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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
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Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 10, 2012
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Publication Date: 
February 9, 1981
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/10: CIA-RDP9O-00965ROO0100160129-5 NEW YORK TIMES Paws ti" 9 FEBRUARY 1981 New Evridence Backs Ex-Envoy plc, an "eyes-only? internal C.I.A. ? re- BySEYMOURM.HERSH port, filed in early 1971 and not provided For. six years- ? Edward M.. Korry, ; to the Intelligence Committee, shows that United States Ambassador to Chile from senior agency officials were aware that 1967 to 1971, has insisted that he.was not an operative had entered Chile under a involved in and indeed tried to stop White false passport and posed as a member of House efforts to induce a military coup in ! the Mafia in making contact with anti-Al- Chile in 19mto prevent Dr. Salvador Al- lende forces. ? In another internal 1971 report, Wt lende thepreimo. , a Marxist, from assuming V. Broe,ahen chief of the agency's Clan- destine service in Latin America, was Evidence has come td light suggesting formally-advised that an operative had that Mr. Korry, despite his strong opposi pose . as - a representative of the Ford ; tion to the Allende candidacy, was frozen Foundatida and the Rockefeller Founds-I out'ot the planning fbr a proposed milt Lion while on special assignment to Chile Lary coup and warned the White House in October 1970 - a tactic in violation of a that it would be risking another "Bay of -Presidential prohibition against the use Pigs" if it got involved in military, plots to of American educational and philan stop Dr. Allende's election. thropic foundations as covers. The opera- Mr. Korry has not worked in his proles- Live, in later meetings with Chilean bust- stons, journalism or public affairs, since nessmen, made it clear, according to the 1974, two Years after the columnist Jack five C.I.A. of documents, American business business "as inta erests," s"ut e he Anderson Published International Tele- was eager "to activate a military take-i phone and Telestraoh Corporation docu over of the Chilean Government." ments that seemingly linked Mr. Korry to, None of this, it is now-evident, was joint I.T.T: Central:;Intelligence Agency known to Ambassador Korry_ operations to block Dr. Allende's eiec NotCorxslderedTrustworthy tion_ In interviews, a number of C.I.A. offs Mr. Korry expressed particular bitter dais directly involved in the anti-Allende ness toward The New York Times for operations emphasized that Mr. Kornyi what he said was unfair reporting about.- was not: considered trustworthy by the; his role in articles in 1974 that revealed White House or by C.I.A. headquarters.) tthe C:IA.'s activities In Chile and An-1 "Korry never did know anything," said -refusing in iateryears, despite his_en-- an intelligence operative who worked in treaties, to investigate ms actions accu- the embassy under Mr. Korry in 1970. rately. While he was in Chile, Mr. Korry was Mr. Korry, who lives with his wife in known in the Nixon Administration for stonington. Conn., insists that his sullied his outspoken hostility to Dr. Allende and reputation and his early inability to get his harsh anti-Communist stance. Mr. appropriate work stem from publication Lorry, who acknowledges the severity of of the I.T.T. documents and from two his views. on Dr. Allende, was active in subsequent widely publicized investiga- lobbying for a $400,000 C.I.A. propaganda- tions by Senate committees: He is now a effort against him and his Marxist views visiting professor of international rela- that was authorized by the Nixon Admin- ' tions at Connecticut College in New Lou- istration in the spring and summer, of don. =. 1970. Much of the new `evidence, including Nonetheless, Mr. Koury insists that he highly classified Internal C.I.A. docu- repeatedly advised Washington not to ments, was provided by a former intent- take any steps toward a military solution genre official who had direct knowledge of the Allende problem. On Oct. 9, 1970, of the agency's activities against Dr. Al- for example, he told the White House in a lende, who died in the course of a military direct message made available to The uprisin;; against him in 1973. Corroborat- New York Times that he was appalled to ing information was obtained in inter- learn that unauthorized contact had been views with other C.I.A. and White House made by the C.I.A. station in Santiago officials. Internal documents provided by with Patria y Libertad, a right-wing ex- the C.I.A. to the senate select Committee tremist group advocating the violent on intelligence - and not published by overthrow of the Government "I think the committee in its reports in 1975 on any attempt on our part actively to en- Chile-have also been obtained. Finally, courage a coup could lead us to a Bay of Mr. Korry made available some of his Pigs failure," he added in the "eyes private communications with Washing- only" cablegram. - ton during the 1970 election period. In the interviews Mr. Korry constantly These materials raise new questions focused on his inability to get newspapers about the extent of C.I.A. operations'in to publish his view of events after he left Chile In 1970 and the efficacy of the Sen- Chile. But be says that he perhaps waited ate committee's investigation. For exam- too long, until 1978, to begin to tell all he knew of the role of the Nixon Administra- tion and its predecessors in Chile.-,.: tional security interests Mr. Korry, who is 59 years old, was a foreign correspondent for United Press and went on to Look magazine, where he served as European editor. In 1962 he was designated Ambassador to Ethiopia by President John F. Kennedy, : serving there with distinction, by all accounts, until his assignment to Chile. His moment in the greatest glare of publicity came in September 1974, soon after The New York Times disclosed that the C.I.A. had spent at least 8 million in Chile in an effort to prevent Dr. Allende's election and, failing in that, sought to make it impossible for him to govern. Mr. Korry, with Richard M. Helms, then Di- rector of Central Intelligence, and two senior State Department officials, was accused by members of the Senate staff of having provided misleading testimony to the Senate multinational subcommit- tee of the Foreign Relations Committee, headed by Frank Church; Democrat of Idaho, which held hearings in March and April 1973 into I.T.T.'s involvement with the Chilean election. During the hearings Mr. Korry testi- fied that the United States maintained a "total hands off" policy toward the mili- tary during the campaign for the elect tion, which Dr. Allende won in a three- way race by only 30,000 votes of three mil- lion cast. Mr. Korry denied knowledge of the I.T.T. cablegram that became a focal point.of much of the hearings - a report from two I.T.T. officials in Santiago that the Ambassador had finally received "the green light to move in the name of Richard Nixon" against the new Presi- dent .. ::.,.. Repeatedly refusing to answer many queries in full from the senators and the subcommittee staff director, Jerome I. Levinson, Mr. Korry insisted that to de- scribe confidential communications and official orders would be "contrary to the Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/10: CIA-RDP9O-00965ROO0100160129-5