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February 7, 1983
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I Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP9O-01137R000 -P 7 FEBRUARY THE ANDROPOV FILE' BY EDWARD JAY ErsTEIN Wh HEN Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov was merely ea d d of the K.G.B., his image was that of the stereotypic hard-line "police boss." His major accom- plishment, according to C. L. Sulzberger, writing in The New York Times in 1974, was "a fairly successful cam- paign to throttle the recent wave of liberal dissidence." Nor was he viewed as much of an admirer of foreign culture. In 1980 Harrison E. Salisbury wrote in the Times that Andropov "has been working for three years on schemes to minimize the mingling of foreigners and natives.... Now Andropov's hands have been freed to embark on all kinds of repressive measures designed to enhance the 'purity' of Soviet society." Completing this picture of a tough, xenophobic, wave-throttling cop, Andropov was physically described, in another Times story, as a "shock-haired, burly man." Andropov's accession to power last November was accompanied by a corresponding ennoblement of his image. Suddenly he became, in The Wall Street journal, "silver-haired and dapper." His stature, previously re- ported in The Washington Post as an unimpressive "five feet, eight inches," was abruptly elevated to "tall and urbane." The Times noted that Andropov "stood con- spicuously taller than most" Soviet leaders and that "his spectacles, intense gaze and donnish demeanor gave him the air of a scholar." U.S. News & World Report, on the other hand, reported that "he has notoriously bad eyesight and wears thick spectacles." His linguistic abilities also came in for scrutiny. Har- rison Salisbury wrote, "The first thing to know about Mr. Andropov is that he speaks and reads English." Another Times story took note of his "fluent English." Newsweek reported that even though he had never meta "senior" American official, "he spoke English and re- laxed with American novels." Confirmation of his com- mand of English appeared in Time, The Wall Street Journal, The Christian Science Monitor, and The Washing- ton Post. The Economist credited him with "a working knowledge of German," and U.S. News & World Report added Hungarian'to the growing list. And this quadra- lingual prodigy was skilled in the use of language, too: STAT Time described him as reportedly "a witty conversa- tionalist," and "a bibliophile" and "connoisseur of mod- ern art" to boot. The Washington Post passed along a rumor that he was partly Jewish. (Andropov was rapidly becoming That Cosmopolitan Man.) Soon there were reports that Andropov was a man of extraordinary accomplishment, with some interests and proclivities that are unusual in a former head of the KG.B. According to an article in The Washington Post, Andropov "is fond of cynical political jokes with an anti- regime twist.... collects abstract art, likes jazz and Gypsy music," and "has a record of stepping out of his high party official's cocoon to contact dissidents." Also, he swims, "plays tennis," and wears clothes that are "sharply tailored in a West European style." Besides the Viennese waltz and the Hungarian czarda, he "dances the tango gracefully." (At a press conference within hours of Andropov's accession, President Reagan, asked about the prospects for agreement with him, used the unfortunate metaphor, "It takes two to tango.") The Wall Street journal added that Andropov "likes Glenn Miller records, good scotch whisky, Oriental rugs, and Ameri- can books." To the list of his musical favorites, Time added "Chubby Checker, Frank Sinatra, Peggy Lee, and Bob Eberly," and, asserting that he had once worked as a Volga boatman, said that he enjoyed singing "hearty renditions of Russian songs" at after-theater parties. The Christian Science Monitor suggested that he has "tried his hand at writing verse-in Russian, as it happens, and of a comic variety." The press was less successful in ferreting out more mundane details of his life. Where, for example, was he born? The Washington Post initially reported that he was "a native of Karelia," a Soviet province on the Finnish border. The New York Times gave his birthplace as the "southern Ukraine," which is hundreds of miles to the south. And Time said he had been born in "the village of Nagutskoye in the northern Caucasus." His birthplace was thus narrowed down to an area stretch- ing from Finland to Iran. There was also some vagueness with respect to his education. The Wall Street journal reported that he had "graduated" from an unnamed Edward Jay Epstein is the author of The Rise and Fall of "technical college," but U.S. News & World Report had Diamonds: The Shattering of a Brilliant Illusion (Simon him "drop out" of Petrozavodsk University, while and Schuster), and is currently completing a book on Newsweek awarded him a di loma from the Rybinsk international decepApproved For Release 2006/01/30 : C44 PePR 0147tWOAQRRI 1 1 a9 vocational school ARTICLE A E P \ r ved For Release ; O Ok - R - 1 P - 11 iff 1000100 ON PAGE 0 1 September 1981+ Central America briefing planned The World Affairs Council of Maine will open its season Sept. 6 with an off-the-record briefing on Central_America by a former CIA of- ficer.- __ _-.. The speaker Jot n- signed from aCIA post in.May in the belief that ''ideolp cai prejudices were overriding a'n elki enc'e judgments in some k areas." Horton will sn xntlligence rations anpoliiyinMexicoi Cn tral America_nd willA.nswer question.s, Durin his 27- ar career with the flop v e rs to Latin America- He was the CIA's cliff Z station in~Ulex~~o fin.. U.nt- i uay -.and_..later~&eryesi a deputy -chief of the agency's Latin American Division. He was recalled from retirement last year to serve on the NatiiofalTin- e Wince Council as o 66-r for Latin America. The co mbnefing will -be Har?aii first public appear- ance since his resignation. The talk will be held at 5:30 p.m. on Sept. 6 in the Pavillion of the At- lantic House resort in Scarborough. The Atlantic House is on Rpute 207 at Prouts Neck- The tax-deductible admission fee is $25 for Council members, $35 for the general public. The council stresses that Horton's remarks must be treated as private and not for gen. eral publication. For reservations or information, call the WAC office at Westbrook College, 797-7261. Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100090001-9 Approved For Release 2006/01/30 CIA-RDP90-01137R00 RADIO TV REPORTS, INC. 41 EAST 42nd STREET, NEW Y CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY STATION' NEWS CNN-TV AND THE CABLE NEWS NETWORK DATE OCTOBER 8, 1983 8 PM CITY -'BRD?ADCA917 E; CERPT NEWSCASTER: The C.I.A. deals in secrecy. That's its business. Reporters, it follows. have a touch time, finding out what's aping on inside C.I.A. headquarters. But Intelligence expert David Wise has learned of some personnel moves not widely publicized elsewhere. In his commentary tonight. Wise suggests what implications those moves could have. DAVID WISE: Covering a secret intelligence agency is a little like covering the Kremlin. They don't talk much but what happens inside the walls. So, reporters have to draw conclusions from little things. like who shows up at public appearnces. or what shifts in personnel really mean. jr) the same spirit. it's valuable to explore some quiet shakeups. that have occurred inside the C.I.A. Little or nothing has been said publicly about these changes, but word has a way Of seeping out to those who watch the walls. In the first chance, C.I.A. Director William Casey has tapped two former clandestine operatives to handle the agency's dealings with Congress and the press. J. William Doswell. is former Richmond .public relations man who headed Casey's Congressional and press relations, has left C.I.A. Casey split the job in two. He named Claret George, until now the second- highest clandestine operator in the aoency, to handle Congress. He put George Lauder, another former spook, in charge of public r r . a. ~ oars. C.I.A. hands deny that the agency's desire to shore up Congressional and public support for its covert operation in Nicaragua was behind these moves. Approved For Release 2006/01/30.: CIA-RDP90-01137R000100090001-9 Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00010009 OL.L L ~J r-i\L ON : 2'_ C E THE ATLANTIC November 1982 CHOOSING A STRATEGY FO WORLD WAR III BY THO'tiL4S POWERS N THE YEARS SINCE 1945, DISCUSSION OF STRATEGIC nuclear policy in the upper reaches of the American government has centered on a single overriding ques- tion-what to do if deterrence fails." The phrase is char- acteristic of the rigid etiquette that governs official talk about nuclear weapons. It means war, and especially a big general war between the United States and the Soviet union-v.,ar of the old-fashioned, all-out sort. in which even fear of The Bomb would take second place to the straggle. Officials have learned to be wary of talking in public about nuclear war. It just gets them in trouble. But in private they talk about war all the time. None of them wants such a war. In truth, none of them expects it-now or ever. But deterrence could fail. What do we do then? For the general public, nuclear war means something like the end of the world-a single burst of destruction in which cities would be fiiclcgd off the face of the globe in a whirlwind of fire. That is not the way military men look at things. They may vaguely threaten to scrape Russia fiat down to the primeval gravel, but that's mainly fer show, to put the other side in a serious frame of mind. 'When the balloon goes up," as they sometimes say, the time for threats is past. Then you have got to fight, not just kiss the kids good-bye and push the button. The general public may be content with the awful either/or, but the military instinctively rebels against the idea that the end of deter- rence is the end of everything else. When war comes, armies fight with the weapons at hand. Nuclear weapons are a prominent feature of the ar- senals of both sides. How are they to be used? What should we point them at? How many should we fire in the opening salvo? In the early days of the nuclear era, the bombs were so cumbersome, so hard to deliver, and above all so few that they were reserved for only the most dramatic targets. As a practical matten that meant cities. In 1945, it meant Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the late 1940s, it meant Mos- cow and, Leningrad. In the fail of 1948, for example, the United States had about 100 bombs, but the early bombs took two clays to assemh'_e by a team of twenty-four. We 1 ' n- h -o assemble them all at once. t m times didn't even know how many bombs we had. Until 1948, the only airplanes that could deliver the bombs were specially modified B-29s, slow craft, vulnerable to attack en route, so limited in range that they had to be based in Europe. Military targets tend to be small, numerous, pro- tected, hard to find and hit. For purely technical reasons, then, the first nuclear weapons were pointed at "strategic" targets, that is, targets the loss of which might affect the morale or the war-making potential of the enemy. The wars of the late 1940s, if they had taken place, would have lasted a few weeks, and would have consisted of devastat- ing blows on Russian cities. ports, and industrial sites. By the early, 1950s, these problems had been solved. The AEC agreed to let the Strategic Air Command (SAC) keep bombs on its airfields. We had a_fleet of new intercontinen- tal bombers to deliver them. The bombs themselves had a much longer "shelf life" and didn't have to be assembled from scratch immediately before use. Above all, they were more numerous. We had entered, in the phrase used by professional strategists, the era of nuclear plenty"-in which we still find ourselves. It is also the era of choice. When you've got only three weapons, as we had in July of 1945, it's not hard to decide what to poirt them at. When you've got thousands. as we have now, and when you can hit any thing in a known location on the surface of the earth, as we can now, and, above all. when the Soviets can retaliate in kind, then you have to think hard before decid- ing what to hit and when to hit it. The decisions imply the course of the war we are likely to see "if deterrence fails." When Jimmy Carter entered the White House, in Janu- ary of 1977, he probably would have clone away with nucle- ar weapons altogether given the choice. This may sound like the inevitable preference of any sane man. but none of Carter's predecessors had shared it. Nuclear weapons solve certain kinds of problems; in particular, they are cheaper than men and tanks. Carter's predecessors had all chosen nuclear weapons rather than press Congress or NATO allies to come up with money for men, and tanks enough to face the Russians on what is called the -central front" in Europe. Eiserhower's first secretary of defense. Charles 'ilson, once said, We can't afford to fight limited . C.. ,. ea CC n ..,a? e w' e 'fight a big wars and if there is SisuEch nergy bombs C as ommi- ion A hi was ret rn ClAon 3e ~ t~ arter w?as a tranger th n i'? rer to the :_i: Force in adv2.nce. The general some- to `rattling on in 1977: he had not been over and over this Approved For Release 2006/01/30: CIA-RDP90-01137R00 A_t. -EARED NOTRE DAME NEWS = G=$=~ ~_~. February 1982 In the CIA, says Ralph MoGe you have to do is tell the truth. Ralph McGehee '50 joined the Central Intelligence Agency in 1952, shortly after he was-cut from the Green Bay Packers. He's not sure why the CIA approached him, but 'during his intelligence training he met so many other pro football dropouts that he suspects the agency considered the-National Football League. a prime recruiting ground. When the Korean War ended in 1953 McGehee joined the agency's clandestine operations section as a case officer. Over the next two decades he served in the Philippines, Taiwan, Japan, Thailand and Vietnam. He did the routine work of an intelligence officer: recruiting agents, conducting investigations, and maintain- ing liaison with the local police and intelligence organizations. During that era the CIA's main struggle was against Communist insurgency in Southeast Asia. That struggle was a losing one. Of all the information often is politicized- In - countries in the region, today only theory, the agency provides accurate and' Thailand remains allied to, the West, unbiased information to the President so l McGehee thinks he knows why our side he can make wise decisions regarding lost the rest. . national security- In practice, when a - In 1965 McGehee directed an intelli- President is firmly committed to a gence gathering effort in a province in particular policy (such as military northeast Thailand where a Communist victory in Vietnam), the agency shapes insurgency was beginning. After a its information to conform to that policy J detailed, yearlong study, McGehee re- Bad or even inconvenient news is ported that he had found a popular unwelcome. That is an abiding theme in movement so broad, pervasive and deeply the history of intelligence, and it is the rooted that purely military measures were rock on which Ralph McGehee unlikely to defeat it. foundered. McGehee submitted his findings to the After he submitted his dissenting agency but, -after a brief period of praise report, McGehee's career took a nose- for this work, he ran into an official wall dive. He was shuttled from one low-Icy in Washington, job to another. He was promised His findings, he explains, ran counter promotions but never received them- to the official Washington view that He was frustrated as he watched his Communist insurgency was a form of country wage the wrong kind of war ink pants who were duped or forced into joining guerilla units who took their arms and orders from outside. McGehee maintains that intelligence clandestine invasion, and that the Southeast Asia, one he knew was natives involved were unwilling partici- doomed to failure. He did what he cowl Hppruveu rur release cuuoiu iiou -. '..iM-rCur,vu-u i i a i rwuu i uuuauuu i -tv- Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R0001000, F T1CIE APFEfsR~TJ ON PAGE S s:. I Taylor 'Branch THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY April 1982 n August 1955, John Prados tells us,* the CIA's Richard Bissell went to the White House to show President Eisenhower some pictures that had been taken from an airplane more than ten miles above the earth. Greens, fairways,and sand traps were clearly bible in the aerial shots of the Augusta National Country Club in Augusta, Georgia, which was not only the home of the Masters but also Ike'sfavorite golf course. The photos clearly impressed the president, who recognized the topography of certain memorable holes. Then Bissell played his trump card. He pointed out that the pictures actually revealed the presence of golf balls on some of the greens, as well as the flags in the cups. This truly impressed Eisenhower, who must have reflected that sometimes he had trouble seeing the cup when standing over a ten-foot putt. Bissell, on the strength of the demonstration, asked for permission to develop a U-2 spy plane that could produce such pic- tures from even higher altitudes, and Eisenhower, who was normally skeptical of new rrtilitarygidgets,heartily approved. Thus, through crafty persuasion and awe- some technology, the CIA won its battle against the air force for control of a new spy system. With technology that has long since made Bissell's U-2 obsolete, the secret services now stand on perma- nent watch against nuclear attack. Simultaneously, they grapple clandestinely with their adversaries in localized conflicts that policy-makers want to keep quiet, fearing Armageddon. These two functions have brought spy organizations to the forefront of modern politics since ,World War 11, as intelligence activities have expanded on both the highest and lowest of roads. The same Richard Bissell who showed Eisenhower thegolfcourse photographs planned the Bay of Pigs invasion. The Soviet Estimate is a readable and even-tempered chronicle of the higher road-the effort of the CIA and military intelligence services to keep track of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Prad os has assembled the first compre- hensive record of American performance in this field, matching predictions of Russian strength against what ends up actually happening in the arms race. Working from National Intelligence Estimates that, ironically, are the most sensitive and yet the most publicly debated spy products we have, he labors to separate the contri- butions of hard fact from those of prejudice, and he makes convincing judgments about the bureaucratic wars within the intelligence community. The human element of intelligence mistakes was more easily exposed during the early years, when the- spy network was relatively unsophisticated. Shortly be- fore a 1955 Soviet-American summit meeting, the Rus- sians invited Colonel Charles E. Taylor, theairforceat tache in Moscow, to watch an aerial parade at Tushino Field. Sitting in the reviewing stand, Colonel Taylor Taylor Branch is a contributing editor of The Washington Monthly. was astounded to watch 23 Bison bombers fly over in z succession of formations. As Prados notes, this was twice the number of Bisons attributed to the Russians only a few months before and four times the number of B-52s then in existence. Taylor's alarming report quick- ly became the basis for another drastic upward revision of the National Intelligence Estimate on Soviet strategic bombers. What Colonel Taylor had no way of knowing at the time was that the Russians were so insecure about the American lead in nuclear weaponry that they had cir- cled their few Bisons repeatedly over the airfield as a blustering show of strength. The Russians fooled the Americans---especially the air force, which was eager to be fooled so that it could build more B-52s--and there- by helped create the "bomber gap," which was the first major hoax in postwar strategic intelligence. Several years later, about the time the CIA and the army and navy managed to push the air force back toward reality on Soviet bombers, the Russians launched their Sputnik. They also tested some ICBMs before they were expected to, causing a wave of appre- hension in the United States. The 1958 National Irtelli- gence Estimate predicted that the Russians would solve all their test problems almost instantaneously, and that Moscow would produce and deploy up to 1,000 ICBMs by 1961. By contrast, the United States had only ten ICBMs in 1960. This was the "missile gap" There was a great public scare, and the shape of the weaponry in- volved encouraged journalists to imply that national manhood was at stake, along with survival. The Alhop brothers reported that the Eisenhower administration was about to "flaccidly permit the Kremlin to gain an almost unchallenged superiority." As is well known, John Kennedy was elected on his virile pledge to change that with a greatly accelerated ICBM program, but by the time he took office the mis- sile gap was revealed to be a larger hoax than the bomber gap. The CIA, joined by navy and army intel- ligence, now realized that the Russians had produced no ICBMs at all. The air force, after a Strangelovian campaign of resistance during which Strategic Air Command generals went so far as to claim that Cri- mean War memorials were actually Soviet ICBMs in disguise, finally conceded. - The result of all this confusion was the Defense Intelli- gence Agency, Secretary of Defense Robert Mc\ama- ra's well-intentioned but ultimately counter-productive effort to end public disputes between the military intelli- gence services. To McNamara, such squabbling was inefficient as well as politically embarrassing. Hewanted a unified, accurate military position on intelligence mat- ters. In the DIA, however, he got an agency that tended to produce brokered intelligence compromises that were *7he Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Anal vsisand Rrssian Military Strength. John Prados. Dial, 517.95. Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100090001-9 Gi Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R0001009____nn1-9 REPORTS; INC. RADIO lv 4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20015 656-4068. FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF PROGRAM CBS Reports STATION W D V M TV CBS Network DATE January 23, 1982 9:30 PM CITY Washington, DC SUBJECT The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception MIKE WALLACE: The only war America has ever lost, the war in Vietnam, reached a dramatic turning point 14 years ago this month. The morning of January 30th, 1968, across the length and breadth of South Vietnam, the enemy we thought was losing the war suddenly launched a massive surprise attack. It was called the Tet offensive. And the size of the assault, the cacualties, the devastation caught the American public totally by surprise. But more than that, it caught the mighty American Army, half a million strong, unprepared for the enemy's bold strikes in all of South Vietnam's cities. As the fighting continued, it became clear that the ragged enemy forces we thought were'being ground down had greater numbers and greater military strength than we had been.led to believe. Before they were finally pushed back, those Viet Cong forces had left behind a nagging question in the minds of millions of Americans: How was it possible for them to surface so brazenly and so successfully at a time when Americans at home were being told the enemy was running out of men? The fact is that we Americans were misinformed about the nature and the size of the enemy we were facing. And tonight we're going to present evidence of what we have come to believe was a conscious effort, Indeed a conspiracy, at the highest levels of American military intelligence to suppress and alter critical intelligence on the enemy in the year leading up to the Tet offen- sive. A former CIA analyst, Sam Adams, introduced us to this evidence and he became our consultant. What you're about to see are the results of our efforts over the last 12 months to confirm h i s f i nd gVed li ftwew 06/flP0C:BMA? DPP Q1i137 A0'i)0?0dd1e9 a n d I f1:lr_FC IN. WASHINGTON D.C. ? NEW YORK ? LOS ANGELES ? CHICAGO ? DETROIT ? AND OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-0113 ARTICLE APPEA EE'D ON PAGE ` THE PUBLIC HISTORIAN Winter 1981 The Hitorian as Fore Policy.Analyst: T Challenge of the C1 PxioP ssioNAL i-nsTOBxAI s and the institutions of Ameri policy have been engaged in increasingly fruitful relal years since World War II. rust as individuals like Geo: _ and Herbert Feis have. linked the- worlds of diplomacy and his- torical research, so the profession has established. "institutional beachheads"' in the historical offices of the Department of State, the military services, and in smaller numbers, the Departments of Defense and .Energy. In these offices historians working as his- torians have applied rigorous scholarly standards in editing pri- mary sources, most notably the Foreign Relations of the United ? This paper is a revised version of a talk presented at the annual meeting of the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association, University of Southern California, August 1950. This material has been reviewed by the Central Intelligence Agency to assist the author in eliminating classified information. However, that review constitutes neither CIA authentication of material presented as factual nor a CIA endorsement of the author's views or those ascribed by the author to others (including current or former officials of any nation). 1. The concept is taken from Otis L. Graham, Jr., "Historians and the World of (OH-Campus) Power," The Public Historian, Volume I, Number 2 (Winter 1979), 34. 01981 by the Regents of the University of California 0272-3433/81/010015?11$00.50 Approved For Release. 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100090001-9 Approved For Release 2006/01/30: CIA-RDP90-01137R0 Jcseah Q. Harsch IVY :,).?II Cpl t 10 'love:nner 1981 Colonel Qaddafi is difficult.= The latest disclosures about Americans working for Col. Muammar Qaddafi of Libya seem to clear .up' one point. Libya was able to invade its southern neighbor, Chad;-last November not because - Libyans were --aided in this undesirable (from the-United States' point of view) operation by the Soviet Union but because-some 20 American pilots, . mostly recruited in or around Miami, were willing to take the colonel's money. "~ t J The money, incidentally came from selling. Libyan. oil to: American oil companies- Libya is the third-largest- exporter, of oil to the US. There is now a vigorous feud between the US and Libya. On May 7 the US closed down the Libyan Embassy 1w Washington. - The feud reached its peak on Aug. 19 when planes from&. US Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean shot down two Libyan.; jet fighters in airspace Libya but considered to be international in Washington. = ' - The feud has been kept going since-then by the dispatch of US reconnaissance planes to the Sudan after the assassina- tion of Egyptian President Sadat: There was suspicion in. Washington that Colonel Qaddafi might take advantage of? political uncertainty in ? Egypt to invade the Sudan. Also, there has continued to be a lively propaganda duel between Washington and Tripoli.:'. - - - The feud began before-Ronald Reagan'-and, the Republi cans took over the White House in January. Previous to that Washington had withdrawn-its diplomatic community from,., Libya. There was supposed to be some danger that the. colp nel might be tempted to do to them what the-Iranians had done to Americans in Tehran ' . ?- . The Carter administration had atone-time tried, to get-:? along with Colonel Qaddafr_:_Bruther Billy's. notorious deal ings with the Libyans ; were= not originally-opposed at the White House. Ia fact Qaddafghelp-was.urrited?'over the-. Iranian - hostage affair:.:_There`was almost a~_ eourts'rip: of .y__ Libya into 1979.. But then- things began to go sours Libyans~vere;.suspected of having, tried to carry out:-a political exe ion :inside the US. Libya was believed to be a main -source "ofrweepons for-.:- PLO- forces in Lebanon,. The PLO is unpopular iogWashing- ton. The Libyans are also believed- to be a main source of weapons to the IRA- (Irish Fepublican-Army in_Northern. Ireland, but Washington has never tried seriously to stop the flow of funds from the US to Libya for the purchase of those guns. So there was bad blood between Washington and Tripoli before Mr. Reagan took over.. But Mr. Reagan picked up the theme eagerly. One of the first orders issued from the White House by Ali,. Reagan-was-forprepar-atiou of a plan "to make life uncomfortable" forCblonel Qaddafi. ?It fitted in with his' campaign theme' of 'Masobvi* being the prime source=of world' terrorism Also in the first days of the Reagan administration the'I White House asked for documentation of that charge of Mos-? cow being the prime source of world terrorism. Previous CIA : reports had failed to produce solid evidence to support the" assumption. The new CIA chief, William J. Casey, ordered', his staff to try again- It is the first publicly- exposed case of -' the CIA being instructed to support a White House thesis. ? In theory-the CIA produces expert, objective information; It is not supposed to start from a conclusion and then hunt around for possible evidence to back it up. That job belongs to the propaganda department of any government. ' . The CIA has still to come up with any hard evidence that Moscow did train Libyan terrorist agents, provided Libya. with terrorist weapons, planned joint terrorist' operations ,with Libya, or used Libya. directly, for its own purposes. These things may have happened.There'is as yet no pub- lisped hard evidence that they did. -, -. But we do have hard evidence that two American ex-CIA. agents. Edwin Wilson ana Frank Terpil, have long been run ning-a:major service operation for Colonel-Qaddafi. Their- work has included shipping (illegally)- US terrorist-type;-. weapons to Libya, recruiting former Green Berets for train ing terrorists in -Libya, setting up a little factory inside the. ? -palace in Tripoli to manufacture terrorist weapons, and re--, cruiting American pilots to supply Libyan troops in Chad. On the public record it now stands that the: US.. not the,, USSR, is the prime provider to Libya- of terrorist-weapons and techniques- This is just one place where the real world fails to-fit the,. world of Mr_-Reagan's campaign rhetoric. It is one reason - why his foreign policy is coming in now for widespread criti-? cism. Too much of it is founded, on ideological assumption rather than on known-fact.:. r_, ; 1/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100090001-9 ARTICLE APPE,9roved For. Release 2006/01/30: CIA-RDP90-01137R0001000 014 PACE NEVI YORK TD-C'5 ~ 18 October 1981 ,SOVIETMTERROR TIES CALLED OUTDATED Haig:Based Accusation on:. J. S.. In'te'lligence Officials Say ,Can Administration charges that the -Soviet Union was directly helping ter- rorists were essentially based on infor- mation provided a decade: ago by a ~tCzechoslavak? defector, - according to . senior intelli gene officials: "What we are hearing is this l0 year- told testimony. coining back to us through 'WestEuropean intelligence and some of our own C-IA people." one official said. . "There is no substantial new evidence." 'z- The defector, Maj.' Gen. Jan Sejna, = was said to have been closely associated WASHINGTON, Oct. 17 --Early Rea-., Decade-Old Information EyLESLIEH.GELB General Under C.I.A. Protection >?General Sejna, who remains, under C.I.A. protection, could not be immedi- ately reached for comment. In response to an inquiry, a C.LA. press officer said any questions to him would have to be relayed by letter.. After Secretary Haig's initial re- marks, the C.I.A. prepared a study that the Director of Central Intelligence, Wil- liam J. Casey, rejected as inadequate. He ordered other studies that, officials said, also did not satisfy his conviction ;In the early 1960's, the kremlin estab- lished training and support centers in the Soviet Union and in other countries .,for Libyans, Iraqis, North Koreans, An-, - golans, members of the Palestine Liber- The purpose was to help these groups with guerrilla techniques and weapons tion.,, But later some of these centers were Baader-Meinbof gang;. the Red Bri- gades and the Japanese Red Army.-:, ??. The Soviet Union. -almost certainly 'block them. But there is also little evi- dence to show that the Soviet Union was in any way directing terrorist actions. Some intelligence experts say "it should not be necessary. to draw pia tures," as one put it, to establish Soviet responsibility and Soviet benefit from the activities. Others say that the Soviet Union .created the centers for one pur- pose -- support of national liberation movements - - and, that the centers turned into Frankenstein monsters, that Sejna Reported Direct Link General Sejna was said to have told Western intelligence agencies at the -time that the Russians had trained ter- . rorist groups like the Baader-Meinhof gang of West Germany and the Red. Bri- .yLr iy yi } "".~ ;;ic } h ~i 1?'} kizi2t ?: 'r- ?.~rr: ?r :?i:- ?tr'r. r.r?rr?r. {_': ^?i: r: r. r. ky- i r?? ?: t L i i i i s F 3 . . E ' Llia'II~E::i i~trii:t~i :F ij! i. _wit.3 I'a i'i :i.-s r-w}: r}.~ys -- 1t ~rZ at}r~-n 1 i i i"={ i iz ^r+:~ 4?'-. ~ i" ? ' 1 } {.: Iii i~ MWL i1i3 LIL-1t1L.i.i :tl : i5 Fi~t 1 {{1-15..2. L- .:J r? ij 1 g r .4 L T. t^ t T :1 F t I. 3i d11--:) wi + err r:r "r I;?E LI1iU, P. 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Y R WWII REPORT i i f t .iLsive crash mgrams such as the MX missile to prevent- the The Soviets frrmArt of "I6b f aRV- CIAi &Eg, experts say. It the crash catca-trip programs tall o~verie next decade, says one analyst on Capital Hill, the ultimate cost or one mass could be "beyond West and the vic default, all at a ti of the Soviet sy: apparent." Complicating. e: the Central Intel. analysts and mil consistently low S. producing them, way they_used to,.' President Rea William J. Casey, deputy director, e: CIA's analytical p4 ma tiorr hearin yet been undertal analyzes Soviet r grams. - - The Bulletin he ---- Current Cl spending (61 to 6f the actual Soviet mates to be 108 1 rate for rubles in exactly what is b single accurate co -- CIA estima percentage of nati percent to 13 Pi probably 18 percen - CIA estirhat purchasing as a p machinery are too over 50 percent th' 'EOs and 35 percent .- The -CIA es better, and unless. estimating Soviet n to be even further o,i in rive years than it.:s now. -- The CIA was apparently caught unawares b}i the introduction, refinement ordep]oymert quantity or tb: ing of at least 18 major new Soviet we?nrars system and technologies. ' - - - Also, analysis of the annual Posture S`ateirents :j the various Secretaries of Defense agat-2-., developments shows the CIA was caught by m :re --a. or extensive development or dloymw?t than it.zird' expected of numerous system and ch - - ing; - A large deployment of Soviet rnedi the late 1 ^50spnd early 1ses; A large deployment ? of m'?~,?. ,#,~ti range ballistic missiles (? I/ rBBMs) in the e od;. -- The deployment of a second genemt on. pc- sub- launched ballistic missiles (S1MLI,, f 3'N S% on- tip of Yankee-class subs in the raid-1s"613s;-' The deployment of zn'ultiple i de ndentl f',~rgeta- ble reentry vehicle (-NMV) w-ae4 il52,LU_ bt?; e~ ~t- 4+ [:Iiru 9P Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100 Ae I CL ~1P1 11s:.S 0z PAG. THE WASHINGTON POST 12 February 1981 Back in' 1976, when George Bush was head of the Central Intelligence Agency and in charge of preparing the .annual-National Intelligence Estimate, he stirred _up a big brouhaha by going outside the government for a "second opinion" on the'critical -question of the To:the'distinct discomfort of the-professionals on the inside, -Bush_called?-in Harvard. Prof. Richard Pipes, -a Russian;history scholar, and.close-student of Soviet of "Team-B''witlia mission-to second-guess the findings;. of the o0"i?al government estimators (" Team A"). - ;r Thenet effect=was to introduce into the final. re port-a.. mnch:dimmer vievV:ofythe Soviet=Union's global atrategy,:of its military-capabilities; of its de-1- ..signs for-world: hegemony and-.of-its willingness tar Today George Bush site in, the vice president's of,-, fice in the White House. And right-:across the street . in the Executive Office Building;' in :an office-with. a ' " splendid view-' of ,Washington'; landmarks,. sits : the ' same Prof. Pipes. He is-now on- the inside-Asa' menraC' her of the:National- Security Coanciistaff-a' mem ber, Yo b*,h t: say, o?-' Team-A,with:: a view ofci Soviet, intentions that, if anything, l ay grown grim 1< Along:with the:restofthe Reagan NSCstaff Pi es p ; under'tigh .wraps na public ; pronouncements, other-than ocral telephone calls, But-it is not hard toc get- a grasp of his current thinking from assorted re- cently published wort , with a.little unattributable in:; struction from the professor himself ; worth taking; iffor no 'other reasori:than what it tells; 'you, about the Reagan -team's taste-. in Sovietologists. Just howdirect a hand he wrll'have'iri policymaking is'`;SRY? ZeMtary-of State=Alexander. Haig is a11-acrd-end-allof foreign policy "formation " He will- . . have Walter Staessel, a former ambassador to Mosco' top man for policy planning Paul' Wolfowita , (anotherformermember, incidentally,"of,"Team B"). Still, Pipes will be the reigning White House, Soviet scholar, working for National Security Ad.- ,viser Richard Allen, who will be reporting. to the president--. through White., House= Counselor Ed; Meese. One way or another, then, the thinking ofd Richard-Pipes is pretty much assured. a hearing.: What you find in his writings are the scholarly under-, ?pinnings for much of what both Reagan'and Haig have been'-saying--about the Soviet-hand in world terrorismi -and/or; Moscow's-master plan for world domination.,:: ^< `1'he-roots-'of Soviet terrorism, indeed of.niodern; tercor+m,"..:I?ipes .wrote recently, date back to 1$79,; when an _oiganization called`"'I'he People's Will" was createdf ifi. a- small Russian town, Lipetsk This small- band of political assassins, which, among other things,- murdered Czar Alexander g Pipes argues; is the true "source of all modern terrorist groups;: whether-they be~ named, the Tupamaroe,, the Baader-Meinhof - group;r the Weathermen, Red Brigade or PLO." Today, Pipes maintains that the Soviet Unionl "encourages and employs terrorism because terror- ism is a handy and relatively cheap'weapon in their Western societies.. - . We must expose itssupport-of terrorism as widely as possible. JIt=must be made absolutely clear that these ac- tivities cvill no longer be tolerated. On the -broader question of Soviet designs, Pipes. reaches far back into pre-Communist Russian history for his theory that niilitaryhas always been the domi, nant element in-Russian society "Militancy-that: is, a commitment to violence and' coercion and its principal.instrumentality, milita- rism,,,.he wrote recently,. seemto'me as central to Soviet communism as the pursuit of profit to societies, with market-oriented economies,','.:.; . = v : :'. In entart' magazine last year he argued in grit article `called 'Soviet Global.. trategy' that `iblarxis Leninisn2asby its very natiire?/a militant doctrine." l , is. also,, he-went on, "an' international doctrine.-` .? -The phases in?the.evolution-of mankind-are global scope-and cannot be contained (excepktransitionally) within the lin its:of the nation-state." He sees Russia as historically,expa rsio, perpet wally seeking to acquire new territory, which` requires' new- buffers;- which 4n`fiirn- must be 'assimilated, re- . `quiring yet more. buffers;=inan endless process. Th' Soviets; he insists;-will not, hesitate -.ta use nuclear weapons,, deterrent, ,- or a. threat-but actually- -use the'mras,a.part-of global:strategy:-The: ultimate aim indeed a necessity. for: the'succesaof Marxist^~ Leninism-is the destruction of'capitalism : Ronald Reagan, it `mind : be argued, needs little err couragement in these beliefs. But anytime he's looking for intellectual and historical reinforcement, he will find it right across the street, in the office of Prof Pipes; ,-'? Approved For Release 2006/01/30 :.CIA-RDP90-01137R000100090001-9 - Approved For Release 2006/01/30: CIA=RDP90-09137 == 117'pf.3_ b By H son E. Salisbury s Ronald Reagan and.- his advisers sit downs in the Oval Office t map. American strat egy for the 1980's, the..'{ Russian actuality that confronts them may be-,- less formidable than. what - some of them may have perceived.. But this is not neces- sarily a cause for re- joicing. Greater dangers may arise - , from debilitating Soviet weaknesses than from supposed Soviet ..military. might Probably not since-World.-War when the Soviet Union struggled to__ evict its German invaders, has the long view from the Kremlin windows been=-4 so bleats. The solutions to crushing.Y problems at home and abroad seem be-.__ yond the grasp of Soviet planners. The real world that Leonid I_ Brezh- _ nev and his elderly Politburo comrades acknowledge in the privacy of their meeting rooms contains few of the su- that dominate Pravda's=. perlatives -political verbiage. ? - - It is, in fact. becoming increasingly evident that the principal danger to.: world peace is not posed by the nefari- ous schemes of Communist plotters set- on fomenting revolutions and over- whelming the West with militarymight, but by the Soviet Union's reac- tion to failures and frustrations that stem from incurable flaws within its own creaky system. ~.- This assessment is, obviously, by-- pothesis_ No one, perhaps not even any - of the solemn old men who sit around the long table in the Kremlin palace, has all the facts. And certainly not this writer. But it is not -diffi5-- h NEW YORK TIMES :MAGAZINE e.~ 1 FEBRUARY 1981 portantly, a profound crisis in the chronically unsettled Soviet barrier zone-this time in Poland, an area that poses unusual historic hazards for Rus- sia. And there is the 4,600-mile frontier with China, guarded by one million Soviet troops, about one quarter of the Red Army, and backed by countless nu- clear weapons targeted against China's principal cities. For 10 years, this enor- mous Soviet force has been positioned against a perceived threat of war with China- There is nothing at present I'I to suggest that this apprehension of im- danger will disappear in the t. pending next decade. The view westward is no more reas- suring. Now that detente has gone down the drain, the United States and its European allies (plus Japan) loom threateningly on the Soviet horizon as an entity more suspicious of Moscow today than at any time since the height of the cold war. In Soviet eyes, the I4 United States and its allies are per- ceived as a capitalist monolith of ramp- ant military and economic strength, a colossus that grows more and more for- midable in violation of every precept of Marx and Lenin. - When Mr. Brezhnev casts his atten- tion inward, on his own country. he con- fronts evidence even more disturbing. Until 10 years ago, the Soviet gross na- tional product rose at a buoyant rate of 8 percent to 10 percent annually. Since 1970, the rate of growth has dwindled. The G.N.P. for 1980, United States ex- perts estimate, increased by barely 1 percent- Not since Stalin launched his 1 first five-year plan more than 50 years ago has so sluggish a peacetime growth been recorded- Soviet agriculture, in particular, is a catastrophe: Annual shortfalls of millions of tons of grain have, time and again, put the Soviet Union in the humiliating position of being dependent on hostile powers, in- cluding the United States, for help in struct a semblance of the tour d anzon _ feeding its 260 million citizens. - on which Mr. Brezhnev must be basing = The history of recent years, a history his calculations- The closer President - of decelerating Soviet production rela- Reagan and his advisers can replicate rive to American growth, contains no the view from the Kremlin windows,. evidence that Moscow can quickly re- the more effectively will the new ad- 1 verse its economic stagnation. The lat- ministration be able to construct an American policy to deal with any Soviet threat. There can be no question that the re-'- ports Mr. Brezhnev receives from his aides depict an inte CQ' rl aW I replete with hostile, intractable and dangerous elements. There is, of est C.I_A_ statistics indicate that the United States, despite its own economic woes, now outproduces the sclerotic Soviet Union by 40 percent. Put another ass me eexxpe contteenu or-speidm for every $6 allotted by Moscow in the accelerating arms race without crip- ment of Soviet military capability, con- i cluded that the Soviet Union was engag- ing in a massive arms buildup - al, though many Western analysts now b--.1 have this was neveractually achieved: Earlier, an in-house team concluded,- that the C_L_A_ had been underestimat-? ing what the Soviet Union was spending l on defense. Its calculations indicated that the Soviet Union's defense spend-j ing was actually in a range of 11 per- cent to 13 percent of its G.N.P., not the 6. percent to 8 percent previously estimat- ed. The 1976 C_T_A_ figures, which Team B used in reaching its conclusion abcut the Soviet defense buildup, were based on a reassessment of the ruble's real purchasing power in the Soviet Union. These currency adjustments, however, do not affect the amount of military hardware. produced by the Soviet Union, That same year, other military ex- perts estimated'that by 1980 the Soviet Union's defense spending would rise to an annual rate of 18 percent of its-' G.N.P. By way of contrast, the United States has recently been spending about 6 percent of its G_N_P_ on de--I fense.' President Carter's-1982 budget projected a defense increase of 5.3 per-1 cent (about 5.6 percent of the nation's G_N_P_) for the next fiscal year. Current. C_IA-estimatesof Soviet de-- fense spending .calculate the increase annually during the late 1960's and 70's at about 3 percent to 4 percent, roughly equal to the growth of the Soviet G.N.P. in recent years. What now interests Western defense experts is the future relationship between Moscow's arms spending and its sluggish G:N.P. Is the bad news for Leonid Brezhnev good news for the new President of United States?, It sounds like good .I news. It sounds very optimistic. But there is a paradox here. Weakness, particularly internal weakness, in a world power can sometimes be more ~Qg O9QQDtls ength. A secure na- -ion negotiates with confidence. A na- l THE BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE 25 January 1981 Roman adviser. Pipes insists he's the 'latter By Nina McCan Globe Staff Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R0001000 _Ichard ..Pipes arrived In America on-his 17th birthday. July 11.194Q He and his father and mother had fled from the Nazi Invasion of Poland. One of his most vivid minnorles of his new country wpm seeing an. advertisement with a quotation from B "min Franklin. "It &" something like, 'Unfore- seenevents need not change the course of men's lives..' I laughed..I had witnessed the outbreak of war In Poland, seen my house de- stroyed. been forced to leave home and nrtgratr thousands of miles." The chasm between American optimism and the Eastern Europe- an expe'ience-of the ravages of war has shaped Richard Pipes' view of .the world arse. for the next few . years. Pipes will have a hand in shaping America's foreign policy. The Harvard txofessor -will be the- Mat t viet Union or the n lnistration - tlonal Security Council. Hey-is one of the leading figures In a, group of intellectuals who are lumped together under the label "neoooaaervative. '-many of whose- memo-write for the combative Commentary magazine- Pipes shares with them a conviction that America has grown soft and sleepy about national defense and a deter- mination to lead a reawakening. . Pipes says he and and like- winded members of the Committee on the Present Danger are "the -same kind of people who. in 1936 or 119V. would have backed Churchill fn_Etg1ard. [People who said] Gee- ?t{iany is arming. preparing for war, and we are doing nothing." Substitute the words "Soviet -Union" for "Germany" and you have a rough notion. of Pipes'' ap' proach to US-Soviet relations. Pipes is the latest In a series of Soviet experts to serve In the high- eat councils In Washington. Like those who have preceded him, from Charles E. (Chip) Bohlen and Qeorge Kennon to Henry Kissinger. Zbigniew Brzezinsla and Marshall Shulman. Pipes brings his own in- terpretation of US Soviet relations to the Job. . . - Although he shares a common Eastern European background with Kissinger and Brzezineki. forced me to choose between Rua- sian history and my other int-n- ests.' Pipes makes his home with his wife Irene In a handsome old house on.a quiet side street in Cambridge. (Two grown sons live In other parts of the country.) Japanese prints, paintings and pieces of sculpture fill the rooms, evidence of his con- tinuing interest in art. But .other Interests -- In phottr, raphy, cross country skiing. and swimming -- have fallen by the wayside in re- cent years 'as pipes has devoted more and . more of his time to the- debate over US foreign pol.'cy:. ' He first caught the eye of Wash- Ington insiders in 1970 when he delivered a paper on US-Soviet rela- tions to the Ameilean Historical Association. An aide to Sen. Henry Jackson (D-Wash.) liked the paper andPipes became a consultant to Jackson's Permanent Committee on Investigations. But It was not until 1978 that he gain n.ati ?na attention r~henj ei headed the "B-tea " %k - group of hon-governmental experts brought in by President Ford's Foreign In- telligence AdvIsory Board to assess ~a estimates, of Soviet strength. The experts looked at the same da Central Intelligepce A cv (Ct, and came to startlinety different cnnc]us~~s,T The team's highly.critlcal report charged that the CIA had corsls- tently underestimated the nature and extent of the Soviet threat. It warned that the Soviets would soon be militarily superior to the _-US and could use that superiority to force US withdrawal from cru- cial areas like the Mideast. - Coming in the midst of the Nix- on-Ford era of relatively good rela- tions with the Soviet Union, the re- port struck at the very foundations of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) and created turmoil within the Intelligence community. Out of the "B tearn"came the Committee on the Present Danger (there was some membership over- lap), and a widely-discussed article in Commentary In which Pipes set out his views on Soviet strategy. - In that article, entitled "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War." he argued that Americans have been deluded into believing that the So- r` pprovcfi -~F 'e Base 20b W6' t~ .. A-AM&-UTP37R600100090001-9 - 7r. T -,x 5D the doctrine of .detente which Kis- singer first espoused and more re- cently downplayed. - The problem with detente -- the pursuit of arms limitation, trade agreements and a stabilized US-So- - viet relationship - Pipes argues, is that .the- Russians aren't playing by the same rules. While American strategists talk about nuclear par ity and deterrence, the. Soviets are aiming for superiority and, uitV mately. victory. - Often described as a "hard- liner" " or "hawk." Pipes prefers to think of himself as a realist.. "'If you want to prevent nuclear war, or tacontain the damage, you have to look at it realistically.- Pipes said In an interview last week. "That does not mean I am in favor of nuclear war You would have to be insane (to favor such a war) . , . I am a veriy pacific person I don't even own a gun." Pipes Is partic'ularly,czitical of the notion,-which he says has been sold to Americans by a succession of political leaders of both parties, .that nuclear war bL -unthinkable!* and "unlmag)nab1e - . - "The Idea that the explosion of one nuclear bomb means the end of mankind leads to paralysis." he says. "You have to look at it very coldly, . , . If a physician is confront- ed with a terrible disase, he is not likely. to cure it by tearing his hair out. You want wphysician who Is cool," - A tall, slender man whose dark hair Is in retreat from a high fore- head. Pipes personifies ,cool.Jug- gling an interview and a steady stream of phone calls from well- washers, 'he managed to be gra- cious. pleased and unflustered. Pipes is an expert on 19th cen- tury,Rusalan who has spent 34 of his 57 years at Harvard. first as a graduate student and then as a professor. As he tells it. if the Har- vard history department had been .more flexible, he might not be on his way to Washington now- . After a couple of Mrs, at a small college in Ohio and three years In the Air Force, Pipes came to Harvard Interested In thehistory of art and philosophy. which he wanted to combine somehow with the Russian studies he had begun at Cornell under Air Force aus- pices. "The history department was very strictly set up, then and Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137ROO01000900 IN THE NATIQN a C.I.A. "reassessment of Soviet zriilt= Lary spending, which concluded that-- such. spending had jumped from 6 to 8 - percent of the gross national product eT ]' to it to 13 percent -- or "doubled," as ?l Y Cr American hard-liners liked to put it. The Tea $ m estimate is now gospel i among conservatives of both parties, including Mr. Reagan and his advis. ers; but if they bring as hard an eye to the new gap as Mr. McNamara did to that of 1961, they'll find that what the C-1-A. actually said about the appar= ent Soviet increase in defense spend- ing was as follows: This does not mean that the impact of. defense prod grams on the Soviet no m L~ increased - only that -,_The Reams aan.Administration has a our ap reciati f 071CL APZWN~F_*3 r"4 .r NEW YORK Tz 8 9 JANUARY 1981 new case of an old malady on o this impact has new case o .A dy - military changed. It also implies that Soviet de- s-Secretary:,of Defense-- : fense industries are far less efficient designate Caspar Weinberger testified than formerly believed," I' at his confirmation hearings, the new . Arthur M. Cox, a former State De- l team will come into office believing partment and C.I.A. official, writing in that it must-bridge a strategic gap that the Nov. 6 New York Review of Books, now gives the Soviet Union a distinct interpreted this to mean that the Soviet advantage over the United States- military effort absorbed more- Soviet Twenty years ago the Kennedy Ad- G.N.P. than previously believed not be- minisKratlon took over with much the cause defense spending actually had same view. "just 'as Ronald Reagan - doubled but, because the C.I.A. had campaigned last year on the supposed .: raised its estimate of how much Soviet -.Iead the Russians bad taken in mili- G.N.P. was absorbed by inefficient tary power, so John F. Kennedy made military production. Thus, in January much in 1960 of the "missile gap" he 1980, the C:I_A. reported that Soviet- -and other critics of. the Eisenhower - "defense activities" for 1970679, esti- Eldministration bell eyed to exist. mated in constant dollars, "increased Then as now, . there was official at an average annual rate of 3 per- backing for that notion. The Air Force cent" -' about the same rate at which reported that by-1964 the Russians..- the U.S. and its NATO. partners have would have the ability to produce sevw - raised theirs in the last four years. eral. times the number of interconti- Paul Warnke, the former Carter Ad- nental ballistic missiles that the U.S.- - . ministration arms negotiator, ad- planned. The - House Appropriations ... vanced much the same thesis at a de- -Committee forecast a 3-to-1 Soviet bate sponsored by the Center for De- lead in ICBM's by. the end of 1962.. fense Information in New' York last Once in power;. however, Mr. Kenne- Oct. 15. In rebuttal, Lieut. Gen. Daniel dy's Secretary of Defense, Robert S. ? 0. Graham, retired, 'a member of McNamara,;' discovered that neither - Team B and a former Director of De.. U-2 .- flights nor other intelligence fense intelligence, failed - at least in means ;could- verify any extensive my view - to refute the Cox-Wade number.-- of :t-Soviet -ICBM launching : interpretation. sites- By2-November. .1961; : Hanson- .. - General., Graham insisted that a Baldwin,: the :military'editor' of The. ' _ :.. Soviet defector had confirmed the sup- New York_Tunes,'= could report that posed increase in Moscow's military new1Defense Department estimates- program_- Citing another factor in put SovierICBM strength at 30 to 75, ":`Team B's conclusion, he also sug_ instead of the 206 to 1,000 the -missile -: `gested that the Russians had "poured E?. gappers`bad variously predicted. The 200 times the U.S.-effort into civil de- United States then deployed 180 Atlas .. ---- :fense" in preparation for starting a '`. missiles, and had 18 more ready to go nuclear war. But Secretary of Defense on line; `with=': the second-generation Harold Brown has derided the idea =Minuteman nearing deployment. that civil defense could: save Soviet -.Mr.- Kennedy never officially disa- cities from an American attack, even vowed the missile gap, but he never re- ;.- after a Soviet first strike. Mr. Cox said ferred to it'again,:either. That doesn't the Russians contend their effort is mean, of course;:that-Mr. Weinberger .:' - only a defense against a much- more e and Mr. Reaganr are- infor the same '= _ limited attack by the Chinese. experience, does suggest that = Mr. Weinberger, athis hearing had they might :well.: stays loose, until. ;. the good sense to reject the current fad ? they-ve seen all. ;the;..: e~+idence on -:_,.for fixed-percentage increases in mili- today's reputed gap. The basic ~yspending and to pledge to restudy, source for that gap is the the -- Carter Administration's over- report of "Team: a ; group of .ex--?.. blown basing plan for 200 MX missiles ?-peres on military' and Soviet . ?t J46 '1. V e' 1ia? A 0OOO1-9 _-- ?~~v pruciaimea, as in 1960, better JleYe4. Thjs view washeavily based on _:.j documented then than True - A To JI For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00010009 THE WASHINGTON POST 29 December 1980 ~i'owla .-Evans and Robert Novak I e- ~: a~-' 'v__-e`:-_as . SA The confidential. recommendation to 'President-elect Reagan for "a pause". in new SALT talks, coupled with the possi- bility of defense strategist William. Van Cleave's becoming' Reagan's -arms con- trol negotiator,-points?to-a decisive break. with-.arms control -philosophy that. any: SALT.treaty is a-good SALT treaty.' :The'unpublicizedproposal for Reagan:' to go- slow _in- new superpower nuclear; arms talks-came-10 days ago from.-the .transition team.turned lose on, the Arms. Control: and- Disarmament Agency. Now required ' reading by?Reagan's national security rstrategists,-'the -report.. is de- scribedby_those who have: studied it as' "exactly ~ _~: what==; the ?:= president'elect=' _ wants complete disclosure -_of :..widely: alleged- Soviet violations of' ast agreements and` ir'.,sts that the reb-ilding of U.S.. mill- I tary strength: to provide a margin of -safety" should' precede a? new SALT That happens to'coincide-with.'arms control philosophies . long held by Van. Cleave, the brilliant iconoclast whose un- diplomatic candor has cost him the Rea- gan administration posts he most want- ed:- the second 'or third top Pentagon job- under Defense Secretary Caspar Wein--, berger. ? During': the presidential -cam paign, Van Cleave- was Reagan's princi{ pal adviser on arms control, a policy area intimately known to. the ...University of Southern California prafesssor. = What Weinberger and other top-level Reaganites. have found. abrasive about Van. Cleave- both: during the campaign and more recently-in. the poet-elections transition could be.his greatest'asset as chief -American negotiator 'with stony= faced Opiet' bargain-hunters- in-,. the Kremlin. "Bill as our nuclear'anns `nego-'J --' - Wiz control and national. security tiator," a Reagan insider privately re- strategy ..., a pause in all arms control _ marked, "would be exactly right in send- negotiations" is essential. ing. Moscow the, message that Reagan is 4 If, as. expected, that ` becomes the one president who won't be roiled over president-elect's policy,.the Reagan on SALT.": ministration' would follow an arms. can Van Cleave was a member of the 1971 trol strategy, exactly opposite that of- 72. control negotiating team but re- Jimmy Cdr four years s ago- Carter arter signed befoie_-the .Nixon administration_ h ? C A T IP y VI I accepted and signed SALT I in Moscow - but when he got an agreement 2'/a. years: 'in 1972. But in' testimony before a Sen-1 _ , " , . . Jackson; he-warned that the treaty con- _ ? ..., Neu x,. ,,,, 4_ yuu III L e Senate:. _ tamed weaknesses that might prove dan- Reagan.s transition '.tearri' warns serous in the. future a prophecy that against "unilateral arms reductions" b `has come-all too. true in the past eight the United 'States in hope y : of.enticing years..: Soviet reciprocity. That is a deliberate:.{ w=.:. Van Cleave'also served'on Team B, rem;nd f th Ali ero e cei11Wonderlad .--n the famous arou of outside ex erts a arms control theory of the Carter admin- ointed in 1976 ten- ntral f me i- i;tration during its blinkered days when . ence director rye us as a check-1 Carter claimed the West no longer need- on t LA's own exert assessment'ot have (;;n "inordinate fear" of commu- UlS and Soviet militarystren~th.? ;.;, nism_The report's strongest ??? b axwment Conceivably, Van Cleave, whose repu-. for going slow is that SALT. has become Cation for intellectual honesty. emerged, "a permanent excuse for Western failure] unscathed from his battles with Wein- to come to grips with the Soviet military rg B d th R a i id s might " e er an o er e gan ns er hll dit V Cl , caenge, acumaneave himself l '! , deci a that b in hief t e g c n ro negotiator a challenge not". large, enough for him. Reagan agents sounding: him out on the prospect think he can be won over, mainly with the argument that no one else could have as much symbolic' The shrewd move to confront 'the o viets with the" cold-steel will and deter- mination of Bill- Van Cleav& as chief American SALT -negotiator could help] put arms control, which is clearly an im-i ]' An- equal argument might be found lire tionship, into proper perspective after I0; the strong tone of the ACDA-transition t years of dangerous experimentation. ` - i team's report- to the president-elect and - - Senate critics who would try to slice the fact that it' is having an enthusiastic down Van Cleave would soon learn thii reception by senior Reagan advisers. The fact:.. Reagan wants a new SALT treaty, team. was headed by- .James Malone, but a treaty that is good, not bad or only ACDA's -.general counsel =. during the fair, for the United States..With Van`; Nixon-Ford' administration. ,Its: central Cleave as his negotiator,.-.he would `noe proposal: that until completion " of a `lose any sleep worrying:- ; ~~i "thorn: ph; .interagency-reassessment, . f. Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00010009000.1.-9 Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100090 ,,ltTI CL_ A? 'D 0;3 r AGiL -,._._S~~ecal u-7he NewYarlt Tlmq W_ 5HI TGTON, Dec :7' - President-- elect Ronald - Reagan's transition team. for, the- Central,InteUigence. Agency has proposed several sweeping changes in, the organization. and. operations of -the na- tion 's,intellioence; programs, including, increased _emphasis- on: covert..: action: abroad, according to Mr. Reagan'ssadvis The aides said that "a preliminary re- port on the C.L.A. was completed late., last: week and is to be,subroitted toMr. Rea gan's transition headquarters, tomorrow The panel is headed, by-3. William Mid dendorf: 2d,.,.foriaer, Secretary.-.,of ;,-the ,Navy, whois.presidenttof Financial.Gen-tl :eral.; Bankshares,':.a Washington-based; bank holding company - Tn, calling" for an-enhanced,' .rule-,and increased'finarcing for covert.' activities,., report-. recommends greater attention-:to- counrerintelligence to combat what is. viewed. as a growing. threat of Soviet:espionage-and interna-; Central liernrds System -This could be accomplished, the report is said to suggest, through the, creation of a.central records system that would be- used by both the C-I -a-.:and domestic"law-= .enforcement agencies, including the Fed-1 ? eral Bureau of Iavestigat icn_ Such, a= ,move has been resisted. by Government. officials in the. past= t e-gro and that iti could pose a threarto the civil lberties or American citizens - The report,:Mr. Reag ts.aides added,: NEW YORK TIMES Q DEC DflER 1980 also recommends the establishment of a competitive system of intelligence analy- I sis; intended to provoke wider debate on III sensitive international issues. Under the proposal, the Central Intelligence Agency would be forced to defend its conclusions against those of other intelligence agen- cies, such as the Pentagon's Defense In- telllge ceAgency- . . - " 'According to several aides, these steps could be taken without legislation. But they, added that the proposals, and the transition effort itself, had already prompted deep anxiety and debate within the agencies. Moreover, the wide-ranging debate over the structure of the intelli- gence-bureaus and the quality of intelli- ' ger_ e,-they produce have recently exacer- bated-long-standing tensions on the.Sen- ate Intelligence Committee. Ti;ough Mr. Mittendorf declined to dis- cus_s.th4 report, he said in an interview yt~rday that he favored a more "ag- gressive"' approach to intelligence and tliat..the report's recommendations were ai n d at "increasing the productivity" of the intelligence agencies. William H..Casey, Mr. Reagan's cam- paign director, who is a strong prospect for the post of Director of Central Intelli- gence, is known to hold similar views. However, it is not known whether either Mr--Casey or Mr. Reagan will approve the transition team's recommendations. Tb`a proposals are similar to several contained in a recent report prepared for -seribr Reagan advisers by the Heritage Foundation, a conservative Washington- based: research group. However, the propt:sals touch on a number of complex isstiea that have been debated for years by intelligence officials. ? Among the most sensitive of the proposals is the call for the competing centers of analysis. Many intelligence ex- perts believe that the idea is good in prin- ciple but difficult in practice; as a previ- George Bush, then Director of Central In- telliger_ce and now Vice President-elect, to appraise Soviet military potential and intentions. Trouble in the Agencies The group, known as-Team B, con- cluded that the C.I.A. andother agencies had underestimated the Soviet buildup and that. Moscow was bent on achieving strategic superiority. The effort sharked an acrimonious debate in intelligence cir- cles and upset C.I.A. analysts when re- ports of Team B's conclusions appeared in the press. Reagan aides contend that under its plan, the competing analyses would be provided not by- outsiders but by such other intelligence bureaus as the Defense- Intelligence Agency. While the Reagan aides believe that this approach would, improve the overall quality of American intelligence, C.I.A. officials maintain that the Pentagon intelligence apparatus is not capable of functioning as an effec-. . tive counterweight. Moreover- some intelligence experts contend that competing centers of analy- sis, as once existed, would overempha-J size disagreements among intelligence agencies. The President now receives a consensus view from the Director of Car.- tral Intelligence in so-called National In- teligence Estimates, in which disagree- ments among intelligence bureaus are usually noted only in footnotes. , -? ALongstandingDebate .--.: -- The report's recommendation that a "central file" be established to enhance f coordination of counter-intelligence ac- tivities is, likely to be opposed by civil growing debate over the push for a larger liberties groups. The file would contain data collected on the activities of sus- pected foreign agents, including, their dealings with Americans. Such groups as the American Civil Liberties Union have maintained that this information could- violate citizens' privacy rights- - - Finally, there has for years been a ' Reorganize Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100090001-9 I Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R0001 A ITICLE kFFEA"i2D G rAG3' _ N ZW YORK TIMES 7 DECEM3ER 1930 ~~ ~ went missiles in Cuba, which ended when the Russians, confronted with Su- I Buildup perior American power, agreed to with: marked a turn in the Soviet-American ajo ssu - eaga ai~mscompetition. Although the United States was build- T .... ?` ing up at a faster rate in the early 1960:s, By RICHART BURT ? ..,G .....~........ r .. D_. _ RT BU initiative. Intelligence specialists believe ` SpecW to TM twee.... , ;: = that, after the 1962 crisis and the ouster of WASHINGTON, Dec 6 -The steady Four years ago a debate was stirred inl Nikita S. Mnrushchev from power in 1964, g}?'owth of Soviet military power, a matter America,, intelligence circles after a Moscow's leaders vowed ahat never again . ofprime concern to-the incoming admin- would the Shout Union allow itself to be stration of President-elect Ronald Rea- group of academic specialists was asked humiliated by the United States. ga.ii; bas emerged as one of the most trou- by George Bush, then Director of Central Consequently, during Leonid I. Brezh- _i -bang problems facing the United States Intelligence and now Vice President- nev's tenure, the Soviet military budget I 'ahd its western allies-. elect,- to appraise Soviet military poten- is estimated to have grown by 3 or 4 per- ` N.llos West military buildup, in the view teal and intentions. The group, known as., cent annually-in the late 1960's and in the of some American specialists, could sig- Team B, concluded that the C.I.A. and 1970's_ other agencies had underestimated the , :toting this growth, William R. Perry, Its Power and Limits First of three articles cialists such as Richard E: Pipes, a Har- and who directed the Team B effort, int political domination-In the view of others point fl of insecurity deeply to Moscow's buildup to assert.that it bar- e . it_re ects?a.sens rooted in Russian history. burs aggressive designs..: .. Also not easily answered is the question, : Other : specialists; including Arthur shish country is the more powerful: the ;Macy .Cox, a former State Department Soviet Union, with 3,658,000 in the armed and C.I.A. analyst, contend that there is a services, based on conscription for two or danger of exaggerating the Soviet build- three years and an obligation in the re- up. Theyassert that Moscow, from its Serves to the age of 50; or the United point. of view, faces threats from nearly States, with its force= of 2,050,004 volim- every direction and feels it must rely on- tears. militarypower: =? An Issue-01 National Concern As much as a fifth of the Soviet military budget, it is estimated, is directed not In the area otnuclear weapons there is against the West but against China. And agreement than the Soviet Union has at- -Soviet forces in Europe have another pe- tained "strategic parity" with the United ripheral.- function: keeping, the Eastern States: European allies in line. Ira.: conventional forces,the- Soviet .:- Most of the Soviet units. added to the Union is ahead in numbers- of weapons. area since 1987 were sent in during the and troops. But this superiority is viewed Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia as- offset by American?:-.achnolog:cal su- in 1968. Soviet forces in Eastern Europe premacy. The Soviet Union is trying to. would also be likely to participate in any catch up and in such- categories as intervention in Poland that the Soviet ground-combat said to have .Union might decide to make. ':. ,. surpassed theUnitedstatesz -. Moscow's nuclear. potential ? is can- As the Presidential election campaign strained, in some respects, by Soviet- illustrated, the debate over Soviet' mili _ American arms agreements. : - tary power has become an issue of na- The 1972 treaty on antiballistic missiles tiorl concern. puts limits these defensive systems, and bath sides appear willing to continue to In part the focus on Moscow's military... ccuiply with the 1972 interim accord on riigat reflecs concern in the Pentagon long-range offensive missiles, which set and in Congress over the status of the existing arms totals- as ceilings: 2,358 for. American military. with some asserting the Soviet Union and 1,710 for the United that American forces have declined in. States.'That accord did not cover long- size, quality andseeamness. range bombers. Floarever the Soviet Union's.-buildup The Reagan Administration, iRepubli- lenged by air.' Cox and Franklyn D. Holz-' man, an economist at the Harvard Rus, sian Reeear'cla Center.. They contend that the C.I.A.'s practice of calculating the sir.7t of the So;-et military budget it the- ea~-lent dollars it would cost the United. States exaggerates the cost of m ;npower, which is paid less in the, Soviet Union. Mr. Holzman and other experts agree' that, with an economy 60 percent that of the United States,'"the Soviet Union now spends at least as much for the armed forces as the United States, or the equiva- lent of $165 billion a year. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown said early this year that the balance be- twtt the United States and the Soviet! Union should not be viewed in isolation but rather in the context of the respective allied military efforts. . : ..` , - .According to Pentagon experts, the , in Western Europe spent 376 billion. for defense 'east year compared with. $20 billion by the East Europeans. The Inter- 'national institute for Strategic Studies. s i that the Atlantic alliance's total. sp-ending thus slightly exceeds that of the. Warsaw Pact.:. .At the same time, the: institute con- tends that the Soviet bloc spends its mili- tary funds more efficiently because. it uses standardized Soviet equipment.: :- Interviews Interviews with American intelligence aides, defense officials and academic specialists indicate that Moscow has in- creased its power in-nearly every mili- tarysector..,: ~= rOZD Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100090001-9 Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100090001-9 AF.TiCLE A= oz. ____ THE WASHINGTON POST 25 October 1980 use of force against the domestic op- I position, although the White House., First of rx series By Scott Armstrong ." %V,13hfngWn P0,68*f1 Writer During the revolutionary turmoil. ?:that pulled down the shah bf Iran; President Carter clung to the belief .though the shah, himself had lost -{ faith in his own power, a five-mortli investigation by. The Washington Post' has found: Two months before the shah fled. =to exile, when Iran was aflame with.' protest,: the president's national se- curity adviser personallY telephoned the Iranian ruler, targirg him to use military force to smother the e~ lution. -A few' weeks later, the president was advised to abandon the shah by,-.: is aAt ,outside foreign policy expert,? whom he called in for counsel. Tell .- r the shah to take a long vacation, the president was told, and begin preparing for a new government in Iran. The president said he couldn't; do that to an important allied leader:, and wouldn't. : =? Indeed, in that same period, State Department sources say they. worked,,, to soften the 'draft of a message from'.'. Carter to the shah, urging again the;; insists that no. such message was ev- er sent Secretary- of State Cyrus B. Vance and his top aides feared such a message would lead only to con- siderehle bloodshed .arid po,"ibly civil war, : turrrioil that could only worsen America's position in the future of Jr- The president field, to his hope,; .even when : most. of his top foreign policy advisers were:,urging him to.:. ease the shah off his throne.and be- in the transition to.whatever iolit- -In:'I ,orces--would follow in. power. once one., of the_ shah's c ,hest.supporters,' abled his ei~~ n~on to-?Washinoton.The presi-: en attitude, he_;said,.;was "short~ arid- did'not unclerstand:NvI;ere. IN- 77 in -ariy.Case he-I 3nontn later, sr~Svas gases=`:permanently?eled the-American president was su _ r- ; f rani el'= -on x~d~dr~_by'conf[ictiriR ~- e .+,he;,.Peacock-- throne',-c'o'uld 9 r dne'person, ironically, who blew r certainty -that ` -the - shaixwas ~c ai was Mohammed Reza-Pahlavi 91e. shah, notwiF.hstaiidinohis rep-. "tuna: as'? a "bloodthirsty tyrant;: di ele enth-hour, :advice from; w+o`agtrators and opposition ? leaders.I lie, was convinced : in his own` mind -that force could not prevail -for long. He lizew that he was slowly dying of cancer and-was an_'dous?to leave hehind' a stable nation that his young son could- xWe Finally, confused by conflicting signals . from ? the.,-United, -States and ; pressured by European leaders to ab-'71 dicate; the shah in his last- month in r moved- to- accommodate they m ocierate opposition, to live 'with some: :digit and relinquish some of his vast; ?cxised of abandoning the-shah prema- tnxely. In fact, Carter still hoped to pre- , serve the shah's paver., long after in- telligence reports and tap foreign policy. advisers insisted, as a zdatter of realism, .the United States- xnua:-assist- the or derly; transition to whatever political, forces, were going to'displace the pea- .cock throne This much is cert2iii: The fall of-the' shah involved a bitter though collegial contest- among the presidents key- ad- visers, contending for control over- fo.r- etgga .policy and veering back and forth-- in their- prognoses for-events, staiemat-'-, ing policy with their disaggreem_ents. Zbigniew Brzedin3ld,-the president's' national security adviser,- appears in-,' -transigen't in this account, stoutly re- sisting the "unthn>kable" outcome that - ..:lay ahead, demanding the toughest pot-' icy line and ultimately: prevailirg over-. .others who saw the'future more clearly. Vance, preoccupied .with other mat- ters,. arms talks witd'the' Soviet Union !or the F,gyptian: Israelipeace talks, was .strangely inattentive, to.tha-alarm bells:: within his own department until it wa..s: Ibo late to make a difference- v ?i end the U.S. intelli7erce comet .ip ,arise` aain,'. seems ; y_.'oezt-0ac6s, ,Ji perceiving the realities of- di~coistent ; within 'ari a; alLnation Sornein governmentdid'see the picture it x - 'clearly,. but :.their. perceptions siii ply did not'get:tlz ugh to- rile Ares=' ident and his. policymakers,`.especially= if =their distasteful--warnings -collided? - ivitl the establ hed.-official Still, this is not just-diplomatic`his 'tomi'_ The events. in `Vasbington"and 'Tehran that presaged the triumph: of lution remain with'us Tom all- tha ved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R0001000 ARTICLE ~ NEW Y(PV TXt-" OT FAGS 20 0CT0BED 1980 Why. the U.&; Since I Has -been, m1sper1celvinb VH t .1 tren 0 'M"litary, S` By Arthur Macy Cox WASHINGTON-A few weeks before?the inauguration of President Carter in January 1977;. the dramatic condo-' sions of a new Central Intelligence Agency estimate were leaked to the news media- The study reportedly found that the Soviet Union was moving rapidly to achieve military su- periority over its adversaries and was acquiring.a combina- tion of strategic offensive and. defensive forces that would permit it to fight and win a limited nuclear war. The so- called Team B report has had dramatic-and continuing im- pact on the defense debate in the United States, especially in the Congress- But the Team B findings, though never ad- equately challenged by the Carter Administration, are based on misinterpretation of the facts.. Team B was made up of 10 military experts, all hard- liners, who were asked by George Bush, the Director of Cen- tral Intelligence at that time,. to make an independent as- sessment of Soviet military strength. Though none of them were members of the C:I.A. professional staff; Mr. Bush nevertheless adopted their analysis as the official. C.I.A. estimate, rather than that of Team A.. the regular C.I.A. staff analysts. According -to Lieut. Gen. Daniel 0. Graham, one of the members of Team B, there were three major fac- tors that influenced the Team B re-evaluation: A.differ ence in the strategic doctrines of the United States and Soviet Union; a new C.I.A. estimate of Soviet defense spending civil defense is primarily for the purpose of providing some protection in the event of war with China. .. Undoubtedly the greatest impact on public opinion.. came from the Team B assertion that the Soviet Union has doubled its defense spending. Most members of Congress believe this today. So, it seems, do most editorial writers. The C.I.A.'s revision has become part of the conventional.::. wisdom of defense policy.. Richard M. Nixon in his new book "The Real War".. writes; "In 1976 the CIA estimates of Russian military spending for 1970-1973 were doubled overnight as errors were discovered and corrected... -Thanks in part to this in- telligence blunder we will find ourselves looking down the ?i nuclear barrel in the mid-1980s." But Mr- Nixon Team B , ,. the Congress, and the news media have been rnis informed.. The true meaning of the C.I.A. report has been missed. Here is, the C.I.A.'s explanation for its change of estimate: as published in its 1978 report: "The new estimate of the :^??rire.. of defense in the Soviet [gross national product] is almost twice as high as the 6 to 8 percent. previously estimated. This does not mean that the impact of defense programs on the Soviet economy has increased - only that our appreciation of this impact has changed. It also implies that Soviet de- that concluded that the percentage of the Soviet Union's fgnse industries are far less efficient. than formerly be lieved"(Italics aremine-)_ So while the C.I.A. increased its estimate of the percent- age of Soviet gross national product spent on defense from The C C.I.A. As B report has 6-to-S percent to 11-to-13 percent, there bad in fact been no -1 doubling of the rate of actual defense spending- C.I.A. ana- had. a _ dramatic and continuing. lysts had been crediting the Soviet Union with a degree of in- dustrial efficiency that was close to that of the United States. i riac t' on debate for veirs : _ What they discovered was that Soviet defense production, in fact, was not efficient. Thus, the Soviet defense effort was ab- sorbing a greater share of the gross national product than gross national product absorbed by defense had jumped from 6-to-8 percent to 11-to-13 percent; and the discovery of `a very important Soviet civil defense effort. Team B as-, serted that the civil defense program meant that the Rus- sians were preparing a capacity to survive an American counterstrike 4--- On civil defense, at least, the Carter Administration has rejected the conclusions of Team B. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown said last Aug. 17: '~ I don't think massive civil defense programs are going for succeed in protecting the population of countries that try it. I think that the Soviet civil defense program, although it probably is 10 times as big as ours, would not, in my judgment prevent Soviet indus- try or a great fraction of the Soviet population from being destroyed in an all-out thermonuclear war::. In a limited [nuclear] war It you target cities they're not going to be saved by civil defense " ? ? ? "t previously believed. What should have been cause for jubila-. tion became the inspiration for misguided alarm. In fact, there have been no dramatic increases in Soviet defense spending during the entire. decade.. In its official The Soviet Union itself acknowledges that civil defense) measures would provide little protection against the United Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100090001-9 -oved For Releas ,QO,Aq /3 :, -RDP90-01137R0001 22 SEA`-1i R 1980 } q NI gonction are plaguing the strate- pT gic Mrly warning and communication L fl S system. In t ,#o instances over the last ! Rrompt a 107 i nand in Chey,:nne biourtain, Colo_,1ave ,tr ` 10"' al which to ssi'iedes and b43- ens were made By RICHARD BURT Specal tothsN wY'r'.c Ttu ready for take-off_ Congre ai.,nal audi- tors meanwhile, reported eerier. this } year that a new generation of c4u~puters for the military's worldwide command C_ 1_ States military, long used to having a ire becoming increasingly vulnerable- .il handle the demands created by a major! '} military crisis. The existing system; i - tima. Mr- -Brown said last clear edge over the soviet Union in nu- ~~ -? - a Clear r?iight, is being forced to adjust to a? month, the Soviet Union might now be 1 moreover, is considered vulnerable and new era in which the American strategic ble to destroy all 1,053 of the Air Force's inadequate- arsenal is becoming -outdated and ever and-based missiles in their underground -Capacity to Retaliate Fiore vulnerable..;: II In recent statements, President-Car- ;ter, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and other senior officials have asserted ghat, in the area of nuclear weaponry, the United States is still "second to none." At the sane time, however. Mr. Brown -and his too aides have started to contend that if present trends in the nuclear balance continua, the United States, by the mid- 1990's, could find itself vulnerable to nu- clearblackmailbyMoscow. _ - Mn Brown, for example, told a group last month at the United. States Naval Defense. Is the U.S. Prepared? Second of seven articles. Under Secretary of Defense for research meant the United States was in danger of Armed losing its capacity to retaliate after a told a House. eerin i d , g, eng n an Services.. subcommittee that Soviet- ! Soviet nuclear attac't_ They said, mare- bomber defenses wen e rapidly imp.rovind over, that intelligence reports indicated and that over the next 10 years Moscow I that American nuclear forces, as a whole, ! were still superior to the Soviet atter.? could find a means of detecting and de- terms of readiness and relibi'.it-;, a stroying.the Navy's 41 missile carrying though Soviet forces were considered submarines. more powerful. - 9Components of the nation's nuclear In addition, they said that Mr. Carter arsenal are wearing out. The mainstay of had approved numerous programs over the Air Force's nuclear bomber forces, the last three years meant to remedy the the B-52, is about 20 years old, and offi- emerging nuclear deficiencies. Although cialsreportthat theplanes stifferfrom an in 1977 the President canceled the B-1 increase in expensive maintenance prob- bomber, which was proposed as a re- lerhs_ The service's 53 Titan 2.-missiles. placement for the B-52 force, officials said that Mr_ Carter's decision to equip f or also been in place meanwhile the older bombers with air-launched two , decades have and have recently been cruise missiles in the next.Iew years plagued by a series of well-publicized ac- would guarantee the Air Force's ability cidents The problems besetting the Titan . to penetrate Soviet air defenses through 2 were vividly demonstrated in Damas- ' the 1950's. - ? ? - cus,-Ark., last week when a fuel. tank of The 1,600-mile sane missiles, which one of the missiles, punctured by a falling fly at treetop altitudes; would permit I socket wrench, exploded and sent a cloud B-52's to "stand off" from Soviet air de- of toxic chemicals in t9 the air. i fences, a less demanding role that offi i ' 1 bel'eve will save wear and tear on a s War College in Newport, R.I., that, with- cut improvements to the ballistic rnis silts anal heavy bombers that make up l the country's deterrent force, Washing- ton could face "at best a perception of in? feriority, at worst areal possibility of nu- clearcoercion." . - the~~ manufacturing nuclear weapons are said Throughout the 1950's and 60's , United States led . the Soviet Union i to be in bad: repair. A confidential report nearly every measure of strategic power prepared recently for flue Department of including numbers of missiles and bon Energy, the agency assigned the task of ers, warhead totals and overall weapo producing nuclear, warheads,` concluded performance- But Moscow; spending that "serious deterioration of equipment much as three times more than Washing- and utilities has occurred over-the past n on nuclear forces during the 1970's is several years which could seriously im- t o generally seen as having attained who pair our ability to meet the nuclear weap- 1analysts call "rough parity".in strategic ohs. [requirernentsl forecast 'for the e Pentagon; sides said that power `1's." AtLi -In a national intelligence estimate pre- :over the last 15 Years, several vired by the _entra i ntel iT epee A enc went-plants producing critical materials Administration officials maintain that,, anew version of the Army s lance tacti- Carter Washington has begun cat'missile bad slowed by.18 months be- under Mr in nearly every measure o nuclear caps- delays in weapons p g - i itv by 1995. cial, for example, said the deployment of ea 7r y us tyear, it was estimated that -and components for nuclear warheads oscow cou surpass the nit to es had been- shut, producing significant. - ro rains- One offi- . to counter Moscow's - growing missile cause of a shortage of plutonium for the- power. Nevertheless, military specialists system'swarbead. acknowledge that several serious prob- . ridified in the next few years, includin 19 The Government's facilities _ for 1 'et I } theagingbombers_ - - these:- 'A r d.For ten iAse 2006/01/30 ? CIA-RDP90-01.137R000100090001-9 1 Farther in the future; Secretary Brown and other senior Pentagon aida_s are ex- cited about the prospects for deploying a Stealth bomber, which would be nearly ~'jnvisible to Soviet radar.. At sea, the Navy this year deployed the first of a new class of Trident missile sub- marines that will gradually replace the 10 ' Polaris vessels built in the 1960's. Each of 71 the new submarines will carry 24 Trident 1 missiles, a 4,600-mile-range missile that I ..? 4American-missing an-dMmber ogees Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-0113 - WORLD PRESS / By ALAN BERGER. papers were describing congressional efforts to pass tough new laws protect- ;- ing-the CIA. a front-page article in the -London Sunday Times implicated the -agency in shady dealings reminiscent of the disclosures made five years ago in: -the Senate's, Church committee hearings on intelligence activities. The Sunday Times article-,was-an investigative. report looking into"a se- ries of mysterious disappearances and, violent ' deaths around the world." Heroin traffickers and couriers as well as :bank- officers-and CIA-. personnel? -.--have- been among the "dozen or so" people who disappeared mysteriously or died violently. "Police on four con- tinents are trying to find the exact. link between these .deaths, .the CIA `-and the collapse of a. Sydney'(Austra- '=1ial-based bank, Nugan Hand Interna- tional. ' the Times reported=-. Saying;' the story-.has.-a..plotwar-' -thy of John Le Carne," the Times'-'in--- :._:vestigative team, offered-these "initial ",conclusions' from-its inquiriesc a "Nugan Hand, .which. boasted fices or.- representatives in a dozen $1 billion, was a banker far the heroin a "And evtdence'that 'the bktddi: an was nurure. -n may evez; have been set up, by the CIA.".; One strand of the intricate "Nugan .'Hand affair" begins in Australia with' - -_a Melbourne-.coroner's., Inquest -into the murder of a young couple, the Wit-. sons, whose bodies-.-we re dug up re- Gently from shallow graves near "a ? surfing beach.. The Wilsons, who were . -both . shot In the head. ' had s. been ? alleged heroin trafficker who 'Import- -".pd 48 kilograms of heroin worth-$2 BOSTON GLOBE 7 September 1980 Before their death,?the Wilson: told Australian police everything knew about Clark's -heroin o! tions., Subsequently,. two. senior, :cials of Australia's Federal Narc Bureau who were in the pay of nd d hi t f th a a e m apes o e ikons resentative' who had served with the.; .making their statements." Clark has I OSS (a forerunner of the CIA) and long since disappeared, but, according i been a commander in Vietnam. Nu to the Times, "Melborne's coroner a-, Hand's . T..:_....n n:g,_. n .said tie was in no'doubt that Clarkl services?manager for Civil Air TransP -I hired hit men to kill the Wilsons." port, another. CIA-owned- company. Official investigations of those re- cords that survived the collapse of the y Nugan Hand bank revealed that Nu-1 . the failed attempt to rescue. the Ameri gan Hand had been "banker to bi,g 1 can hostages in Iran." ly.the senior-and most sinister traf- ficker was Terrence Clark.- -On Jan. 27 of this year. Frank Nu- gan cofounder of Nugan Hand, -"was .. found shot dead in hia Mercedes-Benz sedan on a lonely road, in the Blue .Mountains, 100 mites- west of Sydney." After Nugan's ? death, his American partner, Mike Hand., .phoned the bank's, :business associ- ates and told them,, according to the Times account: "You're 'not going to believe this, but` it looks like. Frank .ripped off a stack of money." -=Then;. after calling in. a liquidator and "blaming his former partner for everything that had :gone wrong, ::.Hand: disappeared.": In. his : wake he ?' left. -what the Times described as , "chaos.---Records were missing,' and there were debts totaling,$50 million. Buf.most puzzling of all to the Times. -And the Manila's - 'consultant' was Gen.-Ray Manors, a Vietnam veteran. who Is now helping the CIA to anal ze Another;- associate of -the :bank mentioned in-'the Times- investigation was Walt McDonald, an economist j who was a CIA "consultant" for 25 years and a close friend of John Ar- thur Paisley. the CIA's deputy head of the Office-of the.Office ?of strategic! Research. "whose bloated body,was! fished out of Chesapeake Bay, NId..' in'1 1978" with '40 pounds - of diving` weights -strapped to his waist and a".1 buillet hole behind the left ear." Spec-.. ulatively; the Teams raised the possi- bility of 'a link from the Nugan Hand.. affair to=- Paisley: that -would:-run- throw h McDonald., - -A less-speculative link was to for mer.'CIA. director William.-'Colby.:. whose visiting card was found on thL dead body f Frank Nugan: Colby tole- { the Times he "was simply Nugan's U$ tt! legal advisor., "There was-no connect was that ."almost no creditors have ton betwee Mr. Nugan and my Intel n publicly-emerged to=stake.. their+ ligence background, he said. _ :'.. claims: Why? a :-The Times' explanation was-"that Nugan s Hand's chief client was the' .CIA:;and that the bank was set up to move-. covert funds into ? Southeast ? w uw a ua~~; :.ninemonths.'!~RM iPi M j.3e 2006/01/30 :CIA, RDP90-01137R000100090001-9 -.:Australian cL y of Victoria. AF ? -r Cs, A pakE `~ - n AG_ %&_L_ BOSTON GLOBE 3 August 1980 7, n Directed-energy w e a p o n s are de~ ' t?ojecr r ora is, omy pars of witKt a arentl is a large Soviet -bearn By John Bierman vices that can send concentrated de-, pp Y at weapon effort. For- .what the, il of u m es sands o Th Glb structive beams tho Special teoe bet ei US Air Force once believed was a Tese are - :,WASHINGTON. - Much of the tremendous Velocft]es,-. American intelligence.. community ther.high-energy, lasers, which travel clear underground teat site at So' rfpa seems convinced the Soviet-Union is , -at the speed of light, and destroy or d]s- ?.latinsk.- '.'Semi-F." as, it is ars t n to US intelligence - now al;pears to be. on the brink. of developing a range of.. able their targets?by heat: or particle mother experimental site for beam directed energy weapons -the "death beams, which travel slightly slower: weaponry. Like Saryshagan, Semi-P is rays" of old-fashioned science fiction- Particle beams are like controlled and in the desolate Kazakhstan Republic- Meanwhile the Pentagon I& be lat directed bolts-,of .lightning, which Another facility, at Krasnaya edly accelerating its own program in achieve their destructive effect by Pahkra, about 30 miles south'of Nlos an attempt to catch up: punching a hole in .their target. cow. is put in the "gee whiz" category Unlike the strategic. nuclear %veap- _ by US intelligence, because of the cali- I For sometime. the central Intelli- they could render obsolete, her of work apparently going on i n n. a gene Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelli- ons, which the beam weapons would not wreak mass underground cavern. Here the Soviets' gence- Agency and Air Force lntelli destruction. Instead, their .effect. , ... have report ~edl} developed the i;rorrnd- genre have been at odds over just how would be precise and concentrated, i based laser, which may be able to put far advanced the Soviets:'are?.in this revolutionary branch'of weaponry. According to -Aviation- Weekly: in formation collected and analyzed dur- ing the past. few months indicates the Soviets now -,.have an operational, land-based laser,-weapon : capable of. putting low-orbiting US'spy satellites out of action.-And;: according to the' authoritative technical weekly. they also have an even more awesome par- ticle-beam?device in, the preprototype stage. , Until. - recently. Air-. Force-. Intelli- gence was unable to convince the rest of the intelligence. community.-- and consequently the US government.:-. thatthe Soviets were forging ahead in this crucialm branch of-weapons, tech- nology; which the US has been ursu- ing: at what a, senior Pentagon. scien-. tist concedes is "an academic pace.,'-... Maj.-Gen. George F Keegan, head:-, of Air Force Intelligence:: resigned In. 1977 in protest when the'Administra- tion did not heed his warnings. Now he feels vindicated, and many inside the Pentagon, agree: Interviewed at his=`borne near Washington this weekennd; `}(eegan . said;-!-.-'It gives me little ` pleasure to have been proven rlght:5_,,-~:,.? ':"The'development'of beam .weap- ons is even more momentous than the,, development' of the atomic ,bomb. Its Iriiplfcations for the=security-..of the frelt world. in this decade;. are so awe- to be military, not civilian., satellites, Big Bird and li14l1 For example, beam weapons- ci- ? The widely-respected Aviation ther earth-based or. mounted on space Week also reports that US analysts stations - could destroy or disable en- believe the Soviets are close to perfect- emy recon na issance satellites. Opera t ing a multishot, land-based laser that ing from space, they could intercept - could hit US satellites 3000 miles in and -destroy enemy, intercontinental the air, while a longer-range program missiles within seconds of launching. would threaten .early warning The first superpower to make such .rlites orbiting at 25,000 miles, weapons systems operational would Meanwhile, US intelligence has in- therefore be able to blind its opponent', formation the Soviets are developing by taking out the "eyes of its spy sat= ': an 11-ton space sta. tion- that- could -! ellites, and neutralize its armory of ? take such weapons aloft within` this strategic missiles. Hence Keegan's: decade. Operating from space, they somewhat apocalyptic view of their ' would be immune to the problems significance. caused-. by._.the.. earth's atmospheric.... According to Aviation Week,...t.he, conditions. most ominous recent evidence of Sovi Aviation `Week's -military editor :,l et progress in this, field has been. pro Clarence Robinson, cites as additional l vided by a soy satellite that.spotted a? evidence-of Russian superiority in huge laser or particle beam device at a;. particle-beam weapon research the Soviet ballistic nissile,Sarysha-' fact that three out of four accelerators -gan, near the-Rsso-Chinese,.border. -being tested in the US.are based on. Constructfon'at'the site reportedly . Soviet designs.... began last November,: and Air Force Politics has been a major factor in _1 Intelligence estimates-: about it began the US failure to move ahead as quick to appear within three .months- Avi- ly as the Russians on beam weapons t ation Week quotes one-intelligence an- alyst as saying "There.: is. no doubt-: that they are,bullding something _at' that location and no doubt that it is an energy-directed weapon. The differences of opinion are-only over. what kind of beam weapon it" US intelligence has reportedly giv- en the Saryshagan? project the code- name "ToraThe guiding scientific act/deYr-icIA'4b V I 7t ,Let RIX ' ncal comprehension of thisggvernmet ~ ii1'mriat lrariers'of the?free world: '.' - chatov Atomic Energy Institutd in Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000 Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00010 ARTIC] E APPEMU'~D Sv4~'- ON PAG' _~ NV1itI 1UI' ViCC1\ a OF r"," I 28 July 1980 Technical Survey Soviets Bui I Washington-Directed-energy weapon that could be the first step in a revolution- ary concept of warfare is being con- structed by the-Soviet Union at Sarysha- gan, a ballistic missile range near the Sino-Soviet border in Southern Russia, according to high-level U. S. officials. Many U. S. intelligence analysts believe the weapon is an early prototype of a new-design charged-particle beam device, ir~ctedEnergy Construction at the site began last November, according to U. S. officials, and Air Force intelligence estimates began to appear in February with briefings to I high-level officials of the Carter Adminis- tration by late spring. USAF officials have been briefing other service intelligence agencies on the Tora project and Air Force officers are hoping for agreement on a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). U. S. officials are closely watching the Saryshagan installation, and the high reso- lution from the U. S. KH-1 I reconnais- sance satellite has convinced a number of experts knowledgeable on Soviet charged- particle beam physics that the device is a design with the imprint of Soviet physicist A. I. Pavlovski. His work at the Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute in Moscow is evident in the betatron and in the use of explosively powered generators, U. S. offi- cials explained. Pavlovski has achieved fame and has been named to the Soviet Academy of Sciences for his work with pulsed power systems. He has- been instrumental in developing high-power compact genera- tors for use with air-cored betatron accel- erators, and the U. S. has many drawings and photographs of the -generators. and accelerators from Soviet scientific litera- ture along with the physics computations- "The power supply for charged-particle accelerators, operating in the single pulse regime, usually is effected from condens- ers of inductive storage devices of electri- cal energy," according to Pavlovski and several of his associates. "More frequent- ly, condenser banks are used, whose power capacity often reaches tens and hundreds of kilojoules and have, a mass of many tons. These power supply sources can be used mainly under steady state conditions. At the same time, there are problems that require the use of transportable accelera- tor facilities. Because of this, a power supply system has been considered for high-powered, pulsed air-cored beta_tr_ns- from magnetocumulative generators with a specific power capacity that is greater by a factor of thousands or tens of thousands than condenser devices. The generation of powerful electrical pulses iii the generators is achieved by the efficient conversion of the, chemical energy of explosives into electromagnetic energy by means of com- pression of a magnetic field by conductors 6t78 1y0er ,T-art] b'fOTT3U$ and that it may be used within a year or so in tests against ballistic missile targets. If successful, it could open a whole new era of warfare in which beams of energy are used to engage and destroy targets- Directed-energy weapons, according to top-level Defense Dept_ officials, could bring about a radical change in the bal- ance of power in the world. There is general agreement among some U. S_ intelligence agencies that the device at the range located in Kazakhstan is a directed-energy weapon-a generic term encompassing both particle-beam and high-energy laser weapons- The device being constructed at Saryshagan is code named Tora. "The argument that once existed between. Air Force, Defense and Central Intelligence agencies over whether the Soviets are involved in developing charged-particle beam weapons and their rate of progress is no longer valid," one Pentagon official said. "If we were looking for a smoking pistol two years ago, we've got one now," one U. S_ beam weapons expert said. "Particle beams as weapons are real, and we can see the Russian machine taking shape from overhead stuff," a reference to photo- graphic reconnaissance satellites. There still are some differences of opin- ion among U. S. analysts and physicists on the facility being constructed at Sarysha- gan. Some of the officials believe it could be a pulsed-iodine, exploding flash wire pumped, high-energy laser. The predomi- nant opinion, however, is that the device is an electron-beam, air-cored betatron ac- celerator using a series of magneto explo- sive generators to produce the high power -pulse necessary to accelerate the beam. "There is no doubt they are building something at that location,-and no argu- ment. that it is a Russian' directed-energy - weapon," one analyst said. "The differ- ences of opinion are only over what kind A. a beam weapon it might be." - - Approved For Release When Pavlovski talks about the mobili-1 ty of the system to power a betatron accelerator at the power levels he hints at, according to U. S. experts, he is making a thinly veiled reference to a weapons appli- cation. - From the U_ S. reconnaissance photo- graphs, Defense Dept. officials said, there can be little doubt that there are rows of magneto explosive generators all lined up behind required shielding. Wires lead: from them to an intermediate location, and from there to an electron injector and to accelerating modules of. the betatron-. What seems to be confusing the issue over. whether it is a particle-beam or high- energy laser is recent information from the' Soviet Union through a variety of intelli- gence methods on development of a pulsed iodine laser.. - - - -"There is no monolithic service position, no clean and convincing particle-beam position," one physicist said-, "based on thel somewhat equivocal information. We have excellent photographs of the outside of they machine, but none of the inner workings of the accelerator. What is convincing is that there are Pavlovski generators powering the long, cylindrical device which certainly resembles a betatron accelerator. "Soviet scientists emphasize pulsed pumping-of iodine lasers and that confuses the issue. But you don *t need a long path of that kind for a high-energy laser weap-' on. It would tend to be a stubby, compact design, not a long, thin' accelerator-like machine." - In an effort to determine if the Soviets are making a scientific breakthrough inI laser weapons with a short wavelength iodine laser at Saryshagan, the Air Force has contracted with the Los Alamos scien- tific laboratory to build and test an iodine pulsed laser along the lines of the device at the range. I - "It really doesn't matter much whether it's a particle-beam or a laser weapon,"I one U. S. official said. "What's important to remember is that it has an awesomei supply of energy from explosive genera- tors, and it has a movable nozzle to aim and control a beam. There is little doubt from the location that the Soviets intend to test it in the atmosphere against dynam- ic targets."- The Soviet Union has a large-scale high-energy laser weapons development I program and a massive charged-particle beam effort, according to U. S. intelli? 100 ee#1ro9tes. The Soviets already have an operational carbon dioxide gas dynamic laser weapon pumped by an electron beam. S_ analysts are eYnrrcdna r-nn- 1 Approved For Release 2006/01/30 :.CIA-RDP90-01.137R00 ___WRTICLE APPRA-RED ON PAG COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REVIYr; JULY/AUGUST 1980 Between Vietnam and Afghanistan, the press forgot a lesson: beware of Pentagon sources. Recent national security coverage reveals a militant press-and few conscientious objectors by ROGER MORRIS eorge Kennan called it the greatest "militari- zation of thought and discourse" since World War II. With the embassy hostages languish- ing in Teheran and Soviet troops crossing the Afghan border American opinion this winter bristled with a strident, frustrated chauvinism-and, from sea to shining sea, American journalism bristled with it. In part, the coverage of events may have only mir- rored the national mood or heated political rhetoric, but much of the season's combativeness clearly be- longed to the slant and conventions of the news media themselves. "The Chill Of A New Cold War," "Back to Maps ,and Raw Power," headlined Newsweek and Time, respectively, over January stories that thorough- ly justified their titles. Writing from what he called "a sense of black despair," syndicated columnist Joseph Kraft joined a widespread and sometimes bitter edito- rial attack\on what was seen as misguided restraint in Washington. The Carter administration had shown "no stomach for striking a deterrent posture," Kraft complained in an early February column, and "has not yet faced up to its responsibility as a superpower." For'most of the media, the meaning of the Iranian and Afghan crises seemed plain enough: ? the. United Roger Morris, who has often written on foreign affairs for the Review, is a contributing editor of The New Republic. James Matthew Lyons helped to research this article. . STAT States had become ominously weak, and its Soviet en- emy defiantly, perhaps decisively, stronger. "A wide spectrum of military leaders," The fashington Post somberly reported on January 3, a few days after the Soviet occupation of Kabul, hoped that recent events might at least have "a shock value that could prove, beneficial." These crises should underscore U.S. mili- tary needs, said the unnamed leaders, and. "help cure the Vietnam `never-again' hangover of the American public-" Of the urgency of those "needs" there appeared lit- tle doubt. The New York Times's venerable military correspondent, Drew Middleton, wrote a steady stream of articles on the subject from January through. March. Drawn from a variety of "experts at the Pen- tagon," Middleton's catalog of American military dis- abilities seemed enough to give the fainthearted pa- triot grounds for emigration. It would take a decade to "redress" recent Soviet military gains, he reported- The Merchant Marine and Atlantic fleets might be fatally weak in wartime, he explained in a pair of ar- ticles. In another piece he warned that "without a state of national emergency or a tougher system of produc- tion priorities," there would be a two-year lag in in- creased production of new weapons. Another ominous- article-reported that prominent Israeli military sources had learned of huge Russian arms caches in the Mid- dle East. To top things off, on March 9 Middleton Approved For Release 2006/01/30: CIA-RDP90-01I37R000100090001-9 'r n Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137 rICLE AFFZ:%~!.D ON ?AGE. STRATEGIC REVIEW Summer 1980 DEBATE OVER U.S. S 1 .TEG] A MIXED RE-CORI) LES ASPIN THE AUTHOR: Congressman Aspin is Chairman of the Oversight Subcommittee of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and serves on the House Armed Services Committee and the Government Operations Com- mittee. He was first elected to Congress in 1970. Aspin served in the U.S. Army from 1966 to 1968 as an economic adviser in the office of the Secretary of Defense. He is a graduate of Yale University, received a Master's degree from Oxford University and a Ph.D. in economics from the Mas- sachusetts Institute of Technology. IN BRIEF The charge has resounded in recent times that the United States intelligence community has chron- ically and woefully underestimated both the pace and, magnitude of the Soviet strategic build-up. Yet, an analysis of the available record of forecasts with respect to eight major Soviet weapons de- velopments-extending from the first Soviet A-bomb explosion in 1949 to the improvements in So- viet ICBM accuracy and yields in the 1970s-shows that the performance has been mixed, consist- ing of overestimates as well as underestimates, and in at least two instances of predictions that were on or close to the target. Few of the mistakes that have been committed in forecasting can be attributed to errors in intelligence gathering; most of them have been the function of more-or- less inevitable- human- foibles. With the demise of SALT, estimates of future Soviet strategic pro- grams are apt to be wider off the .mark than they would have been under a SALT 11 Treaty, because the reference points provided by the Treaty for U.S. intelligence have been removed, and precisely because the human element in intelligence evaluation and forecasting is thus again maximized. "It is . . . a matter of record that the growth of the Soviet ICBM force was underestimated for a decade after the 'missile gap' by the entire intelli- gence community-including Pentagon 'hawks.'- Gen. Daniel O. Graham, USA (Ret.) Lt. he death of SALT II turns the focus of U.S. strategic intelligence away from "verification" "forecasting." SALT provided for some degrees of restraint and certainty: We knew how far the Soviets were allowed to go, and the `But the history of the past twenty years shows task was to verify their compliance with these quite the reverse. Few indeed are the instances restrictions. Without SALT, there are no limits when the Soviet military threat later turned out to or guidelines. The United States must rely be greater than the estimated 'worst case.' Usually, purely on its skills in strategic forecasting-in the governments experts overestimated the danger." ro ectin the future, including future Soviet Approved For R R@p 0f/$a ,sklA-ReVc1 g 1 0 OM bilities. ,........... , Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-011371 IRTICIii. A?YFAR-~D 02~ PAGy__ S'.i'RATEGIC REVIEW SUMMER 1980 DEBATE OVER U.S ST A TEGF A POOR RECOR-E WILLIAM T. LEE THE AUTHOR: Mr. Lee is a consultant to several govern- ment agencies and private research organizations, and he has written widely on Soviet military strategy and economic matters. Mr. Lee served with the Central Intelligence Agency from 1951 to 1964. He is the author of Soviet De- fense Expenditures in an Era of SALT (USSR Report 79-1). Congressman Aspin's assessment, while heralding a welcome Congressional attention to the prob- lems of U.S. strategic forecasting of Soviet weapons developments,. does not portray accurately the U.S. intelligence community's past performance in this crucially important arena. His scoring of the eight cases of forecasting selected not only is too generous to the CIA and other U.S. intelligence, agencies, but it also neglects the relative weight of the mistakes committed-particularly in the failure to forecast the formidable build-up of Soviet strategic capabilities in the 1970s_ The record of intelligence estimates becomes even.more grievous 'when looked at in the larger compass of the 'CIA's responsibilities, notably its estimates of Soviet defense expenditures. A rati faed SALT II Treaty could not ease the problem; the solution, rather, lies in badly needed improvements in the intelli- gence interpretation of the ample evidence available. ongressman Les Aspin has offered an assessment of U.S. intelligence fore- casts of Soviet weapons systems devel- opment and deployment that says, in effect: We have won some, lost some and tied some. Moreover, he implies that this is about the best one can expect from intelligence forecasting of Soviet weapons technology and deployments- Congressman Aspin's assessment is welcome on three counts. First, it needs pointing out, as he does, that the U.S. intelligence services have mates as well as many underestimates. Second, public recognition of some of the intelligence underestimates by a member of the Congres- sional Select Committees on Intelligence is long overdue. Third, at a time when the Congress and the Executive Branch are negotiating a charter to govern the activities of covert intelli- gence collection and action, our attention needs to be focused also on the neglected question of how to accomplish improvements in the intelli- gence analysis and projection of Soviet forces a mixed reco Ml fP a P5t 9S9i&AQW"b3A: CIA tJP MrW 01Q8o9QIl01V'Se are about a development: there have been some overesti- decade late in realizing that the repeated and ,3}a3 E13It7CKSMTrH - Intelligence Agency, and Seymour Weiss, spxtal eo beN.e '*' f Ttme~ former director of the Bureau of politico. WASEfj4d- ON, May 24-Late-in 1976; i~rfiIitaryAffairs at the State Department. as Jimn~f Caster-was preparing to enter the- White House the American ;ntolli- ; other active figures worms t closely with Richard V. Allen, Mr-- Rea- gan's principal campaign coordinator for- mament . Agency; Laurence H. Silbea . man, former Deputy Attorney General and Ambassador to Yugoslavia; Robert`s W. Tucker, a political science professor j - at Johns Hopkins University, and Lieut. Gen. Edward L_ Rowny, who *id as the Joint Chiefs' representative at the strategic arms talks to oppose ratifica- tion of the second strategic arms limita- tion treaty. "It's a Republican gz pup, right astr ide of Republican views ontoreigo policy and defense," said Mr, A11en, a -1-?-year-old specialist on Soviet and international eco- nomic affairs who was Deputy Assistant: President ixo "'Th t diff = n_ o ere are er ences i thin the group, but if we have any area where there's unanimity, it would be .or increased defensespending.". Beyond that, the w-ritings of the intel- lectual inner circle reflect a somber world view, akin to Mr. Reagan's but pos- sibly more pessimistic. Long before the Soviet intervention in Afzhanistan aroused new -skepticism about detente and Soviet strategy, the Reagan advisers were .disturbed by the buildup of Soviet power and Soviet outward thrusts and alarmed at what they saw as the leis of tary of Defense Roberti. Ellsworth; for- mer-Deputy Secretary, of the Treasury C'naris E: Walker:: Adm. Thomas H. f strategic. panty -with. the'- U--n_ited Gies but for nuclear superiority ' This estimate of the- Soviet Union's long-term strategic-buildup and its inten-. tions, a striking dissent from American intelligence estimates over theyears. be- came sharply controversial. TMembers of the outside panel, known as the "B team" because the. Government's intelligence experts were called the "A team," were )accused of being alarmist, hard-liners l bent on increasing' American military 'programs or scuttling the strategic arms limitation talks. - Since then..the= American intelligence- agencies and even president Carter have come to accept the B team's central con- clusion- about Moscow's strategic goals. Moreover;.members of the B team have. become key foreign policy advisers to Ronald Reagan, the almost certain Re- publi can Presidential nominee. The foreign policy and defense advis- ers to the former California Governor, now numbering over 90, have been ex- tended beyond predominantly- conserva- tive Republicans to include such experi- enced officials as former Deputy Secre- vas of outside experts who contended foreign policy. are Fred C_ 11de, former uti a-encecc-mmuni was}oltedby aforcet critique rom an officially--appointed American nuclear superiority and the' general shrinkage of American power.. ?'_ re inn o a _ Chiefs of Staff,.`and-a sprinkling of such !.`.. - 5_,.v-_ Democrats-as-'Jearie'.J' Kirkpatrick; a ,`-:Writing in Comnientary in July 1977, Georgetown University professor of gov- Professor Pipes, who headed the B team, ernment_ hued-that the American concept otrnr' clear -deterrence-was becoming out--I r ] t? M be I3 df s Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100 CIN 2.) 1930 Advisers V;-ew'. of So let into t -on> an u ? . e n? em s moded because the Soviet union was At the core of the working groups is a preparing to fight and win a nuclear war. i hand."ul of key B team members -- Wit= The Russians, he wrote, sought "not liam. R.?Van-Cleave,a defense-policyana- deterrence but victory, not sufficiency in lyst at the University of Southern Califor- weapons but superiority, not retaliation nia; Richard E. Pipes, a Harvard histo- but offensive action." He added that "the rian who has. written many books on the regime is driven by ideology, internal Soviet Union; Lieut. Gen. Daniel O. politics and economic exigencies steadily - - -. pared ?, ,.. ~._-.- .,... __. w ri ~. J Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100090001-9 Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00010009000 1:134 Y`J_- ~'1?,l ins r ~ rr 1- o 'v P 1.CrT.'.._ 13 rlAy 1930 By RICHARD BURT. submarine-launched rockets by 1995.. Together with about 1-,000 weapons that could be carried by Soviet grabens, the intelligence group's "high estimate"` for Soviet warheads in 1995 Is 17,CW, officials viet ucie r 'E dam = -- Is Envisioned by enu WASHINGTON, May. 112 _..American i:iteili-trice services have concluded that 'I t !.he? next few years the Soviet Union. c~)uid achieve an edge over the United Crites in every major measure of strata s?.c?- nuclear power,, including overall iiurrihers?of missile.warheads, CarterAd- 1 ministration aides said today. he aides said that the projection-eras i,ne of the principal findings of a national incelligence estimate completed by the Central Intelligence Agency and other ;Tovernuwnt intelligence bureaus. The estimate is now being circulated among h? h-level policy mai ers and has-been i ??ntedtnPr[sidentCarter. ricoording to officials familiar -wn the iin,=tnent, the Soviet Union, in.. the ab?- :E?ance of the new nuclear arms treaty, could posers a missile ? arsenal in 1985 c--ipahle of many as?16,000 i?,:,clear -+a.rbeadsi against: the United Estates. Otficials estimate that the United Scats, in the same yeax,isliltely tohave a _,rissile fore equipped with about 8,0'ai0 Debaie Ver Ip nber3 Some military expertts' contend that bith Washington and. ioscow possess 50 many :nuclear warheads that ccsnpari- s,;%vs of total numbers does not make r Ich differerca..E3owever, American of- ticials have traditionally pointed to -rarheadss to argue W shin.gtatu's lead in zaL Moscow has not .surpassed the u i noted States in strategic power- - ? - \ioreover, some academic specialists b-eiieve that. growth in'the numbers. of Soviet nuclear warheads in the coming d.m ade could-neutralize the Adnlinistra- tico's plans for building a new mobile missile, the MX. While-othe~ as acts of fete llitelllg ice is:tmate.:have apparently caused hs- putts; the projections cn warhead num- bers have, been welcomed by diverse ele- rneucsiritheGovernmenL,' ' ;:, ?:? sign a smaller portion of American mis-l siles against targets in China and a lamer : number a gainst the Soviet Union. ? The balance in strategic forces has been gradually shifting against the United States since the late 1960's, when ?Mosctn initiated p.togl ams to deploy new ; land-and sea-based ballistic missiles. During the 1970's, the Soviet Union was'. able to establish- an edge in such meal- ures of strategic power as overall num- bers of missiles and long-range bombers azd.the total-payload that these systems Clear U.S. Advantage in, 'iembers But. the, United States; with a larger part.ol its -missile forts equip--_d w:itia multiple ?-rheads, possessed a i adran- tagt over the Soviet Union in the 1970's in the number?.,?bf ; nuclear-. weapocs that could - be delivered : by : -the, two sides' forces. Accordingly,. in the annual De- fense Department report in January, Sec, rotary of Defense ?Iarold Bra-, .m said that Washington possessed a total force of abort 8,lX) warheads on its land- and seams ~_- r2issiles, c with 8,V W for `Iioecow. - Officials said that over the next five years, the .American total'-yas unlikely to change significantly. In 151.5, the said, the laird-bled missileorce -:wild be equipped with about 2, l CO warheads while sea-based roc ets would carry about Air : orce bombers, they added; could deliver: another 3,C XJ nuclear weapocs, consisting of bombs and air-launched During the same perfcd, the afficlals said, the intelli,aerce estimate Arta that without the new arms pact Mcscaw outdid put as many as 11,090 warheads on its existing force of 1;140 land-base Mis- sile'; and as many as 5,0)0 additional warheads could befitted to Moscow's 950 Proponents of arms Control "fn:--the W-bite-13ouse and. the?-State -Department said- the estimate demonstrated the' im- portance of approving the strategic arms pact., which -w uld place limits on. nu.m- b'rs of Soviet warheads. The reaty, signed June 18, 1979, was before the Sen- ate when the Soviet Union intervened militarily in Afghanistan. The Adminis- tration then asked that consideration. of I the pact be postponed as part of its effort to induce Moscow to withdraw its forces. At- the Pentagon, officials said the re- plort strengthened their case for deploy- ing the Air Force's new MX mobile mis- sile, which-would give American forces an additional 2,000 warheads in the late A ged F-?e Retease 2066/01130? - Other defense aides said that Moscow's growing nuclear' arsenal.. set against Washington's improved political ties with The officials said that If the new arms treaty . was finally - ratified, this total could be cut by about half. By placing a ceiling of Flt) ?on land-bbased' missiles - ffia multiple warheads and by i d r i a pe e4u 1 freezing numbers of nuclear bombs, that J could be placed on individual 'missiles, the new accord, officials said, would per- mit Moscow to deploy culy about 8,500 warheads through 1983. - Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000 :ll~ L f. JS-_ By .Michael Getler Washin[LOn. i4m, Scslt writer,_, An extraordinary- split has . Bevel.. oped between military and civilian telligence agencies over conclusions- -reached by the director of the Central. Intelligence Agency about the balance of strategic rnilitarv= power between,' the-'United States.and the Soviet Cu-, .ion-.. The military--agencies;area-arguing-. -.thatM:the.C[Asumriary,.of?;a top-se- cret government-wide- assessment af the Hower- balance,: which does to :President Carter, not represeiata- tive" of: the analytical work that went-- into preparing that assessment.. -Perhaps more= iuiport antly, -the mill. tary contends that the: job of compar-- ing: U.S::-and.:.Soviiet. forces and, how they might fare in. an- atomic struggle': constitutes what is called a '-net' as- sessment" Preparing - such assess' ments, they?eontend,-is the prerogative?- of?the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Department rather than. the..; CfA. The - CIA,.. this argument goes, should confine ?itself-tofiguring out what the Soviets are doing.. The.. dispute -centers on the latest version of the National Intelligence Estimate, which does from the nation" top intelligence. - officer, CIA. chief Stansfield Turner, a - former admiral,., to the president That Turner is at the center of this dispute is-not surprising. The ex-Navy man. has been the target of some criti- cis._from both military. and, civilian--; defense officials in'recent- years'as he, under Carter's-orders, :has--solidified his'somet'imes- controversial,.-codtrol.. over-the nation's-ihtelligence'-appara- tus. Because .the: National Intelligence Estimates are widely circulated''a'mong the top rungs of government and'*are so authoritative,. these estimates :have great. importance within the bureau=- cracy in sl"ialling-.future U.S.-.national': security. policy`on many issues:`*". - :' --Officials-say that,the-NIE sure ary' contains what', is-`called a "footnote but-which in fact is a sharp dissent by . -the Pentagons -:military-run , Defense- Intelligence Agency (DIA) --together with the--intelligence chiefs- of-:the: three armed services -- , '? ..~ :. Approved THE 'iASHINGTON POST 9 '-lay 1980 ~ , dministratian . sources -: call the t;readth of. the- split with .the civilian formed Pentagon -source says:- "It is fair,ta-say this.,is:probably as strong an -assertion of. dissent: on the-part of the-DIA,.to-thy director-of?.cen':.ral-in_ telligence" as has c eezn ;registered. = The-Sta;,e,Department's--'-Bureau of Intelligence ?ahd Research aid: the su per-secret National. security:._:a;ency did--notr:joikt- _ia the, di sseat,:;.sources The actual conclusions ofthe report a xehighly:cassified;:but.source -sUg- 'gest they- cons; a, mixed.- bag of- as-_ailv sessments that trouble the military= On the one hand',-the defense agen= cies are said to believe that the report underestimates the-.'relmtiye momen- c . military t:of the- Soviet 'strat et g um ..buildup: -in comparison to that of United. States, arguing iii. effect, that the.:picture---iss' evext'.'g comer-` than presented -tiff _ Yet ?the' `nnilitafy" also'?cofltends other sources say, that.: the new report overestimates the Soviet-? threat that, could^.: he -mounted against.-the -Penta-'l gon'splanned ti super-i -issile. 1 The.-military is counting on the MX as its. ,future land-based, long-range miss ileforce.: Critics contend the-Sovi- ets,-with-their bigger missiles, -will a1 ways be able to lob enough atomic warheads at _ the MX s elters to make surv:wal of _a~-feiv.:'af tliehz-notworth at.l the- huge`:oost,: esizmated -by= some iililI 'ti: Supporters more $60 MX argue that the Russians wouldn't that fashion;; ' _ - rise their miss il s in -: CI. Officials :sa~r_- that full-scale net as se3sments;!inrolving;st}ch things, as paper tivar;.games:< t : ,figure.;out; who -wins, :are :indeed,., thePentagon's. jolr. Re; CIA claims,-zit is,. ;n..ot doing-.that but rather has been using "amore so- phisticated forna of-. analysis in recent years":. arid,. "adding some juci ;meats" to? its.findings rather than- just count- ing Soviemiasiles_.:: -,:The::CIA . offici.alsiicontend =the many.peopla. within .the'; government find this-technique helpful, in, assess ing.the..power.-balance,. a:claim-con- `? firmed: in interviews: with'civilian off:- cials elsewhere in''governmeint= Sbxne CIA. officials. suspect' the mill- tary objections -at this:_time,:may have a.n "element- of.,polities.:to=them seer= in perhaps to take advantageaf an election year to support th ose arguing for higher. defense spending in face of the Soviet threat Pentagon sources suggest it undvetb= tedly. will be left -to the president to .resolve.he -dispute over:. who--does what-kind'-6f The're'port summary also. has.-gone to-.-.Capitol Hill, and sources say. the House sub- committee, af' ...tell genee- oversight- p'robablywill. begin closed- loon hear,, ergs next-.week on the report,. includ- irg: the ,disputed _` footnote-" ? ,: ,:;.The I's at tonal ._.Inteliigen _ sti mates, produced by--the entire. u.S. in-. telligence community;.'normally: 'in- clude at least two. main volumes,-.the summary and- the back-up factual and analytical data. ? - >;i ;r ?. ,. -TMr :=.':'.,1 The-summary` section'-bft1he'dlspu - ted` NIE, number 1138, was 'compl'eted in mid-March.-The second volume: o? back-up data is scheduled to he urea-- lated very soon ; sources indicate, ?-?. - :, In the past; . there have been othe.r.- dissenting- footnotes to these report Lute officials suggest they, usually] have' been over - technical matters, t d ba e such as the [a ovCr the range ur.-t the, new Russian Backfire bomber and whether it is aimed at U.S.' targets or other targets -closer- to the S_ ovi.et__Un. ion-in?China.. -,'In the current='dispute, the-DI:' and military ehie-Is axe understood to have "disassociated.'-. theim ellea from . -the summary .presented:?by -Turner, cont tending that-it concentrates?,too much.- -q"-u- and gives.., too little welgat to Sovie.mi:litary doctrine, policy;-: overall capability, momentum. and future Programs.:- ::SirnilarLY; thez=tnilitary_Js -said---to contend; that-the kind.of analy'sis?used in.-the summary -distorts?,judginents. and that these=-are shaped too much by U.S. thinking, rather-than on So- viet thinking; bix strategic matters:- ..- -Though ?Tui-iier also' is'-not without his critics elsewhere in the civilian;. run agencies t of: government, =_ on this . issue the--former admiral- seems--to:- `have supporters. One adx imiatratioh:sourtea%says he, haq grudging-?=- admiration for Turner in,?re?using- to.budge.from his position, once he -and:bis analysts-are ` For Release 2006/01/30.: CIA-RDP90-01I37R0001QGO 9O lt%i ?;, -ar-e _r Approved For Release 2006/01/30: CIA-RDP90-01137R000100 90001-9 THE NATION! 5 April 1980 r SOVIET INTENTIONS e CO-L.A.s Debate DALE VAN ATTA community which moves with one voice and makes irrefutable conclusions based on vast technological and human resources has been eroding ever since the Iranian revolution caught them by surprise in the winter of 197879- The mixed reviews they have received over their predictions and advice regarding the Afghanistan invasion has further challenged any notions of infallibility. - Ignored in most of the commentary on "intelligence failures," however, is a basic issue that has caused a deep schism among key analysts for more than a decade-the in- tentions of the Soviet Union. Only the analysts, reviewing covert information from ingenious listening devices and spies, are expected to give their final estimation to the Presi- dent. But it turns out that they don't know any more than the rest of us-or at least have the same disagreements over such issues as the usefulness of the SALT 11 treaty and Russia's next step after taking Afghanistan. No document has shown this schism more clearly than an internal Central Intelligence Agency paper coded "Top Se- cret Umbra" and entitled: "Understanding Soviet Strategic Policy, Objectives." The relatively dry but erudite account of splits in the community over this issue was authored by-a C.I.A. analyst, Fritz Ermarth, and disseminated to about 100 top policy makers on December 8, 1975, in the National In- telligerce Daily, a supersecret newspaper. The unprecedent- ed decision to publish such an analysis immediately after the appearance of the "National Intelligence Estimate," which represented the community's consensus on the subject that year, was explained by the editors as an attempt to air "the spectrum of arguments that specialists in the intelligence community had to deal with in reaching the estimate's key judgments." he concept of a monolithic American. intelligence nsiders agree that Ermarth's analysis still holds:'up and reflects even more accurately the "groupings";of analysts over the Afghanistan situation today than it did for those on the SALT II debate at the time. Er- _LL marth, who is now a high-level strategic adviser on'the Na- tional Security Council, began: very elusive. Pertinent evidence is voluminous; but it almost never speaks for itself. Interpretation of the evidence always - involves our preconceptions about the Soviet Union as a na- Because of their som documents, Ermarth observes, U.S. analysts "do not have complete and explicit intelligence" on Soviet military doc- trine. `Although Nye differ on important details, analysts in- side and outside the U.S.- intelligence community tend to agree on the broad outlines.... Soviet doctrine clearly pos- tulates that war-waging forces are desirable for both deter- rence and conflict, emphasizes counter-force capabilities and. targeting, and stresses the value of preemption as well as the need to have a survivable retaliatory capability." - Where the analysts divide, however, is on the questions of the sway of the military in the Politburo and the importance Soviet leaders attach to military doctrine. Continues Er- marth: - - - Where we differ most is on how important doctrine actu- ? ally is for Soviet policy or how well it-reflects the actual thinking of Soviet leaders. Some of us believe that it is quite literally prescriptive for and descriptive of Soviet behavior. They point out that the Soviets have serious deployment or R&D [research and development] programs in all areas required by their war- fighting strategic doctrine. Whatever the obstacles, the Soviets keep plugging away at the requirements of doctrine, perhaps only falling back temporarily when technological problems are severe, as in the ABM [anti-ballistic missile) : _ area. Others tend to regard Soviet doctrine as much less pre- scriptive for actual military policy. They.see in it a good deal of pretense and exhortation really intended to support troop morale, ideological prejudices, and parochial service inter- ests. They point to the quasi-religious themes of "victory". and "superiority" in the literature as examples- _ They believe that Soviet political and military leaders are free to ignore doctrine when they make practical decisions, as these leaders have-habitually ignored or manipulated the ideas of Marx or Lenin. In this vie'-Y, Soviet decision-makers admit to themselves that attaining the requirements of doc- trine is vastly more difficult than Pontificating on them- - As for assessing the role strategic power may play in any Soviet foreign policy move, that too is difficult, according to Ermarth, because "again we have to start with ambiguous evidence and divergent interpretations.'.' -But he is able to narrow down the divisions into two rough groupings: Some of us believe that the Soviet acquisition of overall strategic equality has given the USSR a new platform from which to exploit opportunities and to press its global in- terests?even to the point of accepting strategic confronta- tion with theU_S. They believe that the political role of stra- tegic power impels the USSR to increase that power which will, in turn, give the USSR even greater sway in the world. Others take the view that at present levels the two sides' strategic forces tend to cancel each other., out and that, always cautious, Soviet behavior in 'potential confrontation areas-will be governed primarily by local risks and oppor- tunities Those of this opinion believe it to be not onlyobjec- tively true, but also to be shared by the leaders of the USSR. tion, internatiA> _ i F% c 2(~lgt~ /~veCIA~RDP90-0 ?;: and the condition of our own country. Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100090001-9 BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS March 1980 Qu ry For a Ciochmrai on N,I, tlltnal ti'tCIII-gence I,siial: ititi, I would like it, eoniaet'n;e:' Ill iI tI \ anti ei~'iii:in inteliiP1.0 people \thtt p:u-ti:i rated in r]ral'tini-,. eaitinl- or ;ip r'tn-inq: National tn!el!i Bence tatini rtes or thco;c t enhlt :t; signed to the Ofti,:c of National Estini tc,, the N:tti,)n;d Seeut'ilt Council staff. liihtttrv Intclligern_c stalls. Or inter' ;1~crteti' aria!}riical working ~~1 )ntlti hettl ~l.'11 I )ti[) ,1114 1904. Please contact I):t:ti l F'Iamher . 220 West 91rd Street. New Yvr., New York 10025.U. r Approved For Release 2006/01/30: CIA=RDP90-01137R000100090001-9 f 17 ::L:'? ved For ReI~ q~ Pffl/Rqy R '8p ?fj c Pot o; 'AG P. 25 February 1980 m s .Rr Ju T .&d to Cfl~ dr X. Strategic Washington--Defense Dept_ factions pressing for a new manned bomber are demanding more accurate U._ S_ intelli- gence estimates of the Soviet Union's stra- tegic - The bomber proponents claim that the U. S. must move immediately toward eith- er a stretched version of the General Dynamics FIB-111- with increased range i and payload, or to the Rockwell Interna- tional B-1 to counter Soviet strategic supe- riority. According to several high-level Penta- gon officials, President Carter's decision to halt B-I production and to delay engi- neering development of the MX advanced ICBM was-the result of faulty National Intelligence Estimates. The Carter B-1 decision came after he received Central Intelligence Agency estimates of Soviet strategic weapons strength issued in December, 1976_ This was the most recent National Intelligence Estimate at the time Another Defense Dept. official added in response, but we would still be gather- that there already is a severe problem with ing information on the location of the the ICBM leg of the triad surviving an attack, and we must be capable of saving a attack by Soviet ICBMs now on line, and portion of the force in reserve for second that there is no way for the U. S. to begin strike or war Fighting capability. This I to reverse this situation until the MX i gives an added impetus to acquiring a new system starts to become operational in manned bomber-pronto," he said. ? . 1986. But it will be 1989 before MX is ii The official explained that rif~ the U. S fully operational. USAF asked for an early warning system and b initial operational capability of 1983 but over-the-horizon radars could determine could not get the Administration to move that only the Minuteman force was under the missile into engineering development attack, the U. S. could have the options of because of the intelligence estimates, the trying to ride out such an attack or could officials emphasize. _ launch on warning- "But we reed a new stem early warning rt s y defense .suppo Because of the vulnerability of the spacecraft to aid us in making targeting ICBM force, the U. S. must look at the assessments, and funding has been delayed bomber leg of the triad to take up the on it," he said. slack in warhead delivery. "We only need Part of the problem is that Defense a bomber system through the.1980s, but it Secretary Harold Brown is expressing must be more efficient than the Boeing doubts about the capability of the B-1 to B-52 in terms of being able to penetrate penetrate Soviet air defense and survive. Soviet air defense," one service official said. He added that the Soviets are testing Penetration Feasibly new-technology weapon systems now at "That logic doesn't hold up," another The President's decision to delay the cruise missile program also was based on inaccurate intelligence estimates, the offi- cials claim. In the 1976 National Intelli- gence Estimate Carter used in deciding on B-1 bomber production, the CIA esti- mated the Soviets' capability then and where they would be vis a vis the U. S. in 1982 and 1985, the officials said. "And they were off by an order of magnitude in estimates of real Russian nuclear weapons capability," one Pentagon official said. . He added that in the spring and summer of 1978 a new National Intelli} genre Estimate was prepared that for-the first time began to pick up Soviet strategic nuclear weapons momentum, ICBM accu- racy, basing.and numbers of reentry vehi- cles being deployed- The year before that the Strategic Air Command had already determined from available information that the USSR had reached parity with the U. S. and that the momentum was continuing with the aim of achieving nuclear weapons superiority. In the last two National Intelligence Estimates, in 1978, and again in 1979, there were massive jumps in the analysis of Soviet nuclear force capability, one official contends. Sary Shagan that make not only bombers pefense Dept_ official said, "1f the pilots but cruise missiles as well vulnerable if the flying tactical aircraft in NATO countries U. are successful. He added that the must penetrate Soviet air defenses their U. S. already is in the early phase of survival chances are at least as good and looking for a countermeasures system, probably not as good as a bomber Officials in the Pentagon believe the ppabhardened to the nuclear environment wih U_ S. is now in a position where there are countermeasures equipments. So you see, few choices available to the President. The the implications in this logic go far beyond Minuteman force could be virtually elimi- a new manned bomber. We are convinced noted by a first strike Soviet attack, they that we are smart enough through a said, so that in reality the U. S. will be combination of tactics and electronic able to rely only on its bomber and subma- countermeasures to keep pace with. the air rive-launched ballistic missile forces in the defense threat:'. 1980s. He added that the Tactical Air Com- Part of the problem,-ant official said, is mend, Strategic Air Command and U_ S. that the U. S. will only receive information Air Forces Europe are all confident that of "a gross attack warning within the first aircraft still can penetrate the USSR and few minutes from an early warning satel- survive_ lite. If it is not degraded by jamming." He said it would be 15-18 min. before U.S. targets could be determined. "ICBMs and SLBMs could be launched The U. S. has invested 10 years in devel- opment time and about 55 billion in the B-1 bomber program. "There is no doubt that the B-1 is the best penetrating aircraft the U.S. has ever developed, am if we can manage to live with the cost w, should acquire it," the official added- "Bu we could get the stretched FB-1 11 a yea or so faster and at $7 billion less than th B-1. In - today's climate of a significan USSR nuclear weapons advantage it wi be hard to get anyone to say that the year's difference may not be important-" Approved For Release 2006/01/30 CIA-RDP90-01I37R000100090001-9 ipv`'T~rv 9 Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100090001-9 AAT1CL 3C?P r7 b:# FAG -- _ But Critics Despair That Spy Agent Can't Do_Good Job. Second of to arricJe By Henry S. Bradsh er . washingtonStar Staff Writer _ -Looking casual in a navy blue cardigan but speaking intensely, - Stansfield Turner gazed out the glass, wall of his office, atop, the CIA head- I quarters at Langley, over the bare dusky woods toward the distant lights of Washington and exuded confidence about his organization- "I'm just very optimistic these days," Turner said. "I've been very impressed by the quality of our human intelligence- activities," the CIA director said. And U.S. technical intelligence is superlative, he added.. In other government offices in the city, most of.them looking across concrete courtyards at other-offices instead of having spacious views, in the private, offices of people who- have left the government, in small. restaurants, rants, in telephone' calls from coast to coast, others talk about the. CIA. too: Some, like 'former. CIA Director' William E. Colby and former Deputy Director Enno Henry Knoche, talk for quotation about things like re- strictions on the agency. But most prefer to discuss the agency's prob- lems from the protection.._ of. anonymity. Turner understandably is'angered by this, especially on.the most emo- tional aspect of his three-year tenure at Langley, the forced retirement of people from the. clandestine serv- ices. He argues that he rejuvenated an aging agency. "The? next time someone tells-- YOU, he said. "that Turner fs-the - stupid bastard who cut the size of the agency. out here, look at the color of his hair.. ?.. This is a young, man's game, and we are better equip- ped today than we were three years sago" for clandestine operations. .: 1 THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE) 5 February 1980 1 The CIA is composed of three main; branches. The clandestine or opera- lions branch handles spying and covert operations. like 'intervening ? secretly in other countries'- affairs or organizing guerrilla movements..; Another branch supervises techni-- cal intelligence, including recon-41 naissance satellite photography and communications intercepts. An ana- lytical, branch pulls information { together for government policymak- ers. The controversy that has marked Turner's almost three years at the agency focuses on the, operations branch. There is also widespread but less publicized distress around Washington about analysis. In both cases, Turner inherited problems. His.critics say he exacer- bated them; his supporters contend) that he has done much to clear them Once Was Twice as Large- The Vietnam war and-the CIA's) "secret army". in Laos, added to .worldwide spying. pushed the num-. ber of agency operatives to 8,500 in I the late 1960s. - roughly double itsj present size. As the Nixon adminis-1 tration began to reduce U.S. commit- ments in Indochina,?personnel had to be reduced by attrition, transfers and other means. During his brief tenure as CIA director, James R. Schlesinger, speeded up a cutback. Colby, his! successor, continued the program, I and so did George Bush during his year as director. Most sources agree that they were handled sensibly. Then President Carter took '.Turner from his navy admiral's com- mand and sent him to- Langley. He arrived with what the old CIA hands considered to be a skeptical, even hostile, attitude. This set a chilly tone to his take over, despite 'his own explanations that he simply wanted to.bring bet- ter management to'a sometimes un- coordinated operation.- His suspi- cions of the need for drastic changes were quickly reinforced by the resignation.of John Stockwell, a 40- -year-old agent in the unsuccessful CIA effort in Angola.... . _.- :... sent out the-first 212 pink slips on j Oct. 31, ?1977- Although. smaller than previous' cuts, this one was handled differ :-ently and hit harder at lifetime,; professionals in the spying and para- military trades. Says Cuts Helped Agency "The cuts in personnel that every- one still complains to me about have strengthened the agency's covert ac- '?tion capabilities," Turner said "You don't run a good, strong paramilitary or covert action pro- gram with.a bunch of 5:-year-olds;' he said.. "What I've done is cut out high-grade superstructure ...and :: doubled the input into the clandes- tine services .. so that we have a group of young tigers, and there's enough accumulated experience and expertise around to- guide them." _ .; This is strongly challenged by peo- ple in a position to know. - "Whatever Turner says, they can't puton a show," says a Pentagon offi- cial who is very familiar with the CIA's present operational capabil- ities. 'We know that over -in? this [ building..'' ---_- Other sources spell this out more detail- One says the CIA's corps.i of paramilitary specialists who could help organize, for instance, a more ! effective Afghan resistance to Soviet". control has declined from about 200 -1 to, 80,: aud- many of the 80 lack the - broad experience needed. for effec tiveness. _:.: ? _ .: But Colby comments hat, if the people in. an operational area feel CIA help is vital, they will find ways to-speed it up. , . ? ? . ? The '.worst, part ''of. Turner's.. changes, numerous present.and re= tired officials say, is what they did to- Approved Foy' Release 2006/01/30: CIA-RDP90-01137R00010 is now coming: oaci up,. vipers say - is at best bumping alongside-., *WINIA suffered; but contends it'_ Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100090001 FAG3? THE WASHINGTON POST 31 January 1980 e Isi''FaleSaid sv Need. far....SALT ' But' with 14,000 Soviet warh By Michael Getler and Robert G_ Kaiser House,x.Pentagon. and, State. I).epart- - some -11,000-., could be aimed ' at recent days washlattton Post Scat writers rnent,said in interviews in that the prospect, without threat and calling the whole MX The nation's top intelligence ? offi- now conceived,into quest eet, a ? SALT- -aa_starkly defined by.the new cials this week are completing a grim N LE , -could jolt the country and the To maintain survival of half new estimate predicting that without , Senate-into the. realization that SALT MX force-under- an uncontrolled : a Soviet-American strategic ? -arms viet'?expansion; specialists say: is. now more urgent than ever agreement, Soviet rockets in 1989 -will. II the first crude estimates.'itndert be able to rain nearly 250 percent But" other administration officials- numerous sources on Capitol Hill -indicate it could mean tripling more atomic warheads on the United land needed in Utah and tievad States than they would if constrained Tressed the belief that the' Senate handle still more silos and do by SALT II and successor agreements. otild:hever be convinced to act favor .e cos The new National Intelligence Esti- th t ably. oil -SALT"Il this year while So- It is this kind' of calculation mate--NiIE 1138-79-indicates that by vie ~i'ineriean relations; are tense. - top civilian'officials believe 1_ 89, the. Soviet could. have about. some "tit title'`the intelligence .estimate is 14,000 highly. accurate warheads 'classified; some government have what one called '"a pro mounted on . their land-based missile t O rr at[yfieii1s' who support SALT' are will- sobering: on. people' force aimed at the-United States. Urt iriq to"'lliscuss the broad figures psi and impact' on captions. of:_what=the realities der current plans, the United States vateljf;:believing-they support the case world without SALT will mean. would have only a fraction of this for the treaty77 The idea of ? building a budge amount. By U.S. estimates,-the Soviets ing Mai -that might not even critics in the Senate and else- would have about 6.000 such warheads :mission is .certain:to -reope b reject' alarmist views of the under a SALT II treaty, which would ill silos, 'almost - quadrupling- SALT I agreement an" offensive orld?} ithout SALT, arguing that the its arguments and _ start: new- on expire in 1985 but could be extended. ? 'American procurement policy. S& ie& wiI1 not. reach- the high num= These still secret figures are- the the For examples some members o b?rs oi~ warheads predicted in _ first concrete contribution to an emer- gress. and administration officia I_l."because they v ill :.Trot "need gency debate within the government already talking privately abou them=~= about one consequence of the Soviet g earlier ideas for missile owi By extending the new intelligence invas:an of Afghanistan, and subse can be carried aloft and fired fro "esttnTate` out to 1989, the intelligence .quent derailing of SALT II, that has planes.. Other ideas are to mo officials throughout the government received scant public attention thus ward- a new class of less expe who prepare iational=Intelligence Es- fare - more accurate- missile-carrying timates for the-president. cover the pe- This debate- is ? prompted by the marines; or- even to go back t riod in which the new U.S. super-mis widely - pereived. conclusion that the idea of in`stalliii "anti-ballistic' m sile, the- MX, is supposed to be fully ( BM) `defenses around- existin United States is in danger of enteril!g deployed. sile silos to-protect ? against - a into a tense pericd of confrontation The United States is'currently plari- tYBl3's... are banned by the SA with the Soviet Union without a ci- ning to build 200 of. these huge mis- treaty,'::so. reverting to them herent or broadly supported policy of riles,.each - carrying 10 warheads. The' amount- to "the- death- of arm dealing: with 7tut le tr weapons.. = - idea is,to- truck. them: around concret'e troll,' -:one official. said. ` : The administration hoped it had " racetracks" in desert valleys of Utah ? For now- President. Carter h such a policy-built around the SALT II andj`Tevada,. hidingitem at randozii Glared a. Policy of respecting the treaty and,a program of new strategic in'=4;60Q~concrete` sh'elte'rs as? on arms contained. in both the S arms procurement that went with .it. protec? tion::against a Soviet=strike.:.The.sys- and..Il agree.ments.' The Soviet& Even before the Soviet invasion of Af tem~xs estimated to cast?between $30 '.ingness . to do the "same, " whe billion: and $100 hillipn ghanistan,'this policy like the treaty -was in. serious trouble, but now it pons. has lapsed and the SA But:'the arcane arithmetic ' of n it_ appears to be on the verge of unravel- treaty has not .been ratified;. w clear forces that drives the armsrace ing: _ -_.-,.- -._., ._. _ :. tested this spring. - : ? _: - . ":could., change drainaticallyl without Senior administration officials now To continue respect?rig the SA SAL?T"limits in- force,'"raising ques- limits, the-Sovietswill probably tions about whether-this-=MX. project see a dangerous paradox-that the to- viet invasion of Afghanistan, poter_- L a?'schere. of--unprecedented '- cost tially a threat. to U.S. security, has- 'and. complexity-is.the right answer. prevented_ passage of a Soviet Ameri- 'Under SALT, government special can arms agreemett that they, beli&-ve fists estimate the Soviets could epos clearly serves the. countrys security sibly aim 3,000 warheads-at the iIX' interests. silos, with the ? rest of their arsenalI For these officials, the new National U.S.. missiles and mili- Intelligence Estimate provides proof tary and civilian. targets: about half-. that SALT II would put crucial con- straints on a Soviet missile buildup the attack, MXtheyforce believe would , surviveenoughato still that otherwise oltj. O thre Y Se 26. /L PP3'~t C'Il~t. 91 0!tpb900100090001-9 vivability oft i~a eads, '-the the projr s ion.. ' the So- that.. a:{etr the ' a' to uble . that' will-: fvund` s per of a_ " -.~ t bust?' fttliitl=-,_ ald-c n e onr f Con ls: are; n t re s that m air-s ve to-', nsive;' sub- o the issile: g ti misis-- ack. }}} LT..I would s coin; .'?~:_ .?1 as d limits ALT I --will.-. n- the - wen- LT lI ill be ` -: I LT: ?I-! have-; rile force.: -: .. - Several -' officials in the.--White Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100090001-9 4'r?1~ N K~1 Sr+..hw CN PAGI' Professional Note MARINE CORPS GAZETTE January 1980 Q1V by Capt Roger E. Mahoney Earlier this year the Marine Corps was welcomed into the national in- telligence community when the Direc- tor of Central Intelligence, retired Adm Stansfield Turner, notified the Commandant of his decision to ele- vate the Marine Corps to observer status on the National Foreign In- telligence Board (NFIB). It is not in- significant that this move followed closely the elevation of.the.Con:tman- dant on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. What needs to be explained in light of this move is what part the Marines can play in intelligence matters on the national level: Or perhaps just as im- portant-what benefit will the Corps realize from this enhanced stature? Figure I displays the members of the NFIB and shows the kind of company the Marine Corps will enjoy as a member of the national intelligence community. The mission of the NFIB is to ad- vise the Director of Central In- telligence on national intelligence matters, including the budget. The Board helps coordinate national in- telligence. production and seeks op- timum coordination between all in- telligence collectors, producers, and users. The NFIB is thought to be the only forum where representatives of the entire intelligence community come together to discuss common or singular problems. The role of actually aiding in the production of national intelligence is a tricky matter. The HQMMC intelli- gence division is certainly riot suffi ciently manned to allow the taking on ; of a major role in the preparation of; national intelligence products. The Marines have always been, and will probably continue to be, intelligence users and not producers. It is not an unforeseen possibility, hogvever, that'; we will be tasked to contribute ana- lytical personnel, from time to time, to aid in the formulation of National.: Intelligence Estimates (NIEs). An NIE, usually classified, is a na- tional level judgment rendered at the direction of the President's National Security Council. It is based on review and analysis of all intelligence available which bears on the subject. The Director of Central Intelligence has under hits a staff of topically or regionally designated National in-: telligence Officers (NIOs). When P.. Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100090001-9 Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100090001 2TI.CLE i ~ E iR D TEL ;li~':G JC n~ (.';iIa-ingt.o ,, )el. ' 7__ ?~i GL 1 27 JUn 10/79 body iaentuieu.: as. LIVI ByTOETRFNTO..,,u~u~.,w,.--.:...... and RICHARD SA.NOZA and to produce witnesses .who be-_:: loyalty to the agency,. where he..1 heve he was murdered. worked for 21 years and. partict-' WASHINGTON - A member of Several of the experts on Soviet, paled in'developing some of the the secret U.S. team formed to weaponry,.who served on the B.` assessments that came under the check independently on CIA as Team said yesterday Paisley was-y; scrutiny of the B Team.' sessments of Soviet . military the prime suspect of leaks that re The B Team's role was to see if stremgth says someone ought to suited in news articles damaging. -I' the CIA -and Paisley had done -find out why information about the to their secret mission. a thorough lob in assessing Soviet group's activities was leaked. The reporter who wrote the 1976:_ 'strength. Paisley. served as.execu--.,,. Deceased ex-CIA official John story confirmed that Paisley was tie director or coordinator of the.. A. Paisley has been identifiecf as a a prime source for his New York team and had access to the highest.." source of the leak. And Seymour Times article. -David .Binder's,: level ofclassified material. -:- Weiss, one of the leaders of the se- story revealed That some mem-'.A cret team. said yesterday it could hers of .B Team thought the CIA. When he, disappeared last year .be that Paisley was working for had undet'cstimated Soviety, milt= he was working on-a report for the -the Soviets. Other members of teh "', Lary, strength The story shocked". CIA raft ofut th B Team. pso e thA unit - known as the B Team the intelligence-? community be-'. boat; the Brirep `wheel it tvas pooh pooh the notion, but Weiss; cause. the team's very existence:' adrift .in,e Chesapeake e tivas supposed lobe top secret.. found Bay _ .; :..e *? eakv., said he thinks some investgativ th body ought to check into Paisley's Binderconceded that while it i9r.. motives. The B Team was fortned in 1976 :a by George Bush, then CIA director highly+:unusual to=revealt.confi= and now a Itpubliean presidential Paisley; then.supposedly retired dential source, he-was in The team was made presidential from the CIA; served as liaison be- this case: because, he believes hi at now a his co nenderl defense experts, none tween the agency and the secret B source, Paisley, is. dead.. He wrote: connected with the CIA, who were.! saccess, U.S. intelli- Team. He died mysteriously while a recent I,cok I1ladazinearticle on given ted t a w wsailing on the Chesapeake Bay.=;. *by Paisley maynaye.eommitted_ gence given ecrets weapons and sys- Sept. 24. He was identified yester suicide:;`::. day as the' source of at least one ems information.: 'vVeissi =a former State Depart`:. -Weiss and other B Team mem major leak in 1976 about the -B _.ment; official who was amIn -' I;A Team s highly classified wark~ ?..i hers said their report concluded, -.Based on -stories, in the News-. dor. tb the Bahamas-when he serv';i that the assessments done b~+ the,! Journal papero about Paisley, his ed?on the B Team said that'?- CIA "grossly" underestimated ?I press revelations. about.Paisley's:=Soviet military. strength. Because role in the U.S. -intelligence corn- CIA activities he had no reason to information leaks about the B munity, a crepardcies .in-;the suspect that the-55-year-mold offi-. :Team would tend to discredit it's .identification of his body, the U.S. I ? i might have been'disloyal. He - findings Weiss -theorizes U S a `Senate Select.Committee on Intel- 'ligence has been investigating the case since last October. , ct now says that in light of recent die- : policymakers would be. less in- 71 e, -r A T -Closures, Paisley,.,, ''could have been working forthe ether side.' . ` :.QtheT membersofthe B Team h conerefic -today to release new evidence shesays was sa however; ~ that Paisley may verlooked in, the- autopsy=ofthei Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100090001-9 STAT Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000109 THE BALTIMORE SUN 27 June 1979 Was sus ec Wilmington (API- Several . members of a secret T.S. intelligence team claim 3chhn Paisley was the prime suspect of' leaks to newspapers about their project, according to the Wilmington News-Jour- nal. Mr. Paisley. a- former Central Intelli- gence Agency official who served as a lial' sons between the agency and the team, dis- appeared while sailing 1nr the Chesapeake Bay September 24. The secret "B Team" of experts on the Soviet Union -was. set up by the federal government to test CIA assessments of So- , strength, according to the viet military newspaper. -.. . The article quoted David Binder, a re- porter for the New York Times, as saying Mr. Paisley was the prime source for?hb. article about the team's highly classified work In that story, air. Binder wrote of the B Team's. opinion that the CIA had underes- timated Soviet military strength. Mr Binder told the News_JouT that while it is highly unusual to reveal a coaf'idestial source,, he was doing so in this. case be- cause he believed Mr. Paisley was dead---. Some members of the team told the NewsJournal that they felt Mr. Paisley may have leaked the information out of professional loyalty to the agency where he worked for 25 yeaM During that time, be participated in developing some of the assessments the B Team was scrutinizing-' The B Team's role was, done a thorough and Mr. Paisley-had in asae ng met length. s aisle r - Seymour Weiss, a former StawDepart tent official, said a Soviet agent would want to discredit the team's conclusion that the CIA was "underestimating Soviet strength." He said such discrediting would .prevent U.S. policymakers from reacting ? by getting tougher." .. M,- Weiss said that anyone connected with leaking secrets from.the team could be a double agent: At the time-Mr. Paisley fOr the disappeared. he was working on a repot about the B Team project, the newspaper said. A draft of the report was found on his boat when it was found- drifting-on the Chesapeake Bay, according to the artide. Meanwhile, an attorney for Mr. Pais- - ley's estranged wife has. callea press evidence. conference for today to present that the former oficial, who was thought- to have committed suicide, was murdered.-, The press conference Was. scheduled for Solomons, Md., near?wbere Mr. Pais- ley's boat, the Briliig. Was found aground--. last fall.' .., The body identified as Mr. Paisleyrs. was. recoveered a week later, floating is the bay. The body was weighted with div ing belts and a bullet wound was found in trf? the head.,:_:.~.;.- ... .. , ~_.:.:.,~ ~~=w?Y:?._ Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100090001-9 Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00010 Article appeared on page B-7 Jack Anderson THE WASHING TON POST' 17 June 19 79 SMT ISpeeding the Arms sew issues are more confusing to the average American than SALT IL Ex.pertswith the hestiniormation and the best intentions have come down on did- metrically opposed sides of the contro- versy. So how is the bewildered citizen supposed to figure out, what, it's all: about? On the face of it. SALT seems straightforward . enough: Strategics Arms Limitation Talks.. Judging it onthis basis, most Americans have sup. ported what they understandably see. as an agreement that will put a lid on our extravagant defense spending_ But our associate.' Dale- Van Arta; after reviewing scores of, top-secret documents and interviewing- several knowledgeable . intelligence- . sources; found the picture: confusing and co tradictory. However; :. one =`.thing.emerges crystal clear.: The treatysigned by President Carter and -Soviet boss Leonid Brezhnev in Vienna will stimulate the arms.-rae,'not stop, it. That was the case with. SALT I, and.there ?is no reason .to suppose SALT ITwill have a different effect.:... .. ?:t ? To put' it bluntly, the Russianscheated on SALT L The Americans re sponded by. trying. _to.: - develop new weapons, such as -multiple-warhead missiles, that would meet. the letter of the treaty, if not its spirit=a technique) that might be called-"legal cheating.,, ?.~ in, b th.. case _the-results - . were:. the same: increased mruitary spending, not disarmament. The difficulty is the=. SALT agree- meats seems to be that they are based on the premise that,. to prevent a.ntr clear holocaust, each of the superpow- ers must have enough deliverable bombs to ensure the other's destruction ---on equal terms of horror.. If either the United States or the Soviet Unioncould wipe out the other without itself ;suffering .total obliteration, .SALT would be a failure. Former - Defense secretary Robert McNamara, with pos. sibly unintended.irony;..terms this con- cept "Mutual Assured Destruction" MAD. _ Former President Nixon and his n tional security Svengali, Henry Kissint ger, spelled out the four operating prim- . "L Maintain high confidence that our second strike [retaliatoryl capabil- ity is sufficient to deter an all out sir prise attack on our strategic forces. " 2- Maintain forces to insure that the Soviet Union would have no incentive to strike the United. States first in a crisis. "3. Maintain the capability to deny; the Soviet Union the. ability to causei significantly more .deaths and "in- dtistrial damage in-the United States iu i a nuclear wax than they themselves would suffer. "- Deploy defenses which limit dam. age from small attacks or accidential launches to a low level." Insiders told us, that .these "Dr, Strahgelove" guidelines have not been n- changed by Under SALT I,. the four MA]) prmc`~ p ies actuallyprovided the impetus for in- creased military spending .to develop new. missiles that would be our in- surance against World._ War .111, The agreement limited the"number of mis- sties Permitted each nation--a ceiling that had not yet been reached-but not the number of warheads in each missile Both Russia and the United States used that loophole . in SALT I to in. crease their nuclear stockpiles without actually violating the treaty. Not con tent with such legal stretching of the Pact's provisions, the Soviets simply re- sorted to violations of the SALT Iagree- meat, the record indicates: . American adherence, generally, to the letter of the treaty put the United States in a declining strategic osition vie-a-vie-'the Soviet Union. S:~LT I al- lowed once superior strategic position. To counter this development, the pentagon asked for and received big- ger and bigger appropriations to de- velop more frightening gr weapons, on a,tnds thatwe must keep abreast of the Soviets' legal- and extralegal armx buildup The same thing began ' happening again even before the SALT II treaty was signed, President Carter has explained that SALT II demands that we-inerease our armament to the ceilings set by the latest. agreement. Political, analysts told ciples of ),LAD in.: the top-secret Na-, us that only under the shadow of SALT tional Security Denis wg4ym i si J Rb1e9 3716 of June 24,1969;for a guidance ofl sewn - to the Russians.. our military leaders- ,. , - - would. such increased military expen& tares gain public acceptance.-.'..:: ace The long term increase in defense spending serves a short-term domestic) political goal: It may appease Senate ~ hawks who would otherwise vote against ratification of the SALT agree. ment. Carter, meanwhile, is selling SALT II on the basis that, without the treaty, the arms race would be even { hotter. This, of course, is a theory that can never be proven. However, using all the facts at their disposal, analysts in. the Central lntelli. gence Agency have raised doubts about the theory. According to one of the CIA's secret National Intelligence Esti- mates, the experts concluded: "If a SALT 11 agreement is not achieved, we believe that the. Soviet._ leaders' objec- tives for their strategic forces would be `much the same.".: ? -.: ?. Warning that. the Soviets can be ex- pected to be far-more aggressive with fl',e agreement than we will be, a CIA I estimate explains:' 'Deeply held tdeo' logical and doctrinal convictions impeli the Soviet leaders to pose as an ulti mate goal the attainment of a dominant; position over the West, particularly the; U.S., in terms of political, economics cial and military strength." - - =- Whether ' this: eternal goal of "Soviet policy will be affected by SALT It and, so, to what extent, the CIA Cannot to l ! i In the end, the experts concluder ? all seems to boil down to this:.WtlCor .without SALT Z- -the best deter_ nt:o both sides is mutual ignorance of inten tions. The Russians-don't know :?wha the man inthe''White?House would.dol in` a particular. situation.'. and we-doh' know what.-the-men. in the, w Krek ould do.' In an' uncezrtain: world; uzictaihty} maybe our best hopeforsurviva?_? R000100090001-9 Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R0001000 ARTICLE i FF- THE WASHINGTONIAN ON PAGE _ May 19 7 9 Edited byJoseph Goulden i he r grey rue Turner Is in Trouble Another wave of departures at the Central Intelligence Agency- many of them under pressure- has so outraged some senior offi- cials that one of them, in only halfhearted jest. is advocating a "coup d'etat"-to topple Director Stansfield Turner. Certainly Langley contains the classic ingredients for revolution: an autocratic and unpopular lead- ership, a demoralized citizen- ry, loss of pride, and bumbling performance. The person being pushed by the intelligence community for Tur- ner's chair is Frank Carlucci, his present deputy. A skilled bureau- crat. Carlucci is one of the few hizh-level Nixonites to retain power in the Caner administra- tion. He first gained prominence as a troubleshooter in HE%'/, then luckily sat out the Watergate years as ambassador to Portugal, and came to the CIA in 1977. Although Carlucci has no in- telligence background, pros re- spect him as a talented adminis- trator with the good sense to keep his hands off daily agency opera- tions_ "As director," says one official, "Carlucci would be content to work as a manager and not try to play superspy." Turner commands no such re- -- spect among intelligence career- ists serving under hint. He is blamed for the current brain-drain of resignations that is stripping the agency of what one person calls its "intellectual cadre. " The more than 300 resignations since January 1 include such key fig- ures as William Christison. chief of the office of regional and' political analysis; Vincent Hey- man, chief of the operations center: and Sayre Stevens, deputy director of the National Foreign Assessment Center. To insiders, these departures are even more serious than Stanfield Turner Turner's ''Halloween Massacre" in 1977, when he summarily fired, retired- or reassigned more than 800 clandestine operatives. many by terse form-letter. "In 1977," one official says, "Turner got rid of the spooks. This time he got rid of the brains." Even loyalists concede the CIA was overloaded with Cold War-era covert officers. Yet they decry Turner's ouster of analysts responsible for refining the rivers of raw intelligence that flow in daily from agent and em- bassy reports, satellite pictures, and electronic intercepts. 1'Iay 1979 Rightly or wrongly, the view within the CIA is that Turner is preoccupied with self-promotion. He wants to incorporate the De-i fense Intelligence Agency, the: Pentagon's spy branch. into the CIA, and elevate the post of di-! rector of Central Intelligence to, Cabinet rank. Turner lost both these attempts during the last round of budget' writing. But he continues to curry favor with the White House, and particularly with Zbigniew Brzezinski_ Carter's national- security adviser- Turner is ac- cused by subordinates of rewrit- ing National Intelligence Esti- mates to avoid any SALT 11 or detente ripples. He is also said to. have cut off the agency's Iranian desk from key message traffic during the Shah -s final turbulent days. Defense Secret`rv Harold Brown, also knocked off the routine list. dispatched a. spy of his own to pilfera copy of one key cable from the National Security Council. Prognosis: The intelligence community is capable of toppling an unwanted dire,-tor-witness the hapless Theodore Sorensen, The same voices are now being raised, in quiet congressional of- fices and elsewhere- against Stang field Turner- By fall, expect Jimmy Carter to see Turner as heavy baggage and find some-` Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100090001-9 Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100090001-9 ARMED FORCES JOURNAL. INTERNATIONAL April 1979 Grim Ne I Xn+elligence AueSam_ent Released On USSR Sfl teg c Arms A NEW NATIONAL iNTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE, NIF I 1-3-3. "paints a dark:,_ picture" of Soviet strategic arms pr( r?s: than its prcdecessor, completed in the fall of 1977, informed Administration sources have told AFJ. The highly classified new assessment is nicknamed "NIE Eleven and Three-Eights." According to sources who took part in preparing the assessment and are intimately familiar with its final content, it contains "nothing new or startling, but shows things moving more rapidly than before." Specifically, "the Minuteman problem is coming faster," according to one source, a reference to the land-based missile's increasing vulnerability to a Soviet first strike because "the whole accuracy picture" of Soviet ICBMs is "changing dramatically." Contributing to Minuteman's earlier than expected vulnerability is the fast rate at which the USSR has been "fractionating" its missiles, that is, adding greater numbers of warheads to them- Sources say the new assessment projects "much uncertainty on Soviet force loadings," how many warheads of what type each missile carries. "We don't know how they're loaded; we can't look under the nose-cone." Under SALT II, the Soviets as well as the US would be prohibited from deploying land-based intercontinentali ballistic missiles with more than ten warheads each. However, a New York Times report of March 14th by Richard Burt says that the CIA has evidence the Soviets have been adapting their largest missile, the SS-l8, to carry 14 warheads. The SS-18 was tested more than a year; ago, in October of 1977, with a new, warhead called "Mod 4" that demonstrated an accuracy cf 0.15 nautical! miles, or less than 300 meters. Thei Defense Department tells AFJ that it hasj no evidence the Soviets have deplo}?ed ICBMs with an accuracy better than 500 meters. N .: Eli Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100090001-9 Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137RO01 ARTICLE APPEARED WILMINGTON NE14S JOURNAL ON PAGE (_ 1 April 1979 is ea a2:: kri ? ~ 'i~ ? r ~ !' ' , ,. : a . _: ?~ 7 .r??a BY JOE TRENTO >:?. Because of its concern-about Paisley's fat and e - and RICHARD SANDZA -' its. possible effect on. the SALT situation; t e U S. a" lsnteSlt Cmitt on Ielli e lun ea_eecomeentgeneached WASHTh ETON Former. CIA official-John.A+-- . man investigationinto?the Paisley Paisley .participated ln.the negotiations-of -the first .That investigation: :became bogged in down strategic arms limitation treaty, intelligeuce.sources anuary-and the committee- asked,:the JustiCe? De- confirmedlastweek: .partment for_help.-,TbefFBLiwas then asked to Paisley was "'in Helsinlf, Finland to .advise:?the' , ,;reviewthe- information available to the Senate..: U.S. negotiators.-on the. nation's capability to tnoni- 3 ".?~''?The: outcome,-reported- last. vreek -=didn't make 'tor _Soyiet compliancewith the treaty,. according. to- the-,Senate committee feel any better: Sources inthe? intelligence-"sources: The treaty was signed in 1972 : `= ~ Senate have-told- the--Sunday-News Journal that the Paisley's disappearance while sailing. in Chesa- FBI. merelLconfirmed the finding of the Maryland- 'peake- Bay-I last--year?`had; caused grave concern State Police- that - Paisley probably committed ?sui- 1 among members-of tlthe4J;S..Senate and the: intelli=::,-,':tide- .The. Justice- Department-_reeommended no: genre community. further Paisley investigation: Their concern ceriters'arbund the SALT II treaty '-"-The CIA has 'repeatedly denied' that-any- classz~- currently. being negotiated:-Senators - and other - fled documents were found among Paisley's papers. .government officials uneasy-about-arms limita-_ But sources-in the.intelligence community-have told tion are trying to determine-) -whether: -;--the:. Sunday.-News .Journal that--among Paisley's, disappearance has anything-to do with-his intimate : - papers; -was a top-secret CIA .telephone directory, -knowledge- of the nation's=intelligence;network: He -: which.-contains the. names of employ ees~p----both was especially-lolowledgeable --about?ahe??nation's undercover, and otherwise. super-secret spy satellite system-L-the veryreason : In, the past the CIA has pressed for. prosecution -he was sent to the SALT I talks:: . ; of people,who have. removed telephone- directories - : Committee--members- are,-also upset::about the:: ` from headquarters at Langley, Va. Last:year-one handling of a note found-: in Paisley's - personaL. =man was-sentenced to l5 years in prison, for- stealing papers. - The note, according to a source, on. the: . a- telephone= directory- that was less sensitive. than .committee, -was in-Paisley's handwriting and said,- -the one in Paisely's papers:: The-phone books. would "Now; what-about Shevchenko?". be very valuable to Soviet agents , tantamount to :..The CIA destroyed the note,.telling thecommit giving them. a blueprint for-penetration' .an intelli tee it had no signifieance;?a committee.source said. 'genre source said.. ri; i J- Arkadyi N:. Shevchenko,? who until -his: defection. _ ;Paisley, was- deputy' director?-of, strategic. re-? : .Held the top Soviet job at.the U:N., was the Soviet's: =_ .search at.the CIA when. he: retired in 1914::.He.was lea ding. expert- on disarmament: Shevehenko defect-;_ `:subsequently given several assignments on'contract - STAT edlastAp:- i.:i~ryv-`;-: ?~, _x:r. ~. ?=:~::untilhi di appe ~,,:. r ::;~ CIA or_ _L Co n ~ ""ea.a~~: >_ .. S 5 arance:-T~; ?. ;~ ?.3._ 3i?';i.:~t ntii < - ;..._: The y ued tor#use;rommez-t' isley cases !e Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100090001-9 Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00010009 001-9 TFIE GEORGETCI1 + INTEFNATIONAL NEWS GEORGETOUTYi UNIVERSITY 13 March 1979 Intelligence reports so released-including, according to Latell, "soma of the agency's By Bill Mcllhenny most important analytic works"--have grown in number from only 29 in 1972 to Until.. a,few, years ago, [CIAh, foreign 'approximately 150 lastyear intelligence' analysts were perhaps the most ',Among the works :,received'. through; obscure-participants in the foreign policyti ~ - DOCEX have been estimates of Soviet and process..:-^T~ Chinese energy capabilities and analyses of During the I-ast five years -orso, mostbf-"' political elites :;::_?--__ -V that has changed dramatically as the average-,'-'"- ':. Further,: although hey -.must stilt - be- CiA analyst has emerged from his previous =-. canscientous: with ;regards-to. sensitive-; anonymity- and silence- sources; C!'A analysts are encouraged- to- participate:.: and` function?-much. as their So asserts Dr. Briar,'Late1F, former Asso-- academic counterparts"in 1977 alone, 300- ciate Coordinator for Acadmesc relations-;, analysts attended conferences-and conven- and External-Analytic Support in, the Cen.-. .clone in their-areasofiritarestandwarding...- tral Intelligence Agency Ire fearth e past,;: to Latell," they open.y and freely identified five years : have seen numerous far-reaching _-their agency - affiliation.'rrLikewise. Latell changes-including structural- reorganize- assorts; a "vigorous new effort is currently tion-which,: have in effect, opened up the ;iunderway -to- add a number of additional CIA's. research- and ,analysis, components- experts to our panels of consultants."? . ti. , The result has been to make these cam-:_.:-_ ^`,Perhaps _ - one of- the most important-; ponents more responsive to a greater public = internal CIA reorganizations was the cre- and private audience. Latell,_ who is cur-? etion last year of the Nations{, Foreign rently at Georgetown teaching a course on Assessment Center. -.The= center, .which the revolutionary process in Latin.America, . _ Latell stresses is "completely overt,'" con- states that because of this. new openness,-.. -_:solidated "all of the CIA components that- "'the public derives more from itstax dollars, do. substantive research aid estimates under spent for intelligence. and the CIA has a single management-" .-The center special- _ ene fired from useful critiques from outside lets? he continues, " b examine and assess the political , economic, military, scientific, and :Typical of these changesis the CIA's in- technological affairs of foreign countries." creasing participation (since 1972). in the -The center is organized into several offices, Library of Congress' Document Exp.[9iting ? such as tnc Offices of Ecoriomic Research Proles - (OOCEX), by whim- unclassified ? Political . Analysis, arid- Gaographic. Re.. studies are distributed to subscribers out- - search which Latell likens to v ri , a ous side. -of -the-, government. Among these .: - departments at a university.-we operate as b su scribers are over 100 university libraries. 1 -.Approve d For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-011378000100090001-9 CONGRESSIO ST-AT much so that it has almost- become a is in the best of American traditions of Issued a report in 1978. This. of course, cliche. After-all, who can be against hu- standing up for the underdog-the op- is a public report. _ man rights? Who? pressed. The majority on the committee,. who But is it not time to bridge the gap Mr. President, let us begin this Senate -are our colleagues and with whom we between rhetoric and action? To my : with a pledge--a pledge to lead the move- share the closest association, concluded, mind, the time for action is long overdue. meat for human rights both here and - that "past national intelligence esti- Th a -a ste s this body can -abroad. mates could have profited from drawing _4A c r p take and I want to make one specific The hour is already late. in experts on Soviet strategic questions suggestion today" Butwe can do no less. N from outside the intelligence community, ..Lau.4a...6uw .ago., w..r..._ ____ THE LATEST ESTINLATE;3 Ur' War II--the Genocide Convention.- Feting assessments from such sources." this treaty is simple- declar-- :.. VIET STRATEGIC. STRENGTH .. _ : However; it went on to fault the "eom- ? -p~ ppge .. ing genocide an international crime.-.'-, Mr. MoYNIHAN. Mr. President, Sen. : petitive analysis'.'.-- -,experiment on the d th t' a s whether it is committed-in times of war::: ator WALLOP and I wish to take.the time .groan or peace What could be morn straight- of the senate today to discuss a matter The composition of .the- B Team dealing forward? More ethical? We are 'simply. of very large' consequence, .in : our view with Soviet objectives wad-so structured that attempting. to outlaw- the heinous,. out-: '_ My distinguished colleague, the senior the ou eme a exercise was pre- d T are me - - termihed and the experiment's cxintributi= au- i i n m rageous, crime -of genocide-t re mass : Senator from Wyo lt; an lessened. The intelligence agencies were cast murder of-members of racial: ethnic, na-.' :. `bers .of the Intelligence Committee and in,: the- role' of . "doves" when over the years inc iss ox supporters os cometiozne poor to LuBuwi Yuc LusYYC.s o[ views.; :..-:_,,.: ? ~_ U__ i th` hi h th Intelli ence Committee n the Genocide. Convention grown- 10 wi c e g . -'"In separate views-appended to the ma- . number so that now every major sell; ;: deals.: Indeed, we do so today in large , _a__, --_ - .___4__ ...o e,.o . 4 - . l,oo;, ,mina, . jority report, Senator WALLOP and I. in ' can Bar Association-And' even:. more irn- - cycle- in, the activities of the executive YLLAY 1111e very ea=Yeuce ul UM. n teaLLL .- - .. . ,_ - - - -1- L-___L __ _._L ...e .._ r-m +., .:was a siLai of the serious auestions which Truman., Kennedy, Jobnson:_ ..Nixon, -:: cuss a matter which would not neces- " 1Le4Li rlscll cvuLT.rlullg trur ac:cuiacy yr our estimates - of Soviet strate ic g Ford, and Carter have repeatedly.called.. sarily be possible to discuss later on. ~. ,_ ~~L aL_ ,_a_~ __~--L ... strength- we hothnoted thFrimnorts~nre.' rassmeni wu.u uC uvvswauo - - aua- .' __ and are in?the process o[ doing- so has gone Of days with proper consideration -and 'Soviet, intercontinental ballistic missile [in the past year] from heresy to respect- ocuy. 1-i - .?.._.. ._? ,- ---- - -- - - -- P NOW, Mr. President, the purpOSe _of As my colleagues have heard me say there lids been a growing concern that, , - our rising resident is now some evi- time and again, the case for ratification : the intelligence community may have trop For the benefit of.been- generally underestimating the'ex-'. dence on this matter in the form of an i t l e em s g. s x r e y -, my 20 new colleagues. I. would like to re tent, the dynamism, and the seriousness . open letter to President Carter, signed view the case for ratification. of purpose of the Soviets' long and per 'by more than: 170 retired generals and First, the United States is ..the only sistent buildup of their military and, in admirals. I asks unanimous consent that major Western nation that has failed to particular, of their strategic forces. ? ~; -'_this letter, published, in the New York i..-+ C..nA.... L_ _--J s, - Lo snore winning Us iu. LL, OJLUVIY LUValMir7. r .. ~. .. u. .. ... .: ordered: ; no sense to ask our representatives: to =been one:of.the inspired actions of the... '.'.:.,.,::.,-;_..?, .? .l .:;:Y `'' ' _ - .. . _?..aL.__. _L_a____ t__'.v,.r__ __~ .a ~_ -. .-..(See exhibit'1`1?,:c;?.,-_...__.?:._ - - O Vasa ....` __ ..: r.:. -._. _. .r +._ . again-.oy. our Lacs. or aCLion'-vi.n,l?IAIl?_'?. aaw~.+..,s.a+..uc,.a aa~o,a rights treaties here in the Senate_' time'=:t the Honorable George Bush - :7Y1The National: tnteutgenca >9timate;..the -_._ - -_ - - _ _:.vt Gli?:)1AT'L+S+idb rr Q. a.,.-,rww.n..i.r-M.r_ - ?: TaonaL law requrres .tna: 'rY.eZUr,.il 41L- Y[i r_; USaWLL iS ULLL-1JCL ULL5LUZ IUe sLLIL V LL43.UG= - that the Soviet Union is, heading -for - :Y j.. major' nations of the, world. Our ratifi :thesGovernmentwho had; over the yearss :superiority-not.:: parity is :the anilitarv' cation will speed the development or m-: Laren a generally more somber -Viewoi.?,_ arena.-.This represents a complete reversal-?' ternational law in'this vital humarrrighta %;-the Soviet military buildup, was assigned:- or official judgments that were a substantial spur renewed interest in-.n?m ngntS.... to sec .-L Dvv1cb ucluavror surnutetj vL treaties by the newly emergent nations. explanations other than those offered in' I hasten_to point out that I have not . ence long. after- these:' treaties??rwere -; ments and which might better -account mate to which the retired officers refer...'. - . Fourth,President Carter ' fas made The B team report was critical of past' speak -soo freely about it in open session.: human rights the cornerstone ofour fns estimates of Soviet, strategic strength For this reason, I wish to speak now on eign policy-a move which many. of us in, and reached somber assessments- of the -the basis of the open letter and of an. the Senate have both urged: sand.- ap- challenge posed by it. Unfortunately, article in the New York Times of Janu- plauded. But our . Nation's represent-:,,: information concerning this report, ary 12, which discusses the letter. I feel atives need the tools to carryout this -which,. like the national estimates them justified in doing this on the grounds. policy and this treaty will.-strengthen. -selves, was highly classified; was leaked that these 170 retired generals and ad- - their hand. .. : < to the press at the end of 1976. As a re- mirals probably -possess sufficiently good - : And, finally, ratification- is importan suit, the Select .Committee on Intelli- 'connections to know what they are talk- because it is the right thing to do. It gence undertook an investigation of the - -ing about. and being men of, good char- an imuortant amied&tarld.l k?Amd abeam ie>llieades as it wai AW_An8R sir lnAalirMu&tton. would not inis- Approved For Release-200610 30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00 1 Mnuary .25, 1979 STAT A l ve A-9 p, or Release 2006/01/30: CIA-RDP90-01137R0001 ON ?AGE? w~.w THE BALTIMORE SUN 24 January 1979 In the nation t,- with paint at Ohio State ligenca Agency recruiter was splattered with` red paint during a demonstration at' ,..,.-.Ohio State University yesterday. The recruiter, a woman whom Ohio State 'police refused -to. identify.. was'- doused with paint but not: injured as she worked in the placement office of the Col- lege of Engineering Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100090001-9 Approved For Releag612OD6,gii'N1'P37R000100090001-9 Article appeared 22 January 1979 on page A-16 Disposal Urged Os CIA -Files For 3 Men in confined.the head of a foreign politi- cal party to a mental hospital at the height: of the : Cold War. and. consid- ered - disposing of. him - when he.' re-.. fused to stay .put:., The 29?year-'old political-leader, who had been working clandestinely for the. agency, was one of three "disposal, problems" described... in'.: ?CIA : docu-:;. ments released last. week under the Freedom of Information Act.- The, heavily censored documents- made public at the request- 'of - the Church pf,.Scientoiogy---did, not reveal the fate of the three men. A-1952 memo discussed the disposal of an unidentified "young,'. ambitious, bright" leader of a small political party . "ostensibly working for . inde?, pendence of an. unidentified foreign count zy. _._..,... .. . The memo -said the CIA arranged for him to betaken into custody by his '-The -?Central intelligence Agency telligence agency. country's police after learning he . was. considering. selling. out to- another" in- i The document said the young politi. cian was held in prison for six months until he -became a "nuisance". and the police "told our- people .to take him back-'- it said the CIA then put him in a mental' hospital "a''s a psychopathic pa- tient":..even though "he. is not a. psy- chopathic personality." "He.has-now been in a,-hospital-for several-', months and-- the hospital au-' thorities.,now, want.. to- get him `out since--he' is' causing considerable trou-:' he ," `th e: document said. . The memo, then. -suggested brain- washing the agent into sticking by the CIA. If that fails; it said, -"disposal : is perfectly O.K." : - . . -A 1951 memo asked-a- "senior repre sentative".,.of an unidentified depart- ment for .help in -disposing.-, of two.. other.troublesome agents: '' "These. two men are disposal prob- lems,-one because of his lack of abi1-' ity to carry out a mission and another: because he cannot get along with the chief agent of... the. --project, the, memo said. ': - -. . - _ The memo, in an. indication that at least one-of the agents was being'held in solitary confinement, said he "is al-- ready-somewhat stir-crazy-?anct ?-lras tried to escape twice," Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100090001-9 Approved For Release 2006/01/30: CIA-RDP99 ART 1 CL AI F ARE.D WAS?1r11GTON STaa.R eti'1 YlHn T.%1VV 1 (Y7111 By Robert Pear washiagton Su Staff W iter- :;This is one of many_new responsi =~ biltiies- assigned to the attorney' 3general by a presidentaii.d a Congress.: ;'anxious to curb abuses, by the intelli . ._{gience agencies "" IN AN EXCEUTIVEorder:last year;; restructuring the intellligence com- K,munity, President Carter'"gave the-' attorney, general a large role in over- seeing and monitoring all-intrusive activities that might invadecitizens' privacy. Sometime ' soon; probably next month. Chief Justice Warren E. Bur- get will designate' seven;Jederal judges to sit in Washington- on -a spe- cial court like.nabother court in the .,.. ? , ..?:, :.. world - - The tribunal: willconductsall. its business in:-secret and will- have. one main purpose. to approve 'or - disap- prove warrants for electronic surveil- lance of spies, counterspies, embas- ,, . ?I. have had responsibility for hold- sies, international: :,. terrorists, ingthe intelligence the saboteurs and, in exteptional- cases, i . rule of law," Attorney General Griffin American citizens with-information I 13. Bell said in a recent speech. deemed essential to national security. :Bell., who spends one-fourth of his The judges, drawn.f rom. different time-on. intelligence matters, must regions of the country, will-been- ,,issue or approve, procedures for Masted with some of the most;sensi- numerous activities such as television - tive secrets of the FBI the."Central . surveillance; undercover participa- Intelligence Agency and the"National _,tion: in domestic organizations and"; Security Agency. F. u N the FBI s foreign intelligence pro- "The most skilled foreign. intelli- gram .--- gehce agents in the world:-will be = On Dec. 21, Bell met with, CIA Direc- seeking this information,'-" Defense .`. tor Stansfield Turner and Chief Jus- Secretary Harold Brown predicted. tice?. Burger. to discuss security Court orders will identify the tar procedures for the new foreign intel- et of surveillance, describe the tech- ligence court g et 'of is not known yet, where the veillance." _:. -.-_ ..;=.; .;,?, ". _ THE COURT WILL be anew venture in-every-way, as critics pointed out THE - NEWS COURT '-was 'one_ of debate on the billlast year. `several checks on the intelligence m~1:.:''.- :,;.. community. required -bythe:.Foreign'- = = ,Rep.' Robert McCIory;-?R-Ill.,:' de- :Intelligence Surveillance Act a U979.- ,;dared; "Thi special-court itself is un .---in signing the measure las~O to- : 'r,precedented: The secret hearings are -ber, President Cartersafd:tbA ':it "re--: ,;:.unprecedented. The secret record is quires, for the first time, a prior judi-~ :.;'unprecedented." Never before, lie. cial warrant _fQr all electronic - `-'s4d has a court.-been bl to pass surveillance for: fdfeiga.iaielligence - upon>the exerise~o re:cecutive au-_I or counterintelligence- purposes in thorfty with-regard. to national se- -the United States in which- communi- . ,clarity and foreign. affairs: cations of U.S. persons might be inter-, '."? 4On the other side of the political, ce ted " = i I~ F_ D b s r nan; ert pectrum, Rep. Ro p ? . electronic surveillance of authorize d surveillance 01 Previously, presidents claimed an :,Mass., also denounced the bill,-saying h l m i h d s use anne un icat on c com arm s u "inherent" constitutionab:right to it was':-`totally unprecedented- in_the c ?ei? ,,,, exciT; aps for fo o S n f A h i J uaaa axo w sto y o ngl - ole i y powers- This type of wsur- eign intelligence purposes, even ?prudetice_' rr_ vi-illnnrp it yp of warrantless when there's fo rrant when in ale- a na napp g .: Kennedy and We currentdirecCVra VL gather evidence of a crime: the FBI,, CIA and NSA all endorsed the cepting communications of an Ameri~ ..., can citizen--_ ney general wo v ,,pp ~re~q Dp 1 any application o MN io _courtt~ dectsions abou Mat late ll>,- "'Judges add an"'auraoflegaiity to -? ':the process. ..," said Sen.; Malcolmf -electronic surveillance authorized by ,,.the special court: would be ipso facto` ton university law professor;.tound it, q curious that governiaent;officials `would support a bill supposedly cir cumscribing their' authority. "That; to their enthusiasm for the bill:'.--.' z -=The American. Civil Liberties Union supported the proposal, even- Amendment '= ACLU FAVORED the bill because it- repealed an-."inherent" presidential - meat and finally set a criminal stand- U.S. citizens or. permanent resident-. In other words, whenever a citizen. there must be evidence that his activi-- ties may involve:' a crime..: The new law, sets carefully grade aliens; somewhat less-. protection' to ! and illegal aliens; and still less protec- - The distinctions, may- seem irrele-- Truong; the Vietnamese expatriate .gets of surveillance in several cele?_:; brated cases- -.general, without a-court order, can, AWPX#Al For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R0001000 ON PAGE i ce. THE NEW YORK TIMES 12 January 1979 1'0 Reared. TOP Military Offic W Carter oFa Soviet h 1e By DREW MIDDLETON more than 170'retired generals and ado mirals have warned President. Carter of. what they describe as an "increasing Soviet challenge'' to the United States. In an open letter, they said a National Intelligence Estimate that is described as "the most authoritative U.S., Govern- . meet evaluation of intelligence data" had --finally acknowledged that the= Russians were "heading for superiority snot parity, aroma in the military The letter said an -Americana intera- gency study orr the global military bal- ance concluded recently that "in a nonnu-' clear conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States in the Middle East; Israel alone might deter Soviet combs forces' intervention or prevent the com pletion of such deployment."' -_ . -. .- Were it not for the ability of Israel's ground forces, the officers declared, the United States would have to station sig- nificant forces and equipment in the Mid-) dle East... ..;- _ _,. . Soviet Objectives Described The signers, among whom were 6 generals, 15 lieutenant generals and 4 ad- mirals, included Adm. Elmo It. Zumwalt Jr.. former Chief of Naval Operations; Gen. Paul L Freeman Jr.. former ArmY commander in Europe; Gen Park- er. former Army chief of staff in Europe; Can. Albert C. Wedemeyer. who w commander of the-.China theater a operations at the end of Worid.War II'. Maj. Gen John K. Siaglaub, former chief Maj. Gen: George 7. Keegan Jr., forme chief of cnteliige+ace, . United Stares reel's value an an ally that can defend i _- o .self oval th to avoid sending American-fore n 'irn al- obj The Soviet- Union'sr'peii tives" were described'as the neutralize lion of Western Europe; partly by deny- ing it access to oil., the encirclement of China and, the isolation of the . United States. The letter said the Soviet focus on th .Middle East to reach these objectives represented "a real and growing that to Western security." It said Soviet infl ? ence and power bad expanded in the east, ern Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, Afp had come under Soviet control and ""an~~ iC forces" were harms the in Iran and Turkey: - -, -- -? Cuban mercenaries were described as carrying out Soviet policies in Angola, Ethiopia, Zaire. Syria and Lebanon. -- -- Debate on Arms Accord In appealing to the President to "re- store the global military balance,,., the writers foreshadowed what is expected to be a national debate over the second; strategic arms limitation treaty~E~el absence of an. -indispensable equilibrium," they- said- "we oppose a . ''deal' that freezes the current imbalance and reinforces permanent. Soviet strate- gicsuperion :.:-:-~:: tY-=- .:Theletter said thecha3lena ~.~' ing in these areeas: ? 9The Soviet Union has developed seven. ICBM-missile systems since.1965, the United States one. 9The Russians have invested heavily. in submarine-launched ballistic missiles and modernized theirlCBM's 49Th e so-called Bacldire bomber, which the letter lists in the Soviet strategic arse. ' naI although the-Russians dal) it a medi- um-range aircraft, "is capable of deliver- ing weapons anywhere in the., United States without ref'aelina ? :.:.: 41 Soviet advances in multiple indeep n, ently targetable re-entry vehicles are rapidly overcoming the American lead in the quantityand quality of nuclear warheads- . : ? ,' = The development of 'Soviet naval power threatens vital sea lames that pro. vide resources essential to, the United . States..---_-.- -------??-_,_.- . 'she writers also mentioned a point raised by nuclear scientists? academic students of Soviet polity_ and many for. ei-t and American -. intelligence viet defense literates . et- "S o :analysts: the western doctrine of. presse rel J ?".^';^~ ? It relects. l speed#ically the notion thatQnuclear stwrua red ve and win- a nuclear. turgid to fights i war." _..- 1vlr: nu? ? including Israel taon of "g enuinepeaCe, and Japan as well as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100090001-9 Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R0001 DES MOINES REGISTER 5 January 1979 Taccountab It was only a few.:years ago, backfired. in. the faces of theirl during the turbulent 1960s and planners: the phony revolution in- early'70s; that government intel- Chile;,.: the. planned murder of' ligence agencies rampaged out of Fidel Castro; and. the it itallation.? control.- opening mail; breaking . of and support for Mohammed, into homes and. offices,. illegally Reza Pahlavi as shah of Iran..:; tapping telephones;: infiltrating :,;,.The FBI: should be required by community .:: organizations, .-,,law to restrict~itself to-the inves ' planning murder; ::overturning Ligation of actual.: or- suspected governments...:ft,: crime: It, must not, be- allowed to Thousands.~r.. -o:f;. iinnocent pervert the criminal law by using;: American-_ citizens: became. itto harass political dissidents or The public isr -potential`-, prey commit ' burglary.- Similar re-? today,. because Congress has strictions.must ne:placed on the failed to enact a comprehensive,-; : NSA.'- law governing operations- of.the ' - These organizations have~ Central IntjUj&Mco Agency;..the. aerated for years on the basis of= Fea Bureau of investigation, vague-laws and, in the case of the and the.National. Security.,;;:-NSA a secret executive order: Agency :Admittedly, it will be difficult to= The. legislation is foundering write a : -law- tight enough to.. because of an increasingly ;con- protect the privacy -and secur- servative Congress, the opposi-. :. ity of Americans . and flexible tion of many,;,-intelligence- - enough to enable the intelligence. public and the inherent difficulty.;:.. "hut it surely - is not impossi of. drafting a workable, fair law. ble,` and various independent Failure to. enact such a law groups that-have investigated in-. would be disastrous-The CIA, the telli;ence abuses have urged that FBI and the NSA have:.. dem- it be ,done; including the Rocke- onstrated devastatingly for many:: feller'.. Commission and the' to operate effectively `and: 7 ,;v;. ..y thout public clamor; it will- . honorably outside the law, and be easy for CCongress to evade its. d t Congress : cannot . be' truste o responsibility and permit the in- perform its oversight functions. ' telligence community to go its- Such a law should,.require the -::?own;.,way 'accountable to, no -one CIA to restrict its activities to but: itself: Before that happens, the collection! of :intelligence. the Congress and- the electorate: That's what it was created to do. should ; remember the wisdom of It was not created to plan the as- Y' philosopher-George Santayana;~ sassination of foreign leaders, _ar_'H Those who forget the mistakes of play assorted dirty tricks. the pasta are doomed to repeat those tricks have consistently , them.,. Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100090001-9 Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137ROO0100090 1, iT}C-~~ AP'P: Rx'1Z THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE) ail FL 24 October 1978 Question Centers on Documents He Handle The Washington-Star that federal- investigators-- will complete their investigations within 10 days. The CIA has.. denied -that -Paisley.- who retired from the agency in 1974 but-continued to serve as a,' consultant on Soviet military affairs. had access to i classified materials or that classified materials I were found on his sailboat or in his Washington apartment ? The committee is expected to review-those.docu ments that were turned over to the CIA by Pais-?.:; ley's wife. The Star has learned that; those docu- ments concerned work that Paisley was doing as coordinator of the CIA's B Team, a panel of civil- ians who do contract work for the agency.: The B Team made a recent assessment-of ?Soviet military strength based on highly classified infor-. -. mation that it received from the-CIA, according to the source. The.CIA's A Team;-a group of agency employees who are given the same information as the B Team and asked to make an assessment. Senate Panel 'Presses its Paisley Probe' nl. - gave a much "softer" report on Soviet military 13ybllchaelD.Davl VashingWnStar Staff Wmer ? ?? - -_: capabilities in a report it issued last February-- - Despite a Maryland State.Police declaration:_ THE COMMITTEE source said that the differ- that forms s h CIA o and kil killled ed .John A. himself Paisley almost ence in assessments "is not. significant" but that month, eSe 'earlier. ehis - Paisley's work with the team "by the very nature gene the Senate Select Commiti on Intore of the reports he wrote" indicated thathe did have access to classified information. -? - - - ---? off Paisley's s work. work. an investigation into the nature, o Pai - The source said.the committee is attempting to The She committee is afied. documen ents to o sten -:- -etermine whether the documents recovered from mine wheethther certain' classified documents .paisley's sailboat and from his apartment should which Paisley.had had. access had been handled: have approhavebeenkept under stricter security. Last wately appropriately, i. Tssaid. Smith, e The source said the committee does not.-at this L Last week Cot Thomas h snvstigat rs be- time believe that there was an intelligence com-?! State Police' said investigators the - promise or that Paisley was involved withthe theft' the MP i l ey- himself I ay to death and fell into th the earlier this yearof satellite documents.. - - . bay from om the e deck of his 31-fast sailboat. But,'he "The 'committee has a mandate-to see that said, the death officially is classified as "an unde- - ro procedures ; /,areare- used in the' handling - of and'that is what the cam-i termined death" because the evidence is not cart- intelligence ligece documents, elusive enough to make a formalruling of.suicide.. _ mittee is doing in?_the.Paisley case,"' the source A-SOURCE close to the -Senate' committee told said. -., ? I Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137ROO0100090001-9 Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R0001000 JOURNAL OF.THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICES INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE STUDIES March 1978 West look Fasts Understanding the Soviet Military Threat: How CIA Estimates Went Astray By W. T. Lee (National Strategy Information Center Inc, New York, 1977), $2.60, 74 pages In 1976, a heated debate arose amongst senior members official CIA estimates of Soviet defence spending. As a result President Ford's national security advisers set up a second team of specialists to make an independent assess- ment of Soviet defence spending, using the same sources as the official CIA team. The independent team assessed Soviet defence effort at approximately double the official estimate. The official estimate has since been revised, in fact doubled, to bring them in to line with the independent teams high figure, but many US commentators still consider this to be a significant underestimation of the actual Soviet military budget. . In his paper the main portion of which was originally written as a chapter of a larger study (Armes,. Nfen, and Military Budgets-Issues for Fiscal Year 1978, Crane Russak, NY, 1977) the author seeks to throw light on the preparation of the two estimates, and explain why the first official estimate was so very low. He has succeeded in producing an admirable summary of the main points of the estimates debate, and in giving a clear account of how the two estimates were arrived at. This alone makes the work worthy of attention. The author, however, is far less enlightening as to why the estimates differed so widely, and why the CIA were so ready to adjust the official estimate to agree with the independent team. In this latter regard, the work poses more questions than it answers, and casts a shadow on the integrity of the official CIA team. In view of the fact taut :ac ~.'hu1e esumates controversy has become a burning political issue, this result may not be accidental. C. N. DONNELLY Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137Fk000100090001-9 C C C, Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000 ARTICr?8 A_~P.h 1) THE NEId YORK TIMES ON PAGE -_ 'y 30 April 1978 Closer C.I.A.- hire H o s~ ' ~ se ~ : on Agency's Independence By RICILARD BURT -r-2 N-Lw 1=k mmes WASHINGTON, April 29-The Carter Ad.-rninistration's drive to make analyses prepared by the intelligence community more relevant to White House needs is raising questions in Administration and Congressional circles over whether the Central Intelligence Agency is able to ex- ercise independence on sensitive policy This concern is said to be reflected in a report by the Senate Intelligence Committee scheduled for release in the near future, which suggests that a much- ;publicized C.I.A.. study on Soviet oil i production may -have been manipulate by the White House- - I The committee report says that the study's conclusion that the Soviet Union would become a larger importer of of J.that analysis work on important intelli- in the early 1980's was probably wrong ! gence questions was performed by his but that the White House used the predic own staff. :tion to develop public Support for Presi w staff. T A Some officials maintain that this epi- in the Nixon years by its disagreements sode, which occurred last year, is symp- with Defense. Secretary Melvin Laird, tomatic of a new set of delicate problems who contended that the agency's esti- .that the Administration is encountering mates of the growth of Soviet military .in trying to make intelligence estimates capabilities were too low. In the early) more relevant to Administration policy. 1970's, Mr. Laird argued with Mr. Helms With too foreign policy officials taking -over whether a new Soviet missile, the an important role in determining what SS-9, was equipped with multiple war- !the C.I.A. addresses, the agency.may be ;heads. Although the C.I.A.'s contention too accommodating, some aides suggest that the missile did not possess such a "when the White, House orders' up a capability - was ultimately proved right study." one agency official said, "it is the dispute badly damaged the credibilit usually pretty clear what results it. is of C.I.A. estimates. looking cor." - - - ~ Central Section Dismantled The Administration has made a .con certed effort, in its plan to reorganize -? Morale was further weakened when the intelligence establishment and in r James R. Schlesinger, upon becoming cent changes made by the Director, o '.director of the agency in 1973, responded Central Intelligence, Adm. Stansfiel to concerns over intelligence bias by dis- Turner, to strengthen and centralize as. mantling the central analysis section in `sessment capabilities that withered in the the agency, the Office of National Esti Vietnam period and were further weak- mates. Aided by the Board ? of National ened by interagency feuding in the Estimates, a group of academics and spe- -Nixon Ford years. cialists who advised on intelligence ques- -tion Addressin the office had built a reputation g New Questions' _ s. i n 'began last-summer, is also designed to Mr. Schlesinger replaced both the Board redirect intelligence work to such new and the Office of National Estimates with 'problems'as terrorism and nuclear prolif- a group of national intelligence officers, eration, which are of growing interest each responsible for a' different area of to policy-makers. These steps have won analysis. "There-was a feeling," one offi- the approval of most intelligence-officers cial recalled, "that they were a bunch as well as the two congressional intelli- :....' of staff officials whose basic job was genre committees. - to match intelligence evidence to the But in undertaking these changes, views of the White House.". - several intelligence officials said recently, .. Now, in the Administration's effort to the Administration has confront make sure that the C.I.A.'s views are not a familiar problem: how to insure that shunted aside, the role of the Director intelligence information that appears to. has been strengthened and an effort his run counter to existing policy is neither been made to insure that Admiral Turner suppressed: nor -distorted. This problem, sees Mr. Carter at least once'a week. officials said, first emerged, in a serious At the same time a Cabinet-level intelli- Approved For Release 0194/3&hCI X17-0 13 iRG genre. information as Secretary of State Cyrus R- Vance and Secretary of Defense Haro1d.,R_Brown to_ define, their. needs According to intelligence officials who served at the time. C.I.A.- estimates that appeared to challenge President John- son's policy of increasing military com- mitment to South Vietnam were ignored by such top foreign-policy aides as' 1;u- gene Rostow, the Presidential national security adviser. Accordingly, communi cations between the C.I.A. and the White House became increasingly strained. A the former Presidential adviser ,McGeo ge Bundy, testified recently be fore Congress, C.I.A. Director John McCone's access to President Johnson de- clined sharply after 1966. - The estrangement persisted during President Nixon's first term, when, ac cording to one former official, the C.I.A. .became, "a service operation for Henry Kissinger. The official said Mr. Kissin ger, as Presidential adviser, strongly dis- trusted Richard Helms, then the Director Within the agency, Admiral Turner In October established the National Foreign Assessment Center, headed by Robert R. Bowie, Mr. Turner's deputy for national -.intelligence. Officials say that the center, similar to the old Office of Estimates, ?' is designed to improve analysis by pulling together estimates done by different C.I.A. offices and other. agencies. There is widespread agreement that C.T.A. studies now have greater visibility in the' Government and that agency re- ports are becoming more useful to policy- makers. The problem, as the official put it, !'is that while C.I.A. -work is no. longer ignored, there is a growing danger that intelligence and policy will become.indis- - tinguishable," Reinforced by Turner This danger is said to stem from the .Administration's attempt to make the Director of Central intelligence a more influential figure--a tendency that, has been reinforced; officials say, by Admiral Turner's 'strong appetite for political power. = - ? "They may not know it," said a former high-ranking intelligence- official, "but they are on the verge. of turning the Director- of Central Intelligence into a - - political job." In the case of the C.I.A. study on Soviet .oil production, the Senate committee hasi ..not accused the agency of shaping. its[ findings to meet White House needs. The' committee reportedly has suggested that; the C.I.A. made an analytical error in! its- report,_ but more troubling, according. to some committee officials, is that Mr. Carter announced the findings last. April in'dramatic fashion at a press conference, -in an- obvious appeal for support for Ad- rninistration energyplans. _ In some other cases in the last year, some members of the Senate committee believe: the. C.I:A., has bent facts to meet 'White House views. One example is-saidt 'to- be : a contention by the agency -that! a proposed Soviet-American accord limit-{ ing strategic arms could be verified using)) reconnaissance satellites, an opinion ap-I parently questioned- by several- .intelli-i ,genre officers. : . ? . Another alleged instance is the failure of the C.I.A. to warn the White House' of possible dangers in moving ahead with Mr. Carter's plan to withdraw some 30.000 ground forces from South Korea. "It was pretty?clear that the Presiderri had made up his mind on the issue, so the agency simply fudged over 11 ~ geet~- ?tion of whether the pullout would'c ?hfe a military risk." a member of the Senate I Approved For Release 2006/01/30: CIA-RDP90-01137R0 ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE A-13 THE WASHINGTON POST 29 April 1978 What the Next Treaty Is Up .gainst The White House team is understand- main is a frozen frame of. mind that ,ably elated by the ratification of the - goes back almost 30 years to the early days of the cold war. - Panama canal Trento t,,.+ it i s `very useful rehearsal for the far .more important battle coming up over . the terms of the U.S.-Russian agreement on the limitation of strategic arms. Treaties, which require two-thirds approval by the Senate, have seldom been the upper. chamber's finest hours, for on critical occasions the opposition, -in _the_ -wounded words of Woodrow. 't=Wilson, has often been led by "little bands of willful men." . '- - No two. "bands" seem to be alike, however. The one that. shattered Wil- son by. rejecting U.S. participation in his .League of, Nations dream was largely motivated by isolationism and political partisanship. The opposition was led by prominent Republicans such as the late Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge of -Massachusetts- " In the Panama Canal fight, there was an outburst of old-fashioned jingoism, with the hard core of opposition com- ing from an ad'hoc coalition of Reagan- type Republicans, and ultra- conserva-tive Democrats, mostly provincial in character. _ -_~ The opposition to SALT II is different :--and more formidable. The leaders are worldly and experienced in foreign affairs. Partisanship is not a factor; some of the chief critics have held high office under liberal, Democratic presi- dents. They are respected for their in- telligence . and knowledge,. plus their .record of- atriotic public service. But what conspicuously unites them is a seemingly unshakable suspicion of any arms agreement that is as acceptable to Russia as to the United States.. Their apparent conviction or fixation (depending on how you look at it) is that the United States will somehow get the worst of any deal. In any case, no president, Democrat or Republican; has so -far been able to negotiate a SALT pact that satisfied them. - Since Richard "Nixon and Gerald Ford were unable to win over their SALT critics, can Carter succeed where .they failed? It's a tough challenge, but first the administration has to under. stand what it is up a9k0Vkod** 6; l Dr. George B. Kistiakowsl~._ a nu I clear authority and President Eisen-! hower's highly respected assistant for science and technology, thinks the problem originated in NSC-68, a Na tional Security Council paper produced in 1950 under the chairmanship of Paul Nitze. It warned President Truman, in effect, that Russia was out to conquer; the world, including the United States, and would stop at nothing. - , Kistiakow?ky takes special note of Nitze because he is perhaps the most articulate spokesman. for the SALT, critics and because his words carry: weight, owing to his distinguished ca-: reer in government as, among other' things, deputy secretary of, defense, l secretary of the navy and a SALT nego- tiator. Some years after NSC-68, Nitze helped draft the panicky "Gaither Re-I port," which in 1957 secretly warned Eisenhower-that Russia was overtaking the United?States rfnilitarily, including missile development. Eisenhower, un- impressed, pigeon-holed the alarm; but it leaked out, and in 1960 John F. Ken- nedy made the so-called "missile gap" a successful. election issue, After becoming president, Kennedy `.- discovered the "gap" was ' largely th figment of . overheated- imaginations and he had the grace to admit it. A year - later, in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, "America's nuclear- superiority was so great that Russia was forced to ba down. .."During the missile buildup, the test- ban debates and the ABINI scares of the 60s," Kistiakowsky observes, Nitze was a high Pentagon official, and more recently "was a member of the Team B' and one of the moving spirits of the Committee on the Present Dan- Team 13 was the designation for an outside group of hardliners who charged that the CIA underestimated the Russian threat. The Committee oat ' the Present Danger is a relatively newI defense-minded organization that also been steadily dwindling. even in the ..Shortly ,before Ford and Chairman I Leonid Brezhnev met and agreed in principle on SALT II, Nitze, one of the negotiators, resigned as a sign of no .confidence in the agreement, although the final terms had not yet been re~- solved. - When Paul Warnke, who servedwith - Nitze at the Pentagon,.was named as ..s Carter's chief SALT negotiator, Nitze opposed his nomination, and ever since r has been leading the attack on Warn- f - ke's efforts to get a new arms agree- anent. It isn't as if Nitre were a lone voice, for his state of mind is snared by other prominent cold warriors. As . Kistia- kowsky says, 'men of Nitae's persua. sion are entitled to their opinion, and no one should question their motives or their good faiths'. But the American public, he adds, may well ask whether their opinion "is 'a reflection of reality or a repetition of the all too familiar, myth-making of the past." - It is difficult, he says, "to regard these doomsday scenarios as anything more than .baseless nightmares." That's the-message Carter must get across to the American public if he hopes to get .. SALT H through, for the opposition :i won't succumb to the kind of appease- went and blandishments that marked .i the Pan ama Canal finale. ea v- #eTct#000100090001-9 - ARTICLE APrEAR: D THE NEW YORK TIMES ON PAGE 4- Approved For Releas~3006AWarlA-ADP90-01137RO0 Senators -Assail '76 C.I.A. Estimate of Soviet. Power; By DAVID BINDER. gpetai o :he Yes York Time! - WASHINGTON, Feb. 16--The Senate; Select Committee on Intelligence nas' criticized the Central Intelligence Agency and, implicitly, the Ford Administration for the handling of a ccntroversial ehori l to analyze. Soviet strategic capabilities and a'.ms in 1976. - - . In 2L a-report issued- today,-the 17-member panel said the attempt to. estimate Soviet capab ilities , through "-'competitive anal- ysis" by separate-teams--cne. from' inside the United .States intelligence' community a!d-the other made.,ue! gf,_outside special- ists--had been- compromised _ by press leaks and by one-sidedness. The estimate caused some c&ntroversy after it was reported on Dec.126. 1976, in The New York Times that both teams had co-ciuded tI t the:Soviet Union was striving for strategic superiority. over the . St'tes. United There were allegations at the time, also alluded to 'n the. committee report, that members of the se-called B t_am of out- side specialists had deliberately. conveyed .information about the comFetitive anal- ysis to the press to undermine the argu- ments of theA, team of inteligence regu- lars. ? ..- _ . .. r'; ? - .- -Today's report noted`thatche competi- tion was undertaken at the request of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advi- sory Board, which was disturbed about what it believed to be optimistic intelli- gence estimates -of' Soviet strategic strength. The board was-abolished last year by President Carter. ' -- a - While praising the contribution or the team of outside specialists as "most re- warding" on technical questions; the Sen- ate panel, following a year of study, said competition on estimating -Soviet strate- gic aims was -"more - c6iitroversial% and less conclusive" than relying on a- single estimate.-; -,'=The panel also asserted that the B`team; headed by Prof. ;Richard _Pipes;_,head of Harvard - University's Russian Research, Center, "reflected the views of only one! segment of the oach spectrum," the Soviet servative -app Union. - Three Senators Dissent The committee criticized - the intelli- gence community, particularly the C.T.A., for basing its so-called national intelli- gence estimates of the Soviet Union's military power "narrowly" on "hardware questions" of weaponry. Instead, it said the agency should address "the wider framework of other dynamic . world forces, many of which are essentially the creatures of neither U.S. nor Soviet initia- tive or control:' The-committee report was issued with dissents from three senators. . Senator Gary Hart, Democrat of_Colo- rado, charged that "the use of selected outside experts was. little more than a camouflage for a political effort to force the national intelligence estimate, to take a more.'bleak view of the Soviet strategic. - threat."' .. Senator Daniel "Patrick Moynihan, Democrat of New York, said the B team nation of a i:oviet drive for superiority in .strategic arms "has gone from heresy t) re?pectability, if not' orthodoxy" in "what. might be called official Washing- ton." And Senator Malcolm Wallop, Republi- can of Wyoming, accused the committe^ majority of attempting "to denigrate the B team" by conveying- the impression that the group of evaluators assembled by the C.I.A. contained many differen points of view while the, outsiders consti- tuted "a narrow band of-zealots." _ _ -- ; ~ - Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100090001-9" Approved For Releas RffiR ARTICLE :APPEAPED 10 MARCH 1978 O V PAGE John P. Roche! Intelligence estimate and. a grotesque eportJ The Senate Committee on TeamB is chided for its pect you would servative" to make accu- issued a report bias, its position has been underestimate (Soviet rate statements? The logic Intelligence last month on the ?1976 adopted in essence by the developments) once ,or seems to run backward: 1) exercise in which an in- president, the secretary of twice or three times. If you all people of good will want house government intelli-. Defense, a Brookings Insti- underest mate the eighth to avoid war; 2) if Brezhnev genre group ("Team A") tution study, Sir Harold Wil- time, real y, you ask for a & Co. are not men, of good- and a group of knowledge- son and, on the left, the Chi- change.: t we underesti- - will, there will be war; able outsiders ("Team B"). nese communists. mated a inch and tenth therefore 3) Brezhnev & Co. were given .the same data.: As Sen. Pat ;Moynihan put time." must be men 'of good will; and 4) anyone who says dif- on Soviet strategic capabil- it, dissenting from his This d gged inaccuracy ity and objectives and-', brethren: "The subject of led in 19761to the president's ferent is -a chauvinist- asked to submit their as-. the 'Team B' report has- Foreign [ntelligence Advi- hysterical conservative: 'a sessments. Team B. led by been before our committee sory Boai?d, a group of pri- war-lover= : - the distinguished Harvard for a year now, during. vate citizens since abol- Auto-hypnosis is - cer- Russian expert Richard -.which, if I am not mistaken,. ished by 'President Carter, tainly protected by the Pipes, found Team A's rather a striking shift has to suggest the two-team First Amendment, but there evaluation wholly inade taken place in the attitude contest. `I'Ae proposal was, are practical reasons why quate for both downplaying of what might be called offi- of course.',' bitterly opposed our intelligence services Soviet -strength and wil- - cial Washington to the then- by the relevant bureaucra- - should not be permitted to lingness to employ it. There unwelcome views of this "cies and, \when it was ap- make a career of it. But be- was a great brouhaha at the - group of scholars -and offi- proved by' President Ford, cause of this weird media time because the central cials. Their notion, that the .the word) went out that response to Team B, or the thrust of Team B's critique Soviets intend to surpass Team B. was picked by -Committee on the- Present was leaked to the press.. the United States in strate- biased, anti-detente, con- Danger (to which I belong), Now comes the intelli- . gic arms and are in the servativest - there is no verification of gence committee, in gro- process of doing so, has As Sen. ;ary Hart said in track records. Paul Nitze tesque fashion, deprecating gone from heresy to re- his supple nentary opinion does not dance with joy the technique of bringing in spectability. if not ortho-? to the recent committee re- watching Moscow play fast outsiders and insinuating doxy." port', the concept of "com-- and loose with SALT; in- Team B was packed with Why then, if Team B was petitive an4lysis and use of deed, the accuracy with Bolshie-bashers. Deploring. on target, should the coni- selected outside experts, - which he has called the leaks, "worst-case" think- mittee expend so much was little more than a. shots is profoundly depress- ing, and the emphasis on - effort attacking its creden- camouflage for a political ing. We would, all be military criteria, the com- tials? Well, as usual, there effort to force the national happier to be proved wrong. mittee never raised the key is a history, in this case of intelligence estimate to question. Indeed, at the out National Intelligence Esti- -take a more bleak view of Finally, if knowing your set the report.states that'.. mates consistently undere- the Soviet strategic threat.." customers - -is . to , be no attempt (has been ?- stimating Soviet capabil This epi$ode illustrates a "biased," we confess-to made) to judge which ities- general. pi'+oblem in media bias. I recall in the 1940s group's estimates concern- - :: bias: the designation of being bitterly denounced as ing the USSR are correct"! _ In- a.?Washington speech,.- anyone wLo suggests the a Red-baiter by the Stalin- The point of an intelli- last spring, Fred C. Ikle, '? Soviets are building mobile ists for saying Trotsky had Bence estimate, at least in a Paul Warnke's predecessor. - missiles ot'?killer satellites a been murdered by the GPU; ! rational universe. is to' as director of the Arms Con-, "conservative,". or -'-in father of KGB. Pravda'said present an accurate pic- -.trol"and Disarmament Ag- George Kennan's- phrase - he was "killed by a disillu-1 ture. Thus iris ironic that in ency,-stated bluntly that-"in; a devotee:- of "chauvinist sioned follower,"-Jacson-l the same time frame that. 'intelligence-you would ex rhetoric.'. Why its it "con- Mornard. Last year in Mos-?l _ J - _ : COW, at the 60th- anniver- sary of the-Bolshevik Reva tution,. Ramon Mercader, alias-Jacson-Mornard, was j made a "Hero of the-So Union-" I was "biased." but . was I inaccurate? Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100090001-9 ARTICLE 71PPE4RED WASHINGTON STAR (RED I n r) ON PAGE__,44:/ Approved For RJie (IVV/30 : CIA-RDP90-0.1137R0001000 By John J. Flalka Wa3singum Star Pact Wriiee The CIA informed President John- son in 1963 that Israel had the atom bomb,- but Johnson told. then-CIA" Director Richard Helms to drop the matter, according to a former high- ranking CIA official. . "Don't tell anyone else," Johnson is quoted as saying, "not evert Dean Rusk (then secretary of statey and Robert McNamara.. (then secretary, of defense)."- The Johnson-Helms. conversation was described in a secret briefing to . a dozen top officials of - the -Nuclear Regulatory Commission in February 1976 by Carl Duckett. then the CIA's third-ranking official. NRC investiga- tors later interviewed Duckett and printed a four-page account of his story in their report, a- heavily cen- -i sored version of which was released last weekend-. ACCORDING TO the document.. Duckett briefed the NRC officials as part of a commission inquiry into - whether nuclear material had been diverted or -stolen from the United States.----- - - . . " The report is part of the agency's internal investigation of allegations that its executive director misled two congressional committees when he told them last summer the NRC had "no evidence" that, there had ever been a nuclear diversion. Censors- at the NRC had cut holes in many pages of the 252-page docu- ment,. eliminating any reference to- "sensitive" aspects of - the case. which involves a- chain of circum- stantial evidence developed by the CIA- - that highly enriched uranium was somehow diverted to Israel from. a private nuclear fuel plant at Apollo, In most copies that were stamped , he was interviewed about the Duck- "unclassified" and released by the ett briefing a month ago during a NRC, the Duckett interview was en- closed session with House and Senate tirely cut out, leaving holes in the investigators. According to, several pages and even in the index where - Persons who .were present. Helms' ' Duckett s name appeared. However ; .. a copy of the report obtained by The Washington Star contained" a seg- ment of the Duckett interview.% Joseph J. Fouchard, the NRC's director of public affairs, said he had no Comment on how the information had appeared in an unclassified vex'- - Sion of the report. A similar account of the Duckett briefing appeared in -December in Rolling Stone maga- fold Helms to Keep 'It Quiet e aS TOW -,12 o The -account states that "Mr. -' Duckett raised the . question of whether the U.S. had intentionally al- lowed material to go to Israel. He "said that if any such scheme was under consideration, he would have known about it and he never heard so much as a rumor about this. He, therefore. does not believe there is -any substance to this allegation." - . Duckett said the CIA drew up a "National Intelligence Estimate" re- - porting Israel's A-bomb capability in - 1968 and stated that he- showed it to Helms. Helms, he said, 'fold him not to publish it. He said Helms. said he "would take it - up with President Johnson." - " " - - Helms, according to Duckett, later. replied that he had spoken with John- son and that Johnson had told him to keep quiet about the matter. _ HELMS COULD NOT be reached - immediately for comment. However, memory was hazy about what John- . son's reaction had been. Duckett has refused to respond to reporters' phone calls since rumors of his involvement in the Apollo case began circulating several months peatedly told Congress and the press that there has never been evidence of a' diversion of "significant quanti- ties" of highly enriched uranium or plutonium, both- of. which can -be made into nuclear weapons. - "By the end of the-meeting it was a pretty somber group." Duckett later told NRC investigators. He said that F William A. Anders. then the NRC chairman, told him that "in light of the, sensitive nature of the informa- tion he was going to go-to the White' House." - - - The report - states that Anders called James E. Connor, secretary to - President Ford's Cabinef, and said he couldn't tell. Connor-what had been .discussed in the briefing because of "classification considerations," but stressed that the White House should have the briefing. - - - Another commissioner, Richard T. Kennedy, - went to Lt. Gen- Brent Scowcroft.? Ford's assistant for na- tional-security affairs, and' old Scow- croft the briefing had "raised ques- tions but no answers." - - Shortly afterward the Ford' administration reopened an investi- gation into the Apollo company.-. -Nuclear Materials and Equipment - Corp..- which had been investigated - by the AEC.and the FBI during the.- mid-1960s when the company re- . ported that 202 pounds of highly en- " riched uranium it had been process- ing under a series of. government - The interview notes that by 1976 contracts had been lost. At the time "from the CIA's intelligence point of . of the suspected diversion, the United - view.-the--diversion did not matter" States was virtually the only supplier --- because by. that time Israel had of highly enriched uranium for com- beguni producing plutonium weapons -? mercial purposes in the-world. - - from a small nuclear "research" ? AT-.THAT P O I N-T " t h e ? IN THE INTERVIEW with NRC- reactor that had begun operating in government's safeguards on highly .-i investigators. Duckett'noted that the the mid-1964x. enriched uranium rested mainly on CIA had verified-in a number of ways The incident, however. matters to 'the metal's value, roughly. $4,500 a i that Israel had become.a nuclear - the NRC and -the- Department of pound. The'regulations assumed that weapons power.-A type of bombing Until just recently, officials - '-from the NRC and DOE's two a company would guard the material practice done by Israeli A-4 jets, pre-,, like old. NUMEC, however, re- ?I Duckett said, "would not hAyqxXaftd, FoMMbW& 1~9 .39 Ei/Q 41 790 0' ( u1P1ih90?6-ffi-%hen.the loss -- sense unless it was to -deliver a nu- mission an a nergy esear could not be eiplained.- promptly - Clearbar*ib-"_ and Development. Administration re- _: paid the AEC more than $1 million. 11 011TNT