18 FEBRUARY 1982 DCI INTERVIEW WITH JOE FROMM, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00845R000201190025-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 11, 2010
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: March 11, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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11 March 1982
SUBJECT: 18 February 1982 DCI Interview
with Joe Fromm., U.S. News and
World Report
Jim,
Attached is the 18 February transcript
of the DCI's interview with Joe Fromm.
This copy has the Director's corrections;
the original was returned to Joe Fromm for
final publication.
Please call if you have any questions,
Attachment
ec: C/PAD/OEXA w/att!'
OEXA Registry w/att.
DD/OEXA file cy w/att.
STAT
STAT
STAT
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24 February 1982
Mr. Joe Fromm, Editor
U. S. News & World Report
The DCI has completed his review
11 of the transcript of the interview
and his changes are attached.
Responsibility for the rah mmar
that might have changed is yours.
We think it was a good interview.
Good luck.
Deputy Director, Office of External Affairs
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24 February 1982
NOTE FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Director, Office of External
Affairs
Here is the transcript of your interview
with U.S. News & World Report. The DDI
has suggested a few minor changes and
corrections in some numbers mentioned.
Fromm has asked for it back by 4:00 p.m.
today.
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Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence
February 23, 1982
NOTE FOR: DD/Office of External Affairs
I've had quite a few folks in the DDI look
this over. Their suggested corrections are
marked on the attached copy. Don't hesitate to
call if you've any questions. Thanks.
STAT
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STAT
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Reprinted from
u.s.News
Interview With CIA Director William J. Casey
The Real Soviet
Threat in El Salvador
And Beyond
In a rare and unusually candid discussion,
the nation's Intelligence chief spells out
a Kremlin strategy for conquest by subversion
and for building Russian military power
by using secrets stolen from the U.S.
Q Mr. Casey, there's a great deal of concern that this country
might be dragged into a Vietnam-like quagmire in El Salvador. In
your view, Is that fear warranted?
A No. I don't think El Salvador or what we're likely to do
there bears any comparison to Vietnam. In the first place,
El Salvador is on our doorstep. And we're not just talking
about El Salvador; we're talking about Central America-
Costa Rica, Honduras and Guatemala. The insurgency is
beamed at all those countries. Furthermore, this is part of a
worldwide problem.
Q Worldwide in what sense?
A Around the middle of the '70s, the Soviets assessed the
impact of Vietnam on American public opinion and decided
we probably would be restricted in our ability to respond to
low-level insurgency operations. In the last seven years,
starting with the dispatch of sophisticated weapons to join
up with Cuban troops in Angola, they have developed a very
innovative and brilliant mix of tactics: Political, diplomatic,
destabilization, subversion, terrorists and support of insur-
gencies. And they have applied this around the world.
Over this past year alone, you've had insurgencies in
North Yemen, Chad, Morocco, Kampuchea, El Salvador,
Guatemala. You have incipient insurgencies in many Afri-
can countries. The Soviets work in some concert with Cuba,
Libya and North Korea. They work with Angola against
Namibia and Zaire; with Ethiopia against Somalia, and with
Libya and Ethiopia against the Sudan.
Q How are the Soviets Involved?
A What happens in these insurgencies is that the Soviets
go in and exploit the underlying social and economic dis-
contents, which are plentiful. That gives them a base. They
feed it with trained men and with arms. That drives away
investment. The insurgents sabotage economic targets, and
so economic discontent grows. And as the discontent grows,
more people go over to the insurgents' side.
It's almost a no-lose proposition for the Soviets. They can
stay in the background. They sell their arms and get up to
20 percent of their hard currency from Libya and other
countries that can pay for the arms. It's something we have
very great difficulty coping with.
Q What Is Cuba's role in all this?
A Here's a country of 10 million, with 50,000 people
around the world-military and civilian. Besides the Cuban
troops in Angola and Ethiopia, there are 12,000 technical
trainees in East Germany and Czechoslovakia and 5,000 to
6,000 students in the Soviet Union. They have 50 people
here, 60 people there-in Africa, in the Middle East and in
Latin America.
They can do this because of the demographics that led
them to get rid of 120,000 people in the Mariel sealift.
There has been a 50 percent jump in the 15-to-19 age
group in the Cuban population. That's quite a latent force
that Castro has no work for at home and can use for mis-
chief abroad. He said in a speech just a few months ago that
he would like to send 10,000 young Cubans to Siberia to
chop down trees for construction projects in Cuba.
Q Do you have evidence that materiel is being supplied by
Cuba to the guerrillas in El Salvador on a significant scale?
A Oh, yes. Without it the guerrillas wouldn't be able to
sustain an insurgency.
Q And Nicaragua? What part does It play?
A This whole El Salvador insurgency is run out of Managua
by professionals experienced in directing guerrilla wars.
You've got to appreciate that Managua has become an inter-
national center. There are Cubans, Soviets, Bulgarians, East
Germans, North Koreans, North Vietnamese, representa-
tives of the PLO. North Koreans are giving some weapons
they manufacture. The PLO provides weapons they've
picked up around their part of the world. There are American
weapons that the Vietnamese brought in in substantial quan-
tities-mostly small arms that were left behind in Vietnam.
Cl. How large are these foreign groups operating In Managua?
A In the case of the Cubans, 6,000 are in the country, of
whom 4,000 are in civil work and maybe 1,800 or 2,000 are
in military and security work. The East Germans and Soviets
each have somewhere between 50 and 100. The Bulgarians,
the North Koreans and the Vietnamese are fewer. They all
have their little function: The East Germans work on the se-
curity system; Cubans work on the general strategy, and the
Soviets work, for the most part, on the large weapons that
have come in. The North Koreans and Vietnamese are good
at caching arms and digging tunnels and things like that.
Q Why is the administration apparently so concerned about
the arrival in Cuba of crates presumably containing a squadron
of MIG-23s-a plane that already is operating there?
A Well, Cuba has the biggest air force in the hemisphere
next to ours. The new planes are just part of a buildup. But
I don't know that we are that concerned. Jimmy Carter
made it an issue when MiG-23s arrived in Havana, and he
didn't do anything about it. I think this President has been
rather careful not to make it an issue-although I wouldn't
say we're unconcerned.
Q Does what is happening now in Cuba violate the 1962
Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement ending the missile crisis?
A Oh, sure it does because the '62 agreement said the
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Soviets would send no offensive weapons, and it also said
there would be no export of revolution from Cuba. The
agreement has been violated for 20 years.
Q So the aircraft coming to Cuba now are attack planes-
A They're attack airplanes, yes.
Q Are they nuclear capable?
A They can be made nuclear capable. There's an export
version which is not nuclear capable. We haven't seen
these planes yet. They're not out of the crate. The probabil-
ity is they're the export version, but it just takes a little bit
of wiring and a little bit of work and some pilot training to
make them nuclear capable.
On the other hand, the Soviets have better ways to hit us
with nuclear bombs. It's more likely these planes are for the
purpose of building Cuba up militarily, modernizing their
Army, probably paying them for their work in Africa-to
keep their forces in Angola and Ethiopia. Their Army prob-
ably feels happy if it gets modern equipment, and they
probably wangled these planes out of the Soviets.
Q Could these MiGs be destined ultimately for Nicaragua?
A We think that Nicaragua is lengthening its runways at
three airports for the purpose of being able to take this kind
of fighter. It probably hasn't been determined whether the
Salvadoran soldiers. "The notion that all massacres of civilians
are perpetrated by the government, not by guerrillas, is false."
planes will go from Cuba to Nicaragua or whether addition-
al planes will go directly from the Soviet Union.
Q Is there a point at which the United States says to the
Soviet Union and Cuba, "This far and no further"?
A That's the $64 question. I don't think the American
public generally perceives the threat in as serious a light as
we may perceive it at this stage. I think we'll come to our
senses and face up to it. But you've got a problem not only of
American public opinion but of Latin American public opin-
ion. It's the gringo problem: They don't want us down there.
When we go down there, we play into the hands of the
Marxists to a degree; we give them a rallying point. The
President has made it clear that there is no intention of
sending troops there. Exactly what to do to help these
countries defend themselves is a very difficult, complex
political, diplomatic, military decision. You can't make it
without public understanding and public support.
Q Is there any sign that Latin American opinion is changing
and becoming more supportive of the United States?
A A year ago no Latin American country was greatly con-
cerned about what was happening in El Salvador. Yet when
Mexico and France spoke out in support of the El Salvador
insurgents several months ago, 12 Latin American countries
dissented. That shows growing concern. At the OAS meet-
ing in St. Lucia a couple of months ago, there was a 22-to-3
vote in support of orderly elections in El Salvador. The three
dissenters were Nicaragua, Mexico and Grenada. Just two or
three weeks ago, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras got
together and called upon Venezuela, Colombia and the
United States to help protect them against Nicaragua.
Increasingly, the Colombians and the Venezuelans are
getting concerned. The Mexicans should be concerned be-
cause they could be the next target. I read now that they've
got at least the beginnings of a quick-reaction force. So
maybe they're coming around. Also, there is dissidence in
Nicaragua. A lot of Nicaraguans think that the Sandinistas
are betraying the revolution. They resent having the coun-
try taken over and run by Cubans.
So we can hope that developments in Central America
will breed a reaction. You say "Halt" to all this when you're
not saying it alone, when you're not perceived to be behav-
ing in Central America the way the Soviets behave in
Poland and when you have enough Latin American partici-
pation so that you're helping them instead of doing the
whole thing for them.
Q Concretely, what threat do these developments in Central
America pose for the U.S.?
A Well, just look at what is happening down there. Nicara-
gua, a country of 2' million people, has an Army twice the
size of El Salvador's, which has twice the population and is
fighting for its life. Nicaragua is sitting there with a big Army
that's getting bigger, with Soviet tanks and airfields being ex-
tended and pilots being prepared for Soviet supersonic
planes. When and if that happens-I think it will happen in
six months-Nicaragua will have military dominance over
the rest of Central America, with a population 7 times theirs.
If Cuba, with 10 million people, and Nicaragua, with 21h
million people, take over the rest of Central America and
build up the armies on the scale of their own, you would
have a very large army down there on our doorstep. Mexico
is sitting there with a military force of about 150,000 today
and never thought of having anything more.
Q Are the persistent reports true that government troops are
responsible for most of the massacres of civilians in El Salvador?
A Nobody knows where all these casualties come from.
This is civil war. Sometimes they come from the govern-
ment, and sometimes they come from the guerrillas. We are
satisfied that the government is sensitive to the importance
of disciplining its forces and is making a genuine effort to do
so. But that's going to be very slow and not entirely satisfac-
tory to our public opinion. El Salvador has a violent society,
and the law is kind of slow. A man can't be convicted of mur-
der without a witness under their law. And those who sit in
judgment risk their lives because the society is violent. So
judges have a tendency to duck the responsibility.
But the widely propagated notion that all the massacres
of civilians are perpetrated by the government and not by
the guerrillas is clearly false. In the final analysis, you have
to make up your mind whether you would prefer a Marxist-
Leninist dictatorship to a society that is capable of reform.
Q Turning to Russia: The CIA and the Defense Department
recently stressed the need to limit Soviet access to American
scientific and technological research. Why the sudden concern?
A You need to be concerned about it. We have estab-
lished a technology-transfer center at the CIA that has
taken a very comprehensive look at the whole question of
the degree to which American research and develop-
ment-and Western technology generally-has contribut-
ed to the increased accuracy, sophistication, precision,
power and countermeasure capability of the Soviet arsenal.
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Key Points Made by Casey
^ El Salvador as another Vietnam. El Salvador bears
no comparison to Vietnam. It "is on our doorstep
[and] is part of a worldwide problem."
^ 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement. The ac-
cord barring Soviet offensive weapons from Cuba and
prohibiting Castro from exporting revolution "has
been violated for 20 years."
^ Havana's role In El Salvador. Without arms from
Cuba "the guerrillas wouldn't be able to sustain an
insurgency."
^ Threat from Nicaragua. "Managua has become an
international center" for subversion-harboring 6,000
Cubans, plus Russians, Fast Germans, Bulgarians, Viet-
namese, North Koreans, PLO. Three airports are be-
ing developed to take advanced Soviet warplanes.
^ Qadhafi--a madman? "You could say that." He
was driven to retaliate with assassination squads for
the U.S. downing of two Libyan planes.
^ Continued threat to Reagan. Qadhafi's hit teams
still pose a danger to the President. "You don't call
those things off."
^ Russia's reliance on U.S. technology. "Soviet stra-
tegic advances depend on Western technology to a
far greater degree than anybody ever dreamed of,"
and the KGB has a large organization working exclu-
sively to get these secrets.
^ CIA mandate. To overcome the effects of years of
rundown, the agency has a "general go-ahead to carry
out a buildup ... in line with the defense buildup."
We have determined that the Soviet strategic advances
depend on Western technology to a far greater degree than
anybody ever dreamed of. It just doesn't make any sense
for us to spend additional billions of dollars to protect
ourselves against the capabilities that the Soviets have de-
veloped largely by virtue of having pretty much of a free
ride on our R&D. They use every method you can imag-
ine-purchase, legal and illegal; theft; bribery; espionage;
scientific exchange; study of trade press, and invoking the
Freedom of Information Act-to get to this information.
We found that scientific exchange is a big hole. We send
scholars or young people to the Soviet Union to study
Pushkin poetry; they send a 45-year-old man out of their
KGB or defense establishment to exactly the schools and
the professors who are working on sensitive technologies.
The KGB has developed a large, independent, special-
ized organization which does nothing but work on getting
access to Western science and technology. They've been
recruiting about 100 young scientists and engineers a year
for the last 15 years. They roam the world looking for
technology to pick up. Back in Moscow there are 400 or 500
assessing what they need and where they might get it-
doing their targeting and then assessing what they get. It's
a very sophisticated and far-flung operation.
Q Can you give examples of how U.S. research has directly
contributed to the development of Soviet military capabilities?
A Yes. The Soviet ability to MIRV their weapons-to de-
velop multiple, independently targetable warheads for their
missiles and to achieve the accuracy of their missiles that
threaten the survivability of our fixed-site land-based sys-
tems came largely from their hooking on to the technology
behind our guidance systems and from the use of high-preci-
sion grinding equipment they were able to get from us. I'm
not saying they might not have made these advances some-
time anyway. But they got them on the cheap and quick.
Q How can the U.S. counter this Soviet drive to gain access to
American technology?
A This is something which needs to be looked at across
the board in terms of our export controls, in terms of the
openness of information and in terms of scientific ex-
changes. I think there probably will be a panel of the
National Academy of Sciences that will look carefully at the
question of scientific exchanges and determine how far one
might go to control damaging leakage. But you're not going
to shut these down. We want to preserve an open society.
We're not going to alter that. But, at the same time, we are
entitled to protect our scientific and technological secrets.
Q Early in the Reagan administration there was much talk of
Soviet involvement in international terrorism. Is there evidence
that Russia orchestrates the activities of these terrorist groups?
A We believe they export them more than orchestrate
them. Terrorism has become a great industry. It was always
a false issue whether the Soviets directed and controlled
world terrorism. World terrorism is made up of a bunch of
freebooters, and they're all, more or less, in business for
themselves. The Soviets have supplied weapons and trained
the Palestinians and other terrorist groups. They have train-
ing camps in South Yemen. That was part of their getting in-
fluence and edging their way into the Middle East.
But if anybody orchestrates them, it's Libya's Qadhafi.
He has made many of them dependent on him. After the
'73 war, when the Arab world was in disarray, Qadhafi was
looking for leadership. The only thing he had was money-
and nothing to spend it on. So he found all these Palestinian
organizations wanting to stir things up, and he started to
put money in them. And then he started to train them and
so on. There are over 25 terrorist and guerrilla training
camps in Libya. Training guerrillas and terrorists is the
second largest industry there-second only to oil.
When Qadhafi wants to send hit teams out to get his own
dissidents or to retaliate for the downing of two of his
planes in the Gulf of Sidra by the United States, he uses
mostly Libyans, but he'll also go to Palestinian and other
terrorist organizations and sign them up to help.
The capitals of terrorism are 'Tripoli and Beirut. The
money comes out of Tripoli, and the infrastructure and the
false documents-the headquarters-are in Beirut. It's a big
business today. They need money, and Qadhafi provides it.
Q What is Qadhafi's aim?
A He's striving for ego satisfaction. He wants to be a big
figure in the world. He wants leadership.
Q Is he a madman?
A You could say that. When he's confronted, he has to
retaliate. He has that kind of ego drive. He has to show that
he's as big as anybody else, and if the United States knocks
two of his planes out of the air, he's got to do something
about it. He talks about it, and then he's under greater
pressure to do something about it. He wants to spread his
influence across Africa, and his money reaches Muslim
groups as far away as the Philippines.
Q It's your view that the hit squads we heard so much about
were sent by Qadhafi to assassinate U.S. leaders in retaliation
for the downing of the two Libyan planes-
A I think that's when it started. Of course, we had previ-
ously broken diplomatic relations and taken other steps
against Libya. Qadhafi is a little guy feeling he's being
kicked around by the big guy, and he thinks he's really
bigger-and he's going to show it.
Q Do those hit teams still pose a danger to the President?
A I think they do. You don't call those things off. Qadhafi
sent somebody to say, "We're going to call them off." And
then he said he was firing people out of his intelligence orga-
nization, but we find they're still there. We keep getting re-
ports that people are being recruited, moving around. It's
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interesting that the American colonel-the aeputy military
attache in Paris-who was killed at his home was at the high-
est level below those provided with security. I think that so
much security was laid on to protect the President and other
top Americans that the Libyans may have pulled back for a
while. But you don't know when they're going to resume.
Our Paris embassy believes that a large number of their
personnel are under surveillance. We see people casing the
homes of ambassadors in other countries. There's clearly still
a threat, and you've got to be concerned with it.
Q Does the rescue of Brig. Gen. James L Dozier from Italy's
Red Brigades imply that the terrorist threat Is receding?
A Oh, no. It's growing. I think we're just seeing the begin-
ning of it.
Take the Red Brigades. People who take up that activity
are not normal, and their egos are easily bruised. When they
suffer a setback, they want to come back to regain their repu-
tation and status. They bungled the Dozier affair from their
point of view, so their reputation recedes. Like any other
business, when their reputation recedes, their ability to re-
cruit and to get money diminishes. If they want to stay in busi-
ness, they've got to do something again. They've got to score
a hit. They do this to make an impression or to get attention.
The reason I say it's going to increase is that the opportuni-
ty to inflict real damage and to really influence public opin-
ion hasn't been scratched yet. The opportunities to score
propagandistic hits are so much greater than has been ex-
ploited. That's why I think we're going to have more terror-
ism before we get less of it.
Q If you were to name the half-dozen most dangerous spots in
the world for the U.S. in the coming period, what would they be?
A Iran, Central America, the Middle East, the other side of
the Persian Gulf, Germany and East Europe, Morocco and
the Strait of Gibraltar.
Q Do you mean East Germany-or West Ger-
many and Eastern Europe?
A I think that whole mix-that's where something could
break out.
Then, too, I think, you've got to look at southern Africa.
There's the danger of that area being cut off and ultimately
falling into the Soviet sphere of influence. That could put a
squeeze on the minerals and other resources that are so
important to the West. That may not be an imminent
threat, but it's something you have to worry about.
But let me emphasize this: We're not the only people at
risk. The Soviets have their problems, too.
Q What sorts of problems are most serious for the Soviets?
A I would make three points:
First, the Soviets have been able to carry on the biggest
military buildup in the history of the world and somehow
manage to make us the warmongers. We're portrayed as
the threat to peace because we're responding. If we tell our
story right, we can turn that tide. We're not very good at it,
but we can make the world more concerned about the
Soviets as a threat to the peace.
Second, the Poland development should be proof of the
failure of the command economy and the Communist sys-
tem. They can't work in the long run without brutal repres-
sion. I don't know how Poland and Romania, which is also
in a mess, are going to pull out.
Finally, the Soviet economy is in very bad shape. The lead-
ership was a year late with its five-year plan. And in order to
increase military spending, they had to make an enormous
reduction in their investment program. The poor economy
has led to a social malaise, alcoholism, labor unrest and strikes
in the Baltic states. I'm told that Solidarity buttons were
bringing $20 apiece in the Ukraine before December 13.
At some point, the bottom of the barrel is going to
emerge in the Soviet Union. There are real constraints on
the Soviets-real constraints. They're only able to carry on
their activities around the world because they've learned to
use other people so well. D
Under Way: A Big Buildup for the CIA
Q What have you done to strengthen the agency after its
years of buffeting?
A The basic intelligence-gathering capability can't be
changed overnight. It had run down over a seven or
eight-year period largely because of a 40 percent draw-
down in funds and a 50 percent drawdown in people.
Over the past two years, starting with the last year of the
Carter administration, there has been an increase in
resources.
We have completed a broad examination of the chal-
lenges that the intelligence community will face during
the rest of this decade-and the available technologies.
We have defined the capabilities needed to meet those
challenges, and we now have a general go-ahead to carry
out that buildup.
Q Does that mean a big increase in funding and staff?
A Yes, but I can't be specific about either as they're
classified, but the buildup is roughly in line with the
defense buildup. We also have introduced a number of
other improvements to integrate more effectively the
intelligence process with the administration's policy-
making machinery and to improve coordination within
the intelligence community. We now have a fast-track
procedure that can produce an estimate in a week or
two when policymakers need something quickly.
Q How important are covert operations, which were virtu-
ally suspended during the Carter administration?
Further Reproduction Prohibited
A The Carter administration did virtually discontinue
these for about two years, but in the final two years they
undertook increasing numbers of special activities. These
can be important. We don't talk about these activities,
and they're undertaken only if they're authorized by the
executive branch and reported to Congress..
Q Are you seriously hampered by legislative constraints?
A No. We tell the congressional intelligence commit-
tees our plans. They raise questions, and this can help us
to improve and fine-tune what we are doing.
Q Do you tell Congress of these operations beforehand?
A I can't think of any time that we haven't.
Q Does the President's recent executive order defining
the role of the CIA permit it to engage in operations in this
country or spy on Americans abroad, as critics have alleged?
A Despite the fuss made over the executive order, it
doesn't alter the situation. We don't spy on Americans in
this country. All counterintelligence, law-enforcement
and antiterrorist activity in this country is the province
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
But since these problems don't stop at the water's
edge-they flow in-the new executive order permits
the CIA to operate to the extent of supporting and
coordinating with the FBI under rules laid down by the
Attorney General. In pursuit of foreign-policy objectives
abroad, we can work with Americans who want to help
or with foreigners here in this country.
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[phone]
u .s. News &World Report
Lester Tanzer
Managing Editor
February 22, 1982
Mr. William J. Casey
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Langley, Virginia
The manuscript of our interview with you is submitted for your
approval. It has been sized for publication, and the conversational tone,
which we feel is important, has been preserved.
Please limit changes to corrections of errors or inaccuracies, making
such changes on this original, which we would like to have returned by 4:00
p.m. Wednesday, February 24, at the latest. When the manuscript is ready,
please have someone call William Deeck at 861-2305, and we will have it
picked up immediately.
After return of the manuscript, we may have to eliminate an entire
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Frith you.
Please keep in confidence our plan to publish this interview.
Let me take this opportunity to express our appreciation for your time
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Enclosure
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O7.EFY : U SFY .V QUEUE :RUEY-tivEL MSG
N~:EkL 'E'MI: HJ: 21 PP INI:JE OPR:ERJ ;02/22,1E:%34
INTERVIEW WITH WILLIAM J. CASEY
IIFICTCR, CEN'IEAI INTFIIIGENCE AGENCY
\ashington, I.C.
U .S .NEWS S WORLD REPORT February 119, 1682
Mr. Casey, there's a great deal of concern that this
cctrtry rright be dragged into a Vietnam-like quagmire in E1
Salvador. In your-view,-is that fear warranted?
I. Nc. I don't think El Salvador or what we're likely to do
there bears any comparison to Vietnam. In the first place,
11 Salvador is on our doorstep. And we're not just talking
etcut El Salvador. We're talking about Central America --
Costa Rica, Fcnduras and Guatemala. The
insurgency is beamed at all those.countires. Furthermore,
this is part cf a worldwide rrcblem.
'crldwide in what seise?
P Arcund the middle of the '7Cs, the Soviets assessed the
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ORIGINAL.
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 CFY : C9 SE Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/11: CIA-RDP90-00845R000201190025-8 E :
irrpect of Vietnam on American putlic opinion and decided we
Irotably would to restricted in our ability to respond to
lcw-level insurgency cperations. In the last seven years,
!tartirg-with the dispatch cf sophisticated weapcns to join
Lx with Cuban troops in Angola,-they have developed a-very
innovative and brilliant rr.ix of tactics --political,
diplcrratic, destabilization,-subversion,-terrorists and
suppcrt=of insurgencies. And they have applied this around
the world.
Cver this past year alone,-you've had insurgencies in
Acrth Yemen, Chad, Morocco, Kampuchea, -E1 Salvador,
Guatemala, E_,_F~You have incipient insurgencies
Every African country. The Soviets wcrk in sorre concert
with Cuba, litya and North Korea. They work with Angola
against Narritia and Zaire; with Ethiopia against Somalia,
Erd with Libya and Ethiopia against the ~;u1an.
C Bcw are the Soviet involved?
A What happens in these insurgencies is that the Soviets
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27-CEY:cASti I .V
c
Fc in and Exploit the underlying social and ecenorric
disccntents, which are plentiful. That gives them a base.
They feed it with trained rren and with arrr:s. That drives
Ekay irvestirent. The insurgents sabotage Economic targets,
Erd so eccnorric discontent grows. And as the discontent
grcws, -more reople go over to the insurgents' side. It's
almost a rc-lcse propcsition for the Soviets. They can stay
it the background. They sell their arms and get 20 percent
cf their hard currency from Libya and other
Ceu.~14'~es
pQ-.o-p1+A who can
lay fcr the arms. It's something we have very great
difficulty coping 'with.
C khat is Cuta's role in all this?
50
F Here's a country of 1C milion with W,000 people around
the wcrld -- military and civilian. EE Sides the Cuban
2-
troops in Angola and Ethiopia, there are 1,000 technical
trainees in last Germany and Czechoslovakia and 5,Q0e-?,QE0
is in the Soviet Union. They have 50 people here,
L eII
recple there
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Y
~..
.C .~i.v
1
They can do this because of the demographics that e
them get rid of 120,000 people in the Mariel sealift. There
as teen a E2 percent-jump in the 1E-to-19 age group in the
Cuban population. That's quite a latent force that Castro
aAakf u yo1.1-
r4s r _ 0 444.0 h a t hcrre a said in a speech. tttlt
fo_4 0_00
ie,w rent agc that he would like to send 4 161 young
Cubans to Siberia to chop down trees for construction
prcjects in Cuba.
C' Lc you have ccnvincing evidence that arrrs supplies are
ccntinuing from. Cuba to the guerrillas in E1 Salvador on a
significant scale?
Q Ch, yes. Uithout it the guerrillas wouldn't be able to
sustain an insurgency.
And Nicaragua? What part does it play?
E This ubcle El Salvadcr insurgency is run out of Managua
ty experienced professionals in directing guerrilla wars.
Ycu've got to appreciate that Managua has become an
international center. There are Cubans, Soviets,-
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 S'r "InY :CASEY .V
kulgerians, East Germans, Ncrth Koreans, North Vietnamese,
representatives cf the FLO. North Koreans are giving some
,,earcrs they ranufacture. The FIO prcvides vealons they've
licked up around their Fart of the world. There are
frerican weapons that the Vietnamese brought in in
sutstartial quantities -- rncstly small arms that were left
lehind in Vietnarr.
Fcw large are these foreign groups operating in Managua?
Ir the case cf the Cubans, E,000 ? are in the ccuntry, of
whcr 4,eee are in. civil work and mayte 1,EQ or 2,QPO are
in rilitary and security work. The East Germans lb and Soviets
have scrrewhere tet>een, @O- Bulgarians orth Kcreans, rz~d -6
Vietrarrese
They all have their little function. The East Germans work
cn the security systerr, Cubans wcrk cn the general
strategy, and the Soviets wcrk, for the rrcst part, on the
large wearcns that have come in. The North Koreans and
Vietnarrese are good at caching arms and digging tunnels and
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:.'I iY:CASri.v
things like that.
C Uhy is the administration, apparently so concerned about
the arrival in Cuba of crates presumably containing a
Egi:adren cf NiG-23s -- a plane that already is operating
-
there 'l
A Well, Cuba has the biggest air force in the hemisphere,
rent tc?:curs. The new planes are Just part of a tuildup.
put I dcn't know that we are that concerned.- Jimmy Carter
grade it an issue when MiG-2.s arrived in Havana and he
didn't do anything about it. I think this President has
teen rather careful not to crake it an issue --althcugh I
wouldn't say we're unconcerned.
G Dces what is happening new in Cuba violate the 1962
Fenredy-Khrusbcbev agreerrent ending the missile crisis?
I Ch,-sure it does because the '62 agreements said the
Scviets wculd send no offensive-s,eapcns, and it also said
there r-culd tE no export of revoluticn frcrr. Cuba. The
?greerrents have teen violated for 2e years.
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Si C?Y:C?ASEY .V rnur:
G Ices that Crean you consider the aircraft that are coming
tc Cute now are attack planes?
A They're attack airplanes, yes.
G Are they nuclear capable?
I They .can be made nuclear capable. There's an export
versicn which is not nuclear capable. We haven't seen
these hEy're not out cf the crate. The probability is
they're the ei;crt versicn but it Just takes a little bit
cr wiring and a little bit of work and some pilot training
to make their nuclear capable.
~~ nno.. _T ~~ r
On the other hand,-the Soviets have better ways to hit us
tiith nuclear tcrrts.
? It's more likely these planes are for
the purpose of building Cuba up militarily, modernizing
their army, probably paying their for their work in Africa
tc keep their forces in Angcla and pthiopia. Their army
Irctebly feels happy if it gets modern equipment,-and they
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S'TCRI :CASEY .V PAGE: E
rrctetly-wengled these planes cut of the Soviets.
C Could these NiGs be destined ultimately for Nicaragua'
I We things that Nicaragua is lengthening its runways at
three airports for the purpose of being able to take this
kind-of fighter. It probably hasn't teen determined whether
the planes: will go from Cuba t'
Nicaragua or whether t
aill gc directly from the Soviet Unicn.
C Is there-a joint at which the U.S. says to Russia and
Cuba, -"Tbus far and' no farther"'?
That's the $e4 question. I don't think the American
jullic generally perceives the threat in as serious a light
es we may perceive it at this stage. I think we'll come to
cur senses and face up to it.
But you've got a prcblerr not only of American public
opinion,-but of Latin American public opinion. It's the
gringo problem. They don't 'cant us down there. When we go
,ORE
(N
)
'Ji
Ott
Ar-
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STCRY :fGAS EY .V PAGE : c
difficult, -corr.plex political, diplomatic, military
decisicn. You can't rF-~ it without putlic understanding
and public support.
Is there any sign that Latin American opinion is
charging and tecorring more supportive of the U.S.?
year age nc Latin American country was greatly
concerned about what was happening in E1 Salvador. Yet when
Mexico and France spoke out in support of the El Salvador
insurgents several rronths ago, -12 Latin American ccuntries
dissented. That shcws growirg concern. At the CA:: meeting
in St. Lucia a couple of months ago, there was a 22-to-3
vote in s-ppart of orderly elections in El Salvador. The
three dissenters were Nicaragua, Mexico and Grnada. Just
twc cr three week ago,-Costa Eica, 11 Salvador and
Scnduras got together and called upon Venezuela,-Colombia
End the United States to help protect them against
t1.ceregua.
Increasingly,-the Colombians and the Venezuelans are
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STCFY:CASiY.V FEGE: le
setting ccncerned
e011a 'E`
The Neaicans should be concerned because theyXe
their -st target. I read now that they've g
a quick-
reaction f crce . So rraybe they're corning around.
Alsc,-.there is dissidence
n Nicaragua. A lot of
Nicaraguans think that the -Sandinistas are betraying the
revolution. They resent having the country taken over and
rur by Cubans.
So we can hope that developments in Central America will
treed a reaction. You say say "Halt" to all this when
you're nct saying it alcne,-when you're not perceived to be
lehaving in Central America the way the Soviets behave in
Pcland and-when you have encugh Latin American
Icrticipation sc that you're helping therr instead cf doing
the whole thing for them.
Ccncretely, hhat threat do these developments in
Central America lose for the U.S.?
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ST'CRY :CASEY .V PAGE: 11
I
A 'Well, just look at what is happening down there.
Picaragua, a country of 2 1/2 million people, has an army
twice the size of El Salvador's,-which has twice the
icpulaticn and is fighting for its life. Nicaragua is
sitting there with a big army that's getting bigger, with
I-cviet tanks and airfields being extended and pilots being
irepared for Soviet supersonic planes. When and if that
happens -- I think it will hapen in six months -- Nicaragua
will have military dominance over the rest of Central
Inerice, with a population seven times theirs.
If Cuba with 10 trillion people and Nicaragua-with 2 1/2
rillicr people take over the rest of Central America and
tuild up the armies on the scale of their own, you would
beve uTwards cf a tr jWd_-- & arrry dcwn there on our
M, 1. {csry-~e,.c?5
dccrstep. Nexice is sitting there with a.-- Hof about
i5Q,eeO today and never thought of having anything more.
Whet bothers many people in this country about El
;:alvedcr are the persistent reports that government troops
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ST.,q,Ry C~St ~ . Y
are resronsible for most of the massacres of the civilian
Icrulatior?. Is this true?
I Nctedy knows where all these. casualties come from. This
is war. Sometimes they come from the government,-and
scrretirres they. acme from the guerrillas. We are satisfied
e gcvernrrent ,is sensitive to the irryortance of
disci;lining its forces and is makin? a genuine effort'to
do sc..But that's going to'te.very slow and not
satisfactory to our yublic opinion.-Il Salvador has a
violent society, and the law is kind of slow. A man can't
to convicted cf rrurder withcut a witness under their law.
Ird those who sit in judgment risk their lives because the
society is-violent; so-judges have a tendency to duck the
resycnsibility.
Eut the widely yroragated notion that all the massacres of
civilians are perpetrated by the government and not by the
guerrillas is clearly false. In the final analysis,--you
have tc rrake ry your mind whether you would prefer a
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