochschild, Adam 16:27 Indian Ocean Harkin, Tom 18:10 Hodge, Evan 24:25-28 .The Indian Ocean: Seychelles Beats Back Harnag]e, William R. 20:31 Hoeber, Amoretta M. 17:10,22 Mercenaries" (Ray) 16:4 10 Harrell, John 25:53 Hoettl, Wilhelm 25:14 Indonesia, CIA in 14-15:10; 1639: 18:43 Harris, Ladonna 18:24 Hoffman, Bruce 23:38 infiltration see provoc icurs and inGxmers Harris, Robert and Paxman. Jeremy Huffman-LaRoche, Inc. 17:16-17 Information Digest 19:9 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP9O-00845ROO0100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP9O-00845ROO0100170003-6 informers see provocateurs and informers "Washington's Proxy: Israeli Arms in Central Ingersoll Foundation 21:28 America" (Lusane) 20:34-37; and Geneva Ingles, Susan 16:9 Convention 24:2; Mossad (intelligence agency) K Inman, Bobby Ray 13:52; 14-15:14; 16:31; 17:35- 16:25-26; 18:12; 19:33,38; 25:4 Kahane, Richard A. 13:47-48 36,40 Italy Kahn, David 20:42 Inman-Riverdale Foundation 21:28 Carabinieri 23:18; CESIS (intelligence agency) Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation 21:28 Inquiry magazine 18:14; 24:36 23:18; CIA in 16:42; 19:5; 23:20; 25:13-14; Kalangula, Peter T. 13:6 Inside Asia 23:40 Guardia di Finanza 23:18; right-wing in 22:41-42; Kalb, Marvin 18:13; 19:8,16,21,24,40; 23:6- Institute of American Relations 16:6,15 23:17-21; SIFAR (intelligence agency) 25:34-35; 7,32,36-37 Institute of American Studies 21:25 SISDE (intelligence agency) 22:41; 23:18,24; Kalianesis, Yiorgos 25:48-49 Institute for Defense Analysis 22:32 25:35; SISMI (intelligence agency) 22:41; Kalish, Abraham H. 21:24 Institute of Diplomatic Studies 21:42 23:14,18,20-21,24-26,35; 25:35; Super S Kallis, Elias M. 17:20 . Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 13:13 (intelligence agency) 23:20 Kaltenbrunner, Ernst 25:14 Institute of General Studies 18:14 Ivanchukov, Naran Sansha 14-15:11 Kaltschmidt, Alfredo 18:39 Institute of Life Insurance 19:34 Kamenske, Bernard H. 16:28 Institute for Policy Analysis 17:49 Kameradenwerk 25:2,4-14 Institute for Policy Studies 13:44; 21:31 Kamil, Fouad 13:21 Institute on Religion and Democracy 18:6,16; 23:39 Jabara, Abdeen 18:64 Kamm, Henry 19:23-24 "Archbishop Obando y Bravo and the Institute Jacklin, Larry Lloyd 13:25; 16:45-46 Kampelman, Max M. 23:32 on Religion and Democracy" 18:6 Jackson, Henry M. 23:16 Kampuchea see Cambodia Institute for Religious Works see Vatican Bank Jamaica Kane, Eugene 1. 25:37 Institute for the Study of Conflict (London) 13:4; "CIA Media Operations in Chile, Jamaica, and Kantorovich, Leonid V. 24:29 21:37 Nicaragua" (Landis) 16:32-43; resources for Kapuuo, Clemens 13:6 Instituto de Investigaciones Socio-Economicas de organizing 23:40 Karamessines, Thomas H. 17:14 Honduras (INSEH) 21:39-40 Jamaica Broadcasting Corporation 19:36 Kamow, Stanley 17:8; 18:68 Inter-American Communication Foundation 22:34 Jamaica Daily News 19:36 Kaschik, Gunther 13:7 Inter-American Development Bank 16:33 Jamaican Press Association 16:32; 24:38 Kasten, Robert W. 22:33 Inter-American Press Association 16:33-36,43; James, Daniel 19:8; 21:32,37 Kastenmeier Subcommittee 13:49 19:31,36 James, Liam 20:5 Katrosh, Ralph J. 14-15:10 Inter-American School of Defense 18:34 Jane's Fighting Ships 13:12 Kaufman, Mary M. 25:24-25 Interarms Corporation 20:15 Janklow, William "Wild Bill" 24:18,20,27 Kaunda, Kenneth 13:31,33,38; 22:37-38 Intercontinental Development and Management "The Strange Case of 'Wild Bill' Janklow" Kavathas, Vasilis Company, Inc. 13:26-27 (Churchill) 24:22-24 The Other Eleni 25:47-49 Intermodal, Inc. 25:37 Janssens (Vatican intelligence agent) 25:30 Kaznecheev, Alexander 16:27 Intermountain Aviation, Inc. 20:27,40 Jaramillo, Rafael 18:45-46 Keegan, George, Jr. 20:40-41; 23:16 International Brotherhood of Teamsters 21:25,35-36 Jarmin, Gary 22:31 Kelley, Clarence M. 24:20,29 International Business Machines 21:18-19,28 Jarquin, Antonio 22:27 Kellogg, Frank B. 17:5 International Business-Government Counselors 20:9 Jarrett, Larry G. 14-15:7 Kelly, Hubert 25:53 International Commission of Inquiry into the Crimes Javanovic, Daniel 21:42 Kelly, John Louis, Jr. 14-15:13 of the Racist and Apartheid Regimes of Southern Javits, Jacob 23:27 Kelly, Mike 22:31 Africa 13:16 Jemmot, Rawlins 16:49 Kelvinator Company 25:33 International Conference on the Unity of the Jenkins, Brian Michael 22:4 Kemp, Jack 18:40; 22:5 Sciences 21:26 Jenkins, Louis "Woody" 22:32; 25:53 Kemper, Vicki 25:53 International Court of Justice 13:4; 21:5 Jensen, Carl 22:34 Kennedy, John F. 17:7; 18:15; 19:15,38 International Defense and Aid Fund (IDAF) Jensen, Christopher Kennedy, Joseph P. 25:34 Focus 13:51; Massacre at Maseru: South African "The CIA Ties of World Medical Relief" 18:47- Kennedy, Robert D. 14-15:10 Aggression Against Lesotho 23:40; Onyeka: 51 Kenya 13:35; 16:10 Namibia Will Be Free 23:40; This is Apartheid: A Jensen, D. Lowell 24:12 CIA in 14-15:10 Pictorial Introduction 23:40; This is Namibia: A Jerusalem, CIA in 14-15:10 Kerr, John 16:53 Pictorial Introduction 23:40 Jervis, Verne 24:12 Kessling, Chuck 16:47 International Disaster Institute 18:59 Jessup, David 18:6 Keyder, Cagier 23:38 International Federation for Victory Over Jeton, Francis John 14-15:8 Keyes, Alan 13:37 Communism 25:53 Joemman, Stanley 18:63 Keys, Wilson Brian 16:38 International Indian Treaty Council 18:24; 24:16 Johanniterorden 25:36 Khomeini, Ayatollah 21:30; 23:21 International Institute for Strategic Studies (London) Johansen, Bruce 24:29 Khrushchev, Nikita 19:37-38; 20:40-41 172 3 John XXIII (Pope) 18:15 Kiehl, Joseph A. 14-15:10 International Linguistics Center 18:42 John Birch Society 13:27; 19:9; 24:20,23,31; 25:36 Killsright, Joseph Stuntz 24:25 International Love Lift 18:35,37,40 John N. Olin Foundation 2126 Kim, Charles 16:45,47 International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) 25:24- John, Patrick 13:22-24,26; 16:44,47-48,50 Kim, Sang In 20:38 25,27 John Paul I (Pope) 18:12,15; 23:38; 25:35 Kimsey, Herman E. 25:36 International Monetary Fund 13:43-44; 16:50; John Paul If (Pope) 13:3; 18:11-12,15: 19:13-15,19- Kincaid, Cliff 21:30,35,37 18:55; 22:37-38 21; 21:20; 22:44; 23:1-3,34,36 King, Jonathan 17:15 International Police Academy 24:6 "The Vatican Connection: Vernon Walters and King, Kenneth 24:32 International Public Policy Foundation 18:49; 22:33 the Pope" 18:9 King, Martin Luther, Jr. 13:50: 21:30 International Public Policy Research Corporation Johnson, Aaron William 13:47 Kinoy, Peter 21:40 18:49; 22:33 Johnson, Haynes 16:25 Kinsolving, Lester 21:35,38 International Red Cross 25:34 Johnson, Lyndon B. 25:43 Kirkpatrick, Evron Maurice 16:28-29 International Rescue Committee 17:46; 22:15 Johnson, Rodney 24:30-33 Kirkpatrick, I.W. 16:44 International Research Associates 17:35; 18:49 Johnson, Ural Alexis 17:7 Kirkpatrick, Jeane J. 13:12,14,36; 16:10,28-29; International Spy Society Johnstone, Diana 19:24; 23:38 18:6,15,24; 20:5; 21:40; 22:5,25,27; 24:35 The Dossier 17:47 Joiner, Ernest V. 21:38 Kisacik, Rasit 23:11 International Strategic Issues 16:22 Jonathan Institute 22:5; 23:16-17,26,31-33 Kissinger, Henry A. 13:8; 16:6; 18:58-59; 20:29; International Telephone and Telegraph 21:18-19,25; Jones, Ben 22:17-18,23 21:26,39; 23:27 25:24-25 Jones, Bruce 25:51 Kitson, Frank Internationale de la Resistance 23:29 Jones, Buford 25:45 Low Intensity Operations 24:3-11 Interpol 23:8,12 Jones, David 17:33 Klaras, Thanasis 25:48 Investair Leasing Corporation 20:27 Jonestown Research Project 16:57 Klarsfeld, Beata 25:12,14 Ipecki, Abdi 19:18; 23:10-14,31 Joseph, Dennis 13:25; 16:47 Klepper, Stewart Iran, and Kurds 18:22 Journal of Contemporary Asia 13:51 "Central America Ignites: The U.S. Order of Iraq Journal of Indo-European Studies 25:32 Battle" 13:42-46 and Kurds 18:22; CIA in 18:22 Journal of International Relations 25:32 Kleynhans, Adriaan 13:9 Iron Workers Local 627 24:30 Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies Knights of Malta 25:3 Irvine, Reed John 16:27; 21:24-38; 22:31 25:32 "Knights of Darkness: The Sovereign Military Isby, David 22:31 loyal, Judy Lawton 21:39 Order of Malta'' (Hervet) 25:27-38 Ishii, Shiro 25:7 Juan Carlos, King 18:15; 19:7; 25:37-38 Knights Templar 25:28 Israel Jungle Aviation and Radio Service 18:41-42,45-46 Knott, Frank M. 13:47 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP9O-00845ROO0100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Knudson, Richard L. 17.47 Koup Attempt, Part 11" 16:44-50,21; "Death Loomis, Patry E. 16:54 Kochtitsky, Robert B. 16:46 Overtakes a Spy" 19:34; "From Phoenix Lopez, Claudio 20:38 Koestler, Arthur Associates to Civilian-Military Assistance'' Lopez Garcia, Romeo 13.46 Darkness at Noon 23:25 22:18-19; "From the Hessians to the Contras: Lopez Rega, Jose 23:18 Victor P., Jr. 14-15:9 Kohl Mercenaries in the Service of Imperialism'' Lorenzo Perez, David 19.11 , Kohn, Clara 18:49 22:10-I I; "Nazis and Klansmen: Soldier of Louden. Ronald A. 13:26 Kokalis, Peter G. 22:20 Fortune's Seamy Side" 22:22-24: "Sources and Loudhawk, Kenny 24:20 Kolev (Bulgarian official) 23:23 Methods: CIA Assassinations-Part III" Louison, Einstein 20:11. 223 Komer, Robert W. 17:52 17:52,50; "Sources and Methods: CIA Louison, George 22:3 Konrad Adenauer Foundation 16:23 Assassinations Part IV" 20:44,39; "Sources Lourdes Mejia, Maria 16:41 Kopkind, Andrew 24:36 and Methods: CIA Religion" 18:68,66; "Sources Lovett, Ralph B. 20:39 Koppel. Ted 17:35-36,39; 18:13 and Methods: Flim-Flan" 21:44,42; "Sources low intensity warfare, theory and practice of 243- Korean Air Lines flight 007 21:30: 22:34 and Methods: Germ Warfare Disinformation'' 11 ''The Korean Spy Plane: Flight 007 Aptly 16:60,58; "Sources and Methods: Mail Lowenstein, Allard K. 23:44 Named" (Lawrence) 20:40-42 Surveillance, Part II" 13:49-50; "Sources and Lowery, Boyd 18:51 Korean Central Intelligence Agency 20:38,42 Methods: The CIA Legend" 19:40,37-38; "The Lubow, Arthur 24:9 Kosiak, Ivan 25:52 History of U.S. Bio-Chemical Killers" 17:5-7; Lucas. Kae 21:35 Kostiw, Michael V. 13:47; 14-15:12 "The Korean Spy Plane: Flight 007 Aptly Lucas, Max 16:47 Kovaci, Ismail 23:13 Named'' 20:40-42; "The New State Repression" Lucas Garcia, Benedicto 1835 Kovalec, Kathy 21:39 24:3-11 Luce, Clare Boothe 18:15. 2L26,291 24:35: 25:34- Kozonguizi, Jariretundu 13:15 Lawrence, Robert 35 Robert H. 21:27 Krieble "Evangelicals Support Guatemalan Dictatorship" Luce, Don 21:30 , Krieger, Harold 21:36 18:34-40 Luce, Phillip Abbott 21:37 Kruks, Sonia 23:29 Leach, Jim 17:9 Lucom, Wilson C. 21:25-26 Krupp Company 25:11 Leahy, Patrick J. 25:3 Ludlum. Robert 1625 Ku Klux Klan 13:3,51; 20:5; 22:18,22; 24:3 Lebanon Lukas, Karl 25:4 "Behind the Klan's Karibbean Koup Attempt, CIA in 14-15:11; 24:2; resources for organizing Lumumba. Patrice 16:8 Part I'' (Lawrence) 13:22-27: "Behind the Klan's 19:35 Lund, Peder 22:16 Karibbean Koup Attempt, Part 11" (Lawrence) LeCarre. John 24:37 Lundahl, Frederick Boyce 13.19,28: 14-15:14 16:44-50,21 Ledeen, Michael A. 13:53; 18:12,15; 19:8,11,22- Luns, Joseph M.A.H. 13:12 Kuboki, Osami 25:53 24; 22:5,41; 23:4-5,20-21,26,30,37 Lupton. Robert Hiller 14-15.14 Kuhnen, Michael 25:18 "Italian Officials Finger Ledeen, CIA" 22:41 Luque, Leone/ 18:30 Kujau, Konrad 21:41 Lee, Daulton 16:53 Lusane, Clarence Kunstler, William M Lee, Edward A. " 'Israeli Arms in Central America' Receives "The Ordeal of Leonard Peltier" 24:25-29 The Lurnpenproletariat and Repression: A Case Award" 22:34: "Grenada, Airport '83: Reagan's Kupperman, Robert H. 22:5; 23:32 Study 24:5,11 Big Lie'' 19:29-32: "The U.S. Connection. Kuwait, CIA in 14-15:11 Leeper, British Ambassador 25:44 South African Torture" 18:55-56. ''Washington's Paula 18:56 Kuzmich Lefebvre, Gene 24:14 " , Nguyen Cao 20:39; 21:36 Ky Lefever, Ernest W. 13:2,13; 18:6; 19:12,22: 20:26 20:14- Proxy: Israeli Arnis in Central America , Legum, Colin 16:5 37 Lehrman, Lewis E. 25:50 Luther, Richard M. 14-15:11 L Leibman, Morris 1. 24:35 Lykas, Judge 25:48-49 La Pointe, Paul 13:39 Lelyveld, Joseph 16:12 Lyons, Eugene 2126: 2533 l.a Prensa (Nicaragua) 16:33-42; 18:5.18-19 Lemnitzer, Lyman L. 21:40; 25:14,32-33 17 8 D l k Leone, Giovanni 23:22,24 : oug as Lac ey, Lagnado, Lucette 17:42 Lemoux. Penny 18:17 M Lagorio (Minister of Defense in Italy) Lescaze, Lee 21:31 MacBride, Sean 13:6,8; 23.41 23:19,24,26,36 Lesotho 22:39 MacGiven, Arthur 13:30.33 Lamprecht, Nick 22:12 Letelier. Isabel 21:31-32 Machel, Samora 2239.40 Landau, Jacob M. Letelier. Orlando 16:33: 18:14; 21:31-32; 22:14 MacKenzie, Angus Pan-Turkism in Turkey: A Study in Irredentism Letterman Army Institute of Research 16:58 Sabotaging the Di.ssideni I'ri's, 2139 23:38; Radical Politics in Modern Turkey 23:38 Levin, Carl 17:24 MacKenzie, Ian 19:12 Landis, Fred Levin, Michael 17:3; 25:3 MacMichael, David C- 222-3 "CIA Media Operations in Chile, Jamaica, and Levin, Murray B. 19:14,23 MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour 23:4-5 Nicaragua" 16:32-43; "Moscow Rules Moss's Levine, Isaac Don 25:33 Mader Julius Mind" 2436-38; "Opus Dei: Secret Order Vies Lewis, Anthony 19:22; 22:39 , Who's Who in the CIA 1657 for Power" 18:11-15; "Uncle Sam's Georgie Lewis, Marx 21:26; 22:31 Girl'' 19:25-28 /.'Express (France) 13:48; 21:27 Maestas, Roberto 24:29 Edward Geary 16:37-38,41: 18:46,68; Lansdale Leyton, Armando 25:18 Magsaysay, Ramon 17:4: 18 46.68 , 56 19:27: 20:39; 2125; 25:34 liberation theology 18:2-3 Maier, Francis X. 25:38 , Laos 2140 Liberia 13:34 Majano, Colonel 18:25 CIA in 17:44: 18:48-50; 22:10 CIA in 13:47; 14-15:11 Malan, Magnus 13:37-38: 16:13: 1856 Lappe, Marc Liberty Lobby 13:27; 22:22; 25:34 Malaysia, CIA in 13:47 Chemical and Biological Warfare: The Science of Libya 13:34-35; 14-15:3; 16:5; 17:50 Maldives, CIA in 14-15:11 Public Death 17:28 Lichenstein, Charles 22:40 Malvaney. George Taylor 13:24. 16.45-46. 20 5 Laqueur, Walter 19:22 Liebman, Marvin 21:25 Man Tech Company 2(1:31 Larkin, Felix 25:28 Liechty Philip 17:4 Mancham, James R.M- 161,.9 10 Larkin, Joseph J. 25:30 Liendo, Jose Gregorio 24:37 Maniadakis 2543 LaRouche, Lyndon 19:9; 24:5 Lilley, James R. 16:56 Manikham, Touy 1746 Larson, Carl A. 17:25 Lincoln Institute 22:31 Mankiewicz, Frank 2138 Larson, Donald J. 24:18 Lindsay, John Rose 16:48 Mankind Quarterlc 25:12 Larson, Lindsay 16:47 Linebarger. Paul 16:34 Manley, Michael 16.35,37-38,43: 193 1-32,36: Latin America, resources for organizing 17:47 Linse, Kathy 21:31 20:6: 24:38 al Conference (CELAM) isco tin American E L Lipton Foundation, Thomas J. 21:28 p p a 1817-20 Lisenby, Robert Lee 13:23,27; 16:49-50 Mann, P.Q. (pseu(I -) 22:34 Latin American Working Group Litton Industries 21:27 Manor, Roy 1652 Central American Women Speak for Themselves Lloyd, David A. 13:26 Manson Forum 22:31 23:39; I.AWG Letter 17:47 Lockheed Corporation 21:19; 2322,24 Manson. Frank 2231 Dick 13:18 Lauer Loctite Corporation 21:27-28 Mantarov, lordan 19:23 , Laurent, Frederic 25:30-31 Lofgren, William S. 14-15:14 Marchetti, Victor 13:19; 1718, 2134 Law Association for Asia and the Western Pacific Lofton, John 21:38 Marchetti, Victor and Marks, John (Lawasia) 16:53 Loftus, John J. 25:12,33 The C'IA and the Cull of Inte'lligenty 1868 Lawler, Philip F. 25:38 The Belarus Secret 23:15 Marcinkus. Paul 25:35 Lawrence. Ken Loggia Propaganda 23:18 Marcos, Ferdinand 20:39 "Behind the Klan's Karibbean Koup Attempt, Lohuaru, Matt 14-15:12 Marcovich, Herbert 17:12 Part 1" 13:22-27: "Behind the Klan's Karibbean Loo, Clyde "Mark" 24:30-33 Marella, Paolo Cardinal 2530 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Marik, Warren J. 14-15:13 Mendelson, Johanna 21:31 Morales. Jose 24:14 Marion. Leon 18:50-51 Mengele, Josef 24:35; 25:2,4-8 Moreau, Arthur 25:51 Markov, Georgi 17:11 Menges, Constantine C. 16:20,22-23,27; 18:6; Morgan-Witts, Max 23:37 Marks, John 19:27 Morlion, Felix A. 25:30 The Search for the Manchurian Candidate 16:38; "Constantine Menges: CIA Ideologue" (Arthur) Moro, Aldo 22:42 17:16,28 16:22-23 Moro, Thomas 19:26 The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence 18:68 Mennonite Central Committee 17:12; 18:51 Morocco 13:34-35 Marsh, John, Jr. 17:22 Mercedes-Benz Company 25:11 CIA in 14-15:11 Marshall, Richard 24:23-24,27 mercenaries 13:3,16-17; 16:6-10; 17:48-49; Moser, Charles 22:31 Martella, Ilario 19:17; 21:20-21; 23:4,14,21- 22:2,4,6,10-24 Moss, Robert 13:48; 16:25,35; 17:47; 18:12-13; 20,33,35-37 "From Phoenix Associates to Civilian-Military 19:7-8,10,33; 21:30-31,35; 23:16,33; 24:36-38 Marti, Jose 16:28 Assistance" (Lawrence) 22:18-19; "From the Chile's Marxist F.rperiment 21:31; 24:36-37; Martin, David 18:13 Hessians to the Contras: Mercenaries in the Collapse of Democracy 24:36; Death Beam Martini, Fulvio 22:41 Service of Imperialism" (Lawrence) 22:10-11: 18:13,15; 24:36,38; Monimho 24:36; "Moscow Marx, John P. 13:47 "The 'Buffalo Battalion': South Africa's Black Rules Moss's Mind" (Landis) 24:36-38; Moscow Mas Canosa, Jorge 25:34 Mercenaries" 13:16-17 Rule's 24:36-38; The Spike 16:27,35; 19:8,16; Massing, Michael 21:9 Merex AG Company 25:5,8 24:36-38 Matallana, Jose Carlos 18:41 Merikoski, Juba Oliva 14-15:7 Motley, Langhorne A. 20:6,29; 25:51 Mathewson, David Preston 14-15:12 Merk, Kurt 25:9 Mott, William Chamberlain 21:26 Matthews, Lodrich E. 16:45,47 Merkt, Stacey 24:13 Movement for the National Liberation of Matthiessen, Peter Mersan, Omer 23:6,36 Barbados (MONALI) In the Spirit of Crazy Horse 25:54 Merser, Friederich 25:11 Brek Loose 17:47 Mauritania 14-15:3; 16:5 Meselson, Matthew 16:58; 17:8,11,17-18,21,24; Moyers, Bill 21:29 Mauritius 14-15:3; 17:4 22:35 Moynihan, Daniel 19:11 CIA in 13:47; 16:4-5; Militant Movement 16:4-5 Messerschmidt Company 25:11 Mozambique 13:36; 22:38-40 Maury, John M. 16:27 Messerschmidt, Jim "Mozambique Rebels Exposed" 16:13; CIA in Mayberry, Thomas 13:53 The Trial of Leonard Peltier 21:39 13:28,36; 16:13; 18:54; FRELIMO 13:31,33: Mayorka, Santiago 22:27 Messing, Andrew 22:31; 25:56 Mozambique National Resistance 13:9,31,33; McAlpine, Harrison, Jr. 14-15:10 Metcalf, Joseph III 20:15-16,27 16:13; 22:38 McAnamey, Charles A. 22:19 Metzger, John 22:17 Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Information McCarthy, John F. 111 14-15:14 Meyer, Cord, Jr. 13:56; 16:27 Centre McCarthy, Joseph 19:24; 23:32-33; 24:4; 25:8,25 Meyer, Edward C. 16:14-15; 17:21,25 People's Power 13:51; 17:47 McCarthy, William E. 13:47 Miami Herald 19:9-10 Mudge, Dirk 13:6 McCartney, James 19:24; 22:8 Michaels, Robert Alan 16:50 Mueller, Heinrich 25:10-11 McCavitt, John J. 13:48 Michel, James H. 20:13-14 Mugabe, Robert 13:10,36: 16:13 McCleary, Paul 18:51 Middendorf. William 18:34 Mulder, Connie 13:7,31 McClellan, John 21:35 Mikulak, Robert 17:10-11 Mullin, Stan 17:37-39,42 McCloskey, Pete 17:39 Miller, Donald L. 13:47 Mumcu, Ugur 23:14-15,38 McCloy, John J. 25:8 Miller, Jonathan S. 21:12 Murdoch, Rupert 19:10; 21:41 McClure, Brooks 20:44 Milliken Foundaton 21:28 Murray, Pat 18:30 McColl, Alexander M.S. 22:17-18 Mills, Robert H. 14-15:10 Murray, William Dennis 14-15:10 McCone, John 25:27,34 Mindzenty Cardinal 25:34 Mussolini, Benito 18:12 McCoy, Charles P. 14-15:11 , Mingolla Alfredo Mario 25:15-17 19-20 Muzorewa, Abel 13:31; 22:24 McDonald, Kathryn 24:34 , , Mirocha, Chester J. 17:9,11,46 Myers, Brigadier General 20:31 Myers, Charles E. 14-15:11 McDonald, Larry Patton 13:7; 16:27; 19:9; 21:31; Mitchell, Edgar L. 2027 24:34 Mitchell, Keith 20:20 McDonald, Melvin 24:13 Mitrione, Dan 16:17; 25:22 N McDonald, Walter J. 16:53 Mitsui Corporation 16:22 Naarendorp Harvey 20:6 McFarlane, Robert "Bud" 25:50 Mizelle, William R. 16:16 , Nairn, Allan 22:26 McGehee, Ralph W. 16:35,39; 18:22; 19:15; 20:42; Mobil Foundation, Inc. 21:28 Nalin, David R. 17:17 21:34 Mobil Oil Company 21:27-29 Namibia 1335,38-41; 18:53,55-56; 22:37-38,40 Deadly Deceits: My 25 Years in the CIA 19:7,37 Mobutu Sese Seko 13:16; 16:8,12 "The Namibia 'Solution': The Future of Southern McGinity, Patrick 16:46 Modica, Charles 20:7,9-10 Africa" (Ray and Schaap) 13:4-14; CANU 13:9; McGoff, John Peter 21:28,36,38 Moffett, William Adger IB 14-15:7 Democratic Turnhalle Alliance 13:4,6-8,13-14; McGrory, Mary 13:53 Moffitt, Ronni Karpen 18:14; 21:31-32; 22:14 PROSWA 13:7; SWAPO-D 13:9,33 McGuire, Mary Anne 13:23,25; 16:45,47 Mohawk, Richard 24:20 Namibia, SWAPO 13:4-14,33,35,38-39; 16:11 McKay, Karen 21:37 Mohn, Sid 24:12 Namibia Today 13:51 McKay, Thomas A. 18:51 Moi, Daniel T. arap 16:10 National Action/Research on the Military Industrial McKenzie, Bruce 17:50 Molinari, Colonel 25:17 Complex (NARMIC) 23:39 McKenzie, Robert P. 16:16 Moncada, Marlene 20:39,44 Up in Arms: U.S. Military Shipments to Central McKnight, Louis 22:19 Mondale Eleanor 24:36 America-A Guide far Activists 23:39 McKnight, Major General 20:31 , Mondale Walter 24:36 Nassib, Scum 19:35 McLaughlin, Bill 23:7 , Menge Luis Alberto 18:8; 20:28 37; 22:29 Nation magazine 24:36 McLean, John K. 21:24 , , Monroi, Mosca 25:18 National Academy of Sciences 21:30 National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics 2040 McLuhan, Marshall 21:14 Montealegre, Heraldo 18:25 National Alliance 13:22 25; 16:46; 22:22 McMahon, John N. 13:56 Montgomery, Hugh 16:56 , National Association for the Advancement of White McNamara, Martin J. 21:36 Montgomery, Stephen Elroy 14-15:7,10 People 16:44 McNamara, Robert 17:7; 19:5 Montileaux, Robert 24:23 National Association of Manufacturers 1929 McNeil, Dennis 17:50 Montini, Giovanni Battista 25:13,30-31,35 National Caucus of Labor Committees 24:5 McQuirter, James Alexander 13:23,26; 16:21,44- Moody, Dale 22:32 National Council of Churches 183,51 45,48 Moon, Peter 16:47 National Council of Community World Affairs McWilliams, James W. 13:48 Moon, Sun Myung 20:38-39; 21:26,29,36,38; Organizations 16:28 Means, Bob 18:39-40 22:30-33; 25:3,18-20,30,35,53 National Defense Council 25:56 Means, Russell 24:17,21-24,28-29 "Arnaud de Borchgrave Boards Moon's Ship" National Democratic Policy Committee 19:9 Media Network (Wolf and Clarkson) 24:34-35; "Pak in the National Endowment for the Arts 22:15 Guide to Films on Central America 21:40 Saddle Again" (Clarkson) 20:38-39 National Intelligence Service (NIS) (South Africa) Medvedev, Zhores 16:58 Moore, Capt. John 13:12 1333 Meenery, John Winn 18:30 Moore John D J 25:28 National Journalism Center 22:31 Meese, Edwin III 13:42; 18:34; 22:5; 24:6,8-9 , . . Moore Robin 13:7; 16:6; 22:22 National Lawyers Guild Meislin, Richard 21:10-13 , Moorer, Thomas H. 21:26 Guatemala: Repression and Resistance 13:51 National Public Radio 21:38 Mejia Victores, Oscar Humberto 20:37 Moral Majority 13:7,51 National Review 18:4,14; 19:8,27,31; 21:31,36, Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP9O-00845ROO0100170003-6 24:34,37: 25:38 National Right to Work Foundation 21:27 National Socialist Party of America 13:22,24-25 National Steel and Shipbuilding Company The NASSCO Case: A Case Study in Infiltration and Entrapment" (Holowach) 24:30- 33 National Strategy Information Center 21:26 National Student Association 13:53 Nationalist Action Party (Turkey) 19:13,16,18-19; 23:10-11,14-15,28,31.34 Natirboff, Murat 14-15:8 Native Americans "The Covert War Against Native Americans" (Churchill) 24:16-21 Navaro, Wilfredo 18:53-54 Navarro, Anthony 25:34 Navasky, Victor Nanning Names 14-15:5 Nazar, Ruzi 23:15 Nazis 13:3,22,24-25, 20:5; 22:22,42: 24:3; 25:2 ''How Allen Dulles and the SS Preserved Each Other" (Scott) 25:4-14, in Bolivia 25:15-20; in Canada 16:47 Nazis and U ,S. corporations "The Real Treason" (Preston) 25:23-25 NBC News 19:14-23, 23:5-7,27-28,36-37 Neagoy, George 25:10 Needham, Joseph 17:7 Negroponte. Diana 18:23-24 Negroponte,John D. 18:8,10,23; 22:25-26 Nelson, Alan C. 24:12 Nepal, CIA in 14-15:11 Nestle Coodination Center for Nutrition, Inc. 21:28 Netanyahu, Jonathan 22:5 Netherlands, CIA in 14-15:11 Network in Solidarity with the People of Guatemala (NISGUA) Guatemala Network News 21:41 Nevin, Edward 17:16 New Jewel Movement (Grenada) 20:3-4,7-8,10,39 New Leader 21:32 New Left 1350 Nerr Republic 19:8.11 New School of Social Research 21:26 New Tribes Mission (Bolivia) 18:45 New World Dynamics 22:31 New World Information Order 23:41 New York Post 19:9-10 New York Times 19:8,23-24; 21:4,9-14; 2230: 23.4-5,9,17,21,27-28,33-37 .. 'Objective' News as Systematic Propaganda: The Nerr York Times on the 1984 Salvadoran and Nicaraguan Elections'' (Herman) 21:7-13 Nerr York Tribune 2038; 24:34-35 New York University 19:34 News World Communications 24:34 Newsweek magazine 13:49. 16:27; 18:13; 19:8; 20:26: 23:28: 24:35 Media Manipulation: Covert Propaganda in Time and Newsweek" (Friel) 21:14-23 Newton, Frederick 13:25; 16:47 Nguyen, Nguyen Van 22:13 Nicaragua " 'Privatizing' the War" (Clarkson) 22:30-33; ''CIA Media Operations in Chile, Jamaica, and Nicaragua" (Landis) 16:32-43: "Nicaragua Braces for War" (Ray and Schaap) 20:25-30; "Nicaragua Under Siege: CIA's 'Secret' War Escalates" (Ray and Schaap) 18:7-10; "Nicaragua Update: Feverish Overthrow Plan Builds Toward Climax'' (Wolf) 22:25-29; "Nicaragua Update: The War Widens" (Ray and Schaap) 21:4-6; "The Ideological Struggle Within the Catholic Church in Nicaragua" (Hynds) 18:16-20; ''The Masaya Affair" (Ray and Schaap) 18:4-6: and Israel 20:35-36; ARDE 20:27-29; 21:5; 22:20,26-29; CIA in 16:3,18,20- 21; 17:50; 20:26-30: 21:4-6; 25:56; Contras 18:10,32; 20:27-30; 21:4-6; 22:2.26-33; 23:39; 24:35; 25:50-51,53,56; elections (1984) 21:1 1; FDN 18:9; 20:27-29; 21:5; 22:19,26-28; 25:51- 52; Fifteenth of September League 18:23; FSLN 18:18-20; military strength 18:26-28; Office of Communications Media 18:18,20 Nicaragua, and Honduras see Honduras Nicaragua, Miskito Indians 16:20-21; 18:10,28. 20:25,28 ' 22:1 1,32; 23:39: 25:36,53 "Covert Action and Indigenous Groups: The Miskito Case" (Ortiz) 18:21-24; Operation Red Christmas 18:23-24,32 Nicaragua Information Center Nicaraguan Perspec'tire.s 17:47; 21:40-41 Nicaraguan Development Council 25:51 Nicaraguan Freedom Fund 24:35; 25:35 Nicaraguan Refugee Fund 25:51 Nickerson, David 14-15:12 Nicol, Donald J. 14-15:10 Nicolaides, Philip 16:28 Nigeria 13:36,39 CIA in 13:47; 14-15:11-12 Nimetz, Matthew 17:13 Nimieri, Gafaar 13:34 Nimitz, Chester 17:6 Nixon. Richard M. 13:52; 21:29: 25:8,38 Noel, Lloyd 20:20 Noel, Vincent 20:11,21 Norris, Michael Stanley 13:25; 16:45-46 North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) 20:35 Report on the Americas 17:47 North, Oliver L. 25:50-51 Northland Poster Collective 23:41 Nortic Enterprises, Inc. 13:22,24,26; 16:44 Noticias del Mundo 20:38: 24:34 Nott, John 17:22 Novak, Michael 16:28; 18:15; 24:35 Novak, Robert 21:31 Non'r magazine (Britain) 16:58,60 Nueva Action Cristiana (Chile) 16:42 Nugan, Frank 16:51,54-55 Nugan Hand Bank "The Australian Connection: t_aan Hand. the CIA Bank" (Grodin) 16:51-55 Nujoma, Sam 13:1,8,13,38 Nunn, Craig 22:17 Nunn, Sam 17:25 Nussbaum, Perry 16:46 Nutting, Wallace H. 18:26,30,40 Nyerere. Julius 22:38 0 Obando y Bravo, Miguel 18:4-6,16,18-19; 25:37 "Archbishop Obando y Bravo and the Institute on Religion and Democracy" 18:6 Oherdorfer, Don 16:25 O'Brien. Conor Cruise 19:15; 23:31 O'Brien. Morgan J. 25:30 O'Brien, Robert 18:51 ODESSA 25:8 O'Donnell Foundation 21:28 Oines, James 24:14-15 Ojukwu Colonel 13:31 Okhrana (Tsar's secret police) 244 O'Leary, Jeremiah 16:57; 18:14; 21:31 Olgater, Christian 16:7 Olivares. Agusto 19:27 Ollivier, Louis Leon, Jr. 13:28 Olmer, Lionel H. 14-15:14 Olson, Frank R. 17:15-16 Oman, CIA in 14-15:12; 2440 Omega 7 13:3; 22:14,35,41 Omega Group Ltd. 22:14-21 Operation Bernhard 25:11 Operation Bohica 1733,35,38 Operation CHAOS see CIA Operation Goodwill 21:15-16 Operation Grand Eagle 17:40 Operation Minaret 18:57 Operation MONGOOSE see CIA Operation Ranch Hand 18:58; 21:30 Operation Shamrock 18:57 Operation Sojourner we U.S., Immigration and Naturalization Service Operation Sunrise 25:12-13 Operation Velvet Hammer 17:33,38,40 Opus Dci 25:37 "Opus Dei: Secret Order Vies for Power'' (Landis) 18:11-15 Organization of American States 18:21,34 Organization of Eastern Caribbean States 20:5,28 Orr, Diane 2420 Orrego, Claudio 18:14 Orrego, Francisco 1814 Ortega, Daniel 18:9,19-20; 19:10; 21:23; 22 25,27 Ortega, Humberto 16.33 Ortiz, Frank Vincent, Jr. 20:3-4; 2538 Ortiz, Roxanne Dunbar "Covert Action and Indigenous Gawps: The Miskito Case'' 1821-24 Ortolani, Umberto 25:34 Orwell, George Animal Farm 16:39-40 Osburg, John L. 1323 Osgood, Charles 1637-38 O'Shaughnessy, Hugh 20:14 15 Ostrow, Ronald J. 16:25,30 Oswald, I,ee Harve) 1938 Otis, George 1864-65 OTRAG Company 13:26 Ottone, Piero 2319 Ovryn, Rachel "Operation Sojourner: Targeting the Sanctuan Movement" 24:12-15 Ox Hollow Foundation 21 28 Oxfam America 2339 Oymen, Orsan 23.13-14 Ozal, Turgut 23:29 Ozgun, Faruk (pseud-) 239,14 P Pacifica Radio Network 24:36 Packard, David 21:29 Padgett. Herman 20:38 Padgett, John 2220,23 Pagliai, Pierluigi 25:18 Paisley, John Arthur 1653 Pak, Bo Hi 21:36: 22:31-32; 2434-35; 2518-19 "Pak in the Saddle Again" (('larkson( 20.38 W Pak Chung Hee 20:38: 21:26 Pakistan, CIA in 14-15:12 Paladin Press 22:16,22-23 Palestine Liberation Organization 2133: 22.42_: 23:16 Palladino, Jack 1742 Palmer, A. Mitchell 1914 24 Palmer. Morton Mow bray III 14 151'_ Palombo, Louis 1'. 17:48 Pan-Atricanist Congress 13:30 Pan American Health Organization 17:29-30 Panama, CIA in 1750 Panax Corporation 21:28,38 Partin. Jeffrey 14-15:11 Panther Press 2216 Papadopoulos, George 25:43 Papagos, General 25:40 Papandreou, George 25:39,43 Paraffins Oil Corporation 21 27 Paraguay. CIA in 14-1512_ Parisi, Vincenzo 22.41 Park, Tongsun 20:38 Parker, Aida 13:13 Parker, Dana Herbert 2_218-19 Parker Foundation 21:28 Parker, Jay A. 21.36: 22:31 Parks, John 1315 Parrilli, Luigi 25:12-13,33 Parrott, Thomas 18:68 Pastor, Robert _20:5,9-10 Pastora, Eden 13:46; 18:9: _20:2528,37; 21:5: 22:20,27 Patrick. Douglas Lee 13:18 Pauken, Thomas 1353 Pauker, Guy J. 16:53 Paul. Anthony 2135 Paul, Ronald 16:45 Paul VI (Pope) 25:10,13,35 Pavelic, Ante 25:7-8,10 Pavitt, James Lynn 1347 Pax Christi IS: i6,18-20 Paz Garcia, Policarpio 13:44 Pazienza, Francesco 23:20-21.26,30, 25:36 Pearson and Company 2231 Pearson, David 22:34 Pearson, Drew 25:26 Pearson, Roger 25:32,36 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP9O-00845ROO0100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP9O-00845ROO0100170003-6 Pearson, Ron 22:31 Peirce, Michael 22:24 Pell, Claiborne 16:22; 23:27 Pellegrini, Carlos 16:15 Peltier, Leonard 21:39; 24:1,19,21,23-29 "The Ordeal of Leonard Peltier" (Kunstler) 24:25-29 Penkovsky, Oleg H. 16:60 Peolosi, Prefect 23:18 Pepsico 21:28 Percy, Charles 23:27 Perdue, Michael Eugene 13:22,24,26; 16:21,44-46 Peres, Shimon 22:5 Perez Marcos, Jacinto 18:38 Perkins Foundation, Barbara 21:28 Perle, Richard N. 18:15 Peron, Isabel 16:14 Peron, Juan 25:34 Perren, Jorge 16:15 Perry, Paul 25:19-20 Peru 18:42,44-45 CIA in 14-15:12 Peters and Margaret Peters Trust, Earle M. 21:28 Peterson, Dale 17:11,42 Peterson, Mark L. 20:27 Peterzell, Jay 22:3 Petrocelli, Major 23:21 Petrov, Sotir 23:24 Petrucci, Basilio 25:36 Pettinelli, Joseph 14-15:11 Pfeifel, Linda 20:44 Pfeiffer, E.W. 17:12 "Book Review: The Chemical Scythe (Hay)" 18:58-59 Pfister, James 20:7 Phelan, James J. 25:30 Philadelphia Inquirer 19:24 Philip Morris 21:18 Philip, Oliver N. 13:23 Philippines, CIA in 13:21; 14-15:12; 18:46 Phillip, Oliver 16:48 Phillip, Walton 16:47 Phillips, David Atlee 13:3; 21:31 Phillips Petroleum 21:28-29 Phoenix Associates 22:18 Phoenix Program 13:53; 17:52; 22:15; 25:52 Pichel, Thourot 25:36 Pierce, William L. The Turner Diaries 13:25 Pierson, Don 13:25 Pierson, Grey 13:25 Pike, Douglas 21:12,36 Pike, Kenneth L. 18:43 Pinay, Antoine 25:38 Pine Bluff Arsenal (Arkansas) 17:14,18 Pinochet Ugarte, Augusto 13:12; 18:14; 25:5 Piper, Howell 13:25: 16:47-48 Pipes, Richard E. 19:23; 23:16 Pius XI (Pope) 25:30 Pius XII (Pope) 25:10,30-31,33,35 Playboy Press 18:62 Plues, Richard E. 14-15:12 Podhoretz, Norman 16:28; 19:28; 23:16 Poelaert, Father (Vatican intelligence agent) 25:30 Pol Pot 17:12; 18:50; 19:22; 22:24 Poland, elections in (1947) 21:8 Poli, Arnie 16:44,47 Policy Alternatives for the Caribbean and Central America (PACCA) Changing Course: Blueprint for Peace in Central America and the Caribbean 21:39 Pot i sario Sahara Report 23:40 Pollis, Adamantia 23:29 Ponce, Jose 21:40 Poor Bear, Myrtle 24:23-25,27-28 Poos, Robert 22:17 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Bulletin 13:55 Portada (Chile) 18:14 Porter, John 16:27 Portugal, George 25:19 Posey, Thomas V. 22:18-19,31; 25:51,53 Posse Comitatus 24:3 Potts, James M. 14-15:8 Poulson, Admiral 17:40 Powell, James P. III 22:19 Powell, John W. 17:7,17 Powell, Sylvia 17:7 Powers, Francis Gary 20:40 Prats, Carlos 16:33 Prensa Libre (Guatemala) 13:45 Preseren (Vatican intelligence agent) 25:30 Press Association of Jamaica 19:36 Presser, Jackie 21:35-36 Preston, William, Jr. "Disinformation and Mass Deception: Democracy as a Cover Story" 19:3-12; "The Real Treason" 25:23-25 Pretoria Institute for Strategic Studies 16:13 Prewett, Virginia 16:16 Price, David 24:17,20,24,27; 25:54 Pringle, Peter 17:19 Priore, Rosario 23:22 Pritchard, Robert William 13:25; 16:45-46 Private Agencies Collaborating Together 18:51 private intelligence firms 17:48 Privitera, John J. 24:25 Pro Deo 25:30 Progressive Labor Party 13:50 Progressive magazine 21:40 Project 63 25:23,26 Project Democracy 19:11-12 Project Overcast 25:23 Project Paperclip 25:23,26,28 Project Resistance see CIA Prokhorov, Aleksandr M. 24:29 Propaganda Due (P-2) 19:24; 22:41-42; 23:4,17- 21,26,33,38; 25:27,34-35,38 Propper, Eugene 19:25; 21:31 Prosterman, Roy 16:22 Protestant Relief and Development Agency 18:23 Prouty, L. Fletcher 16:47,52; 17:48 Provisional IRA 23:31 provocateurs and informers in American Indian Movement 24:16-29; in anti- draft movement 16:49; in Italy 22:42; in labor movement 24:30-33; in sanctuary movement 24:12-15; theory of 24:2,4,6,10-I1 Pryor, David 17:20 pseudo gangs 24:5 psychic research 21:44 psychological propaganda 21:14-23 psychological warfare 13:21; 16:19,32-43; 19:3,5; 20:19; 21:15,25,31; 23:44 "Sources and Methods: CIA Religion" (Lawrence) 18:68,66 Puga, Alvaro 18:15 Puren, Jeremiah "Josh" 16:8 Puthoff, Harold 21:44 Pyes, Craig 25:52 Q Qaddafi, Muammar 13:34,37; 14-15:3; 16:5,24-25; 17:50; 23:20 Quaker Oats Company 21:28 Que Pasa 18:13-14 Quintero, Rodolfo 16:37 Quixote Center Honduras: A Look at the Reality 23:39-40; Nicaragua. A Look at the Reality 23:39-40 R R.J. Reynolds Company 21:17-18 Rabb, Maxwell 22:41 Rabe, Mike 18:39 Rabel, Ed 21:33 Rabin, Yitzhak 22:5 Radio CFTR (Toronto) 13:22-23,27; 16:45 Radio Free Europe 13:6; 19:6; 23:15,27; 25:27-28 Radio Liberty 19:6; 21:26; 23:27; 25:27-28,33 Radio Marti 16:28; 19:6,12; 25:34 Radio Swan 19:6; 25:34 Radio Venceremos 13:43 Signal of Freedom 23:39 Radio WHMM 19:31 Radix, Kenrick 20:17,19; 22:3 Radosh, Ronald and Milton, Joyce The Rosenberg Files: A Search for Truth 25:23 Ramgoolam, Seewoosagur 16:5,10 Ramirez, Carlos 18:34,40 Ramirez Zelaya, Jorge Ignacio 20:39 Ramos, Amoldo 21:40 RAND Corporation 16:22,53; 17:14; 19:27; 21:36; 22:4,31: 23:28; 25:50 Randal, Jonathan 23:38 Randi, James The Magic of Uri Geller 21:44 Raptis, Nikos "Eleni: The Work of a 'Professional Liar' 25:41-49 Rashke, Richard The Killing of Karen Silkwood 13:51 Raskob, John J. 25:30 Rat Line 25:8,10-11,14 Rather, Dan 21:33 Rauff, Walter 19:27; 25:2.5,11-12,14,17 Rauh, Richard W. 14-15:11 Raw Materials Report 17:47 Ray, Ellen 22:34 "Argentina Activates International Death Squads" 16:14-16; "Disinformation and Mass Deception: Democracy as a Cover Story" 19:3- 12; "Nicaragua Braces for War" 20:25-30; "Nicaragua Under Siege: CIA's 'Secret' War Escalates" 18:7-10; "Nicaragua Update: The War Widens'' 21:4-6; "Pentagon Moves on 'Terrorism' " 224-9; "The Indian Ocean: Seychelles Beats Back Mercenaries" 16:4-10; "The Masaya Affair" 18:4-6; "The Namibia 'Solution': The Future of Southern Africa" 13:4- 14; "U.S. Crushes Caribbean Jewel" 20:3-20; "Yellow Rain Skeptic Found Dead" 17:43-46 Rayburn, James 24:14 RCA Corporation 21:34 Reader's Digest 18:13; 19:7-10,18; 21:26,28; 23:3- 4,9,27-28,30-31,33 Reader's Digest Foundation 21:28 Reagan, Maureen 17:39 Reagan, Ronald 16:25-26; 17:20; 19:9,11; 20:6-7; 21:38; 22:38; 23:17,28-29; 24:2,6,8-9,29,34,36; 25:2-3,27,50-51,56 Reason Foundation 22:30 Reason Magazine 22:30 Rebozo, Charles G. "Bebe" 21:29 Recto, Claro M. 20:39 Red, Robert 18:30 Red Army Faction 24:5 Red Brigades 22:42; 23:26,35 red scares 23:5 Red Star Cadre 24:5 Redeker, Bill 17:40 Redmond, Paul J., Jr. 14-15:7-8 Reed, Dana 20:34; 22:34 Reedman (FBI agent) 24:28 Rees, John Herbert 19:9 Rees, Martin 17:9 Rees, Merlyn 19:34 Refugee Relief International 22:33; 25:35 Regalado, Gideon 17:12 Regent (Vatican intelligence agent) 25:30 Reid, Malcolm 13:25; 16:47 Reisinger, Thomas D. 22:20 Rene, Albert 16:4-5,9-10 Reno, Donald 24:13 Reporter magazine 18:12 Republic of New Afrika 24:27 Resist 13:50 Resource Center Honduras: On the Border of War 21:40 Reston, James 23:29 Reuters 18:4 Review ofthe News 13:15; 19:9; 25:36 Revolutionary Union 13:50 Reynolds Foundation, J.B. 21:28 Rhodesia see also Zimbabwe and mercenaries 22:18,24; CIA in 22:10,18 Rhoodie, Eschel 13:7,31; 16:6 Rice, Wesley H. 22:8 Richard, Mark R. 18:30 Richardson Testamentary Trust, Grace Jones 21:28 Richardson Charitable Trust, H. Smith 21:28 Richardson, Robert C. III 25:32 Richter, Heinz Greece Between Revolution and Counterrevolution (1936-1949) 25:44-45 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP9O-00845ROO0100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Ricord, Auguste Joseph 25:8-9 Rustin, Bayard 23:16 Scholtes, Richard A. 22:7 Ridenhour, Ron 24:9 Ruth, Thomas A. 11 14-15:8 School of the Americas (Panama) 25:16 Riding, Alan 16:41 Ryan, Allan A. 25:9-10 Schorr, Daniel 16:56: 2436 Riley, Brigadier General 20:31 Ryan, John 1). 25:30 Schreiber, Walter Enid 25:7,26 Riley, Murray Stewart 16:54 Ryan, John H. 21:38 Schreyer, William A. 25:38 Ringdahl, Phillip H. 13:47 Ryan, Leo John 16:57 Schrihman, David 2042 Rio Tinto Zinc 13:5 Ryan. Leo Joseph 16:57 Schroeder, Patricia 2214 Rios Monti, Efrain 18:34-37: 19:30: 2028,37 Ryan, Vincent J. 25:34 Schultz Foundation 2128 Rios Montt, Mario 18:35 Schultz, W.G. 2418 Ripon Society 21:36 Schuman. Julian 17 7 Rips. Geoffrey S Schutt. Jane 16:46 Unamcriran Activities, The Campaign Against S-Cubed Company 17:21 Schwartz. Jack 24211 the Underground Pre.c.e 1747 Sadat, Anwar 13:34-35,55: 14-15:2-3: 16:25 Schwartz, Stew 17:37,42 Ritholz, Jules 21:36 Safire, William 19:22-23,38: 21:6 Schwarz, Fred 25:38 Rivera, Brooklyn 189 SAGE Associates 16:22 Schwend, Frederick 25:5-7,1 1,14 Rivera y Dumas, Arturo 13:43 St. George's Medical School 20:7-8 Science for the People 21:29. 23:41 Rivero, Emilio Adolfo 21:37 St. Georges, Laurent Maubert 1348 Scientists and Engineers for Secure Energy. Inc. Riveros, Rene 19:25 St. John, Jeffrey 22:31 2126 Riviere, Bill 16:48 Salazar, Jorge 18:19 Scobie, General 25:39-40 Rizzo, Frank 21:29 Salim, Salim 22:38 Scoon, Paul 20 19 Rizzoli Publishing 23.19 Salisbury, Harrison 21:30 Scott. Joe 17:39 Roach, John 18:37 Salisbury, Steve 22:11,20 Scott. Peter Dale Roberto, Alfonso 18:9.16: 20:25,28-29: 22:27 Salvatori Foundation, Henry J. and Grace 21.27 ''How Allen Dulles and the SS Preserved Bach Roberto, Holden 13:10,16: 16:12: 21:25: 22:13 Samim, Ahmet 23:38 Other" 25:4-14 Roberts, Alun Samphan. Khieu 18:5(1 Scott, Terry L. 24:18 The Raising File: The Inside Storv of Britain's San Diego Police Department 24:30-33 Scott, Winston MacKinlev _2132 Secret ('orurart jar Namibian Uranium 13:51 San Luis Obispo (California) 249 Scricciulo, Luigi 23:27 Roberts, George 17:45 Sanchez, Celia 19:9 Scripps, Edward Wyllis 11 2129 Roberts, J. Milnor 22 31 Sanchez, Javier 18:10 Sdravos, C.hristos 2547 Roberts, Ronnie 13:25: 1647 Sanchez, Nestor D. 16:56: 18:8,10: 19:29-30: 22:25 Sea Swallows 2125 Roberts, Rowland F., Jr. 13:48: 14-15:13 Sanchez, Phillip 22:32: 24:34 Seaga, Edward 16:19,50: 19:36: 20:6,14 Robertson, Pat 18:34-35: 25:37-38,53 sanctuary movement Seagrave, Sterling 17:9 Robideau, Robert F.. 24:23-25,29 "Operation Sojourner: Targeting the Sanctuary Sea-Land Corporation 21:18 Robinson, Julian Perry 17:18-19.24 Movement" (Oveyn) 24:12-15 Sears, John P. 13:7: 18:55-56 Robinson, Randall 13.4 Sanders, Charles 22:13 Sears, Roebuck and Company 21.18 Rocca, Raymond G. 25:31-32 Sandoval Alarcon, Mario 25:52 Seaward Explorer Out)) 24:40 Rocha. Brenda 18:10 Sandoz Company 17:16 Seaward Services (Miani) 24:4(1 Rockefeller Foundation 13:50 Sanford Foundation 21:28 Security and Intelligence Fund 25 32 Rockefeller, John D. IV 13:50 Sangumba (Savimbi aide) 13:10 Seiler, John 16:28 Rockefeller, Nelson 18:17: 20:9: 2135 Santamaria, Amilcar 20:38 Seitz, Frederick 21:26,38 Rockwell. George Lincoln 16:47 Santiapichi, Severino 23:22 Scjna, Jan 16:27 Rockwell International 21:19 Santini, Father 23:26 Selig. William 25:19-20 Rodriguez, Ermila Loretta 2044 Santovito, Giuseppe 23:18,20: 25:35 Sellar, Don 19:35 Rodriguez. Rene 19:10-11 Sapp, Kenneth Mitchell 14-15:8 Senegal, CIA in 1347-48 Rodriguez Equizabal. Amando 21:10 Sara Mellon Scaife Foundation see Scaife Founda- Seraphin, Oliver 13:22.26: 16:44,48,50 Roehl. Carol Ann 14-15:13 tion Serge, Victor Rogers, Bernard 17:7 Santa Kenedy Fast Foundation 25:37 What Frervone Should h'non' About State Rogers, Montgomery L. 14-15:14 Sassen, Alfons 25:7.11 Repression 244 Rogers. Will 21.38 Sasser, Jim 22:19 Serrano, Mariellu 22:27 Rojas, Don 2(1:11-12 Sassoon, Donald 23:38 Severo, Richard 21.30 Roldos Aguilera, Jaime 17:50: 18:42 Saunier, Kenneth 13:55 Seychelles Ruling, Bert V.A. 17 17 Sauter, Van Gordon 21:29 "The Indian Ocean: Seychelles Beats Back Romanoit, Aleksei 2536 Savimbi, Jonas Malheiro 13:3-4,8-10,13,15,34- Mercenaries" (Ray) 16:4-10: CIA in 165-6 Romberg, Alan 22:31 35,38: 14-15:3: 16:12: 18:53: 21:25.42 Seymour, William 17.50 Rorne Daily American 19:7-8 Savov, Dimiter 19:23 Shackley, Theodore G 17:48 Romero. Oscar 13:43. 20:39: 21:21 Scaife Family Charitable Trusts 21:27-28 Shaffer, Deborah 21:411 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 17:6: 19:4: 25:6,13,24,44 Scaife Foundation 24:36 Shakespeare, Frank 2537-38 Rosenberg, Ethel 25:23 Scaife, Richard Mellon 21:27,38: 24:36 Shaker, Assata 24:5 Rosenberg, Julius 25:23 Schaap, William 22:34 SHARE Rosenblatt, Martin A. 25:28 "Deceit and Secrecy: Cornerstones of U.S. El Salvador: Refugees in ('trio 2_140 Rositzke, Harry A. 16:27: 216 Policy" 16:24-31: ''Nicaragua Braces for War" Sharkey, Jacqueline 25:51 Ross, Thomas B. 19:38 20:25-30: "Nicaragua Under Siege: CIA's Sharon, Ariel 2034 Roth, Fred 18:49 'Secret' War Escalates" 18:7-Ill: ''Nicaragua Shcharansky, Anatoly 19:22 Rothman, Barry 18:62 Update: The War Widens" 21:4-6: "Pentagon Sheehan, Mike 16:20 Rothman, David 18:62 Moves on 'Terrorism' '' 22:4-9: '*Statement to Shelton, Robert M- 13:23 Rothinyer, Karen 21:27 the U.N.: The CIA and BOSS" 18:52-54: "The Shelton, Sally 20:4-5.9-10 Roulette, Christian Masaya Affair" 18:4-6: "The Namibia Shepherd, Lemuel C. 25.36 La Eiliere: Jean Paul //-Antonor-Agra 23:38 'Solution': The Future of Southern Africa" 13:4- Sherry, Francis S. III 14-1513 Rowan, Carl T. 22:4 14: -U.S. Biological Warfare: The 1981 Cuba Shipley, Carl L. 13.7 Rowan, Richard W. 19:34 Dengue Epidemic'' 17:28-31: "U.S. Crushes Shipley, Smoak and Akernuut 13.7.15 Royal Bank of Canada 16:22 Caribbean Jewel" 203-20: ''White Paper II: Shock Battalion 2341 Royce, Kathryn Coe 2231 Administration Stonewalls While Covert Shultz, George P. 18:9-10: 20:6.24, 21:2,6,221 Royko, Mike 20:8 Operations Escalate" 16:19-21 22:5,27,29: 24.10 Ruben, Bruce L. 14-15:10 Schaar. Stuart 23:29 Shultz, Jim 22:17 Rubin, Alfred P. 22:4 Schanche, Don A. 18:48 Sidey, Hugh 19:22 Rude], Hans Ulrich 25.8.11 Scheer, Robert 18:15 Sichens, Harold W 2_129 Rudolph, Arthur Louis Hugo 25:2 Schellenberg, Walter 25:13 Siemens Company 13.5 Rueda, Enrique 22:31 Scherer, William F. 17:31 Sigel, Thomas 21:40 Rugh, William A. 13:55 Schlaefer, Salvador 18:5,20 Sihanouk, Norodom 18:5(1 Ruiz, Horacio 18:5 Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr. 20:18 Silkwood, Karen 13:51 Rumanian Iron Guard 25:52 Schlitz Foundation 21:28 Silverstein, Josef 20.18 Rumrill, Clark 14-15:8 Schmider (Vatican intelligence agent) 2530 Simmons. Robert Ruhl 16:56 Rusher, William A. 2136: 2434 Schmidt. Helmut 17:22 Simms, Linda 20:8 Rusk, [)can 17.7: 21:40 Schnee, Jeremiah 21:36 Simon Wiesenthal ('enter 25:5.35 Russell. Arthur F. 1328 Schneider, James G. 21:29 Simon, William Edward 2_126 29: 2_435: 2515,17 Russell, George 21:15-16,23 Schneider, Rene 16:33 Simons, Arthur D ''Bull' 2'.17 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Simpson, Peggy 24:21 South Dakota National Guard 24:27 Sullivan, William Healey 17:7 Sims, Robert 16:9-10 South Dakota State Police 24:27 Sulzberger, Arthur Ochs 21:32 Sinatra, Frank 25:36 South Korea, CIA in 14-15:10 Sulzberger, C.L. 25:33 Sindona, Michele 25:34-35 Southern Africa see also Namibia and South Africa Summer Institute of Linguistics 17:50; 18:37-46; Singer, Daniel 21:42 "Secret Collaboration: U.S. and South Africa 25:18 Singer, Max 16:20 Foment 'Terrorist Wars" (Gervasi) 22:36-40; "Pious Infiltrators: The Summer Institute of Singh, Ricky 20:7,13 "The Secret State Department Documents" Linguistics" (Wolf) 1841-46 Singh, Yoginder (pseud.) 23:5 13:37-41; CIA in 18:52-54; 22:36; resources for Summit Aviation, Inc. 16:54: 20:27; 22:28 Singham, A.W. 13:5 organizing 21:41; 23:40 Sumner, Gordon 22:33 Singham, Archie 22:34 Southern Africa Committee Sun Oil Company 21:28 Singlaub, John K. 21:36; 25:3,37,50-53,56 Southern Africa 13:51 Sunshine, Cathy 21:40 Sipe, Bob 22:17 Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference Suriname, CIA in 18:63: 20:6 Siri, Cardinal 25:14 Report on Police Conduct During Township surveillance see also provocateurs and informers, Sithole, Reverend 13:31 Protests: August-November 1984 23:40 electronic surveillance Sivell, Gordon 13:22-23; 16:45 Southern Agricultural Chemicals Association 21:30 "Sources and Methods: Mail Surveillance, Part Six, Franz Alfred 25:8-9 Southern Air Transport 22:28 11" (Lawrence) 13:49-50 SKF Ball Bearings 25:25 Southern Poverty Law Center 22:18 Survey: A Journal of East and West Studies Skinner, B.F. 16:37 Sovereign Military Order of Malta see Knights of 23:30,37 Skipp, Peter 24:40 Malta SWAPO see Namibia Skorzeny, Otto 22:42; 25:8,11,13-14,34 Sovereign Order of Saint John of Jerusalem 25:36 Swartzendruber, Fred 17:12 Skouras, Spiros S. 25:38 Soviet Union SWAT Teams 249-10 Skyhorse, Paul 24:20 KGB 19:20-22; 24:37; Soviet Olympic Sweden, Nordiz Ricks Parti 18:62 Skylight Pictures Committee 21:3 Switzerland, CIA in 13:48; 14-15:13 "When the Mountains Tremble" 21:40 Space Research Corporation 13:9,17,26; 18:53 Symbionese Liberation Army 24:9 Slifer, Harry Seger, Jr. 14-15:12 Spada, Massimo 25:35 Symms, Steven D. 22:33 Smit, Robert 18:54 Spagnulo, Carmelo 23:21 Smith, Bradley 25:14 Spain CIA in 14-15:13 Smith, Charles Stephen 14-15:9 , Spaulding, Anthony 16:34 T Smith, Hedrick 21:13 Speakes, Larry 20:15-16 Tambs, Lewis A. 18:60; 21:37; 22:33 Smith, Ian 22:10,24 Spellman, Francis Cardinal 25:30-31,34 Tanzania 22:38 Smith, James Douglas, Jr. 13:28 Spence, John 17:21 Tardowski, Joseph 24:28 Smith, Joseph B. 18:12; 24:37 Sperry Company 21:19 Targ, Russell 21:44 Smith, Lloyd Hilton 21:27 Spinelli, Robert L., Jr. 14-15:7 Tarrants, Thomas Albert III 13:25: 16:46 Smith, Mrs. Ian 13:7 Sponberg, Derrel 18:30 Tashkent Associates 1732,35 Smith, Richard Harris 25:12,14 Sporkin, Stanley 13:52-53 Task Force 157 16:53-55; 17:33 Smith, Tricia 21:31 Spotlight newspaper 25:34 Taube, Serge 14-15:8 Smith, Wayne S. 20:25; 2140 Sri Lanka, CIA in 14-15:11,13 Taubert, Robert 24:19 Smith, William French 16:29-30 Stafanizzi, Umberto 25:36 Taubes. Gary 21:21 Smithsonian Institution 17:14 Standard Oil of California 21:28 Taubman, Philip 17:50; 20:26: 23:27 Smoak, Marion H. "Joe" 13:7 Standard Oil of New Jersey 25:25 Taylor, Caldwell 20:7 Snepp, Frank 14-15:4 Stanford Research Institute 17:23; 21:44 Taylor, Maxwell 19:5 Soberania 16:3; 17:47 Stang], Franz Paul 25:11 Taylor, Myron Charles 25:30-32 Soble, Ron 17:40,42 Stankard, Francis X. 25:37 Taylor, Ray Hooker 22:27 Social Democrats U.S.A. 18:6 Stars Foundation 21:28 Taylor, Stuart 20:14-15 Socialist International 13:43 Stans, Maurice H. 21:28-29,35 Taylor, Telford 25:4 Society of Former Special Agents (FBI) 21:34 Star Wars see Strategic Defense Initiative Teamsters see International Brotherhood of Socovia Company 16:6 Starr, William 25:53 Teamsters Soilih, Ali 16:7 state repression Teller, Edward 21:29 Soldier of Fortune magazine 13:23,27; 16:6,49; "The New State Repression" (Lawrence) 24:3-11 Terpil, Frank Edward 14-15:3; 16:26,54-55; 17:9,11; 18:49-50; 22:2,11-24,32-33; 24:31; STEAG Company 13:5 17:48,50; 23:28 25:35,37,53 Steele-Perkins, Chris 19:35 terrorism 13:2-3; 21:2-3: 22:4-9 "Nazis and Klansmen: Soldier of Fortune's Stein, John Henry 16:57; 17:35 Tetra Tech, Inc. 24:40 Seamy Side" (Lawrence) 22:22-24 Stephenson, William S. 25:7 Tetra Tech International 24:40 Solidarity (Poland) 23:6,36 Sterling, Claire 17:47; 18:12-13.15; 19:8,14-19,24; Texaco Oil 13:6,35; 21:18,28-29; 25:25 Somalia 13:35 22:5,42; 23:3-38 Texaco Philanthropic Foundation, Inc. 21:28 CIA in 14-15:12 The Terror Network 16:27; 18:13; 19:15-16, Texas Educational Association 2128 Somoza, Anastasio 17:50,52; 19:12; 20:35-36; 22:44; 23:22,30-31; The Time of the Assassins Texas Instruments 21:18-19 22:13 23:9,13-14,24,29,31,37 Thailand 17:12-13 Son Sarin 18:50 Sterling Products 25:25 CIA in 14-15:13; 18:48-49 Soto, Oswaldo 20:38 Stetsko, Yaroslav 25:52 Thatcher, Margaret 17:3,23; 20:16-17; 21:4: 22:4; Sourlas 25:45 Stettinius, Edward R. 25:44 24:37 Soustelle, Jacques 23:16 Stevens, Thomas 18:30 Thomas, Charles 17:24 South Africa 13:36-41; 22:37-40 Stevenson, Adlai 19:12 Thomas, Gordon 23:37 "Angola: Pretoria's Continuing War" 16:11-12; Stevenson, Gloria 21:12 Thompson, Dudley 16:43 "The 'Buffalo Battalion': South Africa's Black Stevenson, R.K. 17:17 Thompson, Tommy 16:47 Mercenaries" 13:16-17; "The U.S. Connection: Stevenson, William Thornwell, James R. 17:15-16 South African Torture" (Lusane) 18:55-56; and The Bormann Brotherhood 25:7-8,10-11 Thorpe, Jeremy 13:31 Argentina 16:14-15; and mercenaries 16:6-10; and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Thuermer, Angus Maclean 19:33-34 Mozambique 16:13; Broederbond 13:31; CIA in 17:18-19 Thun Hohenstein, Ferdinando 25:31,33 13:6,31-32,48; 14-15:13; Communist Party 13:30; Stockwell, John 18:22; 21:34 Thurmond, Strom 16:6; 22:9 Detainees' Parents Support Committee 18:55; In Search of Enemies 18:52; 19:7 Ticknor, Joel D. 14-15:10 Government Information Service 13:32; Herstigte Stone, Ellery W. 25:31 Till, Ernest 23:21 Nasionale Partei 13:30; National Intelligence Stone, Richard 20:25 Time magazine 20:26 Service 13:31-33; National Union of South Strachan, Selwyn 20:5 "Media Manipulation: Covert Propaganda in African Students 13:30; Operation Daisy 16:12; Strategic Defense Initiative 25:2 Time and Newsweek" (Friel) 21:14-23 Operation Protea 16:11-12; Progressive Reform Strauss, Franz Joseph 25:38 Times-Tribune Corporation 20:38 Party 13:30; Secret Services Accounts Act 13:32; Streicher, Helmut 17:50 Tisdall, Caroline 19:35 South African Defense Force 13:32-33; State Streicher, Julius 13:24; 16:44 Tock, Mike 20:39 Security Committee 13:32 Strike, Mihroy 19:27 Togliatti, Palmiro 19:37-38 South Africa, BOSS (intelligence agency) 13:13 Strughold, Hubertus 25:26 Tolbert, William R. 13:31 "Statement to the U.N.: The CIA and BOSS" Students for a Democratic Society 13:50 Tom Dooley Foundation 25:52 (Schaap) 18:52-54; "The Militarization of Sturgis, Frank A. 13:54: 17:52; 18:54 Tomlinson, Kenneth 19:8 BOSS" (Weir and Bloch) 13:30-33 Suarez, Adolfo 25:38 Tools for Peace and Justice in America 23:39 South Africa Foundation 13:7 Suazo Cordova, Roberto 22:25-26,29 Tore, Teslim 19:14-15 South African Military Refugee Aid Fund Sudan 13:34 Torres, Camilo 19:27 News and Notes 23:40 CIA in 13:48 Torres Arias, Leonidas 18:28 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Torrijos, Omar 17:50 United States Chamber of Commerce 22:31 21:24.37 Torrisi, Giovanni 25:35 United States Communist Party 19:38 U.S. Intelligence Authorization Act 22)1:22 Tortola, Colonel 20:13,21 United States Council for World Freedom 25:51 U.S. Intelligence Identities Protection Act 13:3; 14 torture 17:3; 21:39; 25:3 United States Global Strategy Council 24:35 15:4-7; 16:2,18,56: 17:4,47. 20:2, 22:3 ''Argentina Activates International Death United States Steel 13:5 U.S. Interior Department 13.50 Squads'' (Ray) 16:14-16; '' 'In Brazil the United States-South West Africa/Namibia Trade and U.S. Internal Revenue Service 13:5() Women Boast About Their Plastic Surgery' Cultural Council, Inc. 13:7,15 U.S. International Communications Agency (Cohen) 25:21-22; "Interview: Salvadoran United Students of America Foundation 24:35 16:24,27-28; 19:31 Deserter Discloses Green Beret Torture Role" United Technologies 21:19 U.S. Interstate Commerce Commission 13:50 1617-18; ''The U.S. Connection: South African United States (U.S.), ACTION 13:53 U. S. Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency 25.23 Torture" (Lusane) 18:55-56; in Argentina 17:3 U.S. Agency for International Development 13:44; U.S. Joint Special Operations Agency 21:2; 12:8 Toth, Robert C. 16:25; 19:24; 227 14-15:10; 17:3; 18:8,17,40,48; 20:36; 21:33,37 U.S. Joint Special Operations Command 22:7 Toure, Kwante 24:16 "The Carrot and the Stick: Alf) Pressures" U.S. Labor Department 13:50 Tower, John 17:13; 22:31 (Bogdanich, Jensen and Frolik) 18:50-51; Office U.S. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Towers, Peter T. 13:15 of Public Safety 25:3 24:9 Townley, Michael 22:41 U.S. Agriculture Department 13:50 U.S. Marshals 2427 Townsend, Amos 17:46 U.S. Air Force 25:26 U.S. National Security Act I9:1 I Townsend, William Cameron 18:41-42 U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act 18:10 U.S. National Security Agency 1625; 18:57 58,44: Tradition, Family and Property 18:17 U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 19:35-36; 20:41: 21:44 Trager. Frank Newton 21:26 17:10-II U.S. National Security Council 18:8.4)) Train, Harry R. 18:311 U.S. Army U.S. National Security Decision Directive 77 19:12 TransAfrica 13:4,37 82nd Airborne Division 24:27; Chemical Corps U.S. National Security Decision Directive 138 212, TransNational Cooperative Ltd. 17:16,18-21,25; 25:26; Chemical Warfare Service 22:9 Tran.sNational Brie! 17:47 17:5-6.17; Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) U.S. National War College 21:26 Transports Internationaux Routiers 23:9 22:15; 25:4-14,36; Defense Intelligence School U.S. Navy, Office of Naval Investigation 17:52 Trevor-Roper, Hugh 21:41 21:24; European Command Intelligence ('enter U.S. Neutrality Act 13:23: 16.4; 18:111; 22:12_,31 Trilateral Commission 21:2 2526; Field Manual on Pspehologieal Operations U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Tronconis, Jose Joaquin 18:20 16:32,34-35,41; 21:15,19; Intelligence School Administration 2430 Trotter, Desmond 13:25 2031: Intelligence Support Activity 22:7; U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity 24:5 Truhy, J. David 17:48 Operation Third Chance 17:15 U.S. Office of Munitions Control 13.15 Trudell, John 24:20-21 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission 21:26 U.S. Ott-ice of Strategic Services (OSS) 13:49. Truman, Harry 25:6.40,43 U.S. Bipartisan Commission on Central America 16:24; 19:4-5; 25:5-7,111,12-14,48 Truong. David 16:3 20:29 U.S. Office of War Information 194 TRW Corporation 16:53; 2032 U.S. Board for International Broadcasting 23:27 U. S. Olympic ('ontmittce 2126 Tsang, Daniel 14-15:5 U.S. Border Patrol 20:32-33; 24:13 U.S. Park Service 2424 ''Complete CAIB Index, Nos. I-12" 14-15:1-36 U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms U.S. Peace Corps 13:53; 188. 19:34 Tshornhe, Moise 16:8 13:22 U.S. Postal Inspection Service 1351) Tsongas, Paul 16:22,27; 20:17 U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs Police 24:27 U. S. Postal Service 13:50 Tull, Louis 207 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency see CIA U.S. Rapid Deployment Force 20:5 Tully, Andrew 18:62-63; 19:38 U.S. Clark Amendment (1976) 13:3,10,34; 14-15:3; U.S. Refugee Act (1980) 24.14-IS Tunisia 13:34 16:12; 21:25; 25:3 U.S. Rockefeller Commission 13:50, 1715 CIA in 14-15:13 U.S. Coast Guard 13:50 U.S. Secret Service 1350 Turkey, Alpaslan 23:10-11.15 U.S. Commerce Department 13:50; 14-15:2,14; U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission 13.52. Turkey 18:56 2134 CIA in 14-15:13; 23:15; Counter-Guerrilla U.S. Customs 13:50 U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee 17:13 Organization 23:15; human rights in 23:28-29; U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency U.S. Senate Church Committee 13.50; 16:32,58; MIT (intelligence agency) 23:14-15; resources for 17:9 1714.16: 18:2.66,68: 19:6.40. 20:27: 21:33-34i organizing 17:47; right wing in 23:6,10-12 U.S. Defense Department 17:30-31; 18:66 249 Turkish Peace Association 23:28 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency 13:12,36; 14- U.S. Senate Ervin Committee 24.9 Turner, Stansfield 13:10; 1630; 1937; 20:42; 24:36 15:3; 18:60.62; 19:35; 20:41; 21:2,26; 22:9,32 U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee 1311); Turner, William W. 17:47 U.S. Defense Science Board 21:26 16:22-23; 18:66 Twetten, Thomas Alan 14-1510 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration 13:50; U.S. Senate Intelligence Conunittce 18:9; 19:31 Tyler, Geoffrey Harrison 13:18-19 1652; 19:11 ; 25:17 U.S. Senate Internal Security Committee 24:4 Tyron, Joseph 18:3(1 U.S. Energy Department 13:14 U.S. Senate Subconuninee on Security and Tyrrell, R. Emmett 21:38 U. S. Executive Order 12333 16:29-30; 19:7,11; Terrorism 13.2-3.51; 173, 18:12; 19:8; 23.4 TN son, James L., Jr. 16:27; 21:30,34 21:2; 22.7; 24:2 U.S. Small Business Administration 13:52 U.S. Federal Aviation Administration 13:18-19 U.S. State Department 113:10: 16:14,24,27, 178- U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation see FBI 12: 18:4,17,51,56,63; 1931. 2235; 25:8.12,24 U U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency 25,31,33 U-Haul Company International 21:28 24:6,9 Bureau of Intelligence and Research 16:56; 17:20, U.S. Foods Corporation 2129 U.S. Federal Reserve System 21:24 Bureau of Inter-American Affairs 22:33; Office U.S.SR. see Soviet Union U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act 22:12 for Combatting Terrorism 22:9; White Paper on Udel. Sheldon 16:45 U.S. Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board 14-15:14; El Salvador 2133 Uganda. CIA in 14-15:13 16:6,57; 17:49; 21:26,29 U.S. Veterans Administration 21:3)) Ugurlu. Abuser 23:14,36 U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 14- U.S. VISTA 13:53 Ultra Systems 20:33 15:4; 18.64 U.S. Voice of Anterica 16:24.27 28: 19:6.8 II). Underground Conserratire 21:24 U.S. Forty Committee 21:26 20:12,28; 22:29: 23:15 UNESCO 193.25; 2341 U.S. Freedom of Information Act 13:52; 14-15:4; U.S. War Powers Resolution 18.1(1 Ungo. Guillermo 13:43 ' 18:25 16:31 U.S. Witness Protection Act 24:27 Unification Church 2038-39; 2136,38; 22:32; 2_435; 25:19,30,34.53: sec also CAUSA; Moon, U.S. Health, Education and Welfare Department 13:50 U.S. Witness Security Program 24.11 Universal Safety Corporation 18:56 Sun Myung; Pak, Bo Hi Union Carbide 13:5: 21:28-29 Union Mutual Foundation 21:28 Union do Pcriodistas de Nicaragua 16:32 union-busting 24:30-33 United Electrical. Radio and Machine Workers of America 24:5 United Kingdom and chemical weapons 17:22-23; and mercenaries U.S. High Commissioner of Germany 25:8-10 U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee 13:10 Subcommittee on Africa 18:53,56 U.S. House Intelligence Committee 16:4-5,10,32-33 U.S. House Internal Security Committee 24:20.23 U.S. House Judiciary Committee 14-15:5 U.S. House Pike Committee 19:40; 24:9 U.S. House Select Committee on Assassinations 19:38 University of California at San Diego 1749 University of Oklahoma 17:14: 18:42 University of Texas 18.42 Upper Volta, CIA in 14- IS 14 Upson, I.inus Frederick III 14- I5:7 UrangeselIschatt 135 V 22:10: CIA in 14-15:14; intelligence and covert action 23:44 U.S. House Un-American Activities Committee 14- 15:5; 24 4; 25:24 Valladares, Armando 1935 Van Den Bergh, Hendrik J 13:311-32 United Nations 13:4-9 U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service 13:50 Van Der Westerhuizen, P.W. 13:12,33,36; 18:56 United Press 19:34 United States Alliance for Industrial Development 18:46 "Operation Sojourner: Targeting the Sanctuary Movement" (Ovryn) 24:12-15 U.S. Information Agency 19:6,25,29,31, 20:40: Van Fleet, James 25:43 Vance. Cyrus 22.13 Vandenberg. Hoyt S. 2_523 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Vang Pao 17:32-38,42-46; 18:47,50; 22:10,17,33 Weathermen 13:50 Wolf, Louis Vasey, Lloyd 16:51,53 Weaver, Donn Alden 14-15:14 "Arnaud de Borchgrave Boards Moon's Ship" Vasquez Mandonado, Mario 18:36 Webster, William 16:26 24:34-35; "Globe Aero, Ltd.: Merchants of Vatican, and Nazis 25:10,12 Wedin, Bentil 18:62 Counter-Insurgency" 13:18-19; "Inaccuracy in Vatican Bank 23:20; 25:35 Weiche, Martin 16:44,47 Media: Accuracy in Media Rewrites the News Vekemans, Roger 18:15,17; 19:27 Weiller, Paul-Louis 25:38 and History" 21:24-38; "Nicaragua Update: Velouhiotis, Aris 25:43,48 Weinberger, Caspar 16:22; 17:13,22,25; 18:10; Feverish Overthrow Plan Builds Toward Climax" Venceremos Brigade 13:50 19:29; 21:6; 22:5,7; 23:17; 24:40 22:25-29; "Pious Infiltrators: The Summer Venerable Order 25:36 Weinglass Leonard 24:20 " Venizelos 25:43 , Weinraub Bernard 21:13 Institute of Linguistics 18:41-46; "The ' " Venter, Colonel 13:32 , Weir Andy Pentagon s Other Option 17:5-25; "Where Are Venute, Donald J. 14-15:12 , "The Militarization of BOSS" 13:30-33; "The They Now'?" 16:56-57 Vesco, Robert 13:52; 16:6 Passport Racket: Papers for Cash" 13:20-21 Wolff, Karl 25:12-14,33 Victorson, Val (pseud.) 20:10 Welch, Richard 19:34 women Videla, Jorge 16:15 Weldon, Charles "Jiggs" 17:12; 18:48,50 in Central America 23:39; resources for Vietnam 18:46,58-59 WerBell, Mitchell Livingston III 16:48 organizing 23:41 casualty figures 21:16; elections (1967) 21:12 West Germany, BND (intelligence agency) Women of All Red Nations 24:16 Vietnam Trial Support Committee 16:3 25:5,8,27 Women's Institute for Freedom of the Press 23:41 Villegas, Alain de 21:42 Western Destiny 25:32,36 Wong Arevalo, Rodrigo 13:45 Viola, Roberto 16:14 Western Geophysical Company 18:45; 21:27 Wood, Harold Phillips 13:23,25; 16:47 Violet, Jean 21:42 Western Goals 25:51-52 Wood, William 24:24,27 Vithalis, Costas 25:45 Western Goals Reports 19:9 Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars Vitosha Hotel (Sofia) 23:5-6,24-25 Western Guard 13:22 24-25; 16:44 16:23 Voice of Hope Radio 18:64-65 , Volkswagen Company 25:11 Western Sahara Working Group Worker-Student Alliance 13:50 Western Sahara: The War U S Policy and the World Anti-Communist League 21:30-31; 22:15; von Aretin, Erwein 25:13 von Brancovan Robert Bassaraba 25:36 , . . , People 23:40 25:3,32,50-53,56 , von Hapsburg, Otto 25:27 Westmoreland, William C. 17:7; 21:34 "Behind the Supply Lines" (Clarkson) 25:56,50- von Hartzfeld, Prince 25:33 Weston, Burns 20:18 53 von Hindenburg, Paul 25:27 Wettering, Frederick Lee 13:7,28 World Bank 13:35,43-44; 16:33 von Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, Frederic 25:33 Weyler, Rex World Court 13:5 von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, Erik 25:38 Blood of the Land 24:27 World Features Service 17:46 von Papen, Franz 25:27 Weyrich, Paul M. 25:51 World Media Conference von Schweinitz, Colonel 25:14 Wheaton, Philip 21:40 in 1981 22:33; in 1982 20:38; 21:36; 24:34; in Vorster, Balthazar Johannes 13:8,30-31 The Iron Triangle: The Honduran Connection 1983 20:39 Vorster, John 13:8,30-31 13:44 World Medical Relief 18:47-50; 2230,33; Vuscovic, Pedro 16:37,39 Wheeler, Jack 22:30; 25:50 25:35,37,50-53.56 Whelan, James R. 21:38; 24:35 "The CIA Ties of World Medical Relief" Whi le David D 14-15:13 (Bogdanich Jensen and Frolik) 18:47-51 W pp , . Whitbeck, Harris 18:37-39 , World Relief 18:23-24 W.R. Grace and Company 25:28,34,37 White, Harry Dexter 25:25 World Strategy Forums 24:35 Waage, Mrs. 13:49 White, Helen 22:31 World Strategy Network 24:35 Waas, Murray 25:52 White James C. 13:23; 16:44-47 Wright, Claudia 13:6 Waghlestien, Colonel 18:25 , White Panthers 13:50 Wroughton, James 18:43 Wagner, Richard 17:23-24 White Robert E. 20:39 44; 21:21 Wycliffe Bible Translators 17:50; 1837-46; see also Waiss, Oscar 16:38 , , Whitehead Steve 18:55 Summer Institute of Linguistics Waldheim, Kurt 16:21; 17:12 Waldrop, William Burnett 13:25; 16:45-46 , Whiteman, Unison 19:32; 20:7,11,21; 22:34 W l L h 19 22 23 9 21 23 26 28 33 34 Whitlam Gough 16:53 a esa, ec : ; : , , , , - - Walker, John D. 16:53 , Whitney, Craig R. 19:23 Y Walker, Lannon 13:10,34 Whitten, Les 21:31 Yallop, David A. Wallace Fund, Inc., Dewitt 21:28 Wick, Charles Z. 16:27-28; 19:8-12; 20:16 In God's Name 23:38 Wallace, Keith 13:31 Wigner, Eugene P. 21:26,38 Yanover, Charles 16:21,45,47 Wallace, Mike 18:23 Wilkinson, Bill 13:24 Yardley, Herbert 18:57 Walt, Lewis W. 21:26 Will, George F. 19:22; 21:17; 23:16 Yates, Earl P. 16:52,54 Walters, Raymond O. 17:10 Willett, Thomas 13:18 Yates, Pamela 21:40 Walters, Vernon Anthony 13:45,48; 14-15:3,14; Williams, Eleazer Andrews 17:48 Yellow Rain 17:8-13,43-46; 22:35 16:14-15,19,43; 18:9,12,15,26,30; 21:27; 22:38 Williams, Garth 17:37 "The Pentagon's Other Option" (Wolf) 17:8-25; "The Vatican Connection: Vernon Walters and Williams, Mike L.H. 16:48; 22:17,24 "Yellow Rain Skeptic Found Dead" (Ray) the Pope" 18:9 Williams, Murat 23:44 17:43-46 Wannall, W. Raymond 21:37 Williams Ray 24:19 Yoder, Beulah 17:45 Ward, Thomas J. 25:19-20 , Williams Ronald A 24:25 Yoder, John 17:45 Warmer, Rob 18:63 , . Williamson Crai 13:31 Yoh, Bernard 21:25-26 28 35-37 Washington Inquirer 18:4; 19:8; 21:26 30 33 36 38 , g , , , , , , Willis-Conger Phillip 24:13 15 Young Americans for Freedom 21:26 Washington Institute for Values in Public Policy 24:34 , , Willoughby. Charles A. 25:36 Young, Andrew 13:48; 22:22 Washington Office on Africa Wills, E. Ashley 20:4-5,17,20 Youth for Understanding 14-15:3 South Africa Information Project 23:40: Wilson, Charles 13:50 Youth Freedom Speakers 25:30 "Southern Africa Hotline" 23:40 Wilson, Dorwin M. 14-15:13 Youth With a Mission 18:35,40 Washington Office on Latin America 18:35 Wilson, Edwin P. 14-15:3; 16:52-55; 17:48; 22:16; Yurturslan, Ali 19:18 Washington Post 19:8; 20:26 25:32 Washington Quarterly 13:53 Wilson Pete 17:39 Washington Star 21:31 , Wilson, Richard "Dickie" 24:24,27 Z Washington State University 18:42 Wilson, William A. 25:28 Zablocki, Clement 1619 Washington Times 19:8,10; 20:10,17-18,38; Wilson, Woodrow 19:3 Zaire 16:12 21:31,36,38; 22:30,32; 24:34-35; 25:35 Winkler, Darrell 22:24 CIA in 14-15:14 Watkins, James D. 25:38 Winsor, Curtin 22:29 Zambia 22:37-38 Watkins, Robert 19:32 Winter, Gordon 13:31; 16:13 CIA in 14-15:14; 22:38 Watson, Francis M. 21:37 Wise, David 17:3; 1938 Zamora, Mario 21:21 Watson, Peter Wisner Frank Gardner 16:60; 19:40; 21:41; 25:7- Zephier, Gregg 24:18 The War on the Mind 16:34 , 9 13 33 Zcrulo, Morris 16:43 Watson, Sharon 17:9 Watt, James 18:34: 21:35; 24:34 , , Wiznitzer, Louis 22:40 Ziff, Howard 19:28 Watt, Roland 18:62 Woellner, E. David 22:30,33; 24:34 Zimbabwe 22:37-39; sec also Rhodesia Wattenberg, Ben J. 1922; 23:16 Wojciechowski, Gene W. 14-15:11 counterinsurgency and psychological warfare in Way, Mike 18:39 Wojtyla, Cardinal see John Paul II 23:44 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 An Overview: U.S. Sponsorship of State Terrorism By Edward S. Herman A hegemonic power with enormous technological and finan- cial resources has wide options in the use of both peaceable and violent means to accomplish its ends. The violent means in- clude all of the various forms of terrorism, and the United States as hegemonic power has used-{)r sponsored the use of-all of them. In most of these modalities the United States is not unique, it is merely quantitatively important, sometimes even supreme, as terrorist and sponsor of terrorism. The United States approaches uniqueness, however, in the use of the nuclear threat as it form of intimidation. The United States is the only country that has actually used nuclear weapons on enemy populations; not just one bomb, but two, destroying two substantial Japanese cities and exterminating several hundred thousand people in the process. It seerns clear that this murder- ous destruction was unnecessary, that Japan was on the very edge of surrender (as was known to U.S. officials), and that no American lives were saved by destroying the two cities.' But the dropping of the bombs had the important function of in- timidating the Russians, toward which end several hundred thousand Japanese deaths were seen as a small price. Since Hiroshima, the United States has been alone in regu- larly brandishing atomic weapons, and on quite a few occa- sions it has come very near to using them again.' The United States continues to refuse to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons in warfare. It has innovated continuously to make nu- clear weapons tactically usable, and it has spawned a large in- tellectual and political constituency that has been striving for years to make nuclear war thinkable and a part of working mili- tary strategy. ` With the Reagan administration, we have in power a group in which the nuclear crazies are an integral part of the policy planning apparatus. It is clear that this administra- tion, in talking up and planning to make nuclear war winnable, in its enormous nuclear arms buildup, its placement of Cruise and Pershing missiles in Western Europe, and in its aggressive technological forward push, is attempting to achieve the nucle- ar superiority of the early postwar years. This would allow it to brandish the nuclear threat more credibly, thus permitting the I_ Sce Robert I_. Messer, "New evidence on Truman's decision," Bulletin n/ heAturnirSi irniists, August 1985. pp. 5)-56 (or a good rccicss anilcitations. Characteristically. President Truman lied in stating on the occasion of the Hiroshima bombing that the attack had been made on a military site. 2. As Dan Ellsherg has said. ''The notion common to nearly all Americans that no nuclear wcapons have been used since Nagasaki' is mistaken.. . . Again and again, generally in secret from the American public, U.S. nuclear "capons hair been used, for quite different purposes: in the precise way that a gun is used when you point it at someone's head in a direct confrontation, whether or not the trigger is pulled.'' "Introduction" to F. P. Thompson and Dan Smith, eds.. Protest and Stannic (Ness York: Months: Resicsv Press. 1981 ), p. i. t-.I Isherg goes on to describe a substantial number of cases in which the U.S. threatened to use nuelear ssrapons 3. Fred Kaplan.77tr tt'i-ails a/ Arntgt!rddan (Ness York: Simon & Schus- ter, 1953): Robert Scheer, With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush & Nuclear War (New York: Random House, 1952). freer use of the more standard modes of domination on a global basis. This is in and of itself a major form of "terrorisml... Another very important form of terrorism used hy' the United States on a worldwide basis since 1945 has been the organisa- tion, sponsorship, and support of rightwing terrorist regiln s. The breakup of the colonial empires and the revolutioiiarv and democratic impulses accelerated by World War II posed a major threat to western domination of the Third World. The United States stepped in to fill the gap. Under the puisc of "containing" Soviet imperialism.' the U.S. took on the role of propping up old regimes or replacing them with the neo-im- perialist rule of compradors, military dictators, the tree n)ar- ket, and the American Fmhassv. The policies fn-merly appli- cable to the "banana republics" of Central America were ex- tended to the entire world, as the United States took on global "responsibilities." The primary function of the tics cotnprador and ntilitatry leaderships was to preserve the main features of the old order, to maintain an open door and friendly climate for foreign in- vestment, and to keep the country as a subordinate within the Free World alliance. Given the income and social inequalities of the old regimes, and the newly unleashed ideas of den)oc- racy and opportunity, the ''new-old order'' installed by the U.S. required a massive dose of terror to keep the masses in the proper state of apathy. It also demanded tolerance of thievery on a gigantic scale, as the people (compradors and military of - ficers) who were willing to serve as surrogates for a foreign power have been almost uniformly venal. In Guatemala, the Philippines, Argentina, Brazil, pre-Sandinista Nicaragua, Chile, Indonesia, and Zaire (aniong others). the elites put in power and supported by the West have been not merely brutal terrorists, but rapacious as well. Noam Chonisky and I have re - ferred to the countries they rule as "shakedown states..., The United States has also used the more conventional forms of terrorism such as assassinations. sahotage, and the organisa- tion of armed hands and terrorist armies. The attacks on Cuba by the United States provide a remarkable case study in multi dimensional state terror combined with the process of ''trans- ference'--that is, accusing Cuba of doing precisely what the U.S. is doing to Cuba. The record sho ss: eight m ktttnrh'tl,t;rtl assassination attempts against Fidel Castro:" extensive sabo- tage of shipping, crops and animals, warehouse stores, termi- nals, oil facilities, and power stations: raids to disrupt activities 4. In 1965 I gave the following definition of Containmcnr. "The eselusion of lesser posers from areas in which sse intend to establish hegemons Ss n Expansion.'' The Great So, ill l)irrHUnars (I'Itiladelphia: Philadelphia Resist ante, 1965). p. 8. 5. The lt'ashington Connrrtion and (/tire( ft nrld l itsrism (Burton South End press, 1979), pp. 61-60, 6. Alleged A%sassination l'lnt.a lm oh in,i / nrriwi Lradrrs, Rep. No 94 465, Select Committee to Study Government Intelligence Activities, l S Senate, 54th Cony., Ist Sess. Nov_ 1975. pp, 75 Il Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 and kill; and at one point the organization of an abortive proxy invasion.7 The campaign of subversion "began virtually at the moment of revolutionary victory in 1959, stretched through the 1960s into the 1970s and endures, vestigially at least, to this day, . . ."x After the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961, the Kennedy administration organized a massive subversive effort under the code name "Operation Mongoose," which involved "continuous sabotage raids" and a major campaign of disin- formation,' which regularly charged Cuban subversion at the very moment that the United States was engaged in a real and massive subversion operation against Cuba (and many other Latin American states).') The rightwing Cuban refugee terror network, which came into existence in large measure as a re- sult of CIA training for anti-Cuba operations, continued long after 1961 as an apparatus of terror employed not only against Cuba but other enemies of "freedom. This U.S. secret war against Cuba was not unique. There is a, long record of U.S.-sponsored armed bands and attacks on the countries of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, China, and the Indochinese states, among others." The U.S. sponsorship of the contras follows a long tradition in Central America as well. Also in a long tradition has been the U.S. outcry about somebody else's "terrorism" coincident with a massive appli- cation of terrorism by the United States or one of its proxies. The sponsorship of terrorist armies to invade Guatemala in 1954 (successful), Cuba in 1961 (unsuccessful), and Nicaragua 1981-86 (unsuccessful) has had two other notable features. First, all three were cases of revolutions from below, with gov- ernments coming into power that addressed the basic needs of a formerly depressed and repressed majority." This process of social democratization has been consistently horrifying and in- tolerable to the U.S. elite. That elite is happy only with elite rule and amenable clients. The threat of a "demonstration ef- fect" of successful performance in the majority interest is also frightening. What if the masses in the other countries of the empire were to get the idea that they were not necessarily born to serve their masters`? A second notable feature of at least two major cases of U.S.-sponsored invasions-Guatemala and Nicaragua-is that they displayed a level of political freedom and bourgeois democracy that have been rare in Central Ameri- ca. With the overthrow of Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954, 7. For many details on all of these efforts, see Warren Hinckle and William Turner, The Fish Is Red: The Storv of The Secret War Against Castro (New York: Harper and Row, 1981). 8. Ibid., p. Vii. 9. "All major CIA stations abroad assigned at ]cast one case officer full time to gathering intelligence, trying to turn the host country against Cuba, and en- couraging the defection of Cuban officials. Reports from this far-flung net- work were funneled to the Miami station for correlation and action." Ibid., p. 113. 10. For many examples, see Philip Agee, Inside the Company': CIA Diarsy (New York: Bantam, 1976). 1 I . Edward S. Herman, The Real Terror Network: Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda (Boston: South End Press, 1982), pp. 65-69. 12. John Loftus. The Belarm Secret (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1983), passim: Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence (New York: Dell, 1980). Chapter 4 ("Special Opera- tions"). 13. One group of Central American experts speaks of the Sandinista aims as follows: "The FSLN sought to fill the political and institutional vacuum by creating new political structures that responded to its agenda of social transfor- mation. That agenda defined national priorities according to 'the logic of the majority,' which meant that Nicaragua's poor majority would have access to, and be the primary beneficiaries of, public programs." Report of the Latirc American Studies Association Delegation to Ohher e the Nicaraguan General Election ol'November 4, 1984, pp. 4-5. pluralism and bourgeois democracy disappeared. The well-es- tablished pattern demonstrates that U.S. "counter-terrorism" is antithetical to political as well as social democracy. Mechanisms of Support of State Terrorism The United States has built up and aided the forces of state terrorism in four ways: by the protection and rehabilitation of the fascist cadres defeated in World War II, by outright or proxy invasions to install or protect terrorist clients, by subver- sion aiming at the overthrow of disfavored (often democratic) governments, and by ''supplying repression" via financial aid, training, and arms supply to security forces and military dic- tators. Of these, invasions have been important but they are rel- atively familiar and obvious in character. ( I ) Rehabilitating .1liscists. During and immediately after World War 11 the United States was busily and aggressively or- ganizing forces for the struggle against the Left. A central fea- ture of this process was the protection and rehabilitation of fas- cists. There were show trials at Nuremberg and elsewhere, and some top leaders were executed, but at the very same time large numbers of fascists were being protected and positioned for Cold War service. Most of these were not scientists with scarce skills-they were mainly bureaucrats and army and in- telligence personnel, many of them mass murderers. This was worldwide in scope: in Thailand, under U.S. influence, a mili- tary dictatorship was allowed to take power headed by Phibum Songkram, who was (in the words of a former CIA analyst) "the first pro-Axis dictator to regain power after the war."" In Greece, the pre-war pro-Nazi forces were gradually pushed to the fore and installed in power by the British and the United States, who eventually consolidated that power by means of a savage counter-insurgency war." The large-scale protection of Nazi and fascist activists and killers is now well established,"' although the western public has been spared the details. This protection included the extensive fabrication of documents and the hiding and spiriting away of fascist cadres. Many fascist killers were relocated in Latin America and played an impor- tant role in the development of the National Security States. Others were allowed to escape to Spain and Portugal, both countries befriended and protected by the United States and other members of the Free World. The nominal denazification and general protection and re- habilitation of fascists provided a structural base for state ter- rorism in a variety of ways. In cases like Thailand and Greece, terror was an immediate instrument of the reinstalled fascists. Elsewhere in Western Europe the fascist cadres were positioned within the NATO framework to resume their tradi- tional role in case the Left proved strong enough to really threaten to attain power. Greece in 1967 and Chile in 1973 were models of how terror states could be quickly brought into service under U.S. auspices in the face of liberal or radical challenges. The rehabilitated fascist cadres have also served as a pool or reserve army of counterrevolutionary operatives for use both in 14. Frank Darling, Thailand and the United States (Washington, D.C.: Pub- lic Affairs Press. 1965), p_ 65. 15. Lawrence S. Wittner, American Interrenion in Greece. 1943-1949 (New York: Columhia Uniscrsit Press. 1982). Chapter 8 ("The Milit.u-) So lution"). 16. Sec "Special: Nazis, the Vatican, and CIA.'' special issue of CAIB, Number 25, Winter 1986, esp. Peter Dale Scott, ''How Allen Dulles and the SS Preserved Each Other'': also, Magnus Linklater, Isabel Hinton and Neal Ascherson, 77te Fourth Reich: Klaus Barbie and the Neo-Fascist Connection (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1984). Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Europe and the Third World. They have served as leaders and soldiers in colonial wars (Angola, Algeria, Rhodesia, Viet- nam), in building up fascist terrorist networks in Latin Ameri- ca, and as organizers of terror in Europe itself. Much of the ter- rorism in Italy has come out of neofascist elements drawing in- spiration and support from P-2 and the intelligence services most closely linked to the CIA and NATO." (2) Subtiversion. Another major mechanism of U.S. support of state terror has been by means of subversion. This term is used to describe actions taken to discredit and destabilize op- posed governments, including the use of disinformation, economic pressure and harassment, manipulating the institu- tional environment of the victim by bribery and the dis- criminatory use of aid, and encouraging and supporting con- spiracies and coups. The United States is so powerful that these devices are used, and hardly even remarked upon, against its larger allies, many virtually occupied countries-economically and militarily-with large numbers of locals serving the inter- ests of the great foreign power. At the time of the overthrow of the elected government of Brazil in 1964, for example, the United States was doing the following:" (1) it had bribed hun- dreds of local politicians in a scandal so great that a Parliamen- tary Commission was forced to investigate the matter;' (2) it had numerous journalists on its payroll, subsidized newspapers and magazines, and for 90 days before the election even rented the editorial page of Rio de Janeiro's evening newspaper; (3) it funded Brazilian thinktanks that poured forth a flood of books and pamphlets dispensing conservative ideology and disinfor- mation; (4) a U.S. corporation, Time, Inc., illegally controlled the largest Brazilian TV station, and dispensed strong pro-coup propaganda; (5) the U.S. government-funded American Insti- tute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) worked to de- politicize and weaken the union movement, and actively sup- ported the 1964 coup; (6) U.S. officials encouraged the mili- tary establishment to oust the legal government, and the United States even had ships offshore as moral support for the leaders of the coup. U.S. dissemination of propaganda and disinformation in- tended to destabilize, and plotting with conspirators to displace legal governments, is even more extensive in lesser client states." Brazil is a good illustration because it is the most pow- erful state in Latin America; despite which the United States manipulated and subverted its institutions, politicians and mili- tary leaders virtually without restraint. U.S. subversion frequently involves the use of money to buy people off. The money is often in the form of loans or gifts that reward "friends" and allow them to pay off their friends and buy support at home.2' The most remarkable form of subver- 17. Edward S. Herman and Frank Brodhead, The Rise and Fall of the Bul- garian Connection (New York: Sheridan Square Publications, 1986), Chapter 4 ("The Rome-Washington Connection"); Gianni Flamini. 11 partito del golpe: Le strategie delta tensione e del terrors dal prirno centrosinistra or- ganico al sequestro Moro, Vol. I (Ferrara: halo Bovolenta, 1981), Chapter 1. IS.See Jan K. Black, United States Penetration of Brazil (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977), esp. Part 11. 19. The Commission's work was, of course, ended following the coup. Mid.. p. 73. 20. Several dramatic illustrations are given, with extensive details, in Philip Agee, op. cit.. n. 10. 21 . Just prior to the Italian elections of April 1948, the U.S. Congress voted a special Marshall Plan subsidy of $227 million for Italy, much of it transmit- ted secretly to the Christian Democratic Party and split-off trade unions or- ganized under U.S. sponsorship. See Roberto Faenza and Marco Fini, Gli nmericani in Italia (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1976), p. 298. Vast sums in U.S. gifts and loans, and loans from organizations like the World Bank, have gone to sion by buy-off is undoubtedly the employment of the AFL- CIO, through the AIFLD, as an instrument for bribing labor leaders in client states. Dispensing large sums, the AIFLD has coopted hundreds of Third World union leaders, inducing them to stick to "bread-and-butter" unionism and eschew politics (especially left politics) and split away from the politicized un- ions. AIFLD has regularly helped put in place anticommunist and repressive regimes that have served well the needs of mul- tinational corporations and U.S. foreign policy, but which have been rabidly antiunion. AIFLD, in short, is a literally "subversive" intruder into any state in which it is allowed to function. (3) Supplying repression. A further major mechanism for U.S. support of state terrorism has been the buildup, financing, arming, and training of Third World police, intelligence, and military personnel. This is in fact a primary form of subver- sion, in which a deliberate attempt is made to bribe and brain- wash the principal armed groups within dependent societies and make them de facto servants of a foreign power. This has been done with a quite clearly subversive purpose: to increase the power of the armed forces, to manipulate them ideologi- cally into serving as an anticommunist and antipopulist force, and to train them in counterinsurgency (CI) techniques that would also serve U.S. objectives. While the policy had impor- tant antecedents, it went into a rapid growth phase after the triumph of Fidel Castro in 1959. It flourished in the 1960s with the development of Cl doctrine and the notion of pret'entiue Cl." We would prevent Castros and Ho Chi Minhs by putting in place anti-radical political and armed forces who would nip insurgencies in the bud." Cl strategy was initially tied in with a reformist "hearts and minds" complement (such as the Alliance for Progress), but the reformist component has invariably been submerged by Cl, for a number of reasons. One is that Cl is inherently reactio- nary, as it rests on an attempt to take advantage of superior state force without regard to underlying issues orjustice. It em- ploys power and advanced technology in areas such as tools of interrogation, and applies them to poor people in revolt. With the "superior" races seeking submission of the inferior on the basis of force alone, this is a system in which escalating bar- barity is "built-in." A second reason for the submergence of "reform" is that reformers are potential radicals, or are willing to tolerate the continued existence of radicals," so that they are immediately suspect and have often been murdered in preven- tive CI practice. Third, Cl doctrine with an antireformist bias U.S. friends like Suharto and Marcos, despite clear evidence of a huge corrup- tion drain. The services rendered by these friends have been substantial, how- ever. See text below on the implicit trade-offs. 22. Jonathan Kwitny, Endless Enemies: The Making of an (Ir friendIr VVorld (New York: Congdon & Weed, 1984). pp. 341-54; Tim Shorrock and Kathy Selvaggio, "Which Side Are You On, AAFLI'?," The Nation, February 15, 1986. 23. Sec Michael McClintock, The American Connection: State Terror and Popular Resistance in El Salvador, Vol. I (London: Zed Press, 1985), Part I ("The US and the Doctrine of Counter-Insurgency"). 24. This was the language used in a speech on "The U.S. Role in Stahility Operations," included as a standard speech in a "Speechmaker Kit" used by the army in the late 1960s. Upheavals from below can be controlled if we are successful in nipping every Communist insurgency in the bud. This is what we hope to do." Quoted by J. W. Fulbright, The Pentagon Propaganda Ma, hone (New York: Liveright, 1970), p. 82. 25. One of Juan Bosch's critical failings from the standpoint of the Kennedy liberals was his unwillingness to deport or otherwise persecute Communists, which was viewed as a sign of his lack of fealty to higher Free World princi- ples. See Piero Gliejeses, The Dominican Crisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins. 1978), pp. 87-89. Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 follows from the primacy of anticommunism in U.S. ideology. Political risks in the United States are incurred by supporting reformers who seek independence, who do business with radi- cal states, or who take radical action like land reform at the ex- pense of U.S. interests. "Losing a country to Communism" or even to a radical and/or independent regime is politically costly. No penalties are associated with support of a murderous rightwing regime that remains within the Free World. A fourth factor is that the groups who are the natural allies of anti-radi- cal strategies in the client states are reactionary and anti-re- formist. Doing business with them may require tolerance of the liquidation of reform and reformers. Finally, the U.S. military, economic, and political elites who are close to and implement Third World policies are also often reactionary, and they invariably put serviceability to U.S. interests ahead of all other considerations. Thus as a prac- tical matter fascists are preferred either on principle or for "pragmatic" reasons as a lesser evil. The United States has the great advantage of having numerous liberals who can expound on the virtues of liberty and reformism with great eloquence, and pretend that these are operative values in U.S. policy to- ward the Third World, while their superiors and the armed ser- vices train and put into place people like Pinochet, Castelo Branco, Massera and Viola, Castillo Armas and Rios Montt, and numerous others.26 The U.S. training and buildup of client police and armed forces has been historically unique in scope and scale. Between 1950 and 1979 U.S. military aid programs transferred a huge $107.3 billion in arms and ammunition to various U.S. clients, in addition to some $121 billion in arms sales. Between 1973 and 1980 the United States sold $66.8 billion in arms to Third World countries, including vast quantities of firearms, chemi- cal munitions, helicopters, and other police gear useful in CI and repression.27 Since 1950 the United States has trained over 500,000 military personnel from 85 countries in the U.S. Army School of the Americas in Panama and in several hundred other military schools and bases within the United States and abroad. Under police training programs that began in 1954 and terminated in 1975, over 7,500 police officers re- ceived regularly training in U.S. schools, and over a million regular policeman have been given training abroad. Large quantities of arms and equipment were also transferred to for- eign police departments. A large investment was made in im- proving police and military communications systems in client states, oriented to CI efficiency and control of protests and other disorders. Training was provided in the design and man- ufacture of home-made bombs and assassination devices, 26. Given the political costs of a Communist assumption of power in a client state, and the fact that most liberals have also internalized the primacy of an- ticommunism, the policies of liberals who achieve power are often indistin- guishable from those of the reactionaries. Johnson and his crew fought desper- ately to keep the social democrat Juan Bosch out of power in the Dominican Republic. The Kennedy liberals were enthusiastic at the military coup in Brazil and displacement of a social democratic government. A major spurt in the growth of National Security States in Latin America took place under Kennedy and Johnson. 27. Michael Klare and Cynthia Arnson, Supplying Repression (Washington, Institute for Policy Studies, 1981), pp. 44-45; Michael Klare, American Arms Supermarket (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984), p. 9. Based on export licenses issued for sales to Third World police alone-excluding the larger vol- umes sold to armies and paramilitary groups-Michael Klare found that be- tween September 1976 and May 1979, U.S. firms supplied the following: 615,612 gas grenades, 126,622 revolvers, 51,906 rifles and machine guns, 12,605 canisters of chemical Mace, and 56 million rounds of ammunition. Ibid., p. 191. which was put to practical use by regular and irregular forces in the National Security States.2" Training in advanced "methods of interrogation" were also offered in U.S. programs, with dire consequences (as discussed below). U.S. training has had a very substantial political content, one expert noting that it was "aimed less at military expertise than . . . at cultivation of internal political attitudes favorable to the United States. "29 It has focused heavily on the menace of Castro, the evils and omnipresence of communism, methods of CI, and the merits of foreign investment as the route to de- velopment. Political scientist Frederick Nunn has stated that "subject to United States military influence on anticom- munism the [Third World] professional army officer became hostile to any form of populism."" There is a large body of evidence that U.S. training has given not the slightest nod to democracy and human rights; instead, it provided all the essen- tial ingredients of National Security State ideology. The rise of the National Security State (NSS) in the U.S. sphere of influ- ence was not fortuitous. Terror Outcomes As already suggested, the massive U.S. military aid and training programs, and other forms of support to states such as South Africa, had important consequences. (1) Military takeovers and the rise of the National Security State. There were 18 military takeovers in Latin America be- tween 1960 and 1968. These coups and displacements of freely elected governments by military regimes were a predictable re- sult of the buildup and "education" of the Latin armed forces. Many were led by U.S. trainees, and most of them were sup- ported by the United States. The key Brazilian coup, for exam- ple, was led by the so-called "Sorbonne group," closest to the United States in personal affiliation and training background." The Brazilian coup plans were known in advance by U.S. offi- cials (who, of course, never warned the legally elected govern- ment), and the coup itself was greeted enthusiastically by the Kennedy liberals in Washington. (A classic remark by U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Lincoln Gordon, was that the Brazilian coup was "the single most decisive victory for freedom in the mid-twentieth century. ""2) These attitudes were not excep- tional, as evidenced by the fact that U.S. aid has moved fairly consistently in an inverse relationship to democratic and human rights conditions. In Table I we can see that as demo- cratic conditions deteriorate (column 2, minus sign) there is a distinct tendency for total U.S. aid and multinational credits to increase markedly. In a more elaborate quantitative analysis of this relationship, Lars Schoultz found that the correlations be- tween U.S. aid and human rights violations "are uniformly positive."" That is, the worse the human rights conditions, the greater the aid. One can also see on Table I that as human rights conditions deteriorate, factors affecting the "climate of investment," like tax laws and labor repression, improve from the viewpoint of the multinational corporation. This suggests an important line 28. See Herman, The Real Terror Network, op. cit., n. 11, pp. 128-31; Klare and Arnson, Supplying Repression, op. cit., n. 27, p. 6. 29. Dr. R. K. Baker, quoted in Miles Wolpin, Military Aid and Counter- revolution in the Third World (Boston: Lexington, 1972), p. 31 . 30. Quoted in Jan Black, op. cit., n. 18, p. 194. 31. See ibid., pp. 176-78. 32. Quoted in ibid., p. 55. 33. "U.S. Foreign Policy and Human Rights Violations in Latin America: A Comparative Analysis of Foreign Aid Distributions," Comparative Politics, January 1981, p. 162. Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Table I U.S. Aid, Investment Climate, and Human Rights in Ten Countries N Y G -J Cj 7 + _ U C y O y E M GJ G N ti y a E '- 7 d ~s Q c c v 4 C c y rJ E y - L ~ y L y C L G s s C ~a,p aZ ~ Country (I) (2) (3) (4) (5a) (56) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) Brazil 1964 - - - + + + 14 4(1 - 7 18(1 I 1 _2 Chile 1973 - - + + + 558 - 8 + 259 1.070 770 Dominican Rep. 1965 - - NA + + + 57 + 10 52 3()5 133 Guatemala 1954 NA + + NA NA NA NA + S.100 Indonesia 1965 + NA - 81 - 79 81 653 + 62 Iran 1953 - - - + + NA NA NA NA + 900 Philippines 1972 + + + 204 + 67 + 143 171 161 South Korea 1972 - + + - 52 - 56 55 183 9 Thailand 1973 + + NA 63 - 64 - 64 218 5 Uruguay 1973 - - - + + - 11 + 9 - 2 32 21 Sources: 1. Information on torture and political prisoners mostly from the Amnesty International Report on Torture. 1975 and The Anini str International Report. /117~ 7( 1976 Supplemented with data from newspaper articles, journals, and hooks on the specific countries. Data on investment climate largeh from articles. journals, and Isook'. on the specific countries. 2. Data on aid taken from U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organi_ations, A.I.D., 1972 and 1976 eiditions, for years 19622 1975 Data precious to 1962 taken from Hi.torieal Statistics O/ the United Slates, Bicentennial Edition, Dept. of Commerce, 1975. of causation. Military dictatorships tend to improve the invest- ment climate, and the multinational corporate community, and the U.S. government, are very sensitive to this factor. Military dictators enter into a tacit joint venture arrangement with Free World leaders: They will keep the masses quiet, maintain an open door to multinational investment, and provide bases and otherwise serve as loyal clients. In exchange, they will be aided and protected against their own people, and allowed to loot public property. Marcos was loyally supported by the United States for more than a decade on this reciprocal basis. The U.S. distancing in 1986 clearly had nothing to do with Marcos' longstanding fundamental behavior patterns. It is just that he had ceased to be able to keep the population quiet any longer, which was an important part of the bargain. Thus, sud- denly, the U.S. media discovered that he steals and is not a good democrat. (2) U.S. aid and the growth of torture. Torture has had what Amnesty International calls "a cancerous growth" in recent decades. Since the death of Stalin in 1953 it has declined mar- kedly in the East. It has been a growth industry in the West. What is more, this terrible and dehumanizing form of violence is almost exclusively an instrument of state terror." That it should have grown dramatically as an instrument of state terror while the new concern over something called "terror" has been restricted to non-state terror, reinforces the point that the powerful define terrorism to their own advantage and indepen- dently of the substance of terror. Table 2 shows the relationship between U.S. aid and train- 34. "Torture today is essentially a state activity." Amnesty International, Report on Torture, p. 22. ing for 15 countries using torture on an administrative basis in the 1970s. A more comprehensive overview shows that of 35 countries using systematic torture in the 1970s, 26 (or 74e% ) were clients of the United States." While these results have not been updated in detail, despite the ebbs and flows of the past decade there have not been any major changes in pattern. "' The linkage between U.S. aid and parent-client relationship and the use of torture is not coincidental. We have seen that the installation and support of repressive regimes has been func- tional. The United States is also wealthy, and can provide its clients with the best and latest in methods and tools of interro- gation. There is a great deal of evidence of U.S. training in methods of torture and provision of torture technology, which have been diffused throughout the system of U.S. client states. Electronic methods of torture, used extensively in Vietnam, have been adapted throughout the U.S. sphere of influence. A. J. Langguth claims that the CIA advised the Brazilian military on the limits that would prevent premature death in the use of field telephones for interrogation." A recently published inter- view with a Salvadoran death squad officer shows that officials from the Salvadoran police and intelligence services have re- ceived intensive training in interrogation methods from the 35. See Chomsky and Herman, The Washington ('onnv( lion, Frontispiece and notes. Parent-client relationship was based primarily on receipt of military training and significant flows of direct economic and military aid. For more details, and the criteria used in determining countries using torture on an ad- ministrative basis, see p. 361. 36. See Amnesty International, Torture in the 19,5O. (New York: At, 1984). 37. Hidden Terrors (New York: Pantheon, 1978), p. 139. This book gives substantial evidence of U.S. training in and support of torture in a number ot Latin American states. Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Table 2 U.S. Military, Police and Economic Aid to Countries Using Torture on an Administrative Basis in the 1970s' (Figures in Millions of Dollars) Military Assistance' (1946-1979) Commercial Arms Exports` (1950-1980) No. of Military Personnel Trained by U.S.' (1950-1980) Police Aid` (1973-1981) Bilateral U.S. Economic Aid" (1946-1979) International Aid' (1946-1980) Argentina" 263.6 90.4 4,017 .45 199.1 2,946.7 Bolivia 80.7 4.28 4,896 15.78 801.8 1,027.2 Brazil 640.0 83.31 8,659 .77 2,424.1 9,080.6 Chile 217.0 8.76 6,883 .14 1,163.1 1.046.6 Colombia 240.9 19.40 8,349 34.17 1,340.7 4,095.6 Dominican Republic 43.0 2.59 4,269 - 589.4 733.9 Guatemala 41.5 5.09 3,334 417.4 703.5 Haiti 5.9 1.87 643 - 251.8 305.0 Mexico .1 12.97 1,003 95.1 2,691.9 5,807.3 Nicaragua 32.4 4.24 1,003 - 298.9 537.1 Peru 239.7 25.63 8,160 8.4 609.3 1,434.1 Paraguay 30.3 2.45 2,018 .09 177.8 629.1 Uruguay 89.2 I67 2,806 - 159.5 632.3 Venezuela" 152.3 60.33 5,540 201.1 657.0 ' For the concept and criteria of torture on an administrative basis, see Chomsky and Herman. The Washington Connection and Third World, frontispiece and explanatory footnotes. Agency for International Development, Congressional Presentation, Fiscal Year 1982, Annex III (3), Latin America and the Caribbean. U.S. Department of Defense. Congressional Presentation, Security Assistance Programs, Fiscal Year 1982. Ibid. Michael Klare and Cynthia Arnson, Supplying Repression, IPS, 1981, p.3. This column refers to police aid provided for a brief period under the International Nar- cotics Control Program. The much larger Public Safety Program supplied $324 million of arms and training to Third World police between 1961 and 1973. See footnote 2. Ibid. The data source for both Argentina and Venezuela, for military assistance, bilateral, and international economic aid categories was: US A.LD., (IS Overseas Loans and Grants, July I, 1945-Sept. 30, 1979. * Reproduced from Herman, The Real Terror Network, p. 129. United States, including advice on the use of torture." The U.S. official position has always been that U.S. police training stresses "humane" methods of interrogation, as well as greater police efficiency, but there has been a remarkable correlation between the coming of such training and the emergence of death squads and the rise of systematic torture. U.S. Con- gressman George Miller recently released a May 19, 1970 Air- gram from the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala to the State Depart- ment, reporting on the torture and assassination activities of a Guatemalan death squad made up of security personnel. Scrawled on the top of the first page of this document from an unnamed Foreign Service officer was the statement: "Jack- This is what we were afraid of with increased public safety support."" In its Report on Torture, Amnesty International noted that torture came to Greece with the 1967 coup of the Colonels, whose leaders were trained and supported by the CIA and U.S. Army. Al points out that the United States regularly apologized for the torture regime, because it liked what it was doing in general.40 Al noted a "seeming paradox"-that "never has there been a stronger or more universal consensus on the total inadmissibility of the practice of torture: at the same time the 38. Allan Nairn, "Confessions of a Death Squad Officer," The Progres- sive, March 1986, p. 28. 39. Quoted in Kai Bird and Max Holland, "Capitol Letter," The Nation, December 14, 1985. 40. Report on Torture (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1975), p. 81 . practice of torture has reached epidemic proportions. "41 The solution to the paradox is simple: terrorism, as we have seen, is defined in accordance with the requirements of power. Just as power permits the exclusion of South Africa and Guatemala from the category of "terrorist states," so that same power may exclude countries using institutionalized torture from the list of terrorist states and their practices from the manipulated consciousness of western publics. The premier terrorist as por- trayed in the U.S. media during the period of the worst exces- ses of the Argentinean regime of organized torture (1976-81)42 was Libya. Argentina was a slightly troublesome friend, not a terrorist state.4' (3) U.S. aid and training and the spread of the death squad and "disappearances''. Latin America has been unique in modern world politics in recent decades in developing an in- stitution called the "death squad" and in the recrudescence of the phenomenon of "disappearances." The death squad is a sub rosa group of killers, who abduct enemies of the state and frequently torture and kill them and cause them to "disap- pear." Their function is to kill and intimidate without attribu- tion to the official forces of the state. U.S. officials generally 41. Ibid., p. 31. 42. At its peak, Argentina had at least 60 separate detention centers in which torture was regularly employed. See Herman, The Real Terror Network, op. cit. n. I I , pp. 112 - 13. 43. On the modes of apologetics and evasions on Argentina in the U.S. press, see Chomsky and Herman, The Washington Connection, op. cit., n. 5, pp. 263-70. Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 accept the claims of the client states that the "death squads" are unconnected with the state, as this allows them to rationalize support for the state committing the organized mur- ders. The claim is ludicrous-the evidence is clear that the death squads are usually made up of off-duty and irregular offi- cial forces and are under the control of the state"-- but the ac- ceptance of these claims by U.S. officials shows the essentially collective and supportive relations between the United States and clients employing this mode of terror. The death squad spread throughout Latin America in the 1960s and 70s. It terminated in Nicaragua with the Sandinista triumph, and was ended or greatly reduced in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay as a result of the recession in military rule in those states. It is still important to recognize that it became very widespread in the U.S. sphere of influence, and that its rapid growth was closely correlated with U.S. aid and training (see Table 3). The death squad emerged in the Dominican Re- public immediately after the U.S. invasion and intensified training of 1965-66. It emerged in Brazil immediately after the U.S.-sponsored 1964 coup. It came to Guatemala after the reestablishment of close U.S hegemony in 1954, and espe- cially after the influx of Green Berets and CI training in 1966- 67. "Disappearances" have been a continent-wide phenomenon in Latin America. This horrendous development has brought forth groups of relatives of the victims in over a dozen Latin American states, who have held a series of Conferences of Rel- atives of the Disappeared each year since 1981. (These confer- ences have been essentially ignored in the Free World press.) It is estimated that the number of disappeared persons in Latin America since 1960 now exceeds 100,000, including over 35,000 in Guatemala alone. There is a close correlation be- tween death squad activity and disappearances, and thus be- tween U.S. aid and training and disappearances as well. It should be noted that the decline in death squad activity and dis- appearances in countries like Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay was in no way attributable to U.S. policy or pressures-it came, in fact, from the catastrophic failures of the U.S.-sup- ported military regimes and their inability to retain open power." In an area of intense U.S. interest and activity like Central America, the death squad, disappearances, and torture have taken on new life. In El Salvador, for example, the en- larged U.S. interest beginning in 1979 led to a huge surge in death squad and regular army killing of civilians. This has been transformed in the last two years to only "moderate" death squad activity, but even more civilian deaths via an aggressive Cl and aerial war on the countryside. Honduras, increasingly occupied by the United States in the 1980s, has joined the list of countries now subjected to disappearances." (4) Escalated ''surrogate'' terrorism. One of the purposes of U.S. sponsorship of conservative and counterrevolutionary states, and training of security forces within states, has been to establish surrogates, who could function as regional gen- darmes. The Shah of Iran and Israel in the Middle East, South 44. See esp. Amnesty International, "Disappearances": A Workbook (New York: Al. 1981). chapter 8. 45. See Edward S Heenan and James Petras. "'Resurgent Democracy' In Latin America: Myth and Reality," Nov Left Review, Number 154. Nov.- Dec. 1985. 46. Estimates of disappearances in Honduras ranging from 147-200 are given in "Hunan Rights Watch," Latinomerica Press, March 17, 1986, and James LeMoyne, "CIA Accused of Tolerating Killings in Honduras,? New York Times, February 14, 1986. Africa and France in Africa, Brazil in Latin America, have been notable instruments of the surrogate strategy. Some have fallen by the wayside, but the strategy is very much alive and new candidates will be mobilized in the future, even though the United States is positioning itself more and more for "open" covert action and direct attack under the guise of "counter-ter- rorism." Since the coming into power of Reagan, the violence of the surrogates has escalated markedly. The suffering pro- duced by surrogate state terror vastly exceeds that inflicted by the retail terrorists, who kill on a smaller scale and do not regu- larly torture their victims. Conclusion The western view is that if Libya or the Soviet Union train and give (or sell) guns to somebody, they are accountable for the behavior of their trainees or buyers of their weapons. As usual, this reasoning is not applied symmetrically. The United States is the greatest trainer and supplier of arms in world his- tory, and the acceleration of its activity as trainer-supplier in the 1960s and 1970s was associated with the emergence of an extensive network of military dictatorships and National Secu- rity States. The growth of torture and disappearances was largely attributable to the workings of this real terror network, and in recent years the mass slaughters by major U.S. surro- gates-Israel and South Africa-have been major contributors to quantitatively substantial world terrorism. The escalation of U.S. intervention in Central America, notably in aiding the contras and the "death squad democracy" of El Salvador, have also been major contributions to terrorist violence. The coming into power of the Reagan administration was also associated with a huge arms buildup and attempt to make the nuclear threat more credible and nuclear war winnable. This is an important forth of terrorism in itself; but its main function is to make it easier for the United States and its surro- gates to employ conventional forces and to support "freedom fighters" like Savimbi and the Nicaraguan contras on a world- wide basis. This is a new and dangerous phase of U.S. imperial expansion. What is most frightening is that the Big Lies that cover over the Reagan policies of unconstrained arms escala- tion and counterrevolution-in the names of "counter-ter- rorism'' and "freedom''-have been effective, and western publics have been made confused, fearful, and thus manage- able. The rightward drift of European politics, partly a re- sponse to U.S. power and pressures, has reduced the con- straints on the United States. The West is being mobilized for a new crusade against progressive change in the Third World. In The Real Terror Network, written in I981 , I pointed out that Reagan's policies would not only greatly enlarge state ter- rorism, his parochial and repressive policies at home and abroad and refusal to address real problems would generate more terrorism from below (retail terrorism). "This natural re- sult of greed, shortsightedness and stupidity will then he used to justify greater state violence, which will he wrapped up in an 'antiterrorist' flag. Rightwing ideologues create retail terrorists and are then quite prepared to kill them."' This is the ultimate Orwellism: Those who terrorize the most arc able to take the puny responses of their victims and use these to justify their own further excesses. It is a feedback system that can only he fought by a determined effort to understand the reality. to call it by its right names, and to organize to contest the licgcmoti of the dominant terrorists. ? Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Israeli-South African Collaboration By Jack Colhoun* Over the last decade the world community has increasingly ostracized South Africa's white minority regime. Arms embar- goes, economic sanctions, bans on the transfer of nuclear and other high technology have been applied to compel South Af- rica to dismantle its racist system of apartheid. But at the same time a triangular strategic partnership of Israel, South Africa, and the U.S. has developed to cushion the apartheid state from the full force of these sanctions. To understand the Israeli relationship with South Africa, it is useful to put it in the context of Israel's growing involvement in the Third World. Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, a former profes- sor at the Univeristy of Haifa who now teaches at Columbia University, writes "Consider any Third World area that has been a trouble spot in the past ten years and you will discover Israeli officers and weapons implicated in the conflict-sup- porting American interests and helping what they call `the de- fense of the West.' " Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, and Nicaragua under the Somoza dictatorship are examples. "In South Africa," Beit-Hallahmi observes, "Israel is ac- tively involved in defending what Washington sees as 'a strate- gic outpost'-with the complicity and encouragement of the U.S. In this case, although the U.S. is committed to the survi- val of the South African regime, Washington feels that the overt support it can give to South Africa is severely limited by world opinion."' But, Beit-Hallahmi notes, "Israel's role in South Africa is qualitatively different from its role elsewhere."' Israel's in- vestments in South Africa, the burgeoning volume of trade be- tween the two countries and their extensive sharing of high technology and military experience has resulted in a unique network of mutual support. Extensive Trade In The Unnatural Alliance: Israel and South Africa, James Adams points out, "While it is impossible to place an accurate figure on the true total volume [of trade between the two coun- tries], it is probable that when all trade is taken into account, Israel may be South Africa's biggest trading partner."Economic relations between the two countries are shrouded in secrecy, says Adams, an executive of the London Sunday Times. According to International Monetary Fund statistics for 1983, South African exports to Israel totaled $142 million, while Israeli exports to South Africa amounted to $69 million.' 1. Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, "Israel's Global Ambitions," New York Times, January 6, 1983. 2. Quoted in Jack Colhoun, "South Africa buoyed by Israeli support," Guardian Supplement, Spring 1986. 3. James Adams, The Unnatural Alliance: Israel and South Africa (London, Quartet Books, 1984), p. 19. 4. Jane Hunter, Undercutting Sanctions: Israel, the U.S. and South Africa * Jack Colhoun is a Washington correspondent for the Guardian newsweekly. He was an editor (1971-77) of AMEX-Canada magazine, the former magazine of U.S. draft resisters and antiwar GIs exiled in Canada because of their oppo- sition to the Vietnam War. But these numbers don't include Israel's secret arms trade with South Africa, or South Africa's export of raw diamonds to Is- rael. "South Africa stands out as the single largest customer [of Israeli weapons]," Aaron Klieman, a political scientist at Tel Aviv University, concludes in his book Israel's Global Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy. "It is thought to have been the pur- chaser of 35% of all sold in the years 1970-79." The Tel Aviv regime doesn't allow much information to reach the public about its weapons sales, especially those to South Africa, which are in defiance of the U.N.'s 1963 and 1977 arms boycotts of the apartheid state. "It is believed that Israel currently gets 50% of its diamonds from South Africa," Adams reveals. "South Africa currently exports in excess of $100 million of uncut gems to Israel each year, and it has been a steady and lucrative market for both par- ties." The diamond polishing industry is a mainstay of the Is- raeli economy. Israel's foreign sales of polished diamonds in 1983 totaled $1 billion.' Many Israeli companies have invested extensively in South Africa. Afitra and Koors, corporations owned by Israel's His- tadrut labor federation, are big investors in South African com- mercial agriculture, high technology, and power generation in- dustries. Israeli investments are also concentrated in other criti- cal sectors of the apartheid state's economy such as communi- cations, computers, advanced computer software, and elec- tronics.' As writer Jane Hunter explains, "One of Israel's chief at- tractions, as far as South African industrialists are concerned, is its preferred status with the European Economic Community and the U.S."' Under the 1984 U.S. Free Trade Agreement, all Israeli exports to the U.S. will eventually be duty free. "To take advantage of Israel's privileged trade status, South Afri- can companies have systematically established manufacturing facilities in Israel, most often joint ventures with Israeli firms. Raw or semifinished materials are shipped from South Africa to Israel where sufficient 'local content' . . . is added, a 'made in Israel' label is attached, and the finished merchandise is shipped off to unsuspecting consumers abroad. "' This practice of "springboarding" is made profitable by the slave wages paid to Black South African workers. The Military Alliance A military alliance between the two countries evolved gradually in the 1960s as the U.N. adopted its first arms em- bargo against South Africa in 1963 and European suppliers of weapons to Israel stopped selling their wares to Israel after Is- rael's aggressive land grabs in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. But the Israeli-South African military partnership intensified after (Washington: Washington Middle East Associates, 1986), p. 32. 5. Aaron Klieman, Israel's Global Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacs' (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985), p. 139. 6. Adams, op. cit. n. 3, p. 20. 7. John Mahoney in "The Link," March 1986, newsletter of Americans for Middle East Understanding. 8. Hunter, op. cit. n. 4, p. 34. See also New York Times, March 5, 1985. 9. Hunter, op. cit. n. 4, pp. 34-35. Number 26 (Summer 1986) Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 South African Prime Minister Johannes Vorster visited Israel in 1976 and signed an agreement with the Tel Aviv regime set- ting up a Ministerial Joint Committee of the two nations' de- fense ministers. According to the agreement, "the exchange of Israeli arms and advice has three major areas: conventional arms trade, nuclear collaboration and counterinsurgency. 1110 Israel has exported sophisticated Kfir aircraft and rebuilt Mirage jet warplanes to South Africa. Israel has also supplied the apartheid state with Dabur coastal patrol boats, Reshef- class gunboats armed with Gabriel missiles, self-propelled 105 mm howitzers, antitank missiles, air-to-air missiles, assault rifles, radar bases and surveillance equipment.'' "Beyond outright sales, Israel has enabled South Africa to become almost completely self-sufficient in several types of weaponry and weapons systems," Hunter notes. "The two countries have set up a joint helicopter manufacturing pro- ject-Rotoflight of Capetown and Chemavir-Masok in Israel- which supplies the armed forces of both countries with Scor- pion helicopters."" Without the Israeli-South African alliance, she concludes, Pretoria could not have broken the U.N. arms embargo. Adams points out Pretoria's debt to Israel in its counterin- surgency wars against the Black African Frontline States sur- rounding it and its repression of South Africa's Black majority. "Much of the efficiency of the South African security services must be placed at the door of Israel," Adams writes, "for both army experts and specialists in counterintelligence operations and interrogation from Mossad [the Israeli central intelligence agency] have been based in South Africa in a permanent advis- ory capacity since 1976."" Israel Aircraft Industries constructed an electrified fence be- tween Angola and Namibia, which South Africa illegally oc- cupies, to block the infiltration into Namibia of SWAPO guer- rillas fighting to liberate their homeland. Antipersonnel mines made in Israel are planted by South Africa along the Angolan and Mozambican borders. An Israeli spy drone was shot down in 1983 flying over Mozambique." Israeli military officers helped South Africa plan its 1975 in- vasion of Angola. In 1981 Gen. Ariel Sharon, then Israeli De- fense Minister, spent 10 days with South African troops in Namibia near the Angolan border." The London Financial Times and the London Observer published reports of Israeli in- volvement in 1983-84 with Jonas Savimbi's UNITA guerril- las, the South African backed contras fighting against the MPLA government of Angola." Nuclear Cooperation Israel and South Africa have also collaborated with regard to nuclear weapons technology since the mid-1960s. Adams states, "For South Africa, Israel had one primary advantage: a relatively advanced nuclear industry that had been working on uranium-enrichment techniques and on the design of a nuclear bomb. For the Israelis, South Africa possessed almost unli- mited supplies of uranium that it might be persuaded to part with as part of a uranium-for-technology swap."' 10. Steve Goldfield. Garrison Stain: Israel's Role in U.S. Global Strategy (San Francisco: Palestine Focus Publications, 1985), p. 26. H. Ibid., p. 27. 12. Hunter, op. cit. n. 4, p. 27. 13. Adams, op. it. n. 3, p. 85. 14. Ibid., p. 93: Goldfield. op. cit. n. 10, pp. 28,30. 15. Hunter, op. cit. n. 4, p. 28. 16. Ibid. 17. Adams. op. cit. n. 3, p. 170. Despite a curtain of secrecy, it appears that both Israel and South Africa have developed nuclear weapons and could not have done so without each other's help. Israeli nuclear scien- tists were frequently reported to have been in South Africa in 1977, the same year the apartheid state abruptly canceled what the CIA thought were preparations for an atomic weapons test in the Kalahari desert." Two years later, the CIA concluded, Israel and South Africa carried out a nuclear bomb test in the South Atlantic Ocean, al- though the Carter administration and the regimes in Pretoria and Tel Aviv denied it. CBS News correspondent Dan Raviv reported in 1980 that Israel "had detonated an atomic bomb in a joint nuclear project in the South Atlantic," referring to the 1979 double flash in the South Atlantic, which is characteristic of an atomic explosion.'" Sophisticated weapons technology purchased by Israel from the U.S. also has been diverted to South Africa. Adams reveals how the Israelis helped the racist white-minority regime obtain the 155 mm howitzer, then the world's most advanced artillery piece. Israel bought the weapon from the U.S.-based Space Research Corp. (SRC), and used the big gun with great effec- tiveness in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war." After South African troops were repelled in their 1975 inva- sion of Angola by MPLA forces with superior artillery, Pre- toria turned to Israel. Although the Israelis were willing to sell the 155 mm howitzer technology to South Africa, Tel Aviv didn't own the rights to the weapon. So the Israelis teamed up with some former CIA agents to fashion it clandestine deal. SRC in the end not only sold Pretoria the advanced weaponry but also trained South African technicians, who later recon- structed the howitzer. "It is possible that another major weapons system Israel's Lavi aircraft, which incorporates highly advanced U.S. tech- nology and is largely dependent on U.S. financing-is now making its way to Pretoria," Hunter warns." There have been numerous reports in the Israeli and international press that South Africa is covertly financing part of the Lavi project in re- turn for a deal that would eventually allow the South Africans to build the Lavi under license in the apartheid state. Hunter notes that the U.S. corporations may, under pressure from antiapartheid campaigns, stop their operations in South Africa, but use their corporate subsidiaries in Israel to continue doing business with South Africa. "Motorola has recently won praise for its announcement that it will stop selling two-way radios to the South African police. However, its subsidiary, Motorola Israel, which produces military communications sys- tems and distributes them in South Africa through Afitra, can offer Pretoria continued access to those radios," she writes." U.S. Encouragement The Israeli-South African partnership evolved in part as a re- lationship between two nations faced increasingly with interna- tional isolation because of their destabilizing and oppressive policies in the Middle East and Southern Africa. But this re- 18. Ibid., p. I82: Hunter op. cit, n. 4. pp. I5-16. 19. Quoted in Hunter, op. cit, n. 4, p. 17. See also Jack ('olhoun, ''Little doubt U.S. helped build an 'apartheid bomb', Guardian, Fchruary Ib. 1983. And see, Barbara Rogers, ''South Africa Gets Nuclear Weapons- l'hanks to the West," in Ray. et al.. eds., Dirty Work 2. The ('I.4 in A/mica (Secaucus, N.J.: Lyle Stuart, 1979), p. 276. 20. Adams. op. cit. n. 3, pp. 38-71. And see, Michael Klarc. "Arms for Apartheid,'' in Ray, op. cit. n. 19, p. 258. 21. Hunter, op. cit. n. 4, p. 24. 22. Ibid, p. 44. Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 lationship was also encouraged by the U.S. "[Secretary of State Henry] Kissinger in early 1975 secretly asked the Israeli government to send troops to Angola in order to cooperate with the South African army in fighting the Cuban-backed MPLA," the British magazine The Economist wrote. "They sent South Africa some military instructors specializing in antiguerrilla warfare plus equipment designed for the same purpose. In return, the Israelis took Kissinger's request as the green light for an Israeli-South African partner- ship." " 23. Quoted in Israel Shahak, Israel's Global Role: Weapons for Repression (Belmont, Mass.: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1982), p. 29. Israeli Spy Target of MOSSAD Hit? By Louis Wolf Ever since Jonathan Jay Pollard was arrested in November 1985 and charged with a long history of spying for Israel, there has been substantial doubt that he will ever receive a full, public trial. Now, CAIB has learned, there is a question whether he will remain alive. The key is the relationship between the CIA and Israel's MOSSAD. The Department of Justice fears an assassination attempt by MOSSAD against Pollard, and at press time he was being kept under extremely tight security at the Petersburg, Virginia Federal Correctional Institution. He is under 24-hour guard in an isolation compound, has been given a "John Doe" identity, and wears a disguise, includ- ing a false beard and hairpiece. He is moved only after dark, for his frequent meetings with intelligence officials. The CIA and MOSSAD Given the long history of especially close relations be- tween the CIA and MOSSAD, both intelligence services- and both governments-would seem to have far more to lose than to gain by allowing Pollard's case to reach the courts. The two sister services share highly secret intelli- gence information and work side by side around the world. Cooperation ranges from covert paramilitary operations to media disinformation campaigns. It could prove extremely embarrassing to Tel Aviv and Washington if the full scope of such activities were to become apparent from a public airing of Pollard's activities on behalf of Israel while em- ployed as a U.S. Navy counterintelligence officer. And, from the Israeli side, it is not just a question of intelligence information. The $4.5 billion in annual aid-which makes Israel by far the leading recipient of U.S.foreign aid-is doubtless a major incentive for downplaying the Pollard case. Pollard's Career Pollard was for years fascinated with the workings of Is- raeli, U.S., and South African intelligence agencies. In 1984 he asked the Israelis to let him spy for them, and he re- ceived training from MOSSAD handlers including the legendary Rafael Eitan. In Washington and on two visits to Tel Aviv he was taught highly specialized espionage tech- niques, including the writing and sending of secret mes- sages and the use of Hebrew alphabet codes. He was given a false Israeli passport, a phony name, and $85,000. And he was promised $300,000 more, to be placed over time in a Swiss bank account. U.S. prosecutors said he had provided the Israelis with "reams" and "suitcases full" of classified documents dur- ing his busy two years, including U.S. technical in- telligence on the military capabilities of Arab nations. A special Israeli cabinet inquiry suggests he was supplying MOSSAD with data on CIA spying against Israel. White House Worries The case is a major headache for the White House. Pol- lard's arrest came only after what an insider has described as "a pitched bureaucratic battle" between the CIA and State Department on the one hand, and the FBI and Penta- gon on the other. Both the CIA and the State Department wanted to look the other way, and let Pollard continue- subject to some scrutiny and damage limitation. But the FBI saw an arrest as a great public relations booster, and the Pentagon was evidently seriously worried about the intelli- gence resources and advantages accruing to Israel at the ex- pense of other allies. The FBI won out, and within three days arrested Pollard and two other spies who were being watched in unrelated cases-former CIA China analyst Larry Wu-tai Chin and former NSA officer Ronald Pelton. As the Pollard case un- folded, the official U.S. position was almost comical. The Munich daily,Suddeutsche Zeitung commented (December 3, 1985), "The U.S. State Department trumpeted its 'horror,'.,.and the CIA wailed shrilly like an old courtesan pretending to be a violated virgin. Jerusalem behaved even less circumspectly." The Spreading Scandal The Justice Department is finally of the opinion that the Pollard operation is just part of a larger Israeli espionage ap- paratus in the United States-something any intelligent ob- server of the scene would have assumed for years. The of- fice of Rep. John Conyers (Dem.-Mich.) has announced that the House Judiciary Committee subcommittee on crimi- nal justice, which Conyers chairs, will commence an inves- tigation of Israeli spying in the U.S. shortly. The conserva- tive New, York Times columnist William Safire reported (June 30, 1986), "I'm told a New Yorker, prominent in Jewish affairs, is likely to be implicated in the [Pollard] spy scandal." CAIB has learned that, for many years, the leadership of the American Jewish Committee in New York has, on a reg- ular basis, supplied reports on U.S. strategic affairs, includ- ing intelligence matters, to the Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations. Israel's U.N. mission has long been a key MOSSAD post. Only time will tell what Safire was told. ? Number 26 (Summer 1986) Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 The next year the U.S. turned again to its covert partner in Tel Aviv. "British television (and subsequently the press as well) aired a report referring to the sale of American helicop- ters to South Africa, in the middle of their notorious invasion of newly liberated Angola. It turns out Kissinger, with reason, expected the U.S. Congress would not confirm the sale of such equipment . . . so . . . an 'Israeli solution' was found for this problem by means of a fictitious sale effected by 'unknown Is- raeli companies,' and the 'copters were transfered to South Af- rica' "Hebrew University professor Israel Shahak writes." Jane Hunter sums up: "Israel has become an indispensable covert partner for the U.S. because this partnership isn't sub- ject to congressional scrutiny or even public debate because of Israel's 'special relationship' with Washington." But, she con- cludes, "The question for progressive Americans should be simply whether we are doing all that we can to end apartheid. If we find, therefore, that the 'special relationship' between the U.S. and Israel spills over into South Africa, then issues like the level of American aid to Israel, the role of U.S. firms in three-way trade and U.S. diplomatic attempts to cover up this involvement cannot he ignored."" ? 24. /hid., p. 28. 25. Hunter, op. cit. n. a, p. 51. Cluster Bomb Hypocrisy Ste` ~*~'~~ '~~,,~?.~; One facet of the expanding U.S.-Israel spy scandal is the allegation that Israel has been smuggling cluster bomb technology out of the United States. Cluster bombs are pods which open in midair, on the way to their targets, releasing up to 500 potentially lethal ex- ploding projectiles. The charge, made July 8 by the U.S. Ambassador to Israel, has been denied by that nation, which insists that their development of such weapons was "totally independent." (Netr York Times, July 10, 1986, p. A 18. ) The U.S. reportedly "halted shipment of cluster weapons to Israel in 1982 after they were used against civilian areas in the Israeli invasion of Lebanon." (Ibid.) But the blatant hypocrisy in such a policy-if in fact it is followed at all-is that the U.S. used cluster bombs against civilians in its invasion of Libya in 1986, to say nothing of their extensive use in Indochina during the 1960s and early 1970s. The photo above shows hundreds of such devices displayed for news reporters on a Benghazi beach. Clearly the United States does not practice what it preaches. ? THE RISE AND FALL OF THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION By Edward S. Herman and Frank Brodhead the most ambitious (lisintorntatiof) coup of the I 980s: A handful of reac- tionary journalists with extensivc in- telligence connections turned the truth on its head. For more than four years, western audiences were mini- dated with tales of the Bulgarian Connection'' -an elaborate scenario asserting that Mchmet Ali Agra, the Turkish fascist who tried to kill the Pope, wasn't a fascist after all, but an agent of the Bulgarians and the KCB. But when the case finally came to trial, it fell apart: Agca claimed he was Jesus and offered to raise the dead. More important. no evidence was ever found to corroborate am thing he said. In fact, the cvidence strongly suggested Agca had been coached while in prison to reverse his story. This book analyzes how and vvhy the media-and the reading public were so totally duped. It is a ease study in western disinformation. ? 275 pages, fully indcscd. ? Hardcover, $19.95: paperback $O 1)5 Order now. Use this coupon. -------------------- JIIERIDAN 50VAKE VVDLKATION5. INC. P.O.Box 677. N Y. N Y 1(11113 Please send me: THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION I copies, hardcover, at $19.95 Catih. I plus $1.75 postage and handling. _l copies, paperback, at $9.95 cacti. plus $1.511 postage and handling Send rue your catalog. I ('ITY. STATE, ZIP I L-------------------J Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 News Note Cover Photo Explained The cover of our last issue showed some Greek women who were hanged by Nazi collaborators during the German occupa- tion. The photo was taken by Spyros Meletzis in Volos in 1944 and given to us by him. While we used the photo to illustrate the brutality of the Nazis and their collaborators, we had no idea precisely who the women were. The cover of CAIB Number 25 was reproduced in the Athens weekly, Pontiki, on January 10, 1986, to illustrate an article about our magazine. It led to some extremely interesting correspondence, and a poignant article (January 24, 1986), translated excerpts of which follow: An emotionally crushing photograph from the martyrdom of the Greek people during the German occupation went round the world via CovertAction magazine. On one half of the maga- zine's cover (reproduced in Pontiki) the execution of two Greek women is depicted, while on the other half, Reagan and Kohl are paying tribute to the SS cemetery at Bitburg. Beneath the photo of the two hanged Greek women are only two words, "Greece 1940s." Nothing else. Shortly after our issue came out a letter from a resistance fighter, Aris Psiaris, a lawyer in Volos, gave us the first pieces of information about those women. On the right is Filitsa Kalavrou; on the left, Lukia Topali. In the original photograph, the body of Sofia Topali, the daughter of Lukia, can also be seen. All three were hanged by members of the traitorous EASAD [National Agricultural Association of Anti- communist Action]. But why? For Kalavrou the reason may have been the participation of her husband in ELAS [National People's Liberation Army], but for the other two, the reason was simply looting. No matter how much their executioners claimed they were part of ELAS, they were hanged because they were wealthy. The collab- orators targeted them so that they could loot their mansion, and they did not even stop to consider that they were Swiss subjects. The unfortunate victims could have saved themselves had they escaped to Switzerland, but they chose to stay in Greece, helping people who were hungry by organizing soup kitchens and schooling for the children in the region. Detailed data, photographs, and reports of eyewitnesses can be found in the book, "Unknown Facets of the Occupation and the Resistance, 1941-44," by the journalist Nitsa Koliou. The women were hanged in the Volos village square on June 7, 1944. They had been arrested eight days before by EASADites, taken to the Alexandra prison, and from there tied with cables and taken to be hanged. According to Fotis Hatzopoulos, who was 12 years old at the time, but remembers the three tragic women very well, when the EASADites came to arrest Sofia Topali, they found her mother Lukia alone in the house. The man in charge pre- tended he was an andartes [guerrilla fighter] and asked why they had not sent supplies to ELAS. The unsuspecting woman replied that she had sent supplies the day before, and was immediately arrested. A short time later her daughter arrived and was also arrested. About Filitsa Kalavrou there is the testimony of her own daughter, Vasiliki Agrafiotis: "My mother tended the mill of my father when he left to join the andartes. She lived in the mill. One night men of EASAD appeared at the mill disguised as andartes, wearing caps with the word ELAS! 'We are in the mountains with Antonin,' they said. 'Why don't you send anything to your husband'?' She said she had already sent bread and woolen undershirts and socks. She said she did the knitting herself. 'You yourself are a fighter?' the EASADites asked her. 'Of course,' was my mother's reply. They arrested her. That was the same evening they arrested the Topali women, and took them all to the Alexandra prison. One day I passed by the prison and I heard my mother call to me from the window. She had been severely tortured, but she denied nothing. She told her tormenters that she had been knitting for the andartes. Later she was tied with cables, taken from the prison, and hanged. The mill and our home were completely looted. " In front of the gallows all three women behaved cour- ageously. Fotis Hatzopoulos remembers the Topali mother cheering for the freedom fighters and crossing herself before they put the noose over her head. As they made her daughter step up on the table to be hanged, she shouted to Fotis, "Take care of the children." She meant the soup kitchen children. Today nothing remains of the terrible crime. The bodies were buried nearby, but were later exhumed and have dis- appeared. Even the tree from which they were hanged was up- rooted some years later by officials charged with the beau- tification of the area. These women were not the only victims of the Germans and their collaborators. Twenty-two other villagers were executed, including a 10-year-old boy. Little is known of the fate of the group of EASADites who arrested and executed the women. The leader of EASAD, the notorious Takis Macedonas, fled Volos for Athens and then Salonika. When the Germans left, in October 1944, he went with a band of followers to hide in the countryside, but they were captured by andartes. Macedonas had hidden a small pistol under his armpit and, a few days after his arrest, told a fellow prisoner that he was terrified he would not simply be executed, but might be tortured. "What will happen if they de- cide to skin me alive?" he told a fellow prisoner. Before the other could answer, Macedonas pulled out the pistol and killed himself. How much one photograph tells. Number 26 (Summer 1986) Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 The Continuing War: Media Manipulation in Costa Rica By Howard Friel and Michelle Joffroy* In his affidavit to the International Court of Justice the former head of the contra communications office in Tegucigalpa, Edgar Chamorro, testified that, through him, the CIA had bribed journalists in Honduras to influence public opinion to oppose the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Chamorro testified that he "received money to bribe Honduran journalists and broadcasters to write and speak favorably about the FDN (the main contra group) and to attack the Government of Nicaragua and call for its overthrow." According to Chaniorro, "approximately 15 Honduran journalists and broadcasters were on the CIA payroll and our influence was thereby extended to every major Honduran newspaper and tele- vision station." Chamorro also testified that "I learned from my CIA colleagues that the same tactic was employed in Costa Rica in an effort to turn the newspapers and television stations of that country against the Nicaraguan Government." Al- though details of the CIA's media campaign in Honduras are scarce (even Chamorro won't discuss them), details of similar operations in Costa Rica are even more scarce. However, re- cent media events in Costa Rica may give observers some in- sight into the nature and methods of U.S. media operations in Central America. Background U.S. efforts to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua in- volve the destabilization of important sectors of its neighboring countries-Honduras and Costa Rica. In Honduras, the militarization of the budget, the expanded influence of the mil- itary, and increased military surveillance and repression of Honduran citizens are policies designed by the Reagan admin- istration to undermine the popular movements and Honduran democracy. More visible is the construction of several U.S. military bases in Honduras and the ongoing military exercises off the Nicaraguan and Honduran coasts and along the bor- der-demonstrating to Nicaragua that the regional infrastruc- ture for a U.S. military invasion is already in place. Finally, Honduran acquiescence to the presence of the U.S. mercenary forces inside Honduran borders is perhaps the clearest indica- tion of U.S. domination there. The purpose of the CIA's media campaign in Honduras is to condition the Honduran public to accept or support the Reagan administration's policies there. In Costa Rica the manifestations of U.S. power are more subtle, primarily because there is no military establishment there to exploit or dominate. Instead, the primary focus of American interventionists is the Costa Rican mass media. Be- * Howard Friel is a researcher and journalist who frequently contributes to C:4/B. He is now completing On Capitalist Realism: Hoc to Read Time and Nem+sreek. Michelle Jot!roy is a philosophy student at Villanova University. cause the mass media were the only major sector of society un- touched by the social reformation of the past half-century, the Costa Rican press is still owned and operated exclusively by the upper classes of the private sector, which, as Andrew Red- ing comments, maintains it "desire to insulate itself from the possible influence of revolutionary ideas on labor and landless peasantry." The vested interests of the mass media and its upper class owners represent "a natural convergence" with "the Reagan administration's desire to remove the Sandinistas from power."' The outcome, as Reding writes, has been "a concerted propaganda and disinformation campaign. Now en- tering its seventh year, this campaign is designed to scare Costa Ricans into a hostile attitude toward Nicaragua, thereby increasing their receptivity to U.S. intervention, Costa Rican rearmament, and persecution of real and imagined domestic leftists.'' According to Reding, who spent several years in the country with intellectuals, professionals, students, and work- ers, many Costa Ricans believe that the relationship between the media and the Reagan administration goes beyond a "natu- ral convergence." Reding states that in Costa Rica, "it is taken for granted" that the CIA is active within the media and that its influence is "comprehensive."' One can examine the recent record of deception and Ialsifjea- tion in the Costa Rican mass media, and especially in Costa Rica's leading newspaper, l.a Nacic,n. to get an idea where CIA media assets might be located. La Nacion and the Falsified Photo On May 30, 1985, two Costa Rican border guards were killed at Las Crucitas during it Costa Rican-based contra attack across the Nicaraguan border. Although an Organization of American States commission was unable to determine how the border guards were killed, the incident was reported in the Costa Rican press as an indication of Sandinista aggression and as revealing the supposed intentions of the Sandinistas to in- vade Costa Rica. The media's coverage of the border incident provoked an anti-Sandinista demonstration at the Nicaraguan Embassy in San Jose, including it nob attack on the embassy by several rock-throwing demonstrators. La Nation's coverage of the demonstration involved deceptive information and the falsification of a photograph. On June 1 I, 1985, La Nacion published three photographs of the demonstration. The photographs are reproduced here and numbered for reference. According to Carlos Morales, the I Andrew Reding. ''Costa Rica: I)enrociatic Model in .Jeopardy." lt Polirv Journal, Spring, 1986, p. 303 2_ lbid. 3. These quotes are from a telephone internic51 with Andrew Reding. Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 editor of La Universidad, the newspaper of the University of Costa Rica School of Journalism, the anti-Sandinista rock- throwing mob was organized by the Free Costa Rica Move- ment, a John Birch-type organization affiliated with General John Singlaub's World Anti-Communist League.' The trident- like logo of the Free Costa Rica Movement (MCRL) is clearly visible in photographs I and 2. In both photographs, those wearing the MCRL insignias are the peaceful demonstrators, thus creating the impression that MCRL involvement in the Photographs 1 and 2. Note visible trident MCRL insignia. demonstration was peaceful and free of provocations. In photo- graph 3 the man in the foreground holding a brick is also a member of the MCRL, although this could not be discerned by La Nacion's readers since the MCRL logo on the brick thrower's shirt had been rubbed out by the editors of La Na- cion. In the original, unaltered photograph the logo is clearly visible. The falsified photograph was discovered during an in- vestigation of the demonstration by La Universidad, which also determined that the rock-throwing incident was, in fact, a MCRL provocation.' Given that one of La Nackn's editors, Juan Antonio Sanchez Alonso, is also Vice President of the Free Costa Rica Movement, it is clear that the erasure of the in- signia and the coverage of the demonstration was meant to mis- lead and manipulate the Costa Rican public. La Nacion and the Manipulation of Public Opinion On March 2, 1986, the period immediately preceding the de- bate in the United States regarding contra aid, La Nacion pub- lished the results of a poll taken by Consultoria Interdiscip- linario en Desarollo (CID), a San Jose subsidiary of Gallup. The poll showed that 69 percent of Costa Ricans supported military aid to the contras, while only 24 percent opposed aid. The poll results were distributed in the United States that month by the United States Information Agency, publicized by The Washington Times, broadcast by National Public Radio, and cited by Congressman Bob Livingston (Rep.-La.) during the congressional debate. Upon publication of the CID poll by La Nacion, La Universidad conducted another investigation of the background and methods of the survey.' Photograph 3, as it appeared in the newspaper. Note black mark on chest. The original of photograph 3, showing trident MCRL insignia before it was obliterated. 4. La Universidad, University of Costa Rica, San Jose, June 21, 1985, p. 3. 5. Ibid. Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 La Universidad discovered that the survey, published for the first time in March 1986, was actually conducted 9 months earlier in June 1985. In addition, the poll was conducted only days after the border incident at Las Crucitas, when, according to Carlos Morales, the Costa Rican public was "under the in- fluence of the press campaign which had been focusing on Las Crucitas." Furthermore, La Nacion published the results of this poll without mentioning the results of a more recent CID poll conducted in November 1985. That poll found that 42 per- cent of Costa Ricans opposed aid to the contras while 39 per- cent support it-a dramatic reversal from the June poll. These results were never published by La Nacion. The game played by La Nacion is apparent-to ensure that Costa Ricans support the Reagan administration's policy in Nicaragua and the rest of Central America. According to Daniel Obuder Quiros, former president of Costa Rica (1974- 1978: All the Costa Rican media owners are conservative. They follow what they feel is the U.S. line, though most of the time much more aggressively than the actual U.S. line. They're ultras in the sense that they go beyond what may be the wishes or recommendations of U.S. officials in the area in order to ingratiate themselves and secure U.S. support.' "U.S. support" involves primarily cheap loans from the U.S. to private Costa Rican banks-an economic assistance program designed to undermine state banks and social programs. In essence, as long as U.S. economic assistance to Costa Rica is contingent upon support for the contras and designed to enhance the power of the Costa Rican oligarchy while undermining the social democracy, the mass media in Costa Rica will continue to operate and publish on strings pulled by the U.S. government. Elogian pretil Me encanta el pretil que construyeron en la acera de I,i Emhajada de Estados Unidos en esta capital. Luce come sins ular ornato que llama la atencion de todos los Iran seunte7s. Seria mu} agradable que las representacione- diplometicas realizaran okras semejantes, va q?ie parecen pequenas trincheras para detenera Ins maleantes que in- Lenten danar los edifictos. I.astima si que scan tan haji- Los, pues ya los estan cogiendo para sentarse v hasta to, perros los ban ensuciado. ;Que irrespeto I)io mio! Se me ocurre que tatnbitn en los barrios residenciales los veci- nos podriamos levantar pretties simtlares para proteger- nos mas. Amalie Zamora V., Ced. 4-033180. The phony letter, as it appeared in La Nacion. The letter is signed with an accompanying cechila number (routinely used in Costa Rica for identification and geographi- cal purposes). Once again, La Universidad investigated. Carlos Morales petitioned the Civil Registry in Costa Rica to check the authen- ticity of the cedilla number." He received the following reply: There appears to be no person carrying the cedilla number 4- 033-180 and it cannot be established how long the number has been non-existent. Page 33 of the jurisdiction flcrcdia numbers from No. 35724 to 36715. Thus, it seems that the letter, absurd as it is, was contrived to give the impression of at least marginal support among Costa Ricans for the embassy wall. Of course, like other La Nacion attempts to demonstrate Costa Rican support for the U.S. pre- sence in the region, the evidence presented for this alleged sup- port was shown to be fraudulent. La Nacion and the Fake Letter As a response to increased terrorist targeting of Americans overseas, the United States Embassy in San Jose constructed a wall to surround the compound for additional security. How- ever, the embassy wall juts out onto the sidewalk, forcing pedestrians to walk into the busy street in order to walk by the embassy. Residents of San Jose soon began complaining about the inconvenience, the safety hazard, and the fortress-like ap- pearance of the new wall. For these reasons, few good things could be said by Costa Ricans about the embassy wall-that is, until the following letter appeared in the May 31, 1985, issue of La Nacion: Praise for the Wall I love the wall constructed in front of the embassy of the United States in the capital. It is a brilliant ornament which attracts the attention of all pedestrians. It would be very pleasant for diplomatic buildings to become such works of art, given that they now look like stockades to detain the criminals who want to damage them. It's a shame that they are so low as now they are used for people to sit on and even the dogs dirty them. What disrespect, My God! It also oc- curs to me that in residential neighborhoods, the residents could build similar walls to better protect themselves.- Amalia Zamora V., Ced. 4-033-180. 7 Andrew Reding. ''Voices from Costa Rica." World Policy Journal. p. 326-27. Ideology and Myths These three examples of misleading and falsified infornut- tion in La Nacion are typical of the kind of lies and mythologies being built up today in Costa Rica to vilify Nicaragua and justify U.S. policy in Central America. It is al- ways the case that when an ideology lacks an ideational and moral legitimacy it must rely upon an extensive network of lies and myths to sustain itself. Perhaps the best way to summarize the most likely outcome of such an ideological campaign is to quote from a recent interview with Jose Figueres Ferrer, former president of Costa Rica and current president of the Costa Rican National Liberation Party:" A few months ago, there was a moment of crisis in Nicaragua following a border incident at Las Crucitas near the Costa Rica-Nicaragua border. People were saying that the Nicaraguans wanted to invade its, and that if Costa Ri- cans went beyond the border, they would he killed. So the democratic labor leaders decided to cross the border to see what would happen, and I joined them. We went to the Rio San Juan, and the Sandinistas shouted, "Viva Costa Rica!" Nothing happened at all. On the contrary, we were really well received. When we went to Muelle San Carlos against the wishes of the Costa Rican Government, we were re- ceived like friends. Many times war is created by myths people are turned into your enemies by myths. ? 8. La Unirersidad, June 21. 1985, p. 2. 9. Reding. "Voices from Costa Rica" p. 122. Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Duarte: The Man and the Myth By Dennis Hans* The case of Jose Napoleon Duarte, president of El Salvador, confounds. The very qualities his legion of admirers in the U.S. government and media profess to see in him are precisely those he lacks. Although he has been caught in lie upon lie, Duarte is praised for his honesty. Duarte, the pitchman for murderers and torturers, is hailed for his morality and decency. This describes the Duarte of the 1980s, the years covered in this review. There was a time when Duarte deserved-but did not receive-the support of Washington. A founding member in 1961 of the Salvadoran Christian Democratic Party (PDC), Duarte was an effective and popular mayor of San Salvador from 1964 to 1970. In 1972, he ran as the presidential candi- date of a center-left civilian coalition that was attempting to bring to an end four decades of military rule. Duarte won the election, only to have it stolen by the army, which arrested and tortured Duarte and shipped him off to exile. Nothing here disturbed the U.S. It had supported a string of anticommunist military dictatorships in El Salvador and promptly recognized the stealers of the 1972 election. As long as the Salvadoran army provided "stability" and a favorable investment climate, and remained loyal to the U.S., the U.S. was content to let it rule. Ironically, the electoral fraud welcomed in Washington in the interests of stability sowed the seeds of instability. Seeing that the peaceful, democratic road to economic and social re- form led to a dead end, many Salvadoreans took to the hills and prepared for a guerrilla war. Some seven years later (October 1979), with El Salvador on the brink of civil war, a group of moderate and progressive of- ficers committed to democracy and reform staged a coup and formed a government with a broad array of respected citi- zens-educators, lawyers, politicians, enlightened busi- nessmen. Unfortunately, the democratic contingent of the mili- tary never consolidated its power. The reactionaries retained a significant power base and gradually expanded on it. It is at this point that we begin our detailed review of Citizen Duarte. He returned from exile in late 1979, and in a matter of weeks assumed a critical role not only in the politics of El Sal- vador, but in U.S. foreign policy as well. 1980 was a tumultuous year in El Salvador. In January, the government collapsed. Distressed at their inability to restrain the armed forces which were terrorizing political and labor ac- tivists, the three civilians on the five-man junta and every cabinet minister except one resigned. The PDC, after much soul-searching, agreed to fill the breach. Mindful of the cause of the collapse of the preceding junta, the PDC conditioned its participation in the government on the armed forces' submission to civilian control and the dis- missal of three notorious hard-liners, Defense Minister Jose Guillermo Garcia, Vice-Minister of Defense Nicolas Carranza and Treasury Police Chief Francisco Moran. * Dennis Hans is a freelance writer based in Florida. He has written for Chris- tlanitV and Crisis, the National Catholic Reporter, and the Village Voice. None of these promises were kept, and that provoked a mass exodus of Christian Democrats from the government in March. The officials stated that the PDC "should not participate in a regime which has unleashed the bloodiest repression ever ex- perienced by the Salvadoran people." One faction of the party, however-the old guard, led by Duarte-stayed on, with Duarte himself occupying the junta seat vacated by the PDC's Hector Dada. Archbishop Oscar Romero's appeal to the Duarte faction not to lend a moderate, civilian presence to a govern- ment clearly dominated by the most ruthless sectors of the army was rejected. In May, troops loyal to the moderate Colonel Adolfo Majano arrested Roberto D'Aubuisson (a retired army officer who was directing death squads with the connivance of the mil- itary high command) and confiscated documents implicating him in coup plotting and the March 24 assassination of Ro- mero. Now it was Duarte's turn to confront the army: The PDC would resign en masse if D'Aubuisson were not prosecuted. D'Aubuisson was released, Majano was demoted, and Duarte backed down. In the next 50 days, more than 2,500 Salvado- reans were tortured, assassinated, or massacred. In October, the top U.S. labor official in El Salvador, Richard Oulahan, analyzed recent developments in an internal memorandum. "Government here operates with no real popu- lar support," he began. "In the past several months, Duarte and company have sided with the conservative military (perhaps because this group holds the key to power now), which has hurt their image among the population." After not- ing that "military inspired violence is much worse now than before," Oulahan described the modus operandi of the char- mers Duarte had sided with: "The armed forces have been operating with the list system here: If your name happens to be on the list and you are taken prisoner your future life expec- tancy is about one hour."' The Washington Post reported De- cember 8, 1980, the latest Duarte ultimatum to the army: "If `democratic interests' are not given complete control of the military the Christian Democrats will withdraw." Five days later, Duarte was appointed president of the junta-but not commander-in-chief. The government restructuring actually strengthened the position of the military hard-liners. As in May, Duarte's demands had not been met. As in May, Duarte backed down. Explaining Away State Terrorism The Carter and Reagan administrations have pretended that the thousands of civilian killings since the civil war began in 1980 have been perpetrated primarily by "extremists of the left and right" out to topple the "centrist" government and, to a lesser extent, by government soldiers "out of control." Be- cause U.S. military aid flows directly to the armed forces, the executive branch has gone to great lengths to hide the fact that 1. Quoted in Raymond Bonner, Weakness and Deceit: U.S. Policy and El Salvador (New York: Times Books, 1984), pp. 203-205. Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 the vast majority of civilian deaths are the responsibility of government troops following to the letter the orders of their commanding officers. The White House has feared Congress would balk at bankrolling known butchers. And Duarte has served as point man in the campaign to protect the image of the Salvadoran armed forces. In May 1980, for example, the army massacred hundreds of refugees at the Sumpul River. At first, Duarte claimed no inci- dent had occurred there, but later conceded that "art action did take place" and that 300 people were killed, all "communist guerrillas. In July 1981, soldiers slaughtered 40 residents of Armenia, including all the members of a soccer team. "Duarte flatly denied that there had been any killings."' He even de- nied that there were rotting corpses at the El Playon lava fields, despite the fact that even U.S. Embassy officials admitted that the fields were a favorite dumping ground of the local army cavalry unit. Stories to this effect were "fabricated," Duarte said. Still, Duarte and the army high command promised to in- vestigate. "Several months later the embassy acknowledged 114 that there had been no investigation. Colonel Majano (forced out of the government by army hard-liners in December 1980) undoubtedly had these and other instances in mind when, according to the Christian Sci- ence Monitor (March 15, 1982), he "asserted that despite the widely held view in the United States that President Duarte is a moderate who is trying to end abuses, Duarte was fully aware of what was happening and had helped to cover up the govern- ment's complicity." On those rare occasions where Duarte acknowledged the complicity of government forces in attacks on civilians, he passed them off as "abuses of authority," certain the army as an institution was not to blame. In this connection, we note that Ray Bonner's widely praised book, which documents countless mass killings by government forces, details only one involving an "abuse of authority." The U.S.-trained Atlacatl Battalion arrived in the northern village of Mozote on a December day in 1981. After assem- bling the villagers in front of the church, the troops proceeded to blindfold the men and take them away in groups of four and five to be shot. "Women were raped. Of the 482 Mozote vic- tims, 280 were children under fourteen years old." Among the victims were the four children and blind husband of Rufina Amaya. She had managed to hide in safety in a nearby wooded area, from where she overheard the following conversation. "Lieutenant, somebody here says he won't kill children," said one soldier. "Who's the son of a bitch who said that?" the lieutenant answered. "I am going to kill him."' A fitting punishment for a soldier who "abused the authority" of the commanding officer by refusing to kill children. When the military and police of a nation murder 25,000 ci- vilians in two years-34 per day-as El Salvador's did during the period Duarte served as a member or president of the junta (March 1980 to March 1982), a sullied reputation would seem sure to follow. But, according to Duarte's letter published in the November 9, 1981, Miami Herald, the armed forces' sor- did image stemmed from an "astonishing, clever, and effec- tive campaign of hearsay and false information channeled by the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other Communist countries." In truth, "The armed forces are waging a heroic battle against a cruel and pitiless enemy supported by great resources of ideological aggression." The "Democratic Process" Duarte was out of the government from April 1982 to May 1984. In the March 1982 Constituent Assembly elections the PDC lost to a coalition of right-wing and extreme right-wing parties. Participation was limited to pro-army political parties in this U.S.-conceived, -financed, and -staged affair: anti-army politicians of the center and left were on a hit list of "traitors" circulated by the army. A unique aspect of this "democratic process" was that the provisional president was selected by the U.S. Embassy and the army. In El Salvador, the president serves the army and the U.S. executive; the U.S. Congress is his constituency; solicit- ing the constituency for military aid is his function. The U.S. Embassy and the army concluded that mild-mannered banker Alvaro Magana could better perform this function than the Constituent Assembly's choice for president, Roberto D'Au- buisson. Duarte remained in El Salvador, attending to PDC affairs and planning his presidential campaign for 1984. Throughout 1982 and 1983, the army killed noncombatants at the declining yet impressive rate of 15 per day. This appears not to have dis- turbed Duarte any more than it did when, as president of the junta, the blood was on his hands. Commenting on a late-1983 conversation with Duarte, Le Monde's Charles Vanhecke, writing in the Manchester Weekly Guardian (December 25, 1983), noted that Duarte could not "find words kind enough for the army, in spite of its 'pacification' methods. Aligning himself with the military when he was president, he lent his name to the most cruel period of repression." Duarte's praise notwithstanding, the army was in fact in dis- array in late 1983, having suffered heavy casualties in the course of a disastrous U.S.-promoted and -designed counterin- surgency campaign. Seeing that the army was no match for the rebels on the ground, U.S. strategists convinced their Salvado- ran clients to counter with a massive escalation of the air war, the objectives being "to disrupt the rebels' ability to mass fix attack and to drive civilians out of the areas in the countryside that the rebels controlled or contested, thereby denying the reb- els a base of logistical support."' A seven-fold increase in U.S. funding for aircraft in fiscal year 1984 provided the Sal- vadoreans with the firepower, while stepped-up reconnais- sance flights by U.S. pilots based in Honduras and Panama helped select the targets. The civilian population bore the brunt of the bombing, straf- ing and rocket fire, a fact amply documented by human rights groups-and cynically denied by U.S. and Salvadoran offi- cials. By mid-1984, eight months into the escalated air war, many hundreds of civilians had been killed and more than 100,000 driven from their homes. The air force even "used the Red Cross's humanitarian activities to locate and attack groups of displaced people in areas of conflict." One tactic was to cancel Red Cross visits at the last minute and greet the gatherings of unsuspecting sick and homeless peasants with it parcel of bombs and bullets.' Meanwhile, civilians in Guazapa were being burned to death by incendiary weapons-napalm and white phosphorous, according to medical experts. Govern- ment troops acknowledged that villages in the area had been 2. Americas Watch report, 1982; the actual number was over 600. 3. Bonner. op cit, n. I, p. 324. 4. Ibid., pp. 325-26. 5. Ibid., pp. 338-39. 6. In the words of a report by the congressional Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus, entitled "U.S. Aid to El Salvador," February 1985. 7. Christian Science Monitor, March 26, 1984. Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 "burned to the ground . . . by incendiary bombs."' While these atrocities were taking place, candidate Duarte was singing the praises of the military on the presidential cam- paign trail. The election of 1984 resembled the 1982 affair in that it was sponsored and staged by the Reagan administration and restricted to pro-army candidates. It differed from the 1982 contest in that the White House invested heavily ($2 million, disbursed by the CIA) in a particular outcome: the defeat of D'Aubuisson. Though he, like the administration, favored a military solution to the civil war, a D'Aubuisson victory would deprive the armed forces of the means to pursue it. His well- deserved reputation as an ultra-rightist gangster would lead Congress to block all but a trickle of military aid. On the other hand, a victory for Duarte--ostensibly the "peace" candi- date-would loosen congressional purse strings. Gullible liber- als could be counted on to vote for aid so that Duarte could "seek peace" from a position of strength. The $2 million did the trick: Duarte defeated D'Aubuisson in a runoff election in May. Within days of his triumph, Duarte was in Washington per- forming the function of the Salvadoran head of state. He in- sisted that no "degrading" human-rights strings he attached to military aid and pledged-with a straight face to abide by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Among its principles are the right to live, freedom of expression and assembly, and a prohibition on torture, arbitrary arrest, and detention. No one pointed out that Duarte had made no effort to uphold these principles as junta president, and that even if he had undergone a change of heart in the intervening years, it was beyond his power to enforce military compliance with the Declaration. He got the guns, without strings. More "Abuses of Authority" On July 23, 1984, Americas Watch charged" that "indis- criminate attacks on civilians by El Salvador's armed forces are continuing at a high level. . . . 1,331 noncombatants had Duarte and the U.S. Churchwomen On December 2, 1980, Sisters Ita Ford, Maura Clarke, and Dorothy Kazel and lay worker Jean Donovan were raped and murdered by five low-ranking soldiers of the Sal- vadoran National Guard (henceforth, the "Lowly Five"). In May 1984, some three and a half years later, the Lowly Five were tried and convicted of murder. In an interview conducted in July 1984 and published in the November 1984 Plavbov, Duarte described the trial as an expression of the moral conviction of the government that arrested and indicted the guardsmen. And that was my doing, because I was president of the junta at that time and the entire junta, together with the military high command, turned the prisoners over to the judge. . . . " He denied that the current defense minister, Gen. Eugenio Vides Casanova, had initially covered up the crime and blocked the investigation in 1980-81 in his capacity as director of the National Guard. As Duarte explained on Meet the Press, May 20, 1984, "The investigation was made by me person- ally. So if there was any cover-up, I did it, but I investigated the whole thing. . . . I don't believe there was any cover-up on that." While Duarte has public/v maintained throughout that the Lowly Five acted on their own-they "are the only and the true guilty ones''-in private he has indicated otherwise, at least on one occasion. According to the June 1, 1984, Los Angeles Times, at a private meeting with a group of con- gresspersons and congressional staffers in Washington on May 22, 1984, Duarte said that "evidence suggests that Col. Oscar Edgardo Casanova," the defense minister's cousin, "may have ordered the slayings." (The quote is Rep. Mary Rose Oakar's (Dem.-Ohio) recollection of Duarte's remark. Two others at the meeting confirmed her account.) The same article notes that Col. Sigifredo Ochoa, the Warlord of Chalatenango, "is reported to have told Senate aides that he believes Vides Casanova's cousin ordered the murders and Vides Casanova attempted to cover up the guard's involvement in the crime to protect his cousin." (Both Casanovas categorically deny the allegations.) The private remarks of Duarte and Ochoa contradict Duarte's public remarks and substantiate the elements of the account of the crime and cover-up offered by Roberto San- tivanez, the former intelligence chief in El Salvador who defected in 1984. At the time of the crime, Santivanez was serving as an adviser on intelligence matters to the high command. On December 3, 1980, the night after the crime, San- tivanez insists that the entire military hierarchy knew that Lt. Col. Casanova had ordered the murder of the churchwo- men. Santivanez himself learned of Casanova's responsibil- ity that evening from a high-ranking army officer. Fearful that this vicious act would result in a cutoff of U.S. aid, Santivanez, met with the army chief of staff the next day and urged that Casanova be charged "for the good of the coun- try." As the days passed, Santivanez realized that the "highest echelons of the junta and the high command were involved in the decision to protect the guilty man and cover up all traces of the murderers' activities on Dec. 2." He im- plicated by name Duarte and Vides Casanova in the cover- up (see Ana Carrigan, Salvador Witness (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), pp. 310-317). Duarte's claim that there was no cover-up is definitively disproved by Judge Harold Tyler. In the spring of 1983, President Reagan, under pressure from the Senate, ap- pointed Tyler to conduct "an independent and high-level re- view of all evidence available pertaining to the church- women's case." Tyler's report of December 2, 1983, while shedding little light on Edgardo Casanova's guilt or innocence, nevertheless demonstrates that: (1) The Lowly Five confessed their guilt to fellow Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 been killed in the first six months of 1984, mainly from air at- tacks.'' Duarte denied it. The next day he boldly declared that he would not ..accept a single case of abrese o/'autbority wher- ever it comes. If I find anybody guilty of this, he'll eo to prison or I'll go away from the presidency. But the crimes Americas Watch described were committed by the army and air force, ordered by officers in good standing, and condoned by the high command. No one was "abusing au- thority" in these operations. "Abuses of authority'' were not the cause of the army massacre of 68 civilians in Los Llanitos, Cabanas, carried out only days before Duarte's bold declara- tion (and carefully documented by Tutela Legal, the human rights office of the San Salvador archdiocese, and several U.S. journalists). Nor does it seem the August 1984 army massacre of dozens of peasants at the Gualsinga River in Chalatenango should he attributed to "abuses of authority." Unable to ex- plain away the massacres with his favorite excuse, Duarte did the next best thing. He denied they ever took place. In September 1984, Duarte finally admitted that aerial bombing had resulted in civilian deaths and issued guidelines to the air force for the stated purpose of minimizing noncom- batant casualties. Predictably, he absolved the air force of re- sponsibility for the deaths. ,,File terrorists are wing the masses as shields and they are using the masses to provoke, exposing the people to he killed,'' Duarte said. ... his is horrible. This is inhuman. But this is not my problem. It's the problem of the subversives' terrorist actions and they have to he held respon sible." No respectable observer was descrihing the 1984 air war in such terms. As for Duarte's guidelines, the air force has continued to violate them and Duarte has pretended that it Iias not. The Peacemaker Duarte the peacemaker was on display at I.a Palma in Oc- tober 1984. His out-of-the-blue offer to talk peace with the guerrillas (who had been waiting patiently at the negotiating Guardsmen repeatedly in the days following the murder. (2) The Salvadoran authorities' response was to commis- sion "two investigations, one public and one private, both with apparently the same objective: to create a written re- cord absolving the Salvadoran security forces of responsi- bility for the murders." (3) Vides Casanova appointed Major Lizandro Zepeda to conduct the private "investigation," and Zepeda reported directly to him. Yet when Tyler and his associates interview- ed Vides Casanova, he was "evasive" and "professed it disturbing lack of knowledge of Zepeda's investigation. At this early stage, December 1980 to May 1981, the Sal- vadoran government refused to admit the guilt even of the Lowly Five, let alone the officer who allegedly gave the or- ders. On December 27, 1980, Secretary of State Edmund Muskie, in a secret cable to the U.S. Embassy in El Sal- vador, assessed Duarte's performance to date: "We do not see him active in pressuring investigation." Ambassador Robert White told Congress in April 1981 that, in the month of December, "there was no serious investigation into the death of the nuns, and as far as I am concerned there never has been and I know of no evidence to say that the situation has changed" (Carrigan, p. 286). This phase of the cover-up collapsed in May 1981, after the U.S. Embassy confronted Duarte and Defense Minister Garcia with evidence of the guilt of the triggernien and de- manded their arrest. They were promptly arrested. (At this point they were the Lowly Six. The sixth Guardsman was subsequently found to have participated only in the abduc- tion of the women, and was released.) In September 1981, Congress conditioned further mili- tary aid on it good-faith effort by the Salvadoreans to prose- cute the case, to be certified by President Reagan every six months. On January 26, 1982, two days before Reagan was required to certify, Garcia announced that the Lowly Six would stand trial "within a few days." The Salvadoreans stonewalled for the next 20 months, forcing Reagan to lie to Congress at certification time in order to keep the arms flowing to the state terrorists (always the primary concern of the White House). Then, in November 1983. Congress made the Salvadoran arniv an offer it couldn't refuse: $19 million for a resolution of the case. The Lowly Five were tried on May 23, 1984, and the jury handed in a verdict of guilty of murder the very next day. For $19 million, senior army officers were willing to sac- rifice the freedom of five enlisted men. The question of how huge a sum would have been required for them to permit the prosecution of a fellow officer-something unheard of in I',I Salvador- did not come up. They made sure of that. According to former Ambassador White, two Guardsmen who were in a position to link a commanding officer to the crime had been executed by military death squads prior to the congressional offer of November 1983. And the New York Times (May 6, 1985) reported the allegations of a Sal- vadoran lawyer on the steps the military took to secure an obedient legal defense team for the Lowly Dive. In December 1982, during the stonewalling phase, three attorneys were assigned to the Lowly Fivc. Salvador An- tonio Ibarra was joined by two lawyers who made little ef- fort to hide their links to the high command. They pressed Ibarra not to contradict a statement that "the possibility of a cover-up had been thoroughly investigated'' and rejected a statement lie regarded as "an outright lie.'' The comnuon- law wife of one of the Lowly Five told lharra that her hus- band and the other defendants had told her that they were merely "carrying out orders from above" on that fateful night. Ibarra refused to cooperate in a cover-up, and for this lie was abducted on October 30, 1983, and tortured at National Guard headquarters. Only the intercession of the Interna- tional Red Cross and the U.S. Embassy secured his release. (He fled to the U.S. and currently resides in Texas. lie has applied for political asylum.) At the trial of the Lowly Five, the legal defense chose not to argue that their clients had merely been "carrying out orders from above. Considering all the information recorded ahove, includ- ing Duarte's private remarks, one must take with a grain of salt his public denial of it cover-up and insistence that the Lowly Five are "the only and the true guilty ones.'' ? Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Duarte shakes hands with Roberto D'Aubuisson during a reception in the presidential palace. Looking on is Assemblyman Hugo Barrera. table for three years) was quickly endorsed by the army and the Reagan administration, neither of which was (or is) known to favor a political resolution of the conflict. Why would advo- cates of outright military victory support a peace process? Be- cause Duarte's negotiating position, from which he never budged, called on the guerrillas to lay down their arms and compete for power through the "democratic process," under the watchful eye of the armed forces-that is, to surrender. La Palma was a smashing success. Duarte's fraudulent ges- ture was interpreted in the U.S. as a good-faith attempt to settle the civil war. Congress was so impressed that there hasn't been any serious opposition to military aid since La Palma. Hawks naturally have continued to vote for aid, while a flock of dim- witted doves have switched their vote to "yes" on the assump- tion that "peace" is just around the corner and therefore it is not the time to weaken the bargaining position of El Salvador's saviour. The doves' reward? For 19 months the army of El Sal- vador would not allow its "commander-in-chief" to return to the negotiating table. Not until June 1986 did the army relent, granting Duarte permission again to seek the unconditional sur- render of the guerrillas in talks set for late July or August. Meaningful negotiations, however, will remain a dead letter so long as Congress provides the army with what it considers the means to pursue total victory. The Contras' Friend Duarte has served well the Reagan agenda for Nicaragua, heaping scorn on the Sandinistas and endorsing aid to the con- tras, whose depravity rivals the Salvadoran army's. Duarte has supported contra aid on the theory that it helps interdict the infamous "massive" flow of arms, via land, air, and sea, from Nicaragua-a theory that coincides with two early Reaganite disinformation themes: Nicaragua is flooding El Salvador with arms; the purpose of contra aid is to interdict these arms. In an interview published in the November 1984 Playboy, Duarte was asked if he had proof of Nicaraguan gun- running. His reply: Look, it doesn't matter what I say or what proof I give you, you are always going to say it's not sufficient evidence. .. . The entire world does not want to accept any evidence that is offered by El Salvador and the U.S. In contrast, it accepts any evidence, even verbal evidence, that the Sandinista gov- ernment offers as proof of U.S. interference. Let the San- dinistas make any declaration about U.S. intervention and they have instant credibility. . . . Here in Playboy, you are not going to publish "Duarte makes important declaration about Nicaraguan intervention." No, instead, you will say, "Duarte alleges some possibility without proof of any kind." That's how the image of our country is distorted. Though Duarte knows that the goal of Reagan and his con- tras is to oust the Sandinistas, and though he's repeatedly en- dorsed aid to the contras, he refuses to state publicly that he supports the violent overthrow of the Nicaraguan government. Setting aside the evident hypocrisy and duplicity, Duarte's reasoning, as reported in the New York Times (March 23, 1986), is that such a public posture would deprive him of the moral high ground when denouncing Nicaraguan support for the Salvadoran FMLN. Duarte's position ascribes a symmetry to the two conflicts that is not apparent. In Nicaragua, a popular government is under assault from a terrorist force totally dependent on foreign aid and bases and led by the remnants of a despised, 46-year dictatorship. In El Salvador, an indigenous resistance move- ment faces a U.S.-sponsored killing machine-the armed forces-that is wholly responsible for the civil war, having for 50 years blocked every attempt by the people to bring about change through peaceful, democratic means. Given this back- ground, Nicaragua need not be ashamed of the moral support it provides the Salvadoran rebels. Duarte's position is doubly duplicitous, for his government is in fact actively engaged in the U.S. effort to overthrow the Sandinistas. In June 1985, for example, a "'DC-3 cargo plane . .. filled with guns and ammunition" flew from Miami to the Ilopango military airport in El Salvador, from where a smaller plane "ferried the weapons to rebel camps in Costa Rica." And since October 1985, U.S. aid to the contras has been channeled through El Salvador, with the approval of its air forces, "in an effort to make up for a recent cutoff of supplies by Honduras. 12 Duarte has been a good soldier in Reagan's propaganda war against Nicaragua. On June 1, 1985, he described Nicaragua as "the cancer from which Central America is suffering." In an address to the National Press Club in Washington, October 31, 1985, he said the "terrorist dictatorship" in Nicaragua is "the Central American source for totalitarianism and violence, and is the sanctuary for terrorists." Duarte picked up on the favorite theme of the propaganda war-censorship of the press-in a May 16, 1985, appearance at the White House to drum up support for "humanitarian" aid to the contras. Contrasting El Salvador's successful revolution with the "betrayed" revolution of Nicaragua, Duarte declared: "Our press is free to say and publish what it wants. La Prensa in Nicaragua is censored every day down to a few lines." Duarte exaggerated the degree to which the pro-contra scan- dal sheet is censored. Worse, he failed to note that the Salvado- ran military is "free" to destroy any newspaper that criticizes it. The army did just that to the last of the opposition papers, El Independiente, in 1981, eliciting not a peep of protest from Duarte. The press that remains either supports the government or criticizes it from the right. These papers do not print stories "critical of the government from a human rights standpoint," reports Americas Watch (September 1985). "Freedom of the press" is hardly the issue around which a Salvadoran president should try to rally support for the killer contras. Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Further Statistics Last year saw a statistical improvement in the human rights record of the Salvadoran armed forces, though the statistics probably would not he much consolation to the families of the year's civilian victims. In 1983. government killings of civil- ians outpaced guerrilla killings of civilians by 85 to one. In 1985, the ratio stood at about 14 to one, with government forces killing "only" four or five noncombatants per day. The army and security forces continued to practice torture in this period, but not on the mass scale of earlier years. Duarte rewarded the groups that documented these reduced human rights abuses by challenging their competence and in- tegrity. For daring to report on the persisting air war on the ci- vilian population in conflictive and guerrilla-controlled zones, the staff of Tutela Legal was called "unreliable" and accused of "permanently working under the direction of (those) trying to help the subversive groups. When Amnesty International and Americas Watch documented army and air force attacks on defenseless civilians, Duarte shot back that they had been duped by guerrilla propaganda." Conclusion Duarte: the man and the myth. A look at the record reveals that the myth is a dedicated defender of human rights, the man an apologist for human rights abusers and an abuser of human rights defenders. The myth is said to have taken control of the armed forces, but the man apparently can't say boo without the permission of the high command. The myth seeks peace and reconciliation, while the man seeks substantial unconditional aid for those committed to a military solution. Genuine congressional critics of the Reagan administration's militaristic aims in Central America, who have nevertheless voted for aid in response to an emotional appeal from Duarte the myth. would he well advised to take a closer look at Duarte the man. ? Film Review Oliver Stone's "Salvador" Reviewed by Allan Frankovich* Salvador, Honda/f, Filet Corp.: produced br Gerald Green and Oliver Stone: directed by Oliver Stone: written hr? Oliver Stone and Richard Boyle: color, /27 mincne.c. Oliver Stone's "Salvador" is the finest dramatic fthn to have come out of the Central American conflict. It has the hard edges of historic truth and does not skitter away-as a Costa Gavras filth might have-from the simple important fact: The death squads in I'd Salvador have been the necessary policy instruments of our freedom-loving, duly-elected government. Today El Salvador is a "free" country because of the death squads, and our President is popular because he has lost nothing to Communism-and only part of his out to cancer. If the Duarte government could neutralize the guerrillas who have armed themselves rather than accept particularly brutal deaths, we might expect to see "Shoah" at a local San Salvador art house. "Shoah" is about history, we are told: but "Salvador" is about refuse disposal, how live humans go from the local army barracks to the garbage dump as the American Embassy has the American press over for cocktails. Oliver Stone and writer Richard Boyle have telescoped the terrible events of 1980 and 1981 into their script. the death squads. the 2,000 bodies a month, the murders of Archbishop Oscar Romero and four American innocents abroad-- missionaries serving their savior. The story is framed in the adrenaline rushes of two palookas-Janies Woods as an auto- biographical Richard Boyle, a down-and-out freelancer giving himself a last chance charge at the big S. doing it his way, * Allan Frankovich is a documentary filmmaker, whose "On Company Busi- ness," a three-hour film about the CIA. has been shown around the world. His most recent work is "Short Circuit." about the death squads in El Salvador. For details, write to Isla-Negra Films. 2735 Fulton Street. Berkeley CA 94705. without the brie: and it pal he shanghais. Doctor Rock, played by Jim Belushi, a disc jockey weaned on Janis Joplin. Cheap thrills, sex, hooch. and uppers and downers. The film has the feel of Central America the drunks we:n ing across the roads, the pot holes, puddles. open sewers. cantinas, bargain whore houses, open air eateries. Mid burned-out car hulks. BoyIc has some leftovers in Salvador, a local woman he loved during it past trip and a photographer friend. When he meets the woman again. he loves her without the patronising condescension for the 'poor, beautiful. how- they-enrich-us" Latins so characteristic of gringo corporate, religious, or political do-gooders. He wants this woman and he gets her, with her kids, mom, brothers, and first and second cousins. Floating over the local dust, the cheap liquor and sweaty carnality, there is the official American presence- the lnt- bassy. press, and military advisory group crowd gathering around a swank hotel swimming pool to hear the 198(1 Reagan-Carter election results. The C'IA's ratan Ton Conies across as a nice guy. They usually are. This nice 1_'uv is Robert Redford handsome, snwoth talking, and reasonable. Except for a few false inflections and some dramatic hyperbole, especially in the casting and direction of the latino bad guys. there is a proliferation of fine ch,u-aeteri/ations, thinly disguised versions of the real figures of Roberto D'Aubuisson, Archbishop Romero, and tI.S. Ambassador Robert White. The pace is quick. Boyle sees himself as a weasel. He has the quick turn of the head, but not the successful furtiveness of a real weasel. lie does get into the chicken coop, but usually to find the door slammed shut behind him. He cuts deals, the kind of small betrayals freelancers must often make to suriye. He'll give the CIA and the military attache a first look at photographs lie takes of' guerrillas, their arms and Camps. Ill return for an identity card for his lover. A cedula means life or death in 1:I Salvador. When the Embassy refuses to accept the pho- tographic evidence that the guerrillas' aurnts are captured American weapons, not Soviet-bloc imports, Boyle delivers in response the one speech in the film, and it is in character. As Boyle boils over, we accept his claim to be as Anicrican Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 as the Embassy flacks because he is making his speech from the gutter, not a soap box. And there is some real love in that gutter. What he says about the origin of the death squads, United States complicity, and the American training received by the Roberto D'Aubuisson look-alike, Major Max, as the movie's head of death squads is absolutely accurate. D'Aubuisson was trained by the CIA at Georgetown, and in American bases in Panama. This simple and key fact is some- thing the big media will never tell us unequivocally. Boyle's betrayal of the guerrillas who trusted him is an in- significant breach of journalistic ethics compared to the sleazy deals regular television correspondents make. In 1980-81, you could have seen them in the Camino Real or Sheraton hotels, bored out of their minds, making the nightly run to the brothel, snorting coke, going off in rat packs to feed off the bodies or shoot the bang-bang, then returning to do gutless stand-ups with Salvador behind them, as if a country were just a billboard. Boyle doesn't like a perfectly cast network Barbie Doll reporter. He believes she really sucked her way up the corporate ladder. We watch her on assignment, lying and talk- ing around the truth. Boyle's other friend, a photographer modeled after John Hoagland, killed under fire, is an avatar out of another myth: two eyes on the prowl for the perfect shot. John Savage plays the character with proper perspiring obsession. He pays for his big picture with a rattle in the throat as he dies while cover- ing a guerrilla offensive. Boyle sucks the blood out after giving his friend an emergency tracheotomy. As he holds his dying buddy in his arms, taking the blood- and dust-soaked rolls of film, you know Stone and Boyle have seen combat deaths. "Salvador" also preserves small details and ambigui- ties-as in the American Ambassador, modeled on real envoy Robert White. Our emissary cuts off military aid after the four American missionaries are raped and murdered, only to re- store it after a pouty little speech when the guerrillas strike in force. More death is preferable to losing Salvador. American arrogance comes in two doses, liberal and conservative. Both are lethal. Boyle and his woman friend do finally get through the countries between El Salvador and the U.S. At the border he comes home. She and the kids are hauled out of the land of the free and the home of the brave by the Border Patrol, wearing uniforms most Americans only see on their suburban garbage men. The film has already told us enough. We don't have to be told now how they treat Central Americans in detention centers along our glorious frontiers. Boyle reacts to the Border Patrol as if they were death squads, and the response is authentic, for both are instruments of the same policy. It appears that our shores now welcome only worn-out dictators and idle mur- derers. ? (Continued from page 52.) were the various opposition parties in Nicaragua, as we shall see. Access to the Ballot A variety of parties may compete in an election but if they are denied roughly equal conditions of competition or access to the ballot or shoved to the edge of the political arena, it cannot be said that democratic competition exists. In the U.S. all fifty states have laws, written and enforced by Republican and Democratic officials, regulating party access to the ballot- often in ways restrictive enough to keep smaller parties from participating, thus depriving the electorate of the freedom to choose someone other than a Democrat or a Republican. Minor parties are often required to gather a large number of signatures on nominating petitions in a limited time. Thus in Pennsyl- vania third-party state-wide candidates must collect 36,000 signatures in a three-week period; in Maryland candidates are required to collect over 55,000 signatures in a short time. Sometimes a 5 percent requirement for signatures has been in- terpreted to mean 5 percent of voters from every district within the state-an impossible task for a third party whose base might be confined to a few urban areas. In some states voters who are registered with the major par- ties are not allowed to sign or circulate minor-party nominating petitions. Petitions are sometimes thrown out by hostile offi- cials on trivial and sometimes unlawful technicalities (as hap- pened to the Communist Party in Illinois and Connecticut in re- cent elections) compelling minor parties to pursue expensive court battles that further strain their financial resources. In some states minor parties must pay exorbitant filing fees: $5,000 in Louisiana for an independent candidate. To get on the ballot in all 50 states, a third party would have to expend an estimated $750,000 in filing fees and other expenses and col- lect 1.2 million signatures, a feat accomplished in 1984 by no third party. And the trend is toward less and less ballot access: in the last 12 years, sixteen states have tightened the restric- tions. Between 1980 and 1984, for example, the states of In- diana and North Dakota quadrupled the number of signatures required to get on the ballot. In Nicaragua, in striking contrast, the electoral law favors the smaller political parties. In 1984 any party could register to field candidates by merely presenting a national directorate and two representatives from each of the country's nine regions. One of the parties that so registered, the Independent Liberal Party (PLI) asked to withdraw from the contest four days be- fore election day. The Electoral Council ruled that it was too late for a party to pull out but that individual candidates could withdraw their names if they chose. None did so. Accessibility to the Electorate Being on the ballot does little good if the bulk of the voters have never heard of you or never hear from you. Third parties in the United States are given almost no national media cover- age during campaigns. News media focus exclusively on the two major parties, failing even to report the votes that third parties get on election day (usually between one and two mil- lion all together), thus treating the minor parties as if they do not exist. Lacking the huge sums available to the major parties, especially the Republicans, the smaller parties are unable to buy major media time and space of their own. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974 finances the major parties, giv- ing each tens of millions of dollars for their presidential cam- paigns, but the smaller parties can obtain federal funds only after they glean 5 percent of the national vote (about 4 million votes for any one party) In sum, they cannot get the money until they get the 5 percent, but they cannot get the 5 percent until they get the money. In contrast, the Nicaraguan electoral law provided public financing of 9 million cordobas ($321,000) for each participat- ing party regardless of size and guaranteed an equal amount of time each day on the state-run radio stations and television channels. Each party was also permitted to receive unlimited Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 funds from private donors, including people and organizations outside Nicaragua, a provision that worked to the advantage of the centrist and rightist parties. As the campaign got under way, complaints from the participating parties led to changes in the electoral law, including an increase in radio and televi- sion time, an additional 3 million cordobas in government cam- paign funds for each party, and a lengthening of the campaign period. Parties were also guaranteed access to products in short supply in Nicaragua: paper, printing facilities, transportation and gasoline. The various parties also produced their own party newspapers, together with leaflets and billboards. Absence of Coercion Instances of coercion and harassment of candidates have not been an unusual occurrence in U.S. elections. In the United States third-party candidates especially those of a pronoun- cedly leftist hue have run into difficulties of this sort. Harass- ment may not be confined to the candidates themselves but may include their supporters and canvassers. In 1972 in Ver- mont, persons who merely signed Communist Party ballot peti- tions found their names publicized by town clerks in an effort to embarrass them into withdrawing their signatures. Generally though, in modern times American elections have not been marked by violence nor by any serious degree of threat against candidates. The coercions are largely of the legal kind noted earlier which work well enough against third parties. In regard to individual voters, however, it should be noted that not every American citizen has the right to an uncoerced vote, as testified by the continuing need for a Civil Rights Voting Act, the re- newal of which President Reagan opposed. Turning to Nicaragua, we find there were serious acts of vio- lence and murder in the 1984 election-all committed by the forces supported by the Reagan administration. The contras killed the presidents of two polling stations and two volunteer workers involved in registration. In the Jinotega mountains, one polling station worker's throat was cut by the contras in front of his wife and family. On election day a member of the electoral police was shot to death by contras in La Tronca. In all, twelve election workers lost their lives in assaults by coun- terrevolutionaries. The election was less than flawless in its procedures, but the overall performance was one that the Nicaraguan democracy can be proud of. There was free and open campaigning in every area of the country except in some war zones. According to estimates by the Supreme Electoral Council, there were some 250 public rallies. In general the election was character- ized by untrammeled and vigorous political debate. If the FSLN was instituting a totalitarian regime, it was going about it in the wrong way. About five of the public rallies were marred by incidents of violence, but no serious injuries were reported. During the first months of the campaign a number of parties also reported that their campaign workers had been harassed by members of the FSLN, or that their posters had been destroyed. The Sandinista leadership denounced these incidents and they seemed to di- minish thereafter. In addition, several rallies held by the Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinating Committee (CDN), a co- alition of conservative business-oriented parties that abstained from the election, were disrupted by fights between CDN sup- porters and Sandinista counterdemonstrators. These rallies were technically illegal since the CDN had refused to partici- pate in the election and indeed spent its time during the cam- paign attacking the electoral system itself. Once the CDN de- cided to conduct what seemed like a sabotage of the electoral effort (in the eyes of FSLN supporters), clashes with counter- demonstrators were difficult to avoid. Because of these incidents, Arturo Cruz claimed that he was attacked by "mobs" and that free electoral competition did not exist. It should be recalled that the country is at war and that Cruz openly identified with the enemy and was not at any time functioning as a legal or serious candidate. When Cruz, a banker in Washington, arrived in Managua five months before the election, the CDN suddenly announced he would be their unified presidential candidate. Without officially registering as a candidate, Cruz toured the country for several days, drawing small crowds. As suddenly as he arrived, he left, announcing he would not run under the prevailing electoral conditions. Throughout this period the U.S. media and the U.S. govern- ment described him as the "major opposition candidate" and treated his nonparticipation as evidence that the election was an unfair and meaningless exercise. In conflict with this view is the one expressed in the report, cited herein, by U.S. citizens in Nicaragua: In general, our perception of the electoral campaign period is that the harassment and fistfights were scattered incidents that did not affect the generally free atmosphere of the elec- toral process. We found our neighbors and co-workers una- fraid to voice their opinions, and heard and read virulent criti- cism of the FSLN. We know of no pressure on Nicaraguans to vote for the Sandinista Front. In particular. we found no truth in the charge made by La Prensa that the cards which entitle families to receive subsidized food allotments were controlled in a concerted effort to influence Nicaraguans' votes. We conclude that the electoral campaign provided Nicaraguans with abundant information on which to base it free decision about their vote. A similar conclusion was reached by the 460 official obser- vers from all over the world who were free to check out all as- pects of the voting process and ballot counting. None of the seven participating parties filed any charges of fraud. System of Representation The FSLN won 64.9% of the vote, a victory that was only it few percentage points higher than the one enjoyed by Ronald Reagan in 1984. The two runner-up parties, both center-right- ist, won 13% and 9% respectively. The National Assembly seats were allocated according to proportional representation so that minority parties were assured of 35 of' the 96 seats (in- cluding six seats that under the electoral law are allotted to the losing presidential candidates of each party). All this was dis- missed by Reagan as "an electoral farce without any meaning- ful political opposition." In contrast, the single-member-district electoral system used in the United States is much less representative and therefore less democratic. The party that polls a plurality of the vote, he it 40, 50 or 60 percent, wins 100 percent of it district's repre- sentation, while smaller parties, regardless of their vote, re- ceive zero representation. Proportional representation provides a party with legislative seats roughly in accordance with the percentage of votes it wins, thus assuring minor parties of some parliamentary presence. But the single-member, winner- take-all system magnifies the strength of the major parties and leaves the minor parties with a percentage of seats (if any) that is far lower than its percentage of' votes. The winner-take-all system deprives third parties not only of representation but eventually of voters too, since not many citizens wish to Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 "waste" their ballots on a party that seems incapable of estab- lishing a legislative presence. Minorities There are other criteria by which the American and Nicara- guan democracies might be compared. For instance, there is the treatment of minorities. Much is made of the Sandinistas' forced relocation of Miskito Indians during a time of serious border attack, a policy that quickly proved not only wrong but in some instances wrongful. Today Managua is now trying to undo its previous policy and resettle the Miskito on their lands, an approach that compares favorably with the U.S. treatment of Native American Indians, to say the least, and with the forced relocation of the Japanese into concentration camps dur- ing World War II, uprooting them from California com- munities that-unlike Nicaragua-were never threatened by enemy invasion. Nor did the U.S. government ever compen- sate the Japanese for the losses they sustained in the way of homes, businesses and farms. Political Dissent There is the more general question of freedom of communi- cation for dissenting ideas. La Prensa is not the only opposi- tion voice in Nicaragua. About half of the radio and television stations in the country are privately owned and most of these give the government a daily ideological pounding that makes National Public Radio look like the tepid establishment mouth- piece it is. The various political parties also produced their own newspapers during the campaign. There is a war going on in Nicaragua. The country is encircled by hostile forces, has en- dured invasions on both of its borders and has suffered much loss of life and destruction of property, yet the censorship im- posed is no worse and probably less restrictive than what the U.S. government imposed during World War II, and Mana- gua's treatment of dissenters and collaborators has been far more tolerant and liberal than the treatment accorded Tory sympathizers during and immediately after the American revo- lution or dissenters who received long prison terms during World War I. In the United States, dissenting views that go beyond the mainstream, or even much left of center, are rarely allowed time or space in the major media, but are consigned to small- circulation magazines that teeter on the edge of insolvency. In short, there is a greater plurality of ideas, ideologies, and de- bate in Nicaragua than in the United States. On this score Nicaragua is a more open, more pluralistic society. It may not always remain so however. Subject to enough threat and siege, assault and murder, the Nicaraguans will start tightening up, choosing security over dissent, survival over pluralism. In- deed, it is miraculous that they haven't already done so. The signs are there; President Daniel Ortega has said: "In the hardest moments we have to convert the defeats into more ideological unity, more political unity ... [and] more organization." (Miami Herald, August 4, 1985). If the U.S. government were really interested in encouraging pluralistic dissent in Nicaragua, it would pursue a policy quite the opposite of the one now in the saddle, offering Managua friendship and support and the hope for peaceful independence and security. Democracy is a delicate flower that does not do well when repeatedly stomped upon. Religious Freedom The Reagan administration has charged that there is reli- gious persecution in Nicaragua. But the Catholic church is alive and well. Elements of its clergy and laity can be found playing prominent roles on both sides within Nicaragua, struggling hard to build-or destroy-the revolution. Religious practice is not interfered with. The Rev. Miguel Gray, a Nicaraguan Baptist minister, hailed the religious freedom enjoyed in that country and pointed to the building of 19 additional churches since 1979-in a desperately poor country where not too many buildings of any kind are going up. The level of religious tolerance in the United States today is as good as might be found anywhere. But in recent years the disturbing intolerance manifested by such groups as the Moral Majority, and the President's open association with the reli- gious Right, including his announcement that "ours is a Chris- tian nation," might cause us to give more attention to the question of religious tolerance here at home. Human Needs If democracy means more than a set of procedures but im- plies something about the substantive conditions of life, then here too poor Nicaragua looks better than rich America in the era of Ronald Reagan. Decades of colonialism, Somocista pil- laging, earthquake, revolution and counterrevolution, have left Nicaragua with a legacy of extreme poverty, yet the very worst is not happening to the poor citizens of that country as it is to the poor on the streets in Washington D.C.; no one is starving and no one has been tossed aside like so much human refuse. International Behavior Finally, in comparing Nicaragua with the United States, we might consider the degree to which each country is interfering with the political development and security of the other. As Reagan himself aptly put it: "Democracies do not spend a lot of money on arms, build large armies or invade or destabilize their neighbors." With typical Orwellian inversion he was aiming this remark at Nicaragua but it applies most perfectly to his own administration, which spends more money on arms and more time destabilizing and invading neighbors than we could ever imagine Nicaragua doing. The truth is also inverted when Reagan calls the Sandinistas "terrorists." To be sure, there is plenty of terrorism going on in Nicaragua and plenty being ex- ported to other countries in Central America, but it is con- ducted by contra mercenaries and Hondurean, Guatemalan, and Salvadoran death squads and military, all financed and advised by the U,S. Those "democratic socialist" critics on the left, who give qualified and skittish support to Nicaragua, who are quick to point out how they have "problems" with some of the things the Sandinistas are doing, who impose flawless democratic standards upon a tiny country that is under mortal siege from the Yankee Colossus, those critics might want to consider the realities of the situation. It is the United States which should be the object of their professedly democratic concerns; it is the U.S. which falls so dismally short of practicing the democratic pluralism it preaches to others, exporting violence and ter- rorism, and pummeling a smaller neighbor that is trying to develop a democratic society of its own. If one criterion of democracy is that a country not act like a thug and aggressor in its dealings with another country-even to the point of refusing to show up in (world) court to defend itself when so charged-then the United States under Reagan comes off looking far less fair, less open, and less democratic than Nicaragua. ? Number 26 (Summer 1986) Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Back Issues: No. I (July 1978): Agee on CIA; Cuban exile trial; consumer research in Jamaica. (Photocopy only.) No. 2 (Oct. 1978): How CIA recruits diplomats; researching undercover offi- cers: double agent in CIA. No. 3 (Jan. 1979): CIA attacks Bulletin; Secret Supp. B to Army Field Man- ual; spying on host countries. No. 4 (Apr.-May 1979): U.S. spies in Italian services:, CIA in Spain; CIA re- cruiting for Africa; subversive academics; Angola. No. 5 (July-Aug. 1979): U.S. intelligence in Southeast Asia; CIA in Den- mark, Sweden, Grenada. (Photocopy only.) No. 6 (Oct. 1979): U.S. in Caribbean; Cuban exile terrorists; CIA plans for Nicaragua: CIA's secret "Perspectives for Intelligence." (Photocopy only.) No. 7 (Dec. 1979-Jan. 1980): Media destabilization in Jamaica; Robert Moss; CIA budget: media operations; UNITA: Iran. No. 8 (Mar.-Apr. 1980): Attacks on Agee; U.S. intelligence legislation; CAIB statement to Congress: Zimbabwe; Northern Ireland. No. 9 (June 1980): NSA in Norway: Glomar Explorer: mind control; notes on NSA. No. 10 (Aug.-Sept. 1980): Caribbean; destabilization in Jamaica; Guy- ana: Grenada bombing: "The Spike"; deep cover manual. No. II (Dec. 1980): Rightwing terrorism; South Korea: KCIA: Portugal: Guyana; Caribbean; AFIO: NSA interview. No. 12 (Apr. 1981): U.S. in El Salvador and Guatemala: new right; William Casey: CIA's Mozambique spy ring: mail surveillance. No. 13 (July-Aug. 1981): South Africa documents; Namibia "solution"; mer- cenaries and gunrunning: the Klan: Globe Aero: Angola; Mozambique; BOSS: Central America: Max Hugel; mail surveillance. No. 14-1S (Oct. 1981): Complete index to nos. 1-12; review o' intelligence legislation; CA/B plans: extended Naming Names. No. 16 (Mar. 1982): Green Beret torture in El Salvador: Argentine death squads: CIA media operations: Seychelles; Angola: Mozambique: Klan in Caribbean; Nugan Hand. (Photocopy only.) No. 17 (Summer 1982): History of CBW; current CBW plans; Cuban dengue epidemic; Scott Barnes and yellow rain fabrications; mystery death in Bangkok. Note Re Overseas Airmail: The quoted figures are for: 1) Central America and the Caribbean; 2) South America and Europe: and 3)all other. _\ CAIB subscribers may order Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Af- CAIB's new NO CIA buttons are now available to subscrib- rica from us for $22, surface postage included. 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No. 19 (Spring-Summer 1983): CIA and the media; history of disinforma- tion; "plot" against the Pope; Grenada airport; Georgie Anne Geyer. No. 20 (Winter 1984): Invasion of Grenada; war in Nicaragua; Ft. Huachuca; Israel and South Korea in Central America; KAL flight 007. No. 21 (Spring 1984): New York Times on El Salvador election; manipulation in Time and Newsweek; Accuracy in Media; Nicaragua update. No. 22 (Fall 1984): Mercenaries and terrorism; Soldier of bornute; "privatiz- ing" the war; Nicaragua update; U.S.-South Africa terrorism; Italian fascists. No. 23 (Spring 1985): Special issue on "plot" to kill the Pope and the "Bul- garian Connection"; CIA ties to Turkish and Italian neofascists. No. 24 (Summer 1985): State repression and use of infiltrators and pro- vocateurs; infiltration of sanctuary movement; attacks against American Indian Movement; Leonard Peltier; NASSCO strike; Arnaud de Borchgrave and Rev. Moon; Robert Moss; Tetra Tech. No. 25 (Winter 1986): U.S., Nazis, and the Vatican; Nazis in the U.S. and Latin America; the Sovereign Military Order of Malta; the Greek civil war and Nicholas Gage's Eleni; WACL and Nicaragua; torture. No. 26 (Summer 1986): U.S. state terrorism and Vernon Walters: semantics of terrorism; Libyan bombing; contra agents; Israel and South Africa. spies, and terrorism; the real Duarte; media manipulation in Costa Rica: democracy in Nicaragua; plus complete index to nos. 13-25. Special: Subscribe to CAB now and you may have a paper- back copy of Philip Agee's White Paper? Whitewash!, edited by Warner Poelchau (regularly $6.50 plus $1.50 postage and handling) for $4.00, postpaid. Subscribe now for two years, and you may have it for $3.00, postpaid. P.O. Box 50272 Washington, DC 20004. Back issues: Nos. 1, 5, 6, 12, 14-15, 16, 18: $6.(X) each; all others: $3.50 each; institutions must add $.50 each; outside North America, add $1.50, $2.00, or $2.50 per copy (see box). Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6 Is Nicaragua More Democratic Than the United States? By Michael Parenti* To justify the policies of attack, encirclement, embargo, and destabilization directed against Nicaragua, the Reagan admin- istration has charged that the Sandinista government is on the road to totalitarianism, that it denies religious and political freedom and is a threat to the security of its neighbors. The goal of U.S. policy, claims President Reagan, is to bring about a pluralistic open society in Nicaragua, a goal that never loomed very large during the fifty years of the Somoza dic- tatorship. More recently in a book on the Nicaraguan revolu- tion, journalist Shirley Christian echoed this line, arguing that the contra war was a justifiable attempt "to force the San- dinista Front into accepting major structural changes toward an open political society." In response to this position, supporters of the Sandinista rev- olution have argued that Nicaragua does have a pluralistic soci- ety, is attempting to make a better life for its people, has no ag- gressive designs upon its neighbors, and instead is itself being invaded along two of its borders. Others have shown that by every standard, Nicaragua's elections have been more open and democratic than El Salvador's and its society more humane than most others in Latin America. Indeed it can be further argued that by every standard Nicaragua is a more democratic society than the one waging aggression against it-and I do not mean Honduras. By every major democratic criterion, Nicaragua comes off looking better than the United States. Let us begin with a comparison of the national elections held in November 1984 in both the United States and Nicaragua.' Popular Participation One crucial measure of an open political system is the de- gree of popular participation. Most voting studies in the United 1. Much of the information regarding the 1984 Nicaraguan national election is from "Their Vote Decided" a report by the Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua (CUSCLIN, Managua, Nicaragua). * Michael Parenti writes and lectures frequently on U.S. domestic and foreign politics. His most recent book is Inventing Realitc: The Politics of the Mass Media (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986). ~CovertAC, 1 INFORMATION 13Ut1.)E:TIN P.O. Box 50272 Washington, I)C 20004 States and elsewhere find that nonvoters show a high degree of alienation from the political process; they believe voting is not a means of effecting changes, and they often fail to see a mean- ingful choice in the candidates presented to them. (This is the view also of a surprisingly large number of persons who do vote in the United States.) Therefore a comparison of the re- spective rates of turnouts in the Nicaraguan and U.S. elections might be worth pondering for a moment. The turnout in the United States in the 1984 election was a little less than 53 percent of the eligible voters, one of the lowest of any western nation. Yet the press took little note of this and instead treated Reagan's reelection as a landslide victory and a democratic mandate. In contrast, voter turnout was nearly 82 percent in Managua and 75.4 percent in Nicaragua as a whole. Yet this turnout was described in the U.S. press as "disappoint- ing" because the Sandinistas had hoped for an 80 percent nation- al turnout. (Left unmentioned was the fact that in Nicaragua the voting was voluntary, unlike most Latin American countries.) Range of Political Choice Elections that offer little choice are said to be wanting in democratic standards. The choice in Nicaragua was noticeably wider and more democratic than in the United States. Seven parties ran for seats in the national assembly and for the presi- dency, representing a broad ideological range: from those on the far left (who damned the FSLN for its moderate policies and for allegedly betraying the workers and peasants) to those on the center and right (who accused the FSLN of exercising a rigid control over the country, wrecking the economy and lead ing Nicaragua to war). All these charges and countercharges were reported and debated extensively in the public and private press in Nicaragua. In the United States the choice was limited largely to Demo- crats and Republicans, who in many races are often hard to tell apart. True, there were a variety of minor parties but these were not accorded the same opportunity for participation as (Continued on page 48.) Bulk Rate U.S. Postage PAID Permit No. 9015 New York, N.Y. Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170003-6