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December 22, 1980
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---=~~_~---- Approve:df~sr Retease 200"f/flT/g7 :CIA=RDP90-O'F'F37R000100130001-4 ~-~ - ~ - - LONDQ~ DAILY TEL~GRAFA 22 D~C~II~ 1g8Q C "' li~;ence:s?rviees, ca-operation d ' `~ : an bet~v~en :the .Iranian ~~ 3. ~LL.~.t7J1~ri.c,%v ~r~~ i. ~OLrFCiS close ?to? ]'resi-_~~ ' ?~ ?:==Syrian secret services ?. dent-el?ct Reagan say?,~ _ - .-.- . . -. - _{.~ - - - ?- t -: suited in important . ex_ - t;~at? lte *, pri~;ately deter- ?I ?+ ~ - 7'-?"' ~ _.,:ehaa~es-bl ? irfnrrnatiun coa- =-`farce 'of a,OCO m-n to set.uF ---?_. . -_ . -: -? ;. Di~~isians>in~-?~Ipsto~r-?,, and.~ihe-- Saud,3-~,^.,r-:-a~?,::,;::-_:c~-_:.. -.~?It~.`_l?~iatil:C_~?I~Ban~iiC.f:F..t:1? C,rnlta~has also."Captured tW0 pre~'ailing~ l:RCGX~21ni~?.:O~C.r.?.7 lyz~'Demuciatic=Front For =-Sahara" ? nnder.? his'?crrnt;al: ~ -~ 1;ca~ianS a -\iig. pilot` and an' :Presic'eat-???Brz-illr~zv's ? .hcal;lt =the. -Liheration nF ' Pair.=tine ''-'Cliff; pupp?t?-repub?ic would' =`--air?fclrce-en,ineer.-who-maY- :znd-th..?shapa,_gf-'.the:suc-:? '~:(t7F-tiPJ, an opzniv~;iarxist- `-~-embraceareaa'oEC~ad,~~1a1; - -be'?able-to-provirJe-first-bond- ?ces=ion-'tn hi:n,.-3nipro~eahe?-~= Leninist- ~rnup tiwitnin [he - - testimony -. to the ,role that -?~igerad:Sez:?_ga~._::?_:';`:.--':, : ;; .prosp4ct~.for...a st:atFaj- nf.:~;'PL~?that ma{;e> nn-secret ?I`. ~-;ta 'Presidect.Sada~_see5."a' := Soviet personnel are playing ? -Iznd. .:re.clarrztiv~l"- .=.und*.~r;.; - u6 its~p~~o-Soyi~'.t luyalt:Ps. has g.? 'ti?reat ~f;,Lihtian-aad;GU?vi?t '-~n-'the???repression_=of-black-?~ r , the ? Pearari_?~d;ni?nistration. - begin % diaributing anti-Sa!!di _ - C- d.. ti~aiast - A,ricans- '- - ~ ~ - - -- - - - - ?a _ ,~`~~pe, - to = -u=e - a-? specia_H ~= _ ..- _ - - -_ '.,,~ `; `?: }..~~ - : - _~ of the 1?i.l~naarian. ~uarisiriy id-; `_ _the ' `Teheran.:: redir:ierc into -.'trained (2n3' =Savi~t-armeu) _;~ ~_pII55iatts?:Capl:urQ ? ,? :_~ ' 135:) , - _ - - - direct - -action .. against ...the - ~-? _ t . I , e arm . Ju_ a..:. -e S r e~l ~n.. ,. , ?---te .t?,enc_; ? -zn- .-. u a a =-C,ou[:~vai .C}seddei to?: estab-?'i Iu~the:Casa.-of?'Cuba,..the pros- I ? ttudropov;_ the. Chaff-Wan ?of-~= zl-Iibouli~=and `the- Iranian? ~?-'%sh his-ss~rernacti.:in'a'.civili :. ~ pP~s for: an'e~ceetive?~cuvart: ?~the.??ICCrB;?~lar. )3oris Porrr~,~c:~-secret=~~service~.--chieF; ?-Gen.j "=war' ag~?ins?'tl:e Follol:?ers vF ~.. action programme ?to red:lee -marev,?tite head oI; the l'nter-:`:::.Ditssei;l =Fardoust= (forme,-ly' ?' -the-forma ; Deieoce'l~finistzr. ++ r~Dr . C;~=tro's =-appetite ? for.l , i:ationzl ? I7enartin~nt of .tn~ :=~-"en-ployed?shy the .Shah),? the :sse^e-.FI~Srr -:? Chad? as_ofl _=.-: foi:ei~?.wars have boea high Soviet-- . Cnrnln,~nist ;.party',.-,~;-Syirian ? ofrciat` claimad`tlzati -- -=major intere~rto l:ibya'; dic-. f! ~,)iaElted by evidence.aF.-recent ~ ,C~htral -Con:mittee, and ;cJr%~:~-the:'?Eadana?"air'?'base= in; ~=?ta,or; CoLGaddaa,'bec;u7e of ~ successes-,by?.the=:anti-Soviet. ?1Iiiilail ;.Suslov; :.the--Posit-:_?~-nortlt~astern Saudi tlrabia?is~ - -its?uranium?re~err-es.?~ which -` Unita-._3tterril.ay is:AnBo[a:- ~.- burn's..-tvp_ ideologist,. rrz?ail '.-=baiug -used by:=Soviet BIucI -=:hP?hore~;-to:_e~crlox:;irsue~ _? Publication' 'note,: -_?~are :the-~ `a. -.Public-. statement (Perhaps; :_ only_in~titutions,ia.the? coon.- a-?`Dedaration of ~Ii~eui," bt: ?_- try--. =possessing: ;the ?~actnal' cause -. uf.. 'the,- large -Cuban ?-mzaiis ? o;'.: a.. revolu"ionary .:,.~migre_'co'rsimun'ity- Chore) de= ?? change,'..;' Soto.' propaanda- ' =i5riiig'';11asliingtoa';'? refusal =- activities-:are ??signlficant,-be= ` to'tale:ate .So.?iet Elpc acti- -~ effort to? L-:bya'~ ~ ioup.;in?-'Chad-?-.couid -l : curbin~ahe :process af= Soci=t. ?: easi'~-- }rave ?- been - averted', ._ elpansicn-:that:' was - allotired: ~~ accordir.? io_ ~~estera -p?ili- ~ ?_to .-,:bo.-,_unresisted:= by - `Cite:: '- =tart'. ai~a~ysts:.'l~a.~=? F' ;:,Ca,_-ter.:Ad.*nicistration.::~:?:.:." _~''.~been' ,Prepared to: -Play ~ari,: S1'hil -~. the.';-; gccupation: ~ : of: .'`active, role: '$ut_-Presideixi .Af~anistan~.;::lost-?:'sllcscow: - r?~:G`lacard -d'Estaing. repv'tedlv.,? ._ , frieads??in ihe.I~lamic- u?or:d_ ?_reiected .xhe - advice.=;:?of?_liis , Lhe ~worL?ers':revalt? in l'alard:. - '. -senior intelligznce?advisers:to ; _ .has-:;;ex.'ubited -.t}ie_=::vulner-; ~?`use: French. lane;,ka-;strafe _. p -. ;-ability--and.'-fragility' of .ihe? -'-::tha,Lihyaa; calumns,.~ ~~;r~_: 3._-_ ? - :Soviet .empire .in.~he face of .: ~io~'r~:thy::mosE,.'e[feetire ~re- 2internal g,re3suresr: -~?--~ =: - -~;spanse -ta---Col.; .Gaddafi'3- If the Aussians?irivade'Polanir;' -~' ~forei~n= adventure3 = may' - be - ??iliey-?= will -lose allies and -min'- direct , sup~wrt:. For.;:the -.- sympathisers throug:tout the' :; e!+~ments ? inside: ?):.ibya who - world: -and deal-'?z -death blow ` are opo~?e[ti.[uiltis?reairrrz.---.,.' = S.n?:"`the =re~?th ?of Eurocom- .It'is. reliab{y reportad that the ~ munissn-" in the run-up to 'the Gar[e~?' Adrnirlis[ratian niter- -_~ neart;F-rench_elecdons.~~%=~ ~'_`_-~ ~ . ?'vened duriaa a- revlvti,; G-l~i~ _. _ . , _ _ ~ ~ "= rriavin; - a~aiast' Libya;. the '- Reagan 1ldminist: atiori, in a ?_=_~` dramatic chance. of ;rolicy, is _ 'li4:ely to. ~:ork-?in close con- {- ter*_ with the E;yp[ians ?to ' ._ ~~ end Cot- Gaddafi's CarreY as --a-1? ~~ In rrrr9laaaai crvuv,e- - ? -~"ma[:er_~~?pCc?ugd'~o~:Rg1e~as~?11~s: ~C~~F~D=~'_'~ _?=vi:ies:.-in'tire -Ccntrai Ameri- I -;.1adoc:nnate -:Saudi ?- ? o~cer-? :-'can re~ion? ---;- a'-..sort ??of? --cadets. wha.?are-sentcto.?the- - ` ?. - ~ - voh'ps the- recent_,ste ing-u :Srlrrr;Yit 'firm . _ - --- --' -- ? - - - - PF F? ? - - _ - _ `- _' ~1 ? ? the. culture and' traditions of~ S7l~L'87"SlOlx.... - -- _ ~ ~( _-~_the_Uirllnr_people,-who--live ,... - ~. . ? - -? .:..~__ _.... _.: ; I VERSH~DUb4~D_-~'b-^?.~ they ~?or: the >-moment, ahe Soviet' ~ .~ 'leadership ? appears-.'- to - .bc - ;: 'Iran-Iraq . ~viir -~ and `-the: ~loCl:ed -in. the aalne .kind. of:: ~ ~1.fibstage~nrablerlr-in ?Teneran,~~ - ,internah? -".debate.:..`that-- prE-' l more'.: crtidence hat- coma. -to- Ceded the invasiun-of ?C~echn, +~ ~' light' of Soviet-backed= efforts _,_.:-.,-:_ __ ,~~~. _-.L_-? --._,_.: - Ito.:dastabilise- the monarc3y ''Asia and China but. in tight- ?_ knit ?COmmutiities : in'' :Saudi . Avabia .too,: ~rhere? many" leave made careers in the_Armed. ? Ponces and ,the. civil adroinis- -=passed .;;,that =:;outlaws.:.pubtication~vf'~ :: independence.' ?of =: the--rtiews?_~media? ~'~'ir~tegrity of thoseitiatitutictss?._;: ~~ ``- ;r ~~-~ n*Because'of.therecent_orgyoi~vela-a - ~-.tlons~arnd restraints;-xhenerrr_admini~- __ = traeivrt wlli+:be te~tptedTio,~]~ter~se _ .~s#ccantriunity!s:;visibiliryFand;.lva~rti~e? -~_restrictions_,5ocie'at bath is regvit'ed.:: ~' 1`Ieither :will=substitute..foc-tbe.,public~ -. ~~'uadeirstandin$~-and support?riecessary f ?->i~to-sustalxt a.long-term program-to-ta= ~=';~baild.thi$ most critical.itmction of gov-~ Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-01137R0001d#~ ? ~ ' ~= "~'4"?`~~'~~~'.?" `'`'~~`~""`" ~ . ' ?.~1;. sham A lfson; deavt of Harvard-Uni-:: ~:veraity's Ke~ririedy: 5choot?oJ'"Govern 010013000 ? App~-~ved For Release~3001/07/27 :~CIi4=RDP?90-O'I'~~7I~00 1-4 ~,'~S~CLy ~,t P:~` x NEB YgRiC TI'S ~..- 21 D~CEItiI~~R 1985 Q~ p,~G~ . ~?: t" GA.~IBRIDGE; Mass:"-=.`Tlie central."- -_"~ , how well its analyses. and estimates in- - fortnpolicy-makersof proYaable'devel- ; optnents abroad= More Than any other, : it~is_ihia test that the United States in-~~ r n , ate..un e g _ '?I978 and.29'T9; : American? intelligence ?..'?:::; are autocratic; repressive _ x ~;profotutdly.~mi8assessed "the -ievolu- .:. ruler: Instead, acceding to'the.:5halt's '.-~ sstuation, and the receptiveness of in-.i . t3vnary'iorces opposing the? 5Yiah:-x'or' : ?:_, demand,:.-.American . -intelligence ~: re- .. telligence users to such analyses-,. -e~tatnple, in August-1978, a Central In- :-~`-;stricted ~i~ .activities 'to liaison. with - .~ .What-into be done?-The problems, i `telHgence~ Ageacy estimate. conclud~~??~ :_:Savalt;theShah'ssecreCpolice.,~; :: ?. .. -.._,' ,~ deep-rooted,-are nor, susceptible to f edz "Iran .is fiat in a revolutionary~or':,;`- =.::.second, ..'America ..?Iacked a :.small, quick? fixes- The? Reagan administra- ~ 'even?prez'errolutionaiysftuation." 'The:.`; dedicated group. of experts focused. on '= tion.will be eagerto get on with the job: ~ '' its would Have:: a Same thins can be done without de- : intelligence community's lailure to il-:-.?~, Iran.. Such 'exile ~ ;:. - ~~Iuminate'' these. events= . exasperated'~~~; :proached the extraordinary. develop-. ~,bate~ But -the first item on the agenda .'President-Carter;:provoking?hits-to~=_'.".merits:of~:19711+.wtth-'deep understai~d?r~g :;,_-should_bexo=join+with-tlie=i:ttelligemcQk :.;se>~,~?memorandutnto.theC.I.A:de~;-~:'=of Iranian society. The inadequacy of :-;'.,:committees of the new Cou~~reSs in. daring: "I-:atii`not`-satisfied with the~_?-. dtrrent..arial}rxic expertise results;pri- _;`;, consolidating a-broad bipartisan eon- ' `~ ?w~ warily:.from the lack of commitment to ~.: senses >;iehiztd a =major prop" ?am of .quality of political intelligence."; =.:, .:: ,;-r;~_ .. .: . =~:=: geneatlt thaavrface of this case; one:~~;`_: recruiting;' developizig, and sustair~in$ . .~..:._ xecanstru'ctian. The feces pf that coo-~~ ..fu:dscharacteristicfailingsof:-thecti~`---.:. _?connpetences,:of~prvfessionaT..analysts.::-?:..'_.; goal?`:tti-. rent:rarnmututy:irE?the:ihree':keyele~..'=" ;'But, the'deterioratian of recent. years ---=; -~give-~America:. the'inteiligencs~ :wants :-?~ai ~_performance~'~~ collecxion;-;:-`"also'reflects`the:estrang"menE:beween . rapabilityinthewarld::;.:.~ :;---:~;~ :: -`. `>::,amalysis; and service topolicy-makers.: `= ;the intelligence community and the in- Ta promote. understanding of whax - ~~'~ `stitutiorsa~that'maintain our..;society's , :?_`-will be required to achieve this obje~ "~,'-First,: in contrast to-remarkable ad=,."'~. ."vances irr technical-colleciiotx':capabil-' ;`._~. storehouses=.of.: snowiedge..especially ; ' tine, the..intelligence..conamittees of-I. !'.-.......ccc_~'nrn.lA_. rirrrEw.~.: rli ria'fly t[]-{ -LC111~[jF-C t?4Y+iu~aaaa ~J a.a acuu..9 ---.~.,. ~ - - -- ` -`` -_Consider__the case: of Iran.-Through : -' - - d ~ ~ of Iran's ~nternai sta di - it~2S; :-C.Ullectlpq -; at %:~lIIIOInl'e1L10T1~; ? Del ..-:: _auxsrciaiuc.~cuau.a.v y............... _ .-... - --- - - - . _ ..~?ageuts~--~s~eroded~.signii[antly:_~Th~. ~~:~::-::Third;'.the:lranian:ca_~2highli~its the hold'.'preparedn~shearings."?~mong.~ -causes. are?[uts ? ixt positions'-far: `:. _;". problem: of-'interaction=beEween?.intelli- .:. :the q~zesttorsio bR addressed-ar?: -?intelligence?offlcers.abroad;`dedicated - ''. getice:", analysts' and policyma'ters: .- =" I. How important is first-doss inteI- 'efforts liy enemies to expose Ainerlcar- ''"=. With aur,:increasing dependence' on the-: Iigence in the period ahead? Given t.':e =:'agents, -and. Heightened .uncertainties '-:., Shah,.top officials came to regard liis;' ~ increasing. tiurtber -and . variety of about the security of agents'. identifies: ~ 'stability as apremise ofAmerican poll- events abroad that, threaten our, inter-- In? Iran, -America: had: no-network-: of ," -`.cy. As a~:Iouse.Intelligence Cammittee? ... ests, the premium an-accurate assess. clandestineagen-stoseawhatwasaa~'~`.%:'report::coneluded:=So stable. was the : ~mentafforeigsdevelopmentsisstead-.! "tuallybappenine to`the~tt;ullahs? trier.-:-. y -"'premise'of:tHeShah'sst:rvival tHat this. fly using.'-. .... ... ...; - :c}rax-ts, a.~~colonels under moderniza-',=.V'~,"limited-:both.fhe'.search accu-: ,.:: 2. How can: the :intelligence. cow- .... . -. - ' ? ~ mrlnity's analytic competence be soli-~ .- stantiallyenhaneed? Protaisirg reme-. ~ ? -',;that?.~,encaur2g~..analysrs',to ;deepsd i -''their; PXpertise `far decades;:: dew. 'lop.. , ? - : ;.frig relations with Outside institutions; ?-`and creating asystem-of well-struts l Lured' cdmpetition 'within::Life inte}1% =. ge;nce coramutrity:. ~ r: ~:?~: ?:::.:-. ;?r ~ ?: ~ . - =-3.:'How,should #mde-of~sbe~weerriir%; - _ .~telligeicce:~'and:~other.-:.imppr~artG.~ru~.- - -';, tior~I vaIiies'-;be made?`,Should`; Eon=:`: :''press declare specific'categoxies of itr' - '~ fortnatfon (for example; about agents) STATI NTL For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-01137800010013 NSW Y'QP.K TINS 9 DECrs~BER 198a ~u~~ians fit Coil-Data Lack-: Sovietofficials said' in Mvsww yes- terday that they knew"nothing so far" . to aonfirnp[. a. Swedish consulting con- . tern's report of a huge oil discovery in -: western Siberia. ~ - - - The report was challenged by Ameri- can.oil industry sources and the Cen-. tral Intelligence Agenry; when it ap-. peered Friday. But the Swedish can- cern., Petrvstudies, defended : it yester- .; According..tD -the report, the Bazhempv:. oilfield contains. ;an .esti- ._ mated:4.3;:trillion barrels~:of,:oil. re- serves; ; ,which :.,would no~ake, ,.,it. the world's largest. ..: Marilio. Jermol, director. of Petr~. studies, said. yesterday in Sweden that the report had been misinterpreted but _ was substantially correct. The Bathe- nov field isnot anewfind, he added:'. A C.I:A:: spokesman,: Dale Peterson, .:. sai in : .as- on n y a e field. ap~~? to a im`g o s ea "T , ee : own.: useo a epth o e e ~ an e a a i is "s a-hTe,^Se said; "-any a f~y ~ra^ctlon of `- fhe o c recove~a~ari eiz= 'or - vs.-- - Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 Approved For Release 2001/07%27: CIA-RDP90=011378000100130001-4 ~.rt 1 ~ ~. `i'' ~~ pcec ai~tr w~,e~e _=r_--'-_ :~~: ~::;...--., -. analysts =believe , he would not choose - - wnlvement - - -- -- -- .-.,: --_ , ... ;. ~ - -__..__, - ~ a~ivu wcLC awu~ w x,c ucKU~^+cu. vw.- on the-heels. of what?-informants>say :was a.j t~ie: Soviet .Union _ appears to=_have:completed':-' ers think the Brerhnav trip `however . , , Brun, dust:-comp e . intE Bence estunate _~preparations foc :passible'zxulitary interdentiion-_' `. might be n2eant to play down any joint- a . e' yvtets apparent y conc u ate m ;iri Poland"and underscored its earlier .wax"~ ? military operation in his:. absenee.:' - grave .corigequences.;,~ __ ~??;~~`x~ asmall--"crisis management committee wa , ----- neces.~ry to stem a ristnn enge -I - - --ter- ` ~s%oit:'here and _ abraad;President . Carter'sum-= Zbigniew ~ Brze~inski...Later, _ the presi- ':White House ofricials..said ..yesterday`..thejr; h h ith t f our w or mare t an an ,~~~ :. ~ gip. national : set~arity ~~~; ~.; ? dent me - .were still in no positions"to saythat`a Soviet'mil- ~meEt with him twice. over the brewing cns~s._ tn.'~ the top-level National Security Council, itary, .move: against Poland:::was. imminent and d Ed t r f St t di i l S mun a y o a e ecre nc u ng Poland and then called in"ional leaders;" ,others said they were ngt absolutely sure ~vhat'. . _ S. Mug{ie.and. Defense Secretary Har- lYloscotir?s intentions were.- B.ut there was` wide. ~forr:a~special ~3Thite:Houce brieFing?'-_:;:_.:---: ::.-? ;=old Brown..-. ;:. ~::: ,; s:~lrind. the he"~ tened concerns. here werE =_ ~'.. -.Aso called to .the White House for aa~reement that the assessment of.the situation __ . b~ -- `'several. potentially .omiinous developments, ac-. a special 20-minute briefing were House here had turned increasingly. pe.9sitnistic in re= cording to informed,US:=offz~ais:..:.;`:- . ~:;:~: =~ ,Speaker'l`hamasP. (Tip) O'Neill Jr (D- cent days..,-: : :.:.~:: -.;:=; .'_~..:: _;.:. _... -.::?;.::~. . ,r~..,oo a,..,,...m a~;,l-+l,~t.f},a~-'else ;znw-:"a ~lblass.l.-House Minority Leader. Jahn t tainty`ahout whaClcincl'~ l o' c Th ':lot~of movement" involving 5cnrie~ and ;o ~ Rhodes (R-Axiz.), Senate Minority but a number ~ the Soviets might take ofactian , . Warsaw. Pact military.. un~s throughout cam=: Whip Ted Ste yens (R .~laska) and Sen- of officials said the Soviet;'intervention~might.1 -'' muinist Eastern Etirope_-.'~+Iore. Soviet`divisions ate NTajority `Vhip Alan Cranston (D- -not came,~orstart out, as`afuil-fledged. invasion ` n~ its thewestera Calif.}-;;= :`._:. - .:-._ but rather. might come ixi: the,guise of, a:joint~. .have "come out_oft}.seeir-gang - -- -: - districts of the Soviet Union closest to the.PoI~.~ ~ At a hastily called news,briefing later; military, exercise involving, Warsaw:, Pact forces: ish border. iVlore: Soiriet .resPxvista-have' .been ;the :White House issued a terse state- - ~: Intelligence estimates here reportzdly indicatz- called. up-~ at an `axeIerated' pace-=~ iri. the: - mentt~at`-`preparations far possible So- .the a vtets sno nn rvene, ey xru~'. t .lastfew days Commandand casnmunicatian fa-: ~ . viet intervention in Poland appear to o so nnon o nngs, m part; ,, .~~ ~ ~ ~auarte~ ~ .~ ~ have been completed. Xt is .our. hope are oua t ta. e.,a :concern-to:Moscow.'One' that! -uo- sach-.intervention will takE is: the .anniversary, on Dec.; 16,- of . tvorkei: riots- ~_=`:tiriet:_Union to other lsarters ~xr l~ Ger.... ~..rpan~and Cxechaslaval~ which-- a_ =F~Oider. 4 _place:-Tfie~United States govemmenl m-1970 in the port city-of.,even=_? - .. - ~_~ + reiterates: its statement of 3 -re- - ._ w. Got, tuallytoppled- the government of Wladisla ?-on'Poland; issue also base .broe~~t-~ . . _ . _ ~ garding~ the very adverse consequencE< estate of readines~:.'I'laese_~mmancl, pastg~!ouId -'~ mulka. The second is a planned review' f,-,...._ _ _. - :-. __.~ _ _ -,,,~,:,-;;:~-..:... ,,~. ~ ?.~ for U.S:Soviet relations of Saviet'mil. =:bytlie, independent labor.unnons of re__I `coordinate~any rates?vention~tl,atinvolvedBaviet"~ itary intervention in Poland." : - -.: ;_ ::.:- ? , ?.seserves had been found in the the area A repart''jresterday that the Soviet ! . , .. of the alle ed discove Mr rhoff and othe ail indust des ite the Me , , g ry, . ry p ye r -Union had-discovered by far the big? ="observers said. Petrostudies had fre- ??- drillingofmorethan100wells. - gest historywas ridfeuled by ~ .. quen[lycountered pessimistic portray- ?,; ~? 1=or his part, Mr. Meyerhoff, who has industry:' and: ? Government ? experts. ~ ;., als.of the Soviet oil industry by the Cen- frequently visited Soviet oil?ields, be- Plevertlleless; :it~ sparked selling,of pil ! .?tral Intelligence Agency- and ot~ier ::'; ~ lieves that the Soviet Union's reserves stoclcsbynervous investors:`'`"-~ ?' , 5 rtes. r... eyerhoff chsr- ::~:~ .fatal X70 billion barrels, farhigher than The field,-said to be in western 5ibe- ;= via, was estimated to total 619 billion _;?acterized its owner,, as a ?._. the C.I.A. estimate, but considerate I: Stalinist.. exiled. from.,Yugoslavia be-. _-~~?~'l'fi`ari- et`n' repo-2ton"EFe?aTi~-tnd. -. tons, mare than twice. the world's esti=' i.-_? causeof his political beliefs.-~:-_ - -; ?;.-? . e of field petrostudias appar- _ mated recoverable reserves of??300 bil- - ? -_? According toPetrostudies, e~cperts at ? =_ ently is referring to is a huge ail shale . lien-tons ~4 find this size would equal -. _?, the Soviet geology ministry called the : ? deposit. at a depth of al;out IO,COD feet about4;500`billiori harrels~~; . ~~',_ ' - - ~ discovery "a..unique...and..sensati~nal,..:.,.....and has ,been known_fos_ a-.long time," T~:rretivs~ sen[,:prices, of bit stacks ? " natural phenomenon,''. -asser'ang that the C.I.A. said: "Because of the depth ' plungirtg.~:;fixnong~the?issues that fell. ;--.the vast quzntfties of ail supposedly, of-"~ie~epasit,and the fact that: it is . were Litose'a[ the. Exxon Corporation, ;=: found were of the hi ualit. -..ti:~ a....:.:e.~ ~ ..,,:.,.~ = r.; Qna~ ?~ ^reY~_ gh-q y, low-sul- ,shale; .only a tiny:.fract_an of the oil - ~v ~c4'r.1lP4G LfilILY ]l~sl~ -_~ J l..VlTij7allJ. Yl ygl~lY1\l1Q, YV Tai ~rW }.w? - /\~ ? __ ,' ~,,;.:-The widespread'bewilderment'Over . Ohlo Staadai+d Down 3'/a ~._' ?'.>y:' . ~ - ~':,`?-~ ~: ~~~ ' Petrostudies~ further asserted that - . - the report of the huge size of the alleg~3 The~stock? a# the Standard Oil Com? _~~:. the Soviet experts believed 50 percent discovery Was -perhaps best summed. pony (Ohio), which hasgyrate&cansid= of the oil could be recovered_ A United __":" tap by the fact,-that.tre C.1.A. and sev-.y.' erablyrec~ntly,:iell3?v4,to?iB..At one`. _;States-oil company official pointed out -;. eral analysts: suggest'ertT~ in? the- . point's tradingit dropped to _ittat only eight'the word, all'in` ,-';-:.course of translating the report from .,,... 75. .::?:'- . v.,.-r= :- =: - ` ~ ~,'-'~:: `: - ~e United States, had attained such a `Russian to Swedish to French to ;rng- The" i^eptirted size of the discovery .- high recovery rate. --.~: -.--=.-=.-~- a~-.-.:-- . ~-:.lish; a decimal point might have been enough '?to float the entire The C.I.A. which says .the Soviet _ misplaced, thus vastly increasing the state ai Texas an 200 feet of p?ue oil," -Union as on y about 30 billion to 35 bil- -?. order of.magnitude.-_::- ~._ . -- _ - - _ _ _ said Arthur.. A_ 1l+Ieyerhoff,- ?a_, Tulsa-. ---' - _. _.. . _ . . based petroleum consultant and a Iead- '- ing expert, on.: Soviet petroIeum_: He called.ateosznts of the find; circulated on leadingfinaricialwires,."preposter- - "It.'saiiabsurdity;ariimpossiBiIity"? said Rob_ ert I.eY~e, an analyst for E.F~ Hutton: Alvfrit].:5flber-a!.Dean Witter ? Reynolds- call,-.the` report'_'.'aff: the ~~~~~. Nonet2feless? -.-numerous _ ~'investars . -rated to sell their 3sigh-Dying. oil stoclta, fearful [hatlargeprafi4s resulting from shor'tages.wval~be:eglacedbya sftua? .lion oiolesG,'~he z=taritet ftrr. alI..sLotlcs?? - has been so pavrerfui on ti-.e sip side Shat: ~ investors az~ vulnerable to any kind of. news," said ~lerz -iL. Pete_rs of 3r'awri BrothersETar.~irnan.?;-~^,1.: _;;:,_ -r.- Swedl.4h Content the Sosnx ~ ~ ?r =' s ~ .,: ' Reports a! the Soviet discovery ema. ;! .Hated fmm a Swedish research corsce;n ~ . .called I?etros:.uies, which Srequently_'. . reports on Sa+net.petroleu~?.develop-., ''ments;:,alarest. always.zitt,~ favorable -~ light. It-was reported in the i3ulletirr de ?`~ r 1'Industrie?PEtraliere a:?Frenc:s?trade - journal; and jolted the- stock;markst after.:it alas carried vn the Dow?Jones.,~ ~ ~ P1E*~J- YO1~iC TIa~~S 6 ~ECi~'~1Hr.R ig$0 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 App~t-cq~.,$4C:`FI?c~~ 2001/07IT~: ~~~~d~1~$~~~~?~~0130001- o.l P.1r,.~ / 6 December 198p SI`OCKH01.r~[; .: 5wedet?, vrgrld's largest kna1~'t>w petrostudies: - a four year-old = Swe~_ dish consulting tirmspe~ializing:?in? SovieC oil ;and= gas .resources, said`: it'.? would issue;a.detatled~report on.the;' digCOYeryMonday-, :}:.~.~..,.;,Y,::-:;;,,.;s->': -;. "Qur, study .isibased:~vn:-.very. reli-: able : iniormatiotl .-from'--the:-.Soviet geologq~..ministry,'`.:said:.Manlio; Jer?' tool; Petrostudies'.dtrector:.:_,-~`=:" ~= '. owever U.S:.-oil ex rts? said- the - amount o oil in the:l3azhenov to ~~ robably " . ossly' eza , erated "- . an a -o tcta sa t e tscover . was revtous re rt as of s a e - whicb s i . tcult.toex loit..-..:: -. '...: e tan as. ournal,'an itidus: tr}{ magaxine,' itz` Janiiary:;estimated. tlYe=vrorld's proven--;:oil .reserves at`, 6421 billion. barrels,: iiYCluding 6T' billion barrels iti-.tlie Soviet Union;. 27,1_-billion.. barrels ~itr' the United- States and -163.4? billion :.barrels irr Sandi Arabia: - ~~__:a;'-'.: ?:,,:'=??-.`':?.?.:, .'. .. "Our liotfom=ki`ne conclusion'is that there is a~low probability thattoday's news release will prove accurate as stated," the firm said. It said that?the report, based on a-translation of Sovi- = et~documents, may have-been exag= gei'ated' because of a. misplaced deci-.: mal`point;;and that the correct esti-:., ~mate.:is ;probably 6.19 billion., tons??'4 rather than 619 billion tons: ';, :: ;? : _. '.~ 'Y'he..Soyiet:Union last: week pul} i lished;: 'a ~.: draft:: ffve~year ?~economic plan'.that ??icakls for production of anywhere,;from 12.4 million to T2.9 million. barrels of oil a day iti 1985:. ; - ....~:.~~ ..-....:~JMr... ~-~~::..:. =4~ Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 ~~T-~~'~ Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 8~ PAC3~ Ned YORK 1 TMES 6 ~~c~rl~z~ 1g3~ :ready volatile=heating' ail futures priced ' down as much as the limit yesterday,`.. market.analysts said:. The report' by a Swedish research concern was widely discounted by ana- lysts on Wall ,$treet and at.the Central Intelli ence ncy:.:.::_:; -::: _ . u an -ys sai that traders:at the j New York Mercantile Exchange re- ~ ..acted almost immediately to the report j of the find; "'Itput the market on the de- fensive most of'the .day," said Andrew I:el)ow .of.'. Shearson Loeb Rhoades. ''Some pepple just started bailing out of positions pn that news."~ - Oil prices had been moving upward =from around 80 cents a gallon to al- most $1 a:.gallpn --;since September, when the war .between Iran and Iran broke out, threat nine g oil supplies, Mr. Lebow said- But prices have bounced around in the last week or so amid a number of .untertainties, including,. .speculation air; what will happen at the scheduled midmonth meeting of the Or- ganizafion of Petroleum Exporting. .Countries; analysts said. On the New York:lVlercarctile Ex- change, heating oil closed at p.95 cent - to 2 cents Iower, with January at 93.8U cents agallon. - Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 ~~ pal Pr1G~~~d.2 6 December 1980 STATI NTL se 2001 /07~/~~ : ~~~~-IQ~~ 378000100130001-4 ";'A Swedish research f1Tm reported >rt:~s_ -The s okesman id th fi d w s ~~~ p sa e n a . Friday-thatthe~Suviet?.ITnion has.: confirmed by the Soviet Geolo~r;; ;~.... =x~iscoverecLa giant oilfield inwest-~`~;_Ministry, whzclz-.called it "a unique 'r.ern? Siberia -with_:reserves. -sevens?and'sensational.xiatural phenomen- :~~ _~_times: greater=than.~the,estimaLed::on":.since about half'of..the._,oil.,is :vrevanurnrl~ivr.rlo;.~.,ca?o~- ". _'-ti_,__,__ ~ _ ;,,;However,.the report was=greefed:? much difficulty.;f _ - - -- - _ -- ~~'~ Such a =,confirmation :with`skepticiszn~b~. officials:.o? ..would ~-bed ;the~ . : . :~~$xnerican-gop~inent...and,the::oil~:~_'~~Y unusual,-since::the,.Soviets.. ' -industry ~Y~=;:~~ ~,~=~~;};-;~ - " ,:;-r.~R;~t: have traditionally.=viewed. infor>aaa~ -, _- ,-~ ;: _"? -"+iii?:w7~..:~:::ain7t~:ahM,Y;-t17 o;,. .,;1 _ ._ gas-industries;:said?th~=reserves.:iiY-~ ~ for the. entral < Intelligence ~ _; ~yahe "oil field of Bazhenov" consisted; ~-~A?enc ;._said?` Petro ? Studie a ~~-,.;-a .of:.4:55 trillion barrels, or.619 billioli,~: arentl -was: referrin to a hu a ail':, ~'iaetric tons of hi ' ,~, _ gh=qualityoiL:;'This'~-_sha a 'de osit'=at- a~de th': of: about :..'i s:~s~the.biggesi:oil;fin~,in'historyay~;;;: O feet:"Oni a tin fractibiZ of"_:' :` fd>?r':- a?,Petiro~~-Studies.:spokesman~~~~cou d be recovered and at an ' `~~afd....... -... ~?-_ ,.~, ~,~~; 2i~it cost " Hetu said ..,.:.-=?.`~;::sue='`"...-.~~:n~~.c-~-:.;.,, . -. _ .~._.....~?~'?- -.-..~~'~~:_:::~_ Approved For Release 200107/27 : CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 ATpproveFor Release 2001/07>~(~P,~~~(~R000100130001-4 ~~?ICLls ~?~. ' ~~~ ~~a;;~ U . S . ARMY 4TAR COLEEGE ~..~,...-r rr,~-... ~ r,Q r. ~he US intelligence community has evolved into a vast conglomerate since _ World War II: th_e Central Intelligence Ag_c>?cy, with groups of analysts working with virtually every region a :d functional .area of international relations; the Defense Intelligence Agency, which provides support to the Secretary of Defense and point Chiefs of Staff; the National Security Agency, which collects and disseminates communications intercepts; the State Departmont's Bureau of Intelligence and Research; the Federal Bureau of Inv-stigatian; the int:lligence agencies of the -separate services; and the intelligence components of the Troasury and Energy Departments.' Th4 bulk .of the comtinPu effor4, in terrlu of cost, goes into collecting raw information from open sources (such as the foreign press), photographic reconnais- sance:, Communications monitoring, and clandestine sources (espionage). The ultimwte product of this massive array, however, is finished analytic intelligence for the use of operational officials throughout the defense and foreign. affairs bureaucracies. The Dr. 12iK1[ard K. Beta is a Research Associate in Fereian Policy Stadia aQ [na Brookings Institution. He reexived his H.A_, M.A_, and Ph_D. in Government from Harrard University, where he served on [he _ faculty in 1977-76 before}aiming Brookings. A Former s~aif rramb"cgr ~Dta[ional_Seetut~tnuLand`Qf ~lx Serrate sleet Committee on Intelligence. Dr. Betts teac~gnNurses on defense policy a[ Columbia _ Universlrty and [he ]ohm Hopkins UniversitySchool of Adraneed lnternaiional Studio. His Fvst book, ?' SotdierS 5tatesnrur, and Cold War Crises (1979), won . the Harold 1}. iswweU Award for tht best book on dvt7-military relations in 1977-78. A[ Brookings he has coauthorzd The /sorry of Vietnam: The System 4Yorked (1979), wltiKlt won the 1980 Woodrow Wilson Prize for [he bat book in political science. and Nonprolijeratian and U.S F'orelare Policy (1980)_ He has eompkted a fershcomin; Brookings book an surprise attacks and -_ US defextte planning, and is editing a study on the straeegic impliaeons of ctvise n[isaie development. Dr. Be[q has a>,o published drtieles ,- - - Saewrry, Asian Slaver The Washinatnn Qaarterfy, aad [ite+v!tere. ]"hs present amide is _ based ~ on the author's sratrrnmt before the House -. ... _ T i finished product Comes in various forms. ! Mast numerous are ."r_urrent" i~atelli$ence analyses. The basic jo:y of the intpil~?erice community is to digest iricrrtation daily'and pass unfamiliar :acts i:rlmediately ~ to ~ policymakers so as #o ~ alert them? to new k developments or frz.~~:`ly e:rrr$ent problems. The National Intelligence Daiiv, warning ~ bulletins, al-ld anc~'~t ~~ytic me:s.-t*acda~are t'.'le products most- relevar..t to -.rig ~?tncti~n. ? ' This kind of intelligence does w?'^t high-level officials like; i! simplifies their j!?bs. National I?.t~lligence Estimates of $oviPt strategic capabilities and objec"ivzs, on t::e f other hand, are quitz different from current i intc'l~~arce repsrtagp. N1Es are t~n.e collective ~ result of coztr'-.buttons by analysts in various ~ intelligence _yercies, and the; ere ncrmzlly produced a~*]uaLy. Draftir_g is coordinated by National Intelligence Officers uzau~r *.he { xe~is rg the Director of Central Irt~ili$ence. {~ The Tina! estiynate is discussed and debated in I the National Foreign Intelligence Board, and disse.^_ts to t}:t: prevailing view arz noted v.~ithin the do^.ument.' '?'`.e al7nual NII;s on Soviet strategic capabilities and objectives are, in principle, the most irnpr)rtaat intelligence documents used by high-level authorities. But becase the issues in this area are so vital and controversial, the strategic estimates aiOnA,_, with their appendices of supportii $ data grew longer and mare detailed over time, so that lay the end of the 197D's they had become book-length, The rare president w:lo actually reads a lens~thy NIE trlay b? use;u-ly educated about the fundamentals of the balaxncc, Soviet programs, and t:he of deterrercC, ii But the primary audience for these estimates is the group of officials somewhat lower in the chain of command,-the l~ders of the State and Defense L`eps*tments, the Natiq, Security Council Gta;f, and. senior officers ai the milt?ary services and th- Artns Control and ?.7isarr-.lament Agency. Since strategic nusl~r matte, are :Ili central elements of the debate, t: ese officials already know a lot ab~rlt s:tch matters arld .usually have Appr~~~`~QO ~IA f2DP90-~ 1 'I-3~R9A0-1 t}E~3t~6{~9 =~--=' ~ ~--~---~_ _ _._ Approved For Release 2001/07/~~5-~C~9~A-011378000100130 McGRAW-HILL PUBLICATIONS _ Inside DOE Special Report; 2~ NOVEMBER 1980 NEW ORLEANS UTILITY MEf;TING COVERS 4YATERFRONT ON EFFICIENCY, ENERGY ISSUES :Inside DOE's coverage of the fast annual utiliry conference co-sponsored by DOF,, foFlows an the next few paged The conference,' titled `Extra Energy and Ef}`rciency"and also sponsored by the American Gas Association,-the American Public Po wer Association, the Edison Electric Institute and the National Rural k lec- tric CoopemtiveAssociatian, covered a variety of topics, includingDO.E'sResidential Conservation Program and tha CentrallntelligenceAgsncy's most.recent forecasts for world energy- The conference wad held _ . Nav. 16.19 in New Qrleans and was attended .b}! Inside DOE's Lynn Stevens. . CiA ENERGY;FORECAST FOR ;19$Os BLEAK; COAL.WO111"T,OF~SIrT OIL USa; AS PLANNED _-_:,~,_~_,e -_-~ =- ~i;A high?1eve1 Central-Intelligence Agency (CIA) official this.week painted an extremely bleak world ~... - ..?....~'r.......~ L= ~..G 1~0~3, ~u~wung Lnar increase.u coal prouuction will. not really of#set oil use as planned_ _~ . Th afP i l l t n e a ic a so said..tha ev_r'energy-product;on.will.probably notmake adentnin demand and that Persian ,..-. - ~-:... . Gulf countries will probably continue to:lawer;production, thereb_ y-reducing oil supplies even if demand could ~Y.o Im..a-e-1 -'-T'_'_ __--__-_ - .... - _ _. _ _ _ - - - ... - =~,;;This.forecast~.was'made;against-the backdrop of the;current; gloomy ens{gy picture, in~which-.there is _. CIA that world oil.production reached its all-time_-peak last year.and is now on-a steady decline. ;_- .. ,.:...;~ ~~ conscrve.gur. way out'or,trus~~energy dtlemmaf;~ Thablaak-forecast was made by 3ames.~.ochrane, spacial,-_ ~_____~L _~ ~L_ ~~ . ~ fit- r _ _ - anon scanty Council. - - = =-- ._----~~_' _-..."?.:::e;,,.~'- - - - - -'- _ _ - ,:~ ;,:;,~ :'.' " ;_~Cochrane-made his predictions at a Nov. 1 CrI9 utility conservation conference sponsored by DOE and four-utility organizations iri New Orleans: Zri luricheon'remarks at the conference; Cochrane also predicted that theSoviet Union iri the nezf twoto tliree`ye.ars'will, far the first time, surpass the~U.S': in natural gas pro- ~ duction.~.a fuelhe expectsalie_Soviets to heavily export to Western Europa in the 19$Os. The CIA official said the Soviets will have ta_expor"t natural'gas_by necessity 'because they can't use it curren tl -in thei ` ` ~ , . y r ' industrial-sector:' ...- .:. -- -. - - v- - - -- -- ~- - s~-.,::.:~_r-, ::~~~_:;:- ":~ ;.; Cooperation & Development (OECD) and developing Asian countries plan on an increase in the demand for. ~ ' " _ . coalof ihe-rate_of.600=million tons/yaar by-1990 -- the oil equivalent of more than 8-million b/d::Cochrane said`tFat of the'600-million'tons', :470=million tons are plarined'for use in new or retioftted electric'potiver~ ~ ~~ faciIiries~i60 ~ of~the facilities~iri the U.S.) arid_ 70=million tons in'metallurgical coal for use by the steel '-` ~ " ' ~ industry, vv~tIi other industries accountin4 for: the resf in steam coal. ~ . - _ . _ " 'According to Cochrane, estimates for. coal demand may be way off because in rnany of the countries' ~~ requirements for vil imports have-adversely affected the economy which has in turn dampened growth in -._ electric:aitd-steel industries;. and-therefore'the need`for coal_~`"CoaI~use; rather than acting as a substitute'for``~~ oil durS~ g;,t3te 19$Os:may'actually;turn out to_be'a complement,"~he told the conference- = -. --' . .. _ .:.,i~IFOrldwilshortager,Cochrane=said.1979 was,a peak.year for world "oil production-despite_thz 2-million _ -~' .- , b/d Ions ittlranian oil witi~, overall output; by.the Organization".of Petroleum Exporting Coun tries.(OPEC) increasing ~ by_1-mo31ioQ,~/d, F~lost: pradncers operated class. to maximum capacities.toschieue thisaeveh.of.production _ _ . f , -._? he said:-contrast, Cochrane said; world oil production in: I9$O,has fallen by more tliari-3-million _b d, to a.. 24md.Iion bjd -production'leyel this month. -This level reflects losses from~the Iran-Iraq war, he said.`Cochrane said the Ioss of oil from the war -especially the 4million b/d of Iraqi crude exports -will continue~ati leasf -' well into I9$T~ `7Fie.a6ility.;of Iraq to:bring-ezp~rt~_capabilityr`ori=Iine~should the Itpstilities ceaseis'becoming - an increasin~y deep cdncern to us;_'."Cochrane said; adding that substantial damage to Iraq's aSl exporting `?"'Cochr3ne~noted that Kuwait and.United Arab Emirates'hnve cut production nearly 2=million bjd and'"~` that Saudi Rrabia wants to cut back to 8.5-million b/d. The CIA believes OPEC oil production will fall by = `~ =~ of - - - ~::-_~:.:..a_-~s~.;::~::F ~s.srrc~~.s ~~...i~;;c::c1a~:~ar3 :u;r '' ~~~~ ,: ~~, ~-. ~r ----- --- .. its'off.$e~s.~ u~.-r~: ,-:.~~b=_~ i':: ~c.:ic~..- - - rr-. __.._~..~. -~ ?-? offsetiticreased.oil production el?ewhere; such as Mezico`or~the.North Sea: Additionally,-new prodt~ctioit ==?_:~= - _ on We"sl ' co t es will r..~, m .. t ,,'...~.,-_:, _.. ._ ; , .. -- . _ . ~ ..'..;;~..~ ,',`: = - - - and 6y'the loon-'?~~..-".~ '`'=~ ~?~~,,,, ~ r'~~e~se~~r~~./b1}`i~~"..~:I~~t-er~a~$`~6-1~'9~6?.~ts'R~4 w:.1a.;~~ -:; __ _ ~; l~d~e ~e~de~ to eve op new covenes an a desue to go slowly with new-production~w;..--, ~~~~ " - ="_~ - :S+-; ;:s~:.-.~ ". . r....t.~.~._v'yrc?. _.~i.!+~2.'SttF-".~':.: rPSS~,.~siisvz::,,':,,,M.;_ .w_,.,yre-, .,.f.ur ,.;~;~.. ~ ... _- _ : ~~. ; ~y =-;~.~ Approved For Release 2~1~~7Q~Jr4~F~~0~~R0 i i3 /UDU. !~~?"J f+"Pi,i:ii_ii.-- li~!!!9~ ~~ 's.=}a~ii.:~ -.: iti? ---.: -. ?-~i~~.: ~.~ _ --._-- =~.?.. :r~~'~}r',t ~.~~E. !y.~! i'i i;; i ~ ~_~~T'!.. ~~ir3 - _ ~ r ii _ ?k~-- _.:~ _ ~?'} ~ ..~?i' - ~ _: - ?-. r r. - _ _ _ 1?~ :LF';id~~ iii rLi[!:d Li =ai'ii~~{a1~~iii~,~i r~~t~~~=^? -.. i??'~~~ ~T:~ _~-~_ i-i w?'- ~-`y.~ L=?=. 5l~`+L. ~w~~t~ ~{{i'ii,. i =~~ ~.2=i?~. -' -'T? .-.. _ ~;i l^ i --.ii_:i:_~ ! __ "' .-._. _~ =5 - iii;y:~?-rr nn :Y~ fir. -:~'.~ -7 L~= 3~. `ice. ~1 .. a-?z iii..3 ??~. Si~~ ~ ~ ..~-.. ~. ~. "F .r ..w~ _ ?-r:- ~~"~ :ice ~!i ri_~ Wit:...... .__. . =i :-.~ -?'! F'3 ~.~ ~2j_ ~ iS ii ie~~ --.-~?~=-~~.r ie~~? ~i~. ~i~?~_~ .: .. ~-: _.-- ~~:..-~. ~i?=- :-:...._ rsy~ .iii -- ... -..~....~~ ~- -.. -_..:..--..--~ =~:._a....= i~-'f?i.. -..?.4 =__.-. ~-.. .. .. his r:-?wi?'~~ ~~- :--r:~i -..~ -~- .. .:!?_ mil ~~-. ~~. 1? - -' -' - _ v _ ~is3~ 33. Vii: ~?'}~.~a T _ -~ -- r -_~''r -- -- -' roc: _~i: - - _-" i? .. ?.t .-.? ~.._ ~?}~~ tZ 1 }'6~ ~ ~1 ~ .. ~.-.- .. .-~~ ~t .: t1 }rte .... ~w _ .. - t S.}ti ~~kif .~.-i:. ?i -e~?i?"rl '~~ .=a~ zz'~y'_y_n rl~ _ ~ ?r. _:~'~_ :i? _ ... _ - _ - - i i. ~~ :~. ~ .. ~ ~ ~l~' ~ ~. ?.~ f.j~ ...: ?. i s ~ ~ - ~ a _ :ice .. -: y,~ _ r ~ ~ r. _ ll.. L. .~'i :mil i- ~a isti- i.' I T: t1 i ~. i~ i'F3~ - - r ?~ - - L r~. ~~ }1"}~ ~.5i}.iF.~ .'}::--~.. 1'k-~i?ir sr~'i~~~~ :r Li~.~rsi~%i ..i~~.~ iiCYii ~ _ .._~.."=~^,r i i9 F'F . ?~ i . :? i~ , i i? ~ ?~* ~~ i 1 i ?7 . 3 ~ - .r =7 { i. i .. iY: }' ~ ~ ~ .: ~:~ " j':.. , .. _ ~. - -.:-. -. ~ .. _ - ~ti~~~~ Li}"ii-''ssj ; '~::r3 ~'.. f iii}~~ i L ?~?~P'ri~1~ ?:': t~a~~ rfr -.~..- ---r-. w, .__ - .. ~ ~ "J:. :1 .. _.f l stu ~=~; Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 STATI NTL Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-01137R000100130001- k'r'T 4:; ~F A:'r.t.i~.G:ii THE NEW 12EPt1BLIC =' t "~`J ~} 8 November 7 9ij0 b~ ~'ad ~~u~c 1'or the first time since the 1950s, the possibility of nuclear war with the Soviet Union appears to be seriously accepted by key figures inside and outside the U5 gavernment_ What long have been unthinkable thoughts now are entertained by influential men and women in Washington. Meanwhile the Carter admin~ istratian is moving apace with measures designed to prepare the US~--and LTS public opinion-for the con- tingency afmajor wars. It is a new phenomenon, based on the hardening conclusion that the Soviet Union's overwhelming concern, aside from a determination to achieve strategic superiority over the US, centers an assuring itself of military endurance and survival as a functioning satiety after a protracted nuclear ex- change. Asenior White House foreign policy specialist says: "In 30 years, I never thought war was really possible: now I think it is possible-if not necessarily probable." _. _~ . -What does it all clean and where does it lead? 7s it a question of .correct or incorrect perceptions held by officials in Washington and Moscow? What are the implicit dangers of such attitudes? There are no pre- cise answers to these questions: But certain realitie7 are observable_ In the US, the military response to the perceived Soviet threat includes the go-ahead for the R/I7C mobile missile system, the work on the "invisi- ~le' Stealth bomber, a controversial shift in nuclear '.targeting strategy against t:`~e Soviet Union, recent _ decisions tq accelerate the production of weapans- .= grade plutonium, and the restoration of US chemical warfare capability. These prepa.ratians are developing in a new psychological climate that has evolved steadily since early 1980 and goes well beyond the (arum; of the presidential campaign_ The new climate, dampening the euphoria of the Soviet-American detente of the last decade, can be traced to the mounting evidence of the build-up of Soviet nuclear and conventional forces, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan last December, and, most recently, the dangers surrounding thecurrentPersian Gulf hostilities. Thoughtful analysts at the Pentagon and the National Security Council staff emphasize Soviet advances in the accuracy of their huge SS-1S missiles (plus the fact that their throw-weight greatly ~ exceeds that of US intercontinental missiles); the deployment ofinedium-range SS~20 missilesin Europe, ; and the direct involvement of combat forces beyond Soviet borders, from Angola and Ethiopia to Afghan- istan. "The grand development in recent years by the Soviets is the projection of their power into the world," says a senior Pentagon expert_ And frequent and i unexplained movements of Soviet troops have wor- riedEheadministrativnandhaveledtasecretalertsby ' US armed forces this year. The result of all this is that the hawks and doves in and out of the government nowadays speak in strik- ingly similar language about the inexorable deteriara- ' tian in Soviet-American relations and its long-range, consequences-although theirpointsaFemphasisvary_ ~f course nobody in Washington desires or actually ~; predicts a nuclear war. But the Carter administra- tion-and the Reagan team--are proceeding along a .:,1 _.._. _ w .. ... CU~irTrj~~ D Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 LONQON pAILY TELEGRAPFf 6 Octpber 1980 IT is almost unpos~,~ble to: -; -::&nd _ an_~.?iateliiaenc~ Drie.fcase CZ]eCl:s ? ~ I The I D .. ? deploys ' its J own ~ E~.rly orE, he snotten the use In recent efforts to ,tighten operatives ~ ?,in Soviet " em- ' ? ''that could be made oE"'tlie secarity at-. Langley, : Adl ~ bassie9 . abroad;, where._their,l Cubans, the Vietnamese, acti4itiei run: parallel to=tha : and'-other ~?Iarxist regimes . ; ~ ( Turner has im osed a_ system - ~?iri~tdn cod '~vhv has?'a.:-, ? = ~+?ork- of the K G B..' Rezideti` -; 'in ? the 'T'hird. World in ord~ri of random . br1'zfcase checi:s. - ? good -word to say about:-? n?a' ~,-atorsr: - C T A ? .~FSrer i cures. - -. _r:y;.;` ~~?'-' to gain acces to.- and in:~u-; A d m i r a-l Stlttsneld ' masaes.vto get the ? wort of Tu;tter. It is no~v widely ? both worlds. ?-'The system is believed that even tf ? ' ' offensive ~ -= to ? loyal C I A President Carter is re- people, ~~-but. also gets' you .,ie..~~ >,v ..:;tr a,a` thinkin~..'abort how much _ -Cdnid~ -`De- 'SmU~$IP.R 071[: auvic7, i?a7~~a.:ar iu r~ume, one _: _~~replaeed~._::~-_? -_~_ : ~?,---??'. "~ - wrapped - inside a shin nr . in hondon, one in 1l~exico ; AdmlTnrnzrhas~drawh'particv-j ': 'stuff'ed=?'dnder?. a='-'brassiere' ~ City, and one at the So~?iet -lac. critip_~n from within- the strap." -:: ? - I T4ission to -_ -the . 'United '- American irstelIi;ence cem-~ ;tleanwhile; the CIA remains ~ : R?atioris in I~ew York-' ?munity for-.allowing- asses. Cripnled,?by-legal=inhibitions I tine of their spr_cia] funs`ions - is to or anise the cl f t in k d t d ti o l g i ewe o - an es ne :e s meats- t I - in mounting foreigrx opera- with 'the -- rldmiziistration's ( ?. tioris- ?-? Recently; '~ the .-FBI 1 funding of. Left-~~?ing lob5:es _ political needs and prejudices. -'rrvv anal=t, from the CIA's national forei7a assessments '?. ? centr~- era sari . to have re-. signed in a _fury .over- the' ?falsifCation=of .troop-;.counts '= for-worth Iiar~a-the delibe- rate- downolavir.~ of Pvort?L- asked the,arranye the Coverage of a meeting by tPd dcabie a7an` a sns ec Diplofttstic cover ,. - . _ ence_ aver. ?-- CYester7a hb- ? erals who would shy. away-' For example, t1'e~ern an?alcsts framing direct identifiCation?~ 17ave- identified three senior with ~ipscow- i ID. H?orking under -Tba ?.m~ricas Department of dhat further Soviet po]ic~? f~vals by pz?each:nzi unilateral p _ - - Tha?.I D i~4 believed by 1,Vestern?' s+~[h his.-I~GIi case handler ~ the ~?ast.,..complez of- t$o~:iet in llezico Citv. 'T'he-CI~.'s = -front organisations. such as' analysts to?have assumed a ? gene*'zl counsel oh.iected the". - the ttiorld Peace Council, the ~ leading role in Soviet plans. sun'eillance -could not be World Federation of .Trade ~ for-industrial disruption in ? ',nnr~-~rPd le,*ally a~!airtst a ~ -. iJnions, and the International ~, ?Data-countries. -Sigx7yficantly,. deli;ged to justify .~ policy j The li CG $ kept its rend=z- ? ?of disensaaement from Seoul- - - ti?ous: rr.thaut the intruding 8ut_ what one -former senior; eve of'the C:A: GfA official describzs ? as' " unoelievavle ?' -vas .: the I ?~~-~~~~)' n~ l ' circulation of an interna mernoranCnm ~.arning the stall' a[ Langley aoout . an intensiaed campaign- by? the h G B to penetrate the _ aaenc~- -_ -- - ? ? 91fereci ~~__ _~ryoa,aoa The .. memorauducu repaired ~ that tae price ? now beuna ohered by .the lk G 13 -for a ' .-- C.[ ~, case otticer who is will: -- iaa to v:orl: for the Russians ?_? as: an ? - agent-in-place - ?- is _ X00,000? (FG08,000): - For ' a?~ .'Cipher dent ar cnmmuniCa- ~, _- tions o~cer, the figure - is double. "You don't sgread tt~t~kind . of news in a climate- of ( general demoralisation;" my ? source gloomily observed:-. 7'he eFrort to penetrate CIA ~ anti other. America,; intelli- gence agencies. as noted in _ _ a previous .column, is the special task 'of Pavel Bess- ; '- merta~l;, the high-ranking :. '-KGB oFncer=whose status KGB) to impose a -reign of He set . out. with -notable- suc- is hi ;hpr than that of ' ttie ; ~ terror in Budapest ?aftzr the' ? cess: to expand the range of ??KG.13 R ide?nt and wh t ~ o D er a t ~ppri~~Y~k1u661i't~elea',~~Q~~~JO~O~o~e4?x'~~d~~~~d~t~ _ Asscriauon__ of--_ I)e:no~2SC ( the Caret of the >ortn Amen-:. T,at.~ers operate uneer the ?', cari .department of ,[he T T) '? guidance-of?-Poaomaret's ID__ (which rovers the- United -Ponomar~ev's main achievement States, Canada and the Eng- ? has stemmed 'from his belief : -. lisp ~~eaking Caribbean, .in- that the Sor?iet Union should Ci.uding' Belize). _- ?~Tikoria: responsible for 'subversion and ? covert action . in thei l~Ve,-tertr hemisphere, and- its' more recently farmed sitter-~ oroanis7a?ion, the' Africa De- partment, there developed under -the guidance-of? the 'ID_ . ? -=Dzsrupti,y~ cola . ?'.radical and Left-r.?ing organi- -tabour- specialist:-.tvho:.has' .cations in the \1-e?t that arc ~ ?-written. a? boon on: United - ?. not -subject- to Communist ~ States trade unior;a. '-_ - party discipline llostovets travelled' to ~Vaslt- . Soviet undercover operations :q'his srt'him at odds with nrore.?! ingtoi '-vith Ponontarev 'in _ a--e. not the preserve of ~ ~ doetrinaire_ thinkers such as . January, 1978, . to. attend- a; the I:G $ _ and. its ~Sis,er= ; - _. 'Mif}hail : SusloY,;' the-- vetecaiz. Conference of the tiVor]d` -service, the G Ii U,-?:~vttt~se:I =::.ideologue and Politburo. mem- Peace GouriCil, "Daring :their initials stand for.: Chef ~ =::;,her-%~rpo. hasp long- remained stay, the.Y?-)tad talks with' Into?ligence Directdrate of. -:-''-'suspicious of ahe, reliability of several American 'publishers; the Soviet Generate Stafr'".- r;;.=?uon-Commun;5t,=-.movements and with a panther of anti-__ defence a~tiYists_ ~ ? ?= Fquallk - impdrtant,::especiallg?: =.' :ad ;the~:Left_- _ _;r_'=: : _._. ? :. ~ Tlie I D i> believed to bz. taking` iu. den}ins- : ~r?i[h Left-~+?zn~; .:; ~ ' j an ? increasing' ?. ' oliticaI-groups in the'SVest,~ - COI7L?dii3 C3 a71(1CCl ~,:?.'.~.: mterest:'_in = p = ~ ? - campaigns - directed , a~'ainst '. -~s -the ?International Depart- As early as 1961; when he first r =meat (I D) ,of ? the- Sur-let' : attaiaad the rain.- of .party }~ o-tern ? trap>-nationah car- : Communist party;-,~ which' secretarc, - - . ? Ponamarev ,'-_ porattons, which offer` the` c deserves its owe share of the ': '=?=preached the need to [hsnnel r?, ?ttradive'dtial oppdrtunity-to i_ lime}ight_ ~_. ?_;~ - .- :--t ?~ y-?- ~ .?.- ?larbestale ?~apport td -groups fa) :practice industrial espion- '? a,~e ivhile (b) helping- : to Founded-~nrider I:hruschev: in : - ~?that~are dPscr:-bzd, in Soviet - T _~ I9a9: -the' ?I D'' 'has?"'been ~--;`parlance, as "healthy forces'.' `? tiadet-lstine, the' performance individuals. and of ZVestern economies: . - I3cris ~--meaning ded since then by h ? : -. ea movements that ? can be re-_ l`ikolaevich P a u o m a r e v, -' whose 'previous' services to ''lied.upon to cacryout actions the _: Soviet:: 5fate '.included that ? favour- Soviet policies assisting Yuriy Andropov -_' without necessaril_v..beina suh- -r?~ Ca-~,Z i~il>s -. from- tae' rest of the: K GB , I D is suven?ised,by its First ,- member-parties,. with 1?Vestern .?.-station--'who holds the-cover ; neputy~-.Chief. Vadim Valen- trade unions, and with "pro- job of_l~linis:er-Counsellar,,at . r tovicb .Zagladin. ?',. .- -, _ eressive" lnbb_as- in' the ~Cer~ir~ .~~st~ " ~-][ow R,obert ~Al~en ~Put1 .._. - ~ ~'-~..r1 ~nen~at ~nzg P>reha.nd ~Ba~s in the U.S. - - By :Charcoal, ;Charlie Wu For"'I'liree ;ears; ~~Ielped exit Posed ,as .Yob .Figure, A~:~TCY,r ~'~'L~-~' THE WALL STREET JOURNAL Ap~ro~~-f~efea~se 2001 /07/27 6 ~~~R'9d ~Q 378000100130001-4 Supplies ~'roin Southwest Asia ~ .=1 .-; But despite such efforts, heroin recentl ?lias been moving into the U.5. in .increasin -. amounts, according to U.S. narcotics offi cials. The East Coast cities of New York, -Philadelphia, Washington, Boston, 13alti ?rnore and Newark, N.J., are- particWarly'i Hard hit. In Boston, the purity content of; ;heroin sold to addicts has risen 10% in the cask six months, an indication'. of its in-i creased availability, Robert Stutman, in ".charge of the drug-enforcement agency's Boston office, says. The gmwth. in the heroin ,supply is largely+~e.result of. a bumper opium crops -last year in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. ?After the -substantial local consumption,i :more than a third? of the crop-60 tons of heroin=was available for..export to Euro- pean,.U.S_. and Canadian markets; according "to U:S; intelligence. estimates. =. Because :of.?the ,heroin influx;.': many.,of ' New-:York. State's: 416? drug-treatment ;cen-lI ? fer5_are :being forced to operate beyond thei~l 'capacity,' a? state official. says.- heaths from, heroin::':ovecdoses,~ in;-:N.ew York City'. alone! may?;exceed 6M)?.this:year, against 471 last :year.and.Z4(, estimated:.. ;;. ;.: Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 ~KiIC ~~~or Release 2001/Q7/~7~~~A 1, ,.~0-0113780001001300 ? ~i]~ ~ ~ ~ ~ .ti I i gic-early warning a :;i crrmmunica?ion ; ?~'1~~~~.~L.~. ~-'a ~.f 3~ ~~ "`~ ~. t.'~~-'"_~~.l.y~~ I yeas computf cq~atttha h~ddqua tern f' ! ~ ; the North r'1t^~?r':can Air Defense Cam-. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i mand in Choy*:anz ~lourtai,-t, Cola, t.av} ~~~ ~ ~ q~ ?j'~~~ ~~, ~~~ ~~ ~ ? ~ ?~ malninctioned, trlgeerinb false alarms in ! which missiles and ~*ztbers ?xere tnade ! ready for take-CrfL Cong.~i~nal audi- I - By IiACI~Rfl BURT tors, meanwhile, reported ~~'ier. [his !; to A" teetinn York TlLe~ - ~ year that a new generation of c~ ze~utars ? - . !for the military's worldwide car.Ztttand NASAINGTON, Sapt_ 21--~ The United ' - - ?- and control system would : of be aple tv States military, long used to having a ~,re becoming increasingly vulnerable..~~ boodle the demands created by a major! clear edge over the Soviet Union in nu. ~'or the first tim?, nSr.-Brown said last 'i military crisis. The existing sys[?rn; j clear might, is being forced *.o adj ust to a? ~onth' L':e Soviet Union might now ba ~; moreover, is considered :r'alnerable and?~ new era in which the American strategic ~hle to destroy all 1,053 of the Air Farce's ~! inaclequate_ - __-_-_'~~-:-. rhoir l~nl?1PY(.1?'(Sllnd .t ~'f ar.9i?Ity PA r~Y.t31iat8 arsenal is becoming- outcated and ever morevulnzrable. - ln recent statements, President Cat ter, Secretary of De;ense Harold Brawn Viand vkher senior officials Have asserted -'that, in the area of nuclear weapony, the United States is still "second to none" At the same tir.-:e, however, ;~1r. 3rcwn ard his top aides have started to contend th~[ if Dresent trends iri the miclear balance -cont;naa; thz United Sia[zs, by the mid- 1990's, could find itself vulnerable to nu- clearblack,-nailbyMoscow: _ = Mr. Brawn, for example, told a group -last :aonth at the United. States Naval . - i~3efense. silos in. a surprise nuclear "3irst strike." _ penta~ori aides stressed that,while 1 Under Secretary of T7efense far resaarch ;meant the 1: nited States was in dangzr of and engineering,-told a Hvuse,:Arrned !losing its capa,ity to retaliate titer a Services, subcommittee that Soviet? i Soviet nuclear attack. 'they said, mores ~ bom'a2rdefenseswererapidlyimnravinp aver, that intelligence rapo:ts indicatedi and that over the next 10 years :Moscow I that American nuclear farces, a> a whole, 'could find a means of detecting and de- were still superior to the.Soviet a _-sen.;' ~n terms of readin2as and :eliabisty, a: carrying ile i ' - ss s ~1 m straying the Navy submarines. 9Components ~f the nation's nuclear arsenal are weang out- Tna mainstay of the Air ,rorce's nuc'.ear bomlJer forces, the 8-52, is about 20 years old, and off.i- cialsreportthat the planes suf'.'er from an iricreasein expensive mairterance prob- ?lems. The service's 53 Titan 2.:nissiles, ~mPanv?aile. have also been in place far I ' ~~ 1=he U.S. ~-`-'rep red? Second of seven article3_ ":. ? _- tiVar Colle;e in Newport, R.1_, that, with- out impmvemeats to the ballistic tuts-' I'siles ard heavy bombers that make up j the country's deterrent force, VJashing- ton could face "at best a perception of in- feriority, at worst a-real passibility of nu- clear coercion " ? " . . they manufacturing nuclear weapons are said hout the 1950's and 60's Throu , g United States lzd .the Soviet Union. inj I to be in bad repair_ A confidential report nearly every measure of strategic power including numbers of missiles and bam performance. But Moscow; spending as =much as three times more than Washing- '.ton on nuclear forces during the 1970's is ranalysts call "rough parity".in strategic power. - -- - ... =a- - :par y t e entra n~~nce ~enc~t oscow can surpass .e nit to es two decades and have rECenLly pea; I cruise missiles in the naXt few years planned by a series ofwell-publicized ac- : would ~~uarantce the Air l=nrce's ability cictents The problems besetting the Titan . to peretrlte Soviet air de:ensue t:nrouah 2 were vividly demonstrated in Dames- ts1e 19b0's. ~ 1 . ct~, Ark., last week when a fuel, tank of The 1,CC~rnile range missiles, which ~ one of the missiler, punctured by a falling fly at treetop altitudes, vrould permit socket wrench, exploded and sent a cloud B~2's to "Stand ofc" from Soviet air de-~ I fens, a less demanding role that offi- aftoxicchemicalsint9the air.. ~ ~ 'als bel~ev? will sa're wear and tear and ~ ci `" - . g'Ihe Government's facilities for t the aging bombers. `prepared recently for the.Department at Energy; the agenty assigned the task of producing nuclear. warheads;. concluded that "serious deterioration of equipment .several yews whic.`t could seriously im- __- - _ _~ _ ~___,___...o,-,_ -- ---- - - ~ons. [requirements] forecast -for the gear the last 15 years. several Govern- =nent plants producing critical materals ard components for nuclear.' warheads thauglt Soviet forces were considered n:orepowerful. ? In adc'ltion, they said that ,~lr. Carter had approved numerous p_oaratns over the last +hree years meant -o remedy the em?rginb nuclear deficierc;es_ Althou~t in 1977 the ]?resident canc~iad the B-1 bomber, tivhich was propped zs a r~ olacemenr far the i3-52 force, afticials said that :dlr. Car`er's decision to enuip Farther in the future; Secretary Brown I and other senior Pzntagan aides are ex- cited about the prospects for deploying a :Stealth bomber, which would be nearly ''Submarlne;teallg~ment - : ~,= _ At sea, the Navy this year deplayed'.he first of a new class of Trident missile sub- .marinesthat will gradually replace the 10 ~ Polaris vessels built in the 15~511's. Bachaf ) tree new submarines will Carry 2~ Trident ' 1 missiles, a ;1,f,C0-tulle-ra.,-tpe rr=issue that I had been .shut, producing ,significant. ro rzs One offi- ra t tri near y every measure o nuc ear caps-I " Administration 6fticials maintain that; ~.urider Mr. Carter, Washington has begun to counter Moscow's ? growing missile power. Nevertheless, military specialists acknowledge that several serious Arab- - lems in the nuclear arsenal need to be - - delays ui weapons. p g :cial,far example, said the deployment of " a new version of the Army's Lance taco-. cal'missile had slowed by 18 months be- cause of a shortage of plutonium far the. system'swarhead. -? ? ~ ?~-- ?_ ? - . ri~EiSi?d in the next few. years, includln 1 chese~" ~4p~ro;~er~~For Rele~se~?~Q~/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 .- 9Amen must a and borb t' orcea Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100 ~~ Q*i PAGE- l -~ TtwE PIATICPIAL GUARDIAN 17 September 19E0 >ay x>uv~ti .l. xELL;vY . . Gzmrzliun Cnrre.~Ft~nc%er. t - F_irsr u~rtrn aerie/es 1ashington, D.C lYho's ahead in rnifitary strength---the U.S. or U55R? The majority sentiment on the U.S. political spectrum now stems to hold that Washington is at best a precarious equal to Moscow in military might. _ A smaller but quite vocal section of the ruling class even maintains that the Soviet military build-up of the parsevrral years ha; reduced the U.S. to second rate status- " The election-yearprescrip[ionbringaffered fram moderate, Democrats to hawkish, neoeonservatives is a crash = "r:armamrnt program? by the U.S. Viriual(y all thespecific steps advocated- to build the Pentagon's 'military machine this -year. are? now being implemented= registration fpr the draft; -deployment of.tht hlX mobile=missilasys[em; assemblage~of .a-Rapid'Deploym~nt'fiord; ~develapment ofa new'fleerofnuclear~rmed bombers, `and a bolstering of .sea warfare capabilities: All of this is to br. financed. ;y -multi-billion dollar increases in the Pentagon budgee-.thalYran- only be-: obtained by _preipe~rtiiinai cuts in social spending_ .-- -%-This-unrest'ained.militarism also?inval~rs _ somesignifitantshiftsin U.S.nnclearwarpolicyr and ageneral- lessening of the chances for avoiding\Vorld 1?Var 3. Talk ofarmslimitation ' -and detente is rarely heard herethrsedays.Thr drive to "regain ?U.$_ 'superiority" is well underway, itsconsequences both ominousand . unconsidered_ . - - . - __ - _ --Onlya courageous few novr question the ; 'Central rationale on which this build-up is 'based. The terms acid tenor of debate have shifted so far in Favor of the hawks iq the. past. _ couple of years that thz undtrlyi rtg premise of ; an all-out Soviet military effort isseldom even . ~-questioned ?any more. 1[ therefore seems -.essential to scrutinizeswhat has become an ` -:axiom for-all bourbeois politicians and for .many liberals and'a-few leftists::- . ~ - BASI.SOFCL,AiIvIS .--_ _ -fi- ? What; first of all? is the basis For the claim _ chat the .Soviet Union has outspent the U.S. j significantly~in the last few years? ' ? It-is certainly not the-Soviet government; which consistently. maintains that it is not engaged iti ~ any push to become the top superpower, An claiming that it seeks only _parity and=thus security; the~oviets paint to their published-figures on defense spending which represent, in dollars; about one-fourth of the U.5. annual expenditur:_ Allegations ~ that the USSR isactuallpspendingmorethan the '. Pentagon- are routine]y denounced by Tv1oscow as "malicious falsehoods:' ~? Confirmation for the claim of enormous 'Soviet military outlays does not come fram somewhatimpartial -analysts'-such as the London-based Institute far Strategic Studies and the~Stockho{m International Peatx !?~= j search lnstitutr (S1PR1). The Br`.tish research ' institute refuses to affix any firm dollar figure to the Soviet defenseprogram,explainingthat ~ any estimate would he based on lasgeamounis of guesswork. SIPR1 meanwhile acknowl- edges that "the scale and momentum of Soviet military activities are scarcely modest" But, , the Swedish groupadds,precisecomputafions -are "very uncertain" and "lack credibility:" Oren sections of the U. S. government?are '! reluctant to certify tht huge sums that have been attributed to the Sc>virt mili:arymachinr_ In an October 1979 report an world armament expenditures, for example, the State-; 17epartment's Arms Control and Disarma- mentAgencypointsouttha["estimatesofthis j type probably overstate the. relative size-of ; ? _. ~ Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-0113780001001.30001-4 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 '3 ;_~'~=t~r~:;~r 1900"0 eg.innir!a in March I97$, Carte:, taking Zbi~tiew ~3rze~rski's cry, used the C_I.. figures in speeches warning that the Soviet Uui .was outspending us. Typical was this exchar~g~ VIC ~ OR PERLO The "Soviet menace" has been the Iei~otif pf U.S. foreign policy and the prime accelerator of the milita.-y budget-far thirty-flue years. Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan are playing it double fortissimo nowadays, while commentators warn of the Russian bear armed to the teeth looming over..the defenseless American eagle. In the early 196()s John Kennedy's "missile gap" was the? pretext far: a big U.S.. militar buildup; the gap was ultimately shov:zi to be fraudulent.-Now there is-a new "gap"-and it can be-shown to be equally spuriaus_ The Soviet Union, it is alleged, has been rapidly increasing its defense budget while we have bee^ reducing ours and is spending SD percent more than the' United States for military purposes_ This was the main argument used by Carter iv raise the mil- itary budget3 percent per-year above therate of . ~inflat7on and, last fall, to .prepare a .new budget calling far a growth rate of S_perc:nt. Now, past- - Afghanistan,.it's up to 7, dr 8 percent. - The alleged Soviet ~"military buildup" remains the central theme of the campaign for defensein- creases: The claun of higher Soviet spending mainly rests an statistics compiled by the Central . Int~.Iigence Agency. (Friar to 197$ the source was not given but now -the? Agency is credited and, with a little perseverance, its reports* can be purchased.) - - ~ ~ - -- - The theme ?was first sounded: back in -1974 when the -Pentagon launched its campaign for a fresh post Vietnarti military buildup. At the ! time, the U.S. Arms Control and Disa.~ritaxnent ~ Agency reported that the U.S.S.R had outspent the United States far defense in 1972 and 1973. Then in February 19'76, ~'urtune showed Soviet rrzilitary spending in 1971 soaring ahead sa ihatF by 1975, it surpassed LI.S. spending by 43 peroent. - -a press conference an 7anuary 26, 1979: Q: Since Secretary [of.Defens:. Y,arald] Brown told tt7c ? Congztss yesterday that the U-S: _arsrnal is fax and avray superior io that af.the Savi~t Union . __. why did y-ou not sw fit to ke`p your Cwrnpaign promise ta? raluct the dtfcctse -. budget irLSt~d of raising it? ~. - - - A: I t'~~ni: we art atilt .-.. to match any military capahili- ty that the Soviets have.... But in the last id or 1S yed'epending?;on the final ~tgure t~et~,spendtng; asYthe Untted States t~ie'Soviefs froia.doing-ps much with -"; n',;::.;exaggerated;.=Sovief.; stretigfh .:, _--~_ _ _y _c ~~ ~- .. -.. _ turned-the Congress and the.cotintry around and: persuaded us' to waste._ literally-b>1lions=on military--spend- ~ ing on the mistaken assumption-_that:- _ ,_,: the:5oviet. Union spends mpre.,?. ands in ahe.:.process builds a more: powerful. military-;;force-: ihan..ati.e~ 'United States.t';~'=`._ ~ '=~_>~~,::'..; .' '-',;';.;, ',Huffstutler-_said:=the :Soviet Union;;, spent thz equivalent=ofabout' 5165':. tiilfiot iii==='Y7:5 =dollars :'oil'. ritilitaiy ~_~ egt?ipmeztt;?~;wages and'development;~._ last year;=pr,about:50 percent.'more.'. tij~'aii5b'U~:~outlaysYiates, the CTA`tries to learn, .projected' economic: growth : amongotherthings'; what :weapons the Soviet - ..; raises:questions:aliout.alie;U55R's.ability to con- . - _ r,.,nc,nrrcaeinoli PfPnSP'finP_n(I1T1 E7~-" .- - - ....,. .,.,_.. ...~j.....,....... -. ... ~~. ___r___v. '. - ... s._., :?: ~`_(.. `;i,'''fy" ~:.:.: ,.k'.'~ - :what wages,itis,paying~.its soldiers.-then de- T ''f~~~y..` .. ..---::~~ssocia~ea.~'ear.'._~::~s:''+.;,.;~~-~~~~:..: ..: _ Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 ATZT~~::~? AP ~:.A?^~ Gl ~'RGit~~ "_~~ ~ ~~~, a ~~ar ~~~~~ ~~~~~s~ ~as~ -:. : RY .George C: "5~ilson? . :. Thy CZ?a yesterday predicted that the Soviet Un- I :lon will keep increasing .its~:.defense budget 5 per- ~,cent ayear; the same percentage.Gangress approved ;for the?United States this year_~.-; ?? :? ~-_~ ` The agency,- at a hearing- before a House Tntelli- - Bence subcommittee,. did .say;, its is possible that- Sa. ` 1-iet military spendinc will slow down because of de- clining'overall economic groR-th. - "The current and projected decline irl.Soviet eca- nomic growth. raises questions'about- the .US-S.R.'s }abilfty to continue increasing defense spending," :Robert:, I~uifstutlez,~ director of CIA': strategic' re~ `search, told the subcommittee: ` - ` ~i'hile foreseeing little. slawdown~~before -1983; ;Huffstutler added; "In the longer term; growing ecp= : nomic._difficulties-may: push the Soviet leaders to `reexamine their plans with-a?view to-reducing the -growth of defense-spending."' ; --.,- - `~.Two-possible,economies?would be-,to~.reduce;.the r.production -rates..of some weapons and ,agree to arms :control==agreements providing .direct :savings, the 'CIA specialist.said: ,- __ - __- - .. - :Fie cautioned, however, that "we think: it highly .unlikely'.'. that. th~* Soviet leaders a-ill:reduce mili- ;tary.spending to ~?the point that it reverses "Iong- =s.taxiding policy oi;continuing to_ improve their milir tary capabilities.'.'.': ; - _ -. - - =.:$e said=Soviet defense spending, after allowing-. ,3or.inflatlon;,.has-gown "an average of 4 to 5 per- `cerrL. a ,year.: since : at least 1963:' In contrast to this ;steady.. growth..US. defense. spendinc=has been: up .- 'and down in: that same period; with the ? Vietnam . war pus- hing,the totals-up during the late 1960s. ': _ . >2=-~Vho:has__been responsible,'for=the-declineit~tiU.S:=.~ .rnilfta`ry spending'since` Vietnam is a'hot issue in' =pubIicans:blamin4: eachot erg:;; ~ ~-,;-~- . .:. _ -_ - THE WASHINGTON POST 4 September 1980 The:GIA estimates how much. it 'would cost the United States and the Soviet Union to duplicate , 'each-other's military establishment, with'one com- parison expressed in rubles and another in dollars. '_~ ' -The GI ?,'s cumulative estimates in= dollars from 197U.through 1979 were $1-.133 trillion for the United- States and $1.4ii0 trillion for the Soviet Union, a.dif-. ; ference of abput.30 percent, In 1979 alone; -the CI=1 ,` 'estimated, the Soviet.Union-spenty165-:-pillion on its military;.about:50.percent;=more than:US~espendi=-:,_ ~~Aspin said during a break in. the hearina:.that'CI'r1': dollar coinparisoris-are distorted because tiie agency..: puEs Soviet.soldiers on U.S:.salaries..,~-:_ .'`__=:: ~= -- -:: .? -lTnder. that.l.-ind .of figuring; `.Aspin said, "the .Chi- nese K?auId be"'spendinv-us' into ? oblivion"- if .their axuge.: army'was 'considered 'to be ? paid U:S: mili- , '-? A:related issue fs whether the CT_'1-has been pro- viding accurate comparisons of U.S. and Soviet mili- aary spending; a topic Chairman Les Aspin.(D-~Yis.) said.the subcommittee .would question.,the agency ;about in closed session. ,..:... ?; ? - ~-'.`The GIA provoked a flap in 1976 by announcing :the . it .was.:nearly doubling its estimates of how big- a:'slice- of the Soviet gross national product .was going for defense- Instead of the. oid 6 to 8 ?. percent: estimates, the CI A; said, the new, estim_ ate 1 was between- 11 and 13 percent.- `. ~ =-'-: `_~ However; i_n 1978 the C1:0. attributed much of the increase to the fact that the Soviets were vetting less bang:-far the buck because "Soviet defense ~ .industries: are.far- less efficient:.than formerly be- ;;:Yesterday? the agency stuck-:with- itsY li to 13 .percent. af. G~iP for the 1963 through: 1978 period, but.raised the estimate to between 12 and 14 percent .:For;, 1979 because the :Soviet economy sagged that year- .-. _ -- The-estimated annual 'growth. rate, after allowing fpr '.inflation, i-n the Soviet defense. budget was `estimated at between 4 and- a percent'.izi rubles. tart' salaries for making dollar comparisons-- . t Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-01137R000100130~1- C f7_[1.1.Jn ~~~J t] lei 1.~;: V ~ A~A'~JiV .L 1lJR 0d P~~G~~~..~~ 4 Se j?t~mbPr ? 98Q USSR-to keep"passing up . US in arm outlays -- CiA - -- - Washing#on Despite growing economic prob-. lems, the Soviet Union will continue to outspend the United States heavily on all major elements of defense, the CIA { I-.. forecast Wednesday. Robert . Huffstutler the agency's director of , 4 ._ research; told a panel of the Housa ' .'`."; - Permanent Select Gdrnmittee orti Intel-" ligence that the estimated dollar vafuef of Sovietdefense activities has.ex-., :;,;.,, -_ ceeded US outlays by a widening. ,:,; -~~., margin since.1971, and by 1979, the`; w'. :rx. Soviet total was about $165 billion -;:,`_~ about 50 percent above US outlays;:;:~F Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 ~~. Approved. For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-01137800010013 01=FIDE ~F GURRE~T C~PERATI~~1S ~lE~JS SF~VI~E DISTRIBUTION li Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130 - TfiE WALL STREET JOURNAL 22 August 1980 ?:{~ - y~~~ In tie '~~in~a ~~ - - - - -i:..~:::- _ - ,. Aver. the last dec~/ade, -while the ~In the 19?Os, U.S. intelligence failed United ~ States -has beem~reining in = to -predict accurately.. the size and spending_ on new strategic. weapons -- speed': of: the ~ Soviet .missile buildup' systems, the Soviet i.Fnion has..been ex- - and; thus; to foresee the time when the ~~ pending huge sums to~ enlarge and to Russians would achieve strategic par- modenniae its missile arsenal::Having, ity: ~Ir:~Brown's latest pronouncement. achieved parity-irr~strated c farces in suggestsa further failure.;:::^--_,-.; - -~.; the late 1.97os; it-eras "inevitable that :.- ..: It canbe said on behalf', of the Intel- the Soviet .Union-{would ~-eventually. -, ligence: professionals that even .when: .reach a position nf- superiority if we~, their estimates are accurate::.they,do, ?failed to boost spending substantially:- -not always `control policy:. Political`: The Russians are now opening that so-::~"leadeis.factor:in other considerations called "window":'~~ ab~~ ~~oppottunity; `;. ,=budget': constraints, their efforts; to-= -meaning: the period ;when:..they.are:in;;. 'win..approyal.for aSALT treaty their= an exceIlentposition-to~use their stra- ~ .own_:;concepts::,of .the..nature of :.the ~_: - tegic superiority~:ta'..try'to intimidate nsks ;Interpretation-~~ af:~ intelligence. the U a.- and a_thei=non-Communistna--.. - -data becomes, at the end;. apolitical- tions. -- ? ~~ --;:~~ . ~ --- = .~ - - task-iza--the- very broadest sense~.`If: Defense Secretary Harold: Brown there is a miscalculation, the political.. said tiVednesday that the potential of leadership must be held the Soviet Union to destroy many or sponsible_`? -* - .. _ - ~ ~ - - -` mast of our land-based intercontinen- But. that does not mean that ~accur-~` tal ballistic missiles "has been real- ate intelligence gathering is not vifaI ized or close to it~;~Only-seven months to the process. We can hardly develop- before,:h~r:_Brownsaid:_tl'iat iL=would '~=a ~pru~lent'defense policy .if we-.don't take the Russians`a.-year;or~.two":;to . .know foiaure what the,Russians.are:. achievethaa capability_"The Russians, doing.-1Ye cannot budget: wisely....-for; - it would appear, have :again caught new~;weapons deieIopmen_t-.,-and.-pro=: our intelligence=analysts:;off`guard:_,.. -=-;ciatement. ~Ve cannot,'or should not;., Congressional {_lieadhunters ;_vir =negotiate arms limitationtreaties: _, .'hially gutted our~~intelligence -ageri= ~ ~ Good intelligence- assessment' lies :cie~, notably, the CIA, in_ the_197os..irr. ~_ at_the heart of our defense policy.: The ;their quest to "expose" alleged abuses ]atest revelations show: that, we-.still ----which in the ~ end didn't~amount ~ to ~ `' are maland the old mistakes.- Instead: -very much. While thatproc?ss weak-; j~: of lobbying for an intelligence charter ened severely our ability to~ gather?~ni=~:_~ telling the CIA what it_caii't,do, the: formation and fv-act _covertly=abcoad;y=;~ administration- should, be'' addressing- it also..helped=:create= anyobscure-=but: ~the~ agency's shortcomings, ,particu;: equally grave=weakness-~ nameIy' 'tli-e, ~ _ lat'lY .-tie ;problem . of accurately , as-y lnadequacy:of o__ur=intelligericetassess.,~; sessing..-the Soviet~:~ilnion's_ military;: -meet operati - - .-- .~.: ~ - - - .. ~ - ~t'. beams could . r?Search afficial_ destroy targets... -- -- '. _ - ? Both countrieb have been working - ~ for years an hi,h~nergy-laser.con-;-, Such an achievement would be a CePts. - ~ - -- -ra~olutionary development, putting .Although such potential weaponry the Soviet nited has been labeled by some as "death:.{ States in a key weapons race. - ?. rays,", military' scientists thin'.i' of _'` ? .Defense officia~s who declined m lasers that could be used to destroy i.~ l;a identified-said the..CIA's position hostile .satelli~es, incoming missile-:;. in the recent.iVational Intelligence warheads and etteniyplanes-rat?z2r'~? Estimate -was fa.r sham of a conclu-.., thanpeople:.:.:- ?.... ~:: , _ ~;=:- - sion that the Soviets already had a . .Defense Secretary 1?arold B~wn;. ~ ` ~ laser weapon__ "~. - -- who holds a doctoral de~rae in phys- _ j ossibtlity~- ed the l d ' - p ownp ay has '. ''We say a possibility, but no ics;. raore than that," said a senior de- that a practical layer weapotx-could:'. Tense afficial.. - - - .. be. ;achieved .anytime: saaa: for=: de-.,: _ The CIA also reportedly said in the- fense'against attacking missiles. `~ ~':-^--: foo-secret intelligence`estittrafe that ' ` ~t'one.heat?ng ia.FebrizaryBrovia-=: the Soviets may " be?;:. developingY.a= ? told Sen. Ernest F. Hollings (D.; S. G). , space-based-.laser.-weapon_ tiizith. an-. that,`'you.are not-gain, to ].ivylong all-out effort. and complete-suwcess,-- enough to see that in your lifetime." = the CIA indicated, suclra?laser weap- ?? on might become available to Soviet - Tn-I~iarch; Dr. Arden L p32m.ent Jr~. ~; forces by thelate-1980x.: atop administrator of aduanced tecix--- Senior defense scientists say there?~ nalogy,' testified-:that the: Defense .. are sa many complex technical prob- ._ Science ? Board had .concluded: last < ? letris to conquer that they believe= it :year that "data da not exist mat present.-=. itz devel? `: to tie i i d o s on ec may take upta-lQ years to reach the:;_to support a stage of producing laser.weapons- opment of any particular laser weap-y Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 d~~ r'A~~Q lease 200'F~~7~2~~: ~I~,~DP90-011378000100130001-4 ;;y i3IC.i-L~~D i3li'.rtT .. :S;xtiai to i:c ~yY~rt llm~n'i" - r,~,'ASi3 (:`~]GTON, tiiay wl ._.. ~1.n authori- '~tativ*~' llioe^ce~timate raducedby ~-i?':e Car'er Acimi-r'srratio~as =.:o~nelucl-ed That the Soviet ilnion has developed i .?,rC'unc'~Lv_'r~tl l%+aar *vapon ilzat could be ,: ,.u~ to ctzsuav American space satel- hies- - G.~vernment oi,icials .laid the est.i- z: nate,.rrhich'r: ~ sFm to l~r?~ldent ('arter -,last wee;c, alp regarts ttlat American in- r tail?genre has fcxttxi evidence tllaC rilos- ~~#~'- ;1g~I~ en an antlsatelPtte laser- __ ,., , ~~~ ~. .~..~.c~;J~,_ j ,veapnrl *:?a[ c~zld ~ dePloYc"[l in bvthernic.l~l's_ r space I a Soviet laser. ~.veapcrl cased in saace, Lh ~ d d l ' ~Ie w~~~v~iet development is not view~cl as?al[?r. g Abe overall Soviet-rmerican milita; ~~.alance, ';ut it is safd to have aresen[2d the Pentagan',ylth Sorlle i7'OI.F- Ming que;tivfisbecause the L'.nited :hates ~ has :~cently becoma more defxndent on tiorLS arld ret'onnaissanca. I4ioscmv's dev?fop laser weapors. The estima~u t2' grour:d-based laser, the aiiicials said, is sals~Ereis"evideaceoiaSmrietoaa'e~ probablyeffectiva pnly against low-0rbi't- `o dc'~elop a space-bared laser weapon my American satellites, sila;tly; those that ;ve believe may have an antlsatellit2 used insurveillaacesystems..._. _.? ;;~applicatian."' ~? . - Intelli,zai?nce o:[ficiais~are in general [ agreement that ire $aviet Union has a j laser system that is capable of destroying f ]ow-0rb.iting...:;e1t:Ierican, satelites.:~.B~*t. `some e.~rts e.-cpressedskepticism aboui;~ whether ;`Moscow would be able to-deploy an antisatel'Lite laserHweapon. ~ space I durirz y this decade_~=:: While the inte,tligence es`~mate:epores that ~Ioscow must still arork cut ;eves.} , technical problems before it: can, placa~ . laser weapons in'sPare,: iC~adds. thar_ ` suca weapons mays be available ior' ox.ratianal use. in ilia mid- to the..late t 198~s.' _ :Che estimate has ~ttrrzd , a debate ~ ti-ithin the?Adlzlinistration and on Capita}. } I~iil over the adequacy of American tixo-~ grams#o ?develop laserweaPgns- 771e Ad-. TMlinistxation plans 'to st~el;d abraut $200' . million on d?velop.irig Iaser weapons this:: ? year, liat::most- of ?this is earmarked iar~ ~reseaa'ch on short-range-~s'eapons that :. f co~.z;d be Used to defend ?ships .and air-~ Tr ~ tl:ai4?e+d' States: Al'3' Faire;. ofticfaIs j aid; has ~'~~m.te?examinethelbssibility of build,?rg a laser-power antisatellite :~ `NeaPan, but Pentagon sPec~alists. believe ~ tha t such a. system is willkelp to be avail- i a i71 ebefore the 199p''s:" ? , T. ere is growing ixter?st=in't+~chnical ~ !circles aver?the Potential of-laser.weap_' ohs because sorrze experts believe they - coulcltzansfortnwarfare.,,:,.~ _ ~,_? ~~ In oixYer space I'aser weaapotts vtipuld be I Particularly eitfeccdve i:7 destroying satel 1 :.liter. Some sFecialists aIsv believe that at some future time-laser-">sa~~~tions"~ could provide-the Soviet Uraon with the; txleans o.f defending itself against Amen- . cart ballistic missiles. - The A Iew York Timesreported an Feb, ~ . 1D tltai a secret ?eport t~nsmitted Ca Cote-~ :grass last yeax.-concluded that- Moscow `"probably" had.developed ~'cund-teased laser a'sapons.? Intelligence e~cperts have: 'also assumed that Moscawwas e_,tplaring ways to develop-. a..,laser ~~~ that would be deployed in space.: __ - -:., ? ? , e~ a el , .could ~ able to strike :,iy: . altitude cz-aft, suc2i as corrarn~;Iticatipns ~ate111[es- , - lilE' OffICi31s said t,~at t_.,-?;:p~~.. ~.:}?'..`;s ~''r.~?separate service br:tnchest-in-civilian~aeici eccinpmic prepar~ticrns, ing in?its" ;;teflecttd in-its military preparations (which?_rniist also be?identified in the encompass a wade-range of tls activities and, ~+roblems.-Naliorral decisions;. ~lective~and c~inr/iirltrFtcive annlysis;?`$otinti'-~:italysis:nf:a given ~rnuntry`must': ~perts to the.same subject:~_ _ -` :_:__ ~-- ?~"-`` "~a'- ""-"=~ r - - - -_'_=:: ~E't-The intelligence anilyst's~main ?advantage lies iii-the?}iri~cedure of?~o}~= =his'd"isposa};`'the greite'r the~intehigen~e-`final st's ~dv_arit~igc'over vtlierex~ -. - - - - - .X-- xknowledge of a given a""r~a_~ Theobvious_`s.ignificance of this-diaracteristic`is'? . ~_ .-:'A[ress-tospeeial intimate;?and~;ensitive dafa complements auth~vritatiye.- ;or journalists are in na`way inferior to-the`average iritelligence_arialyst:_ail have?acquired expertise throtigli a~aden-ci~ ?studies,'military'_sdiools;-or'long eper?onal experience;_Nevertheless;~ther?e-are three major'd-iracteristics-that ;distinguish the intelligence arralys(:~from=?ot}ier'observers of world afF~ie's-~~- :sus hes advantage over any other expert Highiy'cleialifiei:i academic researchers aWhat?distinguishes: the intelligence ~professiona! from other analysts?..What! _.~ ?In brief,-ahi4 artide discusses how a better understanding of the complex -relationship between intelligence and its "clients," the derision-makers, tan lead to more satisFachory,?tivelt-integrated }ierformance: ~?? .. :ante}lipence analysts For bad dedsions based on speculative estimates. - -J' __---..-p...__ ..... .. .~ ........ - ing`moi-e fhati a`straight-forward scientific and technoloP cal disc7p}ine that ``should--serve distinct analytical-needs. Inte}liPence certainly has capabilities -i .crag advanta?es that should be understood and exp}cited; but ono should be ji _,eclually~ware~of its limitations. Derision-makers--both civilian-:znd troll- !I ,tary-~who`do not understand this, must often share responsibi}ity with thsir Irate}ligence.professionals obviously never ctairrted that they could read the ,Approved For Release 200'F/07/27 : CIA RD~~7R000100130001-4 - 1q v i~.RTICLE ~~~~~% r Releaser200~1~0~/2m~ CAA-RDP90-011378000100130 QN PAGl a'~.. ~~.?~~ Lll"i4~V ~~ r~lar~c;~ i98o ]iy RICl-l:*:sides are permitted tawork on developing ;new systems. Mascow,is said by-intelli?~ gence analysts to spend about $1 billion ~?year on ~arttiballistic: missile research ? while. the ?=Pentagon's budget==for-_fisca:~ .'year~1981 includes about $265 tnillian.~q workinthisarea_~ ~,~ - . = --~?x,,,.r-~ ~~_.._..._ ,- -. .. _ _ w, ... ~. Apphoved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 ROCKY MOUNT TELEGRAM (N, C. ) 19 January 1980 ,:~.~ . , Despite assurances from the `administrationthat U.S. intelligence operations are adetluate, the crisis in Iran and a string of other U.S. foreign policy setbacks indicate that U.S. i.~ate]ligence capabilities have been "degraded to such an extent" .that they are no longer an effective arm of U.S. foreign policy. .That's the assessment of sec.uity analysts writing on the intelligence -gap in she currant issue of 1Yational Security record. The analysts blame the break- down an the--internal reforms within_ the Central Intelligence .Agency in the early 197gs and. the external .exposiu-es and resulting-limitations placed onthe agency in the late I970s in, the wake of congressional in- vestigations. - These reforms resulted in the forcible rQtiremerit of some ~2,G00 mostly senioir ~ 'officers, and the discharge of another 820 officers from the super-soeret Deputy Directorate of. Operations, which is responsible for cavort actions. Throughout the past war era the U.S. has relied upon - foreign in- telligence .activities to support U.S. interests overseas. Clandestine collection, counterintelligence and covert operations have all been essential .elements aF the U.S. in- " telligence ei;art. Yet today, as at no- other time there is a growing consensus that U.S, intelligence .capabilities .have. been degraded to such an extent that ` the U.S. is increasingly incapable. of ?: carrying on intelli;ence activities. - In addition to Iran, which caught r this country totally off guard, there; are several other examples of in_ . telligencefailures. U.S. intel]igerice consistently] ~. rnisinteipreted the intent of Soviet' policy in Afghanistan. Downgrading; of intelligence capabilities led to a; failure to moxutor the. Soviet; .military buildup in Cuba, and Cuba's; support of revolution throughout _ :Latin America. _ . -~~ In 1973, U.S.intelligence inac- curatelypredicted that Israel would not be attacked by the Arabs. l~/lore recently, underestimating Nvrth Korean troop strength by 25 - percent lad to President Carter having to reverse his previously- announced troop withdrawal policy_ . The U:S. has .been unable to ? confirrrx whether a nuclear explosion actually occurred aver the Indian, Ocean lastSeptember, and i? so, who was responsible.. - - This~country was not able to an-~ ticipate the rapid shift of Soviet support from Somalia to Ethiopia. In 1977 the CIA revised its in- tellig~r,ce estimates an Soviet oil; '. production, concluding that 14loscow! would. be a net oil importer through the I980s. Yet the Defense In-' telligence Agency, and many Western petroleum experts, Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :.CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 POLITICS TODAY January/February 1980 .~.o.ti.;.x-,.:_?.+~" ;.~~'kr~::~.we.~_r_.._ zr: u*~.,Kk~ _~xt~:-~ wy~^^w...~,~.~_..n.~x.s~v~ - -- --- . _ -~~.z..-,.....ti..9~..?..~ . il?~i~t~~.~"t~~~3~~ d~-7'~'1H~ ~~G~- ~~ When they are bad, they arehvrrid. But-though the possibilFty gets little atten~ tian these days-CIA agents can stilt be .very, very good at what they do. Arid right now, behind. its many closed doors, the agency should be congratu- lating itself on three sub- stantial successes: Since I_T_S. relations with China have improved, the CIA, in its awn gesture of recognition, has stepped up its surveillance of Chinese military developments. This led mast recently to the discovery of a super- secret program to build the first Chinese intercontinen- tal ballistic missile. Called the CS$X-4, the missile is part of a vast military mod- ernization program under- taken by the new: Chinese leadership and. inay be operational in two to live years. At this paint, China's military capacifies are still relatively back- tivard. But the CSSX-4, with a '7,500-mile range, would be more than capa- ble of reaching the U_5.--= to say nothing of changing the equation oA power be- tween China and Russia. a - In 1972 the CIA was caught una~x~ai'es by the Russian food crisis. Since then the i7krainian wheat fields have beer, on the. agency's list of top priority surveiliances_ U.S. farm- ers, economists and generals are all interested. The army, even in this tech- nological age, still runs pn its stomach, and if the Sov- iets suffer a large crop failure, chances are good that they won 't plan any ~ military forays that year. The Arn.erican economy is also affected by Russian weather. In i 1972, poor crops in Russia led to unex- pectedly large wheat pur- chases Dn the .America~t market, which in turn drove up domestic prices. But this Decembar when the Russians announced a 179 million metric ton shortfall in their' grain crop, it was no surprise in the U.S_ CIA experts earlier this year had tracked "sukhoveys" (hot, dry winds) blowing across the steppes and accurate}y pre- dicted that the winds would take out 25 percent of Rus- sian wheat. Only a year ago the CIA somehow missed all signs of the Shah's incipient overthrow. But the agency has now honed its intelli- gence work in Tin to a highly sensitive point. one month before the attack on the American embassy in Iran, the CIA warned the, White Mouse that security in and around the embassy needed to be tightened and recommended that the number of marines sta- tioned there be increased from 16 to 200. The agency also prophesied that the Khomeini regime would be highly erratic and that "acts of violence" against Ameri- cans in Iran could be ex- p~cted. For a variety ofrea- sons that history will have i410~e~the White House did not act immediately an the agency's advice. G~ `/.fit C U s ~~ .s~c~k Approved For Release 2001/b7/27 :CIA=RDP90-01137Rb0011)0130001-4 sy~-raornrgajta~w - the Kremlin aver the nation's siuggislk. dtn,eco,uat?enuoJT+esu? - `-, > economic performance is unmistakable. ? Moscow-The Soviet Union has? 6eeu .. Mr:, Brezhnev delivered a harsh critique forced to scale back its economic growth.r;~~ the economy in a?speech Tuesday be- ' targets for the coming year ns a result of .fore the Communist Party Central Com- generally disappointing industrial per-~?.: mittee:~.:;",'~`:~:=-.- ~ . - - - .~ - _ .. , formances that Gave. brought unusuallx.-;~:.;.~, abridged version of lthe speech~?. sharp criticism from .Leonid f. Brezhnev; _ -S~g.~~-~ itself-was released'late - theSoviet Communist pariychief..: ? -~ ;4x;k-=-~:Tuesday;,night>_by_the-official Figures presented:..yesterday ':toy the::~r agcy..- , '; _~';:.:._'_ _%::~ -. , -: . - - - opening session.oi_ -.. iir~i i_LiiF3LFA n?'i ~1 1,.? .: r?.?Ce _} ~ _ _ ?; vs_ ~ ii ~ e } r. ~ ~ y _ F 5'k :?. ~ ?.. ki F'F I?? S ~ f '.` i f ~ ? ie rrs i r} }v vs w< < r?: Y of 1 4? ? . ? s k: e?n } ~ Li r .t 5? ~ F?t T? *? ~ fF -. "i r _ _ ~ T. ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ r- _ r i- ~ ~,.? ~ _ Li I'+. _ _ i _ i k? 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Z. ~ S-I'_s _ ? r! ?} ii _i s . i i !?. .. 3 F4 ?. !'3 L L } .. _ . ~L _?w _ ~L`- n }'YL vsr ~ ~ L: La i'7 r.r pis j a?}L?'?.w t ! .. F i:... ~ ... _ .... - - - - --"L LLLj-? nii. -, i Lpir _i }?c:-,.-.. e'!~"i` _ }+LL =-~. was Yi }-?t_, F7?~trs _i~. -..-~~...-- .. .._ .Approved For Release.200T/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-01137.ROOfl~:OQ'~30001=4~:- _ rs - _.._-._ -- - - _ ... w . --- ^. ..~~ rii ri- _i wP. w. _~l~k?-'3- ~r?`L .. }'F'3 ~. St i':?r .ir}g}-?-_-Fi .. 3{~1a ~? ,r._ ?"rte -- .. .._,.. _ -. .-.... ._~_ea r. i sd iaiiaa~. _ ~i~ar - i r i i fi _ ti i ys ,,, .~ '. 34 F '~. } }_F r y ? i w, ti }~? ~ i i?1 :. !'9 1 .. r P. ^ 1 .. ~ 7'+ p 2 _ 7s ra .. } _ e s _ r. _ ,. -- .. _ _ ' _ .' - ._ ?i?'s vnr is{?_ }...~ _?TFY -- ... ~a~-_ _ir _tirTc -~_ TF. ii}'} - '- r r. ~j~ii~i~_ ti__ eiii.=i Lam -l?}:,.-.. Y}9,-_ }rri .l?~, 4`.i FS~LY -!l T?}'.- ~~`: ?i'~ ?-a-}a- _ _ _ sa _ -..- - _ .. - .-..._ -'-- ?~}' '" --.} iir wfl~_?:. r~?-. _i rg l~e i_a~L~`.'7= }?s }?}~:~_ ~.r F ~?~.-k?'E F'! 5.7 `--r _ _ -. `+ r. r. - r. r; _ Approved For Release 2001/07/27.: CIA-RDP90-0113780001001300 ~i~CLP: L,L'P A x CN P:iGE:~ ~_~ 19 Nov1;rl~~ 1979 '-' _ w ? _milita -spending. Academe ex- ~? ~ +, ~ } perts such as Messrs. Lee and . - -. ~.~:=::__:...- ~__ _. __._ _.... --._~o-w-~ _; authoritative checks on CIA -- Last week an imposingprocessioni- + In itsfirstpresentationtothesub-~::= analyses, since no institutional ~of tanks, missiles and troops rum= 1 com~pittee, a CIA official testified,'; check on CIA calculations is carried .bled through the snow in Moscow's . ~ that the Soviets devotel5 percent of ~? on by the U.S. government. ?Red Square to.commemor~t~e the their?.military budget' fa personnel. ~ .The rate of .increase in Soviet 62nd anniversary of the Bolshevik -" .compared with 30 percent=by the j military procurement, adjusted for revolution..Reviewing the. parade - ~~ U.S:-After Sen. Byrd objected that ~ inflation, is galloping at 11 to 13 per- "from atop Lenin's tomb,?-Soviet . ; the 30-percent figure didn't jibe with - cent, said 14ir..Lee, while President defense minister Dmitri Ustinov::--. -congressional and Defense Depart- . Carter is seeking only a3 percentin- denounced what- he called:?"false~~:t-ment calcul.ations,? - "Mr. Duncan stressed that the vu]- nerability of OPEC production-was of great concern to the Administration;' :one source said. , --._ _? ` The degree of seriousness was evil dentin the testimony b1r..Kahrt gave today to the Subcommittee on Energy and Power of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce: -Committee. dI said the Iranian situation was not only endangering supplies but also driving up spot prices for. oil and thus cantri uting to inftauon_ _ '-"'`:: ` - ...-_ -- - ' Fo>?-this reason; lze added, Adtrt9sti f -eying a wide range of options to reduce energ}r consumption in such a way that Approved For Release -2.001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011~7R000100130001-4. Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 A.~~xcl~ APP~~ ON PAGE~~ THE WASHINGTON PO5T 7 November 1979 ?-_ ~F- ' B J. P. Smith - - 'r ? -.. Y - ' WaaL-nRton POat Stott wTItCY .. The CL'4 has told sepior Carter ad=~ 1T"-1S3:.S l,~d L:V (1 i,l.[Z1C;1Q~] ~ii1LL .L'~1141 `. J~+ t at Azar is haltiAs its niI -exports to the [Tnited States:.., .':;:_;: ~. - , = - - -The -report, if confirmed:..eould be'?~ the be.ginnin~ of the cutoff. o? Sranian:?- oil. that the State 1]epdrtment- uad: pri~...I '~; FFowever, one major~oil compa.nyex--~' ecutive-said that:as recently as noar~~ ? yast~rday one of its tankers had left' .Kart-Island, lran's main~oil..shipping = terminal.: without- dif#iculty.~ That ex- ecutive said that'if ?"Iran.: lzas-.cut=offs=' (exports), we're not':aware-of i,_?~ ?,:-~ , -`O`ther oil company`-'officials-- said they were aware- of some~intemtpkion = in oil. deliveries, but;wexe .not sure--oi; -. viould not"mean'`an immediate'return" to last summeYs gasoline .lines; but.--it-% would result in:. anothex--wave of- stiff ' oil price. increasesr according-to':some-; _~ ~ Publicly,; the Carter- administration - ' has continued to downplay the~dikeli hood that' Ayatollals. IShomeini's - re~ gime would ban shipments to America or. sltarplY cut back e~coorts_ > '. ~ _,..: ? ` - .~"die ezpeet.that:ouroil suPPly will. npt lie cut off,""Nodding Carter, the- State??Department s? _spoisesman;.: said . - Privatelyr ~State~`~Departnient office - , cials==have~'a. more~pessimistic~giew:?-~. United S.tates.:or:a.,--drop ?in exports is7L ~~ cause Traix?now-has`~~S`~bt~]ion~in?'offi"~' ;year with a $4-billion surplus'?-:..~ ^~ ~ ^ ":.a :'Sunday,' Ali . NIontifar; head .of the -Iranian :~Natianal~0i1- Co.; `was,: `' ]Khaumeni:orders-=~t:__This_-and.;pther'.: beeni~issuing . suchweiled: t~reats~have , _ from'Tehrabsince.the tatzeovex of then _;J=U:S:~embassY._~tFlere~-by. students de- : rz~anding the extradition-of-the shah:' `' with.400,Q00.barrels a day..or_more, ac~? troleiun Indust~y'Researelt:,,Founda- A p p ro~vti dn1~8~Re~ ~ ~`T ~:-_ural-gas hecause,af:the..upheava2.~+ -.:.. ~~~,ichtblau said:: acutoff :would- npt cause gas lines in the'near future.. ':: -: -. -:The.Tnternatianal?Enery.Agencyir ,Paris . said. r~inei?.icans ?,vi11. _ `lave enoi;gh-.heatinr:;:.pi1'ca~':asOline.~ to.. ia;t tlimugh..tixa .?~yinter-if.-lran, does--, cut shipments:-Lastr.week the.Ener;y~? Department. said the oil industry: baaj ~~~~c~aed President'Cartex's 2~mi1= lion-barrel heating oil inventory goal-.~- Cil.roen-suc'n as: r\tlantic .?~icafieid's.: ` chief; international = analyst,,.'David- Sterr-li~ht;:also:pointed aut?-that-?iL?. "Iran did ston.U-S': shipments, "natktin:. , s would really-happen_far 30 to EU days ;~ =:because of :==;tankers ~-: alread9 -under., ; Stexnlight ~also~ said:.other }?I'ersianw Gulf-praducexs;:,such:_ as Saudi ~srabia : . =_. and Auwait;~might be induced `to in '' crease' their ail-production to makeup ?:' -~ for'Iranian cats:' :. --. :- -~`"; , ~wfiile, there . ~vould^--definitely- be _ a.. ?; shortage in the U.S:," Sternlight said. '=. ~~~?ceiSable: that .they would.. cnt- off eic_ -~` exports to ttie " vrould-just triq- +~~ ger a reshuffling i1t the. oil market-"- .. . - Like Sternlight; Eck a.nd-other indu-; -?. stry executives? interviewed -said that. if Xran. announced a ban on e_~cporCS to the- United States, it would force an- t_ ether quick...increase, in, prices on-that >'~nearl,}! twice- the?~ Orangization Hof.-Pe- E~.,troleum Exporting_Cauntrizs'.;official ~`_? _TheIraniari-~-oil'~squeeze.earlieir.tliis; the shah?.,touched- o_ff..,the._massive._oik pace increases this t'ea`r.-Since: tiie be- ~` ginningof-the=year,OPEG-price_have: eel, ? the-. ?lacgest?-:increase-~: since ; this; =? ucing al;out.~3.8'million?barrels _a day, refs aday=under?:the. sha1~.,Tehrau-:is .,..~ _r .~~':= The lUioirieir~?'regime lias;?a3so cre~ ?~~ Gently .to~Con,gress "The-r Ovigt~ 1F short term- frorrr the cutoff''pf.-eiiergy RDP90-0113~1~6~E~~6~~.'~1?n Soviets-were -: very co e? outh.Caucasus last ART. T? IS 1983 The~A,yato11a1t.Khomein! has-died, .leaving Iran. ur:political turmoil. In the confusion, the Iranian Communist Party claims toe have seized power: Challenged by the army and Shia Dloslems,? the Communists- call on .the SovietUnion,foraicL - .. - -- - __,_r - Eight divisions of -5oviet''airborne troops are swiftly flown to Tehran.andta the oil fields. at.Abadan in the? south. A Marxist-Leninist government ? is-? prate laimed and??Iran's daily--exports of .six million barrels of oil are withdrawn from the world market, diverted tb -fuel- the Soviet Union and its allies. The United States is powerless to intervenes -- ; ; but some of -the ingredients are already apparent: _: -- -_ -- - ? Iran is already in?political_turmoil; and thus is a source of instability: on the Soviet Union's southern border,: ? - :.: -.-;, o In the early 1980s; the? Soviet Union will become dependent for therfirst time: on foreign oil, Because it will?be short of hard currencyrit may not be able to pay forit... _...._.. ___ _~._.~ .- - __ o What the.$oviet Union ivaK have~is a - Sophisticated? military- machine;: built- up - over 20 years; to_ the point where it can carry out a majorforeign military.inter~~ vention, especially-close to its.borders. o The onset-of. Russia's-oil-shortages? . and the new strengtlrof its-conventional, militaryforces~will.coincide.with a tem- porary, thearetical~but psycholagica}lp important.` the_. early. 1980s, -America's: land-based b7inuteman missile force, hitherto protected is under ground- silos,.will become vulneaable to scoring -direct -lots. Thee United .Staten could? find. itself outgunned not- only in nuclear missiles, but in planes, tanks.and manpower needed is a conventional War:w This = is,::='of ;~couxse;~(?a--.worsGcase~ . governmenE assess thaconsequencesof_a_' gore's Andrew` Marshall can writes=?As th ? Soviet-Uniox-becomes-bolder.iut pushin involving. hex: Pw~fo_cesr.aiore~openIy _ thereiathepossibilityo4a.inajo>r.eonfrc?= fation~so_me time inyth~:t9$0 _'~ `;;i ~_N_ P~1GE~~~ ,,,,~,~ 6 No~rernber 1979 Eease 2001/: ~~~F~~~I,,'tj~34+09i0013000 ...__ - _-- - - _ _-- - Y .--~:~w:.~ --'""""`-"~-'~. -i - --`~ Emulating a?U.S:?capacity;the $n3~~ 'rent U-S ~ weakness' and Soviet might ? tempt . the ~ Kremlin into ? such a confrontation are behind the demands ln: Washington thatthe United Staten embark on a $4B-million .crash program over the next five years to-modernize its convene tional armed forces: -- - . - - -- - ? w~goneressional committee w,~s tol b the Central Intelli ence A e v lac wee. ,I,hat? oviet military exner.~li _ i es are currentl 50% hi her than America's and wi continue !o-rise at east t roue 1983. A former CIA anal st asserted that even that estimate was 50%o too low. ~ ? ? -~ ere is an a ement o . quac cry in estimating Soviet defense-expenditures;. which are a state secret: The basic method is to assess how much it would-cost the United States to duplicate a?S_ oy-let grog- ram. Little ore no allowance is made for - the fact that Soviet labor costs; for exam ?ple, are only one-tenth as high,as prevail. irg American wagesi _ - ~' ~= ? ~' - - - Regardless of how much?the Russians -actually spend; however, it is indisputable ,that they have built up a modern military' machine -with an array of sophisticated weapons?for'the army, airforce and navy, that rank with the best P,merica produces.' _.Speaking of"Russia's'defense?'effort; Aire-' -Force Gen: David? Jones, chairman ai'?the _:Jaint Chiefs of Staff; told Congresa?last' ':. own borders, The-.1.$?millioh??men`o# the =:.Red Army . arB:.;stationed :either. =in the ~~~Saviet Union itself--with half a jnillion men ~ itr ? 44 ?divisions-along th`e - hostile- : =Chinese fxontier-? or in Eastern Europe,. 4 confronting the- xlorth Atlantic..Treaty_ `' by-~.U.S. - standards;' ~ but ;nonetheless';: unprecedented: _-~_ _ :-:~ ~: ~-_ax ~ ,.._ _., ~,by-:a[- headquarters' in? Vladivostak;_.has ~?capable _of interdicting Pacsfic' sealaner? ;-'and the?~key Japatt:`This _~ Qceagthrougb the Straits;of Malacca~~y^ 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 -suns have crea~ea?a~smau maruxz ~vrp.s.- -` It currently numbers or~ly~about' 12,6UD ?, men, but in many Third R!orld situations; =: a shock'assault by a small:for_ce would be decisive: - -- - i4'` `. -' s The Russians have built.?up eight =_ airborne? divisions, and though they still lack long-range lift. capacity,-geography ~.. is such that the Soviet Union can outstrip, -_ the-United States.in_moving large nutxH..: _ hers of men and weapons into the tiliddld; ? East-thePersian_Gulf an~Korea~:?~~= - '--?- _. ?.-` According to Pentagon. analysts. this extensive, coordinated .and obviously -planned buildup of all categories of economic benefit and na readily apparent:' purpose. The Russians have poured bill, _ ions of dollars in cash ark weapons-ixtto ?Cuba,?Vietnam, Syria and smaller nations around the world -and they are neither. off as the result. _,=_.. _._~ ~--~___-: --=__r_ -?~ The United States has always had at -least the pretext that U.S. military forces -are protecting visible American interestsr -.Since Adm. Dewey sailed-into:4Yanila Bay. in 1898; Americans have become accus- tomed to seeing their young men sent off ?'North Atlantic ?shipping`lanes,?.~diddla ~~East oil, or the Lever:Brothers coconut- plantations on Guadalcanal.- _=-.- =:-=;=-'w ---Historically: the:Soviet:Uriion has-had =no-similar,. vital: foreign:'interests, It has; -.metals, growing its owz~food and dev_e_lop= =ing its own industries. ;~..~ -~~; r_ _~ ~~; `~~Soviet-buildup-are:a~mystery; but there: ??'a.g;eat power,_as_they-hare_seen tha? `United'?States~behave~~around' the world.' =of woi3d?conquesb~au=idea favored by'- - -some-~coaservatives~`?but''scoffed ? aC--by- ;~nast'ga'Vi~+_~tent:"officials : Third;_: they= CoNrxNUE~ Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 APTICLE 11PPE 4P~D OPEC cut O`I P=1GF ~--.----- 5 November 1979 ILIA defends CHICAGO TRIEUNE Fi'ASHI:VGTON [UPI]~The-- Central. Intelligence Agency has ?defended the-. L~:?IrC oi: ^a;zl', cuts io petroleum aac-, nazis as conservation. measures similar. k~? rzo~es z:,zri~r study in the ?linited. States, it was disclosed 5unday_ +I Te.,tifying at a closed~loor congres- sional heari-cg, CL~? analyst John I;ck- ?land~ said the prganization of Petroleum ? . L:cporting Countx;es is "doing the same?~ thing that the State of Alaska is doing:" Ecslard, u=.e chief of Cr4's petroleum supply analysis center; told the Rouse Intelligence Committee's- oversight panel that-the OPEC cuts could?ba compared to conservation -studies ordered by~ Alas- kan officials. _ .. _. _ _.. - _ -- He said the State of Alaska has Called in consulting? firms ta- determine how ? . fast oil tan be pumped from Prudhoe' . Bay without causing damage to the field. - - - - :. _ ... - _ ? ~ "ALL'. OF TAUSE studies? say?. thatY Prudhoe Bay .starts to decline ~ around _. 1986," the analyst said. He said production can lie kept at about 1.5 million barrels a day: unti~? about 2D per ? cent of .the oil liar been . pumped, but "is boing to inevitably_fall',':.: from then on. ' ? - "Diow,-?OPEC- countries ale ~getting~'~- these sorts of -answers: on their oil `. =fields," EckIand said: "They are #acing a need to try to preserve?aad stretch out . this resource." ; ._ .- ..- :-~. ..-..._ ? - A transcript of the closed~oor= heart . ing, .which _ was ? held.: UCt..17, was re- . - leased 5unday_ ~ Rep. Les? Arpin Cl).,; , Wis.], chairman- of .the: aversi sulk:. Committee. _.- ?- ~~bIAURICE ER:~TST,. the CI.~'s econora l is research director; said the Soviet TIn- ! i~~n i~ not to blame for OPEC's cuts_ ~ L^~st. told_,,i.'tr crommittee tm~ Soviet :.~ tinion has energy problems of -its. own - and would made them worse by increas. inn the pr.?ce the lsxenzlin must nay .for- imparted oil. - - - . -- - In addition, he said, the Soviet Union -:: doesn't have the clout to get the oil-ex- porting nations to cut back export, even if it decided such a move would be in its . hest interests:- .. .. -. _ . ? ~ .- "I .would say so far; the Soviets rim-. ply do not. have the influence over? the oi!-producing countries .that could-~ ena=_ ble them to ? reduce or to affect: the oil ,supplies,: even if-they=. wantedto;" -be ,?.;? said. .. .......:. .:.:...:.. ... _ . ~. Ernst told the sulxommittee that Savi- V , et oil. production was. expected to peak :. this year or- next and to start declining "within a year_or~two aFter that." -, _ ~? .. Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : C1A-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP9.0-011378000100130 ~r~cx~ ~>'EaR~~n Ott PAG~~~,-, 7HE WASNIPdGTON P05T 3 November 1979 . ~-:.'.?-,.:~t: ii,:~ ~..u:.~l~i~r~.a'Ilil''s_~ ~~` ~resldent~ Carter's belated threat to- :? ~~ ~iinlsli'tlis: oI~ com~anie9 fv~. turning ~'~th: e~worldwide: oil ';crisis".into ~uncon.' ,~ sc~onably higli~'pofits'may Qnce a~aln:l :Y-..... , . . ,: turn out to be a case of too little, too` ~` ~afe'.The sad trutb:~ls:tliat ii the preSi }dent wanted to be~iair about it, he'd.= '~ hays to march himsali out to the wood:,F, `~ shed along with the oil Aioguls. _ ~;; :.; ` ,~;ck'A-wealth a[ information was avails- ~~l~.:to; Garter ~~and~ his.: advisers.;that'; ;~ showed: Big .Oil's: excuse ? for =the ? goal ~llnes and price jutnpa;- a.worldwide." roil shortage caused- by-the cutoff'oi:, ~.Iranian`r~roduction`=_'was in fact~af ,1~,, -. a . , a al~-s. ~:~ hat-e ose t e Iranian sca a oat as. :'.;a;.mylh~:; Other. oil-producing.. nations. more .than made : up : #o~.: the Iranian, ~~ shortfall,,: and, ; T-J,~~; impgrt~ : actually; 4'? ; ,~~:'.=:Both the oil.ltidustry and-the Carter ~??~: :t administcatiori knew this. Yet lhen~n- 4 ergy :czar: James :Schlesinger .? stead= y lastly ~ insisted. that ~ our ~ imports were dowtt,2=;nlllion-.barr'els a=day because= ~of the Iranian situation, and that,. ac= ~.cordi;ig ?; to - the:: ~ administration; -.was ,: yvhat was causing the gas. crunch.: _ _-`-t: >-~tVe have-uncovered other. reports; ? ~~.-. .. :''same r: still ~ suppressed! ~:-which shot: ;down-the. Big Lie~about'Big~ Oil. The -way the reports were handled has con;. r. . :winced -those. who. knew what-was In ;:them that there,was indegd a conspir~_ ~:acy-by-the-oil companies to extract: :huge-profits from, the American pu-: ~;~blic's. peliel; iri ~, shortage that..was jul :.. act a 4antom.~ ~~~:iis:j"~ ~:. ~~: ~ ~~ ~~~~~On~ ital pieSe`ott'evide>tc~.whici~?~ ~;detiii~iked theNtpytli'-oi -the shoriage`~ j;,was~ a~s~udy-?.prepar~d ?i'ar Rep;'?~lbert Gore Jr: lD-'I'erinJ 1iy the Congressional. Research::Service's~ top'?:internationalj ,oil analyst, l?arlo $cu$a, fast j~'ebruary .Core made same at;.the,~Ggnclusions public,in; i`Iarcli;;including?a;gredia: ..lion. that world oil product4gn.. would be the same iii the f jrst, nine months of 1979 as'it`-had ?aee~t a year eai~lier,;dz- spite the Iranian cutb~ek,:'r ,yc.~ > = _~f:.,'.: -~ ~ Gore dream denials and ridicule~fronr~ fhe'oil moguls,~the'admiriistration=and- the ; media.: The Scuka . predictian9; thoughr turned. out'to- b~.`right Qn,;ttie money::.-t"-.'i:.;;:?~:~;`:~z.~~ ~,:4~;-~:.ia~~,;- :~. Meanwhile;.I'.Scuka :;asseuil~led:~; 60. papes'af backup data. 5ouirces told uur- associate;Dale Vast ~Atta? the report, ,i~r ~released,~in~ .April.: when ?it'tvas ~~corri- `pleted would have been'`devastationg~: ~to~~Carter's:and Schlesinger's'eredibfl-.? ity. ~ But" its was buried. 'According' fa ~a ; source cIosa to fhe probe, the CRS ana-- 1?yst . "`was :raked:: over. tha (- coals ? by ? higher-ups-.;: and~,~they-1=stonewalled ;Gore;'., who.neyer did get the-tuu:;e; ~~~~'As,for the man:whotold~the truth? Dario Scuka is also tieing punished. Nis bossses :are;. threatening : to ` transfer. 'him-out of his field of -expertise,-r:in;;; xernational petro]euni;~'-~-~to. ~a ~-job where?his honesty. wil; be less embar=~~ rassing:~... . -;~ ? ~ - ,-;~3:: ?.ri.:~~'..,:..;.t.,~t Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 ~~;~;.I~r ~ or Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-0113780001001 3'i Pary ~ ~ ..~ - 2 Nov~;~F~ Y 979 _ - - - ~,__ ~-._ -..c~~ 1 1.1.iU 1 V: :. }~:~._ sY : _. ? _? ~~ - r.a.4__ _." ~ i ~a `` -: ` --- ??. '"'''' sp2ndin "are~'often'CdnzrOV ~ - r- g?~~ ersial:?because:tlte-I~remlin_! i .~ ~'? ~~ ~~~ - ? ~? , . -1 " - ~~"' : _.._ ...._.eense;~ng eepsits ~~ :dfbd k ' :- et-secret;_forcing:U-S,:anaIysts:to~' ,. _ .? _ - _ >` ? :' ?_ , y~. ~, ~ ~~ ~ estimate':th : ; ~,r. _ =~:~~:- ~~ `~ ~~ :.r~',. ~ ~ ~costof;7nilitary, p ograms:t t_ can -be'ob-:: -.r~-__.._.:, ?: . - ..~ _- '?-' - ~=.- strvedb? satellites andintelli nc th ds e eme o ::~ ,~,. ~~'~~~_Y -'=Burton estimated the 5vviet defense bud et for- `~ - ~~~~~;=~ .._.~ this year;,' _ - - - _ '8t-betweeri~5S-billion.and 63,billion=..rubles-gxn,:Ce , rasa of theta .., ` ~~ . "~_~ : SY ~+D Me'1,3~i~S~t+itiSTE . -'~i ~"`~-':~'' ~:T; v _ - : ~ =~? r R R ~,-~ ' buyin o ~? ~' -~ ~ ri , , . ~ g p 970: ~., *: a ruble , ~ :~ - -- -? :,. - ... ~;' - i '~~' sa=~ rJ:~ tx'' Tinwi STHf !Mh-llr,....a:: :: t;': y.... -k%, y ,.~:_;} ~- ~ _`~~ >~:_ ;L ; :-t~-~ ~.--~: :Based orr 7 .~ the official`excha e rat # ? 7aa ?~ - ~? ~ ~ ~ .: n ~ ? t i'~ii:3 g e. gcire,svoul }f ~_ _._, __ .-...,.;.-;~.;.I..,r~~r: =~"'WASHINGT'UN=-Defeiise~speitdinghythe$oviet?Union.`' ~ua1 between S&i billion:and-S92~illioir~;Sitt:the:L"fA're=":~ - t~]-increase~steadil~?for: at? ]east'the-next five vears?iie~~ ' its such astraight-line conversion'from rubles to-dollars, ]wavy binden of isms an that nation's ec:onotny,.the Cen ~.: ~ ~n~~ met far~ce~:domestic pricuig system-doesi' '~alIntzlli;.once-Ageacy.vradicted~'ltursda -~-;,y=>.;;.~~Y:.',':=-:=;F :.-. ._~~:-_.: }? Far instance: ?Lee said, mditary hardware will account ~: 'for more than half of the total output of Soviet machinery . next year::A.s recently as 190"5, he said; the:military.share ? f machmery:production was 25~.r,~.~:~s:act .of. farsighted. much: as the most. greedy "statesmanship forthe Saudis Arab..,~~ .-'.. _ to have-temporarily uPP~ ` We' are fortunate~that the - praductionto give the W largest OPEC producer,. time ta?adjustto lower coa- Saudi Arabia, has been pre- suznption levels. They are pared to hold its price below ? motivated by the' stake they the new OPEC ceiling and to have in Western prosperity increase production- from and -by their.. well-founded 8.5 to 9.5 million barrels: fear o? the Soviets. But they Fulfilling a promise~made to .sometimes despair of a fair this reporter on Jung; 9., ., hearing_:ia ..the ~Ameri:caa Crown Prince ,Fahd..ex-. znedia.-...._-;__,,;: ::_._; .;___..~'~.:- plained to Carter's envoy, When ~:=`the . ? In?addition to Saudi :~rabia's? reluo- tance to increase its production: nuw about S.~ -milli.on ban-els a daY, pros- pects for higher world prices are - fed by. the UPEC nations rising inter- nal financial demands.:. - Last year some cartel members, in- cluding Saudi Arabia, its richest mem- ber, had financial difficulties. : ? ? The CIA analysis says, "The current ` account of all the member countries ? will improve;-easing many. of the' fi- :_ nancial burdens plavuine the?cart~l." ?. Even with higher ou prices, however;.. the CIA says that~? three.cartel znem-~ bers=Algeria, Ecuador.and Venezuela ' ?-will have.. deficits :in? -their: current accounts this y ear:_ - . - - _ - The current account is a measure of ? Fahdil.Chelabi. OPEC's deputy-.sec=. a nation's income.after totaling- ~earn- retary General, recently offered a sim- lugs and payment for trade,: services, ilex ~ icw_ suGsesting that 519,5p a bar. tourism and.- earnings . on ,#breign in- rel was "a rational price" for-oil: " ? ~= vestments.. ' - -- - -- - :lieanwliile~ the: cartei's?-benclrmarir The CL4'sprnjectlon~Jof a_?,$29 billion price of SI~aS~a barrel for-Saudi Ara- current,-account?? surplus. for UPEC bia'a light-. oft~nce considered the ? met~abers assumes that Ixan's spend standard indet far world: oiL-prices--- ing'on imports this pear will drop to bears: virtually no -r~semblance? ?to .oil $11 billion, 5o pereent below last yrices:anymore...: .. , :- .- .:: year's level. - - - _ - ? ~4 orld, oil prices have risen a ~ total Individual current account. balances of ~l.percent since. the 13-member car. are expected to range from a pro-. tel?aset in Abu. Dhabi last-December, jetted deficit of $?~.2.billion in? Vene- according to Treasury Secretary lV. zuela to a surplus of $1().2 billion for Michael Blumenthal; and -further in? Kuwait:.:--.:. - __ . -: ?--.~-.., -.-... - ,' - creates are likeIy_ _ l~-'~': d~i~lpgaa'skve~F~atTiliF~ise 001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 Approved For ~elease 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-01137R0001I ARTXCLE APP~1; THE ECONOMIST ON P/~GE,~,~"~.r"X ~.2-18 T~1ay 1979 ~ - ~~~~~~ ~~~ ~~'~ ~~~~~ ~~s Washington, DC American intelligence correctly predicted that Vietnam would invade Cambodia, that China would invade Vietnam and that the Soviet Union would not invade China. But, reassuring as those recent successes were; the Central Intelligence agency's record elsewhere has been less good. Iran is the worst example. In 1953 tc:e C1A helped restore the Shah to his throne, but in 1978 it had scarcely a clue that he was about to be-toppled. Before that, the Shah knew that a communist coup was brewing in Afghanistan, but the CIA did not. - - In Nicaragua, Zairc?and Yemen, ac- cording to American officials, intelli- gznce on insurrections and invasions has been late and inadequate, with the result that subsequent American policies have sometimes seemed dangerously make- . shift. Inter-agency 'reviews after- the Shah's fall have concluded that American intelligence dpes not know much, either,. about what is happening In such places as Indonesia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia or even next ddar, in Mexico. - .What ails the CIA? One-problem is the tendency for-poliryrnakers to ignore in- telligence that does _ not support their preconceptions. _~~ - Israeli intelligence- warned the Carter administration about the Shah's peril months before his fall. So did law-level members of the American embassy irr Teheran, but the White field Turner, President Carter's Naval Academy classmate and director of the CIA. Appretiated at first as a mart who shared the president's fonhright and businesslike attitude, he is nbw accused of arbitrarily switching people around and of trimming agency reports to suit White House political views." Morale at the CIA has fallen so far that more than 1,000 of its men have left in the past two years. - . __ ..~_ . '.? But undoubtedly the diagnosis most often made is that the C1A: is'suffering from a surfeit of democracy-Irt'govern- =ment circles it is now frequently argued that there has been too much cortgress- ional' oversight, newspaper exposure, le- gal restriction and public accPSS, and that the black arts should be restored to dimmer light, or to darkness; where they can thrive. -- " ' - "The mast serious problem we face," according to the CIA's deputy director, Mr-Frank Carlucci, is an inability to protect. intelligence sources from expo- suce.='. According to ?CIA -officials, this means that foreign intzlligenbr~services 'are reluctant to share information, poten- -tial'agents refuse to work for`the C1A and ?.merican businessmen decline=]:o report back after their travels because they-fear that =Their ? actions might -later' become known through a congressional leak or a lawsuit undo the FreedortTof lnforma- Hause did not want to hear bad news , tiori' Act." ?- "~ ' "-'-~' ~` ' about its ally. A further difficulty is that '`~~`Another'special target of~;criticism'is the administration, in order - to avoid 'tlie~. 1974 Hughes-Ryan-=',aitiendmeni, offending allies, has forbidden its agents - which~~holds that before ?the'=C1A~ can in )~gypt and Saudi Arabia, as it did in 'undertake- covert political-actfoii in an- lran, to make contact with potential other country, it must notify eight sepa- subversives- A more :intractable problem is that a{though American. intelligence ' is capable of gathering vast quantities of infatmatian, especially by technical means, it lacks the skilled manpower to make sense of what it collects. And then there is deep unhappiness in the intelli- gate congressional committees consisting -of 163 legislators and 41 staff~members. ''The `requirement; according`' Senator Danicl-Patrick Moynihan of` Ne:~rYork, '-virtually eliminates the pos5ibilily of se- crer American intervention'-in?= athar countries and limits the CI'/~'to-"doing research that might as well be done in the gence community with Admiral Stans~-: Library of Congress". ? - '~''n:~~'-?"'="' - American officials confirm that 'they C1A now engages in only a few minor covert operations.- Legal restrictions are not the only reason, however. President Carter has openly declared his distaste for in*.erference in the affairs of o[her countries. The president's attitudes and congres- sional restrictions on intelligence are born of America's bad experiences in Vietnam and the disclosures of excesses by the C1A and the Federal Bureau of Investigation-assassination attempts against 'VIr Fide] Castro, efforts to "de- stabilise" the Allende regime in Chile, infiltration of American protest groups and illegal surveillance both af. radical political parties and of private citizens. But' now Republicans, conservative Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 Approved For Release 200~~ts~~e~e~~~'~i~j~gp0130001-4 ~ are mina o argue t o t o errors of Vietnam ought not to afflict ~ American resolve far ever; they think that misbehaviour by intelligence agents ??as exaggerated and has been more than corrected. And the Soviet Union's inces- sant probing, they say, is proof that the United States cannot stand back from the dirty-grey world of espionage, subversion and counter-intelligence for ever. I Some liberals in congress and in the administration still dare to hope that the United States can have both an effective intelligence system and adequate con- trols. For more than two years, they have ~ been trying to draw up with all concerned a legal charter for the CIA, the FBI and ~I other agencies. - A 1978 draft bill failed to win approval ; because the intelligence agencies regard- ed it as too specific in its prohibitions of certain of their activities. Progress is now .being made towards a new draft.. Liberals acknowledge a need to reduce the num- ber of committees to which. the CIA needs to report its .activities. They also agree that new measures must be taken to ?punish those who; without authority, dis- close important government secrets. De- spite their misgivings,:.the .intelligence agencies stem to accept the principle that i congress has the right to oversee them, and that some legal restraints should bind ~ Yet there is still no agreement about standards for government spying on Americans who have information that the , government wants, but who are not sus? ~, petted of committing a crime or working'', for a foreign power. The liberals, joined by Vice-President Walter Mondale, want to ban surveillance, investigation or other intrusions on such citizens' privary except in the most extraordinary cases when ~ the president. would have [o authorise ~t personally and report it to congress. Members of the CIA, backed by Presi- dent Carter's national security council, believe that they need to collect and analyse lots of information in order to ~ achieve. results, rather than rely on spe- cial operatiaris. 5o they warit to investi- gate Americans whenever.-the. head of .their agency deems ii in :the national interest... - - --_ :,- These differences over basic.,principle may prevent agreement on a charter. But without a charter, in the words of Mr Les Aspin, a member of the intelligence tom- i mittee of the.-house-of representatives, ~ 'the agencies in the short term will let matters drift on in their bad way, and in the.long run will simply do as they please. ', "If I were a Machiavellian CIA man," he ~; says, "1'd do everything I could to pre-', gent agreement on a charter; and then go back to doing the old stuff." -. Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 r'lrticle appeared TIME an pale 9 5 ~~~~~~~ h ~~~~~ ~~ ~ tzlligence senice. -^~ ~.~~ _ ~ Y--_ Ladies acct Gerrle.nen_ demoralized CIA Tl:is is a rrottb!erl world? Threatening forces continue to chat- peep secrets. Sa} /ercoe res. For rl:is reason, we must have a reliable intelligence sec- happened to the ti?ice--she President's eyes and ears. Yet we are seeing and/rearing U_S." Chaim He dimly because ojrite present condition ojthe Centro! Intelligence telligence, warns: ~;g?~r:cy_ In the past, the agency engaged in some practices that were the U_S. has des nor rcceptahle in America, but those days are behind us. The CtA world. You can't i:as reformed; now rre must stop punishing it. We must remove agreement on bet Borne ojrhe.constrainrs that keep itfrom. duing its job. We must re- has been occurri store the confidence of its members and treat them ns honorable mine and demoi men in an often perilous profession. A great power like America their shoulders tmmy Carter may never make a .speech like this, but he should. A combination of events has seriously disabled the CIA at a time when its services are need- ed more urgently than ever. To guide its foreign policy, to help its friends and restrain its foes, the U_S. must have adequate intelligence from those areas of the world where information is suppressed, confused or con- flicting. The nation cannot afford to be caught off guard by sud- den hostilities in the festering arc of crisis or in the vast arenas of Asia where Communist giants collide. With weapons tech- nology advancing more rapidly than ever, the U.S. must keep abreast of the latest. Soviet developments, since an undetected Russian breakthrough could jeopardize the ever fragile balance of power. In a world of turmoil, frequently erupting in anarchy, the U.S. must be able to exercise its inRuence to maint=1in sta- biliry_ Where the U.S. fails to do so, some authoritarian pawns can be counted on to fill the void. Thal, for better or worse, is the way things are. Today the CIA is not equipped far its role because it con- tinues to operate under a debilitating cloud of suspicion. Until iha early 1970x, its mission was pretty much taken for granted and its methods were seldom questioned. Then a series of rev- elations deluged it with hostile publicity for the first time. The agency was implicated in assassination attempts on foreign lead- ers~nly a very f w, but a few too many- Other abuses were also uncovered by a press seemingly ravenous fur ctA misdeeds; inevitably there were gross exaggerations. A punitive attitude toward the agency lingers on when there is no longer any real justification far it. The White House seems determined to keep reminding the agency of its past transgres- lions. Vice President Walter Mondale, in particular, has been. the moralistic champion of a highly restrictive charter to govern U.S. intelligence agencies, though the legislation will probably be much modified before it is approved by Congress. CIA Director Admiral 5tansfield Turner has responded energetically to a se[ of problems that did not confront his predecessors, but vride- spread Washington opinion holds that he is not the right man far the job. He may bring too rigid an outlook to what is, after all, an art form: the collection of educated guesses from incisive minds. Though the reduction of budget and personnel began before he took office, his critics charge that hundreds of senior off vials with experience, dedication and language skills have been forced out_ Turner feels that new blood is needed, but younger recruits may not be able to fill the vacuum far years. Ray Cline, former deputy director for intelligence, thinks that the "core of continuity has been destroyed. By and large, the historical memory is gone" Foreign intelligence services, whose cooperation is essen- tial, are bewildered and increasingly wary of dealing with a ment brings few ~ not even tell thei closely monitore~, -_, _ _ _ . _. . Much of their undercover work is far from glamorous and numb- ingly routine. "Nobody who ?aorks for the cIA is going to have a statue erected to him lake the one to Nathan Hale," s~~~? 12 Aiarch 1979 i~las~iragtc~n M~G~o~pc~r~r~, Associates of the President say bis chiefprablem with intelligence from the CXA is char he receives a moun- tain of facts and figures bur not i enough inrerprerarian and assessment of what they mean. Said one aide: ; "Xt s getting more and more difficult co find people who can orrice a good, clear, analytical sentence." A battle is raging inside the adminis- tration over whether to release spy- satellite photos that pinpoint Soviet missile fields. Intelligence officials oppose the move for feax it would reveal how precise U.S. recontiais- sance methods have become. But Carter's political aides argue that showing how closely the U.5. can monitor Russia would gain support in Congress for the SALT weary. Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-0113780001001 A~iICLE APPFA~D 0~1 PA~.~ ~' BY GEDRG~E I41eAItTHUR. `~ _:. ~VASHINGT.ON--As the revalutiorr~ in~~Iran continues to squeeze Ameri-._ can-oil = suppLies_ and ,send:, shack'' waves through the 14liddle East,:U.S.?.- diplon?,a[s and palicymakers 2re~ la'=~: horir:; under a severe handicap.-but. it is a.problam they are familiar wil,'~; ~~They knave almost nothing about: the, Lioslem .religious leaders,. t'adical leiiis~ and :others;contending: for; power in- Iran, governrtlept; officials , ., conczde--'largely, laecause?.U.S: jntel-..: ligence~ agencies estahli~hed .virtually. no contact. with opposition faction; in the tronths and years before the fall -, of Shah' biohammed. Reza' Pahlavi.:;, _ ~! and,.a survey~of tiVhite House and ; intelligence sources:indicates, the in- formation -gap .;n .Iran is far- from unique.. In a dozen. or more countries; _ around the world, including same+ol' the. nations, mpst. important toy the:-:; :--United States; American intelligence-'-'; _ gatrering efforts are subject to re-~;~ siraints? or :inhibitions, th~~; could.,, again leave ~Vashingtori.flyin.p almost.-.~ blind in a crisis.. - ` -'The CIA and ; otligr:, iritelligetiee? -agencies deny that there, are. w~?ilteri .agreements or' farrrial ~areaties're;.;. =striating the scope of U.S,~intellgenCe_' efforts in other cpuntries.._~ . c: ` ~- Officials ackiowledge, ~` hgwever;: tF:at .intelligence -operations-espe- . cially collecting political=intelligence; or establishing contai:t.~with dissident. ~_?factions siteh as Iran-are limned by a tivide array of unofficial :="understandings;' .secret warking- level agreements; and policy priori, i .ties. : . ` bforeover, it appears thai the col- ' lectian of political intelligence con- corning opponents of a regime is like- ~ ' ly to be most inhibited in nations ' where it might someday be needed most, strategically important states 1 'with autocratic,-potentially unstable.) regimes-. .. ~ _ LDS AITGELES TT~iES 11 March 1979 _: Among the countries in which tl: CIA and other intelligence aget:cit ;are understood to operate under sip nificanl restrictions are Saudi Arabi: lsrael, Irgypt, ltaty, Singapore, Tai ?tivan, Sauch Africa, Nicaragua an othcr~parts of Latin America. ` i~ Some inhibitions appear to be mat- ters of broad, if unwritten, palmy. ?"~Ve would never peneu?atz Eng- ~ land's opposition party, tar examplz,"_~ one govermnent official said. "They :~ are good friends. bVe share alL kinds of intelligence information ~ and re- i saonsibilities with them." - . - 141are often, the limitations an U.S. intelligence grow out of lnformal lists` of. "don'ts" compiled in- individual Copntries by the U.S. ambassador and. Elie CIA station chief. These limits ark' based on such considerations as U.S. and local political, conditions and the nature of the relationship that exists betweQn U.S. intelligence agencies.. and intelligence officials of the' coup-r. try itself. .... - :~:Implicitly, what goes an is a kind of Cost-benefit _ analysis-what might the United States gain from a particu- - la>? kind of intelligence effort in a foreign country and what might it. lose if the effort were discovered? :'"If the CIA had infiltrated Iran's; religious movement and -got caught; imagine the outcry by the liberals in= t}ie United States," one American af- fi~ial said in defense' of the CIA's airoidance of anti-shah factions there. f'~'urther complicating the decision oil what to do or not do in a particular; Country fs the fact that nations such ? as Iran have been important bases for: 'intelligence operations against the .Soviet Union as welt as important in-:, tehigence targets in their own right. = "A foreign nation may permit the ; CIA to operate relatively openly ~ratwan ~s a .troubling example of; that problem, :officials say. since; President Carter ended diplomatic re- Iations with the island, the CIA has, been hastily restructuring its opera-, lions there....,- .:' ..- ' - _ .: i The previous focus had been.aImost entirely. on the activities of the Cam-.' munist regime on the Chinese mzin-_ land. Caoperatian from Taiwanese to-! tellioence authorities was almost total ~ -encompassing ~ everything from ~ =elecrronie .eavesdropping to cloak-~ :and.dagger . parachute ~ drops- ~_ and lanflings along the China coast.: ~ - - ?`_': ~'~orking closely. with intelligence, agents of the ruling Kuomintang Par-:I ly,. the CIA for more than..30 years ~l paid almost no attention to factions apposing. the Kuomintang among the ].5 million native. Taiwanese and 2 trtillian refugees from r;iainland China..! ' =During that time, officials. say, the .CIA did not feel that it was operating nnifer`any significant restrictions or inhibitions. The ~pr%oi ity target was mainland. China and all,else seemed secondary.: ~ ` ~~ - ~ ~ -- - ~~ -_- ;~~~ Nave, the internal politics of the is-~ land have suddenly becairte,'a matter, of concern. : _ ' ' : i ; ~ '," - ~ "' ~~ Intelligence, sources say..the: CIA"s situation in Saudi Arabia parallels the j previous situations in lean and .Tai;.;; wan. .- ',." ~ ,.? .,: .. . -.::.,~ ? ~ .Nobody, but nobody, is goingaa do~ anything to upsek the royal [amtly.:It~. may not be spelled ottt; but that's the'! way it's going to be; ':ono intelligence :. - . ,. source said. ;, : ~: -:-, =-: _ ,~, _ .:: ~ _ Sometimes ~ the limits are inposed:: by U.S. officials themselves. In Italy:: last year, the .1J'-S..ambassadar or_ dered a vii-tual end to covert actions; in that . country.. ~ (Technically,' the'. ambassador has Control aver the CIA~~,- in any country;;-this authority is not- .often strictly~:,etifotced, btitrstrong--' 1 d amb ' ad d d - n' - ?' ' n v~e ass ors can a o ma 1-:, Approved For Release 200.1/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-01137R00010013000'~ o and restrict: CIA activities; i"ntel`= Jigence sources say,)< - ~ - _ ~ A~ppX$~gd F~c}~-~?~~e 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 THE CHRISTIAN SCTEP7CE MOVITQR G,: Pr1JP~ 21 February 1979 ~~~~~~~ ~~~ ~v~~~~i~~ ~o~s ~~~ .r~~~t _ _ - By Curtis 1:. Jones - - - -- -. - _ _ ?. _ T'?e~ say the F'resideni is unhappy 'with the Israel took in June, 1967, there would be war in ??? icanr money and perhaps some Lebanese-li~?e ClA _`or not alerting him thak Iran was about to the Biddle East by fall. In the summer of 1978, Here a3ain, however, personal predilect alovr- Spada; of-19;3. when Kissinger. took eva- . some analysts accurately predicted the early intervened, ti5 leaders were not about to sire action against critics by putting out word. collapse of Pahlavi absolutism. = -. .~ pouse?a cause dominated by Lebanese pan- that C.'S intelligence had failed to warn him.. ;- Why didn't- the policymakers ac[ on these abists and their Palestinian allies, and tl that the Arabs were planning a surprise attack --warnings? - _ could not bring themselves to participate in an I~-ael-' - - ?? First,- because every leader; being human.- -demise of a friendly regime:- - - - ? ?- =- ~ - R?2 could di~:ni,;s these phenomena with the,: filters his data through the screen of-his.own .-: Some problems are so intractable; and th passing observation that the L'S intelligence= prejudices and predilections... - - _. _ _ -__ . _.: implications so- apocalyptic, thaE 'the- wis community seems to be useful?both in sueeesshcials went, they - got a different reading on Carter's intentions_ They reported home that the US. "apparently has no clear or positive policy ready, either for Mexico or the rest of Srranish-speaking Amer- ; ice.'' Indeed, same aides thought Carter's final decisions on scv- eral major matters might actually have w be r~de?during the ; ~ 4%-hour flight to Mexico City. Nonetheless, the broad outlines of what he will seek arc known: I - A promise to keep the US. as Mexico's No. ?1 foreign cus= tourer (the buys 8570 of Mexico's oil exports). Schle- singer estimates that by 1985 Mexican wells will be able to match Iran's prc~tisis output of ~ million bbL per day. The CtA i____s even more bullish. Its experts forecast that ire tan years. ~ Mextcv cool pump milliard bbl. per day, which is slightly more than Saudi Arabia's currc~pt produstion_ Brat 1.dpez Par- . tilio prtabably will not budge an Mexico's plaits to increase production more slowly, to Z25 million bbl. per day by 1480, including 1.1 million bbl. far- export. {Present U~ oil can- sumptionper day is 18.7 million bbl.) - Resumption of n baatiataons on the sale of natural gas to the U.S. Lopa2 Portilld has already indicated to Ambassador Lacey that he wants to strike a bargain on gad ii a way can be found without in,8,amiag his politigl appesitian. For the moment, however, Carter is expected to propose atilt' a gen- tlemait's agreement that Mexico Promise to begirt selling gas to the. LIB when dcrraart+d a?atstrips dbrttestic supplies, perhaps. within a decade. The prioa ueould he hagotiated is tkte 6utura According to Mexican ofncials Lopez 1'ottilto~ will tell . ogtuzes ac s Mexico's touchy new self- canSdence ste#1as from the fact ? rhos -for -the firer time in ~his- would. ba greatly steed.. But other nati~s .also are ; a ~~ tls~t he is willutg to bargain on ail and gas, but only if begg to ,Cptt1't -the. now Mexico. , Japanese taclsniciaAp ~ the U.S. is willing to negotiate qn two issues the; xtiatter mast have been exploring, $(s~l? is megataattttg.. and France's .Pros- . to Mtsxlcv: ident valery Gisrard~ d'~taing ci7mes calling later this rrinnt)t, .._ _ . -~-- The basic purpose of Caite~ ttzp is to over,..crmc years .of' ~. -- - bittemess and persuade the Mexicans that tits US. is not ~ ~~~~ ' grily their best customer but oleo their best friend His itin- ~ . erary is very businesslike. ARer landing at Benito Juarez Air- ~ port and offerirt$ some good wishes in his Craergia-accented. ' Spanish, Carter will go straight to the Mexican National Pal- ace for the first of two private sessioes with I.opcz Porti,ila. He will 1 eh with ~i loraa th f ~ ? G~r4 ~~ ~ hosts expecting to be treated with faz more respect than US.. Presidents ~'.~~~ L...o ..ass.-.11.. .. L....,.~ ... 4Ln j~ = os~ Lopez Portillo meet as .2 - ,? _Y:. _ . _ 90-011378000100130001-4 S~vii embassy st~$~8~~~thE` ~~n Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 ,~i X OTrx. Ai'P~.~7 V . S . NEGTS & k'ORLD REPOP.T pit PAGw,~ 19 February 1979 ~s~~~G~~~C~: ~~~ ~~~ ~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~ By Marvin Stone Our ill~lisguised hunger for I~iexica_n ail, President Carter has scaled, will not move him co interfere in decisions that are far Mexico alone to make. That apparently means that during his visit to biexica Ciry, February 14~1G, Carter will not seek of President Lopez Portillo anything that infringes on Mexican sovereignty. By the same Token, he should nor offer any Concession that infringes on our own_ We are referring here to the problem of illegal aliens from 1~iemco. In this light, leaks from the White House are disturbing because they seem to indicate that sorb concessions have -been under consider- ation. The W/afhington Port, sting the draft of a National Security Coundl study, reported sev- eral possible results the drafters saw from a "redirection" af.U.S. polity. Among them, in the Pon'.r words: - -- - - - "Ii could ravide an alternative to increased de endence on Arab oil and access to some of what the CIA esrirnates could be as much as 10 million barrels of Tyiexican oil~roduction a day , by 1990- ~' -.._ "It could mult.ia a sanctioned program for Mexican aliens now immigrating illegally to .the United States at the rate .of hundreds of thousands a yeas." -. Is that the deal, then...-~to e~ntioe Mexico into supplying us with oil in return for the official opening of America's-borders to millions more illegal aliens? ~, - - - - : - - - . _ '. The most widely ~dced estimate far illegals crossing the southern border is $00,000 a year. Do these people, as afrc~ts crated; take Daly jobs that Americans would not do? - ' -- - This claim is open to carious dispute. A for- mer commissioner of the Immigration and Nat- uralization Service found that two thirds of the illegals identified were "working in industry, service and construction jobs that pay good salaries-jobs that might be filled by ... job- less American teen-alters ar by ... black American youths who are put of work" The United States generated some 3 million new jobs last year, leaving almost G million of --the. nation's growing labor force unemployed. If half of the 800,000 illegal aliens found em- ployment here, then 400,000 of the increase in jobs went to them. In facx, there are economic writers who be- Iieve that, since a very large part of deficit spending is aimed ac reducing unemployment, illegal immigration plays a substantial role in the country's budget imbalance, .inflation and financial difficulties- Will these worries soon abate,,now chat Mex- ico's immense discoveries of oil promise wealth and increased employment south of the bor- der? This is a badly mistaken impression if applied co any solution in the next 20 years. Lopez Porttllo is planning to take out the oil and natural gas at the rare that will.:be -most beneficial to his country. As he himself says, in an interview elsewhere in this magazine, "Mexico's job problem will be solved only after we have invested income we will receive from expartg of petroleum. I do not believe that will happen before the end of the century." ~ - - . Before That point, if immigtatioti across the Mexican border should Continue at anything like the present rate, the.U.S. economy could be seriously threatened. Winking at illegal immigration is nor a prop- er trading card far Mexican oil. The United States ran offer various. Combinations of busi- ness cooperation- credits, border industries, lower tariffs and other aids. It may even be possible to work out a better arrangement for legal admission of limited numbers of tempo- r~.ry workers, where there is mutual benefit to both nations. Keeping out illegal aliens is nor anti-Mexi- can. It is a-matter of observing our laws. The laws are there for good reason. - - Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 ___. Approved For Release 2~QH1/~Q7/~~.7~~~~~~0~~3~~0C~~1~(~~(~Q0~1 ~E ~ article apaeared 13 Februax?y 1979 on page ~,?-~ ~~ ~~~~~~ "prospectively more serious than the; 7~'7~ embargo." ~ TREASURY S.ECRE7'ARY tiV, l~fich- j eel Blumenthal tore in behind Schles- I finger to say it wasn't that bad. Schles- inger's apocalyptic predictions had produced a run on the dollar, making things worse on the inflation front - . a side-effect that might have been i avoided. The president in his press confer- ence took a stance roughly in the mid- ' die. The situation is "not crucial now'" and we could offsat'the currenf reduc- ~ lion in the Iranian supply if we heeded 5chlesinger's call for volun- tary conservation. The handling of the revolution in i Iran also was the. result of divided .counsel within the administration. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance sum -' Bested that we not panic at the l thought of the shah's departure -- a. view subsequently espoused in the se-' cret report af. George Ball -but when it mattered, Zbigniew Brzezinski clamored successfully for all-out, unconditio3al support of the shah. ~ After the.shah left for his winter vacation, we. endorsed the regime of ~ his chosen successor, who also bit the dust. We seem to have proceeded not i with a thought to energy but only to maintaining Qur right to interfere, as we always have, in the affairs of Iran. ' The result is we have no friends among those who have their fingers on the spigot. ..._. .~~. ..:_ _ , ~ -THAT of COURSE, leads us-to another current embarrassment, the CIA and the performance of Carter's ; handpicked director, his Annapolis classmate, Stansfield Turner. The CIA, drawing on Its Incestuous relation- ship with the shah's secret police, SAVAK, gave the White House bad which rational foreign-policy deci- sions can bemad~. - i~o intelligence shortfall pro- duced the crisis with Mexico. Here the failure has been one of common sense. - The discovery of oil and gas re- serves next door has been treated by Schlesinger as a calamity. He has given it a wetbac'_~c's welcome. He has practically cold us we would not want our homes heated or our cars run by stuff from a neiglibor that had been vulgar enough to nationalize its treas- ure: .. . ~yHEN THE `.iEXICA~S calae up ~~ here last year to make, a deal he ip.-; a suited them. ~i~'1'en they cazte back tq try anain, he ref used to see tllem_ First he told us that their supplies were tco expensive. Then he.said they . were .too cheap and might create i havoc among our o?,vn producers. - The result of his advance work has been to unleash a wave of anti .4meri- canism "on the eve of the president's visit. - - .Carter's press conference statement that he was "proud" of `iexico's bonanza sounded a bit odd. That's E .what he said about Bert Lance. j If he's going to convince the. coun- try to cooperate, he has first to con- wince people that he' understands the . situation. People will walk and shiver if they're sure it's necessary. Sv far, they have no evidence that the: energy crisis exists anywhere but in - the boardrooms of the oil companies -and in~the SV?hite House, where the .man in charge doesn't seem to have = made any final decisions about haw important energy really. is. ' dope ?-net to worry, they kept saying,F.. as millions iitarched in the streets- I We have becotue-accustomed over recent years tc hearing of the botch fine ~Ir~ mane of things it was not sup-. up :he spectre of grass growing in the : posed to be doing. Iran provides the'i erects. ;'hen our client, the shah, , f I' ? ~ t -- The way thins are going, Jimmy,; .Carter would have trouble getting j -people to turn off the lights in the in- tercet of conservation. The energy crisis - if that's what it' .is -bring; together a number of blunders and etnbarrassmen5 that; has~e brought hint to a new crisis ofi :esteem and a sharp plunge in his job ?rati=g, which is down to 28 percent in :the fates*, polls. - - Asking people to make .sacrifices .when they can see for themselves 'what the trouble is is one thiag_ But `asking thetz to be "patriotic"?when ~_they suspect i?hat they haven't been told th e whole story is quite anoth er. ~ Septicism about oil shortag4s was' ;born in the wake of the 1973-74 oil -embargo, which was handled with f .good cheer and resourcefulness by . -many citizens who later learned that f -the "crisis" had been greatly assisted 'in it; development by oil companies' =withholding supplies in the interests cf hi gher prices. r 'f'H-'~T SKEPTICIS?lf haunted the. 18- ' .month struggle over the energy bill, the passage of which was supposed to avert the kind of problems we may ar' may not face as a result of strikes ini ,__- Sut at the heart of the problem fief the president's totally a>nbivalent atti-~ -trade toward what he once called "thee moral equivalent of war." if it is of the paramount, overriding concern, why. did. he conduct relatiaas with two I .major oil-producing countries, Iran' and 3iexico, with such frivolous disre- Bard of the effect an us? ?. The closing of the oilfields in Iran Gras greeted with something like' ecstasy by Energy Secretary dames Schlesinger, who is ever on the watch I for something that can be taken as a I green light to rush out and tell us that I the sky is falL?'ng-so he can raise oil prices. - D uringthe tarntousprogress ofthe energy bill, he periodically conjured Ina ~~ p~~o~Fe~o~~I~ager~001/07/:th~l'1{~'ib'iS''"c~~a~e~t6a~~~0001-4- rushed forty a to warn us of a-crisis , which is collect information on Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 Art1Cl$ ~77$~TBd an ~a~e r1-21 THE ~~ ASHZNGTGN PGST 10 February 1979 ,Terry ~: ~Iorig~i _: ~~~~ - This catcntry~ engaged is a Widespread pass; morteza on the gavermmeat's failure to aatici- pate the course of event in Iran, bxtt our intelii- ~gence pmbleat now is nar in becoming alert to change in Iraq, but m avoiding.a simflar =`= -"- tiviry w change is other cauatrie~ Tb a speeial- ist on the Soviet Unio4 there are distvzbing parallels between onr enrr~tt efforts to uzider- stand the Soviet Z"il~om 2~ad-our eatlaet~ imtelli-. genceeffortialr3tL - - ~'= = . ~~ _ The US. government and faitraahsts have,'of. course, bad a great deal of with ? representatives of the dissident" m~etnent in~-= - bioscaw However, the di~denss .themselves Tice xvritar ss o pra~essor ?t l?ukt UeraFi}:: - pave i~erome very d~scoaraged abou ~esr owe -chances for sntcess; and cantact~with.them }3as led Lo the conviction that therSoviet regime is unchanging attd the..near~iu=.~ tune. - - __ ~ ::=~~ns~.~~:M~::.~ - But what It tile: dissidents are- not' -the real- force far change is the Soviet Union?"What if. there are forces within the Soviet establishment: itself that lsave the- potential: of :-praduang major evolution:withia the Soviet Union?;= -' 4~ " If tktis is the ~-~ the United States will be-as surprised by events as it was la Iraa.:;The sad -fact is that t>ze.U.S~ government is allaaat totally =unequipped to assess lang~erm palitit~il= dev _ lopments with,iA the Soviet establishmeatv:Zhe American embassy fA iidasCow has anlyfaur 'sans in the palitiral section who study~tnte~l Soviet developtneats,-two of wham concentrate: - on Krsmlinologicai gttestionsand two ~vho:hasi== cai.ty fangs on rise lesaisit and disdd?nt~:,gues~ ~- tiozzs a mafa_fotaa of Lire CIA -- tit~al sis of the ~ system seems, i?_praet6ee, _ flo~tprimarily from itsregnire:ae~tt~ep ute to the morning ae~wa briefing [rkthe- deat. Hence, it- too: tcnceatrates an. cttrreat-ai' f airs and the amble As a result, the LiS govez~et~t=devvt~ tremely little attention t4 the vigorot~:dehatea on policy aptioua and as changes im the poIi " . system that are psiblfshed in the Soviet Umo For example. the:Svviet ~urnal:deatmg. Latin America has carried most uiterrsting an important debates on_the ittttu-e ai Latin Amer ica and on which desreloptiientY"ia.that reg~ the Soviet U`nioa~should support. It:ls a trontin ing debaie .with -important impltcatians ..tor Soviet riews~~~dpr~ Yet, the Jo dst never.- in the, 1LLG JL?MaL1V11 A1L111G%JFlGti.^ W L14111 GJ L1L. 1..~VLL. =I discussions is worse:' The Commerce Depart tnent does a good job in f_ollawiag the debates { that relate to the growing Central Asian popula-! ,: tion. But no. one is trying to map out the eco- ! _< nomic debate as a~whole and the positions of the major institutional actors in?it-and this at a _:: time w]aen Soviet policy utteliectuaI.s are giving enormous attention to the implication of the? "~ labor shortage impending in the 19$Cts. - - _~=-. Indeed. although almost all tlxe major Soviet economists are loudly arguing for greater wage_ ,differentials and a reversal of the long tread : toward wage egalitarianism,~a great.many re- sponsible Americans -are-convinced that, the ` Brezhnev em has featured a grawt]a in the.rela:- tive.pri4ilege of the elite. Hence we ds>aot even know one of the mast elemental az-d basic #acts j about the nature-oi the Soviet economic prob-f lem, and we have no awareness of theresulting. i - ;pressur~es far.:major reductions in military ex- pendirures if the international situaQon were ` more aPpmPria'te-- - _ The time to improve om? intelligence opera- tcons is nqt"after the disaster, but before. Re- torm. is Russia has traditionally came from the ;.top, but .leaders' actions. are normally_ in-{ ~ fluenced by their apparatus and the currents of .' r opinion among the po]icy>ateIlipent~ If we do '..not lruow what those persens are saying (often. - quite openly we will continue to be blind to major currents for rh~e -that _eastR .Even ? worse, we inevitably wilt 6e afiet~tfng.Saviet ice. ~. ternal deveiopmenb.:by our.: policies without ~. any awareness of the nature of the efiecrt.:Ia - fact, leading liherals~withia the Soviet establish meat insist that American policy has beea.seriy ausly harming their cause:: ~' _:.'- ... `~ ;~': - ~' With the amount o! money tttat-is spent o ~. :` trying to find oui about the Soviet Union,. it=~ absolutely inexcusable that we knoaras little ax' ;:we do-about its. politics: It is even more in - ~.able_and.dangerous.that our ideolagic~k blia :.=ers dead ux to smugly .assume. that there-is na - ?~ middle-level politics worth studying and that it' ?cannot=have an impact ast the future. It was `such an attitude that led to. our Iaiiure of under_ standing in Iran. -;': -.- - : - .. . -.i h/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-01137800 ~,~-I%L F~tPr.n,.=~D AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW Div' ?AGy~ January -- February 1979 vvo~LD ~~A~E A~~ THE SOVIET N1lLITA~Y THREAT Captain Steven E. Cady EW THINGS iri this world are as certain as change, and certainly our world has changed irzeversibly since World `Var II. Yet, as the Frenchman said: Plus ~a change, plus c'est la rneme chose ("The more things change the mare they are the same."). - World peace, far example, continues to depend on American supremacy, and that supremacy is a function of the develop- ment and deployment of highly advanced weapon systems. A possibly moot point, in this connection, is the nature of the Soviet threat to world peace. What are the intentions of the Soviet Union? Has our assessment of its intentions and capa- bilities been realistic? If the Soviets, as a result of their intentions and massive arms buildup, pose an active threat to the United States, will our present stockpile of -nuclear bombs and "conventional" mis- siles be sufficient deterrent to Soviet power? Are the current SALT talks leading to a weakening of American military power relative to the Soviet Union, and, if so, will such a weakening act as a stimulus to Soviet aggression? These and related issues are discussed in three recent books about the Soviet Union. Fox a realistic insight into the nature of Soviet thinking, Marshal A. A. Grechko's The Armed Forces of the Soviet State: A . Soviet View provides a detailed picture of the ~vorldwide goals and ambitions of the Soviet Union in relation to its military and political policies. William T. Lee, a U.S. specialist in Soviet military and economic affairs, published two similarpublicati.ons in 1977: Understanding the Soviet 16Ii1i- tary- Threat: How CIA Estimates Went Astray and The Estimation of Soviet Defense Expenditures, 1955-7~: An Un- conventionad Approach: Soviet intentions The true intentions of a nation can be assessed in terms of its stated intentions and its overt activity. Grechko's work, i which was written when he vas Minister of Defense of the U_S.S_R., serves as a major source far stated Soviet intentians.T Marshal Andrei Antonovich Grechko joined the Red Army in 1919, took part in subsequent civil war campaigns, and became a memberof the Communist Party i in 1928. After graduating from the Frunze Military Academy in 1936, he entered the General Staff Academy, graduating in j 1941, just as Hitler attacked the Soviet Union, tiVhen hostilities ended, he was General-Colonel (three stars) and cow- wander of the 1st Guards Army. Sy 1953, Grechko was General of the Army, soon becoming Marshal of the Soviet Union ~ (1955). He later became Minister of Defense, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet ,,Ground Forces, First Deputy Minister of Defense, Commander in Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw ; Pact nations, Minister of Defense, and finally a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Grechko died on 27 April 1976, but his statements f 14larshal A. A. Grechko,ThsArrned Farces Qf the 80Ui8t State: A 5oaiet View, translated under the auspices of the United States Air Force (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern- ment Printing Office, 1975, $3.20), 349 pages. Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 can still be considered as fully represen- tative of Soviet thought. Grechko viewed all mankind as moving inevitably toward socialism and com- munism. He felt that only a socialist system, such as that of the U.S.S.R. could have an army with a just goal: the defense of "the revolutionary achievements of the working people." (p. 2) He regarded the Soviet armed forces as possessed of a "great liberating mission." According to Grechko, the army fulfills an "inter- national duty," and the goals of the Soviet army are also adapted by the ,armies of other socialist states, all of them assisting the peoples of nonsocialist nations in "fighting for their social and national liberation." Countries such as the United States are pictured as controlled by "reactionary imperialists'.' who have "not given up Their aggressive schemes." Various nations are accused of hindering the policy of peaceful coexistence by differing social systems. This is a curious assertion in view of Grechko's unqualified condemnation of alI systems that differ from That of the Soviet Union. The capitalist nations are charged with disseminating lies, slandering socialist countries, and unleashing anti-Soviet hysteria at any cost while continuing the arms race. Grechko concludes that the U.S_S.R. must, therefore, strengthen the combat pov~?er of the Soviet aimed forces, supplying them with "modern weapons, combat equipment and other supplies." His sequence of chapters documents this viewpoint. 1 T IS HARDLY surprising, then, that ~'Villiar:~ Lee, in Understanding the Soviet IY.filitary Threat,- depicts the Soviet Union as pursuing a policy o? political expansion based on military forces that are develop- ing more rapidly than those a? the United States. As its title implies, Lee (formerly with the CIA) finds fault with certain CIA estimates of Soviet military power. The U.S. formerly relied on these estimates in reacting to the Soviet military threat. In the Foreword, Eugene V, Rostow points out that Soviet spokesmen frequently talk of a projected military expansion program designed to achieve complete superiority in every category. On that basis, the Soviets feel that they will "determine the direction of world political development." (p? 2) . Rostow emphasizes that the American intelligence community has resisted accepting these facts. Its conception of the ~ Soviet Union is interpreted by R.ostow as a government seeking paxity with the United States rather than dominance. i Thus, the U.S.S.R. is seen as a developed nation interested in maintaining the status quo, and the usual strategic and conventional weapons, sufficient to deter Soviet expansionism, are adequate for U.S. defense. Defense i=xpenditures Lee cites Soviet defense expenditures that have grown steadily since 1958, with 14 ar 15 percent of the Soviet gross national product allocated to defense. The love-Year Plan for 1976$0 continues the trend, with perhaps 1$ percent of the 1980 budget allocated for defense. Included are an increasing number of weapon sys- tems-much more accurate MIRVed ICBMs/SLBMs, for instance-able to 1'William T. Lee, Understanding the Sv~iet Military Threat: .lYow CIA Estimates Rent Astray (New York: National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1$77, $2.00), 73 pages. Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 reach U.S_ targets from Soviet coastal waters, as are new aircraft with larger payloads and greater potential for pene- trating hostile airspace. These capacities, Lee feels, are consistent with the "~vell- documented Soviet objective of achieving superiority over the United States and its allies in military power." The Soviets have achieved, or will soon achieve, numerical parity or superiority in almost all impor- tant types of weapon systems, Lee asserts. Although they may still be lagging qualitatively in weapon technology, their intention of becoming both quantitatively and qualitatively superior in all weapon systems is potent. Lee believes that the continuing power buildup can be accounted far partly by its political utility: the Soviet Union holds that peaceful coexistence, or detente, exists largely because of its superior (or supposedly superior) military power. Increasing Soviet military budget outlays through 1950 indicate an expectation of further political gains resulting from military power. Lee contends that the current trends in Soviet priorities are made possible with the help of the Western nations-techno- logical and otherwise. ClA Estimates William T. Lee's The Estimation of Soviet Defense Expenditures, 1955-75: A. n Unconventional Approachf was pub- lished in collaboration with the General Electric Tempo Center for Advanced Studies, which solicited the cooperation of Soviet analysts and economists in its preparation- The author describes the uncertainties and data gaps existing in the CIA's direct-costing approach to esti- mating U.S.S.R. defense expenditures. Because of various hidden expenditures suited to the political "cosmetics" prac- ticed by Soviet leaders, the CIA adopted the direct-casting method, which esti- mates the amounts in each military ; program, then applies estimated indi~zd- ual prices to each quantity. Only recently has the CIA admittc:l that it under- estimated the Soviet dense budget by a factor of t~vo in 1970 and possibly by a i factor of three at present. Lee analyzes this error in an in-depth review of various i methodologies used to estimate U.S.S.R. '' national security expenditures (1\TSE), providing an alternative ~vay of esti- mating NSE "based entirely on published Soviet industrial output, budgetary, and ~ national income data, while accepting the limited coverage of the `Defense' and `Science' budgets." (Tr'ce Estimation, p. 2) The author lists the advantages of this i approach: itis derived directly from Soviet data, in rubles; it is not subj ect to the index number effect of applying U.S. prices to ; Soviet weapons and technology; it does not depend on estimated ruble-dollar ratios; it reveals resource allocations in each Soviet annual and Five-Year Plan; it is an alternative to the direct-costing method , and provides an aggregative check on the results of that approach; and it provides an approximate picture of U.S.S.R_ NSE as' Soviet leaders see it. While admittedly not .~ perfect, Lee offers his approach as one ~ resulting in a better estimate of the Soviet NSE. _ As to why the CIA estimates went so wrong, Lee lists a' number of reasons in Understanding t]ze Soviet 167ilitary Threat. The first was its emotional rather than analytical response to the initial ; overreaction to the intelligence communi- tWilliam T. Lee, The Estimation of Soviet Defense ; Expenditures, Y 955-75: An UnconventianalApproach (New , York: Praeger, 1.977, $25.00), 358 pages. Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 ty's early overestimation of Soviet heavy bomber production and Soviet ICBM deployment, Some consequences were U_S. expansion of heavy bomber production and ICBM/SLBMforcesfarbeyond what the U_S. might otherwise have considered necessary. A second reason was the fear of strengthening bureaucratic Soviet mili- tary forces and nuclear overkill on both sides. Lee points to the Cuban missile crisis as proving that the U.S. advantage in bombers and missiles was effective in curbing Khrushchev's adventurism, with- out risk of war. Lee maintains that,- in response to the bomber and missile "gaps" of one kind or another existing between Soviet and U.S_ forces, "The prevalent reaction was some apparent institutional guilt for having contributed to a perceived overreaction by the United States, plus a widespread belief that the Soviets had opted out of the intercontinental missile competition, and a determination not to overestimate again." (Understanding, p. 29) The Soviet Union envisioned the threat to itself as being through Europe, so that Eurasian strategic requirements came first in its priorities. The United States, according to Lee, expected the Soviets to manufacture several hundred heavy bombers and first-generation ICBMs in the 1950s. Instead, the Soviets manufac- tured several thousand medium bombers and 700 IRBMs. When the U.S. produced 41 strategic missile submarines, the Russians constructed some 57 (41 of them nuclear-powered), but many of,these carried cruise missiles designed for operations against naval targets. "We simply did not understand Soviet strategic concepts; hence we misjudged Soviet priorities." (Ibid., p. 30) Lee concludes that Soviet political leaders want a great deal more than minimum deterrence and that they have made no secret of their aspira- tions_ Lee mentions another error in American strategic thought-the so~alled "mirror imaging" based on the implicit or explicit assumption that Soviet aims are similarto ours, that they react as we do~ to common problems and experiences.. American strategists equate "strategic" and "inter- continental," whereas the Kussians inter- pretstrategic considerations to encompass :. their very borders. Lee feels that the threat of civilian and city destruction is no deterrent in Soviet thinking; they think in' terms of the destruction of military, industrial, and administrative targets rather than worrying about how much of ' the population will die. "All the indicators suggest that the Soviets will not accept assured destruction in the future unless there are stark changes in the political leadership." (Ibid., p. 32) What many observers in the U.S. do not { understand is that the Soviets have their own brand of propaganda, difficult for ; Westerners to comprehend. "Actually, it is probably more ritual than rhetoric as we :; now use the latter term. Such ritual does not really involve factual or intellectual credibility; it is required dogma in the Soviet system: ' (Ibid., p. 34) One must look beyond the ritual to find the real message, making distinctions between Soviet doc- trine, strategy; and "operational art:' Failure to do this has caused some American analysts to dismiss genuinely informative statements by Soviet leaders as pure rhetoric-statements that are factual and which are taken seriously. Proposals for the future In view of CIA and other underestimates of Soviet military strength, Lee makes a number of proposals for improving intelli- gence studies and estimates. First among them is giving credence to the obvious: exploiting unclassified information_ Not ,only should the statements of the regime's Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 spokesmen to their people be taken at face value but also greater use can be made of the large quantity of unclassified infor- mation leaking out of Russia. Despite the great secrecy surrounding military mat- ters, the Soviets have been willing to discuss their objectives and various of their programs. "The time of these programs, the choice of system designs, and the integration of the new weapons into the forces, all suggest a well~onceived plan guided by doctrine, strategy, and lessons drawn from the Vietnam and Middle East wars." (Ibid., p. 39) Lee also suggests that efforts be made to simulate the effectiveness of Soviet weapons and forces and that a more realistic historical perspective be adopted. Knowledge of past trends can help us understand how new trends in Soviet planning reflect Russian objectives and requirements. Ranging from the opportun- istic tactics of Russian revolutionaries in the nineteenth and early twentieth cen- turies to Grechka's updated statement of policy, every added bit of historical evidence helps American analysts acquire a realistic view of Soviet thought and ambition. The evidence suggests strongly that the U_S.S.R. understands and re- spectspower. Negotiations are not likely to succeed unless U.S. representatives can speak from a position of unquestioned power, especially military power. The U.S. has engaged in disarmament or arms limitation conferences with the Soviets for decades, and may continue doing so at the cost of tempering military preparedness in deference to the seeming- ly interminable but hopefully fruitful negotiations.l'n the meantime, the United States has been weakened militarily in relation to the Soviet Union. In view of tiVilliam Lee's analysis of the situation, realistic thinking suggests that American negotiators are not likely to impress the Soviet planners except from a position of military strength. `Vhere social, political, and economic vacuums have existed, the Russians have usually moved in to fill them. A major reason for their retreat in the Cuban affair was their unwillingness to test American military might at that time. - , one consequence of such realism is a military program costing many billions of dollars. Such a cost may very well be the price Americans must pay for the survival of their institutions. Skimping on pro- grams on which our survival depends could amount to committing national suicide. However, an adequate defense program need not increase the overall United States defense budget alarmingly. At the present time, more than 60 percent of our defense budget goes for financing personnel costs. Cutting manpower is not inconsistent with maintaining a defense posture. A manpower reduction would leave us tivith sufficient conventional forces, permit greater recruitment selectivity, and re- leasethe funds needed to finance the exotic new weapons required to countex the Soviet threat. In any case, a crisis in decision-making now exists. One realistic alternative is to develop, manufacture, and deploy weapon systems an a scale the magnitude of which will impress the Soviet Union. if this alternative is pursued, the stagnating arms limitation talks will become maze meaningful and likely to produce results much sooner. i Loring AFB, ~~Yrairie ~I Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 Ate, ~ I~.r ~,~'~ Q~ l~s~.~ :p~. Release 2001/0~'T~ :~01137R00010013 ~9 ~~~rrA;~Y x9T9 ,.. ~.- ~ __ - syRICHARD BURT ? ~ =- - ?? cials? said they- included Saudi-- Arabia, Bence'' that he zvas getting and told his ' s~si c~~~:e~+~or~cr~-~~s ' ::`;,:',';' Turkey, L'~a P:~ilippines, " Indonesia, aides to worlc:On,together to upgraue such ':~ ASiI'L`;GTON, San. 23 -The Carter Egypt, South Korea and 13raail_ ? .:, ?- ~- information. . j Ac,~i,^..i;tration is assembling a comprw- Some officials believe that opposition t " Shortly tt;ereafterr gf`icials said, Mr_~ ' ~.,. ~ ~ve plan to upgz-ade-its ability to fore ?~u~ -in each ?oE these. countries could) Carter's aides formed the task force and j cast pc?itical turbulcncc arvtmd'. the threaten the, viability o: their .govern- put eaclI ofthei~top assist3n[s in charge: ? j a-or?d, a step that setnvc Gvvarrtment of- zYients, which. are friendly to.: t1te.Unired ~ They are:` David- L_ Ramr., .:vlr. Baezi.-t-. ,icials said today could restttt insweeping. ,Stotts. In, assetice; the intelligence aide ski's deputy' David -fY-Newsom, Under .changes in existing methods of intelli- -said, t:5e_Adniinistration.wanes to.,-know j5ecretary~af_State for political affairs, T"ue officials said t~sat. since ? early-, Dacember, a higi3-level interagency task farce has been examining ways for Intel-? ligenceagenties to improve tbeix ability to aredic~ political instability in cauntries- of critical 'importa~c+.ce~ to ? the- United ---The tacit farce, they said, was created- af:er ?residen~Caster expressed.his dim pieaa~re irrNovembar about the failures of L'~e agencies,to anticipate the, Iran.-.. _._-:w_---- _-- ?~;c.-- TLe . task~orce ~+as~not_-expeetec,to iss~:e its formal reGOmrt:endatio~s to the Presiden[.until next?month, theofficials said, but a hies-ranltinn intelligence aide in L`:e State-Department said-.that the Ce^*sal Intelligence Agency andthe.State -partment had already been'ordered to t'e-?: rnine if other. strategies- natior:s r_zgat b? susceptible'ta events similar [0 L':ose. in Iran; and to-.suggest-_.ways_'in ~rhich the United States ttugl'it respond to s.:chfut+ussituations:~ - -..`~` -? ; Try intellio race aide declL~ed to~name the countries-under study, bur other.offi- suchappositiairgiaups sal thatttie iI>ii.r~d States will not:'be .surprised by events similar to taosein Iran.. - - - - ?'-Efforts to enhance political forecasting have been given special priority by: the Administration:Zbi~niew Brzezinski, the , , ; have.. stressed that military intelligence ~ American diplorrisis ?? and = ititelligenee alone was no longer adequate: - -"~~~= ? ~ agents have ignored social changes insey -?-The- intelligence? aide=said that :the' eountriea:,duiirib th`e la~?t-"decade, and United States%t'Can no longer.:just'bludg_ ~ have focttse~instead oi~`a~hat the ruling eon:its way intirsituations:: ~ ~ ? _--~- _ ~~: _ ~.:., > elite;vias. fliiiiking: `?" ' -i`tw : ' - _, ~ - . "As our`relative'potver d"eclines;-~-'t?1e ~_;,: This-has meant; +rffic"r~s said. that in aidesaidr;'we Inu~t.lEarn, Like the.Bzibish , contrast'to fhe~earlj+'19b'0's; ?,merican of- nating; alen and skilled in political hitel- ligence." - - ? _ ~,=~: Memor2~tdum From Carters ~Y7 Ot1?er officials traced the. task force's origirt?to? a handwritten memorandum: stnt by Mr.. Carter,in November to tiir. Brzezinski;'Secrefaiy pf .Stafe'Cyri:5 ~, Vance and Adm_-. Stansfield Turr:er;'the Director of Central Intelligence: In-the and Frank-C. Carlucci; the Deputy Direc- tor of Central. Intelligence_ According to the officials; the` task force-has met regu. larlysinie?December: ? . - ~ ' ".- . . - ~heintelligence?aide?said thafi the task force has identifie& several shortcomings of- existing intelligence practices. Ore such problem the' aide said vas' that ficials abroad have had little contact with forces outside -governiients_ =sacra ~ as ~ youth groups, intellectual; and reli~ot:s leaders. !WiL'turthe,Central Inte'ligence Agency; the-officIals-said, ihis'tTerd was ) reiniarced in the 1970's crhen more re1i- "ancewas placed,ozi technical means of in- telligence;, .cgilect',ion,. thanr..orc_ human] - - ~ ? note, Mr. Carter said that he "was dissar--~ isfied with the quality'of'political intell;=i Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 Ai~TICLE AYi'r.A.;~;~ THE NEId YORK TxMES ON ~pEo~elease 200'11~~7LP~t~t~~90-01137R00010013Q -.- .-~r.y~,-~+'DREIC.x.I1Ta4.~+'I'A.I~ZS -W ng ~'eace a~~ ~e~~inglt. B~rnunawor~ue~ ~` I.US ANGFIES ~ For. mare than a- decade, tthas been plain that of ail the -disasters of the Yietttam War the 'vrorst might. be. the lessons ire wipu]d draw fmm it: Our political Mites, rsr coiling from that remote atabiguaes struggle. cvtaciuded that impr'o'ving-. our ability m project force into distant plates was a danger oo the world and to us. If we improved our tarce.~we'd be more .apt to use it and become. Arms spendinS. Sa the lesson rams, Ls worse thaauseless. It provokes adver~ caries to spend more in- turn in -aa unending. spiral- ]]~staat ~~ ~= largely iadigenoris, $ ~ iaCSl in justree and corrarption acrd, in case, ~ part of some Soviet or.ot>1er- Communist coaspiratY: We ate not eta gaged in a: simple bipolar contest with ~ the Soviet Union. Neither superpower I. can dominate the -world. - Instead af. playing poliaennaa m the erstire wvrid, we should - uz the President's Phrase -. be making peace for the vrorld...: . But is that the lessa~n2 Caa.~ve make . peace anywhere if we cannot reliably . promise the necessary. force m keep Secretar3- of State Cyrer~ R Yanaa 'was right to reject the stark bipolar.. picture recently: But if we are not locked iri a simple duel with the other.. superpu+rer;. its interests doh appose ours in marry essentials- Nar are dreg - liltely m be reconciled is nay forrsee- . .able arms agreement, least of -all in ~- .SAI.? II,- which iras preoccr~red? the: Aamiaistrattors as one apparently a~ diet .disaster after ~aofltierhastalsenit.bysurprtsG? = 'a~t threats of further dis- - membermeat. ibis time by a Baluchix-' tan liberation movemeaL sided by the Afghanis and the Soviet Unioa:.Oman :bad the Shah's help im putting dawn a 'Yemeni and Soviet~upported rebel'` .. lion in Dhotar; trouble may start there again. Both the Saudis and the Israelis have beca,distwrbed, not only by. the turn of events in-Iran but also by the patent American inability to do gray- . thing about it. For the Israelis, the giv stag of boxier territory in return for an' American guarantee lacks amsider- ablyrislrier. ... - -.. : _~, ..~ , ~- According to Pres3deat Carter: "We have ... neither ability nor desire m lnterfera in the internal affairs of Iran. Azad we certainly have m intention of permitting other nations tb-interfere, But if we have eao abilitq to intervene ourselves. can we prevent others from intervening! ii we are unclear about Soviet intetierence in these ambigu- ous deadly quarrel9, the Russians are not. Their military? guarantees, em- bodied in "Friendship Treaties" with India cad with Yitetaam. assured India that it could dismember Pakistan and Vietnam that it could invade Combo. din. free ox concern about China. And that Ls hardly the end of the matter. An extension of Soviet intervention or coo- .trot !ar chart of "world doaainatian" tnaald do us and out allies grievot>3 halm. And even where Mbacnw is not gaining control, we seem to be lasing, it. Our major intelli~eecs failtues t coma en kee their a es ~ s ut t to unp easant trends- Two ago. a usstaas no abil? itg+ to match American or Britislx forces in the Persian Gulf or Mediter~ ranean. They could not overfly Yugo slavia, Turitey, Iran of Paidstan. :Today, tive have the problems with Tights and the use of overseas tiases. But this is nA inevitable "da cline of the West" we have the resources to reverse these treads and -the technological base to do it eftideatly rather rhea by merely multiplying armies: We and ~ our allies have had otter priorities. 'Between 1960 and llt'Tl we more titan doubled the perrestta$e of the Boss national product made up by Federal outlays as "social welfare." while cut. ring almost in halt the fraction devoted to the common defense --which could mean we shall all fair badly. But to choose to reverse the decline. ` we need at least torrotice it. Albert Wohlstetter, University Prates- sor at the Uruversity of Chiccgo, is_a . guess colwrtnisi. . Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 Approved Foa-.~elease 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-01137800010013 r~ AI~TiCLL ~~~`~' Tvc T.rn cuT~Tr_rnu cTeu ((_u~R1T 7 7NR7"k U.S.: !n#e~ligence Predicted Suez Crisis '. ~~ U.S. intelligence agencies correttly:predicted Is- I rael, Britain and France would take military action in 1956 to keep the Suet Canal open but wrongly be- lieved Soviet leader Nikita Khrushclaev was, on the. . verge of falling frompower. - "~ `- .. ,Publication- of once. classified transcripts:of?se? .I cret sessions of the? Senate Foreign, Relations Committee -in 1956 yesterday- provided.the? histori? cal notes.._ .:._.. _:: ~ .,:......~..... .. . . Intelligence predictions-on Khrushchev's fate, and af.the-draaxatic.Hungarian-uprisings of the same`year, were notably off-target :, .~ _ L,.,,,,f. ~_..-" .., Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 Approved For Release 200/,~2~,t~gp1P~~~~~`00130001-4 Z3 January 1979 _ -~1 -~.. - .. ~.._.. k, .r _ - _ _. ~ Flas U_S. forei l - ~ , , - ; . gn policy-ever` before :;::Afghanistan. and Iran sneaked up ort tlz been as badly splintered or as disorgan- ~.: United States. The CIA gave litti ized as it is now? - ~ warnin~_ -?--~ - For starters, take U.5 relations with ~ ~. For years the CIA has been pilloried , , Iran. The outcome of the turrnpii in I~ ry~u,,,', its morale shaken, its capabilities deg is far from clear. But already it is clear '~: creased. In each: foreign country, the enough that? any,. likely -outcome .will. ,; :CIA reports tQ the ambassador, In both pmbabl~- damage United States' ?inter- Iran and Afghanistan; evidently. the -sets. Unfarizmately in~the face.:of this?CIA's contacts with non-0fficial sources challenge, American policy seems hard- p!ere severely circumscribed: =::. =~- ~ _: ly more intelligible than Irar-ian politics...: ~?'' '1'1ze charter vihieh Congress is IikeIy -The U-S. will:. probably= :loge'. the' r'to acceptor reject this session was. bo listening posts it. has .used tt- moaitar .of concern with CIA ab ~erira Soviet strategic--. weapons::' Access :-to 1 That's an import~mt'problem, to be sure, Iranian oil could well be cut :o#f. And a -? rout so is~ the ability of the CIA ?th do its communist ,or ?~radical-Islamic-~ - ~~ Iab =abroad. In ? discussing the charter, nationalist government could y~,e~ ~ a force for fin'ther-r disniption in that. Congress should pay -more attention to _ Nor ?s the trouble confi~d to: Iran,' -?:: They second chance. Congress will The pro-Russian government that seized ~ : ~~ : to .Pass orr the administration pov~er . receatly~ in .Afghanistan:. is har- .. foreigrs. policy will be the SALT treaty. boring gueriitlas ? who ?,8re~= attacking with the SoiTiet Union. Russia views the Pakistan.. The radical Yeniejni- reg9-fie .. ; -vorld as ~ a "correlation .of . forces,,'? hosts guerrlllas-who-wish to take aver ire : ~:, seeing inva$ian in ~:.ambudxa, s;:bversion Saudi Arabia..'-::=~` ~ -~. _--.~ -_ ~ _..=: ...-. Across the Persian Gulf, Russian and .._, ~, ~` "uaaue~ as steps wwara a lamer Cuban advisors,-are .?esconced-. iii ;:igeopaliticalobfective. - - -.- _ .: --.5 Ethio ia. Far the -West, these develo "~ It is the .idea of - an overarchkng p p" ? ~ geopolitical goal` that official American menu threaten oil supplies; peace in the ~ . -; _ Middle East; and many, ather^:strategic ' ~ ' dmo p e e ' -:: a inlstratl on rejects interests: :.-?= - - ,. th id a ofr During the copying session,' Cairgress :~ ?`Ltnka~E? continues to insist that Soviet will probably leave at least two' c}iances .;' advereturisrn in Ethiopia should mot- to try to help untangle the mess That the .~ enter our thinking about our t~ ubles in adminictrat;n.,i,~a.,,eae,se:rte r_~____._:? 1zanoranagreementonstra~e carets.. First Congress-is uxe~y,.te vote-on a~~, ch ~~ arter for the CIA. It' time for another' ? close look- at th~nization: Events in ? _ Congress would ~ well to question: the fraetui^ed policy- the administration? serves lip.. Fok~ it is increasingly appar? ent;that ~, politer is not serving the Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-0113780001001 /~~ 1 1i \~~\J 1 ~ 1 I~~O ~~~, iNC. Fog PU3L l C AFFA I PS STAFF PAOGRAI~1 Face the Nation DATE January 21 , 1979 I I :30 AP~1 suB.lEC7 Interview with Senator Frank Church 1JDV~~1-TV C[3S Network ti~lash i ngton, Q.C. GEORGE HERPAAN: Senator Church, U.S. policy towards Iran seems to have waivered.between favoring the Shah, favoring the Bakhtiar government, and, most recently, some hints of favoring the Ayatollah Khomeini. Have wa had any adequate, appropriate Iran pal icy at al I? SENATOR FRANK CHiURCH: ~Jel I , our policy, of course, was to support the Shah as long as the Shah cou Id stay i n Iran. But the chaos that developed there, the inability of the army to keep order, the overwhelming protestations from the streets fiinally fiorced the Shah to leave. After that, I think it was a bit premature for us to endorse the Bakhtiar government. Bakhtiar.stands an a banana pee I , and h4' I I have to be an adroit acrobat i ndead to keep h i s fiaot i ng. I think we might have refrained unt i f we had a better i d.ea of what ki nd of government wou I d emerge. from the present chaos. ANNOUNCER: From CBS. News, ;~lashington., a spontaneous and unrehearsed news interview on Face the Nation with Senator Frank Church, incoming Chairrnan of fihe Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Church will ba questioned by CBS News con- gressianal correspondent Phil Janes; but Richard Burt, diplo- matic correspondent for The New~York Times; and by CBS News correspondent George Herman. HERP4AN: Senator Church, your first answer was at Ap~iFd''i`o~"~l'e 20~~'>-~~tA-I~I~(~'~01~13~10O1 ~~~ I~-~R P~ti"ciPA~. c~ri~s Approved.For Release 2.001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001 ARTICLE APP'' ~. NEWSj~EK OH PAGE~Q g ._,~ 22 January 2979 @~~' hen, as lately, America's decline ac- evidence ofreality, because ifyou accept R~~ celestes, it is useful to look back that the Russians are. embarked on an along the dmvnward, crumbling path.. imperialist course far the indefinite fu- Eugene Rostow has done sn in The Nash- tore, i? you accept that their military, ington Quarterly, recallingthe 1.968 Sovi- economic, educational and cultural poli- et invasion of Czechoslovakia. -He was Gies are all geared to the reduction ... of Under Secretary of State, and was struck, the ability of the United States and its then as now, by the attitude prevalent allies to resist, then you have to do some- ~vithin government that "soviet action . thing about it." - must always be given the benefit of the- - Whatthe-United States has done since doubt." That summer, officials resisted the mid-1960s is invest its hopes in arms the idea that Soviet military maneuvers. control. It has based arms-control policy presaged an invasion. When senior Sovi- on the hope that the Soviek buildup is et.afFcialsinterruptedtheir2,ugustvaca merely a reaction to U.S. arms, and can tions to convene in l~ioscow, President be restrained by unilateral U.S_ restraint. Johnson assumed they were preparing So U.S. arms-limitation efforts have Hat an invasion but an invitation (for him ~~ limited . - . U.S. arms. i\'ow The Econo- to visit _ldoscow to begin strategic arms .mist of London warns that the SALT II limitation talks). Significantly, they were treaty, designed to run through 1985, preparing both. They wrongly assumed . "could be the beginning of seven singu- what they reasonably assume today, that lazly dangerous years." - . the U-S. Administration would mute its.. _..- 'A HALF- HOUR CATACLYSM' reaction to Soviet conduct, however erg- _ _ gressive, sther than jeopardize SALT .. The cosmetic equality in permitted to- negotiations. (Johnson immediately can-~ tats of launchers conceals, The Ecano- celedthetrip.) mist says, "a large imbalance in Russia's With today's satellites, U.S. ofncials - favor." Given existing U.S. arsenals and would have seen unusual markings on procurement plans, "by 198a the United tanks and other vehicles in the Soviet Slates will be behind Russia both in the maneuvers. Evidence that these were .over-alI total and in some of the most im- about to go into action against identical. portantsub~ate ones,"including"mod? tanks and vehicles--those of the Soviet- ern large" missiles: the Soviets will be supplied Czech Army. But many officials permitted308(aforcethatcancarry3,000 would have resisted any upsetting evi- wazheads), the U.S. will be permitted deuce about the Soviets. Rostow recalls none. And SALT II "may leave the Unit this from the preceding summer: ed States itself vulnerable to a surprise ... The first time. '1~gyptian' MiG Russian attack. ~ - - fighters appeared aver our Sixth Fleet "By the early 1980s, the growing num- shortly after the 196' Six Day War, oux ber of increasingly accurate warheads monitoring sources reported that the pi- Russia can pack into its huge missiles lots of these `Egyptian' planes were-talk- "will put- it in a position of being able to ing Russian ...Well, for two weeks our destroy virtually all .of America's Iand- ' Soviet experts were explaining this away .based missiles in a single half-hour cater .. [They said] that these were training clysm, while still keeping quite a lot of flights, that the pilots were Egyptians -its own missiles in reserve, ready for a who had been instructed in Russian by ~'seCOnd blow :.. [A] counterattack Russian personnel .:. and so on. Of against the Soviet missile system would course it soon transpired that the pilots have to depend mainly on the aircraft were Russian and those arguments col- Carried Cruise missiles permitted under lapsed. Sut for two weeks they were ~ SALT II, which would take ten hours to stubbornly held .. _" .... - ... trundle toward their targets-and even then would desuoy not :ouch more than 'STASILI7Y' IN IRAN .': ~ half of the Soviet launching silos." Today, the pattern ofstrikes andunrest . To say that the Russians would pmb- in Iran strongly suggests Soviet finger- ably not push the button "misses the prints, but whit a the Soviets broadcast point of nuclear mathematics: instructions for manufactaring gzenades - "The point is that the Russians would and bombs, U.S. "experts" suggest that not have to. If they know that [an] ex- the Soviets are priml~arily interested in c~hapny gcepaf Soviet first strike~I,a~,nyd~,,A~1m~ ear-} explarlln u~~~l~illl~i i~~~gt'n1`~01~fEl~i2fno~~ii~~~~~~ii~?,"`I~HzY~H1 "The answer is: fear. The American ~ would then hold Americas cities hos- political class is afTaid? of living with the tage, they would know that the Ameri- can Presidentwould know it too- and that he would be para- lyzed by his knowl- edge ...This is the political reality be- hind the apparently abstract calculations of who-would-have-more-missiles-]ek." On the crucial question of how the. United States sank to this danger, The Economist is too charitible: "Americans were so mesmeri-zed by Vietnam and tiVatergate that they failed to spot the danger." Nottrue- The political days had sufficient evidenceall along. italso hada desire to disbelieve, and with a few ex- ceptions (such as Sen. Henry Jackson) has shrunk from leadership. Fred Ikle, former director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, writes that we: aze in a third postwaz phase. From 1945 through 1950, the period of "nuclear motiopoly," the U.S. actually had few ready nuclear weapons and was substantially weaker than the Soviet Union in terms of ready land- based power. After North Korea at- tacked, the U.S- immediately tripled its defer:se budget, building up air and naval capabilities. After the Cuban mis- sile crisis, the Soviets.began a sustained buildup, while Vietnam sapped Ameri- ca's material and moral resources. _ {GNOAAiVCE AS A S7R{4TEGY ' The Soviet. Union has doubled its military budget, in real terms, in the last __ fifteen years. The- U.S. budget in .con- .-~ start dollars is less than it was in 1961. And as Ikle says, this "third-phase shift , in the Soviet Union's-favor is still under way: ' In 1965, Defense Secretary laic- _ Namara said that "the Soviets have de- cided that they have lost the quantita; ? five race ..?. there is na indication the ~I Soviets are seeking to develop a strate- gic nuclear farce as large as ours: ' Ikle ! blames a huge "intellisten a failure n `r e s or sue in in an armtu persistence in unilateral re- strains as a o icy or inauc:ng 5ov~et ~ restraint, or a even veers in a roj w_ t~ annu U- inte}li ence 4recasts un- derestimate the number of missiles ~ Russia would de ov.' ? - i But I ? e, - e T e Economist, is too ! charitable. When people are so wrong For 4 so.long on the same subject, in the same , 3~~~~ti~n, the failure is not of intelli- i ut of will. For such people, igno- ran~e is a strategy. Their pxoblem is not ~ in finding the truth, but in facing it. Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 ---.~0.RTICLE APPE~~ THE C?l4?~LL STPEET .~dUR`dAL QN PAGE,~~ 18 January 1979 ~nt~lli~~ncc ~'a~lur~ # ~Z~2~ ~~ It sometimes happens that events : ~~ Qon's intelligence capabilities, or lack _ bypass purposed Iegislation before it thereat, to come out before Congress ~ can be enacted into law. Something could pass a bill and claim to have dis- like this seems to have happened to posed of . the. intelligence problem. S?52~, the Intelligence Reorgani2a.tion That an analysis of Soviet open- and Reform Act reported out of the source material by a single outside r~ Senate Select Committee on Intelli- searcher could force the CIA to double gence, a new committee created in its estimate of ~ Soviet military spend- 19Ti. This bill, designed to protect our ing? that the CiA could grossly under- civil liberties against the "invisible estimate the size, scope and purpose empire" of an omniscient CIA, is the of the---Soviet strategic buildup;..,thaf commttee's response to public fears the CIA' could not perceive the brew- . and images of wrong-doing created p ind?instability-yin .Iran-these?,enor- back in 1976 by the- accusatory hear---- inous -intelligence failures are ~ what ings of the Church committez, the Se-'concern the American public today , lect Committee's predecessor. ~ The Intelligence Committee's bill does, The committee has been busy these not address this concern. Indeed, to years fine-tuning the bill in search of this day the committee has never held an appropriate mix between civil lift .- hearings on the fundamental issues of ernes and the Attorney General's pz~ what intelligence-does the U.S. need mgatives on "intelligence intrusion." ...;and how is the U.S. to acquire it- . ,: And now Vice President Mondale and ~":;"the hearings sponsored by the Pike the American Civil -Liberties Union axe-completirgtheir negotiations aver .. and Church committees were. them.. which circumstances permit what ir.- selves intelligence failares. These cir- formation to be collected in which way cus-like performances bequeathed a on which individuals, thus ermittiin _ one-sided concern to their successor p g''~--cozi'imittees, a concern`.that. has ra~ the committee to mark up the, bill: for :--~ p presentation. to the Senate. ..- ~-_:r_~: ~:-Y ~~bited them: fiom dealing~;wiih the In the meanwhile the public has:=--: real-intelligence problerr~,:.;;~ .. been learning of a long string of Intel-::,: ~:., _-. Toda}r the.~crediliility ot..the U.S. is ligence failures, of which the unantici-'"'~, strained;' both with- its allies and its pated collapse of the shah's position in ~ enemies. W~,cannot afford any. more Iran is the latest; and is wondering, , extravagant: misperceptions.. There why the CIA's intelligence is so far off. ;~_: will always:,be=~intelligenc~;faitures,~ the mark. The public's concern has n-...=but the . goal=~should be to~-minimizE ~ shifted from fear that the agency's. ac=:~~~em- Before.-the Senatepa$ses a bill tivities will pre-empt civil liberties to _~:,~.reflecting,~outmoded concerns; it ought fear that the agency lack. s compet,~ to nvestiga.te- they requirerrients of an ence. -.. ~~: ~: effective intelligenice senvice:'Perhaps The time spent fine-tuning the bill some hearings in this direcrion_would. has served apurpose- It has permitted be-an appropriate new venture for the; more Important facts about the na Select ,Committee on Ir~telUigenee- .~-. Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-01137~~00100130001-4 ~FiE. DALLAS l'1QR'~ItiG N 14 JanLary 1979 RICHARD NLYON, trying to - government. But how it makes I rally support for his yiernam us look in the world's eyes is ~ policies, once admonished only to be imagined. against this nation's ever giv- Some of this is the Carter ing tine impression that it was administration's fault, but not "a pitiful, helpless giant." It is :.all. _ The adm inistratian's lack: easier, some years later, to see of a coherent foreign policy, its what he meant. ~. -inability to articulate . clear ; . -With respect t0 at least two international aims ~ such. current international traumas, things have hurt. But- in fact a the U.S. image has in truth sense of purposelessness has _. been one of .helplessness, .afflicted our foreign policy for whether of pitifulness or not: -the past. decade. We cannot ~Nezther in Iran. nor in Camboa seem to make up our minds dia?has the United States had - what our. interests abroad are. any- leverage - to exert It has --The old Dulles-Eisenhower pot- been_ reduced to hax-d-wring icy of opposition to communist. ing, - _ hardly . _ an -..edifying .expansion "had its drawbacks, exercise for one of-thy globe's ? but, at least it was coherent. It two superpowers.. _ ~~-=- provided the rationale for the In Cambodia; the problem is ;-beefing up of our defeiases and -twofold. It is not just that there ~ the extension of U. S. inflsence was little we ~ could do about.- = .throughout the -.. globe... But ~Jismam's..-successful invasion -:. ,.detente and "the China card" of its communist neighbor.' We : ~ have canceled out anti-cammu- actually got on the wrong. side nism as the basis of our policy. that of -Cambodia and its We still feel vaguely that genocidal rulers- by Publicly . there ate causes we should be p;ratesting ~ the invasion,' ?p;amoting around the world -- although it was Cambodia that .. ;such as .human rights ~ but . i commenced hostilities in ?the ..with Realpolitik out the vvin- ~irst place.. ~-. "-: _ - ? dow we have cut bacl~ our ~ _ - ~ " in Iran, we announced early ,armed forces, mangled the CIA - on-(and correctly, in The News' .:. and withdrawn from many of view) our;,support far .the ~> our advanced outposts: We lack embattled shah. But as it devel- ~~ not: ust the motivation but the oiled, our support meant,troth- `` mea~s io make as big an impact in.g... The CiA= :had -lost- ,touch ~ as we formerly made in foreign - with-:the _oppositiox~- and,'-: as it ~ affairs.=-- -:. _ ~=.. _ : - __. : - . -now -= appears, .~"had ~-failed" to ~::,.-~ ~_ And .as _i~t. all-this were ~~ot-- apprise:., Washingtoa;~of_..whow damaging?.,.enaugh,. we- have really desperate was the- shah's-.. begun "to..~ake a mama. for: ours plight Adjus-timents- that might. selves .whezt it .comes to sabo- have been- made?-in our policy . "caging: allies. =First Cambodia;:: years back went unmade:' '? -=-~- _ then Vietnaza. (Is it any. wan- . _ Sa.nov~ the-United States has - der we lack leverage in South- ` laeen obliged to-~ backpedal,. east Asia?) Most-recently~the~' making latown that it' thinks Republic of China on Taiwan. --.,,?. its old. friend-the shah.=--~so=?_ ~' A pitiful; helpless giant? - Jimmy Carter.has~often enoughY' ;Vlore confused than helpless; denominated .him ..- should ,..~ iii our view. But the time- has clear out for. awhile. It is a pru- ?~ come for~clearing up the confu'- dent policy, perhaps, given our ~; sion:? dust what is it after all ; dependence- on the gpad will that : we ,stand far? -And. ovhat'?~ and the oil of the new Bakhtia~y-...are we going ^. _ abo.__ ... :.i.~. Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 ~Q~~p~~v~d~l ~ase 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001 ~ O~i YriGiJ THE NI;W YOR?C TINS ]2 January 1979 aynREw;YII~nz.~.Tarl More than 170 retired generals and ad; . '~,~tQ ~ Areas Accord - . mirals have waned President-Carter of - what they describe as an "increasing Soviet challenge" to the United S totes. In a.*a open lettef, taay said a National Intelligence Fstirtsate that is described as the most authoritative . U.S.. Gaverra- - .meet evaluation of itatelligetsts data" had - finally acluaowledged that; the=Russians were "heading for superianr~ ~a;nt parity. in the mi]itary ar?...tsa.",. ~ - ... _ The Ietter said an -Amerieass Intera- gency study arc the global Iailitary bal- ance conciudedrecently that "iu a nonnu- clear conflict between the Soviet Union ? and the United States in the 2-liddla Easy; Israel alone might deter Soviet combat forces' inter~v-ntian ar prevent the_ co pletian of such deployment" ' : - '- ~- R~ere it not for the ability of Israel's ground farces, the officers declared, the United States would haves to station sig- nificantforces and equipttieat in the ii~ild-~ dleEast.. - -... - -~' Soviet ab~ves Describ~e~d . ? The signers, among whom were fi generals, 151ieute~+ant generals and 4 ad- mirals, included Adm: >w1nlo R. Zumwalt Tr., farmer Chief of Naval Operations; Ctn. Paul L Fr2emaa Jr., farmer Arm commander in Europe; Geri-'T'? w- Park er. former Army chief of staff in Europe; Gen. ,Albert C. Wederueyer, who w commander of the -~ China theater o vpzratinns at the end at world -wax II'! Maj. Ctn. John K Siaglaub, former chief ~' of stmt, United States farrxs, I{ot~a~aru J chief of intellig~. um? Jwwc~ ..~ ~p~-_ reel's value as an ally that can defend it to avoid seadin8 Arrlari~ foss to th - tivz5' were'deserit:ed as the neutraliz~- - ing it access to oil.. the encirclement of Ctliata and. tllr: isolattcoa of the. United Sta-r~ tecrar said the?Soviet faGVS cm Ili ?_ ~ ". ~. - ~. ~ a threat res~enied a. _gm~a e.:_Fl,~ ence and power had expatsded in the east- ern Mediterranean, the Red. Ses and tl;e Persian Gull, Afghacistan ~ad cores under Soviet control and "anu-American forces" were lsarassin$ the Governments - ~? ----- ---- - ea were described as - Cuhan mercescari htzee in Angola. earryiag out Soviet po ~, y _`----- - Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100 ~~TICT,iE APP~..~2~1,- O:i PAGP. l ~ AIR kORC:E I:?IAGAZTNE January 1979 i3Y FDGAFi LL SAiti1~f~, S~MtoR t~oITDA Washington, D. C., DEC. t3 Space Treaty Rift? TherE is evidence of considerable ps!ariza:ion within the Administra- t:c?n c:,ncerning national policy on spice vreapans and electronic war- fare related to military spacecraft. T'^.e paint at issue is a treaty that is being negotiated between the US U^d the So?:i2t Union barr;ng the d~?ployment of aniisatellite intercep- tors. or ASATs. Several sticky, gravely consequential paints are in- vo;ved, 5eg~nnir.g with the fact that t?-:e Soviet Union has fully o~~ra- tional r.SATs that clearly are capa- iia of blo~.ving u~---by nonnuai2ar r-rsans-spacecraft at low to mAdi- u:r ?!titud~s. The US has no such systems in being although there can be no doubt that launchers 4vith nuclear warheads ere readily available to destroy So?:iet spacecraft, if, in case of vier, the National Command Au- thorities should .decide to disown iti? 1 ?~7 Outer Space Treaty that prohibits racing in orbit objects that carry nuclear weapons. This prohibition probably be- comes academic in case of nuclear war between the superpowers. But there are operational drawbacks to using .nuclear ,veapons--especially those meant to protect US military spacecraft from attacking intercep- tors-since nuclear effects in space pr.apa~ate over great distances and don't differentiate between friend ..~d `ee_ ~?~en relatiaely lo?ro-yield ?:,arhgar_'; :would disables most if not at; c;~-:a:~e,^.ed soacacraft within a . ~~`:;; c:` several hundred miles. ii~~8. tr:a ?E~tri:CtluR Of a SOVIEt AS~?.T at :"'E cost of dooming the US sp?Cr:cra`E that is to be protected- ~t least until US spacecraft can be :`:::;~ r'~ar,~ned-'Mould be a Pyrrhic victory. A stron~~ case is being made by t~~ bc`n^se Department and other obviously is tantamount to granting Moscow a fundamental advantage in perpetuity. Such a condit;on vrould enable the Soviets to break out from the agreement since they have all required technologies, if not oper- ational hardware, while the US would Head years to reach that point. Arrayed against the reservations of the Defense comr:~uni!y is a loose liaison of Arms Control and Dis- armament Agency (ACDA) and too- level StatE Department officials, tacitly supported by the National Security Council's Victor UtgoiF_ The latter group seeks to di{ute Presi- dent Jimmy Carter's guidelines con- cerning the US position an a space weapons treaty-such as the in- struction not to perpetuate existing asymmetries and not to agree to terms that can't be verified-by urg- ing that Soviet promises and good will be taken at face value_ The State Department/ACDA group has proposed further that the US commit itself to a policy of com- prehensive "noninterference" with Soviet military satellites. The term "noninterference" in the context of an anti-ASAT treaty tends to take on extremely broad meaning. At stake are prohibitions against jamming hostile satellites, inspecting them by visiting Space Shuttle crews, hinder- ing their operation by placing for- ei~n objects in the paths of their transmissions and their fields .of vietiv, incapacitating them in various ~,vays-such as overheating or over- loading ;I'~Eir sonsors ?.vith ground- bas~d high-energy lasers-and either "pirating" there through e~ec- tronic means or causing them to "self-destruct" through spurious command signals, The Defense community--whose views a this writing seem to have greater leverage in the 4Vhite House than do ACDA's views-believes for the second, permanent phase of such an accord, The "Sullivan" Affair The New Yvrk Trmes's November 13, X978, revelation that Sen. Har,rf S M. Jackson (D-1?Vash_), chairman of ` the Senate's Arms Control Subccm- mittee, was furnished a bootl~~ggod copy of a secret, highly Inforrnative CIA report on Soviet SALT tactics and duplicity leads to a story behind a story. Attributed to "Administration and intelligence sources," the re;~ort ; Contains misstatements and orris.- . sions, the latter including in(orma- tion disclosed in our December "In Focus .. ?" (p. 25) under a November 'i 3, 1978, cateline. A good case can be made for t;,e proposition--widely circulated on Capitol Hill-that Ad- ministraticn sources leaked the story to Seymour Hersh of the Nevr York Times in order to embarrass Senator Jackson, one of the Congress' pivotal and most unccrrlpromising and knowledgeable SALT experts, and his inf!uantial staff advisor on SALT matters, Richard Parle. Well-connected congressional sources also view the leak as part of the opening round of a brass- knuckle campaign-patterned after but far morn energetic and refined , than the setting of the Panama i Treaties last year-to ram SALT Il ' ratiF.cation through the 5enatP, tCsy protaconist in the Naw Yortc Trrrre~ Story is FOrmer ~i.A StrarwntC 7?r'a''- ~~ D_lvid :i. S;.;i',, a fanner !tnn?^.~? Corp; captain who ssrv?d in Vi?'- nam and is the son of retired Air Force f~"aj. Gen. Henry R. Sullivan, - J r. Sullivan improperly but not it- ; legally furnished to Senator Jack- son's staff a copy of a highly classi- lied CIA report--authored princi- eL~r;;ents e. the Executive; E3ranch that aspace-v;s?apons treaty should pally by him-that demonsL-ales the 3 ~a:r- hn:t;ng the embryonic US be treated as a two-stop process. nr~,ir-absolute: cnn'rc?! ov?~r Sovi?': ASr' ~.~~?-}ypr9r~~?~~tottf~&ll~a6ie-200~d07rf~7!tteCh~PttR~R?A-~rk371~13U~100`~~310~0~?~4oies exerted by that r.a_ s!ra?Fd ~~:urcr:pt capability. Agree- protocol period similar to the one lion's military hierarchy, as r: el! 23 i-; t,? ., -=,z~' the SoviF?t and US envisioned for Sl,LT IL--a certain P.toscovfs elaborate deception; a`. . ... - -~- -___-_. ~_--_'- -_-""---_~ ncnT .,,..t.-...r.~~lrl F.,~nnr_ 11, fiQIT n~a:]'13:0r5_ The SLIIIiL?a:'{ Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100 ~RiTCZ,E AP ED" AID FORCES .70URN,',L Q~1. PAGE JAt`IiTARY 19'(9 ~? The US must revise its policy towards Moreover, in Iran's case there were N BEND QUESTION of the THERE C? - 1 strategic importance of Iran to the United ._ assisting developing nations in educating exceptional long and short term warning States and its major allies. Iran shares a. =.' their youth. Virtually without exception, indicators_ The U5 has been intimately 1,?50 mile border with the USSR, and is ar:_~?. half the population of every developing involved in Iran since 1943, and it literally critical chick and balance to the expansion _.- nation is now under eighteen. The U5 must should have had a quarter century of - ' . - - of Soviet power in the Near Ease and' =help its allies to ensure that their students warning. - - - - - - - _- __ - "r~~ 7 ...... Tom.-?. R........n l.,.i:raf.,ra - modern military equipment, .and. armed - forces of over 420,000_ : - - ?- , : ` . Iran provides the West with oil exports of approximately S_S million barrels per day. has a total production capacity of b_8 :v1ti4BD, supplies roughly 9~Jo of US oil imports, and is a key supplier to Israel and Japan- Its gas exporu to the USSR and Soviet Bloc reduce communist pressure on the world's oil supplies_ Iran also has de facto military- control over the West's jugular vein-the Straits of Hormuz- through which the free world must get roughly twenty -million barrels of oil per . day, or 3790 of its oil production.. There also, however, can be no question '' that the United States must now rt-think how to best preserve Iran as an ally and - strong strategic forte in the Near East.- - . Specifically. the upheavals in Iran-during the last year have demonstrated the US must re-think five critical aspects of its strategic relations with lean and other key allies, such as Saudi Arabia: - _... - ? The US must accept the risk ofbroaden= of their eeonomy to absorb such student t[ nos peen clear for more mart two I populations, and must re-structure the US -decades that Iran is a society which is educational visa program to reduce the undergoing massive internal strain and ~ radicalization and alienation of foreign culture shock. Its development, in- students studying in the US. dustrialization, and "westernizaiivn" have e Finally, the USmust re-think not only its been achieved at the cost of pressures approach to intelligence, but its entire which have alwa}'s been capable ofsudden- reporting process on developingnations. It ly and unpredictably exploding must introduce a new emphasis on realism ? Exploding Population GrowtFr: While in country team reporting, and in the policy demographic estimates are uncertain, analysis of the NSC, Stag Department, iron's population almost certainly did not and Department of Defense. It must treat exceed 13 million in 1945. Ithad risen to 26 ~ the crisis in Iran as a failure in policy million by 1970, and is variously estimated leadership, and not as a failure in in- as being from 33 to 37 million today, telligenee_ presenting incredible problems for any These are demanding requirements for 'Iranian government_ - - , changes in US policy. However, even a ? And Exploding Youth: Iran has an broad reviewafthepressuresthatledtothe extraordinarily young population. crisis in lean, and of U5 policy towards. Something like half thepopulation is under Iran. indicates that such changes are vital if 16. and two-thirds is undzr3D_Thisensures the U5 is to maintain and improve the a high rate of cultural instability, problems security and stability of its key strategic in education and in creating new jobs, and allies in-4he developing world. an inevitable "radicalization of moth of A QUARTI?R CENTURY OF WAR1~lI,i lG the population. ' - It is ironic that events in ]ran could have ? Unmanageable Shift to Urbanization: ins its contacts with all the pro-Western taken the US sa much by surprise. There sy the late 195Ds, it was clear that ]ran was elements in developing nations. It must .have been countless examples of similar facing the inevitable problems of a massive accept the unpredictability and- ` in- - -situations producing cultural and. and continuing shift of its population from _, dependence of such elements. -~. `.? -=? -, . economic explosions since World War lI. peasant agnculture to "urban'~obs. ran s . ? The US must adopt a new realism in There havealso been countless examples to urban population leaped from 5 million in 1956 t l0 "ll~ n 1966 and will o m~ w o analyzing the economic development of allies, and its control of the impact of tiVestern sales and activities. ? The US must improve its approach to , t providing military advice and sales. prove that authontar~an regimes cannot 1"d I' - 1 ' tabilit that when a roach or exceed 20 million by theend of ns t Aboui the Acithar. Abu! K{{Q~~Sini ~arlsu is the ~CCt?i~?i~~~~ Departrn t~aa tCrul?:wtr Y`tn mate^ ~ -K experience in'lrarrurrt.affain:~-~~'~ y; pp ica t put a i on po i they try, the pressure builds-up to the this decade. Much of this population breaking point; and that in the process of growth has concentrated in the capital city ~ repression, such regimes cut.themselves off of Tehran. It, and its satellite towns and Pram the contact wish their peap{e that give cities, have grown from SOO.ODO in 1940 tot them warning and time to react. The million in 19b?, over 3 million in 1970. and Savak, afterall, followed in the footsteps of 5 million today. Something like 500 of /~i~t~ ot~~i Qs~1~e~t6~1t6fb'l3~'k-copulation is now "urban" versus ultimate impart was to cut off the regime 3$~'o in 1956, and 5~'o in the late 1940s. they served from the people it governed. Roughly 150 of the total population lives ~~F~c~se 2001/07/2731~1?~~~~~~-`1~~000100130( To Hell With the Old Year By James Reston :': ~-_. PARIS. Dec: 30 - At the turn of the year, officials in WestPra Europe seem less anxious about the problems of the Middle East and military arms control with the Soviets than- about political opinion in the..United 5iates_ Tney are more relaxed he.-e_ To-hell with the old year, they seem tasay. ~ : . _ Though they live=?*+~~*?~shadow of Soviet'missiles that ixaye ihe? ca- paciry mdestroy everyaarieritcapital of western Europe; and axeconcerned about the turrnoi{ in Iran~~.Turkey, and the Lang delay in. react. SALT. agreement' with. biosccsv~rsofne kind of compromise' betweeu.lsrael and Egypt, there is no.sense of crisis among officials herc.~ . ' .;_ -: They don't think success~~of."Lhe SALT negotiations;which theq ezpecr, will mean very much, but they believe that failure of these negotiations might lead to another expensive round in the arms race, with more billions spent an new interrnntinental nuclear weapons and therefore less available far weapons that might defend them. 0ffitials here simply don't under- stand the debate on these issues in the United States. They are openly suspi- cious o1 statistics on the re a 'v strei7 of U.S. and So w ich the debate proceeds; which_they aCLYi'6aL~I a of on acid C.I- - caa wit a su jective interest 1.[t rais- ing e _ m1 it - _ _ ?~;;; Why, they ask, is the debate'sa sofa-. tional and polarized?-IE is clear'ly' iiot- an argument between extremists who' favor unilateral disarmament'oriirst-: strike capacity by the; United' States; Nobody in the forefront of the debate is suggesting arms control without tnili- tary balance. trust in Rtt~ia without: reasonable verification ~ major cuts in the Pentagon' budget without. equal. cuts on the other side- Yet the nar- rower the issues the ersatz.bitter che.- debate, leading to the fearhere that: ,SALT II may be' dei~ted-making everything [Wore dangertxes for all:-.-.. Even before the SALT II negotia- tionsare finished, indications are that President Carter is not reducing the military budget for fisca1.198D but in- creasing it to $122.$ billion - $1D.8 bil- lion more than this year -- despite his cries for austerity in other areas. For the moment, the turbulence along the"Saviet Union's southern bor- derand the prolonged differences be- tween Israel and Egypt seem to favor hoscow's opportunistic.. politics; but ;'.little.eviden~e_ that the Soviet Union had anything to do with this de- stablization from Pakistan to Turkey, with the possible exception of the rise of a pro-5oviet'reb me in Afghanistan. Officials in Western Europe are more impressed at the begituting of the new year with Moscow's problems than with its successes. The Soviet Utuon is. clearly concerned with the emergence of ..,China,' now -formally recognized by the 1Jnited,.States;:and with China's efforts to drag its billion .people into the modern world. ' It has made same pi-agress in An- Bola and in Ethiopia, but-i[ has been squeezed out of the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations, defied by the major Com~ monist parties af.Western Europe and challenged . by Rumania- and other restless allies in Eastern Europe: Looking to the 13D's, the Soviet Union ~ -also faces the hard facts of a stagnant i economy and population, a decline in its oil and energy resources, limiting_ its ability to pay for expensive modern technology from abroad. - ? ? Meanwhile, it is in trouble not only with China and the United States, but with japan and the major industrial countries of Western Europe,.and that is not all: How to finande massive mili- Lary forces both along the.China fion- tier and Europe while trying to satisfy increasing demands for abetter stand- ard of. living for its people at .home? How to deal with its own ethnic tninori-. ties, some of whom, along its southern . border?-are susceptible to the funda~ -mentalist counter-revoIutioris -in Irani and 1~rrkey? This is what the Soviet of .. ficials would like to know. - - - So it is hard for officials in Western :Europe to believe in the-argument so prevalent in the United States that Moscow is again on the march, purse- ing a ~ well-0rgatuzed ~ plan-: for.' _ the achievement of world hegemony in our time, with the will and military- Ca- pacity toachieve this ambition:?~ : ?- ,, ;.Instead, the view here?is. the[ they -are opportunists who..will take advan- _? tags of any chance to expand Their in= fluence, provided the frisk is not too 'great, and that they have even more problems than the Western. nations, i1 such.can be iatagined:..~??_ from; the Soviet I,'ition; where the' task: iS.irii ~~-- - harderbiit.~the:;pay-0ff. greater~:~rtather;is?! pmblem'of harzngrUS'"contacts ;witty opposit: groups eyets.,more-~dominated~by.:eIandesfJ' i?eTationships:_FinaIly; there is ",tlze'llneomf table _-question "of'just._,howrmuch,=spying~ want. to.~d'v'in'?fizendly-countries:'~~'`~'`? ~" ?' -- ?;11Mr~,''lrepertnrt is-:axsista~r~~director-:oj '=- the.Internationvl 7rrsttture,_for~:Strategit ~-'Studies in I.mrdan:and editarnf-Sw~iir;al:?r Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 STA~TINTL Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 COI~iIOI~iW1;EU. 22 December 1978 Of seve~a~ :minds: T3ZOnzs 'Power~s~= His a lesson to bix learned from the troubles of Iraq, but it doesn't Iook as if Presidant4Carter and his principal advisors are going .W grasp' what it is..The-aoubles. eight them by - suiprise, as troubka tmd to do: _Czrtcr is apparently in a mood to blarioe~the'suty _- prise..on the CIA; .whicls?sattt him a piece ~_o?hopeful papeslast~suinarer saying tlnai the Shah ~ of Iraa~ bad everytliitrg~tittder =control.- The paper was~?it>~ Grzor-:"-13e Shah has theamry~uiider eon~ol;; fo~thu ~momeat; but not?rnuch else: Zhis is wor- eying the President: Iran is supposed?to be~ the bulwark of "tlia PGisian Calf: ~ On `November-lrltl~ Carter~_addte"ssed a bandwritten note to three of his principal . advisors-Cyrus_.:Vance;=:Zbigniew ~Brzezinski; and Admiral 5tansfield -Turner the'- Director. of~-Central - ? Intelligence--telling them, :"I~am ~dise 'satisfied with the quality of political-in-?. .-= The burden of this message naturally fell heavieston Tt~, sines the CIA is _ su~posed~tn be at least one jump ahead of the gamma when it comrs~ to domestic troubles tbreatening important allies. After~iaceiving Carter's note, but befots its message was otirtfided to-William Sa- ~~of=the New Park Tirnes,..Turtier rz- spondeii~rith an aanouriceatertt he.was settin~;up. a new crisis-prediction-caite~ irlthC~:' When iII d0t16rCtGatG $CQI'nr nutt~_~Ise. President ~ ttsay-; nvw- ccnfi- .:, j .-~ . _ deritIyezpest.a flood of newrpaperciting potential troubles threatening important allies ~~ a~pralifGrativti 'af the-condi lions]'; tense which -is=the-. cur3e~ of intelli4ence~the maybe', .could bc;. would;be's~a-ith whiciranalyats atterrtpt ta=iris`tiIate their?prrdictions'frvrrt the sheercussednesa of the world: ? '_':;_- - - Of course the CIA has best through all this before:' The ~ Agency ? was severely criticixed~pFtli' Seb~( ?'Bogotaza" in. Colombia itr ~ 1948, the. entrance of the Chinese into the Kore~n~. took power in Cuba, the building of the :Berlin Wall; the Tet Offensive: in~Viet- Ham in ~9b$ the Arab-Israeli war in oG ,~.... } toter, 1.ggC3, The files of che? National Security-Council are rlsock full of Paper the surptise`of the moment; of endless .special. studies of the intelligence carte: muniry? and of the QA's voluminous; response~tounhappy officials. TbG cure. for wrongYpaper is more paper. Bitter. experiencc'txas taught CIA analyst to - writs an~essapa hatch into every -ester: mate,, a;~stibotdinate clause or string of `cunditioiialYverbs,vvhith, in reirospecf,.: ? might a.w_arning flag. :~-= - = :. In they course of time the thickets of tli~ - conditionaLgrow so dense they begun tp- tesemble tiselate novels of Henry James. Busy.' officials. have -not got ,time far the thickets;-a paring back of the. undert g~wthta:;eveal what.thepaper, afterall;, is supposed; to be about-'the autline~f = ~' ~. resd,=bui+~it'doesn't make-it any more 1,7cely to~be?right. Eventually a surprise{ . comes along and the. old charges are rem. Hewed: Back and forth it goes.. Kissinger - was a weeder; he insisted the CiA have; the courage of its.convictions, and stag: them' clearly.. Carter's note ? will .bring -back, tbe~cotrditional undergrowth, be- ,.-: -: .cause hcis asking the CIA to da the one thug it rant da-tell him what is going to happenz:There is a reason why the Oracle . at DelpUi-~poke in riddles, -: - - - .. .All ttti~s::is.part?of the eternal give and r. -_.- - .take of'~government It's not surprising that Cartar should be , distressed by the . ~CiA's ntismadin$ of events m lean, nor. ? that tb~ClAshould defcted itself against ... ? a requestto dv, what rio one tan da. The ~problem~s~not analytitai -timidiry,~;nor presidential iritportunity, nvr even the fu=?- 's ill The real reason for:_ 01 /07/~''~C~~~i~t~0~i~t4y3f troubles;:lie the reason why no metban--. the furuieis to be found in the gag~whicb -i separates?~Iran ? as -American policy-?; makecs.waat it to be, frorir Iran as it ise_ j The one=is abstract, lt~cr the geopolitical . strate~of which it is a part, while for othet?isconrrete; various and teal: Thh_~ 'one exists onpapa; wht~e-thec"rtlrcc is the warld_ The one is a{r iirraiigement, ~,while_the otheris~locvs~iifu~runlyFfac~t:. -The central illusion of policy-rnakers~~ ~the'reason-fnr-?the.suicprise~~isrt~? ~~~, found itr the notion that -tbese. rivo 'very= different things arc the?sa ;=~-"~`~~; :::~ -- ~~This?- may'sourd-'deliberately:;even';: `-gratuitously=obsctiia_~Eui go:'baclca bi% .? A fevr- years~ago the Shah held an elabo=. _ tatc~ceremony in thr.ancieet'city~6f Pert; ?sepolis??tp Con7mCmprdtG_ ihC 25f10t1i? ~' nivarsary of the founding af?the Persian - empire: From all ovei thc.vworld t~re_pov~= erful the rich -and the#amous:-_werc ~in_= :_vited to-attend:'Ilie~world had nof~wit` nesscd;~: acf'of stith"nalced=imprsial-- inching since Naaoleon'~placed an ?em ~pecoi?'s~ sown oti Iiis owii~li~Gad: Ttie?r :?r -.suits bf"that earlier."arstiire shoirld~have: served"the-shalt-as?a~warrting;-riot he- those to trust the panoply cif power;_ltisr secYet `policy;_ his billions"of'batit~sjof' proven?oil reserves; Arrierican aiins?and. the'force bf his?owtt ambition.`The?oiI ? would pay -for the= panoply;' the~%arms= would ~ protect ? the oil, 'SAVAK ~ would Secure the?]oyalty of t~}ic?Aimy;-and the: Crown' would~'direcf tlierri: all: It is nut' easy io grasp thecrrormiry bf the Sha'h's -ambition: He did-noiintcnd rnerel}%to bey his'country's'lradet`every_ courtt~-"car% have brit over aftecall: Noidid he stop at = . a~claim-of ~unrestrict~d=sovereignty.;' ,~. which- is also common` enough: He`jn-= tended?to'astablish~?a dynasty which' ?" _ would piss. his power undiriiinisKed to. . his son;aptacticG~.~ icti had disappeared .: from all but a feai Dist-of-the-way eoiner5' of the`w6rld centuries-ago: =? ?' - =f= D01-4 .. .. - ... __ .__,_ Approved For Release 2001/07-~~'~~bi4P0#~~Rb~~(T0130001-4 ~.rticle appeared la December 1978 on pale A-Z2 - e.,Price of Intelli~eiice ~'riz7ures~ Recent news reports concerning gathering, intelligence failures corms - .' widespread rioting:~in Iran spurred,. time and bear drastic consequences;, _- by apposition to continued ru}e by -far the United States in its foreign 'the shah, ones again aze serving to c: policies and; in the case of Iran and . point oat.that; despite the billions of. oil imparCs, :its domestic policies. dollars ~ spent by the United. States-~ Now we, are faced with the potential. .everyyeariapurs~it.otintelligeace~.toppling of?:aiiegime--3>z which:we -;'our inte}L'gence. agenaes:have re=r`have invested. heavi}y,;a=med to the- . ~_^=_peatedl}~:failed-~ ta.. perceive;; teeth,-. anti relied upon; for: oil ii~w _Se}ecC~Comimttee~on:~ ~Intel}igedce feted"a se1L deception,. byrwhich~,wer .~ tY;:...:: ~ .~:::~.:,:::;~ - fa~1m~;3nclndirig;.tatabl~r the o~?_ I=aniari;politieal stabili w~~~ ~+`''"" -''p" : ~ monist=-rise~to*paw~i~porttigal~` =TlYenafortaaate~IessoA~ of`this'ezr~-~- rwheteim.our~at~lligence,~ersoanel fire experience. is that isathing ever. ~ ' " . = S~niprX =~ored~~as~t~atsavor.. ; feally ehaages~Intelligence is gaEh= .--:withthe prevailing~'regime;~'he-paw -eyed in- aYfau}ty~-maio.~aer. distorted -.failure in Iran;isobvi~us- =~ =-poredInsteadnf howling.~ve~:wliaC r:``~ ::. .~ The U.~;~~int~lligea~_.COmmtmit~, =_ultimate}y,'has.constituted an:iacpn ~~_ -'quicktoconderrin:the~l'ea}png_ai?_the+ U.S:"intelligence~agencies:.s$ou}d.: ..-publicatiamiathe-Yil)age Voice-su1;::committee to heartZ-Iu?tbat tliey.dbr-- -it'As is the_t~sa.:tyith-any.. lea}c;:cor~ .can-taxpayers continue to spend.bil _ - . ?.. ;:-cern;yeas vented.;not?over~the:can'_'liozisof.dollarsfoc-faLse;distorted'or:;_ _ ~ -gents failures; but with the `methiod. t - - ~``':~ST4IYI~Y'11~ )~T`~- highpriority- placed op intelligence =~ Fa}is Ghwreh _ ~ ~:=..~.%.~='v ~ ~_ .. t` :~'- ~;~ K .-_.-?..~ ..-~r"yr.i.,s2viR ~~.w,'+otL3:av ~:S-.: ~. - .~.L..-.x~-..-~ ica~-.aAS.+=a}-fR~:'Tn.'~i'~'-Y ~~: Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 STATI NTL Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 It was embarrassing enough when the CIA was forced to concede to former security officer William Kampiles's lawyers that 'twelve other copies of the top-secret satel- lite manual Kampiles is ac- cused of selling to the Rus- sians are unnccounted for, including one signed out to former CIA Director George Bush in 1976. But a prelim- inary check by the agency's Office of Security. sources xe- port, has revealed a signifi cant number of equally sestet documents which have been l signed out and never re- tuxned. Among the missing , are: a highly classified CIA' estimate of politburo in- triguing among Bre~linev's potential surcessars, an evac- uation ~of Soviet :submarine tactics designed to evade L7.S. detection systems, personnel and pay records which in- clude the actual names of case officers, and a report prepared for President Carter on the extent of CIA invalve- ment with Soviet dissidents. Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4 STATI NTL ~-.. Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-01137R000100130001- THE tiYASH~NGTON POST 4rticle appeared 1D December 197$ oxi page C-b --~?fi~~i~rrianY~~zerif~zn .~~zfe~'~igelzc~~~a~h:~n/~~~~y.?,- -- Reg:Same,eltiS~-Sizsttpxr~x~.~'I3~ttDncrita]eatAtth~tlr~extzvas :.~ his lette~'!a-'They-drat' ~"Anie~SC~'S Spy,'"~3riOSt. nril7ersailg pe~~?d~'~Tit}ltd.. t1~.Z _Gap.:_De~ij,_hisaonr:?~*?;f~+~r-?^ageQCY't1fa.:~t~se~am, ate.' our. intellig~~co~?eflozrk~: a~?~to ~ pravida: i_ ar ~-. cnmtinn~g? hirm~ -naw? .alcxst.~ exrins t?e}iaicax;;and;:? :~aad training arf x operational perso .that rope: haves ciit a#i dassio;~ person:~e3~ as averstafted~Operatia~ Dire~? persca-'hnmari,~~3]igestcacallectiaa~~toraLe~-4ha~; tarb~~arad:_dasrrr: and$at ~i;ia?,_.: - r~'._.. ~ ~ ~=} ~~ ~~r,; af~ _r~ 7. eT ~a T L v` +!r?^~,,.._~?_..~-~=!~.Y:t^~',=?~~M1.r_-.r~ scy+~ u,La ~ 44{4 ~++~I~. ~.~.C3~~ P'P~~~~1t7T~A~r7~ iy$IIC~e? i~cp:' S ?d~~~~~~n~. Llla.t". gap~~e? an~a~:iYC.Lheap~th~UD,iCe+d. States IZd~thebestanld masC; t1o~~IIOWd~dO'oYT1gY"dd8w~~~-LaL8111~2DC~:.~ 727SDi~3~17n- :the`ccat~niag:aad.vital?~tporcaaea:oi ~~p~bj~;:{~.~,~,~~ this,;;~re $3LSt~~ . What; lit ~~!~?S`~L~~'~'-t!"dCt`~Vtd'TCi31II_YhB )~ ~113t8lllte~- tientart~T.,,~~'~`=~'a'gffice=a#ff~~a,.suPpl~art#h~?~. ~' W3te~2repntti?~ tirEang~ aad' to ~p~e~oaai'~tasks;: and. ses tbaL th .. the-age~ra~ thy'rieed~and--~#ianale^.~-~av~,t?a.eunderscandi~~and: appre~s-; "forredz~ctsons-ia.t2~Opesa~riasD~:~-tiDn"of'tlxei~emplo~,:#ha=Amari torat~~saide.`_"W'eiteed.#h~~~-~ ~enp1~:-Sanrari- intellge~~?colleetioa~ of ths::dir~ratee~'as aiuclr-tadag-as` "i~ a.~riaeaactr ~~~ and relies heavily- =even.~'~IthongIsna~f.Cnieso9,e~::__-omt]ie`:comage aad:ingenuirg:rn'L= troIlectia~germit=as to e~en~ou~ce~: operafaons= ozfic~r~..Give . thera.~ ay Iection:efterts~the~an7Y:~~?m~~ ;mateof'pnS~li~opiaion..that` is supper-- - they: datin?~'s~ge~sed~aamaarcoTie~r~~;.wi~tTiin-~ _ _ _ _ _ ^' Y ~~m, I write severaleveryclay; -j ,.-. _ .. _ a--_ -- ?_. {.~._ -...7r'1' ~~~~ _fn fhn~hhf:nw~l Ca....._~. ~~~~, - ods they were usigg, and noyo siiace the ~ = ~ , ~~ ?-the . qualtty of our. 'assessment ~=.- =Iran thing thtre's a gaud deal of cr'iti- ?; ;. ~ Program and also. particttlarty; polio- cfsm; it seems. about their evalriatia~~=t`: cal assesstaents.;;:~ ;.~z._;_:.;~~; 7 .. -}" ,`-:-Haw caatxraed about-ihe i~ .- . ..: - -' '?{- s ` ?: ~ c--? ?-~a=.: -.. ' . -Since~I've'beeti iti oifica~re have sul~ ~-'~ telligen~>;ewaluatiaiis ,in: Iran? .And .:..: stantiallymodified the order of priori- :?. =. could you give. ns a general commept =:': ties:addressed b}-the intelligence cnm- -.r about what y_ou think the state of the in?.'. mururyry in its totality. When I 'because - . _,~.Y~.-sue r-:5.. ...~~.t: ?n_1._":-.. _ -;~;~:~ ~`Bjt~Cl`iAAD?BURt~= ''$?`~~~~`:..- ;`.n-:.'~s'= :Far all the.ccmplaints, thrnig)z, iherear~reasanstabe~.' - _ rt ~ ~~.____,._,...?._- -:.: _. - ..- , .,.., ...: ~._ ~?s ~';~~ ?:~. ' _'" ...,^"-~~ that the worst is over for both Admiral Turner and hts.' - ? . - ? --r~=~-.~:= -.-;?:, ~:?.. ~ _ : _,+...~ a en Mordle'atthehead uariers in Len Va. seetns?= the 'pvarsliipS her Cam- WASHII~iGTOI~~Lilce used to ": ~'' o e d . :-- - -. . : t hav improved, in part, the. director's ai es~ay, because-" mand,.:Adm: Stansfreld:Ttimerhas.come throug>t an ardu-,'~" ffa ts~ t f t hi t e ith t ff' b H ~~ . ' o e r o ge m o- mee w s a mem ers. e naw " " ous shakedawrii czuis~asiheCaxt2r:i4 +~+;rt~~tian's direr=. for of: CentraLIntelligestce. It is too early.tosuggestthat he== :~' `. ~~ to have lunch with members at various atfices once or^ =~ - ? - ?-?,.,;..e ~ 'n,mtr : e.t,,,:ht .T..=,.e~ ~"~ f.n. a.,,t,,,,,.,. ,w~~..,...,,:,~ --- When he was appointed 17 manth~f ago - ? ` " - -'1=~_ start aglad-handing campaign just to make people feel bet- ~, _ to head the Cen--; _-, L_ ,. - _ .""'.."". "'. "' ? "'6 """' ' ""'?`.?"."""`"""' . ~ `:; that has.taken place in the criticism directed at the agency.?` been.shakea?byrevelationsof.illegal.activities:at.homeand:_:=`~ ?,-,.,,:~.,,,,,-,Ls,.a...:_...L:.._,__.......L:_-_---?_--_.___. _._-~ __~ __-__._ .-~-. ~_-~ _-----_-,------- ,? .. exactly thesamethatthemilitarytookafterYietna.m.'' -.}:" :' that had been alIawed to fester. for years undermined rhe?: :?; . , . ,It also helped that Frank Carlucci`taak over eariy?thisx agency's eifectivere~=Admiral. Turner talks Canflaently;~~_~ as depury: director. handling- the day~a.~day-manage: as he did itf?att intesvie~wIast week; abou6how under him the. _ : aQen/.~~ is' an its way L~ back ~}~ v ?? tttent of the agency. Mr. Carlucci had done well insensitive--" b J. J ^....'..'fl ~.. F^"'.'. 111J manner':... _-r n`.r :nY.c .....~f. ..s..e~sl....~.. .L.s 1T~:..~A'C._. ~..- ~.- r..~The agencyyhas?,aome under.attack,'-especially from~`~~ cal role?in-helping establish a? democraria gaverttmenr ia?~ - 1MC V-_~-----~L-.L .L-.~---_~.._~~_t _~-__i-.~_-L ]em fundamentallses who are challenging the power of Shah ~ _' knawledged that his depury had' .'taken a?tremendaus load? r offmyshaulders.' ~ ,_: .-:: ?- :..:..:_:~ _;.: - .-. =.,?:.~; I~iahammed Riza Pahlevi~ Less crtucial?perhaps, but still dis- - `' ~-? Even if operations are smoother at J.angley,.the admi- - tracting, is: the way Admiral Turner has been embroiled in :; *, ~ remainsa controversial figure within the Carter Admin- disputes involving former agency emplayeesr .-_.; ' __;,. ,- _ . One that could affect the ageney'sfuture dealings with . ~,Y.estratian at large. His relations with members ai the White former workers was the suit a Frank W. Sne House staff are tense, and he is known to have lacked hams 8~t PP ~.E;:~-~uentlyt with Bavid Aaron, deputy. to national. security whose book. "Decent.Interval,'. chrnmcled,GIA tvttgling?:?:_.'.adviser Zbi in the- United Staten evacuatiotf of South Vietnam three.. , ~ ' ~~ 13tzeunski and a key intelligeszct aide. As a one-aimestatf member fob the Senate 5elees Committee on years ago. Last week? William Kampiles, a former~agency =;,-Intelligence, Mr. Aaron as well as~the Senator he had Clerk. was found guilty of selling [he Russian. a manual on . . the KH-II- reconnaisance satellite.. Aa'expert on_strategi~=' ,-worked for; Walter F~ Mottdaie, became a keen skeptic of _? arms; David S~ 5ullivan,. was dismissed after-tie?was-sus::- ~eagency'scapabilitp- ~~; - -. F - -- - - - _ - pected of Passing secrz~Es to?an aide ,to Senator Henry: