Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 13, 2005
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 17, 1986
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3.pdf6.24 MB
25X1 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 WASHINGTON POST proved For ReleiaBeINE/01/13g8 ccIA-RDP90-01137R00 1 THE CIA IN TRANSITION Casey Strengthens Role Under 'Reagan Doctrine' By Patrick E. Tyler and David B. Ottaway Wativingtca Post Star Writers When the Soviet Union shot down a Korean Airlines plane in September 1983, an angry Presi- dent Reagan told CIA Director Wil- liam J. Casey that the United States should send U.S.-made antiaircraft missiles to Afghanistan to help the rebels shoot down a few Soviet mil- itary aircraft in retaliation. . Casey was willing, but the plan was never approved, in part be- cause of a reluctant Central Intel- ligence Agency bureaucracy, ac- cording to one source. Some top CIA officials argued that introduc- ing U.S. weapons into that conflict would escalate it dangerously, end any possibility of "plausible denial" of U.S. involvement for Washington and alienate Pakistan, the main con- duit for covert American aid to the rebels. Now, with the decision to begin supplying U.S.-made Stinger anti- aircraft missiles to the rebels in Angola and Afghanistan, the Rea- gan administration apparently has dispensed with such cautionary di- plomacy. In so doing it has thrust the CIA into a far more public role as the lead agency in carrying out the United States' secret diploma- cy. This stepped-up commitment, under what some administration officials have called the "Reagan Doctrine," is dedicated to the pres- ident's vision of effectively support- ing anticommunist "freedom fight- ers" in their struggle against Sovi- et-backed Marxist governments in the Third World. An earlier article in this occasion- al series examined the evolution and debate over the "Reagan Doc- trine." This one focuses on the role of the CIA in implementing that doctrine and the agency's remark- able growth during the tenure of Casey, the former Reagan cam- paign manager turned spymaster. Casey's influence, both in rebuilding the CIA and as a trusted counselor to the president, has made him a critical and sometimes controver- sial player in the administration. During his five years as CIA di-, rector, the intelligence budget has grown faster than the defense bud- get and the agency has rapidly re- built its covert-action capabilities with a goal of restoring the prestige of the CIA's Directorate of Oper- ations. The "DO," as it is called, suffered a series of purges and in- vestigations during the 1970s and its image was smeared by disclo- sures of past assassination plots, use of mind-altering drugs and spy- ing on U.S. citizens. Since that time, a new generation of senior managers has ascended to the top of the CIA, and they in gen- eral have been a more cautious breed, eager to avoid risky opera- tions that would. embarrass the agency if disclosed But Casey is not a prisoner of that past. - He is one of the anti-Soviet "ac- tivists" in the top echelon of an ad- ministration that has promoted stepped-up U.S. involvement in the struggle to "roll back" recent Soviet gains in the Third World. While supporting the CIA's more cautious career bureaucracy, Casey also has moved quietly?sometimes in his political channels?to prepare his agency for a more aggressive role in countering Soviet influence in the Third World. cie Ag lig tic ge tag hea cor be ov has wit ge se Go ren Le Ha Ca 100140001-3 the ag to promote the administrations goa s in Nicaragua and elsewhere in the Third World. More than once, according to sources, Casey has angrily rejected CIA analyses that did not mesh with the anti-Soviet pronouncements of White House policy-makers and speech writers. One key senator has said that relations between Casey and the committees are at an all-time low. The penalty for Casey could come in the next two months as the com- mittees prepare to make the largest cuts in the intelligence budget since the Carter administration. Some officials see Casey's most formidable challenge in Reagan's second term as facing severe bud- get cuts mandated by the Gramm- Rudman-Hollings deficit-reduction act. This comes as. the U.S. intel- ligence community is projecting multibillion-dollar outlays for a new generation of high-technology spy satellites that some officials say are badly needed to guard U.S. inter- ests until the end of the century. Some critics charge that Casey is 40 years out of touch with intelli- gence management and shows ob- sessive interest in mounting covert operations in the style of the World War II Office of Strategic Services, where he cut his teeth on clandes- tine warfare under Gen. William J. Donovan. His critics point out that these were tactics of a bygone era. The country was at war; the more covert operations the better. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 (*aid 3 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00010014 WASHINGTON POST 14 March 1986 CIA Official Sherman Kent, 82, Dies By Bart Barnes Washington Post Staff Writer Sherman Kent, 82, a Yale Uni- versity history professor who came to Washington in the summer of 1941 and became a major figure in the development of this nation's in- telligence community, died March 11 at his home in Washington. He had a form of Parkinson's disease. He was an early recruit of the Of- fice , of Strategic Services, the World War II predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency, and he served abroad as well as in Wash- ington. When the war ended he re- turned briefly to Yale. Shortly after the outbreak of the Korean conflict he joined the CIA. From the early 195ds until he retired in 1967, he was director of the Office of Nation- al Estimates of the CIA. At his retirement, he received a Career Civil Service Award for hav- ing played "a unique role in the de- velopment" of the CIA. He also re- ceived a President's Award for Dis- tinguished Federal Service, with an accompanying citation stating that he had played "a unique role in im- proving the contributions of intel- ligence to our national security." Colleagues in the intelligence community said Mr. Kent ended, or at least curbed, "a strong tradition of equivocation" in intelligence es- timates. Mr. Kent's particular genius, ac- cording to former colleagues, went to both method and organization. First, he had a rare ability to glean significant facts and decipher trends from the morass of information re- ported from a worldwide network of intelligence sources. And second, he perceived at an early stage that the effectiveness of the National Intelligence Estimate, for which his office was responsible, would de- pend on direct access to the White House. "He saw the main art form in which the CIA would distinguish itself was in having the ear of the president," said one former col- league. As director of the Office of Na- tional Estimates, Mr. Kent presided at meetings of intelligence repre- sentatives from a variety of depart- ments and agencies?Army, Navy, Air Force, State Department, Atoihic Energy Commission and the like-:?and then sent to the president a distillation of their findings. His office dealt with such issues as the rate of Soviet aircraft and nuclear weapons production. One notable success was its ability to adviSe the White House six months in advance of Sputnik in 1957 that the:Soviet Union had the capability of laiinching an earth satellite. TAscribed as "intellectually de- mantling but not arrogant," Mr. Kent habitually wore red suspend- ers,:and he liked to hook his thumbs in the galluses and put his feet up on the table during high-level meet- ings: He was said by friends to have been blunt and forceful and to have had a profound and colorful com- mand of profanity that was "most useful," in the words of a colleague, "in keeping the Army and the Air Fore in their place." BOrn in Chicago, Mr. Kent moved to California as a child. He lived in Washington from 1911 to 1917 when his father, William Kent, was a Republican congressman from California. He attended Sidwell Friends School here and graduated froin Yale, where he also earned a doctorate in history. Throughout his life he refused to be called "Doc- tor.? BY the summer of 1941 he had been teaching a popular course in modern European history at Yale for'several years when William J. ("Wild Bill") Donovan, a New York 'airier and World War I Medal of Hotior winner, invited him to come to Washington. lirt the time Donovan was assem- blink a cadre of the brightest minds he eould find in academia, law and business to determine the nation's intelligence needs in a world war that was certain to involve the Unit- ed States, III 1942, Donovan became the first head of the Office of Strategic Seririces, and his recruits became thelfirst OSS officials. Mr. Kent was put; in charge of the Africa section and later was chief of the research and analysis branch. He served in Waihington, North Africa and Italy. After the war Mr. Kent became acting director of the Office of Re- seal-ch and Intelligence at the State Department, taught at the National W11- College and then returned to hiOrofessorship at Yale. Ile wrote a book, "Strategic In- telligence for American World Pol- icy: that was published in 1949 and waa said by columnists Joseph and Start Alsop seven years later to have been "the most important postwar book on strategic intelli- gence." Mr. Kent's tenure at the Office of National Estimates covered a tu- multuous period that included not only the fighting in Korea but also the collapse of French rule in Indo- china, the Cold War, the Cuban mis- sile crisis and U.S. entry into the war in Vietnam. In retirement, he wrote a book based on his boyhood experiences on a brother's ranch in Nevada and he produced an unusual set of blocks for children called "Buffalo Blocks." He is survived by his wife, Eliz- abeth Gregory Kent of Washington; one daughter, Serafina Kent Ba- thrick of New York; one son, Sher- man Tecumseh Kent of Oklahoma City, and four grandsons. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 oNANT0AGEICLEAFproved For Release 2ows) EgIVAPIE10-01137 17 January 1986 000100140001-3 To Check on the CIA, Send In t By EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN The ambiguous nature of secret intelli- gence is often not fully appreciated, espe- cially by top Central Intelligence Agency executives who boast that they are privy to the intentions of the Kremlin through sources that report to them directly from its inner sanctum, the KGB. The "facts" that proceed from secret intelligence are not discrete objects, like marbles, that can easily be separated by color, lined up and counted. They tend to change their shape, color and meaning depending on how, and by whom, they are arranged. Consider the case of Vitaly S. Yurchen- ko. He came to Washington last August as a "defector" from the highest stratum of the KGB. Then, after the deputy director of the CIA, John N. McMahon, had staked his reputation on the quality of Yurchenko's information and CIA Director William J. Casey had proclaimed him "for real," Yurchenko returned to Moscow. Despite this embarrassment, Casey con- tinued to assert that Yurchenko had pro- vided extraordinarily important informa- tion to the CIA during his curious visit. That very same week, on the basis of a briefing about the case by his national- security staff, President Reagan said categorically that "the information he provided was not anything new or sensa- tional." He added that the putative defector had told the CIA nothing more than it "already knew." Clearly the CIA director and his deputy, and the President and his national-security adviser, had looked at the same set of secret intelligence "facts" from the same defector, but they arrived at diametrically opposite conclusions about their value. The issue goes far deeper than the credibility of a single defector. It cuts to the core of the CIA's assumptions about Soviet deception. Does, for example, the KGB systematically attempt to mislead Ameri- can intelligence by allowing its agents to reveal misleading data? The CIA's current position on this vexing question, as stated in a letter sent to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, is that it can find no evidence of such kinds of deception on strategic issues in the past 20 years. Counterintelligence experts outside the government, such as those at the Rand Corp., reached the opposite conclusion. The problem can be resolved neither by insiders, who are committed to a denial of deceptions, nor outsiders, who lack access to the highly classified data. Nor does the evidence speak for itself. What is needed to break this conceptual logjam, if only on a temporary basis, is another "B Team." The B- Team idea stretches back a decade, when George Bush was the CIA director. Data from reconnaissance satel- lites had raised serious doubts about the CIA's assessment of Soviet bomber and ballistic strategy. The question again was not the raw data but what might be missing from it. In order to settle the matter, Bush appointed two teams to look at the same data. The A Team, headed by Howard Stoertz, the CIA's national intelli- gence officer on the Soviet Union, consist- ed entirely of CIA insiders; those on the B Team, headed by Richard Pipes, a professor of Russian history at Harvard, were all outsiders ( with proper clearances) who were not committed to any prevailing view of Soviet strategy. The most dramatic result of this un- precedented competition was a radical reassessment of the Soviet threat, based on the B Team's conclusion that the CIA had seriously underestimated the accuracy of earn Soviet missiles. It also shook up much of the complacency at the CIA. Casey, at his confirmation hearings, suggested that there was definite value in these kinds of competitive analysis. If so, the current crisis in counterintelligence presents a golden opportunity for a new B Team. The team should be chosen by Casey, not in his capacity as the director of the CIA but in his wider role as the head of the intelligence community. As in the model of the 1976 B Team, these experts should be drawn both from other U.S. intelligence services, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency, and from think tanks, such as Rand and R&D Associates, that have been working on these problems for a decade or more. To head the team, Casey might consider a senator who has served on the intelligence committee and is respected for independent thinking on these issues, such as Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.) or Daniel Patrick Moy- nihan (D-N.Y.). Since this B Team's primary purpose would not be to investigate but rather to test the CIA's imagination, it should have a limited mandate and be confined to two or three specific issues. These might include Soviet use of double agents and Soviet disinformation tactics to confuse anti- ballistic-missile strategy and mislead U.S. submarine deployments. The idea would be to test the proposition that analysis with diverse views might discern different clues from the same raw data. The results, again, might prove both surprising and useful. Edward Jay Epstein, the author of "Leg- rrui: The Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald," is completing a book about inter- national deception. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 AIR= AMAMI pAguLassi 27 December 1985 Nicaragua Rebels Linked to Drug Trafficking Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R WASHINGTON POST US. Investigators Say Contras Help Transport Cocaine in Costa Rica By Brian Barger and Robert Parry Prcs Nicaraguan rebels operating in northern Costa Rica have engaged in cocaine traffick- ing, in part to help finance their war against Nicaragua's leftist government, according to U.S. investigators and American volun- teers who work with the rebels. The smuggling operations included re- fueling planes at clandestine airstrips and helping transport cocaine to other Costa Rican points for shipment to the United States, U.S. law enforcement officials and the volunteers said. These sources, who refused to be iden- tified by name, said the smuggling involves individuals from the largest of the U.S.- backed counterrevolutionary, or contra, groups, the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) and the Revolutionary Democratic Alliance (ARDE), as well as a splinter group known as M3. An M3 leader, Sebastian Gonzalez Men- diola, was indicted in Costa Rica for cocaine trafficking a year ago. No other contra lead- ers have been charged. A new national intelligence estimate, a secret Central Intelligence Agency-pre- pared analysis on narcotics trafficking. al- leges that one of ARDE's top commanders royal to ARDE leader Eden Pastora used cocaine profits this year to buy a $250,000 arms shipment and a helicopter, according to a U.S. government official in Washington. Bosco Matamoros, the FDN spokesman hare, and Levy Sanchez, a Miami-based spokesman for Pastora. denied that their groups participated in drug smuggling. [Matamoros said the charges were a "dirty and repulsive insinuation against our movement that impugns our integrity and our morality.") Cornelius J. Dougherty, spokesman for the Drug Enforcement Administration, said the DEA is aware that drug traffickers use airstrips in northern Costa Rica to transship cocaine, but has not examined the political affiliations of those involved. Dougherty said the DEA focuses its Latin American enforcement efforts on the cocaine-produc- ing nations of South America, rather than on countries, such as Costa Rica, that are used in shipping the drugs to the United States. Earlier this year, President Reagan ac- cused the leftist government of Nicaragua of "exporting drugs to poison our youth" after a Nicaraguan government employe, Federico Vaughan, was indicted by a federal grand jury in Miami. But Dougherty said DEA investigators are not sure whether Sandinista leaders were involved. Rep. Samuel Gejdenson (D-Conn.), a member of the House Foreign Affairs Com- mittee, called on the administration last week to investigate the allegations "with the same vigor that they would devote to charges of left-wing drug trafficking. "After all, the victims of narcotics smug- gling are not able to differentiate between left-wing and right-wing cocaine," he said. State Department deputy spokesman Charles E. Redman said the United States "actively opposes drug trafficking" and that the DEA is not conducting any investigation of the charges. ' "We are not aware of any evidence to support those charges," Redman added, The U.S.-backed rebels, fighting to over- throw the Nicaraguan government, cperate from base camps in Honduras to Nicara- gua's north and from Costa Rica, to its south. Contra leaders claim a combined force of 20,000 men, although some U.S. officials say the actual number is much lower. The Costa Rica-based rebel groups are smaller and more poorly financed than those in Honduras. ' Associated Press reporters inte.,viewed officials from the DEA, the Custon is Ser- 00100140001-3 vice, Federal Bureau of Investigation and Costa Rica's Public Security Ministry, as well as rebels and Americans who work with them. The sources, inside government and out, spoke on condition that they not be identified by name. Five American rebel supporters said they were willing to talk about the drug smug- gling because they feared the trafficking would discredit the war effort. The five?including four who trained rebels in Costa Rican base camps?said they discovered the contra smuggling in- volvement early this year, after Cuban LL ... The victims of narcotics smuggling are not able to differentiate between left-wing and right-wing cocaine." ?Rep. Samuel Geidenson Americans were recruited to help the Hon- duran-based FDN open a Costa Rican front. These American rebel backers said two Cuban Americans used armed rebel troops to guard cocaine at clandestine airfields in northern Costa Rica. They identified the Cuban Americans as members of the 2506 Brigade, an anti-Cas- tro group that participated in the 1961 Bay of Pigs attack on Cuba. Several also said they supplied information about the smug- gling to U.S., investigators. One American rebel backer with close ties to the Cuban-American smugglers said that in one ongoing operation the cocaine is unloaded from planes at rebel airstrips and taken to au i Atlantic Coast port where it is concealed on shrimp boats that are later unloaded in the Miami area. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 ta-P or Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R0001 ART IAP' ON PAGE WASHINGTON TIMES 2 October 1985 Space weapons development opposed, not research, Moscow negotiator says ? 00140001-3 STAT FROM COMBINED DISPATCHES GENEVA, Switzerland Chief Soviet arms negotiator Viktor Karpov yesterday said Moscow had never opposed basic scientific research but was sticking to its demand for a ban on development and testing of space weapons in return for reductions in the superpowers' nuclear weapons arsenals. Mn Karpov, speaking to reporters before resuming presentation of new Soviet proposals at the 7-month-old superpower arms talks, said the Soviet proposals are reasonable and are aimed at making a success of the Nov. 19-20 summit in Geneva between President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhael Gor- bachev. But he also said the proposed deal links, any limitation of existing long- range and medium-range nuclear weap- ons to a scrapping of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI, and a ban on space weapons, including testing and development. Mr. Reagan has repeatedly said SDI, commonly known as "star wars," is not negotiable and last week repeated that his $26 billion program would be contin- ued to develop a defensive shield that can shoot down missiles in space. The Soviets have proposed a 50 percent cut in the approximately 11,500 "nuclear charges" or warheads in their arsenal. The U.S. arsenal contains 10,645 total warheads. But only 2,130 of those are on the more accurate land-based missiles compared to 8,500 Soviet highly accurate ICBM warheads. A recent National Intelligence Esti- mate, however, indicates the number may' be difficult to verify, -thereby making. warhead constraints difficult to negoti- ate. The still-secret National Intelligence_ Estimate indicates that the main Soviet ICBM, the SS-18, may be deployed with 12 warheads instead of the 10 permitted under SALT H, according to U.S. govern- ment sources familiar with the estimate. Last June, a Soviet negotiator in Geneva told U.S. negotiators the Soviet, SSN-20 Typhoon ballistic missile has. been deployed with 10 warheads instead of [lie nine orlgfnaiiy estrmnea American intelligence analysts, the Source saig. "As a result, constraintsbn Soviet war- heads will be .impossible to verify or negotiate," the defense expert said in commenting on the latest Soviet pro- posal. Mr. Karpov said the Soviets were not opposed to "basic research, basic sci- ence." But he added that, "We are against any research that leads to the creation of? space strike weapons." "Every sane man shouldn't want .the- 'star wars' project," he said. "It leads to more instability. It leads to an increasing danger of war ... despite all words tattle._ contrary" The Soviet proposals ? said by offi- cials in Washington to call for cuts of up to 50 percent in nuclear arsenals if SDI is abandoned? were outlined by Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in his meeting with President Reagan last Fri- day at the White House and presented to U.S. arms negotiators in plenary sessions Monday and Tuesday in Geneva. The New York Times yesterday quoted American officials as saying the Soviet proposal called on the United States to reduce its long-range and medium-range nuclear weapons by 50 percent, while offering a reduction that would cover only Soviet long-range weapons. The chief U.S. arms negotiator, Max M. Kampelman, on Monday said the Soviet proposals were "interesting" and would be "studied with care," but he made no comment after yesterday's meeting. Mr. Kampelman was expected to return to Washington today. Asked if the Soviet Union was taking such a tough stand on SDI that it could block any arms agreement, Mr. KaPpov replied, "We are taking a reasonable --Stand. We are trying to do everything we can that the meeting between Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev is successful, but of course if takes two to do a tango." "Our proposal is as balanced as I stay on my feet. It covers all three areas of our discussions and is well-balanced. It is bal- anced as far as the whole complex of problems is concerned:' The Geneva negotiations, which began _ March 12, deal with space and defense, strategic nuclear weapons, and medium-. range systems. Bill Gert contributed to this report in Washington. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 ARTICLE APPEARED ONVIZOMME-Or-Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00 WASdINGTON TIMES 7 August 1985 Soviets fill craters, dig new STAT 0100140001-3 to fool U.S. on missile accuracy By Bill Gertz' THE VIREANNICfrON TIMES The Soviet Union is trying to deceive the 17mted States abouf the accuracy of one of its nuclear nus- sites by fllUing in impact craters from test warheads, and by digging false craters to be photogra_phe-d by tr.s. spy satellites, sa_ys a U.S. govern- ment defense expert. Recent photographs obtained by satellite reconnaissance taken in the early morning showed Soviet troops concealing test craters from incom- ing SS-19 warheads launched the night before at Soviet missile test sites on the Kamchatka peninsula, the expert said. The photographs also show mili- tary personnel digging false craters in a wider radius, the expert said. The SS-19 carries up to six mul- tiple, independently targeted war- heads ? called MIRVs ? on three known nuclear ' warhead modes. With a force of 360 missiles, it is the most widely deployed Soviet first- strike ICBM. Revelations about the accuracy of the SS-19 appear to be part of a dis- pute within the 13. intelligence community over estimates ot the S-19's accuracy. The controversy seems to involve different views of analysts from the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency andthe outcome could sway administration detense policy on strategic modernization programs, the defense expert said. The Soviet deception is one of sev- eral reasons why Pentagon analysts dissented from a U.S. intelligence community assessment of the decreasing accuracy ot the SS-19 - and which was reported to pose less of a first-strike nuclear threat to US. strategic forces, the expert said. Press reports citing the 1985 National Intelligence Estimate of Soviet strategic weapons trends said the CIA revised its estimate ot the warheadssfr Eima'-cNtige" new judgment, reflected in the still- secret estimate, retroactively down- grades the CINs previous analyses of the first-strike SS-19 since it was first -tested in wrs. Miss& warhead accuracy is measured through a process called circular error probable ? the radius of a circle within which at least 50 percent of a missile's warheads fall. The SS-19's accuracy reportedly fell from a CEP radius of 330 feet to 440 feet, according to a report ear- lier this month in the National Aar- .nal. The loss in targeting ability would seriously affect U.S. assess- ments of the missile's ability to knock out "hardened" missile silos. Public support for a very expen- sive military buildup over the last five years has been based in part on the idea that the United States is now more vulnerable to Soviet attack because of major increases in Soviet missile capabilities during the 1970s. Defense experts believe the revised estimate of SS-19 accuracy could undercut the Reagan adminis- tration's strategic modernization program. If Soviet missiles are deemed less accurate, critics of the administra- tion's defense buildup in Congress could succeed in cutting the U.S. strategic modernization program. The, new estimate could strengthen support for the admin- istration's plan to place new missiles in older, more vulnerable silos. The administration has been battling Congress over the deployment of the MX "Peacekeeper" missile. Critics have charged that placing the larger MX in existing silos would Leave the only U.S. ICBM capable of deterring a Soviet first strike vul- nerable to such an attack. Congress cut MX funding to SO missiles, half the number requested by the administration. A New York Times report on the SS-19 published July 19r states that the DIA disagreed with the revised accuracy estimate ot the CIA and other -U.S. intelligence community components. The dissent is re_part- edry outlined in a footnote to theNIE. DIA-believes the SP.9's accuracy has improved since the first uncoded electronic intercepts of flight data were made between April 1973 and March 1974. ? Since 1974, only a small portion of the data has not been encoded, and therefore its characteristics ? such as accuracy and weight have been more difficult to determine. "As a missile gets older, it gets better not worse through modi- fications," the expert said. Another reason for the dispute on SS-19 accuracy, the expert said, is that the latest NIE indicates that the largest-sized Soviet ICBM, the ' SS-18, is expected to be deployed with more warheads than it has been tested with. lb date, 10 warheads have been detected on tests of the SS-18. "When it upgraded the estimate of SS-18 warheads, the CIA felt it had to downgrade the SS-19 in order to be partially consistent with its old bias of underestimating Soviet stra- tegic forces;' the defense expert The latest intelligence estimate reportedly states that future mod- ernizations of the SS-18 will put 12 -warheads on each missile, accord- into the defense elpert. The controversy over Soviet mis- sile accuracy dates to 1976 when two competing teams ot intelligence -analysts offerect divergent opinions of the evolving accuracy of Soviet missile warheads. The so-called "A-Team, B-Team" study revealed that Soviet missile accuracy was increasing faster than anticipated by previous CIA analy- ses. As a result, a " windorulner- ability" to Soviet attack would exist in the early 1980s before the United States could modernize its forces. "The CIA is trying to revert to its originarertimate of Soviet missile accuracy trends," the expert said. The agency was charged by a team of analysts from outside the CIA with underestimating Soviet missile accuracy developments. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency expert Matthew Murphy would not comment on the details of SS-19 accuracy, but he said missile accuracy is determined by "national technical means;' the government euphemism for intelligence gath- ered by satellite reconnaissance and eiectronicTistening posts. An ACDA statement in response to reports of SS-19 accuracy warned against drawing "erroneous" con- clusions about Soviet strategic cap- Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 Approved For ReleasoRtigt/6@fa$ 01Aliatitic190-0' ARTICLE AMR% August 1985 ON PAGE 14 CIA Sees Soviet Strategic Buildup, But Critics Slam Report's Release by Michael Ganley The Soviet Union is on the brink of a massive expansion of its strategic nuclear offensive and de- fensive forces, according to a new in- telligence estimate by the Central In- telligence Agency. In rare public testimony, intelligence officials told Senate Members at a joint hearing of the Armed Services Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces Subcommittee and the Defense Appropriations Subcom- mittee June 26th that the USSR's arsenal of strategic nuclear warheads could grow to 12.000 by 1990 from an estimated 9,000 warheads today. Without continued arms control restraints, the officials estimated, the number of deployed Soviet warheads could rise to between 16,000 and 21,000 by the mid-1990s. Some conservative Republican Sena- tors, apparently frustrated by the Con- gressional slowdown of the Reagan Administration's military buildup, urged the White House to release the CIA report and let CIA officials testify in open session about it. The report is based on conclusions ? of a secret new National Intelligence Esti- mate on Soviet military forces prepared by the CIA. Some Senate Democrats, however, complained that Republicans were playing "partisan" politics with the intelligence as- sessment and damaging the CIA's credibil- ity on Capitol Hill. The CIA assessment and testimony came only two weeks after President Reagan an- nounced June 10th that the US will con- tinue to comply with SALT II despite in- tense pressure from conservatives in Con- gress to renounce the accord. The Soviets could deploy more than the Thousands ol Warheads Growth in Number of Deployed Warheads on Soviet Strategic Intercontinental Attack Forces by 1994 Ballistic Missiles SLBMs ICBMs Bombers 21 18 15 12 6 3 1985 SALT II Possible Soviet US Numerical Expansion START START Restreints Beyond Proposal Proposal Until Mid-1990 Arms Control 1990 Source: Soviet Strategic Force Developments; CIA paper presented in testi- mony before the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommitee, June 26, 1985, STA 137R000100140001-3 predicted 3,000 new nuclear warheads in the next few years, according to informa- tion provided AFJ by one Republican Sena- tor's office. Those documents show a potential Soviet warhead increase in the next six to seven years of between 2,956 and 5,072, even under current SALT I and SALT restraints. The US. by contrast, must dis- mantle nearly four times as many warheads as the Soviets between now and 1991 in order to stay within the treaties' limits. Some of. the new Soviet missiles are de- signed to carry More warheads than older ones they replace. The numbers of laun- chers would still remain within the SALT I and SALT II accords, however. Because the US is deploying hundreds of single- warhead, air-launched cruise missiles. which are counted as launchers under the SALT accords, its Trident modernization program would raise the total number of launchers above treaty limits unless older Poseidon subs and Minuteman missiles are retired. About 7,600 US warheads, over two- thirds of which are based on nuclear sub- marines, are currently deployed- Only modest future increases in the number of US nuclear warheads are planned. depend- ing upon how many M-X missiles are ap- proved by Congress. (The Senate voted to cap deployment at 50 M-X missiles, while the House voted on June 18th for only 40 missiles. the difference to be resolved in a House-Senate conference that began July I 1th . ) Republican Pressure The Republican who pushed hardest to get portions of the new intelligence report released was Sen. James A. McClure (R- ID). On June 6th, Mc- CI ure . along with Senators Jesse Helms (R-NC) and Steven D. Symms (R-ID), wrote President Reagan ask- ing him to release as much of the informa- tion in the new Na- tional Intelligence Es- timate as possible. They told the Presi- dent that because the new report?NIE 11-3-8-85?predicts "a dangerously wor- sening state of Soviet military suprem- acy. . . . We consider a full public under- standing of the evolving military imbalance between the US and the Soviet Union to be essential. . ." Shortly after receiving the letter, the White House ordered release of a declassi- fied version of the intelligence report's conclusions, according to Hill sources.? McClure Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 Continued A provAst, For Release 2006rWitiegl5590-01137 8 July 985 vie.7 How the U.S. Assesses Soviet Wea RC.135 aircraft based in Alaska record telemetry ? the FM signals given off by transmitters Rus- sian scientists attach to monitor their missile's vital parts. By RILL KELLER WASHINGTON?The Government periodically Issues reports reciting specifications of Soviet weapons with the itemized precision of a hard- ware catalogue. They are sources of fascination for Soviet-watchers, and they underpin auhorita- live studies such as the weighty reappraisal Of the superpower balance released last week by a' Library of Congress expert, John M. Collins. But occasionally there is a reminder that what we think we know about Soviet weapons, we can rarely claim to know for sure. . The most recent example is the revisionist i& telligence assessment of a missile caliedthe SS- la. a six-warhead mainstay of the Soviet missile force. Since the late 1970's, the SS-19 has beep classed as a "stio-killer,'T accurate enough to have NO likelihood of destroying American rnEr site silos. Government sources jay that a new, classified National Intelli Tatimate_a con- _Menus of intelligence experts-711as oalicludeirtbe missile is less accurate than previously thought, by more than a third. The estimate nas led many analysfs to CcescrUdeinat the onssite Is ha, Atter all. it reliable silo-killer. The Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency vigorously dissented, defending the earlier ac- curacy estimates. And in any case, downgrading the 55-19 does not substantially diminish the Soviet military threat ? the 3,090 independently targetable warheads on the bigger SS-113 missiles are still considered accurate enough to destroy most American targets. Still, the putative ac- curacy of the SS-19 has helped shape .the United States image of the Soviet war machine, contrib- uting to the notion of an American "window of vulnerability," and influencing the 1979 arms talks. The Duplicity Factor One problem with intelligence about Soviet weaponry may be duplicity. The United States has accused the Russians of camouflaging mis- siles sites and encrypting the signals given off by their test missiles, both violations of arms con- trol treaties because they impede verification. In 1979, according to a former Central Intelligence Agency analyst, American satellite photographs of the Kamchatka firing range were said to have caught the Russians digging holes and planting dummy warheads to try to spoof American eavesdroppers. Both sides practice various forms of what's called "strategic deception." More often, the Soviet-watchers' handicap is the inherent complexity of their detective work. The estimate of what a Soviet missile can do, for example, is a distillation of hundreds' of pieces of data, mostly technical. Reconnaissance satellites take high-resolution photographs of the launch site. perhaps providing information on the size and configuration of the missile. Radars in the Aleutians and elsewhere plot the missile's trajectory in test flight. High-orbit satellites and 000100140001-3 These crucial intercepts may tell eavesdroppers how many warheads were tested, or how steady and reliable the missile is in flight. Ships in the region may help plot where the war- heads land. Once the raw data are gathered Jalencies begin debating what makeft .he course of a missile lobbed into the Pacific may be known with some precision, but it is a matter of educated guesswork what point in the ocean the Russians were aiming for. The agents may have collected dozens of clear signals from the missile in flight, but which frequency was transmitting the fuel flow, and which the steadi- ness of the gyroscope? "The data besets fairly common," said Jeffrey T. RicheLsan, author of a neu book an United States intelligence "What ? can change from agency to agency, and even from person to person, is the analysis." One reason is the analysts make different as- sumptions. A missile was tested vrith 10 war- heads and 2 decoys. Will the missile be deployed with 10 warheads. ot 1.2? John Prados, author of a book on estimates of Soviet weaponry, argues that eves with the great leaps in the sophistica- tion of intelligence-gathering equipment. faulty assumptions about Soviet intentions have often produced misleading intelligence that propelled American policy. For example, exaggerated American estimates of Soviet antimissile de- fenses in the 1960's spurred the development of multiple-warhead missiles. One source familiar with the new disagree- ment over the accuracy of the SS-19 said the earlier estimates had been based on assumptions about how rapidly the missile would improve. The Central Intelligence Agency, this source said, judged from recent telemetry readings that the missile had not improved as much as expect. 'ed. The Pentagon insisted that the new readings, taken through a fog of Soviet encryption, were too fragmentary to be given much weight. Although the agencies deny it, many Intelli- gence experts say that the bureaucratic impera- tive puts its own spin on weaponry estimates. Conservative aelligence buffs contend the C.I.A. Ueda to put a benign slant on its estimates in order to encourage arms control; the agency is an 2t_pjnyes_to_tinns_aggatiatians_and v rificatlon. Liberals say the Defense Intelli- gence ency and the military service intelli- gence operations tend to justify the military budget by portraying the Russians in the most sinister light. "Sure, estimates have political input," said one Government intelligence evaluator. "But for the most part, the intelligence community is ob- jective. The problem is simply that we can only know things so well," COVDPITTrm, Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 Piarieigi:04 WERKSRDi_IFAAAREM1137R0001001 0001-3 ? 21 -July 1985 Soviet missile lesser threa than 1st thought, CIA says By Richard Gross United Presa Iniernatmal WASHINGTON ? Reassessing the Soviet SS-19 intercontinental missile, the CIA has concluded that the nu- clear-armed weapon is not as accu- rate and poses leas of a threat to the 'U.S. missile force than first believed, administration sources said. The U.S. intelligence community had characterized the missile as hav- ing the capability of destroying U.S. Minuteman missiles in their silos. But the Pentagon's Defense Intelli- gence Agency disagrees with the re- vised CIA evaluation, contained in a secret report called the National In- telligence Estimate. "We believe the CIA view is com- pletely wrong," a Pentagon official said Friday of the assessment, speak- ing on the condition he not be identi- fied. "We believe the CIA analysis is based on incorrect assumptions. They've made a mistake. We are con- vinced the CIA is wrong and will be proven wrong over time." The Pentagon estimates that the Soviet Union has deployed 360 of the six-warhead SS-19s. U.S. officials used the 55-19 and the bigger 55-18, which carries 10 warheads each, to support arguments for building the 10-war- head MX to give the United States an appropriate nuclear counterpunch. The CIA re-evaluation of the 55-19's capabilities was reported by Michael Gordon in Friday's Issue of the week- ly National Journal magazine. Ad- ministration sources confirmed the account. The article quoted a Pentagon offi- cial as saying the revised CIA esti- mate had reduced the projected ac- curacy of the 55-19 by "better than a third." extending the radius of the missile warhead's circular error of probability from 1,000 feet to 1,300 feet. The circular error of probabili- ty, known as CEP, is the radius of a circle in which a warhead has a SO percent chance of falling. A Pentagon official said the re- vised CIA estimate "did reduce" the estimated accuracy of the SS-19 war- head, but he declined to go into de- tail. U.S. officials suggested that the re- assessment was valueless because there is widespread agreement in the intelligence community that the 55- 18 can knock out all 1,000 Minute- man. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 r ReleaseNiM0/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 NAL JOURNAL 20 July 1985 CIA Downgrades Estimate or soviet L.SS-19 25X1 . . . Saying Missile Too Inaccurate for First Strike By Mideael R. Gordon Key U.S. intelligence officials have revised their estimate of the capabili- ties of the Soviet Union's SS-I9 mis- sile and no longer believe the intercon- tinental ballistic missile has the accuracy to threaten U.S. missile silos in a first strike, government officials said. The new assessment is reflected in the latest National Intelligence Esti- mate (NIE) prepared by the National Intelligence Council, a panel k intelli- gence experts chaired by a deputy director of the Ceitral Intelligence ;Agency- But there is not unanimity on the S5-I9's capabilities, according to a Pentagon official. "The CIA has revised its estimate of the SS-19's accuracy: the DIA has not." the official said, referring to the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). While the CIA's view is reflected in the main text of the NIE, a footnote states the DIA's dis- senting view, the official added. The SS-I9 figured prominently in public debate during the Carter Ad- ministration. In 1977, intelligence pro- jections showed the missile's accu- racy?as well as that of the SS-I 8? was improving at a quicker rate than earlier forecast. "Analysis of intelli- gence data on new versions of the SS- 18 and SS-I9 missiles indicates that by the early 1980s, a substantial threat to our Minuteman will exist," said the Defense Department's fiscal 1980 report to Congress. The view that the SS-I9 was a "silo killer" encouraged the notion that the "window of vulnerability"?the time when U.S. land-based missiles would be vulnerable to Soviet attack?had opened earlier than expected. In addition, those assessments of the SS-I 9 influenced the U.S. negoti- ating approach in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). In light of intelligence estimates. the Carter Ad- ministration in 1977 was amenable to a Soviet suggestion that the treaty set an over-all limit on multiple-warhead land-based missiles, including the SS.. 19. Previously. the Carter Administra- tion had pushed to limit the multiple- warhead SS-I8. the largest of the Soviet land-based missiles, according to Walter B. Slocombe, a Carter Ad- ministration Defense official. At present, the Soviets have 308 SS-I8 missiles, each of which can carry up to 10 warheads under the terms of the SALT II treaty, for a total of 3,080 warheads. There are 360 SS-19 missiles, each carrying 6 war- heads. for a total of 2.160 warheads. The view that the SS-I9 is a silo killer is still expressed in Pentagon publications. The Joint Chiefs of Staff fiscal 1986 military posture assess- ment states that "today, the most ac- curate versions of the SS-18 and SS- 19 missiles are capable of destroying most time-urgent and hardened tar- gets in an initial attack on the United States." The new CIA reassessment, how- ever. casts doubt on this view. "It is no longer a silo killer." said a State De- partment official familiar with the re- assessment. A Pentagon official said that "what the CIA basically says is that given the large increase in CEP it now asso- ciates with the the 55-1 9, the individ- ual probability of' kill is low.7- "CEP" is a technical measure of missile accu- racy that stands for "circle error prob- able" and refers to the radius of a circle within which 50 per cent of a missile's warheads can be expected to fall. The London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies esti- mates that the CEP of the latest models of the 55-18 and the SS-19 is 300 meters. In its reassessment, the CIA has increased its estimate of the SS-19's CEP by "better than a third" and now puts it in the range of 400 meters, the official said. That would mean that the SS-I 9 would not provide a high- confidence capability against a U.S. missile silo even if two SS-l9 war- heads from two separate missiles were aimed at the same U.S. missile silo. "Even two gives you low confidence of killing a silo." the Pentagon official said. "You could use three or four and Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 .."'^ ReleaseZ1,06AMI3M3M-RDP90-01137R000 fig p _ 19 July 1985 U.S. Study Finds a Soviet ICBM Is Less of a Threat to Missile Si! WASHINGTON, July 18 ? Umteo States intelligence officials, in a re- vised assessment of a Soviet missile known as the 55-19, now believe that it is too inaccurate to pose a threat to American missile silos, Administra- tion sources said today. The new appraisal, which differs from assessments by the Pentagon, is contained in a secret report, the Na- tional Intelligence Estimate, which is prepared once a year by the Central In- telfigetice Agency and represents the cressensus of United States intelligence experts. Administration sources said that the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency dissented in a footnote to the document and steed by earlier esti- mates of the missile's accuracy. The purported capacity of the 55-19, an intercontinental ballistic missile, to destroy United States missile silos has been an important political factor in American arms control considerations and in the campaign to build an Amer- ican counterpart, the MX. Officials said the military signifi- cance of the revised estimate of SS-19 capabilities was minimal because an- other Soviet ICBM, the SS-18, is be- lieved accurate enough to threaten missile silos. The revised estimate of the 55-19 was first reported by Michael R. Gordon in an article to be published Friday in the weekly magazine National Journal. The information was confirmed today by Administration sources. Some Officials Draw a lesson Present and former Government of- ficials said one lesson to be drawn from the new estimate is that intelligence re- ports used as the basis for major deci- sions often seem fragile and uncertain. The intelligence agencies generally rely on the same data ? in this case, observations of Soviet missile tests ? but differ in interpretation. A former national security official, referring to the revised estimate, said, "It shakes my confidence in our ability to know what the Soviets are doing." The Pentagon estimates that the Soviet Union has deployed 388 SS-19 missiles with six warheads each, a total of 2,180 warheads. The 308 55-18 missiles have 10 warheads each, a total of 3,080. In 1977, the Central Intelligence Agency said the accuracy of the two missiles was improving faster than ex- pected, posing the danger that by the early 1980's or sooner, they would be . . By BILL HELLER- SpoclaJ op The Now York Timm able to wipe out- the 1,000 American Minuteman missile silos in a pre-emp- tive strike. ? That estimate was central to the view that the United States faced a "window of vulnerability." It also influenced President Carter's. approach to the arms control talks, of- ficials said. The American negotiators had initially focused attention on the SS-18, and sought to negotiate a treaty limiting the size and destructive power of missiles. But after the C.I.A. esti- mate of 1977, the Carter Administra- tion accepted an overall limit on num- bars of multiple-warhead missiles and, because of Soviet resistance, set aside efforts to limit destructive power. The 1977 estimate has continued to be Influential. The Joint Chiefs of Staff told Congress in February in a report on the American, military posture: "Today, the most accurate versions of the ? SS-18 and SS-19 missiles are capable of destroying most time-ur- gent and hardened targets in an initial attack on the United States." Defense Secretary Caspar W. Wein- berger has frequently cited the ac- curacy of the two missiles in the same breath when arguing for the MX. A major justification for the MX has been the need to match the silo-killing abil- ity of the two Soviet missiles. Administration officials said the new estimate of the SS-19 was open to inter- pretation, but one official said the best 00140001-3 estimate of the missile's abilities was significantly lower than earlier esti- mates. The National Journal article quotes a Pentagon official as saying that the new estimate bad reduced the pro- jected accuracy of the SS-19 by "better than a third.' The technical measure of missile ac- curacy is called circular error prob- ability, which is the radius of a circle within which a warhead has a 50 per- cent probability of faffing, The, Na- tional Journal said the revised esti- mate had extended the radius from LOW feet to 1,300 feet. Administration officials said they would not dispute the National Journal figures. A Pentagon official familiar with the report said that even if the estimate was accurate, it would still leave the Soviet Union with 3,000 more accurate warheads on 55-18 missiles, or three for every Minuteman silo. One Administration arms control specialist said the new estimate might give the United States more time for missile modernization and might be used to defend the Administration's plan to put the MX missiles in fixed silos. Critics have said that the MX would be a sitting duck in fixed silos be- cause of the accuracy of the Soviet mis- siles. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00 \LLcTREET .5nURNAL 16 July 19S3 REVIEW & OUTLOOK Winnable Nuclear War Caspar Weinberger has until No- vember to assess Soviet treaty viola- tions and suggest a response to the president. Yet from public reports of a 1985 National Intelligence Estimate. 11-3-885. the impact should be known: a. ?f:langerously worsening state," sen- ators briefed on the report say, of ''Soviet military supremacy.' The response must be a defense to shield U.S. forces, and someday cit- ies, from nuclear attack. For years, policy makers have held to the belief that things like NIE estimates, and terms like "supremacy," are moot. After all, we and the Soviets have so many weapons; some of them will survive an attack; the attacker gets blown up in a "second strike"; so he never attacks. No need to fret about missile accuracy, ABM technology or Soviet treaty violations: Whatever the numbers are, we have a stable stale- mate of Mutual Assured Destruction. The NIE assessment, representing the collective wisdom of the Central Intelligence Agency and all three services, raises questions about that thinking. It describes a furious Soviet warhead expansion. from 6,000 in 1978 to perhaps 12,000 today and 20.000 by 1990 !see table). It notes a vast re- search effort to locate subs at sea, mount defenses against U.S. cruise missiles and "stealth- bombers, and extend the range of Soviet weapons, possibly lasers. to vital U.S. commu- nications satellites. Offensive Weapon Production (1984) Weapon Soviets U.S. NATO 1. ICBM 2. SLBM 3. SLCM 4. IRNF 5. SRBM 200 200 1350 150 350 80 665 70 0 _ . Key: 1. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, 2. Sub-Launched Ballistic Missile, 3. Sub-Launched Cruise Mis- sile, 4. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, 5. Short-Range Ballistic Mis- sile. Yes, there is such a thing as "su- premacy." Assured Destruction ceases to be Mutual if one side can find the other's deterrent forces, wipe most of them out and ward off any surviving retaliatory missiles with its own defenses. Perhaps the most serious threat concerns relatively obscure develop- ments in submarine warfare. Many MAD strategists assume submarines are inherently invulnerable to attack. Indeed, 11-3485 suggests that both the Soviets and the U.S. need a break- through in order to locate strategic Subs at sea. Yet, as intelligence offi- cials warned in testimony on 11-3-885 before a House-Senate hearing, "We are concerned about the energetic So- *iet research and technology efforts" aimed at precisely this problem. The Soviets have tested a "syn- thetic aperture radar" that may soon render visible the internal ocean waves that submarines disrupt. They used an SAR to track their own subs from Salyut 7. In 1978, a U.S. SAR mapped the ocean bottom at depths of 500 feet. In all. a dozen more exotic detection schemes have been sug- gested, from using blue-green lasers in order to follow changes in plankton behind a submarine to spotting ther- mal, chemical or magnetic "scars" a sub leaves. Cruise missiles enjoy a similar pa- tina of invincibility. Yet the Soviets have already practiced intercepting U.S.-type cruise missiles with look- down, shoot-down radars on the Ful- crum and Foxbat supersonic intercep- tors. Given their sluggish battle-man- agement computers. the Soviets could not knock down every last U.S. cruise missile should America launch a first strike. But after a Soviet first strike, the Soviet network of 2.500 planes and 13,000 surface-to-air missiles wouldn't face all U.S. forces?just the fraction that survives an attack. There would be ample time for Soviet civil defense to prepare for a counterattack by slow-moving cruise missiles and bombers. As NIE briefers said. "The Soviets will be able to provide an in- creasingly capable air defense for Many key leadership, control, and military" installations. Of course, the U.S. will soon deploy missiles and bombers with stealth technology, which uses coatings and electronics to " spoof radars. Yet 0100140001-3 stealth is one-directional: It cannot yet evade multiple sensors. The U.S. has tested detection of stealth systems By bouncing radars off the ionosphere. Stealth might also be countered by a "passive infrared" sensor in space; the U.S. is already building prototypes of such a sensor. This does not mean cruise missiles or subs are inherently vulnerable. Thermal or electronic sensors will be countered by technologies to disguise those signals. In turn, more sophisti- cated sensors will learn to overcome these muting techniques or to read still other signals. And on and on. Yet in this race, the U.S. carries one severe handicap. To comply with the 1972 ABM treaty, U.S. leaders are holding back on the deployment of de- fensive technology. The Soviets, de- spite treaty constraints, have begun mass production of a nationwide ABM-X-3 system, according to 11-3- 885. As the U.S. adheres to MAD, try- ing to match the Soviets offense-for-of- fense, it will likely fall further behind. Aside from obvious short-term limits ,on weapons-production capacity, there may be political limits to how long a democracy can compete in such a de- moralizing race. Thus, the U.S. needs not a few hun- dred more warheads but a dramatic increase in the security 01 8.000 exist- ing warheads. The answer: Defend those forces. Mr. Reagan already pro- poses a shield to render nuclear weapons obsolete. Early layers, based on the ground, could be started now. This would be a step away from MAD and toward a multilayer shield for cit- ies. It may be the only way to meet the threat to deterrence itself. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 ( Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137 In7-1: 7 :727:73 WASHINGTON POST 27 June 1935 Soviets Would Add Arms Without Treaty, Hill Told Testimony Counters SALT'S Critice By Michael Weisskopf Washington Post Staff Writer A top intelligence officer told a Senate hearing yesterday that the Soviet Union would increase the number of warheads on its nuclear missiles if unconstrained by the un- ratified SALT II treaty, with the United States. The testimony of Lawrence K. Gershwin, national intelligence of- ficer for strategic programs at the National Intelligence Council, con- flicts with the views of SALT II critics in the Reagan administration who express doubts that the Soviet Union would increase its nuclear warheads even if the treaty lapsed because Moscow already enjoys a large strategic edge over the Unit- ed States. Asked by Sen. Dan Quayle (R- Ind,) if there would be a "significant difference" in the number of war- heads deployed by Moscow in the absence of SALT II. Gershwin re- plied, "There would be some differ- ence'and that's clear." He cited the case of the SSX25 mobile, single-warhead missile now being prepared for deployment in the Soviet Union. Moscow, he said, has "certain potential" to arm the missile with multiple warheads if not for limits imposed by SALT II. President Reagan announced June 10 that the United States would continue to comply fully with the treaty, siding with advisers who argued that abandoning SALT II would benefit Moscow more than Washington. Each superpower has The public appearance of intelligence officers became an issue at the hearing. said it will avoid undercutting the SALT II treaty as long as the other does the same. Gershwin and Robert M. Gates, deputy intelligence director for the Central Intelligence Agency, tes- tified before a joint session of two Senate defense subcommittees called to review an unusual report on Soviet strategic developments prepared by the two officials. The report, which concluded that the Soviet Union is poised for a ma- STAT 000100140001-3 jor expansion of offensive nuclear g weapons and defensive systems, - was derived from the usually clas- sified National Intelligence Esti. ? mate. Parts of the estimate were de- classified for public release yester- day at the request of the White House. Republican senators, frus- trated over cuts in the administra- tion's defense budget, had urged Reagan to release intelligence find- ings to document the extent of the Soviet threat, according to Senate sources. The_public appearance of intel- ligence officers who normally tes- tify in closed sessions became an issue at yesterday's hearing, with Democratic senators calling the move politically motivated and Re- publicans defending it as a way of keeping the public informed. Sen. Gary Hart (D-Colo.) criti- cized the administration for wthak- ing partisan and ideological what is central to the national security." Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.) said the hearing "seems to have more of a political than intelligence pur- pose" and asked Gates if his appear- ance did not "compromise theA credibility." Gates, saying he would not "ad- dress motives of the White House," replied that professional intelli- gence officers "face somewhat of a dilemma." "We're fully aware of the dangers of a public presentation to the tegrity and objectivity of our as.. sessments," he said. "We also rec- ognize the value of making available on a broad basis a commonly agreed set of facts for discussion of Soviet strategic force development." STAT Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 Approved For Release 2Ock6e41/(Th 1:91ArIN.Eg0-01 13 ARTICLE AFP ON PAGE 26 June 1985 7R000100140001-3 STAT Soviet Reported to Build Up Nuclear Arsenal By BILL KELLER spoud rt? rim York Times WASHINGTON, June 25 ? The Soviet Union is in the midst of nuclear We510135boom that could dou- ble its arsenal of nuclear warheads by the mid-10's if treaty restrictions are removed. to new forecasts bi Government int gence agencies. The report. to be nresented to a ,$en- ate hetrine Wednesday by anoints for -LLus sa that -a 7137M - .) strides" in developing missiles that can travel by rail or roacEwith nearlYa fourth of its warheads expected to de- the mid-1990's. The report also predicts that Soviet military =ending will grow by four jamentage points more than the infla- tion inflation rate over the next several years. more than double the intelli- gence agencies' estimates of Soviet spending in recent veers- A Pentagon official familiar with the report cautioned that the internal:pm agency forecaes "are projections. end when you get 5 and 10 years off, they can befaith shaky. There's probably a lot oatly_auglaIng_d_rnjainforma- tion_, in those estimates." The intelligence report. based on the ? classified National Intelligence Esti- matu,nnrr_cgmaienjua distilled from data compiled by all of the Gov- eplinent's intelligence services. is te be presented to an unusual public hear- ing of two Senate panels Wednesday morning. --A-a7ance copies of the declassified version were sent to lawmakers and key aides today. A Pentagon official said the decision to report on the intelligence estimate in a_p_iAlingjes&apprnmecuu_ihe. White House and was designed toUs- tr popular rthrlilerinnidellt'S embattled military budget. Another Defense Department official added that the "bleaker picture" of the ;Soviet military buildup would help win public and allied sump:1ft if President Reagan decides to respond in kind to what he says are Soviet arms control treaty violations. Report on U.S. Responses The President agreed this month to abide by limits on the unratified 1979 treaty limiting strategic arms, but has asked the Pentagon for a mid-Novem- ber report on possible American steps If reported Soviet transgressions con- tinue. Conservatives in Congress have long lobbied for =republic reporting of in- telligence data, saying this would counter attempts to cut the military budget. The new report, lb a statement that goes beyond previous estimates. says, "By the mid-1990k nearly all of the Soviets' currently deployed interconti- nental nuclear attack forces ? land and Sea-based ballistic mingles arid I heavy bombers ? will be replaced by new and Improved systems." The report added a number of detail*, to the picture of Rtissian power con- Mined in the Pentagon's annual publi- cation, Soviet Militaty Power, released in April. - For example, the intelligence report forecasts that?the Soviet Union will be able to increase its arsenal of nuclear warheads from the present 9,000 to 12,062 by 1990. Possible Soviet Buildup If arms-control limits contained in the 1979 treaty are eliminated, the esti- mate said, they could expand to be- tween 15,000 and 21.000 deployed war- heads in the mid-1990's. The intelligence report said the "most notable" trend is Soviet enipha- sis on mobile missiles, which "repre- sents a major resource decision" be- cause such systems are costly to oper- ate and maintain. The new report says the Soviet Union last year embarked on an accelerated program for constructing new ham for its SS-20 intermediate range mis- siles, and that some of those bases were being converted to house new SS-25 missiles, a single-warhead missile capable of reaching the United States. The Soviet Union is preparing to de- ploy the SS-25 this year, and the 10-war- head SS-24 next year, the report noted. The SS-24, as has been reported before, Is to be put in silos at first and then based on railroad can. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 Approved For_ft.' - case 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R0 AnTINT r?Entlil WASHINGTON TIMES 25 June 1985 0100140001-3 Soviets plans surpass limits called for in missile treaty By Bill Gertz THE WASHINGTON TIMES The Central Intelligence Agency is expected to release its annual esti- mate of Soviet weapons growth tomorrow in what the Reagan administration regards as the most dismal projection to date of a U.S.- Soviet military imbalance, accord- ing to an administration defense expert. The estimate says the Soviet Union is likely to deploy a nation- wide mobile anti-ballistic missile defense system in 1986, according to the official. The ABM modernization is described as the "rapid deployment of the ABM-3 mobile ABM system on a nationwide basis in 1986," the administration official said. The Soviet Union has cited the terms of the 1972 ABM treaty in a propaganda offensive against Pres- ident Reagan's Strategic Defense?, Initiative. If SDI research moves to -r the deployment stage, Moscow claims the system would violate the ABM treaty. "The Soviets will have a nation- wide ABM system operational by 1987, when the Moscow ABM-3 is completed and the Pechora-class [ABM1 radars are completed;' the administration official said. Three thousand mobile ABM interceptors will be operational by 1987, the offi- cial said. Based on the new intelligence estimate, the official concluded that Soviet plans to exceed the ABM treaty limits are "already visible." A declassified version of the National Intelligence Estimate, numbered 11-3-8-85, is to be made public tomorrow at a joint Senate hearing of the Defense Appropri- ations Subcommittee and the Armed Services Committee. The new study outlines the cur- rent U.S. view of trends in Soviet weapons developments, primarily dealing with strategic missile and launcher programs, the official said. A product of the combined U.S. intel- ligence community, it is produced annually in order to provide the president with an assessment of Soviet military deployment and development trends. Besides the CIA, other intelli- gence agencies contributing to the estimate are the National Recon- naissance Office, which handles sat- ellite photographs. the National Security Agency. the Defense Intel- ligence Agency and several other organizations. Other key forecasts on strategic weapons prograins include: ? By 1990, the Soviets will have deployed 700 new SS-24 and SS-25 ICBMs, all with "rapid reload and refire capability" ? The Soviets have begun mass producing the new Delta IV ballistic missile submarines capable of car- rying 10-warhead SS-NX-23 mis- siles. Typhoon-class submarines are also entering mass production with four new subs under construction. ? A new "stretch Yankee-class" submarine capable of launching supersonic SSN-24 cruise missiles will become operational this year Modified versions of the SSN-18. SSN-20 and SSNX-23 are also expected to be flight tested this year. ? over the next decade, the Sovi- ets are expected to greatly expand their strategic air forces by produc- ing up to 140 Bear H Th-95 bombers capable of delivering long-range cruise missiles. Forty Bear bombers have already been detected as oper- ational. ? Production rates for the Back- fire bomber will continue at 30 per year through the 1990s. ?A production facility for the Blackjack bomber is "almost com- plete," and U.S. intelligence expects production will begin sometime before the end of this year. ? A new generation of short-range and intermediate-range nuclear missiles is undergoing flight tests at a Soviet test range. ? In the next five years, "over 3,000" cruise missiles will be deployed. The new assessment projects that Soviet spending on weapons will increase by 4 percent to 6 percent throughout the 1990s, according to an administration official familiar with the estimate. By contrast, the Congress is ? pressing the administration to freeze Pentagon defense spending at current levels. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 STAT Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00 DEFENSE WEEK 24 June 1985 What You'll Hear On The reat BY PETER SAMUEL The Reagan administration this week will make public much of its latest estimate of Soviet strategic developments as presented in classified form in a new national intelligence estimate. Director of Central Intelligence William Casey and national intelligence officer Gary Gershwin are to deliver some of the key judgments on Wednesday morning at a joint hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Appropriations subcommittee. Defense Week reported some of the findings of the new intelligence estimate (June 17, 1985), and more detail has now been made available by an informed source. The CIA reports that the Soviets are presently deploying 100 SS-24 ICBMs and 200 SS-25s. The SS-24 is a 10-warhead rail-mobile system; otherwise it resembles the MX. The SS-25 is similar in size to the Minuteman Ill, carrying three warheads, but is mounted on a wheeled vehicle for mobility. The CIA estimates that some 150 SS-17 missiles will be replaced by silo-based SS-24s and that 200 rail mobile SS-24s will be deployed by the end of the decade. The projection is for 800 SS-25s by 1990. Both systems will have rapid multiple reload and refire capability. There is heavy camouflage and concealment of SS-24 and SS-25 deployments. The estimate reports "new evidence" that the SS-24 has more throw-weight than the SS-19 and is therefore a very heavy missile. Flight testing is about to begin of the giant SS-X-26 and the large SS-X-27, regarded as follow- ons to the SS-18 and the SS-19 missiles respectively. In addition, an improved version of the liquid fuelled SS-18, the Soviet's largest missile, is being reported. Modifications to the test versions of the SS-24 and SS-25 haveteen sighted. In the submarine branch of the Soviet triad, a new Delta IV boat is reported carrying the long-range SS-N-23 which is said to be in mass production now. In addition to the two Delta IV craft launched, four more are under construction. Four lYphoon submarines are under construction. One stretched Yankee class submarine converted for cruise missiles is expected to be operational later this year, carrying the supersonic and long-range SSC-N- 24 cruise missiles. Modification to the current generation of submarine launched ballistic missiles, the SS-N-18, SS-N-20 and SS-N-23 will begin flight tests late this year. Forty Bear H TU-95 bombers carrying the long range AS-15 air launched cruise missile are produced, and another 100 are expected over the course of this year and next. Older Bears are being equipped with the AS-4 air-to-ground missile. The inventory of Backfire bombers is put at 260 and production is expected to continue at the present rate of slightly over 30 annually into the 1990s. The B-IB equivalent Blackjack bomber plant is nearly complete and production is expected to begin later this year, at the same rate as the Backfire, about 30 a year. Over 3,000 long-range cruise missiles for air, ground, and sea launch are expected to be deployed by 1990. Three thousand is also the number projected for mobile ABM missiles to be deployed before the end of the decade as part of a nationwide ground based ballistic missile defense. This will include the ABM-3 system and SA-10s and SA-12s (which are primarily air defense missiles but could have some ABM capability, especially against slower moving SLBMs and Pershing us.) The Moscow ABM system will be modernized and the network of Pechora class large phased array radars are estimated to be complete by 1987. The SH-4 and SH-8 missiles associated with the ABM system are reported to be in mass production, so elements of an ABM breakout are, in this account, reported "already visible." Soviet defense spending is projected to increase between four and six percent annually in real terms based on evidence of production rates, factory expansion, test range expansion and deployments under way. STAT Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 Approved For Release 2006/01M8Alik-Kta90-01137R ARTICLE APPEARED 17 June 1985 WAGE ir Big Soviet Buildup Foreseen U.S. intelligence is now predict- ing a large rise in Soviet nuclear warhead numbers?over a thousand this year and possibly 8,000 more by the end of the decade. These numbers reportedly are contained in the CIA series called National Intelligence Estimate, the latest issue of which is coded NIE-11-3- 885. One usually reliable source says the intelligence assessment?on which President Reagan was briefed recently?shows "the world balance of power will have greatly shifted by the 1990s." In the past six months, the United States has detected a num- ber of new nuclear systems being deployed by the Soviets. The Rus- sians have also accelerated con- struction of anti-ballistic missile systems. The report, for the first time, alludes to a possible Soviet "break- out" from the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty through the fielding of a nationwide ABM system to intercept U.S. missiles. This could occur by 1990, the NIE reports. The report comes during the same week that President Reagan unexpectedly decided to continue to abide by the SALT 11 Treaty limits beyond its scheduled expiration at the end of this year. Reagan's decision will require the United States to withdraw a Poseidon nuclear-missile-bearing submarine within six months of the sea trials of the Trident sub,. USS Alaska. Those tests, off the Connecticut coast, are scheduled for this fall. As compared with the last offi- cial U.S. estimates of 9,000, the National Intelligence Estimate says the Soviet Union will, by the year's end, have 11,500 strategic missile warheads. (The United States has some 8,000 nuclear warheads, on average each one-third of the explosive power of the Soviet warheads.) In the. years 1986 to 1990 the Soviet Union is projected by the ME to add an additional 8,000 nuclear warheads to its arsenal of 11,500. (By contrast, the United States plans at present only to add modestly to its strategic warhead numbers.) BY PETER SAMUEL Evidence of the big Soviet nu- clear buildup through this year is in the form of intelligence about the deployment of the latest two Soviet intercontinental nuclear systems, the large SS-24 missile and the smaller SS-25. Twenty bases are being prepared for the SS-25 missiles. At each base, nine sheds with retractable roofs are under construction, but observation of the operations sug- gests the plan is for 10 missiles to be deployed at each base. The Soviet plan for these road-mobile missiles is for at least one missile per base always to be in the field, so the scheme is assessed as a total of 200 missiles (20 bases of 10 missiles each). Though the SS-25s have been tested as single warhead missiles, one source says they are actually capable of carrying three warheads, and that the force being deployed this year will therefore add 600 nuclear warheads to the Soviet arsenal. The United States has com- plained that the SS-25 tests with a single warhead are deceptive be- cause they use only a fraction of the available "throw-weight" or carrying capacity of the missile. Under the SALT agreements, tests with warheads are supposed to use at least 50 percent of available throw-weight. Some SS-25s are classed in the latest intelligence estimate as al- ready deployed. An old SS-7 base at Yurya, now used to base inter- mediate range SS20s, has opera- tional SS-25 missiles. One 55-25 in its launching canister on its wheeled launcher was photographed under camouflage nets at Yurya recently, according to the source. The other operational SS-25 base is at Yash- karola. Also being deployed now by the Soviets are 100 SS-24s, a large 10-warhead nuclear missile similar in design to the long-delayed MX missile. These SS-24s are being deployed out of two bases in the An- change! area, of northern European Russia. Fifty SS-24s are being deployed at the "test center" 00100140001-3 STA of Plesetsk, alongside 200 single warhead SS-16s. Another 50 SS-24s are being deployed immediately at Kostroma, where some have been observed replacing SS-17s in exist- ing silos. At Plesetsk, says U.S. intelligence, there are signs that the SS-24s are going to be deployed immediately as rail-mobile missiles. In this form they are carried in a railroad freight train. Another new development re- ported is the addition of another 40 Tu-95 Bear H cruise missile carry- ing bombers, which has increased the number of Soviet strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to 2,544. President Reagan was, briefed on these developments recently by the CIA. The staff of the National Security Council has said it sup- ports congressional briefings on the new intelligence. The Senate Armed Services Committee and defense appropriations subcommittee are being urged by conservative sen- ators to hold an unusual joint hearing on the subject. The White House has also hinted that a declassified version of the report will be made public shortly. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000' r f WASHINGTON TIMES 13 June 19?..5 STAT 00140001-3 New report credits Soviets with leap in warhead count By Bill Gertz THE WASHINGTON TIMES The White House is preparing to release an unclassified version of a national intelligence estimate, possi- bly in a Senate hearing requested for todav: which sh2ws a dramatic iumn in Soviet ballistic missile warhead levels, an administration defense' expert said. Yesterday, Sen. James McClure, R-Idaho, requested an "urgent" joint hearing with the Senate Armed Ser- vices and Appropriations subcom- mittee on defense to make public the key findings of the study. ? Tfie national intelligence estimate was the subject of a letter from Sens. McClure, Jesse Helms, R-N.C., and John East, R-N.C. to President Rea- gan last week. The senators charged . ._ that information in the estimate shows "the evolving [U.S.-Soviet] military imbalance." Sen. McClure, in a letter to Appro- priations defense subcommittee Chairman Ted Stevens, R-Alaska, said the White House National Secu- rity Council informed him that some findings of the estimate are ready to be released and asked him to request the hearing. The letter was also sent to Armed Services Committee Chairman Barry Goldwater, R-Ariz. A National Security Council spokesman could not be reached for comment. "This year's National Intelligence Estimate confirms Soviet military supremacy" Sen. McClure wrote in. the letter. A spokesman for Sen.- Stevens said the request had been received and aides were attempting to schedule a, hearing for today. According to the administration expert who spoke on the condition he remain anonymous, one finding of the new report shows that warhead levels for Soviet ballistic missiles now total 11,500 warheads. The new figure represents an increase in some 2,000 missile war- heads from figures published two months ago in the Pentagon's annual assessment of Soviet missile war- heads. The figures do not include warheads? delivered on strategic bombers. ? Soviet deployments of the new SS-24 and SS-25 ICBMs account for the increase, the official said. The ; new estimate, he said, indicates that . the Soviet Union has begun deploy- ment of approximately 200 mobile SS-25 ICBMs and 100 large SS-24 missiles configured on railroad track launchers. Besides the new ICBMs, the increase in missile warheads is also attributed to an additional number of warheads on the SS-18 ICBM, the largest missile in the Soviet arsenal. Each SS-18 was thought to carry 10 warheads, but is now estimated to hold 14. The Soviet deployments contrast sharply with the U.S. missile mod- ernization program. The original proposal to deploy 200 MX missiles, a counterpart to the SS-24, has been cut to 50 by Congress. The only mobile U.S. missile is the single war- head Midgetman mobile ICBM, which is being researched. Previous reports on the ? intelli- gence estimate said up to 20 bases for the 5S-25s were sighted bv U.S. intelligence. Each base contains nine garage-like buildings with slid- ing roofs. The bases are expected to eventu- ally hold 10 missiles each, with one ICBM constantly moving and the rest in buildings, the official said. The new estimate indicates that 18 mobile SS-25s currently are deployed and operational, the offi- cial said. The new estimate will also dis- close that the Soviets have completed testing of the SS-24 and have moved the missile into its deployment phase, the official said. Intelligence experts, for the first time, have sighted an operational SS-24 under heavy camouflage on a rail launcher at the Strategic Rocket Forces complex at. Kostroma, he said. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 ANTI C1.1 ON PAGE pproved For Release24M01/132q: gthg9RDP90-0113 10 June 1985 Soviets Said To Hurry Missiles Reagan Expected To Report Today on Their Deployments By Walter Pincus washingion Pat Staff-Writer U.S. intelligence agencies have concluded that the Soviet Union is moving faster than de- y1 op ante: c mis- s& *terns, according to informed sources. ?Tie conclusions of a "National Intelligence Estimate," which inti- mates that Moscow may be poised to begin an ambitious round of new nussile_lieDloymeuis?wilLneinclud- ed in President Reagan's report to Congress today on future U.S. ad- herence to the unratified SALT II treaty, the sources said. As reported earlier, the presi- dent is expected to announce today that the United States will continue to adhere generally to the limita- tions of SALT II but will make "pro- portional responses" to what it de- termines to be Soviet violations of the pact. Given the new intelligence esti- mate, some sources say Reagan may link continued U.S. adherence to the SALT II limits after the trea- ty expires at year's end to some sign of Soviet restraint in these new missile programs and to steps end- ing what the United States consid- ers Soviet violations of SALT IL The new intelligence estimate reportedly concludes that the growth in quality and quantity of Soviet intercontinental ballistic mis- siles appears to be faster than an- ticipated and that two additional large missiles may be flight tested within the next year. One of the larger ICBMs is looked upon as an updated version of the 5818, but the other may be a new type prohibited by SALT II. The United States has observed only testing of solid-fuel engines for this second rocket, so little is known of its eventual configuration. A new solid-fuel Soviet ICBM would violate SALT II. IR any case, new ICBM produc- coulil put the Soviet Union over the SALT II limits relatively quickly unless it takes steps to eliminate large numbers of old silo-based ICBMs and scrap older submarines, as it has done in the past. In a letter to Reagan last week, Republican Sens. James A. McClure (Idaho), Jesse Helms (N.C.) and John P. East (N.C.) identified the National Intel- ligence Estimate as NIE-1I-3-8-85 and said it indicated "a dangerously worsening state of Soviet military supremacy." The three legislators called on the president to give it "the widest possible distribution in Congress. " The Soviets increased the num- ber of their ICBM warheads from approximately 5,500 in 1979 to about 9,200 as of last year, growth that was permitted by SALT H. They could add another 2,000 war- 'heads and still remain within treaty provisions, according to a study by the Federation of American Scien- tists, a group that supports keeping the SALT II limits. The president has already charged that Moscow violated the SALT II agreement by producing more than one permitted new mis- sile and by hiding information on its ICBM tests. Reagan is expected to announce the first "proportional response" today?what will be done this fall when a new Trident submarine car- rying 24 strategic missiles goes on sea trials, taking the United States 14 missiles over a SALT H limit. Sources said .an older U.S. Po- seidon submarine, the USS Sam Rayburn, with 16 missiles, will be removed from active service as a launcher of ballistic missiles. But the process of destroying the sub. R000100140001-3 as required by the treaty, will not begin. Instead, the United States will take advantage of the six months' leeway tha: is allowed on destruc- tion of missiles to determine what the Soviets do in the Geneva arms uegotiationF, and what they do with their missile systems. The announcement today is ex- pected to settle, if only for the time being, a basic disagreement be- tween Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Defense Secretary Cas- par W. Weinberger. Shultz initially proposed contin- ued adherence to the treaty and a supplemental defense spending re- quest to Congress to show resolve in the face of the Soviet violations. Weinberger proposed that the president announce that the United States would let the treaty expire, but would not make any immediate change in the size of the U.S. stra- tegic forces or the pace of their modernization. In the end, sources said, national security affairs adviser Robert C. McFarlane adapted an "adherence- . with-exceptions" approach first sug- gested by Paul H. Nitze, the pres- ident's special adviser on arms con- trol, and Kenneth L. Adelman, di- rector of the Arms Control and Dis- armament Agency. Supporters of the Shultz position pointed out yesterday that the de- cision does not put the United States in violation of the treaty for the time being and, in effect, con- tinues the policy of observing the unratified treaty. it also allows time for the Soviets to respond before a next step is taken. Weinberger aides said they were disappointed that the views of the NATO allies and Congress played more of a part in the president's Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 Colt n tied Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R0 AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY 18 March 1985 CIA, Defense Intelligence Diverge On Soviet Arms Spending Growth ify Brendan M. Greeley, Jr. wasbington?Central Intelligence Agency estimates of a 1-2% Soviet rate of defense spending growth for 1983 differ from the 5-8% estimated by the Defense Intelli- gence Agency but do not indicate any split between the two agencies, according to Robert Gates, chairman of the Nation- al Intelligence Council and deputy three- tor for intelligence at the CIA. The CIA figures became available with the publication of a censored version of testimony given by Gates before a closed session of the subcommittee on interna- tional trade, finance and security econom- ics of the Joint Economic Committee of Congress. The CIA believes that it is too early to estimate 1984 growth, while the DIA believes growth continued at the same 5-8%. Gates said that estimates of Soviet de- fense spending are subject to great uncer- tainties because analysts look at Soviet defense hardware and force levels and fig- ure the cost as equivalent to what it would cost the U. S. to field a similar establish- ment. Because prices are determined by differ- ent factors in the West than in the Soviet Union, the comparisons are at best indica- tions of relative, rather than absolute, spending levels. Both agencies agree that there was little real growth from 1975 through 1982, al- though Soviet defense spending remained at a very high absolute level. "It is time for Washington TO take official notice that Soviet military procurement has been stag- nant for the past seven years and to stop acting like nothing has happened," Sen. William Proxmire (D_-Wis.) said. "It is true that military procurement has leveled off at a rather high level, and the Soviets have been able to add large numbers of weapons to their inventory despite the slowdown." USSR Inventory During the period referred to by Prox- mire, 1977-83. the CIA lists the following purchases by the Soviets: ? 1,100 intercontinental ballistic mis- siles. ? 700 submarine-launched ballistic mis- siles_ ? 300 bombers, including Tu-22M/Tu- 26 Backfires. ? 5.000 fighters, including MiG-23/27 Floggers. ? 15,500 tanks, including T-72s. ? Substantial numbers of naval surface combatants and submarines. Gates pointed out that even though the rate of increase slowed or stagnated dur- ing the period, the Soviets were already at such a high spending level that they were able to . modernize and improve their forces substantially. "The best measure of Soviet military capabilities for use by U. S. decision-mak- ers is what the Soviets actually have bought, are deploying and are develop- ing?rather than an artificial reconstruc- tion of what it cost them," Gates said. He added that cost comparisons have value only when used as analytical tools by ex- perts who understand their very signifi- cant limitations. . Fighter Production Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger made the same point last year when he said the Soviets were producing about 840 fighters a year while the U. S. was produc- ina 350 (Aw&sT Feb. 13, 1984, p. 11). Summarizing CIA testimony over the years, Gates stated that Soviet economic growth, which military growth closely matches, was quite strong during the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s. The mid-1970s marked a turning point when the economy becan TO decelerate and eventually fell below 2% growth from 1979-81. Since then, it has rebound- ed. The Soviet gross national product is very sensitive to fluctuations in agricultur- al production, and the slump .in GNP in the late 1970s is tied closely to poor i bar- vests n those years. Farm output rose by 63% in 1983, reaching an all-time high, d 1984 should reflect similar gains. Industrial production grew by 3.4% in ,1983, and a similar rate seems likely in 1984. The most significant improvement ,13as been in the production of raw match- is and intermediate products. Poor per- formance here in the late 1970s created ? bottlenecks, which affected the entire eLonomy as requirements outpaced sup- plies. In some cases, notably steel, imports [ have been used to take up the slack. Chemical output gains also contributed to it g rowth. 0100140001-3 rFuel Concern pThe energy situation in the Soviet : Union remains a problem. Coal produc- tion continues to fall and oil production r shows scant growth. Gas production is t' up, though, and electric power is becom- ing more plentiful. The CIA attributes the severity of the late 1970s slump to a transportation sys- !'jtem unable to meet demands placed on it ;7- in a country whose size requires an effi- cient network. A poor showing by the railroads during this period is partly to blame, and im- F-provements in this sector have helped the L: industrial recovery. The amount of gas transported by pipe- line continues to rise at double-digit rates, but traffic on highways and rivers has declined. The CIA estimates the iare of the So- viet GNP allotted to defense spending at 13-14%, almost double that in the U. S. This 13-14% share has remained relative- ly constant since 1965 because defense growth has matched economic growth. Some key industries devote disproportion- ately large amounts of their total output to defense. For example, more than 25% of all . machinery production goes to de- fense as well as 20% of all metallurgy production. As examples of intangibles that increase the burden of defense on the economy, the military has priority access to: ? Highest quality raw materials for de- fense. ? Transportation and distribution of raw materials. ? Best industrial workers for the de- fense industry. ' ? National pool of research talent. ? Most advanced machinery. As examples of intangibles that help the economy, the CIA cites possible use of troops and equipment in construction and in helping with the harvest. CIA estimates of the defense burden do not consider the following: ? Subsidized weapon sales. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00010 140001-3 APTINIMPKAM USA TODAY ? 3 A 12 March, 1985 Veil of secrecy to to pierce By Richard Whitmire and John Hanchette USA TODAY While the world waited Mon- day for confirmation of Kon- stantin Chernenko's death, So- viet television led off its morn- ing programs with a feature on baking pumpernickel bread. It was the usual frustration with Soviet secrecy for Krem- linologists ? those who gather information on the Soviet Union ? and many intelli- gence experts say the veil is more impenetrable than ever. One reason, say critics of U.S. intelligence: We're relying too much on computers. The CIA and DIA ? the Defense In- telligence Agency ? have "loSt the sense of the classic analyst with the green eyeshades and soup on his tie," said Paul Smith _ chief editor of the U.S. Information Agency's Prob- lems of Communism. Another possible reason: "The time of governmental re- searchers is almost completely consumed with short-term de- mands from Congress and vari- ous administrative offices," says Oberlin College President S. Frederick Starr. The U.S. intelligence effort also depends on hundreds of university academics, ex-gov- ernment researchers and pro- fessional "think tankers" who pore over obscure bits of infor- mation for clues to Soviet life. For the CIA and DIA, satel- lites "can flag every new fac- tory building, every new road," said Harry Rositzke, who from 1946 to 1970 worked for the CIA. "The old signals like who's standing on the Kremlin Wall are still valid," said Jerry Hough of the Brookings Institu- tion. "But there are lots of newer ones you have to pay at- tention to ? who gets TV play, which commentators are on the most, which economists are published ? shadows on the cave wall." STAT Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 __ApproVed For Re!eat 2005/0111pAS q1)2CIRDM-0 1 20 January 11485 - By Joseph Lelyveld OR FEE CENTRAL Intelligence Agency and its frequently embattled leader, William J. Casey,_ the start of the sec- ond Reagan Admin- istration is more than. just the beltway mark in a mara- thon: .Ronald Reagan is the first President in 12 years to take the oath of office for a second time, but it has been 16 years since a head of the American intelligence community last managed to continue in office from one -Presidential term to the next_ On the previous occasion, in 1969, Richard M. Nixon reluctantly gave in to an argument that be should retain Richard M. Helms as Director of Central Intelligence in order to safeguard the nonpartisan character of the office. There have been five di- rectors since, and Casey ? whom no one has ever called nonpartisan ? has now survived longest of them all. This can be regarded as a footnote, a fluke, or an indication that the ? C.I.A. has essentially weathered the investigations and stricture's of the 1970's, that it has recovered much of its old effectiveness and mystique. The present director, who would mina- _ Joseph Lelyveld is a staff writer for this magazine. ? rally favor the latter interpretation, has tried to function as if it were so, casting himself _in the mold of Allen W. Dulles and John A McCune, who flourished in the 1950's and early 60's, before serious questions had been raised, on either moral? or pragmatic grounds, about covert- action gti a global scale. Like them, rather than like his immediate predecessors, he has been recognized in Washington and beyond for having ready access to the President. Like them, he has not hesitated to make his voice heard at the White House on policy matters as distinct from intelligence evalua- tions. (Indeed, he might even be said to have surpassed them in this re- spect, for, serving a _President who values the Cabinet as a forum, he has managed to become the first Director of Central Intelligence ever to sit at the table as a participating Cabinet member.) And like Dulles in particu- lar ? fondly known to his subordi- _ nates as "the great white case offi- cer" because of his consuming pas- sion for espionage and related gimes ? Mr. Casey is believed to have im- mersed himself deeply in the day-to- day management of clandestine operations. Yet for an assortment of reasons ? some personal, others having to do with changing times and changed ex- pectations of a director ? no one would suggest that official Washing- ton has learned to view William Casey ? hi Sc tx ?Fm 1 137R000100140001-3 STAT -- reliving his youth. -Conservative members, who can be nearly as harsh, tend to portray him as the opposite of an activist director: that. is, as a captive of a Langley bu- reaucracy whose major objective, it is alleged, is to shield itself from con- troversy. The two images overlap, in that neither takes him very seriously as an effective Director of Central In- telligence or an influence on policy, either broadly on matters of national security or narrowly on matters spe- cific to the intelligence community What is involved here is more rhAn a clash of perceptions about Casey. It is also a clash of perceptions about what a Director of Central Intelli- gence should be and, beyond that, about how ready the United States should be to intervene secretly ? politically and, especially, militarily ? in the affairs of other countries. On bath sides ? those who think this di- rector is too active and those who think he is not nearly active enough ? there is a tendency to forget the fun- damental insight that emerged from the investigations of the 1970's: that all directors, finally, are creatures of the Presidents they 'serve. If Presi- dents hear intelligence about the world that conflicts with what they would rather believe, they have the option of setting it aside. But no direc- tor can ignore the President's vials. The different ways directors inter- pret their jobs reflect differences among the Presidents who picked them. - Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-1--- II writ-4 r. tpc-,c7 riTkpproved For Release 2006/010'. agE1011-TOR1N1A3L7ROC f-? . ? i J'anua 5 p, 1.1A Letters to the Editor Errors Espied I am complimented that the Journal de- voted a front-page article to me on Jan. 11; however, it started out flat wrong with its story that many years ago I tried to pur- chase a house already promised to the Jap- anese embassy and that the "brash Mr. Casey didn't get the house." You got the story upside down. Not only did I "get the house" and live happily in it for seven years, but the Japanese embassy had tried to purchase the house that had been prom- ised to me?not the other way around! The article also claims that I sent one particular estimate "back for revision nine times." The record is that I saw and com- mented on the last two drafts. What hap- pened was that the analyst who drafted the, estimate, based on his 20 years of experi- ence in the region and months of research and visits to the area, felt that deletions made by another staff officer would alter or suppress significant information and ? judgments at which the analyst had ar- rived. My role was to restore some of the deletions to ensure that, on a controversial subject, the policymakers got the full range of judgments prevailing in the American Intelligence Community. The es- timate was approved unanimously by the heads of all the members of the Intelli- gence Community. The production of this estimate was reviewed by the House Intel- ligence Committee, which concluded last week in its annual report that: "dissenting views were printed at the very beginning of the study, a practice the Committee ap- plauds." While I cannot comment on your allega- tions attributing certain covert activities to me, your readers should know that any such activity must be directed, authorized and funded by those in the Executive Branch responsible for our national secu- rity and by the Congress as well. WILLIAM J. CAsEy Director of Central Intelligence Washington ? SIAI 0100140001-3 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 TICLEAppALKoved For ReleasgARIMAO%tflA-RDP90-01137R000 Cr: PAGE__2& 6 October 1984 The Beating of trums, tae i,inging of Bells Washington. ON Wednesday of this week, a Congres- sional committee investigating the bombing of the American Embassy in Bei- nit professed its astonishment at the way in which the responsible officials ignored re- peated and credible warnings of the attack. American fortifications in Lebanon had By Lewis H. Lapham been bombed on two prior occasions in the last 19 months, and the probability of the third attack was, in the words of the com- mittee's report, "so unambiguous that there is no iogica: explanation for the lack of ef- fective security." There is, of course, a logical explanation, but it is non-partisan in character and not one likely to attract either votes or ap- plause. As the committee well knows, the typical informed citizen (like the typical congress- man, newspaper columnist or military pro- curement officer) really doesn't care much for facts. If given a choice in the matter, he prefers to believe in myths. Myths are, after all, easier to understand and easier to remember. They also eliminate the tire- some chore of having to study something other than one's self. __Pre-sit-tilt Reagan, like most novelists _ . ..?_ . : and all actors, knows that stories move from truth to facts, not the other way ,- around, and that the tellers of tales seek to convey not the details but the essence of a thing. People like to believe what they're told, to imagine the distant forces of history speaking to them in a warm and human . voice. Mr. Reagan's delight in myths accounts for his genial carelessness with respect to numbers, dates, events and names. His in- souciance enrages the officious people in' the national media who berate Mr. Reagan for the slovenliness of his memory. In the phrasing of their editorial rebukes, they of- ten sound like an exasperated mother tell- ing her 13-year-old son to clean up his room. They might as well be trying to teach geometry to an elk. Americans choose to see the world as , they wish to see it, not, as it is, and this bi- partisan habit of mind (as characteristic of 00140001-3 Democrats as of Republicans) sets the course of American foreign policy as well as the terms of the national political debate. By now it has become axiomatic that if a coup d'etat takes place anywhere in the world, the gentlemen at the Central Intelli- gence Agency will be among the last to hear the news, and the State Department will re- spond with its customary expression of po- lite surprise. Certainly this was true in Iran, not only with respect to the advent of the Ayat011ah - Khomeini but also with regard to the sei- zure of the American hostages. In the course of the subsequent recriminations, it was discovered that none of the embassy of- ficials could speak Farsi. Six months before Yuri Andropov died, the American Embas- sy in Moscow lost track of his whereabouts and, to the best of anyone's knowledge, no- body in the American government ever knows what the Israelis will do next. A week ago, it was reported in Washing- ton that the CIA had cashiered one of its operatives because he persisted in sending dispatches insultingly at odds with what his superiors wished to believe about Mexico. Precisely the same question ? about the political- uses of intelligence data ? lies at the root of the argument in the trial that will begin next week in New York between General William Westmoreland and CBS News. The indifference to facts shows up in so many other American advertisements for reality that it isn't fair to locate the genius for myth in any one city or profession. The book publishers in New York, like the makers of television docudra_mas in Holly- wood, routinely mix the elements of fact and fiction in a compound substance malle- able enough to fit the molds of whatever images the public wishes to buy in large vol- ume. The ritual finding of facts belongs to the category of religious spectacle. As the cam- paigns increasingly come to resemble corn or harvest festivals, so also the loud shout-, ? ing of facts bears comparison to the beating of drums and the ringing of bells. The old- est and wisest members of Congress know that if enough committees keep up an in- cessant din for 40 days and 40 nights, ther., with the rising of the hunter's moon, a great. spirit will descend and turn the facts into myths. Lewis H. Lapharn is the editor-of 13arp- 00W041183i0CIA-RDP9041137R0150100140001-3 Approved For Release 2 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00 WASHINGTON PO5 I ARTICLE kEDFEARED 5 Oct ober 1984 Oh FASE - STAT 0100140001-3 EWERS TO THE EDITOR Soviet Arms Spending Ellen Goodman's column-on Sept. 25 ["Force Feeding," op-ed] is one of several places where I have seen the CIA's method of measuring Soviet de- fense spending criticized_ According to her, the CIA's method is to count up Soviet military equipment ,and person- nel and calculate how much it would cost the United States to produce the same amount of equipment and field the same number of personnel. Obvi- ously, this method does not actually tell us how many rubles the Soviets are spending on defense since, as Ellen Goodman points out, the cost of produting things in the Soviet Union may differ from the cost of producing them here. For this reason, she de- scribes the CIA method as "fanciful," "bizarre" and "bogus." If we do not know the actual Soviet cost of producing a specific item, using the U.S. cost of the item as an esti- mate seems to me as good a method as any other. Even when we do know the Soviet cost, I think it is better to use the U.S. cost. For example, she notes that the CIA calculates the cost' of a Soviet private at $573 a month (the U.S. cost), even though the Sovi- ets pay their privates only about $100 , per month. If the CIA were to. use the actual Soviet cost, its calculations would show that the United Stats was "outspending" the Soviets on military personnel even if the Soviets had five men in uniform for every one , of ours. Under the circumstances, to use Soviet costs to measure their de- fense efforts and U.S. costs to mea- - sure our defense efforts would be dan- gerously misleading. WILLIAM W. CHIP Washington Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-0113 7:7277.0 PORTLAND OREGONIAN 28 September 1984 /7tnalyst quit In CIA dispute 6..orripiled from stall and wire reports WASHINGTON ? The senior Lat- in. America analyst at the Central In- telligence Agency resigned in May af- ter William J. Casey, director of the CIA, insisted that he revise a report on Mexico so it would support Reagan administration policy, intelligence of- ficials asserted Thursday. 7 The intelligence officials told the New York- Times that-Casey -wanted the report to portray the economic and political problems of Mexico as a threat to its internal stability, as well as an indirect danger to the overall security of Central America and the United States. ? ? . The officials said that when the analyst, John R. Horton, refused to revise the report on the ground that intelligence data did not support such an alarmist conclusion, Casey had the rsport rewritten by another analyst. -- 7R000100140001-3 STAT -? A spokeswoman for the CIA, Ka- ' thY Pherson, said that Casey would not comment on the Horton case and that the agency could not discuss spe- cific intelligence estimates because they were classified. She confirmed that Horton left the agency in May but said he did so after his contract ex- pired. Other intelligence officials said Horton's contract would ordinarily have been renewed but that he decided to leave the agency. "There is pressure from Casey on slbjects that are politically sensitive to jigger estimates to conform with poli- cy," Horton said Thursday.. He --- He declined to comment further about his departure from the CIA, say- ibg was preparing an article on Lis views for publication next month. Administration officials said that ?&sey wanted a tougher report from rfprton:. in part to help persuade the \liite House to approve a program of covert and economic American pres- sures on Mexico to induce its support ferr.U.S. policies in Central America. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 ? Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R030100140001-3 PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (ME) 7 September 1984 7ealotry'calledCIAcrimp By CLARK T. IRWIN JR. Staff Writer American policy in Central America is being decided in an atmosphere where White House 'zealotry" and 'very strong ide- ological clamps" prevent full discussion of options, a former Central Intelligence Agency offi- cer said Thursday in Portland. - In his first interview since re- signing as Latin American spe- cialist on the National Intelligence Council in May, John R. Horton told the Press Herald that "Where there's a strong political feeling in the ad- ministration, there's pressure to skew intelligence estimates." Horton was interviewed at the home of his son, lawyer Mark Horton, before a talk for the World Affairs Council of Maine. _ Despite his resignation, Horton said tie has no policy fight with the current adminis- tration. "I think our broad policy in Central America is completely correct," he said, describing that policy as supporting a restora- tion of democracy and civilian government in El Salvador, re- sisting rebels supported by Nic- aragua and Cuba and "opposing the attempt of the Sandinistas (the Nicaraguan revolutionary junta) to close their society up completely." His objection, he explained, is to political pressures for intelli- gence officers to massage their "national intelligence estimates" to f5Tlitiafli? the "inferior quality of dis- ? culiicii-i"--res-uiting trorrithe sqldiirTg -of-sompointe of view. -CIA Director William Casey called Horton out of eight years of retirement last year to help prepare intelligence appraisals of Latin American countries for the National Intelligence Coun- cir The council's members rep- resent the CIA, the State Department, the Defense Intelli- gence Agency and the armed forces. As chairman of the team doing Latin American estimates, Horton gave Casey an estimate on the political, economic, mili- tary and diplomatic strength and capabilities of a major Latin American country important to U.S. policy concerns. But the CIA director "wanted the estimate to come out a cer- tain way" to strengthen the case for administration policy. Horton said, "and kept constant pressure on me to redo it." "I refused to do it, so he finally had the thing re- written over my dead body, so to speak," at which point Horten resigned. That experience, he added, is not typical of the estimating process, which he believes is producing more and better readings than during the _Carter ad- ministration. The more general concern, he said, is that incom- plete discussion of options for carrying out policy could lead to decisions that will eventually harm the country's intelligence services. For example, he said, "It's no secret" that Cuba and Nicaragua are supplying arms, communications assistance and espionage data to the leftist rebels in El Salvador. .S._ce "Interdiction (military attempts to mit sup- port)asn't worked and can't work," and since no one is seriously proposing to remove the Sand iniita regime in Nicaragua forcibly, Horton argued, it might be prudent to discuss offering Nicaragua a deal of reduced pressure if they stop supporting the Salvadoran revolutionaries. But Casey's final vote at National Foreign Intelli- gence Board meetings ? this being a group which reviews the National Intelligence Council's .esti- mates ? and "constant crunching back and forth" between the administration and "pragmatic people" at the State Department tends to suppress such dis- cussion, Horton said. On the administration side, he said, there is a group of 'very bright people" including U.N. Am- bassador Jean Kirkpatrick, Casey and Undersecre- tary of Defense Fred Ikle, 'who are either against any type of compromise with the Sandinistas, or if not against it, suspicious that State can't handle it. "There's a real distrust of the State Department," Horton said, 'this feeling in the administration that 'State's soft.'" Aside from the risk of the country's being given flawed policy decisions because of unexamined op- tions, Horton said, there's the "institutional risk" that the CIA will be left holding the bag. "At .some point," he continued, "Reagan and ? Casey are going to be in some other world or retired from public life. If any cans get hung around any- one's neck for Central America, it won't be Reagan's or Casey's ? it's going to be the CIA's." ? That could lead to a repeat of the post-Watergate, post-Vietnam backlash against the agency and again impair the country's ability to supply its decision- - makers with the best intelligence information and analysis possible, Horton fears. A registered Democrat, Horton also said, "I want ? to be fair about this thing.... It's not just this ad- ministration." When the Sedinistas seized power in NiceWA TINTL r? in 1979, he said, President Carter's National Securi- Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-011 37R000100140001-3 PRI- I CLE AVFLARED Release 2006/01 to 9 -iF1l11l 37R000100 27 August 1984 Chemical Arms In Terrorism Feared by CIA The gravest "clear and present danger posed by chemical and bi- ological weapons is not from ag- gressor nations, which are re- strained by fear of retaliation, but from terrorists or lunatics who de- cide to use these hideous weapons for blackmail or to publicize their causes. A secret CIA "Special National Intelligence Estimate," which had the concurrence of eight other fed- eral intelligence agencies, ex- , presses concern that the use ofsoi- son gas bx the Soviets and the Iraqis who got the inz.edients from West German companjesi "could influence the attitudes of ter- forists toward use of chemical and biological weapons." The report, which was reviewed by my associate Dale Van Atta, points out that chemical-biological weapons are not yet popular among terrorists?probably because they're terrified of them. But it warns that "one successful incident involving such [lethal] agents would significantly lower the threshold of . restraint on their application by oth- er_ terrorists.' " In fact, these weapons have been used in isolated cases by terrorists and others. In 1978, for example, a Palestinian group injected cyanide into citrus fruit exported by Israel. Huk guerrillas in the Philippines poisoned pineapples destined for export. In both cases, rapid and ef- fective response to the discovery of the poisoned fruit prevented fatal- ities. Similar incidents of 'consumer terrorism" have been attributed to individuals, like the person who in- jected cyanide into pain-reliever capsules, and the ex-convict in Aus- tralia who threatened to infect herds with hoof-and-mouth disease last January. The low cost of chemical-biolog- ical weapons and their relatively easy availability make them attrac- tive to terrorists. Once they have overcome their fear of the weapons through training?by the Soviets, for example?terrorists will see the advantage of deadly agents that can be smuggled into a target area vir- tually immune from detection. It costs hundreds of millions of dollars to build a nuclear bomb, whereas any reasonably intelligent biology or chemistry student can make a kilogram of deadly Type A botulin toxin for $400, according to Pentagon consultant Joseph Doug- lass. He adds that with a forged re- search permit a terrorist could get ,anthrax germs by mail for $35. One supply house offers samples of five toxins, including the probable lethal 40001-3 1/-k I ingredient of "yellow rain," for less than $100. A group of experts told a United Nations panel in 1969 that "for a large-scale operation against a ci- vilian population, casualties might cost about $2,000 per square kilo- meter with conventional weapons, $800 with nuclear weapons, $600 with nerve-gas weapons and $1 with biological weaporit.: Inflation may have changed the figures, but not the deadly bargain ratio. " The United States ,is wide open to terrorists with chemical-biolog- ical operations in mind. The only federal agency that monitors the sale of deadly pathogens is the Ag- riculture Department. Universities and other research laboratories are poorly guarded, and the necessary knowledge is easy to gather. -Clandestine production of chem- ical and biological weapons for a multiple-casualty attack generally raises no greater technical obsta- cles than does the clandestine pro- duction of chemical narcotics or heroin," the CIA report concludes. Among law enforcement agen- cies, the Secret Service is partic- ularly aware of the near-impossi- bility of protection against chem- ical-biological attacks. An expert told the presidential bodyguards that he could stroll through the White House with a tour group and leave behind an undetectable poison that would kill all the building's in- habitants by the next morning. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 ARTICLE AppEARgroved For Reims? M0glifaiLyAi-MAO-01137R00 ON PAGE 02_7 25 June 1984 Special Report i. -? ???.., Covert actions, such as mining of Nicaraguan ports, make the headlines. But developments elsewhere In America's secret spy agency are even more far-reaching. After a four-year program to beef up the Central Intelli- gence Agency, the results can now be seen?a spy service with new muscle and influence to match. Flush with money and manpower, the CIA is back at work worldwide, operating on a scale not seen since the Vietnam War. Even its mission has been expanded. On top of espionage, intelligence analysis and covert operations, the agency has joined the wars on terrorism, international drug traffickers and Soviet theft of U.S. technological secrets. One thing has not changed. CIA involvement in covert operations still stirs passions and controversy. Congress is threatening to bar funds to finance the "secret wax" against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. The turnaround, pushed hard by President Reagan and CIA Director William J. Casey, has elevated the spy unit from a state of disrepute during the 1970s to a newfound position of power and influence on foreign policy. Central to the agency's changing fortunes is Casey, whose close political and personal ties to Reagan give the CIA the kind of White House access?and credibility?it has not had for years. The despair that gripped the organi- zation during what were called "the troubles" has lifted. But some critics fear that the revitalized agency is be- coming too influential arid that Casey has too much say in the shaping of U.S. policy. Others warn that CIA Director C covert actions will drag America into combat. cr_ Congress, while attempting to keep a tight buildup of the organization even before Casey rein on the CIA, actually began pushing the took over and has strongly supported it since. g This backing stems in part from a need for better. 8 intelligence about a growing Soviet military ca- I pability. The CIA is also seen as providing Amer- ica with a means of intervening in world crises without sending in combat units. Headquartered in the Washington .suburb of Langley, Va., the supersecret agency, with up to 18,000 staffers, has long been embroiled in controversy. While most concern has focused on covert activities, these are by no means the most important part of a broader mission. Clandestine Wars Return Nowhere is Casey's influence more apparent than in the revival of covert action?missions Approved For Release 200 some of them filled The effects of thi being felt around th ? In Afghanistan, support for Moslem tion forces. Annual the like?now is said ? In El Salvador, political groups in th Jesse Helms (R-N C) in the victory of Jos?apoleon Duarte. All told, says one official with access to inside informa- tion, the agency is engaged in about half a dozen large-scale covert operations overseas. The CIA may conduct as many as 50 minor secret projects. That number, while far smaller than in the CIA's peak years, nonetheless marks a signifi- cant increase in covert action under Reagan. Far and away the most eye-catching operation is in Nica- ? ragua. Under Casey, officials report, some 73 million dollars has been spent to build up anti-Sandinista contra forces to 12,000 rebels. The CIA has coordinated airlifts, planned attacks and built a sophisticated communications network for the larg- est paramilitary action since the Vietnam War?activities that have sparked charges that the agency's covert opera- tions have gotten out of hand once again. But Senator David Durenberger (R-Minn.), a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee and a frequent critic of the CIA, says: "The question is: Did Reagan leap in to start up operations? And the answer is no. While the inclination to use covert operations is stronger, there's still a great deal of care.." Even within the staff at Langley, Casey's enthusiasm for asey on Capitol Hill for hearings on secret operations. Ar Approved For Release 20W1/03 ? CIA-fDP90-01137R00 ARTICLE AFI'EA.-,31' YORK POS ON PAGE 9- 1 9 March 1984 TS D By-NILES-LATHEM ? ?Bureau WASHINGTON -- The ..Soviet_ Ilnion has ne-arif -doubled --the number of missiles pointed at the U.S. since -the SALT II ?treaty- arts, according to a grim -analyebt by VS. " Intelligence agencies.' - - Senior 'Defense Depart- ment -and-=Congressional officials -told The Post - that '-a _Nedra:al Int111- - ence Estimate _preowned the CIA .and the--De-- showed that-the soviet nu- clear arsenal aimed at the U.S. has increased by an astonishing 80-85 per cent- Amr,...S4oWa2acccst 'This is far greater than ? ? - duringt.hiselection year. - --= In a resent ippearence . -Congress; ; Assistant' :Secretary - of - DefenseRichard -,--Parle admitted that rthe Size of the Krem- lin -nuclear -force has grown by roore . than 75 percent: _ ? ut 1)ffic1alz who have seen the CIA/DIA esti- mate, completed this _ Month-- Bay lhat the still - secret figures. are more -staggering- - than what revealed. - - According to these Sourrea the Soviets - ' - ? Increased their total number of nuclear war- _ heads .pointed at the U.S. from about -5000 in 1979 to -19400.- . - ? In cr -*abed -,the total . number of missile 'winch- era -to -nearly -2503 which :of5ciaj5 -say violates a EALTlimitot.ZZ25.' ? These figures include all _subniaccine4aunched and biteroontineotal ;ballistic . 'They do-not in- - dude . nuclear .warheads from strategic bombers -- - an area where the U.S.-is ? known to have azi over whelming edge. theincreaseof the U.S. nu-' _clear-weaqxxis targeted at the-Soviet-Union-over the samelime period. - ? . Officials said ..that :the - analysis . has sent shock- waves -throughout . -the White -Houae and the Na- tional:. -Security 'Council and.'poses major dl- lemma for President'Rea- ? gan who ? is anxiously ? seeking -to - avoid confron- , tationa with the ,Kremlin. ? Despite the Relegate' ministration's inaasho, i defense buildup over the 'past three years, the num- ber-of U.S. :nuclear war-,5 ? heads now aimed at the ,-. Soviet Union II about eC01 .. --At the same time, totalznumber of U.&-inW Biles- latuichers cream front 1250 triabout 1300 next year;:to -eomply": -with the SA.LT treaty, qtri; cialsaayi- 7 :21 ? - ? mate 'conies on the -heels '4 of the 1 recent corepletionf:, a 27$-page report of the -- Arms amnia' Diaarma- - menf Agency wfdch de ?_Ulla -more than 40 Soviet 'F. ; violations oft4e EATAT_,n7 cord& ? ? Although R4agan said publicly in the past - to months that he heves the Soviets are tido- ' lating the SALT &Cowan, - officials believe that if ? Reagan were to challenge -the .Soviet Union and ?make a major' btsue Out of ? these violations tt would result in. a -new outbreak;" . tensions with?the Dew - Kremlin leadership. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 NEWS FOES:Waved For Release 2egtaim :CI .LN A:RDP90- N01137R0001 CAL & tw.,EERING EWS 9 January 1984 ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE 1? 00140001-3 U.S. claims it has incontrovertible proof the Soviet Union is involved in use of toxin weapons, but evidence it has made public is tenuous For years, and from faraway places have come reports of death and sickness from the skies. The tales from ruggedly independent and mostly illiterate mountain people of Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan tell of aircraft-, rocket-, and artillery-delivered clouds of yel- lowish material that killed rapidly and grotesquely those directly hit. Villagers more fortunate and further away became ill, but with a strange combination of symp- toms. Survivors often told tales of mys- NEWS A Lois R. Ember, C&EN Washington flooded local embassies after alleged reilow rain attacks. The mysterious toxic agent causing these symptoms re- mained elusive to the chemist's probe for seven years. Then on Sept. 13, 1981, in West Germany, Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig addressed the Berlin Press Association. In an otherwise unno table speech. Haig said: "For some time now, the inter- national community has been NAL YSIS terious yellow rainlike spots on or near their villages that they called yellow rain and as- sociated with deaths and illnesses. These tales spurred U.S. investigations. First U.S. embassy personnel col- lected the victims' grim stories. Then military physicians examined these people, now in refugee camps, for signs of chemical agents used. And finally, the U.S. launched an intensified search for physical evidence. ? From the early surveys came the speculation that three possible agents?a harassing agent, a nerve gas, and an unknown chemical?were being used. Chemical anal- ysis of collected material proved futile. No traditional chemical agent?no riot control gas, mustard gas, or nerve gas?could be detected. And still the reports of skin irri tatioiApprblitticFrOr R6Ibilistd20o0117t/013 ?LICIA vomiting, of dizziness and trembling, and of death .:AnLlare 19E4 alarmed by continuing reports that the Soviet Union and its, allies have been using lethal chemical weapons in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghani- stan .... We now have physical evidence from Southeast Asia which has been analyzed and found to contain ab- normally high levels of three potent mycotoxins?poi- sonous substances not indigenous to the region and which are highly toxic to man and animals." With these words, amplified the next day by under- secretary of State for political affairs Walter J. Stoessel and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, an obscure issue was thrust into the spot- light. The physical evidence that Haig referred to turned out to be a single leaf and twig from Kampuchea. This veg- etation was contaminated with parts-per-million _RD4290.tilpp1sIRttogoictot4eobicene toxins, substances produced by Fusarium fungi. This detection of fungal Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00010 ARTICLE APPEARED ON RAGE 2 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 5 January 1984 US declassifies documents on Latin America policy Washington President Eisenhower told his top ! advisers in 1954 the US was in Latin America to fight "a war . . . against communism," ac- cording to docu- ments declassi- fied by the State Department. In a National Security Council meeting in No- vember 1954, Ei- senhower said: "You must think of our policy in Latin America as chiefly designed to play a part in the cold war against our ' enemies. Russia would shortly step ! into any vacuum if we allowed one to develop in Latin America." One declassified .national intelli- gence estimate, prepared under CIA director Allen Dulles, warned that the presence in Latin America of United Fruit Company, which was influen- tial in the Eisenhower administration, was increasingly resented by inde- pendent Latin American governments. 3140001-3 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 ,?.?????=.? ? THE NEW REPUBLIC ARTICLE APPEARRp -Led For Release 2006A10,s3sieGas-F111M01137 e Casey's smart (and rich), but does he run a ft R000100140001-3 TINKER, TINKER, TINK1 BY MORTON KONDRACKE UNITED STATES intelligence apparently had an idea that the so-called Party of God, an Iranian- connected, Syrian-protected Shiite Moslem group that car- bombed the U.S. Embassy in Beirut last April, was plan- ning an attack on U.S. Marines. But U.S. intelligence did not have agents inside the group and therefore could not warn with precision that it was planning the truck- bombing that killed more than 230 Marines on October 23. U.S. intelligence knew, too, that Cuba and the Soviet Union were militarizing Grenada, but again the United States had no in- telligence agents on the island and underestimat- ed Cuban troop strength. The U.S. had not pene- trated Maurice Bishop's New Jewel Movement, and did not know that Bishop's colleagues were planning to oust and kill him. And when Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica reported to the White House press on October 23 that "we noted with great interest the movements between Soviet Embassies and known activists" prior to Bishop's assassination, it also was news to White House policymakers. On the other hand, the Central Intelligence Agency did predict correctly that the Soviet Union would not invade Poland in 1981, but would crack down through Polish authorities instead. Using its superb technical capabilities, U.S. intelligence was able to develop a precise analysis of how Korean Air Lines' Flight 007 was tracked by the Soviet Union, lost, found again, and shot down. And, several months before Leonid Brezhnev's death, the director of Central Intelligence, Wil- liam Casey, reported to President Reagan that Brezhnev likely Would not be succeeded by a collective leadership, as agency analysts had concluded. "Chernenko peaked too soon," Casey wrote Reagan in a memo. "Kirilenko faded in the stretcl bet money, I'd say across the board." Casey's prescier, lance, is likely to lx ing to well-informi more disturbingtm tell the President I. dropov had pushe. DRAWING BY VINT LAWRENCE FOR THE NEW REPUBLIC Approved For Release 2006/01/03: Zler was Klanappea oy the Red Brigades in Italy, the C.I.A. dug hard to discover who had him and where; but U.S. offi- cials say that in general, journalists like Claire Sterling have put togeth- er a better picture of in- ternational terrorist net- works than the C.I.A. When Turkish gunman Mohammed Ah Agca shot the Pope, they say, the President found out more about Soviet and Bulgarian involvement from Reader's Digest than from U.S. intelligence. The C.I.A. can't know everything, but the Republican Party correctly declared in its 1980 election platform that ''the United States requires a realistic assessment of the threats it faces" and "must have the best intelligence capa- bility in the world." The platform said, "Republicans pledge this for the United States." Three years into this Republican Administration, the United States certainly has a better intelligence capability than it did in 1980?it could hardly fail in that?but overall it is still far from the best in the world. Can William J. Casey make it so? Well, he gets credit for trying?even from his adversaries--but there's reason to doubt that he can. LONTIIVUED CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 ARTICLE APPEARED LOS ANGTTYS TIMES ON PAGE 4.2_ 26 November 1983 Nicaraguans May Vote on Assembly; CIA Assesses Rebels MANAGUA, Nicaragua (Ai?This country's leftist junta is expected to announce the date for long-prom- ised elections on Dec. 4. But political sources said Friday that the balloting probably will be for a constituent assembly, not for president. "There exists a great possibility that (junta coordina-_ tor Daniel) Ortega will announce Dec. 4 the date for elections for a constituent assembly," said a political source who spoke on condition he not be named. "The plan for a constituent assembly could be stalled only if some last-minute delay or problem comes up," another source said. Rafael Solis, deputy commander of the Council of State, told journalists recently that Ortega would announce the election date Dec. 4., when the council,1 which now serves as the nation's legislature, completes its Mx-month session. The political sources said that the constituent assembly would probably write a new constitution to outline future presidential elections. Nicaragua has not had a constitution since the 1979 ouster of the rightist regime of the late strongman Anastasio Somoza: The leftist Sandinista National Liberation Front, in power since the revolution, has said repeatedly that elections will be held in 1985. The Sandinistas' critics, including President Reagan, charge that the gov- ernment has reneged on promises to hold early elections and develop a system of political pluralism. The Reagan Administration is providing covert aid to rebels fighting to overthrow the Sandinistas. Washing- ton contends that Nicaragua helps infiltrate arms to leftist guerrillas in U.S.-backed El Salvador. CIA Appraises Rebels The Washington Post reported Friday that the CIA has concluded that U.S.-backed guerrillas in Nicaragua lack the punch to topple the Sandinistas. Quoting congressional sources, the newspaper also said there are indications that Washington is beginning to give some thought to how the war by the counterrevolutionaries can be wound down. The CIA says the rebels lack the military capability, "financing, training and political support to overthrow the powerful and well-entrenched Sandinistas, the newspaper said. ST1T (In Washington on Friday, a senior Administration official told a reporter that the CIA assessment "has been overtaken by events." He said that the CIA analysis "goes back to last summer. Since -then the 'resistance' forces (contras) have become much stron- ger, the population has become much more supportive in parts of Nicaragua, and the weaknesses of the (Sandin- ista) regime have become much more apparent. ("The Administration is clearly in favor of continued support for the resistance forces. It is not at all their ?purpose to overthrow the (Sandinista) government, but to try to bring about change," he said. (Asked if recent Sandinista overtures to the Roman Catholic Church, business and the press, provided evidence of such change, the official replied: "We are not interested in cosmetic changes. But it is clear that by diverting their energies, they are forced _to reduce the' amount of aid to the Salvadoran guenillas.") Interior Minister Tomas Borge said Thursday that Nicaragua would be willing to get rid of its Cuban military advisers if Honduras and El Salvador get rid of their U.S. military advisers. Withdrawal of all foreign forces in Central America is a cornerstone of a proposed regional peace treaty drafted by the So-called Contadora Group?Mexico, Venezuela. Panama and Venezuela. Citbans Reported Leaving Government Sources say that 1,200 Cubans of the more than 8,000 here?most of them civilians?already have left for home. The United States has 55 military trainers in El Salvador and about 200 in Honduras. An Interior Ministry source said Friday that Borge plans a 10-day tour of the United States to lecture at universities and meet with congressmen, religious leaders and the news media. - Meanwhile, the publisher of the newspaper La Prensa, an important voice of opposition to the Sandinista government, said Friday that the newspaper will suspend publication indefinitely Dec. 7 for lack of. paper. "Our paper reserves are running out and the shipments of paper that friendly businesses in the United States and Canada have promised us cannot arrive before Dec. 7," publisher Pedro Joaquin Chamor- ro said at 'a meeting with the newspaper's more than 200 employees. "Therefore we are obliged to close the paper indefinitely." La Prensa, which has clashed frequently with the leftist government, has had problems with newsprint supply for the past two years. Financially strapped Nicaragua has only limited foreign exchange to buy such foreign-made goods as newsprint, and the government_ recently reduced newsprint allocation to Nicaragua's three daily papers. They now can print only 10 pages on weekdays and 14 on Sundays. Because of this, La Prensa asked for donations of newsprint from newspapers abroad. _ Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 Approved For Release 2006/01/03: ARTICLE AFTEARED 021 PAGE ki WASHINGTON POST 25 November 1983 U.S.-Backed Rebels Can Nicaraguan Regime, CIA Finds By Patrick E. Tyler Wroihington Post SUff Writer The CIA has concluded that there are no circumstances under which a force of U.S.- backed rebels can achieve a military or polit- ical victory over the leftist Sandinista govern- ment of Nicaragua, according to congressional -sources. In addition,, there are indications that the administration, despite its tough public pos- ture, is beginning to give some thought to how the war could be wound down and how an am- ? nesty "for the American-supported forces could ? be arranged. In a National Intelligence Estimate provided to the congressional oversight, committees this fall Coinciding With crucial votes to continue funding to the rebel forces, the CIA said the US-hacked 'contra" forces made up of 10.000 ? to 12,000 guerrillas lack the military capability, financing, -training and political support to overthrow the powerful and well-entrenched Sandinista government with its relatively large and well-equipped standing army of 25,000 soldiers and even larger militia forces. The CIA analysis, according to these sources. Concludes that the Sandinista leader- ship is controlled by hard-line Marxists who will not give up in any kind of military con. frontation with the contras. In addition, the CIA has concluded that the U.S.-backed - counterrevolutionary forces have not -been able to win enough support in the Nicaraguan population to overthrow the Sandinistas, who seized power four years ago after ousting Gen. Anastasio Somoza. ? Administration officials said on previous occasions that they did not think the U.S.- backed force was strong enough to overthrow the .Nicaraguan -government, but the rapid growth of the rebel army .from its original 500-man level authorized by Congress and . the loosely defined administration goals left many Members of Congress uncertain as to President ..Reagan's true intentions in Nic- aragua. , With the new CIA analysis, Reagan has also stated for the first time that he wants a general amnesty for U.S.-backed rebels who have been fighting the Sandinista govern- ment as part of the CIA-directed force. Rea- gan included the amnesty provision in a se- cret document justifying the covert action to Congress. The amnesty provision would be a precondition to a cessation of hostilities, sources said." The document, a presidential "finding" under the National Security Act., was presented to the congressional committees in September by Secretary of State George P. Shultz and CIA Director William J. Casey. The amnesty provision is not spelled out in any detail in the finding, and a number of questions have been raised in the congres- sional committees as to how it would he ap- plied and enforced. It is not clear whether exiles who are fighting the Sandinistas would be allowed to return to their homes in Nic- aragua or win back property seized by the ?government: But the most recent discussions between the administration and Congress have cre- ated the impression that the administration is giving careful thought to how to end the 2-year-old secret war against Nicaragua. The amnesty provision addresses an issue that has been unresolved in two years of private consultations between the administration _ and congressmen fearful that Reagan and the CIA were slowly committing the United States to thousands of Nicaraguan exiles whosef would b uncertainif a ne oti- ated settlement of regional tensions were reached in Central America. Last spring, Casey warned in private of a potential "bloodbath" if Congress withdrew _ support from the U.S.-backed rebel force_, ? House cut off funding for the covert ' operation twice this year, but in a compro- mise with the Senate, legislators ended the session by approving $24 million to fund the covert paramilitary operations at least until June under a mandate to keep military pres- sure on the Sandinistas until they stop sup- porting leftist guerrillas fighting the govern- ment of neighboring El Salvador. . The CIA has concluded that paramilitary harassment from the U.S.-backed contras, ' who have been operating from bases in Hon. duras since early 1982, has caused the San- dinista government to reconsider its support' for the Salvadoran guerrillas and may even- tually persuade the Sandinistas to abandon the Salvadoran leftists altogether. According to one congressional source, who spoke on the condition he not be identified, there is a bipartisan consensus, especially in the Sen- ate, that the covert policy of the Reagan ad- ministration for the first time is consistent with publicly stated policy goals of the U.S. government and the governments of the Central American region. Under this view, many members of the congressional oversight committees report- edly have beeome convinced that the admin- istration is willing to end its secret war ? against Nicaragua as soon as the Sandinistas give concrete and verifiable assurances that they will no longer give aid, commend and control and logistical support to the Salva- doran- guerrilla movement. Doubt remains, however, among members who were surprised by an administration effort during the summer to redraft a pres- idential justification for the covert operation in terms that some members believed would have committed the U.&-backed forces to an all-out victory over the Sandinista govern- _ _ _ _ ment if it was not willing to rriake substan- tial political and diplomatic concessions. In this draft presidential "finding," the administration said the secret war was nec- essary to stop the spread of revolution from Nicaragua to other countries. It also stated a necessity to .keep up covert paramilitary op- erations until Nicaragua returned to a dem- ocratic form of government, reduced its level -of armament and guaranteed press and re- ligious freedoms. Many members considered the latter demands as diplomatic goals, not suitable for inclusion in the secret justifica- tion as preconditions to cease hostilities. frgYIEVVED Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00 AMC:LE ILATTEARM PAGE_L-11__ WASHINGTON TIMES 1 November 1983 mustache, -chaps and a By Tom-Nugent:-- horse . and he was the lam in ? Josephine-County! e's a retired U.S. Army "joe Rutsela. His picture general: He's .the for- hangs on the wall of the county rner chief of the U.S. courthouse-, even today. Sitting Defense Intelligence on his horse, and glaring_ And Agency- And he's the cootrover- you knew that you didn't want ? siai creator of "'High Frowzier" to get crosswise o( the law . . Wasizingron-nased public "Well, I lived with hi= for a interest group which hopes to 'couple of years. I was just a kid. end the threat of nuclear war And one day I walked iI5Z0 that by piacing non-nu-clear wear'- cabin . . I'd just gotten into a Das in outer space. fist fight with a half-breed ? A rather, imposing back- ' [Indian] kid named Sonny ground, you -would think at Thompson, and be was a lot first- . tougher than L was, and he Butif you want to understand. thrashed.lne!." :Dan- . Grahaz*, - He-laughs a-gahr-here.. It's a i.-stand: Dan Graham., then you raspy sound, since be smokes have to Kan someplace else. all the time, like a saw going You have to start, a.s a matter th rough dried lumber. of fact, with his grandfather's "HARRGGIMA" and yessir, thandleba_r mustache. " he's having a good tune, this ."POW!" three-star American general, You have to start with:the for- remembering the pounding- he naer three-star general, now,-.5i,,oncerj,!?took.-. "Viell,",- recounts years .sittua- gin. his... dowrL,,,CT.raham._'ff I camein pretty well Washingicat,-office and-IL-binged-up, anti-hi-Wing:. And.' pounding his--Tiglitiistirito.hisF;:badthezaisfortimeAn. TUII- intp 7 4eir,palmrtt.P0WT,7;,:,-ts ::2,-./4'.,-trandfatlaeglii.Stead of -my lAizid then:- he laiighsoiitiouctf:;,--I'.,-:gi-atidmother Arkthe said:. !Ypu-._ , !.?My4 maternal-, gTandfatherrri.a-fightr.: . - remernbering_his.iktyhooddast ttDid-you get;whippedr" ac-roSs--thietCabin!". tlCoUpty,' our_tbereiiii.southerri ' N,CO3-ithe generalleans- iritn ,,Oregon... And ? - alN771VVED Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 ARTICLE APP ON PAGE RED Approved For ReleaseMISM103 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 10 Oetoiber 1983 America's Secret W Under William Casey, the CIA is back in business wit n a string of Turk- ish cities and towns, agents of the Central In- telligence Agency have arranged covert support for Iranian exile groups seeking the overthrow of Ayatollah Khomeini. Two thousand miles away, in the Pakistani cities of Peshawar and Islamabad, other undercover operatives are coordinating the how of money and materiel vital to rebel tribesmen battling Soviet invasion troops across the border in Afghanistan. The agen- cy also supplies secret aid to friendly forces in Chad, Ethiopia, Angola and the Sudan? and has launched the massive campaign of -espionage, air strikes, propaganda and oth- er support for a now notorious "secret war" against the leftist Sandinista regime in Ni ca- ragua. Clearly, the cloaks and daggers have come out of cold storage at CIA headquar- ters in Langley, Va. For better or worse, the Company is back in the business of covert action?with a global scope and an intensity of resources unmatched since its heyday 20 years ago. Under the most unlikely director of cen- tral intelligence in the agency's history?a mumbling, often maddening tax lawyer and businessman named William I. Casey (page 40)?the CIA has found its ranks expanded, redirected and re-energized for covert con- frontation with hostile forces around the world. Casey also has streamlined basic analysis and reporting functions, helped swaddle the agency in a cocoon of contro- versial new secrecy orders and moved it forcefully into two areas of stepped-up na- tional concern: the fight to keep tons of deadly drugs from coming into the United States each year and the battle to keep scores of critical high-tech advances from being pirated out. Casey's ability to get things done stems in large part from his close and frequent contact with the presi- dent (at least two meetings each week, plus frequent phone conversations) and with fel- low members of the cabinet (Casey is the first DCI with cabinet rank)._ 5iusbroorne: Still, the increase in covert action has raised old questions about the wisdom, propriety and effectiveness of American intelligence activities. Critics on and of Capitol Hill say Casey shows an old cold warrior's insensitivity to the potential embarrassment and diplomatic danger that secret missions always pose?and a high- handed disregard for the role of congres- sional oversight in this most sensitive area. -"Weare like mushrooms," says California's Democratic Rep. NorrnwpOloved.4-talie Permanent Select Committee on Intelli- gence. "They keep us in the dark and feed us a lot of manure." The most dramatic showdown so far came this past summer when the House Intelligence Committee voted to cut off all funds for further covert support of the anti- Sandinist contra rebels in Nicaragua?a largely symbolic act, since the Senate never a Wally MeNprneo?NEwsrotaK THEDCLATLANGLEY: A covert clientele concurred. The national debate will fiare again in the next. few weeks as Congress begins to consider the nation's 1984 intelli- gence budget, which is reported to have grown at a rate of 17 percent annually for the past three years, faster even than Penta- gon spending, to regain the level it held before big cutbacks began back in 1973. The prospects for making any substantial cuts in the face of new Soviet aggressiveness?both the shootdown of a Korean Air Lines jet- liner and Moscow's hostile rejection of the latest U.S. arms-control proposals (page. 26)?"are not promising," concedes com- mittee 'chairman Edward Boland of Massa- REOLVSes24000V1130: EMPRORSOf-0121 JOhn lionglatid?Gornaka-Lieisoral NICARAGUA: Anti-Sandinista contras events vital to our national security inter- ests, a capability which only the United States among major powers has denied it- self," it proclaimed, in pointed reference to the decimation of CLA. undercover ranks under President Jimmy Carter and CIA Director Stansfield Turner (operatives were pared down to perhaps_ 300 from a high 3700001001)40061-81 the early 1960s). 00+7.277Att1710;-: RADIO TV};(11.rPvQ1;201.--FeaigNk6/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 4) EAST 42n STREET. N y FOP. PROGRAM :ENTRAI INTELL2EENCE AGENCY NEWS STATION STAT CNN-TV AND THE CABLE NEWS NETWORK DATE CITy OCTOSER E, 19E3 ? B PM NEW YORK -IiRDADC4k7 EXCERPT W c, :: A c. 7 ET F.', ! The C. 2 . A. tea: s :in e..e C76 ecy . 7 n Et h1._,ciness. Repo7ters,'-,. fo:Llows, have a touch trile 1--. ritno out C . .72 :1 :7 a or .i rste :. a . A. hestouarte7s . But ah..e.oe,e ele"..-67- DEvad Vise ha'S EL-771EO Of SOME per-sonne] moves not wacei\: 7--,:eo ejSE,"'he:-E. ! ni has COrarTiente-7y ter:.Loht. WE SL!aaeetS 1,::-.EI 2mo1acat.lcns those Moves ;COLI1O have. 7-.L v 7. n? 't,,'`i Q. c- : LOveran0 a- Sec7 et il-lt.E.1 a _. 6 hoe 'aa enC \ a _tt -ie -: -_-:e Ca \ _nc-.. the 1-(Tem.:-i 7 7hev don't tE2k much. E:Dcut ,..:nat haa,c-,ens f,r1s.,_de the as. Sc. re!:acte:-.S have to C.7.6 EW r: a- n a a u S. I- o riS f :OTT a att." e th;LT--ic. .1 who shows U .6.-? a t ii Li b 2.1 ::: w!--,at Shft5.'..'n dersonne.:. r6ea6..av Mean. ECCE27rOec. In the same :ts VEjLEE tO E p SOrne OL1': E chaeL,..,.. that have occurred _inside the E.I.A. Lat_te C7 nothano r-EF been SELC CUrl'ICy about 7.mese chances, out wC7t has E wEy cut to those who watch the waffls, In chEnDe C. a . A. D.7-ect ri E. e h tac,ceo two forme: caancestane operat:ives to hEnte the aoencv's ceELf7,cs thOcnoress and the press. =. W:L.Thm DcsetI. E fc.7,7mE7 Richmond pubc .:.-eatons man wnc heated EEsev's 2OnC7ESE:10fle'l and press 7eial'ons, riEc, left Case? sp2' thec?-,t6.., :in two. He named C'jzir- EecTge, unta]. now the second- hfohest c-anbestdrie opera-to: :in the ecency, to handle Ecnoress. He p.ut Geo:9e Laudel-, anothe: forme spook., dr cha7Qe of putaft affaLrs. hants deny that the zoency's te.sare to shore up and pubIc suppc.:t for Ht.s covert oper on n lx.Lc-ET-aCua Ihese Trioves.: Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 - DETRO!7 ? LOS "-mGELE.S. - k-?,?A.S.-NC.70i???? C: C ? ctcsc? 4.+-:,":J pRiNalpAL c.,-!"1- aTtalroarrekEzaRelease 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000 TAthE 4-, , SHINGTON POST 25 Tuly 1983 100140001-3 U.S. Envoys Hini At Possible Latin Naval uarantine By George Larclner-Jil:, and Fred Hiatt ? 7-71-aixin5it iairtiietlinted-St.ates washrroaraPps's""hmem-4;:z-54-- _ US. Ambassador -to Nicaragua ; Anthony Cecil Eden Quainton -terday refused --tor;rule out tbei-pos,.: sibility of a navaLuarantinec-aimed---; sat reducing the !?`.sulast.a.ntiarfiow of; arms and supplies to guerrillas in-El Salvador - ?._-, : ' His stance followed by a day iJS Ambassador to the United Nations ? Jeane J. Kirkpatrick's suggestion that-a demonstration of U.S.-ability ?, to interdia arms shipments on .the seasthigtit be-salutary. - Also yestertbay:,la top Pentagon official who reqUested anonymity.: said that the United States is play:? ing a little 4:at-and-mouse-game" - ; with the Nicaraguan government; and that a quarantine in the near future is 'most rolikely? - 7?- ? Another top-ranking Pentagon official said yesterday that the time is going to come"- when a quarantine would begin if Nicaragua does oot slow what. the United States claims is a massive military, bilildup: -How- ever, he said there 'is no timetable for escalating . planned U.S. ? naval maneuvers into a quarantine " - Appearing on "This Week With - David Brinkle?" - (ABC.,"1; WJLA); Quaint= was pressed to-sliellL out- U.S. goals in Nicaragua' "Our policy," he said, 'is-hot-to - topple the Sandinista government Our policy is to try and modify its behavior in some substantial ways which are consistent with our inter- ests and our vital :security concerns throughout Central America? saidudc L mixed economy._ antV-a- trtily non- aninterview on Cable ::INewe Network; Kirkpatrick said she thought it would mind that'they do otlaveitriiOnofsafOlferae in the :J-Are 'we. shOWing 'them that . the ? United States - could . . blockade 'Nicaragua?" -1Cirkpatridk .was asked. "Maybe," "Ivlaybe zemindAhem brthat Mayb? rrwe're :also doingsOmething relevant- : to interdittinverms7because they use--they-'do -a lot of exporting arms . into:El:Salvador ?-by*ay of that Pa- Re-Tgan was visited. if;fret)orteis uponhia return yesterday -to-the White House from Camp David, "What-about more advisers for El Salvadorr.WaVing'fbff_.gueitions;iii:tgi-7. plied, "Not todity17-Z.-,,::: : One top sPentsigOill4itficitZ risterda3;5-said he believes theta quarantine is most unlike.: ly" ;in the nearluture.--He said officials iire leavingthe-p)Open for a reason,"--.4-1-4,. "Were playing a-little cat-and --mantle? - genie-with squeezeian;-- ? making them viondet'what's going to happen next," the official-said. "Ultimately, the idea is to convince them that,allowing the El Sal- , vador guerrillas to use Nicaragua for --their _headquarters for revolution -is not a -good idea if they want to keep their oval damn -irevoltition?, . However, US.-intelligence officials Alive concluded that the-leftist .Sandinistaoregime in Nicaragua faces little danger of being,top- ? pled without a much greater exercise of cific corridor along the coast" force several sources indicated. - _ -____ _ __________ .. ____ ----? ,. The blunt hints on a series of weekend: ,., The latest National Intelligence Rstimate television interviews were matched by grow- on the troubled region, a composite study ! ing expressions of alarm from several con- reflecting the views of the U.S. intelligence 1 gressional Democrats. They protested that agencies, reportedly was completed June-30. - sending-troops to Honduras for joint military ; "h was interesting," one source said, 'for 1 exercises andStationineU.S. battleships, oai- the scenario, it played out about where do ; riers and jet fighters off Nicanagua's 5''',6.. you go from here. There are no good choices - could'7iolatethe War-Powers Actz--- : . :. ? -,- --down the Toad.", - , -,- ' ' The Democrats?Sens. 'Daniel Patrick - Another -source described it as blunt and . Moyrisi.han- =fN.Y.i) -and Christopher J. Dodd i _confirmed ow it had no? dissenfttng- ;foot- (Corint):And Itep.-Micl D Barnes iMd-)-H- L "Doigff,;r:;:l.::i..,-;:"-:2-::;-l'L'-''-:'; ' ' also:-:Were*itiial=o14--pf:nding P;entagon Te- quest!,==tomore-':thW-2dOtilale the -number of i U.S.inilitaryadviierain El Salvador from its - longstanding but-unofficial lid of 55 to 125. Pentagon officials yesterday confirmed that Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinber- ger sent that recommendation to the White House last -week: On Saturday, a White House spokesman said that such a request is not pending before President Reagan. Moynihan, who vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence- Committee, and Barnes, who is chairman of the House Foreign Af- fairs subcommittee-on Western Hemisphere affairs, yesterday expressed similar ? conclu- sions, but without naming administration documents they had in mind. hi his appearance on "Face the Nation" (CBS, WDVM), Moynihan contended that the United States ought to _get tough with the Soviet Union instead of fumbling around in Central America._ He advocated an ulti- Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001.-3 rialerZZLIZ i,..PPFApptoved For Release W5lid0/1/%10kA-RDP90-01137R 20 July 1983 House. in secret ?reportedly hears covert action criticism By David Rogers Globe Staff - -WASI-LT_NGTON - The House, beginning debate on a resolution to cut off -covert military aid to Nicaraguan insurgents, went into .a rare closed--door session yester- day in which opponents -of the Administration's policy cited 2 recently completed CIA study criticizing the effec- tiveness of the operation. sources said, . The National intelligence Estimate. dated June 30, is one of the most detailed. high-level analyses yet within the intelligence community, and the critical tone of the classified document is seriously damaging to the Admin- istration's case, the sources-said. The four-hour closed-door meeting yesterday marked only the third time An -more than -a century that the 7HO-1:Ise has gone' into secret silsion, -.arid' the resolution is an unprecedented -chal- -:-Ienge to President Ronald Reaga.riS policy in: Central America. - No votes on the-reSolution are expected 'Until . next week, but there appears to be increasing . unity in the Democratic leadership behind the resolution to cut off aid, which is sponsored by Rep. Edward P. BOland ID-Mass.), chairman of, the House Intelligence Committee, and Rep. : _Clement Zablocki. (D-Wis.): chairman of-the For-, eign Affairs Cominittee. ? . . -*When it comes down tolt, I will be with Be-.. land-Zablocki." said Majority Leader Jim Wright (D-Texas). After participating in private talks with the Administration over the past month. Wright said there is a "remote" chance that a compromise can be reached before the House vote. ''It is really a question of what we want to be as a country." said Wright in one of his sharp- est ci'iticisms yet of the covert aid. "Do we want to be sneaky country or a straightforward coun- lry. . We ought to tell the truth:" ; A united party leadership will strengthen So-. Jand's hand on the floor, but the Springfield _Democrat. is faced?with what appears to be '] 000100140001-3 strong Republican opposition and the risk of major defections from conservative Southern delegations such as Florida's. "It look g like a close call, really." said Boland. While most of yesterday's four- hour meeting was intended as a classified briefing by the Intelli- gence committee for members, some of the speakers drew ap- plause, reflecting the continued partisanship seen earlier in com- mittee votes. - "The applause was partisan." guessit was predictable but_it's not good.' ? -.-From the outsetof the covert op- ; eration the firstyear of the-Ad; .'.'-ministration? leading 'members- of .'.Fthe Intelligence -Committee have ? questioned the operation. As the in- - surgent forcelui.sgrown,s6has the _oontroversy ?surroundinLit: Ar part of a classified annex to the 1983 'Intelligence Authorization ? Act, Congress ?attadhed language last year to prohibit any aid for the purpose of -overthrowing the San- dinista regime. The same -restric- tion was made law in December as an amendment to an appropri- ations bill. ; - '-. ? Though-the Administration has I-said the operation is within the law, the insurgents have made no -secret of their hope to overthrow the government, and Reagan him- self has referred to.the anti-Sandin- ista guerrillas based in Nicaragua and neighboring Honduras as "freedom fighters." 71 have no doubt in my mind _ that.that amendment has been vio- lated." said Boland recently. He has criticized 1.1-ie effectiveness of the operation in meeting its stated goal of interdicting arms ship- ments from Nicaragua to leftist guerrillas in El Salvador. Rep. Bill Young (R-Fla.), a mem- ber of the Intelligence Committee. said there is "hard" evidence that these shipments have been les- sened. But according to sources. the National intelligence Estimate report-reflected a consensus within intelligence branches like theCIA and the-Defense intelligence:Age:n-7. -cy seriously allenging4;be, -grain's effectiveness ItQiiis:some very. -verY1:013-g l?stuff.2iairinne source. -Itrqxii;ed-__,-7. ly provided the framework -forti:-.; strongattaelE by RepEguiii- :member ,genceandorelgriAffairiairnmit-.- , tees, whotook the lead witftolancl An-supporting the resOlutiorL.,A7; Young_ xepresented the 7-441117.-: tion on. the IGOE' side -with:41.cp. _ Henry Hyde membersa:02e- Poreign Affairs Corrira1ttee.7---:: _ ? Though ? attendance :dwindled after the first two hours. members ? said that-dose to two-thirds-of the "House ;was present -to beat: the ? opening !iemarks. _Minortty Leader Robert Michel dismissed reports last-week that the CIA is preparing for a force between 12,000 and 15,000, but' yesterday an aide acknowledged that the numbers had "credibil ity." Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 ARTICLE APPEARnM3proved For Release 20919194f941{9142WAM137R00 ON PAGE SUMMER 1983 Angelo Codevilla is a professional staff member with the Senate Intelligence Committee. Previously, he was a foreign service officer and a fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford Univessity. Dr. Codevilla has written widely on European polities and in the field of intelligence and military policy. 0100140001-3 STAT STAT Angelo Cocievilla STAT By focusing so exclusively ( rules and standards of operations, the intelligence debate of the mid-1970s did answer the fundamental question of what the Uniteis States expects of its intellige services or what they are to accomplish in order to meet challenges of the 1980s. The Substance and the Rules Since the early 1970s, this country's intel- ligence agencies have been asking, "What does the country expect of us?" That ques- tion had not arisen in the postwar period be- cause the American political system had left the agencies to the total discretion of those appointed to lead them. In the early 1970s, factional conflict among those leaders spilled over into a national debate about what America's practitioners of intelligence ought to have foremost in mind. That debate con- tinues. Recently, Admiral Stansfield Turner, _ President Carter's Director of Central Intelli- gence, and his former special assistant, George Thibault, published an attempt both to answer that question and to indict the Rea- gan administration's handling of intelli- gence. The author's answer seems to be that the American people expect their intelligence agencies to be as innocuous as possible. They charge that the Reagan administration is undermining the agencies by loosening too many restrictions. The authors thus contend that for our civil liberties' sake, and for the sake of the agencies' own standing in the country, the agencies ought to concentrate on formulating for themselves the right kinds of rules and restrictions. However, bne would not suspect from Turner and Thibault% arti- cle,,that the rules by which intelligence offi- cers live ought to flow from the intelligence profession's substantive requirements_ Nevertheless, in intelligence as in other areas of government, the American people rightly want their employees to accomplish the functions for which they are paid. This author will argue that Stansfield Turner is Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100GgagitiEll- - Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00 ARTICLX Azrraamt) WINC.TO ?DE 2 j 9E3 lic-Lck Anderson .War? With Bi.ter: President Reagan-and the allied ieaders meet- ing in WilliProstrurg haven unparilieled oppor- tunity waiting to -beTrasped.'1f they play ? their' *carcis-righi, they.-cansocripple-theSoviet."bnion economicsity itiattheKtexulin WilLhavemo choice tto-ezut back on itszaulitary-spending.";z4,---', One serious contributing lactor_intleCriiiet ,.. 'economic _mess . is the huge pereentagevillthe ? countri.''s gross national.producteatehitip.nithe arms race. The Kremlin-las reached :..thelimits ofrits guns-and-butter balancing - . The hawks in the Illeagan -ad.' ministration ., hope to push the Russians beyond their 'ico- .nomic capabilities by -forcing them either_ to spend billions in -response to our new :weapons -systems or to cry-uncle and come to-the megoti-- atinz table for serious disarmament talks, ' r- l-iov--much better it-would be all around to flip the other side of the coin -and -force the Kremlin to disarm by driving it to therwalheco- nonaicaliv. Tne president might even 'consider unleashing the CIA for little covert-action? on the economic front _ All it would take, -really, -is seeing- -that world oil pns stay ciovon?or-fall even riower. Aside from gob?whose price has also been4e- pressed late?the Soviet Union musrsell-cill ior the hard carrencv -it .needs AZ buy grain 4irid Western technolou. The Russians ars -already underaming OPEC prices in their desperation to keep the dollars and deutschemarks coming in. The CIA showed a hint of the Soviet's precari- ous economic situation?and its potential ploitation by the West-4.o surface in a :Special National implliFence Estimate ISNLE, _! pro- bounced "Snee''). It's classifiedsecret, but a copy was obtained by my associate Dale Van AtI8-: . - In the 1970s, the report not.,, "rapid increase in Soviet imports from -the 'West . : _Nes made possible by large-windfall gains in expontarnings due to the-surge in oh prices-and the--wiliingoess of Western countries to provide large 'credits, most of which were government guaranteed." But today the Soviet Union "is encountering growing economic difficulties, which will make it more difficult to increase its imports frorn.tbe West in the future.'' But there is one exceptiorrnatural.ges.: STAT 0100140001-3 "Moscow's, best hope _of -improving its -strained hard-currency position in the longer ::run is to secure the cooperation of Western Eu- 'rope in building large new pipelines for the de- livery of additional natural gas in thelate 1980s .:or in the 1990s", the CIA concludes, "With enormous pis reserves-and a _Powerful incentive to earn more hard currency, Moscow is .pre- -,pared to sell as much gas as the West Euro- 'pearls will-accept.'" The inevitable result? "Making Western militarv-relatee technology, -subsirli7ed credit nd incked-insas markets available ..helps the r.lSoviet -build 'military buildup,' the -CIA esti- '7-ziaate-warns , . theother hand., the CIA explains, "short- in Soviet hard currency-earnings. _ would force 'further cuts in imports of machinery_ and equipment." The report adds: -"Moscow fears that reductions in food imports :would use -.popular unrest_ ? In other -words, selling the Russians grain _idoesn't help -their military machine, it hurts it, :by eating up precious hard currency that could ? otherwise go for guns. ?, Finally, the CIA points out,--the combination of 'restricted Western technciloz' exports and ithe Soviets' shortage .of hard currency -would. ;raise the-cost of Soviet military rnociernizatior, while at-the-same time weakening the -industrial . base for military, production:" . Unfortunately, -:..Atnerican business interests ? many of them multinational corporations more loyal to the dollar than to the United ? Statat-- want to do business with the Soviets and abhor the ides of economic 'warfare. Maybe Reagan will be able to resist the powerful forces. Maybe he'll be able to per- suade the European leaders to go along with an economic squeeze on the Soviet Union instead of a costly military buildup. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-011 ILT-1 I I :II; 1.1.111-.L.t= 0N -PARADE MAGA ZINE WASHINGTON POST 13 MARCH 1983 FlY 7R000100140001-3 HE U.S. has eves and ears all over the globe. Yet our Presidents often act like someone who is blind and deaf. They seldom , seem to anticipate world events of mo- mentous importance. They have been caught napping by revolutions, inva- sions and other developments of awe- some consequence. Why is the President invariably so late to act that he can only react? I. can tell you that it's not from only of sound information. He is served by profession- als who spend their lives sifting fact from fantasy. truth from propaganda. They produce stunningly accurate as- sessments?which are routinely ignored by the White HouseA Vida O'g Fka examples of warnings Ye' gobe - unheeded: .114Jack Anderson ? President Richard Nixon could have prevented the ruinous 40-fold jump in oil prices had he heeded the available warnings. The federal government, with all the agencies that watch over the oil industry. had an immense early-alert system. ? President Jimmy Caner could have spared the nation .444 days of humilia- tion if he had j1.15 paid attention to the State Department's Iranian experts. With startling prescience, they warned of the likelihood of an attack on the embassy and the seizure of hostages. ? President Carter could have stopped Fidel Castro from shipping Cuba's crimi- nals and crazies to Florida. where they have aggravated the crime rate. The CIA submitted at least five advance warp-_ ; ings of C.astro's intentions. ? President Carter might have dissuad- ed the Soviets from invading Afghani- stan, thus preventing the breakdown of detente. if he had acted on advance information. He seemed to be the only one in high places who was surprised by the invasion. ? President Ronald Reatan might have been able to avert the Falkland Islands -mess had he reacted promptly to intelli- gence reports that the Argentines would invade. Indeed, the AnentineEVseries istitilethWIROitfflikisgqkti3P ; Yrikig sion would have his blessing. ? President Reagan could have dealt ments that an Israeli invasion was "in- evitable." Earlier, the Israeli attack on Iraq's nuclear reactor also was forecast precisely. In each of these disasters. a President had access to information that would have enabled him to take preventive actions, rather than blunder along. May- be the-correct intelligence never reached the President. Maybe it had been so twisted or toned down that it was easy to ignore. Yet in some cases, I had published the warnings long before events got out of control. Of course. a President gets bad ad- vice as well as good. Conflicting infor- mation comes in from various confiden- tial sources available to him. The real pros among those who provide informa- tion have been able to forecast or antici- pate events with far more reliability than any President has ever done. The prob- lem is that the politicos around the Presi- dent either don't know who the reliable experts are Or prefer to ignore them. How doescrucial information get cut off at the pass? First, let's examine how a President reaches his decisions. Though different Presidents have asked for intelligence in different forms, each has received what is known in the intelli- gence communiry as the PDB. or Presi- dent's Daily Brief. The idea is to give a President the most sensitive informa- tion U.S. intelligence agencies have 37R00(0)al he can read in L Ott= ON PAGE Approved For Release 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001:3? " WASHINGTON TIMES MARCH 1983 ARNOLD BEICIEVIAN STAT Does the CIA know what it's talking abotru: _ 11; ..The only experts on the Soviet and intentions and strategic weap- the CIRs estimates of Soviet weapon Unionare those who sit onthe Pont- onry and over-all military effort." expenditures were implausibily low buro in Moscow. The rest of us have "Beginning in the 1960s," said the and failed to reflect the rapid quan- varying degrees of ignorance." authors, "theCIA embarked upon a,i? titative and qualitiative improve- Malcolm Mon, former U.S. ambas- . consistent underestimation of the ments which we were seeing in sador to the Soviet ICBM buildup, missing the Soviet weapons systems and teclino- _, ? mark by - a wide margin: Its esti- . logy" - _ mates became progressively worse ' Said Parker "My own estimate,, '!Estimating is What' you do when on the law side. In the mid-1970s, supported by those of Most Military you do not know." Sherman. Kent;:,-,-:: the intelligence community_ under- unelhgence organizations; inditated, _ former chief of the CIA National J.,::.,..estimated the scaleand effectiveness that the real value of Soviet iveap- Intelligence Estimate. ? = .of.. the Soviet's multiple .indeperi- ons production was growing at ?-?.- roughly10 percent per annum; While :fdetitly targetable re-entry -vehicle (M1RV)program. Even mareimpor- the agency put the figure variously :tent Soviet warhead accuracies that between 2 iand 4.5 percent 'per page-one itoryiriYesterday's have already been achieved and New York Times -about the '1-7-..thathave equalled US.. accuracies What Rosefielde has done hi abril-' - Central Intelligence AgencY had been estimated by American Rant technical and statistical wady- - . and the Soviet arms buildup could, intelligience to be unobtainable by sis is to 4emostrate the inconsis- - if true, help make mincemeat of the Moscow before the mid-1989s." tencies in CIA, estimates of Soviet 1Reagan administration's' defense How could such mis-estimates production- costs,- inconsistencies ; budget. Unnamed CIA specialists, have happened not only -_under which ,arise from a CIA methodol- according to the story, claim the Democratic but also under Reputdi- ogy which "systematically under- Soviet military spending growth rate can administrations, right up to the states technological growth and has been over-estimated for the last :present Reagan presidency? , ? biases the agency 'S. estimates' six years. Ellwsviorth and Adelman; who downward" Instead of a 3-to-4 Pereent annual awaits a Senate vote on his itornina; UntilPresidentReaganperithdes. increase, corrected for inflation, the . tion as Reagan 's arms negotiator;' the CIA to adopt his view Of Soviet: growth rate "may have been no more ? said that the source of the problem intentiOns towards the US. and the , : than 2 percent," the Times reported. lies "within the bowels of the intelli.2 Free World, estimates of Soviet miti- It went on to say that estimating- gence bureaucracy itself!' ' " tary spending will be subject Wall . Soviet military spending "is an inex- American intelligence "has long kinds of anti-defense propaganda. act art, based on incomplete infor- been stultified by the domination of CIA optimism about Soviet inten- mation, subjective assumptions, and a clique," which has prevented the tions leads to one kind of interpre? difficulties in translating Sovietupgrading of the National Foreign tation, Reagan's pessimism or ruble costs into dollar values." Assessment Center. CIA Director realism about Soviet intentions The real story about CIA's analy- William Casey has tried to do some- . demands a different kind of inter- sis and estimates branch is that it thing about it by involving himself . pretationaboutSovietarnis expend- has had a dismal track record esti- personally in the National Intelli- tures. . . mating the growth of Soviet mill- gence Estimates machine. But it has .. Alexander Solzhenitsyn recently. tary 'power. It has systematically , taken a long time to take even the. ? wrote in National Review that "Wei. discounted Soviet military expen- first step. ? ? would understand nothing .about ? ditures. CIA analysts also were The real bombshell which- could communism if we tried to coinpre,. wrong in their predictions about the . destroy the CIA methodology for hend it on the principles of human. stability of the shah of Iran's estimating Soviet military procure- reason. The driving force of .com-. , kingdom, right up ,.to the shah's ment expenditures has just gone off._ _ munism, itwas devised by Marx, downfall. _ - It is a recently published book, False is political power, power at any cost I am no admirer Of -President Science: Understanding the Soviet and without regard to human losses Carter but he was surely correct _ ATMS ,Buildup, by .Prof.. Steven? orapeople's physicaldeterioration." ? when he sent off a handwritten memo Rosefielde (Transaction Books, 1982) . In estimating Sovi et. mil i ta ry to his top security advisers in 1978 published under the auspices of the expenditures, the CIA might be well which began: "I am not satisfied National Strategy Information advised to base its conclusions ori" with the quality of political intelli- Center - ' _ what, perhaps, we might call . gence." . , The preface to Rosefielde's book' zhenitsyn's Law. In an article in 1979, Robert is by Patrick Parker, who was dep- Ellsworth and Kenneth Adelman uty assistant secretary of Defense Arn-old Beichman. a Viiitingl described in Foreign Policy "stag- for intelligence a decade ago. Scholar at the Hoover Institution iS likrinestungia' 2 -1... .yz oo6imsr: .1?Aii14FiwougihtRozfo.olempigrotri be mr of the Consor-:' Tryeaw ernment service, discoverea tmt- hum or t e study of Intelligence.. STAT Approved For Rele ase 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 IE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE January 1983 By Philip Taubman illiam J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, sat at the end of the mahogany con- ference table in his office. Outside, the late afternoon sun played across the trees that ring the Central Intelli- gence Agency's headquarters in northern Virginia. filling the windows with a fresco of autumn colors. A short stack of docu- ments, some stamped SECRET, rested at Mr. Casey's lett elbow, and a yellow legal pad on which he had penciled several notes was positioned to his right. "The reason I am here is because I have a lot of relevant experience and a good track record. ," Mr. Casey said, alluding to comments that he was un- qualified for the job and had been appointed only because he was Ronald Reagan's campaign man- ager. Mr. Casey, an imperious and proud man, had ....been fuming over the criticism for months, accord- ing to his friends, and now, in his first comprehen- sive interview since taking office, he wanted to set the record straight. Be flipped through the papers and extracted a yellowing clipping from The New York Times that extolled his record as chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission from 1971 to 1973. Next, he provided several pages copied from a book about Allied intelligence operations during World War II; he had underlined a glowing assessment of his con- tribution to the Office of Strategic Services. The final clipping was a story that appeared in The Washington Star in the summer of 1980, describing Mr. Casey's role as Reagan campaign director. The headline: "Casey, the Take-Charge Boss." It was an oddly defensive performance for a man who, according to classified budget figure; pro- vided by Government officials, is overseeing the biggest peacetime buildup in the American intelli- gence community since the early 1050's. Because intelligence expenditures are secret, ft is not widely known that at a moment when the Reagan Admin- istration is forcing most Government agencies to retrench, the C.I.A. and its fellow intelligence or- ganizations are enjoying boom times. Even the military services, which have been favored with substantial budget increases, lag well behind in terms of percentage growth, although military-run intelligence agencies are growing almost as quickly as the C.I.A. Spending figures for intelli- gence agencies, including the C.I.A., are hidden within the Defense Department's budget. With a budget increase for the 1983 fiscal year of 25 per- cent, not allowing for inflation, compared with 18 intentions, ? integrity percent for the Defense Department, the C.I.A. is and capabintinved For Release 2006/01/03 : Q1A-RIDEBOg631?4241ii48,0011tae Federal Government, according to Administration budget officials. trrrs, LIZTICia. Lk p, For Release 2006k4/691X"F'90-0113 9 JANUARY 19: 3 ce,E ? '000100140001-3 C.I.A. Says Soviet Can Almos By BERNARD GWERIZMAN spEcii ten* New Yost TilDM WASHINGTON, Jan. 8?The Central Intelligence Agency, in a study of the Soviet economy, - concludes that the Soviet Union's ability to live without im- ports is much greater than that of most, possibly all, other industrialized econo- mies. The report, delivered to the Joint Economic Committee of Congress on Dec. 1 by Henry Rowen, chairman of , the C.IA.'s National Intelligence Coun- cil, seems to support the argument that American trade embargoes against the Soviet Union have only limited effect The Reagan Administration has sought to tighten Western controls on trade to the Soviet Union to bring politi- cal pressure on Moscow, a policy often at odds with European allies and with some American businessmen. ? Capital, Technology and Food The C.I.A. report said that for the last decade the Soviet Union has used trade with the West to help modernize its economy and make it more efficient. It said that the Russians bad relied on im- ports of capital and technology to in- crease or maintain production of some raw materials and that food imports bad "become critical" to maintaining a quality diet. Imports of pain and other agricul- tural products, it said, meant primarily to prevent a decline in meat consump- tion, cog the Russians $12 billion in 1981, or 40 percent of their hard-cur- rency purchases that year. But Mr. Rowen said that "despite the large-scale expansion in agricultural imports, the Soviet Union remains basi- cally self-sufficient with respect to food." He said the average Soviet citizen consumes ablaut 3,300 calories a day, as against 3,520"f or an American. The re- port showed that the Soviet diet consists of far morgill-in?and potatoes than the American diet, but less fish and meat and less sugar. And Mr. Rower' said that grain production in the Soviet Union "is more than sufficient to meet consumer demand for bread and other cereal products." The report said trade with the West amounted Wordy 5 percent of the Soviet gross national product. But it seemed to agree with some Administration policy makers when it said the Russians would . have to import 15 million to 20 million tons of steel pipe in the next seven years to build the pipelines it has planned, and will need "sophisticated" exploration equipment, for its oil and natural gas fields. The Administration has tried to block those exports in particular, provoking feuds with Western govern- ments that have contracted to provide ? the equipment. 0 U Imports from the West, Mr. Rowen An Ability 'to Remain Viable' said, "can play an important role in re- I lieving critical shortages, spurring technological progress and generally j improving Soviet economic peform- ance." But he added that "the ability of the Soviet economy to remain viable in the absence of imports is much greater than that of most, possibly all, other in- dustrialized economies." "Consequently," he concluded, "the susceptibiity of the Soviet Union to eco- nomic leverage tends to be limited." The Soviet Union has always put great emphasis on self-sufficiency. This dates from the earliest days after the 1917 revolution, when most foreign countries did not recognize the Soviet regime, and it continued as a result of the isolation the country experienced in World War II. Mr. Rowen's report was prepared at the request of Senator William Prox- mire, Democrat of Wisconsin. .The Senator, who is vice chairman of the subcommittee on international trade, finance and security economics, ad asked for "a balanced assessment" of the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet economy. This was the second C.I.A. report in a month to point out strengths in the Soviet economy. Approved For rrtports ; Mr. Rowen said tneC.I.A. agreed with Mr. Proxmire that "confusion sur- rounding the Soviet economy abounds." "Western observers have tended to describe Soviet economic performance as 'poor' or 'deteriorating' at a time when Soviet defense spending continues to rise, overall Soviet gross national product in real terms continues to in- crease and Soviet G.N.P. is second in size only to that of the United States," he said, noting the apparent contradici- tons. As a result of recent declines in the rate of growth, the gap between per- formance and expectations, and the lack of economic efficiency, "the record compiled by the Soviet economy in recent years has indeed been poor," he said. "Results that are unsatisfactory when measured by this yardstick, how- ever, do not mean that the Soviet econ- omy is losing its viability as well as its dynamism," the C.I.A. official said. "In fact, we do not consider an eco- nomic 'collapse' ? a sudden and sus- tained decline in G.N.P. ? even a re- mote possibility," he said. The C.I.A. projects, he said, that Soviet economic growth "will remain slow but positive," averaging 1 to 2 per- cent "for the foreseeable future." al- though per capita consumption might level off or drop slightly. Energy Production Rises Mr. Rowen said that natural gas pro- duction had continued to increase at a rapid rate, 8 percent in 1982, and that energy as a whole was increasing, with oil up by about 1 percent and coal 2 per- , cent in the past year. The Russians - have also improved their trade with the West, cutting their deficit from $4 lion in 1981 to $2 billion in 1982. The Soviet gross national product in 1982 was estimated at $1.6 trillion, or $6,000 per-capita, roughly 55 percent- of the American gross national product. The C.I.A. estimated Soviet gold re- I serves at 200 million troy ounces, giving 32 lk it 35 percent of the world total. Produc- tion in 1981 was estimated at 5 tons and its stock at about 1,900 tons. worth ' over $25 billion at current prices. The report said a major weakness in the economy was the declining growth - of the work force, with only 9 million ex- pected to join in this decade as against 19 million in the 1970's. Agriculture remains the weakest link. Grain production achieved a record high of 237 million tons in 1978 but has not reached 190 million tons since then. The report also highlighted Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP9Ortirtirrptettra on; bkoetci railroad system and depletion of many I mineral reserves. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01 37R000100140001-3 _ ARI CLE APPEARED PAGE / Rebuilding US. Intelligence LOS ANGELES TINES 3 JANUARY 1983 STAT Casey Shapes Up CIA, Survives as Top Spy .7.0BERT C. Toni, Times Staff Writer WASHINGTON?Last summer, Casey's midterm report card several months before Leonid L shows that: - - - - Bret-I:my died, the Central Intelli- ?The country has expel-jerked no gence Agency produced a study of known "intelligence failures" or Kremlin leadership politics almost "intelligence abuses" during his two 40 pages long. It predicted that a years. cluster of Soviet officials would ?Intelligence budgets, up 20%, succeed- Brechnev, not . a - strong have grown even - faster -.than individual leader. ? Pentagon budget:- After reviewing the top-secret ?Output at analytic studies his report before it was forwarded to jumped a remarkable fivefold over the White House, Central Intelli- the last years of-the Jimmy .Carter gence Director William J Casey Administration. . -- concluded that President Reagan ?Covert activities have dropped -would never wade through it alL So, somewhat in number, but individual in a brief covering letter couched in operations have grown in size. race-track parlance, he boldly pre- ?And "intelligence guidelines," dieted which Kremlin contenders which are the do's and don'ts of the would win, place and show. -community, have been shortened Kirilenko peaked too soon, Casey drastically. told Reagan, and Chernenko faded Casey's former deputy, retired in the stretch. Ancleopov is in the Adm, Bobby R. -Inman, believes lead, perhaps challenged by -Usti. Casey will be rated "ver/ high" as a nov, with Gorbachev the dark horse director of intelligence for "totally and a future corner. overhauling the process of making national intelligence esti- mates?sharply increasing their number, making them shorter and more focused on problems That policy-makers grapple with?plus winning the President's support for rebuilding the intelligence .commu- nity." Substantially Better' On the Massey , - ? As it turned out, Casey was right on the money: It was Yuri V. Andropov, not a committee, that succeeded Brezhnev as general sec- retary of -the Soviet Communist Party. But the episode is less Wiper- tent as a measure of Casey the Kreralinologist than as a measure of tu es, eve y has "moved the CIA backward" in restricting the release of information and in resurrecting its covert action capa- bilities. And some conservatives, who asked not to be identified, complain that Casey has not shaken up the intelligence community as the Republican Party platform of 1980 promised a Reagan Adminis- tration would do. ? Be that as it may, Casey?a veteran of American intelligence operations during World War 11, a multimillionaire with an entrepre- neurial bent and a former senior federal official in financial and eco- nomic areas?has no intention of leaving the job. . "I'm enjoying it," he said in an interview, "and-we're making prog- ress. I intend ta stick with it." Twelve months ago, it was _far from obvious that Casey was either enjoying the job or was going to keep it long. At that point, he was reeling from his early and almost disastrous decision to hire a fellow Reagan campaign worker, Max Hugel, as chief of the CIA's clandestine operations?a "very conspicuous mistake on my part," Casey later called it. Hugel quit after private financial irregularities were alleged Casey the CIA director and of the "Under Bill, things are substan. in the press, but three senior Re. methods Casey has developed to rim tally better than the public image publican senators called for Casey's the multibillion-dollar-a-year U.S.-suggests," Inman said in an:-inter- resignation. intelligence commtmity. view. - - . The Senate Intelligence Commit- Casey ?a scrappy, sometimes ar- Ray S. Cline, a former senior CIA tee re-examined Casey's financial regent, bulky 69-year-old who re- . official, has praised Casey for seek- background-1.00.h grudgingly con- tains a trace of his native New York ing to balance, with equally high - accent?has surprised admirers and priority, the need to !provide accu- critics dare by surviving as the _ rate, in-depth analysis with the nation's top spy through the first need to make it. timely and useful in two years of Reagan's tenure. Even helping to answer the hard policy more, he has managed to set and questions of government. maintain a careful but significant On the other hand, liberal _critics pace for rebuilding the nation's L/ such as Morton Halperin, director of intelligence capabilities. - - _ the Center for National Security Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 L'aVI2IVUTLEZ STAT Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00 'RADIO TV REPORTS, IN 4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEW CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 656-4068 100140001-3 STAT FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF PROGRAM DATE SUBJECT Jack. Anderson Confidential December 18, 1982 7:30 PM The CIA and Banking STATION WJLA TV Syndicated Washington, DC JACK ANDERSON: This is Wall Street, the center of the international banking system, a system on the edge of a crisis so severe that the Central Intelligence Agency is preparing drastic measures. Something must be done to avert the breakdown of the Free World's monetary system. , The crisis developed after $600 billion in risky loans were made to 40 Underdeveloped countries, countries too poor to pay them back. Richard Dale is a visiting scholar at the Brookings In- stitution in Washington. The CIA came to see him because he's one of the foremost authorities on international banks. He spoke with my colleague Terry Repack. RICHARD DALE: Well, as I understand it, the CIA takes the view that the momentum towards collapse is already far ad- vanced and that the political will to anticipate the problems that may arise is simply not there. And I think they take .2 rather skeptical view about the whole problem; namely, that governments will not act until, in a sense, it's too late. And that is one particular interpretation. So I think they say, right, we will not solve this problem ahead of events; we will have a global bank holiday before anything is done, and that will be the stimulus to get governments to act and cooperate to pull us out of this. But, of course, the CIA's job, if I may say so, is to look at the downside risks. They're always looking for the worst case. That is the nature of their job. So that was their focus. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 ? OFFICFS IN- WASHINnTnN rir NFVJ vrok? enc Al\P-Zgl rzg a ? ruir-erem r?,..7rine-wr ? Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00 AaEEARED ON PAGE - PLAYBOY MAGAZINE December 1982 0100140001-3 b frk a ? ? . ? '2 ? 7/ - - ? --,--- : ? ? ' ? ? - . ? -- -??????? ' ? ? ? ? . ' - . . ? - : ? -- 711; ? ? ?? ? 16.1?11 VE: ? ;?-?-? . ? . - ? !ft, 13.=: CH.?;,??;,' r ;7F:. S.- a r ? J--Z: t*.?"?, 7.1 ?- - - - ? -. -? . . _ -" ----, -???????--; - A FUNDAMENTAL CIntANCEAtas occurred' lbe-U --tbe? election hot .2.9130:--Our.-leader1,clueing--...:,..'.14;x7a, , tbe time of Rona -Reagan liaie come -to ? ? for waging and 'winning, .a nuclea.r war.-?with _ - - -tht-Soviet Union; and they are obstimed:5- 7 _ - -L - strategy --of confrontation?including ? , r....AbsSortetitieo-7- gfitagcletw.e a6e-ry:- - - ? --rbat obseision has gone beyond the discuatioc. ? ----st-nc?-,-President- Reagan ,had been 432 ciracei-leas'-::4,- zecteg-zralt...% , 1.}'.it?_ ?;" _ . .c.,o2ntaenthetorit-Itit49 who belzevalzat niZectrzvar ? - _ - - Z d arid elvage zvon - ......, ,-?-.........70,.....,...7ryt.-.,?,--....-'71,-:,,?:? . . .. ? , . ? ... _ ''' L'-'" --'...;'?e; ' . .g.g'*.4.--3? -.......,,r-1-'-"","'.5:474'i;:2-?"--4-.17-:''''"'-;--- --' t'"I''',..N;.? ,,,-;;*',.-74.4i4Z-,&?:1.:-.. _ _ , _ . ,.. ,. ,, ,?s2.4.. , _,. ,,__.. ..: _ .: , .....k.;:a.:- ;?*.?-,--?'.:-.'?;:;.".1.7':177-4'''''''.1-.711-ae.''.....,,,..,,,...itt,...7:?:C.: _ ..,,..?,:_,..?...,....,..6-.?,,t,..,:z_,,,..,..:.?-; ,1,-z,:-.,,,.;?,.?4-,:,-;,;;,_?,-.2r--- .-:Dr-'-?;-,-,:_?-?,::.-4,-;'?-,-'i'--;:.-:..?"-t.',?27.--74;-.'t17,,,...,.,:' ,-'-;: --;;',:----..-C-7...- - .. &-r".. 4-,...37;..i.,,,,i_.:4-r...?.,,,A.!"------,-? . . . ..-?--?-,?.-..,.;-..-a-:z.,?;?:--..'..%, 7_;.,? ,-. ;-..:..-?!-- t?" X-2::".:,-s:r4;'.''.;'a',4-:-:??$r471-(;-j:--q.1..,.4.. 7.0--2.6--.:.-F.,:-- e ...:.--.;-::.4-.,:r.-;7:,.a:4:,7-z--. ;z;.,:6-I.1-.:.41.:-1m',..-.,-,,i ?? ::':::--: ; -7----z,-L'.-? ?-? ' -- -: ?---: --` ?.'-'''' ????? d-4i - ?;..-111.-.1.- . _ ? .. rt....N. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137 ART I CLE 1*--iNLREI) NEws?TEEK ON PAGE 22 NOVEMBMD, 1 982 PERISCOPE The FBI Investigates the Freeze Movement President Reagan's charge at his press conference last week that Soviet agents are involved in the domestic nuclear-freeze move- ment was based on a secret Federal Bureau of Investigation study. The White House has identified the Reader's Digest and State Department reports as Reagan's sources. In fact, after reading one Reader's Digest article outlining a Soviet link with the freeze movement, the president asked the FBI to confirm the charge. The bureau reported that there is hard evidence that Moscow has tried to infiltrate and exploit the U.S. peace movement. But according to one bureau source, the report does not contend that the Kremlin inspired the movement or controls its leaders. FBI counterintelli- gence chief Edward O'Malley's recent testimony on the subject before the House intelligence committee is under review for possi- ble declassification. Freeze advocates, including Republican Sen. Mark Hatfield of Oregon, have challenged Reagan's accusation. Similar charges were made repeatedly against the anti-Vietnam War movement: no significant Soviet involvement was ever proved. The PLO's Missing Members Israeli intelligence says it has discovered that the camps in Tunisia that accommodated 1,000 PLO guerrillas after their evacu- ation from Beirut are now empty. Israeli officials suspect that the, fighters have made their way back to the Mideast?either to Syria or Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. American Mideast specialists say that Syria has recently tightened its border watch to prevent PLO fighters from sneaking back into Lebanon; they speculate that Syria is fearful of provoking an Israeli attack. How to Stop Soviet High-Tech Spies Washington's campaign to stop the Soviet theft of technology may handicap American businessmen more than the secret-snatch- ers, according to a Senate study to be released this week. The Senate's Permanent Investigating Subcommittee reports that the Commerce Department tries to protect so many high-tech com- modities that its 'limited resources are spread too widely to be effective. The proposed solution: having the intelligence agencies work harder to pinpoint the particular innovations that Moscow covets most; security measures could then be concentrated on those areas. The panel also recommends that customs officers be given 'broader powers and that the federal wiretap law be expanded to permit easier surveillance of suspected poachers. 00100140001-3 STAT The 'CIA In Fro)... The Central Intelligence Agency has boosted its influence to new levels during, the Reagan administration, by at least one measure. Under Director William Casey, the CIA has sharply increased its production of National Intelligence Estimates. Based on both public and secret information, the NIE's address such topics as Soviet nuclear strength, international terrorism and world oil reserves. The reports are designed to be used by policymaking officials, but they are often ignored. Nonetheless, the number of NIE's can be a rough indicator of the CIA's standing. When Jimmy Caner was president the CIA turned out about 12 a year. That number more-than tripled during the first year of the Reagan administration and will probably reach 60 in 1982. (China Arms Iraq China has set up a stall in the Middle East arms ba7aar. United States intelligence officials say that China is now a major source of military supplies for Iraq. According to a new report, Iraq buys one- quarter of all its weaponry from China; that accounts for half of China's arms-export total. Most Chinese weapons are based on Soviet models, which makes it easy for Iraq to integrate the Chinese equipment into its largely Soviet arsenal. ERIC GELMAN with bureau reports 4 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 7 ? -rit ? 1,-zdiarn.Anguish: Being Ordered to Lie STAT Mississippi colonel explains how it feels to cover u and to tell the tnith Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00 ON PAGE C. - THE WASHINGTON POST 14 INIC VEMBER 1982 STAT 0100140001-3 Gains Hawkins is the administrator ? of the Dugan Memorial Nursing Home ? in West Point, Miss., and chai.7-'inan of the Clay County Republican Party. Order of battle intelligence, broadly speak- ing, is everything one must...know about an ememy's military force. .his knowledge comes from studying the units of that force; By Gains B. Hawkins A FAMOUS LADY columnist Who writes .n..for The Washington Post called the other day and asked if I had any regrets about participating in the making of CBS' controversial documentary on the mis- or uncounting of the enemy in Vietnam ? the documentary that has led Gen. William C. Westmoreland to file a $120-million libel suit against CBS. In a state of mild shock at being called by a famous lady newspaper columnist, 1 could only mumble something about "Yes" and "No:" With all my wits intact could have an- swered a bit more eloquently, "Yes, there is some anxiety ? a to be a fink or a ra concern that I will appear scal, or a sensation monger or worse; and some private annoyance that -life in relatively quiet retirement in this little community of -West Point on the black prai- rie of nort-heast Mississippi will never be the same again. But, no, too, M said), there is a iss Mary (1 should have compulsion here, a tardy realization that the tale must come out no matter what the personal pain or annoyance. In truth, the retelling is somewhat like the war itself, Miss Mary. If hurts, and it is larger than all du& When the deception began is not clear in my memory. Years have passed and memory can be like the smoked glass through which one is warned to when the deceptionm look at an eclipse. Even ? was going on there was a wish not to remeber, as if the not remem- bering would somehow belie the happening itself. But it began to happen sometime dur- ing the last three or four months of my 18- month tour of duty that ended in the early part of September: 967. The tour began in February 1966 as a reun- --- ion and a challenge. The reunion was with then-Brig. Gen. Joseph A. McChristian, the chief intelligence officer of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. I had served under the general before when he held a simi: 'Jar post at the Army's Pacific headquarters in Hawaii. There, under the tutelage of Gen. appreciated the pay, which was much better NIcChristian. this AtikerrouinVieence than that4 of Mississinni school teachers. I had challenge of an area of military intelligence of my home. of battle. where exactly they are located; how many people are in them; what types and how much equipment-and weaponry they possess; their organization or command structure; their supply system; their tactics; their state of training; their state of morale, or will to fight; their actual -effectiveness in combat, and probably most important, the quality of their leadership, from cornmandel-in-chief down to squad leaders. This is a slow, deliber- ate way to study a military force. It is .also a technique we needed to use to try to under- stand the Vietnamese communists. During the quarter century I spent wearing the Army uniform, intelligence was my prin- cipal endeavor. Drafted in early 1942 out of a tiny teachers college in the Mississippi Delta to serve in The Big War, I was later commis- sioned a second lieutenant and did my thing in Europe as a very junior intelligence officer (where I served briefly with then-Col. McChristian). Discharged as a captain in the Army Re- serve in 1946, I returned to Delta State Teachers College to complete my degree, taught high school English and somehow managed to earn a master's degree in English at Ole Miss just in time to be drafted again ? for service in Korea. The Army was good to me. It paid me well and held out the promise of security in retire- ment at a fairly youthful age. It taught me Japanese, sent me to Asia, then launched me permanently in the area of intelligence by sending me to Stanford University to concen- trate on the countries of the Far East. I held no pretensions of finding a place on, the Army's fast track to a general's stars. I was happy as a duck on a pond doing the aca- demic work of an intelligence analyst, and I officer had first cis vere ame 211,q?toikcpni., RP 9,-9144AT qiNtO 17: Vietnam was the ultimate test for professional intelligence officers. There field commanders could not draw circles around hilltops or towns and make them military objectives simply because they were important pieces of real estate. In Vietnam the critical problem was not real estate, but finding and destroying the 'enemy's military force. Intelligence officers had to find the enemy before ?the enemy could be confronted and .destroyed. And so it was that in early 1966, bored with a job as an intelligence personnel officer at Ft. liolabird in Baltimore, I had sent a note to Gen. McChristian in Saigon offering my services. A few weeks later I was sa- luting him at his desk insideyths MACV compound. ? Considering our previous relation- ship in Hawaii, I was not surprised when the- general told -me I would oversee the production of order of battle intelligence. In his words, I was "Mister Order of Battle." This was the challenge. The title was reiterated again and ? again during the months I served -him. And I have always believed there was a special motive for these persistent reminders by the general. to his staff, to visitors and to every- one else up and clown the line. There were almost as many vocif- . erou.s estimates of the enemy force in :-Vietnam as there were interested :parties. But Gen. McChristian wasn't : interested in journalists' guesses or ?-? field commanders' "gut feelings." He demanded a plodding, painstaking ? analysis of the bits and pieces. This ? was to be my responsibility. I - - Keeping the books on the cornmu- nist force was a complicated task be- cause the force itself was Byzantine. 0 ajleui *re the North, Vietnamese Army units. There was the massive infiltration effort which provided ditinnAi raciriaroc arNr1 Approved For Release 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140 01-3 I :" ON ?LG.= THE ATLANTIC November 1982 CHOOSING A STRATEGY FO WORLD WAR III BY THONLkS POWERS IN THE YEARS SINCE 1945, DISCUSSION OF STRATEGIC nuclear policy in the upper reaches of the American government has centered on a single overriding ques- tion?what to do If deterrence fails." The phrase is char- acteristic of the rigid etiquette that governs official talk about nuclear weapons. It means war, and especially a big general war between the 'United States and the Soviet Union?war of the old-fashioned, all-out sort. in which even fear of The Bomb would take second place ' to the straggle. Officials have learned to be wary of talking in public about nuclear war. It just gets them in trouble. But in private they talk about war all the time. None of them wants such a war. In truth, none of them expects. it?now or ever. But deterrence could fail. What do we do then? For the general public, nuclear war means something like the end of the world?a single burst of destruction in which cities would be flicked of the face of the globe in a whirlwind of fire. That is not the way military men look at things. They may vaguely threaten to scrape Russia fiat down to the primeval gravel, but that's mainly fer show, to put the other side in a serious frame of mind. When the balloon goes up," as they sometimes say, the time for threats is past. Then you have got to fight, not just kiss the kids good-bye and push the button. The general public may be content with the awful either/or, but the military instinctively rebels against the idea that the end of deter- rence is the end of everything else. When war comes, armies fight with the weapons at hand. Nuclear weapons are a prominent feature of the ar- senals of both sides. How are they to be used? What should we point them at? How many should we fire in the opening salvo? In the early days of the nuclear era, the bombs were so cumbersome, so hard to deliver, and above all so few that they were reserved for only the most dramatic targets. As a practical matter, that meant cities. In 1945. it meant Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the late 1940s, it meant Mos- cow and Leningrad. In the fall of 1948, for example, the United States had about 100 bombs, but the early bombs took two days to assembe by a team of twenty-four. We didn't have teams enough to assemble them all at once. STAT STAT times didn't even know how many bombs we had. Until 1948, the only airplanes that could deliver the bombs were specially modified B-29s, slow craft, vulnerable to attack en route, so limited in range that they had to be based in Europe. Military targets tend to be small, numerous, pro- tected, hard to find and hit. For purely technical reasons. then, the first nuclear weapons were pointed at "strategic" targets, that is, targets the loss of which might affect the morale or the War-making potential of the enemy. The wars of the late 1940s, if they had taken place, would have lasted a few weeks, and would have consisted of devastat- ing blows on Russian cities, ports, and industrial sites. By the early 1950s, these problems had been solved. The AEC agreed to let the Strategic Air Command (SAC) keep , bombs on its airfields. We had afleet of new intercontinen- tal bombers to deliver them. The bombs themselves had a much longer "shelf life" and didn't have to be assembled from scratch immediately before use. Above all, they were more numerous. We had entered, in the phrase used by professional strategists, -the era of nuclear plenty"---in which we still find ourselves. It is also the era of choice. When you've got only three weapons, as we had in July of 1945. it's not hard to decide what to point them at. When you've got thousands, as we have now, and when you can hit anything in a known location on the surface of the earth, as we can now, and, above all, when the Soviets can retaliate in kind, then you have to think hard before decid- ing what to hit and when to hit it. The decisions impiy the course of the war we are likely to see If deterrence fails." When Jimmy Carter entered the White House, in Janu- ary of 1977, he probably would have done away with nucle- ar weapons altogether given the choice. This may sound like the inevitable preference of any sane man, but none of Carter's predecessors had shared it. Nuclear weapons solve certain kinds of problems; in particular. they are cheaper than men and tanks. Carter's predecessors had all chosen nuclear weapons rather than press Congress or NATO allies to come up with money for men-and tanks enough to face the Russians on what is called the -central front" in Europe. Eisenhower's first secretary of defense, Charles Wilson, once said, "We can't afford to fight limited Such bombs as wel-140e6tked1friftrkei6aiV?R/66%1W: CIAlitapar. -15itISti4Noti ht a big war, and if there is e I 9 it Energy Commission (AEC). which was reluctant to turn one, that e n tN'f . .11farter was a stranger th over to the Air Force in advance. The generals some- to V'ashinetori in 1977: he had not been over and over this Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R0001 fr.:77.7.=0"7:;- THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 28 October 1982 By Daniel Southerland Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor STAT 00140001-3 Washington "The Soviets," says the bespectacled round-faced man who looks more like a stockbroker than America's top spy, "got virtually a free ride on all of our research and development." He's talking about secret agents ? from the Soviet bloc. And, he says, they plundered America's technological secrets because our own spies weren't watching them. The speaker is William C. Casey, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency and coordinator for all intelligence gathering for the United States. He indicates that things are likely to become much tougher for the Soviets in the world's intensi- fying spy wars if he has his way. After years of controversy and cutback, America's spies are finally getting a break. The Reagan administration is putting more money and manpower into the busi- ness of spying, and into countering Soviet bloc spies both at home and abroad. Exact figures on recruiting for the spy trade and on the money spent on the intelligence agencies are kept secret. But it is clear that after years of decline, spying is now a "growth industry." One of the few government insti- tutions which is hiring new employees in this time of recession is the US Central Intelligence Agency. ? In the view of some experts. the effort comes none too soon. "We've got to strengthen HUMIN"T," says oneof the experts who has access to sensitive intelligence reports, speaking in the peculiar argot of professional spies. He means "human intelligence gathering". "Our SIGINT (signal intellegence) and photo intelligence are among the best, but in HiTMIN'T . . we're lucky if we're among the top 10." The Reagan administration took power some 21 months ago deter- mined to strengthen intelligence collection, analysis, and operations, and the dozen agencies that make up what is known in the trade as the "intelligence community" are benefiting. Take the Federal Bureau of Investigation, for example. According to one high-ranking intelligence officer, FBI money and manpower was once stretched to the point-where the bureau had to stop surveil- lance of certain known Soviet spies, who, together with European surrogate spies, were operating in an increasingly sophisticated and aggressive manner in this country. The FBI has become increasingly concerned over the loss' to So- viet spies of American high technology information. Although pre- cise figures are closely guarded, it is now clear that the FBI is get- ting more in way of resources to conduct a more aggressive counterespionage program. ' Mr. Casey argues, however, that the intelligence agencies are not so much increasing their budgets as they are building back to where they were before they got cut during the 1970s. In a more than hour-long interview with the Monitor, Casey said that because of these cuts in money and manpower. intelligence re- porting on an increasingly turbulent third world and on a variety of other problems had been drastically reduced. According to Casey, major intelligence analyses. known as "national estimates" often failed to cover third world developments. US intelligence: focus on the Kremlin, third world countries Approved For Release 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-g?A7::'"-L:.;7; Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 CROSS nza CiA 3, 03e //9 Els-77/2,1,97-ES 61/1E) For additional information on 'the above, see: FTLES DATES 0?, n/ A// / Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00010 r;.:2,53 71I EELL L OCTO3LR 1982 Cr'",r 1140001-3 U. S. Vigilance Over Soviet Space Activities increased Washington?The Central Intelligence Agency and other U. S. intelligence orga- nizations are increasing their vigilance of Soviet s7.-.ace program capabilities at the ura'ing of the new U. S. Air Force Space Comman d. "We will push for more attention and understanding for operational space intel- ligence so it gets at least the same treat- ment as the missile, air, ground and naval threats," Gen. James V. Hartinger, who heads both Space Command and North A.rnericam Aerospace Defense Command, said Hartinger said he has discussed this is- sue with CIA director William Casey. Ca- sey "agrs that the operational space intelligence area should be a national in- telligence estimate placed in a high-priori- ty position?now it's going to be," he said. Soviet Launch Rate Continuing high . Soviet military space launch rate coupled with new Soviet de- velopments that will increase Russian ca- pabilities during the 19S0s has recently prompted Defense and other officials to highlight the threat posed by this Soviet de-:eloprnent push. National Aeronautics and Space Ad- ministration deputy administrator Hans M. Mark told an Air Force Assn. sympo- sium here that he wanted to comment on the Soviet Hlitary space buildup at the recent United Nations Conference on Space held in Vienna (Aw,ksT Aug. 16, p. 16). He was overruled by the State Dept, he said. and in Vienna the U. S.. was criti- cized for space militarization, not the So- viet Union. Under secretary of Defense for research and engineering, Richard D. DeLauer, told a Senate Foreign Relations subcom- mince that the Soviet Salyut space station program "engages in military activities and may be the .forerunner of a weapons. platform.- Under secretary of the Air Force, Ed- ward C. Aldridge, Jr., told the Air Force Assn. symposium that Defense Dept. is concerned xl-th Soviet development of a Sat:n5-:]ass ]auncher capable of placing an anp7c:ii-:-.2ie 300,000 lb. payload into ? In addition to space station launch, Aldridge said Defense Dept. is concerned this new heavy booster could be used to launch large high-energy laser weapons systems. "We will be watching this closely , and make sure we have the proper. re- ! sponse," Aldridge said. "We are going to provide the operation- al pull to go with the technology push that has dominated space flight since its inception," Hartinger said. "We are going to develop space 'doctrine and strategy. We are going to strengthen the weakest link in space systems development?the statement of operational need procedure." The new command plans to insure that U. S. military space assets participate rou- tinely in military exercises like those 6:in- ducted by other elements of the military services. "We have been exercising everything else but not space. We are going to now," Hartinger said. Hartinger cited milestones toward bringing Space Command to full capabili- ty: a Activation?The command was acti- vated Sept. 1. This will be followed Jan. 1 by activation of the 1st Space Wing at Peterson AFB, Colo., near NORAD head- quarters at Colorado' Springs. Space Com- mand's Communications Div. will be activated also on Jan. 1, and on Apr. 1, Space Command will take over Peterson AFB from Strategic Air Command. The USAF Space Div. that remains un- der Systems Command was to activate the Space Technology Center at Kirtland AFB, N. M., on Oct. 1. The Space Div. and technology center will be closely aligned with Space Command, although they will remain under Systems Command control. Command Heads While Hartinger heads both NORAD and Space Command, the head of Air Force Space Div., Lt. Gen. Richard C. Henry, is also vice commander of Space Command. This is designed to form close ties between developmental and operation- al Air Force space enns. ? 1st Space Wing?The new organiza- tion will be responsible for world-wide space tracking and missile warning-sen- sors that Space Command will be acquir- ing from Strategic Air Command. , The new wing will have 6,000 Air Force personnel and 2,000 contractor per- sonnel spread between four primary bases at Peterson AFB, Colo.; Sondrestrom Air Base, Greenland; Thule Air Base, Green- land, and Clear An, Alaska. The north- ern bases have missile early warning sensor responsibility. Lt. Gen. Henry, vice commander of Space Command, said at the symposium, "Every operational Defense spacecraft in orbit is either national in character or provides support to more than one service Or agency. "My point is that spacecraft are gener- ally strategic in nature and our depen- dence on them is such that we should start thinking of their deployments as stra- tegic issues," He posed several questions for Space Command to answer: ? How vulnerable are we to spacecraft attrition by failure or combat? ? if a spacecraft should be lost during launch, how do we recover the lost capa- bility? ? How do we address orbital selection? "We know some orbits are less vulnerable than others. Do we have an orbit strate- gy?" ? "If we define an orbital strategy that can absorb combat losses, do we have the supportive procurement and launch strate- gies?" "Our mission in space is to deliver from on high to our operational forces the elec- tronic bit stream, the written message, oral conversation, a picture or navigation situation wherever the forces need it, whenever they need it and with total cer- tainty," Henry said. "Space Command's job is to define the orbital strategy and force structure needed to make this come true," according to Henry. 0 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 :7 --;?,7 CY. Approved For Release 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP90-01137R 00100140001-3 PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER 12 SEPTEMBER. 1982 Military. game Scary leaks calculated to STAT win weapons fundiriv- - Ironically, as U.S intelligence.- gathering and analysis have become more Sophisticated, the translation of threat assessment into budget re- ality-has become more frantic. Despite the Reagan ? administra- tion's commitment to a five-year, SIS trillion increase in military spend- ing. blossoming budget deficit pro- jections have convinced Pentagon planners that they should get new weapons systems approved quickly, before congressional support for big defense budgets evaporates. As the Air Force competes for funds with the Navy and the Army. defense analysts say, leaks have be- come more profligate. "In the old days there were few leaks. and -there was always a guy frem -the FBI in my office the follow- ing morning trying -to -find, .the leaker," says retired -Gen:-Daniel 0. Graham. former head of the Dense ?Intelligence Agency - (DIA). 'Tell. now it's gotten se rampant I. don't think they bother ? with that any- more." Briefings offered . Compounding the problem --4or Congress and the public is the gov. ernment's penchant for stamping nearly all intelligence analyses "ton secret." As a result, the editor of a respected military journal says, inde- pendent verification of leaks has be-, come more difficult. The Pentagon does offer classified briefings on such issues to members of Congress, but the sessions are not normally well attended. And the pub- lic has no access to such briefings, which. could give better perspective to issues that have been the subject ? of selective leaks. Even ..expegienced congressional staff members wittiliciifitrtleare- ances say they are haying increased difficulty digging information out of The Pentagon. "You tend to go to your friends over there." one aide says: "The problem is that your friends tend to share your ideology, and sometimes I feel I'm not getting a ,"balanced picture." In the resuliant-cauldron of leaks and rumors, rational, calm and inde- pendent thinking on defense often gets short shrift. That is unfortunate BY David Wood ARteLeS 11~.3 Serftf-t WASHINGTON ? During a break-:. fast session with reporters recently, Gen_ W. L Creech, commander of the Tactical Air Command, unexpectedly disclosed that the Soviet Union had developed three new fighter planes that might- out-perform the best fighters currently in the US. arsenal. The result was alarming headlines in newspapers ? and success for the Air Force with a time-honored Wash- ington ploy: the calculated leak. . Earlier, the Air Force had asked Congress for 52.3 million in the fiscal 1983 budget to begin development of a new-generation fighter. Classified intelligence analyses of the new So- viet threat had been available to key members of Congress, but the re- quest was in danger of falling victim to the pervasive budget-cutting mood . on Capitol Hill. Two weeks after Creech disclosed the previously secret assessment of the new Soviet aircraft, however. Congress voted to let the Air Force go ahead with research and develop- ment for the U.S. fighter. The incident illustrates a bureau- cratic maneuver common enough in the past but becoming increasingly prevalent since the Reagan adminis- tration took office: selective leaking of intelligence and other informa- tion to tilt decisions on important` defense questions. It is a trend that some military analysts fear may fritter away Penta- gon credibility and help dissolve na- tional support for building a stron- ger defense_ It always has been difficult, even under the best of circumstances, to assess accurately the threat posed by the Soviet Union or either potential adversaries and to shape the budget to meet such challenges. And the pressure from American military es- tablishments always has been tre- mendous. Indeed, President Eisenhower and Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khru- shchev, according to the Soviet lead- er's memoirs, glumly acknowledged during informal talks-at Camp David 23 years ago that neither was able to resist the demands of generals who First, the high technology in- volved in modern weapons systems has dramatically lengthened the time it takes to bring new weapons from concept through production into use. The budget decisions Con- gress mikes this fall will shape the American defense posture well into the 21st century. Second. because of a slowdown in defense spending in the 1970s, dos- . ens of major weapons systems will become obsolete within a few years. Thus. the nation faces decisions now on a wide variety of important mili- tary programs, ranging from the MX missile to the 600-ship Navy and a fundamental re-equipping and re- training of the Army; Look for evidence Between "selective" intelligence leaks and the increasing classifica- tion of thorough intelligence ana- lyses, it is becoming -clear that military intelligence personnel tend to look around for evidence to sup- port their causes. It was precisely to avoid this prob- lem that the .process of gathering. analyzing and collating intelligence data into official "threat assess- ments' was created. Under the system. reports on Sovi- et military technology, weapons pro- duction, defense spending, strategy and other subjects are analyzed by the CIA zed its Pentagon counter- part, the DIA, as well as by -Nagy. Army and Air Force intelligence branches. This work then is gath- ered into one National Intelligence Estimate. The estimate -is supposed TO rise above the instintional biases of the individual services and intelligence agencies. But according to former and cur- rent intelligence executives, the pro- cess has gotten seriously skewed, ' with the more "aggressive" DI?kgain- ing an edge over the more treelll'on- ally cautious CIA. , Graham, who as DIA director. engi- neered the agency's rise in infkience in the White House and netigel se- curity circles, dates the beginiseag of the DIA's ascendancy to theaarly had intelligence repom about ypii 1970s. when the CIA was widely-crib- the other side was tifeFIENRVI4Pikor Release 20.601/1331sCWRDP290t01137R0001611fatecieizlY underestimate doing. perilous now for two reasons: mg sovier mi nary power. , -Ap-proved-For Release 2006/01/03 CIA:RDP9001137R0001 ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE ? Capital Tactic entagon Joins Itsel ilk Lea By DAVID WOOD, s Times Staff Writer- - -WA.SlifitGTON?During a breakfast ses_gicin with reporters re-- "cently, Gen: W. L. Creech; coth- -.gander of the Tactical Air Com- mand, unexpectedly- disclosed that: -_the Soviet Union had. developed 'three new fighter planes that -might- out-perform the best fightersfighters cur- ,rently in the U.S. arsenal. *: ; 7 The result was alarming 'head- lines in newspapers?and 'success: :for the _Air Force with a tiine-hon- ;cored Washington ploy: the caleulat 1 s_..ed leak. - s ' ? , ? Eg_rlier, the Air Force had asked :Congress for $23 million in the fiscal 19'63 budgettto begin development a new-generation fighter. Cla.ssi- fie,e. intelligence analyses of the new Sovita threat-had been available to -- key members of Congress, but the reqeiest was in danger of falling ? tim to the pervasive budget-cutting mood on Capitol Hill. Two weeks- after' .Creech went public with:. the previously ilieskaret assessment of the new Soviet air; -craft, however, CongressVoted to, -let the Air Force go ahead with re- -- search and development 'for, the new U.S. fighter.. _ More Common Practice The -incident illustrates bureaucratic, maneuver common enough in the past but becoming in- creingly prevalent since the Rea- gan Administration took office;se- lective leaking of intelligence .and -other information to tilt decisions on important defense questions. It is a ? trend that some defense analysts fear may fritter away Pentagon credibility and help dissolve nation- LOS ANGELES TIMES 12 SEPTEMBER 1982 I.Tnderjhe best of circumstances-, :accurately -assessing the;. threat 'posed by the Soviet Union or-ather :potential adversaries and shaping :the budget to meet such challenges always-has been' difficulL: And the pressure . from American military establishments: ? 'always has .:,been' tremendous. - ? ".... Indeed, President a_ Dwight 11 .Eisenhower and Soviet Premier Ni-' kita -S. -,.I.Ehrushchev, according; to :the.Soviet leader's merrioirs, glumly ? :acknowledged during informal talks .at Camp: David 23 -years ago that. ..neither Was. able to resist the de- snands Of generals waving .intel- -,ligence reports about what the oth- er side was be doing _ . . . Inaccurate teaks in 19Os? Nor is the calculating,' budget- 'manipulating' government . official? new on the scene_ : :the 1950s, the -jobs..of.:14,000 ?. 'people in seven states arid congres-. .sional appropriations of More than $1 :billion to develop in-- atomia-; -powered boniber were sustained in part by: Official leaks about:Soviet construction of such a plane._Intele ligenee eiperts, now agree, howeV .er, that the leaks were not true: Ironically, as U.S. intelligence:- gathering and .analysis' have be-,. come' more sophisticated, -the ra? tional 'translation of threat assess- ' _ment into budget -reality7has -be'. come more frantic. ? Despite the Reagan Administra- tion's commitment to a five-year, $1.5-triliione increase iri -defense spending, blossoming budget deficit ? projections have convinced Penta- gon planners that thy had better get new weapons systems approved ? qi:lickly, before congiassional sup:- port for big defense iudgets eva- porates. ,? As the Air Force empetes for .4arce funds with the Isavy and the . Army, defense analyst say, leaks 17ave become more profigate. ? 1"In the old days then were few ? ltaks, and there was alVays a guy ftom the FBI in my offie the fol- morning trying b find the Iral.zer,? said retired Gen_Daniel 0. Graham, former head of the Defense ? Iptelligence Agency. "Hell now it's gcetten so rampant I don't think they ? that an ymore." - al support for building a stronger ,bother v;ith defense... ? Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 0140001-3 STAT Conipounding the pro em for Congress and the public- is the gavernment's penchant for 'Ttarnp- itg nearly all intelligence atalyses top secret_ As a result, the edtor of respected- , military jourhal_says, i$dependent- verification - of Aeaks has become more difficult: .1 The Pentagon does offer elaasi- . fed briefings to members of Cm- &ess on such issues, but the., fes- ' eons are not normally well attend- ed. And the public hasno access az! sich briefings, which could give better, perspective to issues thaa liave been the subject of selectivaks ,. ? - - . An Unbalanced Picture And even experienced congres- sional staff members with security: clearances say they are having creased - difficulty prodding infor- mation out of the Pentagon. "You tend to go to your friends over there." one aide said. "The problem is that- your friends tend to share your ideology, and sometimes I feel I'M not getting a balanced picture." In the resultant cauldron of leaks and rumors, rational and calm inde- pendent thinking on defense often gets sideswiped_ That is unfortunste_ any time, but it has become more perilous for two reasons: First, the high technology in- volved in modern weapons systems has dramatically lengthened the time it takes to bring new weapons from concept through production 0J7sITLVVED Approved For Release 2q0SEIg-thatoiClikIREW90-01137R00010 10 September 19 82 SALT violations, continued Fresh evidence arrives almost daily that the Soviet Union is violating numerous and significant provisions of the SALT I and SALT II agreements. A member of the Defense. Intelligence. Agency has told The Washington Times that the Soviets have constructed between 40 and 220 SS-16 mobile ICBMs now operational at the Plesetsk r4issile site. The National Intelligence Estimate of? Soviet Strategic Forces,as reported by John Lofton, states as an agreed U.S. intelligence judgment that "the Soviets will break out of the SALT I and SALT II agreements this year." The paper reveals that the Soviets will increase the number of MIRVed mis- siles to 920. overshooting the SALT II ceil- ing of 820 missiles by 12 percent in a single year. These are just two more bits of evidence in a growin2 mound. The Kremlin, it seems, has violated the letter and spirit of SALT on every major provision, from ABM testing and construct2on limits to missile and bomber ceilings an d nen-interference with U.S. verification. Most disr_lrbing of all, information reaches us that the P;rms Control and Disarmament Agency L3 al)out to declare that the Soviets are still "in fundamental compliance" with the SALT aczonis. The report. fo:.-a congressional committee, will take no: of the various allegations, but 0140001-3 STAT dismiss them as either insignificant or unproven. It looks like the kind of cover- up the Republican platform of 1980 pledged to end. It isn't all ACDNs fault, of course. Despite the heroic efforts of a handful of congress- men, both the SenateForeign Relations Com- mittee and the House Armed Services Com- mittee have refused to open hearings on the matter. Despite its helpful attention to Soviet violations of other agreements?the chemi- cal weapons ban and Cuban missile under- standing, for example ? the administration is still reluctant to give up publicly on Soviet good faith. What ACDA needs is a clear directive from the White House to admit that the violations are violations. Convincing the public won't be easy. The president's critics will shout all the predictables; the cowboy, we'll be told, is just looking for an excuse to scuttle talks with the Soviets altogether. The presi- dent was insincere all along on arms control, they'll say. No matter how hard the evidence, the media organs of the Left will pronounce it not hard enough. However, even the polls cited by the nuclear freeze lobby show that Americans do not trust the Russians to keep any agreement that isn't airtight ? and SALT I and II are not. The evidence of Soviet violation must be examined with great care. If it holds up, though, the American people need to know. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 V ARTICLE AP:EpRED ON PAGE Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00 WASHINGTON TIMES 8 SEPTEMBER 1982 JOIN LOFIDN'S JOURNAL Reagan spends less than Carter on arm Ronald Reagan has caught a lot of flak, and many Republican candidates are being put on the spot, because of the president's alleged massive increase in the defense budget But, a close look at new data reveals that real defense spending ? in terms of constant comparable Reagan dol- lars ? is less than it would have been had Jimmy Carter been re-elected_ Furthermore, under President Reagan, defense spending is likely to be significantly less in 1983 than it would have been under Carter. Also, in terms' of real defense spending or outlays in 1981 and 1982, the Reagan administration has spent slightly less than Carter planned. Thus, there has not yet been a real increase in U.S. military capabilities. In fact, Reagan's highly touted military buildup is still largely a promise and will occur ? if at all ? only in the future. ? While it's true that in each year the president has 'requested defense budgets higher than Carter's, he also has supported congressional cuts. . The new data that compare and contrast the Reagan and Carter defense budgets comes from the Congressional Budget Office. What the CBO has - done is convert the last Carter five-year military budget into constant comparable Reagan dollars. This provides a realistic, fair comparison between Reagan and his predecessor. Here are the figures: In 1981 outlays, Carter proposed spending $160.1 billion; Reagan's figure is $156.1 ? which is $4 billion less than Carter. In 1982 outlays, Carter proposed spending $181.7 billion; Reagan, $182.7 ? which is Si billion more than Carter. In 1983 .outIaye, Carter proposed spending $203 billion; Reagan, $215.9 billion (requested as of April of this year). STA I ? For 1983, Congress would have appropriated S203 :billion for Carter; for Reagan, $207.4 billion_ For :1983, under a continuing resolution, Congress would :have appropriated $203 billion for Carter; $182.7 billion for Reagan. Thus, under these figures, Carter :would have spent $23.3 billion more on defense :than Reagan. ? So, regardless of what you've heard or read ? 'as things stand now ? Ronald Reagan's defense :budget is actually smaller than the defense budget :projected by Jimmy Carter. This is undoubtedly the 'reason why such hardline Reaganite groups as ;The Committee on the President Danger and The :Heritage Foundation have criticized Reagan's 'military budget as inadequate. Says Robert Foelber, a :Heritage defense expert: "So far the FY 1983 defense budget debate has :focused almost exclusively on the economics of 'defense. It is now time to consider the budget in :terms of military requirements, stable deterrence :and the realities of the Soviet threat. As they stand, .the administration defense budgets cannot reverse :the West's decline' This new information from the CBO is not the ;only astounding information regarding the adminis- -tration's military policy. A National Intelligence 'Estimate on Soviet strategic forces ? issued this - :past spring ? reveals that if the Russians continue to kuld their MIRVed (multiple independently :targeted re-entry vehicles) ICBMs (inter-continental .ballistic missiles) at the same rate, by the end of this year they will be massively violating the SALT H treaty. .?_.. _ - - - - This information was available to the president when he announced this past Memorial Day that the United States would, de facto, be adhering to his pact even though our Senate has never ratified it. On June 29, Reagan declared: _ - ?. "As for existing agreements, we will refrain from actions which undercut them so long as the Soviet Union shows equal restraint." But, the spring National Intelligence Estimate shows no such restraint. Projecting the existing growth rate for Soviet MIRVed ICBMs, it saS,,s that if this continues, by the end of 1982 the Russians will have 920 MIRVed ICBMs, which is 100 more than the SALT II limits allow. .csflivirNvEat Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 ' Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-0113 Soviets to Meet Goal, ? CIA Analysis Finds By Dan Morgan wureei. Smr f wziter A classified memorandum pre- pared by the Central Intelligence Agency in August concluded that the Soviet Union will meet its gas deliv- ery commitments to Western Europe "through the 1980s," despite the Reagan administration's efforts to delay construction of the Siberian pipeline. The memorandum, classified "se- cret" but circulated widely in the government, undercuts a central ad- ministration argument that the sanc- tions, divisive as they are proving to be within the Atlantic Alliance, eventually will pay off by depriving . the Kremlin of western currency needed to support its lagging econ- omy and its miliary buildup. For this reason, middle-level of- ficials at the 'n:ational Security Council, and the Szate, Defense and Commerce departments are reported to have challenge-6. the CIA conclu- sions and pressed for a Special Na- tional Intelligence Estimate, or "SNIE," of the issue by the entire U.S. intelligence community. The interagency critique of the CIA memo was reviewed last week by State Deeiertment counselor James L. Buckley and sent to the National Security Council. NSC of- ficials, however, declined to discuss the matter yesterday. The CIA analysis, based on infor- mation as of Aug. 6, expresses the view that Moscow has "a wide range of options" to accomplish its goal of increasing natural gas deliveries to Western Europe, including the fol- lowing:_ -7..e:ete......7e-er 7R000100140001-3 ? "Deliveries could begin in late 1984, as scheduled, by using existing pipelines, which have excess capacity of at least 6 billion cubic meters an- nually." 0 "-Using some combination of So- viet and West European equipment, deliveries through the new export pipe:ine could probably begin in late 1985 and, reach nearly full volume in 1987?about one year later than if the sanctions had not been im- posed." ? "At substantial cost to the do- mestic economy, the U.S.S.R. could divert construction crews and com- pressor station equipment from new domestic pipelines to the export pipeline, or even dedicate a domestic? pipeline for export use to ensure ca- pacity adequate to meet contractual delivery obligations." Only this last choice of relying primarily on their own resources would cause the Soviets much dif- ficulty, the memo said. It could force Moscow to cut back its domestic pipeline construction program, forc- ing a reduction of domestic gas de- liveries by as much as 30 billion cubic 'meters a year. That possibility has faded in the last few days as French and British companies have loaded key pipeline components on Soviet-bound freighters in defiance of President Reagan's order June 15 forbidding foreign firms utilizing U.S. licenses from delivering the equipment. But European governments have unan= imbusly rejected these controls and ordered their firms to proceed with deliveries. The practical problem facing the administration is that enough U.S. built equipment is in Europe to allow European firms to ship the Soviets as many as 23 complete tur- Vac* of the 125 ordered. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 STAT Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000' WASHINGTON QUARTERLY THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATION2W GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, Autumn 1982 00140001-3 Rayinond L. Garth:ow, o retired Foreign Service officer and ambassador. is a senior fellow at the Broolungs Instinthon. In 1962. serving as special assistant for Soinet Bloc Paiitico-hlilitai7.- Affairs in the Deparanenr af State hr participated acoyeh in the Cuban titiLsile crists deciston-nsaing process. - Using his own recently declassified memos, this former senior State Department official examines the military considerations behind U.S. decision making during the Cuban missile crisis. The Meaning of the Missiles. Raymond L Garthoff One of the crucial considerations in U.S. decision-making during the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 was our evaluation of the military significance of the Soviet de- ployment in Cuba of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (lRBMs). This fact is obvi- ous, yet at the same time far from clear. It is. for example, well known from several in-' formed accounts that then Secretary of De- fense Robert McNamara had said from the outset that the military significance of the Soviet missile deployment was not unman- ageable, and could be offset without having to remove the missiles?whether by compel- ling Soviet withdrawal or. if that could not be done, then by U.S. military action. Not all military leaders agreed with that judg- ment, but the question was quickly set aside W-14 because of President Kennedy's concern over the political consequences, troth inter- national and domestic, if the United States were to acquiesce TO the Soviet deployment in Cuba. McNamara did not question that judgment or decision, and he did not deny that there was military significance to the de- ployment. The actual impact of the missiles on the military balance, therefore, did not become an issue of contention. Indeed, it was no: even fully analyzed in the hectic week of initial decisions. But it remained a factor throughout the 13 days of the con- frontation until Khrushchev agreed to dis- mantle and remove the missile systems. Beyond the narrow circle within the ad- ministration dealing hourly with the crisis, the question of what political and military measures of coercion?or concession? MISSILE CRISIS +20 1 The Meaning of the Mulles Royrnonel L. Garthoff 8 The Cuban Blockade: An Admiral's Idientalr George Anderson 13 A CIA Ilerniniscenee Ray S. Chne Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 STAT Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 LaT 111-77.EARLI ON PAG Z, I THE NEWSDAY MAGAZINE (N.Y. 11 July 1982 HI case Heim: uietiy in Co By David Wise Photo by Ken? Spencer Some -weeks ago, an interesting piece of information began circulat- ing in the intelligence community the closed, spooky world of the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency, Defense - Intelligence Agency, National Secu- rity Agency, Federal Bureau of In- - vestigation and the other spy agencies in and around Washington. The word went out that William J. 'Casey, the director of central intelli- gence, had bought an expensive house in the exclusive Foxhall Road section of Washington. . To men and women accustomed to working with fragments, piecing to- gether minute bits of intelligence to form a larger mosaic, the report was immediately seen for its true signifi- cance. Better than any official- an- nouncement, it meant that Bill Casey, a Long Islander who has a? home in Roslyn Harbor, was plan- ning to stick around as CIA director. There have been times in the past stormy year and a half when it was not at all clear that Casey would sur- vive as the DCI, as the spies refer to their chief. There was a series of di- sasters. First, Casey named his for- mer political aide, Max C. Hugel, as head of the CIA's cloak-and-dagger directorate. Hugel was soon forced to resign as the result of disclo- sures in the Washington Post about his questionable business dealings. Then the Senate Intelli- gence Committee, responding to a barrage of publicity, began probing Casey's own financial past. And Sen. Barry GaikkraivredliFeritiilease 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R0001 chairman of the intelligence com- mittee, once a Republican presiden- _ - _ -- point-blink for Casey to resign All of that took place last year Casey's first year on the -job. Thi storm subsided. The Senate panel in a backhanded way, found Case `not _"unfit" to serve. And through all, the CIA director Ronald Rea gan's campaign manager in 1980 ? ? managed to preserve his close per sonal relationship with the Presi dent. ("I still call him Ronnie, ?Casey has said.) . . Among those who must surel have heard the report ? about th house off Foxhall-Road was Casey' deputy, Adm. Bobby Ray Inman ..who Sen. Goldwater and a lot of oth .er members of Congress bad openl hoped would be Reagan's origins choice for CIA director. Blocke from the top job, wooed by privat industry with job offers in six fig ures, Inman in April announced tha he was quitting. In Moscow, the KGB has no doub already heard about Casey's nec house. Very likely, Vitali V. Fedor chuk, the recently appointed chair man of the Committee for Stat Security, better known as the KGB, has already informed President Leo- Brezhnev in the Kremlin. And the report is true. J. William Doswell, director of the CIA's Of- fice of External Affairs, a smooth, Richmond, Va., lobbyist and former newsman whom Casey brought in as his top public relations man, con- firms it. Doswell said that Casey and his wife, Sophia, moved last month from their apartment some- where in Washington to their new home off Foxhall Road. career who has managed to stay one jump ahead of trouble, barely avoid- ing -entanglement with the Iles of Robert Vesco during Watergate. For example, - Sen. Joe Eiden of Delaware, a Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee and Casey's most vocal critic, refused to endorse the panel's findings on the CIA di- rector, declaring. "Mr. Casey has displayed a consistent pattern of omissions, misstatements, and con- tradictions." And Casey's critics also charge he is not really qualed to run the CIA, since his intelligence iqffige-qiates from World War II, when he worked for the Office of Strategic Services (the OSS was the Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00 :.? - ARTICTZ APPEABID- ON PAGE T6, NEW YORK TIMES 5 JULY 1982 Q&A I Bobby R. Inman Assessing Government's Ap to Intelligence Simla. to TX tieVYadenisug WASHINGTON, July 4 ? Adm. Bobby R. Inman startled Washington in April when be announced his inten- tion to resign as the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. He said he wanted to go into private business, but associates asserted that the real rea- sons for his departure were policy dif- ferences with the Reagan Administra- tion and mounting frustration over dealing with the White House National Security Council staff. His retirement from the Government and the Navy complete, Mr. Inman sat down last week to discuss intelligence issues. Q. Is the Reagan Administration. - using intelligence information as a neutral basis for foreign policy formu- lation, or, as some critics have charged, is it twisting intelligence data to justify policies? A. It's been very rare in my experi- ence when an Administration makes an effort to deliberately twist the in- telligence to support policy, but there have been efforts over the years to force us to say-more than the intelli- gence professionals believe is safe in terms of protecting sources and meth- ods. I believed we found the proper balance earlier this year on the issue of Cuban and Soviet involvement in Central America. The debate was not with the intelligence but with the poli- cy. I don't believe that the Cuban and Soviet threats were being exaggerat- ed. For years we had a minimal effort dedicated to Central America and did not detect in a timely way the com- mencement of the training of prospec- tive guerrillas in Cuba. We were slow to recognize the breadth of insurgen- cies that we were. going to face. When we finally aaaimulated A large body of rawdatsi:iiitif Understood the scope al-Cuban activiefeTearly undertaken with full Soviet support, there was a taeclency-to- react with shock. That mayieell havecome acttes as overre- action. The language used to describe -Cnbanacrivity may have been a little more shrill than it would have been had we detected the activity from the outset. ? Q. How has the Reagan Administra- tion changed priorities in intelligence collection and analysis? 1100140001-3 STAT A . Early in the Reagan Administra: dens" on verification. There are sev- non, increased emphasis was placed eral ways to deal with that. There are, on gaining a knowledge of events in for 'mance, forms of on-site inspec. Central America and the Caribbean, tion that would increase verification? the causes of terrorism and the Prob. capabilities, but if you insist on abso- lem of the transfer of American tech- lute certainty, if you insist on the ca- nology to the Soviets- and Comenmist pacity to detect every violation, you'll bloc. Over a longer period of time, ? never have an arms control proms. there's been a fools On improving You have to take some risks. The key knowledge acress_the_third world. ? is being confident that you will detect Q. Has the Reagan Adminatation; anyserious cheating. placed a greateerellance on the use of ? covert operations than recent admin- istrations?? Q. What is the state of United States' ' A I know of no way that I can talk intelligence ozPabilities? ? sensibily in public about specific coy- A. The United States intelligence t ert operations. By their nature, there community, as currently structured . Is nothing unclassified about them. I Intel warmed, is marginally capable to believe historians would agree that deal with the world of the late Ilea's every administration ultimately tarns and 90's. That judgment is-shaped by to the use of covert operations when my view that this country's primary - they become frustrated about the lack problems in that period will be found of success with diplomatic initiatives la the competition for raw materials, - and are unwilling to use military ? natural resources, and markets in all farce. Some may begin by being more unstable world with the potential far eager than others. I Wouldn't care to minor conflicts that couldssealate 1n characterize any of the administra- re* hie we now have little or no dons I've watched. In the Icing years intelligence effort. I do not believe we of drawing down intelligence ameba- can do less than.we are doing against itics, we almost completely disman- our principal adversaries, and there tied the nation's capacity to conduct are areas where that effort isn't as covert operations. The impression good ag it should be, specifically Intel- that we're running around the world ligence on economic and political conducting covert operations is plain ? developments in the Soviet Union. The false. I would add that concern about major strengths of our system involve the extent of covert operations is not military matters. Our major weak- just found in Congress- It's also found nesses include a minimal effort both ? in substantial depth among intelli- in collection and analysis about many gence professionals. They are over. of the non-Communist countries. We whelmingly concerned about the qual- lack the encyclopedic effort that will ity of this country's foreign mtaui, let us understand trends before we get ? gence, and they worry that covert to the level of a crisis. operations, especially when they are ? exposed and criticized, impact' ad- Q. Over recent decades, there has verseiy on the more important job of been art increasing reliance on elec. foreign intelligence collection and t tronic and other technical means of analysis. si collecting intelligence. Has the result- ing neglect of human sources dam- ? - 1. . aged overall collection capabilities Q. When the Carter Adaninistratifet and quality? negotiated the second strategic armsA. A myth has grown up from state- limitation treaty with the Soviet merits of some officials that we are too Union, opponents said the United ! dependent on technical collection. ? States lacked the ability to verify such t There was a period of time when deci- agreements. Is that true? sion makers believed that satellite A. We have tried over the last dec- photography was going to answer all ade to improve the nation's ability to our needs. We're all a little wiser new. verify arms control treaties. There No analyst should be left dependent on was valid criticism in Congress that a single means of acquiring intelli- the resulting capability was thin. The gence. Human collection runs the risk requirements for verification with re- of relying on someone who wants to ? Approved For Releackartgadednite4J-01:01719Millatftilcamss- whelming. ? A more complex treaty Scatectlo cecinr- arN72-11\ 722-L7 will place substantial additional bur-. STAT Isigagffor Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R0001001 ART ICL:F, THE WASHINGTON POST PAGZ__11.2_ 9 April 1982 By Michael .Getler. . Wa5h4ngton Pont Staff Wer 'Government. spkialists :say that -a ? :string of recent. press reports alleging : the Soviets have .violated the SALT: 111 strategic arms- agreeraent by - Oloyi ng . the - 6-Utley:Kt,SSit mobile: ; missile are Wrong.7 ' But They acknowledge thit-There is still --snine Uncertainty and dis- - agreemerrt .as. to the intended role and . present.. deployment .oL this 1-eapon',. which has. been the subject dispute within intelligence 'circles for many years. . , ? Informed official&. in several eriiment agencies' say -;that-' a- top-- iiecre_t; just-published_p,S, pailonal intelligence estimate concludes there.. has been no violation thus far of the SALT 11 au?reem6nt by-- Moscow; even though that- 1979 -agreement_ 'igned? by President Carter and So - Piet_ President- 1?eonidrI. Brezhhev-, tias never been :ratified by the US, and has. been. -all ?but?-clis- avowed by the Reagan.administra--:,-. tlOfl there-- is still so-me- .ambig,U--- 'Sty abotit the status. of the. 5516, of- ficials Who witch-such-matters closee: agree is-not-deployed. in a mobile -fashion. which would;be, a alolation ofiSALT-; -and that . if-the aRussians ever_ doe deploy a -,new-_-rno.', ,f,bile missile-it isnot likely to be,the Secret mobile ISS1q ?wood . already state of- tension_ between _the two su., -;.perpoWers..on ?nuclear:-,,w_eaporks: iS- SUes 3othcountriekthus.far,:have tinued - infcgmally -4.14 adhere_ ,toJbe `-_SALT.JI prtivisionS,-. apparently with ,;.11e.!"-e5cpectation:f!that -:some -new round of arms-eoritrol talks-covering .jstrategic -frcontinent-spanning atomic ..eventually take place Approved For - ? . ? The-SALT. It treaty a_nd stii-Called ? "carninori.? understandings" reache? d between the United. States- and. So- viet Union that acCgrd specifically require that Moscow not "produce, test or :deploy ICBMs of the SS16 type," which are-,mobile weapons carted axiiiinclzthe- countrysidon- wheeled vehicles they are be verY bard. for ;U.S. picture-taking satellites to spot :.and thus very_harct to count and .ver_- . . ily .in foiy. arms control. agreement. They. would also be hard to attack in _ ? a wart-e.y ? with detailed knowledge ofjhe situation say there has been oine: dispute -about the SS16 ever :sincetest models began to appear in the. mid-1970s. The Soviets test-fired the missile frtinra test range at Ple- i setsk in 1976 but stopped the testing :-.1ter the 1979 SALT agreement was signed and --hati? not tested it since , then, the sources say - One authoritative . official rs.',says ':-..that the heart of the latest digcus-1 sion and the Catiie for some disagree- -Anent about, the missile within the -top echelons Of U.S: intelligence is-a inew,"belief".:tliat the Russians, back the 1970s,-actually produced a lot SS16s than US. spy Satellites ever observed being tested.: The '-dea- tral iuestion s What has- become of _ ,,these, if in fact they were produced Are ..they being Used for training Or: Are-theY.,being secretly deployed in fixed sites9 1'hese are -questions being aked, one official said,:. While stating that there is no evidence :.t 4- deploythent.. ? . 'fare'f:sOrliei thil ? -_.-SS16sline- well placed official put '-the number at less than twti dozen? still, at .the:PleSetWrange:Mbiare said to bAin "tixed' positions and i,!`ertainly jtot es another tofficial time that theie 21e:iwidespread agreement, pi aeliantaRritigttqltle're_":416. The t. f,intelligerie7Foinniiiiiiti"....:.thfieth 01 )7-'"One 'eiperienc Official ileicribiS -,the Missiles At sPlegetsk as "devices at -a' test range'and in Various ?stages of readiness But there is no 'Proof that it'-'haSjeVgi-- been `de- 'ploYed and tocal1. it a real'sy-s- Win is stretching it-.7:F? ? - But on April ;3, - The New York Post; citing reported that "three Soviet Mobile missile -reg- iments,- -each equipped with 12. eu- in are- Pojsed the frigid wastelands near Perm"_ - in the Soviet. Union. On April .5;:the.syndicated colum- nists Rowland Evans and: Robert Novak reported that there-is "a new, still-secret consensus . among U.S. intelligence -agencies, folloiving -;months of bitter dispute, that the ;Soviet:Union has -deployed -?lm aost 200 mobile intercontinental missiles 'In-violation of the SALT II treaty.. .The next day;' State DePartmenf. .spokesinan Dean Fischer publicly_ -denied thos.e'?-reports,stating :that .'"our intelligence information:: does not Support. these Staterrients."-: But; imMediately iThe Baltithoie Sun' repOrted that ,"other [unnamed] officials; indignant at the' denial" made _by Fischer;-irei !,?Affirmed the?-thain point -1--nade:h5! the One sourciFiaYilhatthere seeii - ,!t6'.12e,"something or somebodYn-thil [has-chosen :to' heighten concern thief' [the 5516 recently, although a?toP5 -ranking specialist calls the public -de.; ;--scriptiona of the .situation-, that -hake! appeared thus far !'mostly garbilietf The reports began to Appear after; 'President Reagan, at a new?ktonfer4 'ienceiclaimed that the Soviet Unionl ;does have a definite marg,in supel rioritr 7 nuclear : --Weapons.: SomJi 4ficialiSPeculate .that circulation al the SS16 -feports may be meant' tO f.jadd-' ere:def.-lc-T.:to' that 'they tress they haile;:rnd.7-:idealof 'whether' this-:particular issue was the. back of the PresidentknitrAZ;,-. 137R0001ed fa-Orr ? Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00010 Ara ICIE AFFEARIO ON PAG-4 .51? , Taylor Branch THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY April 1982 N POLITICAL B n August 1955, John Prados tells us,* the CIA's Richard Bissell went to the White House to show President Eisenhower some pictures that had been taken from an airplane more than ten miles above the earth. Greens, fairways, and sand traps were clearly visible in the aerial shots of the Augusta National Country Club in Augusta. Georgia, which was not only the home of the Masters but also Ike's favorite golf course. The photos clearly impressed the president, who recognized the topography of certain memorable holes_ Then Bissell played his trump card. He pointed out that the pictures actually revealed the presence of golf balls on some of the greens, as well as the flags in the cups. This truly impressed Eisenhower, who must have reflected that sometimes he had trouble seeing the cup when standing over a ten-foot putt. Bissell, on the strength of the demonstration, asked for permission to develop a U-2 spy plane that could produce such pic- tures from even higher altitudes, and Eisenhower, who was normally skeptical of new military gadgets, heartily approved. Thus, through crafty persuasion and awe- some technology, the CIA won its battle against the air force for control of a new spy system. With technology that has long since made Bissell's U-2 obsolete, the secret services now stand on perma- nent watch against nuclear attack: Simultaneously, they grapple clandestinely with their adversaries in localized conflicts that policy-makers want to keep quiet, fearing Armageddon. These two functions have brought spy organizations to the forefront of modern politics since , World War H, as intelligence activities have expanded on both the highest and lowest of roads. The same Richard Bissell who showed Eisenhower thegolf course photographs planned the Bay of Pigs invasion. The Soviet Estimate is a readable and even-tempered chronicle of the higher road?the effort of the CIA and military intelligence services to keep track of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Prados has assembled the first compre- hensive record of American performance in this field, matching predictions of Russian strength against what ends up actually happening in the arms race. Working from National Intelligence Estimates that, ironically, are the most sensitive and yet the most publicly debated spy products we have, he labors to separate the contri- butions of hard fact from those of prejudice, and he makes convincing judgments about the bureaucratic wars within the intelligence community. The human element of intelligence mistakes was more easily exposed during the early years, when the spy network was relatively unsophisticated. Shortly be- fore a 1955 Soviet-American summit meeting, the Rus- sians invited Colonel Charles E. Taylor, the air force at- tache in Moscow, to watch an aerial parade at Tushino Field. Sitting in the reviewing stand, Colonel Taylor Taylor Branch is a contributing editor of The Washington Monthly. was astounded to watch 28 Bison bo succession of formations. As Prad twice the number of Bisons attribut only a few months before and four times the number of B-52s then in existence. Taylor's alarming report quick- ly became the basis for another drastic upward revision of the National Intelligence Estimate on Soviet stratte bombers. What Colonel Taylor had no way of knowing at the time was that the Russians were so insecure about the American lead in nuclear weaponry that they had cir- cled their few Bisons repeatedly over the airfield as a blustering show of strength. The Russians fooled the Americans?especially the air force, which was eager to be fooled so that it could build more 13-52s--and there- by helped create the "bomber gap," which was the first major hoax in postwar strategic intelligence. Several years later, about the time the CIA and the army and navy managed to push the air force back toward reality on Soviet bombers, the Russians launched their Sputnik. They also tested some ICBMs before they were expected to, causing a wave of appre- hension in the United States. The 1958 National Instill- ge.nce Estimate predicted that the Russians would solve all their test problems almost instantaneously, and that Moscow would produce and deploy up to 1,000 ICBMs by 1961. By contrast, the United States had only ten ICBMs in 1960. This was the "missile gap." There was a great public scare, and the shape of the weaponry in- volved encouraged journalists to imply that national manhood was at stake, along with survival. The Alsop brothers reported that the Eisenhower administration was about to "flaccidly permit the Kremlin to gain an almost unchallenged superiority." As is well known, John Kennedy was elected on his virile pledge to change that with a greatly accelerated ICBM program, but by the time he took office the mis- sile gap was revealed to be a larger hoax than the bomber gap. The CIA, joined by navy and army intel- ligence, now realized that the Russians had produced no ICBMs at all. The air force, after a Strangelosian campaign of resistance during which Strategic Air Command generals went so far as to claim that Cri- mean War memorials were actually Soviet ICBMs in disguise, finally conceded. The result of all this confusion was the Defense Intelli- gence Agency, Secretary of Defense Robert McNarna- ra's well-intentioned but ultimately counter-productive effort to end public disputes between the military intelli- gence services. To McNamara, such squabbling was inefficient a s well as politically embarrassing. He. wanted a unified, accurate military position on intelligence mat- ters. In the DIA, however, he got an agency that tended to produce brokered intelligence compromises tha t were STAT *The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Flissian Military Strength_ John Prados. Dial, 517.95. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00010 ART I C LE AI'PEARED ' THE ATLANTIC ON PAGE April 1982 BUT NEVER DANGER TODAY BY THOMAS POWERS THE SOVIET ESTIMATE - by John Prados. -Dial, $17.95. . . ? wrong? The question of honest diately posed by the tenclenc lysts to reflect the views and hopes of the institutions they represent. In the late 1940s and early 19503, for ex- ample, Air Force intelligence consistent- ly predicted a huge Russian bomber. building program. Army and Navy intelligence just as consistently derided these alarms. When the Russians finally did unveil a new long-range bomber, at the annual May Day parade in 1954, something like panic swept the upper echelons of the American government. The. CIA's Board of National Esti- mates was badly buffeted in those years by conflicting claims. In theory its paper (the generic term for finished intelli- gence reports) was supposed to repre- sent the mature conclusions of the intel- ligence community after all the hard evidence had been soberly analyzed; but as a practical matter, it had to sound as worried as the officials who were sup- posed to read its estimates. "Our an- swer," said one board chairman at the time, according to another BNE official I met a couple of years ago, "is to say nothing is going to happen in the fore- seeable future, and say it in the most alarming way possible." The, result of this approach was one National Intelli- gence Estimate (NIB) after another ad- mitting that we were still ahead for the moment but predicting a huge Russian bomber fleet down the road. --: ." - But the Russians never Produced long-range bombers in any numbers. ? They concentrated on missiles instead. - The BNE was slow to catch on, at least ? partly because the Air Force wasn't in- terested in missiles. It was run in the 1950s by World War II bomber generals ? who liked to fly. They grudgingly funded a low-level missile-research program, largely to _ensure that the Navy didn't take-over the job and steal away by de- grees the Air Force's strategic-bombard- ment mission. But deep down in the Air Force there were missile colonels con- vinced that rocket propulsion offered a cheaper, more effective way to deliver nuclear warheads. In love with missiles, the colonels concluded that the Russians were, too. In the intelligence business, this is called mirror-imaging. - - One of those colonels recently told me. that during the Korean War,' when R&D fruih-RiaReQtDe la321119Q414614141MIP 1'3 that nothing 'would budge his Air Force superiors but fear Of a Russian missile. To PRADOS'S FEST history of the in-- t) telligence wars, The Soviet Estimate, is certain to become a standard work in .the field. It's hard to think of an impor- tant intelligence issue in the past twen- ty-five years that Prados does not cover; - the 'missile - gap," Galosh, the Tallinn_ "upgrade" problem, the A Team, B Team controversy, and other flurries of con- cern over "monster missiles" and alarm- ? ing-holes in the ground areall there. In-, telligence professionals will consult his book to find out what's in the public domain and what's still secret. Students ? of the national-security community will . mine it for data on what we knew and when we knew it. But ordinary readers probably wont use use it. at all. They will find it too hard, too dense, too dull, too filled with num-_ bers and acronyms, too obsessive in its attempt to gather in one place all the: - facts and echoes of contention in the strategic-intelligence business as they have ;appeared over the -years in the : professional literature and in congres- sional hearings. Prados's excellent bil- Ii.ography, the _ most comprehensive I have seen; lists hundreds of items. It is Lone of the curses of research in this field to read the same facts and figures over. - ...and over again; How .Prados survived _ his ordeal in the library I do not know. It :_must have involved years of stupefying tedium. But the result has justified his ; devoted efforts. Well-thumbed copies of She Soviet Estimate will be at the right hand of everyone who tries to under- ? stand why the United States and the So- . viet Union elected to build enough nucle- ar weapons to break the back_ of our I:- Prados's _comprehensive: book raises two great_ questions about strategic in- telligence. First; Is it honest? And sec- the . analysts so: often. i-vtsti-...ail-T440 20081/0 iiidhis;:of:The;1}1:17.WliO" ic?t Kept_ the Secrets, is at lurk ("1.a hiitory of STAT 1140001-3 E Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R0 22 March 1982 i-ri 1 3 :7 - ? z ... : I. r-1 STAT 00100140001-3 : F. I : ;7.,.m! Nit Ilia I- x I _...._E_ _. 7.r 7 _ r ".7 n-r- 7i=?:-..-r : : ? ": ! I ; ? I w j :?e - 1,2TE ? 7-17 ; "THFfisi FtsTR: " ?-? =--7 11 r- " ; 1 r-::- = =:7 ;?,.. 7-; - !?. ' 1! : i-; - I-" = i1::?-? ? ? ;_? : tRNrL ? ! L. : ; F F ? : -? ? I - ? i - L.! ; - 1.2 7 ?? r- : : ; f : 4r. I - ? - ? IEWIr ; i? I- ? 1.j I i _ : ; r. 7 r C: ? =-? T ! {-iP .... T T ?- i u E r: _ . S -r TU r.: N.3 7 rif 3 1,7; ri'Z'ri .... Tk' a :7 ----- : .2:4) e =..7 ? = ' = 3 = 77 ='-'7 ""rli TIT 3737r 31 72-:C:rifT-:?E-C--72 5277 -- iIit Lii?: 1 -:r r i -- rut:- 7..riEri. k, 2 B ! I ?- :6: F-ifqii r ? 1 r 3 7.7 .7- ;1:.! I r ? nn 4 - - - ? r- - - ? - -r7=77.. 7 " ,?7 2- 7 --- c It!- ! N 7-7_1 i i I Etik?H'.? -? ::fl : H '-IL ?-1 N "Ci I- il't-Ft.11t. hrt- EiFt Approved For Release 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP90-01137R00010 AF.T CLE APP7 tia.D TFE WAE-',HDIGTON T72.2,S ON PAGE...4 20 July 1982 140001-3 STAT Queen's protector quits; homosexual tie exposed LONDON (AP) ? The queen's police offi- cer, Commander Michael Trestrail, has resigned from the police after acknowledging "a homosexual relationship over a number of years with a male prostitute," Home Sec- . retary William Whitelaw told a stunned House of Commons yesterday. Whitelaw's brief announcement came an hour after Scotland Yard had said Trestrail, 52, was resigning for "personal reasons," which Britons assumed were connected with the security breach that enabled an intruder to find his way into Queen ELizabeth II's bedroom at Buckingham Palace 11 days ago. The news came as the state prosecutor's office announced that prowler Michas el Fagan will not face charges for the July 9 bedroom intrusion because there was no evidence of criminal intent. Trespassing is a civil, not a criminal, offense in Britain. Trestrail, head of police at the palace and the man directly responsible for the queen's safety, resigned on Saturday, the Yard said in a short statement. Scotland Yard is investigating the secirity lapses that enabled Fagan, a 31-year-old drifter, to enter the queen's bedroom before 7 a.m. on a Friday and chat with her for nearly 10 minutes before an astonished cham- bermaid discovered him and summoned help. Fagan, appearing at Bow Street Magistrates Court, was sent for trial at the Old Bailey Criminal Court on three charges: trespassing at Buckingham Palace on June 7 and stealing a half-bottle of wine, a June 26 assault on his stepson and a June 16 car theft. He was ordered held-without bail. ' Fagan claimed he was the son of Nazi war criminal Rudolf Hess, who has been in prison since 1941 when he flew to Britain from Germany. State prosecutor Stephen Wooler said the palace break-in in which Fagan stole the wine "was one of a series of irrational acts on his part connected with a deterioration in his matrimonial situation." - Addressing Magistrate Ronald Bartle, Maurice Nadeem, Fagan's lawyer, said, "Let us remember what this case is about. It does not relate to the later incident when my client was in the queen's bedroom?' ? - From the dock, Fagan shouted: "I told you not to mention- anything about the queen's --bedroom. I don't want her name brought into it. I would rather plead guilty than have her name mentioned in court." Fagan was led into the packed courtroom amid tight security, accompanied by his wife, Christine, and his parents, Ivy and Michael Fagan Sr. According to British press reports, which -have been confirmed by the government, all of the palace's guards and electronic secu- rity devices did not prevent Fagan from entering Buckingham several times. In another development, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher promis to tell the House of Commons about security at the secret British center which monitors radio and tel- ephone communications. Mrs. Thatcher will speak today on the mat- ici she is likelyasive a "broad assess- ment" rather than provide details, Press Asso- ciation reported. The center. called the Government Com- munications Headquarters. is in Cheltenham, 109 miles northwest of London. The center. like the U.S. National Security Agency outside Washington, eavesdrops on communications around the world, trying to glean information useful to British intelli- gence. It has cooperative agreements with its American counterpart and thos_e_ allied nations. The affair began last Thursday when a Ch-e:tennam man. (Jeottrey Arthur Prime. 44. was arraigned at nearby HeretorTon Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDIP:90-44417R0604001404561113):scu;01' .Ti'T.:;:e gravest possible nature. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00010 140001-3 AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY 8 March 1982 STAT Intelligence Estimate Revealed Unintentionally Washington?A secret U. S. intelligence estimate that the Soviet Union could have the capability to deploy a space-based, high-energy laser weapon station within a year was unintentionally revealed In a House Services Committee hearing in late February, confirming earlier AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TecHeoi.oav reports (May 25, 1981, p. 40; July 28, 1980; p. 32). _ The USSR's accelerated space-based, high-energy laser program was described in a secret_ statement to the committee. by Ricard DeLauer, under secretary of Defense for resea- rOh7= and engineering. It" included : the assessment that the Initial operational capability of Soviet laser battle station could be as early as 1983, or as late as 1988.f;7:-.4.i..:.;4: Rep.1Ken:Kramer:(11;COlo.Va'meMber-Of the committee read aloud in a House : Armed Services hearingearlier-lest' 'Many- by DeCauet:given in a closed session that: provided an insight into Soviet laser weapon development activities. ? . , - That assessment ; based on intelligence community InforMatIon, concluded that the , _ . ? laser space station couldprovide an- antisatellite weapon Capable of destroying U.S. surveillance._ spacecratt;'-communioations-satellitieS or, early; warning satellites that operate at geosynchronous ? - ? By the early1990silaccording to DeLauer's statement,:.the Soviets-COuld'have a - large space tcomple>=7, in Orbit-Capable -ot: attacking e:yariety. of targets-within. the - Earth's atmo-sphere-frOm Kramers_ -,:;VOrdsi-diiring-theO43en--h-earin'g were labeled inadvertent' by staffmerr;-- hers, who Said that he believed:the hearing to be-a closed session. ? - Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-0113 JIT.TICL;}Zr.'2E.-C,MED ON PAC: ?1"., _ STET JOTECAL 1 idarch 1982 Asian Refu 1- ?-? By Vinitaai KUCEWICZ SANTA ANA, Calif.?In 1976 Yang Ying started a new life in this Los Angeles sub- urb. He and his family fled their besieged native village in the hills of Laos, and were lucky enough to be among the 53,000 fellow ? members of the Hmong tribe to be admit- ted to the security of the U.S. With the help of a local Hmong community group, he learned English. acquired a trade in elec- tronic component assembly and got a job. On Friday evening Dec. 12, 1980, Mr. Yang returned from work, ate dinner with his extended family in their small two-fam- ily house and took his two young .children for a short stroll. For the rest of the eve- ning, he sat around the table talking with his father and brother and went to bed about midnight. Around 4 o'clock in the morning his wife awoke to the sounds of her husband gagging and gasping for air. She called- his father and brother, and someone called an ambulance_ But within minutes Mr. Yang, at the- age.of 25, was dead. Mr. Yang's relatives say he had been in perfect health until the day he died; he had never even been in a hospital. An autopsy by the Orange County coroner could not de- - termine the cause of death other than to say his heart failed. To -this day no one knows what caused Mr.- Yang's untimely death. ' But whatever killed Mr. Yang has reached epidemic proportions among young. male Hrnong refugees here. At the end of 1981, the U.S. government Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta had re- corded 39 cases of "sudden, unexpected. nocturnal deaths."-..-- Of tl3ese.-, 26 were Hmong, eight othersvLaotian,Aour Viet- - namese and one Cambodian; Only. onewas ? a woman. In addition to the 39, seven new- "suspected" cases have been reported so ? far this year. The =calculates that dur- ? ing the last year the death rate for young Laotian males was 87 per 100,000, compar- able to the sum of the four leading causes of natural death among U.S._ men of simi- lar age. Unable to Identify a Cause " T hi s'is a strange and fascinating oc- currence," says Dr. Anthony C.onta.zerro of the University of California Medical School in San Diego,- which runs_ a referral pro- gram for Southeast Asian refugees. There ? have been at least seven cases of nocturnal deaths in the San Diego area, but neither_ the coroner's office nor doctors at.the Med- ical Center have been able -to, identify, a, cause. _. - In December the Centers for Disease Control published an initial study. conclud- ing "the deaths reported here share sev- eral features that suggest tute a distinct-syndrome: . . :night or in the early moiningliOurs dart% ? sleep and -involved mostly app _ _ ? _ . . R000100140001-3 STAT syrnptonisiptions? Of , the terminal events suggested that the transition from apparent-health to death occurred, within minutes." --The only- publicly suggested Cause for the deaths - his been that. the-men were- frightened to death by nightmares. Similar deaths have been reported among. young -.? - Tests of "yellow rain" samples have identified the killer as mycotoxins of the "trichothecene group. which are poisons produced naturally by _fungus on grains. Most natural outbreaks of this toxin have occurred in the Soviet Union, though some cases have been reported in the U.S. and Japan. Scientific studies continue on the ef- -The report does not mention the fact that the Hmong n _Laos have been initnary victirns of biological taxm _ weapons,- cornmonix,called 'yellow rain!. . !Japanese and Filipinos in their own coun- tries, and witnesses have sometimes intera' ipreted the-terminal groans as-signs of ter- rifying _dreams: However, the CDC report :says "careful questioning of the witnesses in the United States indicated- that the ter- s jninal sounds were those that lare. often I heard following cardiac arrest". - The CDC. report concludes that the ;heart's-natural pacemaker mechanism has suddenly failed for some mysterious rea- son. "The abruptness of the deaths re- :ported here is compatible with cardiac dys-? rhythmia, but the underlying mechanism remains unclear." As close as it comes to an explanation is the speculation "there might be a genetic or an acquired disorder, predisposing these persons to: 'sudden . death." ? What the report does not mention islhe _ ? fact that the Hmong in Laos ha-' been pri-7 mary victims of biological toxin weapons, , commonly called "yellow rain." . ' These hill tribe people, many of whom fought alongside the U.S. in the Vietnam war, have been a traditional center Of re- sistance to the Communists in Southeast : Asia. After the fall of Laos; the Commu- i nist Fathet Lao tried to resettle the. Hmong in the more controllable lowlands. -Those Hmong :villages that .resisted were attacked. Since 1975 the Hmong have been fleeing across the border into- Thailand and telling stories to anyone .Who cared r? to listen about. "yellow rain.", This ye!- lowish powder, dropped over villages- and fields by Communist aircraft; causes blis tering of the skin, vomiting and? massive hemorrhaging, with the victim often chok-- Lag to death on his own blood. ? The U.S. government and independent - analysts have confirmed the use of "yellow rain" by Soviet-backed troops in Southeast Asia. According to a still classified Special Nation-al Inte ence Estimate, TbeTLS. now nas communications intelligence . shows direct Soviet involvement in the use .of these obscene weapons which are sup- posed to be banned under international law. Secretary of State Alexa -in Re I eirta 2006071/03' ftltICiliRlY10'9010nPF combatant icasualties from triese,weapons ,range in the r"scores of thousands.Liaii.-;?.?:.: feCts of these mycotoxins on laboratory an- imals. Little is known, however, about the long-term effects on man of low-level expo- sure to these fungal poisons. - Many of the Hmong are convinced that -the current, sudden- death syndrome is Somehow connected to the use of these tox- his or other_ Poisons in Southeast Asia. "This never happened to our people before. :Never. We've never seen anything like it in the past," says Xeuvang Vangyi. executive' director of Lao Family Community Inc... which runs resettlement and training cen- ters in Los Angeles and more than a dozen - other cities in the U.S. "We've complained already to CDC to .scheck" into a possible connection between -- "yellow rain" and the sudden deaths:, says , Gen. Vang Pao, who led the lirnong troops in the Vietnam war. He is now president of ' the Lao Family organization and is also considered chief spokesman for Hmong. srefugees But CDG "won't or can't do any-, thing to help that proof for the people," he adds. ? ? 2" , "It's something we've looked into" as a possible, cause, _explains Dr. Roy Baron; an epidemiologist in charge of CDC's study of these sudden deaths. However. "in the pre- : Ihninary reports of the manner of death,' nothing suggested toxic substances should be proposed" as a likely- cause, he adds. The center interviewed families of 2501 the - 39 victims of this sudden death syndrome., "Only one had a history of definite expo, sure (to yellow rain), and two might have. : This -is a similar proportion of the control t. group" of young refugees now being moni- : Cored, Dr. Baron says. - The lirnong here complain, however, that ' they can't be sure they have never been exposed to "yellow rain." They ex- 'plain that the trek out of the hills of Laos to refugee camps in Thailand takes weeks ,01.' ?walkini, through unfamiliar territory ;that may have been previously contami-- nated. If not yellow rain, they add, other poisons are also being used in Asia. They tell of cases of-persons,becoming Ill and 7ROORBAX116141-rilted-water, salt, peat: ,CONTIVETED Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R0001001 NEW YORK TDES ART I CLE, APPEARED 24 JANUARY 1982 ON PAGE STAT 40001-3 US. Says Pakistani's Nuclear Pate. ntial Is Growing! By JUDITH MILLER ? _?_?;;.?L- - test stems partly from President Mo- spedanormsewvarknmes hammed Zia ul-Haq's unwillingness to WASHINGTON. Jan. 23? An intelli- jeopardize the Reagan Administration's gence report has concluded that Pald- six-year, $3_2 billion military and_ eco- Stan will be able to detonate a nuclear nomicaidprograrn. : : . - device within the next three years, but is The study also contends that Pakistan not likely to do so, according to Adminis- is likely- to continue developing and tration and Congressional officials. , stockpiling fissile material that could be This conclusion is contained in an used in a nuclear device. Continued ; analysis, known as "Special National_ development of Pakistan's nuclear pro- Intelligence Estimate 31-81." prepared gram, analysts argue, is likely ,to by the Central Intelligence Agency and prompt increasing suspicion and hos- completed lest rnont. ? - ? tility from India. As a result, according Intelligence officials assert that Paki- to the ,report, Pakistan could face a stares reticence to Conduct an atomic growing threat of a Dre-emotive strike Iby India against its miclear installations by the end of this year:-: India and Pakistan i'ill hold talks in New Delhi next Friday on a security pact. Foreign Minister Agha Shatii Of Pakistan is expected to discuss propos- als for a "nuclear-free zone" in South- west Asia with his Indian counterpart, P. V. Narasimha Rao. t -,_- ._. .. . _-..- . - .-:.. 1-2- 'Irregulares! Reported ? :. _ The discussions are being closely fol- lowed by officials at the International Atomic Energy Agency, based in-Vien- na. which monitors nuclear niants..The agency has been pressing Pakistan =- successfully for several months to per- mit the installation' of; additional cam- eras and measuring devices to improve safeguards at Pakistan's 135-megawatt nuclear reactor, nearKarachi. --:- - :-? ? . The- agency made itS7request after it. detected "anornaliesand "irregulari- ties";-aethe reactor,-which is capable of producing plutonium for atomic weep, ons.-There is no evide.nce-that.Pakistan has been diverting fuel from its civilian-, -reactor for nonpeac-eful purposes.-?But the agency expressed concern at- a -pri- yate meeting last September. that the current monitoring arrangements were no longer adequate, given Pakistan's 'ability to produce its own nuclear fuel.-- --: The '- India-Pakistan talks --and , the- agency's effort to improve safeguards- are of concern- to the Reagan AdrnJ tration, Which persuaded Congress last month to approve $100 million in aid fo Pakistan; a downpayment on the six- year program.. In addition, the United States is selling Pakistan 40 F-16 fighte planes on an accelerated schedule. The Administration says Pakistan needs the planes to help withstand Soviet pres- ? sures horn neighboring Afghanist' an, ' Pakistan had previously been barred ? from receiving American aid by a law that prohibits assistance:- to pountries that pursue nuclear Weapon-programs. Conesasiispended-raict In 1979 on-the basis- of evidence that Pakistan had es:, I ?tablished a -worldwide network of pur: :chasing agents; including bogus comps- . nies and intelligence operatives, to ob- tain_ccurnonnenta fnr-xurreiliurn_e 1fuge enridiment plant-pat: coulcIA- ? ' used to make fuel for weapons:: -: ?e-= '--- - 7, - ; ? India Detonated DeVice in 1974 *---; r India detonated an atomic device- 1974, but maintained- that its test was "peaceful nuclear explosion,'" a distin ..., ' tion the United States does not ancept. 'i -? :- The -,. Reagan -Administration:. _ hai .argued that Pakistan' can only be digi ?I suaded from conducting a nuclear test ? Iit would jeopardize a strong, security' ' relationship with the United States. Mei . new estimate tends- to ,.support. ? claim. . : f :,2:3-.,..,;-,11 ..- ' ...' - The estimate's ceoclusionila priVatelyi Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-011 3711110N 11913660131bgligaleucy. ?lysts, Nirbo doubt that Pakistan will willing to? forego- a- demonstrable- mg3.1 iclear weapons opticet.i ittliglit loti.theil STAT Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R0 ? '-::N.I.LRED THE WASHINGTON POST 22 February 1982 00100140001-3 :...:!-:Giotesque' Evidence Reported ? . ? - I; On Soviet Chemical Warfare r Assodated Prrs3 secret intelligence report ..;,:psepared for the White House p:ovides "very? grotesque" evi- i,dence that the--.- Soviet Union --usetl chemical warfare to kill ;1fiousands of people in Southeast asia d Afghanistan, 'sources .?- The classified National lntel -!?,":14,;erice Estithate by the CIA con- tains additional "hard evidence" -;:lit:Soviet use of, potent chemical- _ Iiiapons including so-called "yel- -;.;lolv, rain," sajr the sources, Who r;kliclined to be- identified: - SecretarY of State -Aleiander Haig Jr.. charged -:last week t'atat the United States has "in- ;4ritroyertible evidence" that the. ?'',Soviets' are using- chemical weap- ?s in Afghanistan; 'Laos and Cambodia . - The sources' said "sanitized' - -.?,A.'ersiort of the intelligence report, 111- be made public within the t _several weeks to., provide riCifther support for the charges", triade by 1-faig and -other U.S. ? One official familiar with the report said, "A lot of this evi- dence is very grotesque stuff." But he declined to go into detail_ --- Casualty estimates are diffi- cult to come by, but they range from-5,000 to 30,000 people, the sources said. ,The official Said the classified report is a two-volume document totaling several hundred pages. The version to be released pub- licly; he said, will contain-"every- thing that you've -ever wanted to knoW?abOut yellow rain?and thak,We 7-..can, tells you- :without compromising :sources or meth- ' "- -,MeinWile, i Islambad, Pak- istan; Cen.-Esmat Ezz, the - head-of a United Nations group investigating whether; chemical weapons are being used against insurgents in Afghanistan, said l'..rtheje have drawn no rconclusions in: a two-week .tour of ,refugee camps and medical facilities Where inore than 2.5 million :MI': ,ighans- fled after the Soviet inva- sion- in December,- 1979: T. ? Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 ? f th t ?. 'nary weapons, w ig a vetwo . e ministration wants to produce poisonous substances that con3e from'i ' 'el -- 1 ii- ? The ad _ vide further stipi3Ort for the charges I' CIA--study; Ili? - e- sources sai , mc u ing ? . hal- components separately packaged. They combine to form a toxic Agent after, some fungi nor Indigenous to Southeast: e weapon is fired. .1 f Asia or Afghanistan -, ' .- . ,..e , -..... - . STAT Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 ..P31 7: I CLE APPE.LRED PAC-E CHICAGO TRIBUNE 22 FEBRUARY 1982 WASHINGTON (AP)-A secret Central Intelligence Agency report prepared for the White House provides 'grotesque" evidence that the Soviet Union used Chemical warfare to kill thousands of? people in Southeast Asia and Afghanis- tan, sources said Sunday. - The National' Inteiligence -Estiniate contains additional "hard evidence" 'of Soviet use of potent chemical weapons, . ?, riled using chemical weapons and have said the United States is making such charges as win support for ? the Reagan administration's plans to re- sume production of chemical weapons. nteeds to resume production of chemical ' Some of the-most lethal chemical I. weapons. weapons that the Soviets are said to ----------------------- . used are called _"yellow rain" because : In , budget, Reagan . :they - are released from airplanes as a 'Proposed spending $705 million for cheini- yellow- powder that covers the ground.' ',cal programs, ccimpared with '53 mil- 1 , includuag _so-called "yellow rain;" the , Symptoms include dizziness, severe itch- -lion in the current budget. - ? The weapor.s would be produced at the sources; who declined - tste be identified, ' ing or tingling of skin with small blisters, said: - ? .-::. : . - , nausea, choking, vomiting of blood, shock Pine Bluff, Ark., ' arsenal. Senate oppa- Secretary_ of State- Aleyeeiider Haig and death.: -, e- IL. . . nents came within two votes last year of charged list week that the United States ?Haig' s comments indicated the report defeatinga - - 'mill' request for $20 ion to .has "incontrovertible evidence" that the. may include physical evidence of use of install production equipment at. Pine Bluff. ? ? ' ' Soviets are using chemical weapons in chemical weapons in Afghanistan. Previ- Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger ,1 , Afghanistan, Laos and Cambodia_ , -?.e .--Tously? there has been little proof of the , . - in his annual report to Congress, said the In a television interview Feb: 14, he . use of such weapons there; although U.& - Soviet Union is "much better prepared" officials last fall disclosed some physical ' said the poisons have- killed "scores? of ' for chemical warfare than the United ' thousands of noncombatants-in. all-three evidence of "yellow rain" attacks in Laos States.- target areas." :' " - and Cambodia. - -"-- = -,- . l'-,- . ? , _ And in his message to Congress, re THE SOURCES Said-4 "kanitiled"..Ver.; . CRITICS HAVE SAID the charges ' Reagan reaffirmed the longstanding -poll- Sion of the intelligence: report_ Will ? be I should be backed up with more detail cy that the United States will net use the' , made nublic within several weeks to pro- : , That "hard evidence" is part of the weapons first. . ? . hh nonl t- -.:-.made by Hai#, and other U.S. officials. h 1 1 One official familiar with the report , said "a lot of this evidence is very grot- - tesque stuff," but he-declined to go intO' detail Casualty estimates : to - come !:;y, but they_ range froth 5,000 to' 30,00a people. - ??-???-? - _ The classified repoi-t is said to be a two-volume document totaling several hundred pages. The versioneto be re-? ' leased publicly will contain "everything that you've ever wanted to know about yellow rain,' and that I We can tell yell, ? without compromising-sources ,or methods," the- source said...1. - CIA.tooknman Dale Peterson detlieed, comment on the report- 'Ieer The preparation or the: report: begari7r, "e. after the U.S. charges were first made l : east fall. ? On.: Sept. 13, Haig said the:', United ? States' had the evidence, but thee: ?. States Department later termed it "pre-:: liminary." - November, Richard Burt; director of} the State Department's 'Bureau 'of- Politica-Military Affairs, told a Senate- Foreign Relations subcommittee that the: ,-,'United States was. "certain" the Soviets' were using the weapons. sHe said "we:, nevi have the srnoking gun" that include "physical evidence" of such weapons in THE SOVIETS have consistently de- Indochina, but said, "we do not, as yet, _ physical evidence" for Afghanistan4 - ON FEB.'S, President Reagan Officially, z,lotifiedgongreesethet_the,administratioke Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 Approved For Release 2006/01/-03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R0001 APTICT,71 APPEARED ON PACE On November 4, I9130., Ronald Reagan. was elected President of the Unia:ai States?a foregone conclu- sion, one of those little events that will be seen in retrospect to be much more sianifiCant than realized at the time. - Team A began tea pack its bags for ? the return home. . heir denarture from the Carter _administrationas that government -began to make way fonts successor? marked one of the more sensational develonraents in the history of Ameri- can intelliaence. For in the space of Election Day 1980, Team A, the national security and intelligence bureaucracy that had on Jimmy Carter's behalf formed Washington's intelligence perceptions; was in effect voted out of office. And Team B?the lobse terra for a coalition of critics of American military, policy?became ascendant. It remains to be seen whether Team B will do any better than Team A. _ Arguably, there is some feeling that it can hardly do any worse; the fact is that by the time of Reagan's election, American intelligence was a mess. As we have seen earlier in this series of articles, the intelligence community was increasingly beset by bureaucratic politics and other problems through- -out its early history, reaching a climax of sorts during the Kissinger years, when Kissinger's National Security Council bureaucracy virtually .usurped intelligence agency functions. Combined with the problems of Watergate and a series of damaging congressional investigations during the 1970s, the intelligence community came very near to falling apart. Certainly, it was not functioning very web, and by 1976, there was consensus that something was not quite right?a conviction reflected in the squabble over whether American intelligence had badly underestimated MILITARY SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY VOLUME 1, NO. 6 1981 INTELLIGENCE how well intelligence, partieularl) the CIA, was doing _its. job. By the summer of 1976, the hue and cry about intelligence was in full blast, acceritilated by the debate over the projected SALT 11 treaty and pro- nounced Soviet foreign- policy ag- gressiveness. As the political pressure began to Mount, President Ford decided on a. tried-and-tree rpolitical expediency t':. take the heat off: He appointed: an "outside panel" of intelligence and military experts to review the performance of the Amen- - can intelligence community in esti- mating the size and threat of the Soviet military apparatus. Before long, this outside panel?known more formally as the Preside-nt's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board?became known as "Team B" to distinguish it from the national security establish- ment it was reviewing, known in turn as "Team A." It is difficult to imagine a more tenseful situation:- Headqeartered itt the CIA's Langley headquarters, Team B members were paid out of CIA funds (which is the faint equiva- lent of paying an-IRS auditor to audit your taxes) and were given total access to CIA intelligence. Tension also was due to the fact that every- body was perfectly aware of Team B's predilections, which happened to be outright skepticism that the American intelligence community was accu- rately gauging the Soviet Union. The Team B leader was Richard Pipes, a noted Russian history pro- fessor from Harvard whose sym- pathies were regarded as distinctly conservative. The members of the rest of the group were much better known in the intelligence community, in- cluding Paul Nitze, an ex-Pentagon official; Paul Wolfowitz, a former strategic analyst with the Arms Con- trol-and Disarmament Agency; Army STAT 00140001-3 " agence " by Ernest Volkman i6.Amelicara te2ligence began to badly tanderes- tiena,.,a the Soviet SLFRA prir,p733113 arid by iS37 the Underestimate was pretty s-evere." the size and dimensionekpimizobSdIEtnr RelGasen20a6itti1100.: GlRDP9ilti1r137R000100140001-3 military build-up. This, in turn, led to head of the Defense Intelligence a whole series of questions on just Agency (and whom the CIA eon- la- Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000 Early in 1969, not long after he had assumed the post of National Security Adviser to President Nixon, a dis- pleased Henry Kissinger sat in his White House office reading a current CIA National Intelligence Estimate ? (N1E). With obvious disgust, Kissinger finished reading the document, and in large letters, wrote across the top of it, "Piece. of crap!" Of such little events are major controversies often made, and that angry little scrawl by Kissinger turned out to be only the opening shot in what finally became a bloody bureau- cratic battle in which American intel- ligence was the battleground. Ul- timately-, dozens of careers were ruined, the intelligence community became bitterly politicized, and Atherican intelligence suffered an -unprecedented crisis of confidence. Indeed, the effects of that battle are still being felt today in the American intelligence community, which has . never quite recovered_ In this series of articles on the problems of American estimative intelligence, we have taken some pains to point out the debilitating effect of politics (and its handmaiden, bureaucratic politics) on the intel-. ligence process. From the first Soviet atomic bomb test through the Cuban Missile Crisis to the great . missile debate . of the 1960s, the- in- vidious effect of politics can be seen again and again. It is possible from ? this, in fact, to postulate a First Law of Intelligence: Where Politi Tread, Intelligence Becomes Oatmeal. Not very inspiring, perhaps, but it makes the point. Which brings us to Henry Kissinger? or, more accurately, a period during which. American intelligence became MILITARY SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY VOLUME 1, NO. 5 1981 INTELLIGENCE first moment he assumed office, Kissinger soright (and very shortly accomplished) total domination of Amehcan stratezic policy, mainly because. he wore two hats?chief ?security adviser to.the President and chief progenitor of American foreign ? That is the sort of anomaly guar- anteed to cause.trouble, and there was trouble very early on. First, there was the problem of the Nixon adminis- tration's stated goal of an "era of negotiations," meaning that both Nixon and Kissinger had set strategic arms control agreements, among other bilateral goals, as the first foreign policy priority. There was an intelligence implication in such a policy, since any agreements had to carry a vital prerequisite: verification. And -verification itself was a political code word meaning that the-Ameri- can military and certain members of Congress would not buy any bilateral agreement without a firm guarantee . that we would be able to detect any ? cheating by the Soviet Union. Was the CIA up to this task? Of course, argued CIA Director Richard Helms, but he was dis- quieted by the. question. An old hand at Washington infighting, Helms was perfectly aware of the fact that the last. thing he wanted the agency to get ? involved in was the-political minefield ? of verification. As Helms realized, it was a .no-win proposition: If the CIA agreed that verification was feasible, then it risked angering congressional conservatives who felt that the Soviet Union would never live up to ? any arms agreement. On the other hand, if . the CIA dragged its feet on the verification question, then ,it risked . incurring the wrath of Kissinger blik I pn ? L tzt-1 Kis.singer's plprra?114 Coup by Ernest Volkman so politicized, it can scarcely be said it (and by extension, his boss). The CIA even functioned, certainly not as it alteady felt uneasy with Kissinger, was designed to do.A rov In a s-nse- of? .ease Av_honchwtosce,t Rpea r or Kei 01A-RuP9d3di Elb7R000100140001-3 course, the politictz ton was in- wanting to create his own intelligence .. evitable, given the fact that from the organization more subject to _hisIt- Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3 7pPLE 2E 'D i? GEjLL_ MILITARY SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY VOLUME 1, NO. 4 1981 INTELLIqENCE STAT ONTELLEGEN_ ? TO PLEASE: . the ABM by Ernest Volkman "With this rocket," then-Soviet ligence series, politics plays the most Premier Nikita Khrushchev was fond destructive role in the formulation of of telling visiting heads of state to intelligence estimates, since politics Moscow in 1962, "we can hit a fly in has the most invidious effect in space!" warping intelligence judgments. Khrushchevian hyperbole, almost Nothing will destroy objectivity faster certainly, but even the severest doubt- than the introduction of "political ers in those days had cause to wonder. factors" into an intelligence debate; After all, the Soviet Union had al- where politics tread, misjudgment is ready orbited the first space satellite, sure to follow. ' and had followed that up with a series ' The background to the ABM con- of impressive stunts, including or- troversy was the Soviet-American biting dogs, a spider (and her web), arms race that began-to reach its most not to mention mankind's first human dangerous level by the beginning of in space. Was it possible that the the 1960s. Like the trickle of sand in a Russians had also discovered a missile huge hourglass, the future of that race so accurate, it could indeed hit the seemed inevitable: production by unlikely target of a fly in space? both sides of bigger and better ICBMs, Many people believed it, but the increasing accuracy of strategic wea- fact was that Khrushchev's claim, like pat's, advanced missile attack de- so many of his other boasts about the tection systems, and, probably most superiority of Soviet technology? ominous of all, development of the space and otherwise?had very little first anti-missile defenses. relation to the truth. :win other words, it was an extremely. In fact, the missile the Soviet leader? unstable "strategic arms equilibrium," was bragging about?known to the as the nuclear strategists liked to call west as the Griffon?was hardly it, marked by a constant race between capable of hitting any small target in offense and defense. All the while, the space. Indeed, there is some doubt "delicate balance of terror" became whether it could even hit the target even more delicate. the size of a house in space. Still, the The intelligence community, of Khrushchev boast unwittingly played a course, played a vital role in this large role in one of the nastiest delicacy, since that community was American intelligence controversies responsible for the two key sources of of all time, a controversy whose information without which neither implications echo to this day. side could exist: In its simplest form, it is known as U early warnings about the latest the ABM controversy, shorthand that technological developments, and obscures a whole series of complex equations that came into play. Most ? probability of future developments. significantly, there was a political APItrpifidrFgESeliPareit2MigollfigtalCIA-RDOtikOsithl ATAKLQ-CiaD 0,14PPA11114 tea equation that Ultimately was to trans- before, does not take place in a form the ABM controversy into a vacuum. It takes place in the context Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000103110001 3 ARTICLE _APPEARED CO PAGE ? It -was .an anguished David Lilienthal of the- Atomic Energy Commission who wrote in his diary on June 30, 1948: "The thing that ? rather chills one's blood is to observe what is nothing less than lack of integrity in the. WaS- the intelligence agencies deal with the meager stuff they have.": .For Lilienthal, later to become . chairman. of the AEC,:hisgovernment experience?especially his relation- ship with the American intelligence community not only angnish7. ing. bui. very_ nearly frightening, as ? well. As Lilienthal and a few_. other: people in the government were aware. American intelligence was a joke:th-e estimating process, partictilarly,, was .. little better than ofthand guess Work, there was a nearly total dearth of hard data, and what little data existed was the focal point .cif ajuvcnihe scris'- of __arguments between the ligence services and the newly-created:. civilian Central Intelligence, Agency. Lilictithars diary effl&v tQ in.the midst .of what an absurd -argument. Earlier. th,O.yea-rs: Lewis Strauss; _ AEC-- chairman,,, had. -met defeat, in. his attempt Ili begin a large-scale 'monitoring. program joi- -det.ecting PbsSible- Soviet- nuclear testing. :As r.noted'- in _ the.. preceding-. article irOhis- series, Strattss.:had argu- ed ,thatonIy' such --a' prolirIttn. would be-able:to detect the,existence.-..f. of a Soviet atm id weapons prograin.. SiBCC at least one open-air test was neeessar3--to--j..-prove7z-..-Ife6 weaponsj'-? -To no avail,:::StraUsinsistedi that without, a mbnitoring- program,: this: -country. would have no idea of the," _ level of the r-Soviet., program?and,,_ most importantly, Whether th . can intelligence- community was right in assuming the gussigns would need' -.about twenty years to end the American atomic?weapons.'monopoly. ._ Lilienthal watched the bureaucratic.' . jockeying in-this little argument with growing unease: the smug reports to- congressional .coinmittpprdypdtEprRe ;intelligence agencies which confiL.'..- . _ _ ? ; MILITARY SC1E.,NCE_,' & TECHNOLOGY VOLUME 1, NO. 3 1981 N.TELLIGENCE dently predicted an American atomic monopoly far into the future were ; based, as Lilienthal knew, on the flimsiest of evidence. Worse,, Strauss was being balked in his attempt to get a monitoring program by the very same smugness: since the Russians - would take so many,years to develop - an atomic bomb, why waste money monitoring something that did not : exist?: Appalled, -Lilienthal realized r: . that the American: intelligence- corn- . . munity had nO, clotnes , As. things turned out :Strauss' fi-.. nallY did get his monitoring program. . but only after he 'shifted money- .-.secretly from his agency to the Air ". Force, which carried out the actual Jnonitoring._ In September of.: 1942; one; of_the Air Force .monitoring . planes detected . the irrefutable_ evi- dence that the Russians had carried - -out at /east one opert-air test:of an-: .atornic bomb. ..I?The fact that Strauss and the AEC.- - ivere: vindicated (notjo.mentioo ? Scientists Who had been- predicting a , Russian .atomic capability by:1949) turned rout to be almost meaningless,::_ ? .ibecauSer the intelligence community :2 seemed to have learned nothingfrom ? its mistakes. In-fact,r-they were abont. to commit an .equalViv'rong-headed thi? time on the oppositeend of the scale. TO be morepr.ecise-, theyr-:14 were about to create the Bomber Gap ...,.-' and the Alissile Gap- 1-lowt those two, ,serious'..intelligence failures developed tells --uS, a great deal 'about ihe.prob- -44 lems of estimative intelligencef.-- The,--:diffictdty: with the bombers sten-tined directly from the imbroglio: :1 surroundiig 'the. first Soviet: atomie-:.? .* test.. As we have seen; that failure was primarily :orunderestimationi judging the Russians as-technological- .primitives incapa e- of carrying-out ? massive: and difficult feats as! - producing; an atomic: weapons pro-