THE DISSOLUTION OF THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL IN THE LIGHT OF SOVIET RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-01226R000100070009-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 14, 2008
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: July 1, 1943
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE DISSOLUTION OF THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL
IN THE LIGHT OF
SOVIET RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY
July 1, 1943.
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.THE DISSOLUTION OF THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL IN
THE LIGHT OF SOVIET RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY
The policy that Soviet Russia was to follow in the event of
an international war was formulated and worked out in detail over
a period of many years. The whole era since 1914 is considered an
era of wars which would generate revolutions and of revolutions
which generate wars. For, said Lenin, "the world never knew an im-
portant revolution which wasnot bound up with war."I/ To this
Lenin returned again and again: "The experience of the history of
revolutions, of great conflicts, teaches that wars-- series of wars--
are inevitable."2/ This view, incidentally, determined Lenin's
wholly hostile attitude towards all disarmament programs. He re-
garded them as material for propaganda and not as matters of realis-
tic policy. For his own country he considered a maximum degree of
military strength to be an object of first necessity.
At congresses and in the press problems of the future war
were analysed and studied with thoroughness. As the fruit of such
studiesthe program theses of 1927 3/ present a most interesting
classification of future wars. These fall into three groups:
L/ Lenin: Works, v. 24, p. 122.
2/ Leis&n: Speech of December 21, 1920. Works, v.26, p. 12.
3/ The Eighth Plenary Session of the Executive Committee of the
Communist International, May 29, 1927.
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(1) "Wars of imperialist states among themselves." This
refers to wars of great powers exclusive of Soviet Russia. The
first World War as well as the present one from September 1, 1939,
to June 22, 1941, also comes under this definition. In wars of
this kind Soviet Russia stands aloof from military operations, while
her friends in all the countries actually at war are obliged to f ol-
lowthe traditional rule, i.e., to convert the war into a revolution.
(2) "NationalQrevolutionary wars against imperialism, in-
cluding colonial war." This refers to China, Central Asia and simi-
lar territories, where the imperialist side may be represented by
France or Holland, or, most commonly, by Britain. In wars of this
kind the national and colonial movements are entitled tm communist
sympathy and help as against the parent states and great powere.Only
in the countries of the latter states should war be converted into
"civil war", i.e., revolution.
(3) "Wars of capitalist counter*'revolution against proleta-
rian revolution and countries of socialist reconstruction." By these
are meant ward'agatnst Soviet Russia. The policy to be followed here
assumes clear outlines. The Soviet Union would defend itself, while
the communist parties within the countries of its opponents (Britain
and France were held to be the principal opponents) were to hamper the
military operations of these governments and as far as possible convert
their anti-war activities into a pro-Soviet revolutions. Thus a gar
against Soviet Ruaaia (a war "on vertical lines") was to be converted
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into internal wars in the countriesof her opponents (emirs"on
horizontal lines").
An interesting fact about this classification is its failure
to include the $ype of war an actual example of which made its appear-
ance after June, 1941, a war involving a coalition of Soviet Russia
with Britain and the United States. It cannot be said that a combin-
ation of this kind was completely ruled out by Bolshevik theory. Its
possibility under certain situationshad to be admitted. But the ad-
mission wasmdde reluctantly and in termsthat were too general, while
in the official program a war alliance between Russia and the princi-
pal countries of world capitalism was not even mentioned.
There was a time, in the very beginning of the Soviet regime,
when many Bolshevik leadersregard4d such a coalition as an outrage
againstthe basic principles of their doctrine. Lenin's efforts to
teach these leaders realistic politics have already been mentioned in
this connection. But, as the years passed, this irreconcilablH'atti-
tude changed, and.the same Bukharin who at one time was s perturbed
at the thought of such a colition, later stated in a sp pech on the
communist program:
"We have grown up so much that we can conclude a military al-
liance with the bourgeoisie of one country and use its help in order
to crush the. bourgeoisie of another country. This is a question of
strategical and technical expediency alone." He could not help fore-
seeing r solution even in the countries ofhis allies, however: "If
as time goes on the bourgeoisie of such an allied country happens to
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suffer a defeat, other tasks will arise, which you will easily vi-
sudize yourselves." Here the minutes record: ("Laughter of the au->
dience.") 1/
Echoing Bukharin, the draft program spoke of this combina -
tion vaguely and as if it were reluctantly: "Since formation of
coalitions between xproletarian states and certain capitalist states
against ether boungeois states is quite permissible, the question of
policy in war depends on each individual case." But there was utter
clarity in the declaration that in all circumstances "the proletariat
of all countries" was obliged not only to defend the Soviet Union,
but also "to expand it in order to expand the base of revolution."
Despite the Bolshevik dislike for it, the Soviet-English-
French coalition began increasingly to loom as a possiblity as the
anti-Soviet trend in German policy grew more and more pronounced after
1933. At the same time it was emphasized with increasing frequency
that should such a coalition materialize, Soviet hussia, by virtue of
her special position, would wage her own, spparate, war. "An answer
to every attack on the territory of the USSR", wDDte Radtk on Decem-
ber 16, 1933, "would be war actions of the Soviet Union. . . But a
situation might then arise in which the Soviet Union would be engaged
in actions parallel to those of the enemy of its enemy, or would there-
fore be interested in joint action with his." These cautiously formu-
lated phhases of Izvestia, which were no doubt checked in the Kremlin,
were aerogram of an eventual coalition with britain and France:
l/ Bukharin: Speech onthe Program of the Communist International,
November, 1922.
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Firstly, such a coalition could come into being only in the
event of an attack (by Germany) on Soviet Russia-- this is an in-
dispensable condition.
Secondly, in such a war the course of action of the Soviet
government would be parallel to that of Britain and France who would
be not so much allies as "enemies of our Enemies". This is none
other than the idea of a separate war within the framework of a mili-
tary coalition.l/
The problem, strictly speaking, received no further study,
although it constantly grew in importance. Clarity was deliberately
avoided-- the theme was an awkward one. A war coalition of Soviet
Russia with Britain and France demanded from the communist parties
of those capitalist countries that they support their national gov-
ernments so long as Soviet 1Lussia was fighting on their side. This
was obviously a delicate subject. Atthe Congressof the Communist
Fifteen years earlier these same principles-were set forth in
the resolution of the Executive Committee of the B4shevik Party,
which was written by Trotsky and had the approval of Lenin. The
resolution said: "In a war with Germany we adopt all means in
order to arm and equip our revolutionary army in the best way with
all it needs, and to obtain this wherever we can, consequently
ffom the capitalist governments as well. AL the same time the
Party preservescomplete independence of its foreign policy, under-
takes no political obligations towards the capitalist governments,
and considers their proposals in each individual case from the
standpoint of expediency." In terms of today, the first part of
thisbesolution night be described asdealing with lend-lease aid,
and the second part, with a separate war.
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International in 1935, after stating that 'the main task of the com-
munists of the world is "to help bring about a victory of the lied
Army by anymeans and at any cost", the delegate Ercoli, presenting
the official report, evaded the concrete problem:
"If anybody asks us what this position means and how we are
going to act . . . we can give a single answer-- in each given case
we shall acct as Marxists . . . We have a leader,Comrade Stalin, who
has always found the line that led to victory . . ." 1/
This was the report offered. At first glance, it may appear
to be very little=- "act as Marxists", "we have Stalin". After fif-
teen yearsof theoretical studies and of practice based of these stu-
diges- after volumes of resolutions-- the statement sou nded like an
admission of confusion, a loss of orientation. Actually, there was
hidden in it something of great significance. It was the admission
that henceforth communism would not always be able to conduct its
foreign policy in the open, with its strategy publicly annourced; that
is policy would not be the product of collective discussion by all
communist parties; that certain inevitable actions would have to be
taken which to many would be unexpected and incomprehensible; that
complete power and authority would be placed in the hands of the lead-
er; and that obedience, even to alietimes incomprehensible directiora,
was the chief duty of all the component elements oif world communism.
When there is a storm at sea, the prime duty of everyone aboard the
si:ipt is to obey the captain; Argument and discussion cannot be
tolerated.
L/ The Communist International,l935, No. 23-24.
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International in 1935 after stating that the main .task of the cod--
munists of the world is ~'to-help bring abut a victory of the Red
Arm
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Not freedom of action, but order and military discipline are what
is needed. And only the captain knows what course to follow and
what is to be done at every moment.
This was the antitheses of the simmering political movement,
the lively exchangd of views, the struggle of ideas, of the early
20's when the Communist International was being founded. Properly
speaking, the old pattern of the--ommunist Internation became
superfluous if the only standard was "we have theleader". It was
not without reason that many.years later, on May 15, 1943, the Exec-
utive Committee of the Communist International, in deciding to dis-
solve itsorganization, cited that congress of 1935, which thus be-
came its last congress. If strategy is the businessof the Commander
in Chief, congresses are useless.
During these years Europe was being given an object lesston in
foreign policy by Berlin,.al:lesstn which dimmed the reputation of
traditional international dAplomacy. It was demonstrated tha t the
grandest aims could be achieved by the crudest of methods. The
Fuehrer was arming Germany,but swore that his only object was "equal-
itg of rights" for Germany,not war-- and people were much impressed.
He was building amighty air fleet, but only as a defense against the
Soviet air fleet, he asserted, and many accepted the statement at its
face valud. He annexed territories, but each time swore that he would
never do it again-- and there were sighs of relief in the chanceller-
ies. He never tired of "guaranteeing the frontiers" and of making
platitudinous speeches about peace--and he was almost believed. The
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crudest form of deception proms to be a first class weapon in world
politics, while wise international diplomacy, grey with age, showed
itself as a little girl, inexperienced, studpid and repeatedly deceived.
All this helped to intensify the Moscow tendency toward authori-
tarianism. Let the leadermake history. This was no time for schemes,
systems and princip'es. Abstractions were to yield places to vigorous
action, to "realistic policy". Communism entered the war with this
mental attitude, an attitude which in turn determined Sovkbt war
policy. There was no pronunciation of communism--only a new strategy.
Communist thought now proceeded from the promise that, in its
scope and intensity, the new seriesof wars and internal upsets was
unprecedented in history and therefore demanded a special home and
foreign policyl The Soveit State which expected to be involved in the
war must, even before the war broke out, and especially during the couV
of the war, turn itself into a military camp with rigid discipline,and
subordination. In anticipation of the reverses and retreats inevitable
in all conflicts, among political reefs, of concluding new alliances
and breaking off old ones, the leader was to be invested with absolute
authority and be given the right tt lead without being compelled to ex-
plain 1s military plans and his diplomacy when it was important that
these be kept secret. To thisend the leader must be raised so high
above the masses that nobody would dare to criticize him. His infalli-
bility was to be the way to invincibility.
Opposition wasnot to be tolerated either on the eve of the war
or during its progress. Doubts cause ciriticisms, criticisms opposition
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opposition internal strife, and strife may mean defeat. Doubters must
de destroyed. It is better to destroy a thousand innocent people than
to have the common cause destroyed. In war, not relaxation but tight-
ening of the reims of the regime isnecessary. It might be a good thing,
perhaps, in arder to prevent some serious defeats, to give the generals
officers and strategists more freedom. But possibly they would reach a
war concept that was opposed to the leader's! No, it was safer to risk
a retreat than to relax the reins onx the officers. It might be a good
thingip perhaps, to make some concessions to the peasants and raise the%
spirits, if only by promises of future reforms. But was it possible.,
in starting campaigns for a new social order,ato make concessions at
the same time to the old order at home? It mightbe better,perhaps,
to release from their places of confinement, hundreds of thousands of
people and to enlist them in the work of defense. But so much mesentp
ment must have accumulated in the breasts of. these people that it would
be necessary either to continue on the part of concessions,or to re-
turn them to their distant places of confinement. No, better no con-
cessions to anybody--no compacts with any movements--no amnesty, no
democratic laxigy, no political liberties.
Applied to foreign policy this trend of thought leads to an
independent, separate war. Of course, at each stage of it one has to
look for allies, and to reckon with them when they are found. ButAl-
allies may change--inevitably they will change. Time was when the
friendship with Germany was regarded as "eementiOd by blood". Later,the
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Moscow radio would repeat, "Long live democracy!" at frequent inter-
vals. Later still, drinking a toast to President Roosevelt, Moscow
would exiblaim: "Godkhelp him in his efforts:" Later, again, promises
would bd given to Japan that strict neutrality would be observed.
Then the Communist International would be dissolved. It is important
therefore not to merge with the allies, not to'become dissolved/in
the democratic sea. A common war-- that was possible, but post war
aims remained different. The own road-is the best road.
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Another probi.,m related to the coming wa_ occupied the minds of
the communist leaders as much as it formerly had. This was the prob-
lem of the revolutionary consequences of the war. The axiom and basic
thesis were still found in Lenin's idea that every deepgoing revolu-
tion was bound up with a war, and that in our epoch big wars engendered
revolutions.
In the case of a purely imperialist war (i.e., one in which
Russia did not participate) revolutionary events could occur in the
countries of either coalition or of both; while in a war against
the Soviet Union, revolutionary upheavals, it was expected, would
shake the countries attacking Russia. Hence, from 1934 on, threat
of revolution was one of the arguments used against Germany and
Japan. Stalin, for example, spoke in January, 1934, in these words:
"The situation is developing towards a new imperialist war. . .
But where is the guaranty'that the second imperialist war will give
better results than the first? On the contrary, it is bound to
tangle up the situation still more. Moreover, it will be certain
to unloose the revolution and will challenge the very existence
of capitalism in many countries, as occurred in the course of the
first imperialist war."
As regards the countries that would venture to attack the
Soviet Union, Stalin said, on the same occasion:
"It is scarcely possible to doubt that the second war against
the Soviet Union will lead to a complete defeat of the attackers,
a revolution in several countries of Europe and Asia, and a route
of the bourgeois-landowner governments".
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"Let not the gentlemen of the bourgeoisie blame us if on the
morrow of such a war there are missing from the scene some favored
governments now, by the Grace of God, z.gning safely. If the bour-
geoisie chooses the path of war, the working class chooses the path
of revolution." J
These categorical statements about the war-revolution and the
extensive liberature popularizing their ideas marked the middle 30'sl,
the period when Moscow witnessed a growing interest in the glorifica-
tion of ancient national herods, especially military ones, and whom
the new national notes in Soviet expressions of patriotism began to
attract the attention of the outside world. This embryonic national-
ism was readily interpreted as Moscow's renunciation of all aims
other than those related to national defense. "Evolution of Bolshe-
visor" was again the favorite topic in all languages. Side by side
with these trends,. however the unimpaired soundness of the traditional
co mnunist ideas was constantly stressed by the Communist leaders.
In this there was no real contradiction. As formerly, "turning an
imperialist war into a civil war" was held to be the policy during
a war. 21
In 1938, almost on the eve of the war, an old article of
Stalin's on "Three. Characteristics of the Red Army" was reprinted
in the Soviet press and in the form of hundreds of thousands of
pamphlets. In this
. 17
Stalin: Speech at the 17th Congress of the Communist Party.
2
See, for example, Resolution of the Congress of the Communist
International of 1935.
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article Stalin saw as the first characteristic of the Red Army its
function as "an instrument of the workers' and peasants' rule", and
the second characteristic in its being an army "of the brotherhood
of peoples of our country", of all the nations comprising the
Soviet Union. But the third characteristic was this:
"Our Army", wrote Stalin, "is an army of the world revolution,
an army of the workers of all countries"; for, as Stalin went on to
explain, it was trained and educated in the spirit of internationalism.
A blend of old internationalism with Soviet nationalism has been the
basic line of communist ideology of the last decade. Revolution was
not repudiated, nor was communism, but the supreme consideration was
the safeguarding of the Soviet Union. Nucleus of world communism,
the Soviet Union was the only fatherland, and its defence, a national
task for the Russians was an international task for all communists.
Hence, expansion of Soviet territory also became a goal of world
communism- a peculiar substitute for revolution.
For among the many prophesies and prognostications of Lenin,
Trotsky and Stalin which eventually came true, one very important
one failed to materialize. The prediction of "a series of terrible
wars" after the peace treaties of 1918-19 came true. The diagnosis
of the world situation as one of unstable equilibrium, and the
appraisal of the role of Soviet Russia in contributing to that
instatnLity were correct. The conviction, offered as counsel to
others, that it is impossible to appease Hitler, and the assertion
in 1938 that "war is already on" were
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also right, But over a period of twenty-five years these evalua-
tions of facts of international relations were invariably accompan-
ied by predictions of internal revdutionary shocks resulting from
international crises. The shocks, the decisive political battles,
however, never materialized; internal ciises of revolutionary
nature grew ever fewer; at the same time, where internal shocks
did occur, they.bore an anti-revolutionary rather than revolutionary
character. The whole world had moved far to the right in the past
twenty years, and only by looking through the perspective of these
years can one realize the great extent of this shift. In no coun-
try did "war against war" assume anything like the proportions of
a strong popular movement. In no country was there anything
remotely suggesting conversion of "an international war into a
civil war." In particular, the expectation of an anti-war movement
in Germany in the case of war also remained unrealized. But how
many sincere hopes were attached in Moscow to this scientific
predictiont
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The invariable failure, over a period of a quarter of a
century, of all promises and expectations of victorious revolutions
has had its effect on Russian communism. Today it is no longer con-
fident that the new war will yield different results. The war is
already more than half through, is probably drawing to a close, but
no important revolutionary movements have been observed anywhere.
The old tenet that the world is "in a helpless situation" until revo-
lution opens a new road, is no longer unreservedly accepted. More
and more frequently this statement of Lenin's is quoted:
"There are no absolutely helpless situations. . . To try to
prove in advance a case of absolute helplessness would be,mere
pedantry, playing with ideas and catchwords. In this and similar
questions the true 'proof' can be supplied only by practice."
If a war could end without revolutions, it was all the more
important that the sphere of the only Soviet state be expanded.
This form of expansion of the sphere of communism implied a
division of the task of communism in the war into a number of
individual'tasks:
(1) In Soviet Russia, a victory over the German coalition
and the expansion of the Soviet sphere.
(2) In countries adjacent to Soviet Russia, creation of pro-
Soviet or pro-Russian movements acting in opposition to their former
government.
(3) In countries allied with Soviet Russia, support of their
war effort, and especially support of future Soviet claims to an ex-
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tended sphere of influence.
(4) In countries of the German coalition and in occupied
Europe, -- the only countries in which the old revolutionary scheme
remained intact-- creation of revolutionary movements.
This last group was also the only one which fitted into the
framework of the old Communist International.
Experience has shown that the outside world, and the great
allies of Soviet Russia in particular, are reconciled to possible ter-
ritorial changes, but are painfully sensitive to so-called "Sovietiza-
tion" of new territories, i.e., to the expansion of communism. In
other words, to these countries nationalism and its aims are more
acceptable than. communism. As a counterpart to this, past experience,
especially that of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-40, demonstrated
to the Soviet government how great a mistake it is to conduct a war
which has the Communist International for its sponsor.
When at the end of November 1939, the Soviet government
decided on a war with Finland there was immediately formed a new
Finnish government made up of prominent members of the Communist
International with-Otto Kuusinen at their head. The outside
world saw in this the confirmation of the view that the Communist
International was an organ of communist imperialism. At the time
this impression caused considerable damage to the efforts of
Soviet diplomacy. Opponents of the Soviets gained new adherents
in those who were ready to recognize the rights of Russia to new
"strategic frontiers" in Finland. Dissolution of the Kuusinen
government in March 1940, was a notable defeat for the Soviets.
The fact was noted in Moscow. When the new war broke out
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it was decided not to repeat the error. Both communism and the
Communist International were pushed into the background. "Communist
International", the old official journal of the organization bear-
ing its name, no longer appeared in a number of foreign language
editions--English, French, German, and Spanish-- and even its
Russian edition was forbidden for mailing to other countries.
Communist parties in many countries were also driven into the
background.
National slogans replaced communist slogans. "Slav conferences"
a non-party Union of Polish Patriots, a non-party movement of
Yugoslav guerrillas, non-party newspapers, non-party broadcasts in
all languages from Moscow, appeals to the religious elements in
neighboring countries--these and similar activities took the place
of the work of the Communist International. The more insistent
the discussions of war aims between Moscow, London and Washington,
the clearer the claims of Moscow to Eastern Europe, the more
dangerous, even harmful, the Communist International became.
"You say you do not aim at extending your frontiers?" the press
of the world asked Moscow. "Very well, But you have another firm,
the Communist International, and under the name of this firm you
will be sovietizing other countries."
From the point of view of communist policy the Communist
International had to.be "liquidated". The actual disbandment
came, if anything, too late. But at the moment of the Soviet-
Polish rupture. (April-May, 1943) when the world, looking to the
precedents of 1919 and 1920, expected the appointment of a new
Polish goverment by Moscow, the Soviet government, overcoming
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its previous hesitation, dissolved the International and thus
disarmed :the critics. Though delayed, the dissolution of the
International justified Moscow hopes: it was appraised by many
as a breaking. away from.a program of international communism,
which was precisely what Moscow desired.
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It'would be, however, a great mistake to overlook the fact
that the Russian leaders keep loyally to the banner of the dis
solved organization and that they have called it up with the
same feelings and the same hopes with which. the American soldiers
.rolled up.their.banners on'Batan.- As; late.as._1938,_.inhis "History-
...of:the,Communist_Party". Stalin deemed it necessary to repeat
the oath he_gave.over.the.grave of-Lenin:
"On leaving us Lenin bade us be loyal to the principles
.of the _. Communist . International..., ; We .. swear .. to ... you, . Comrade Lenin,
.that we will not spare our lives in,fortifying and expanding the
union of the. toilers. of. the :..whole.-. world, , the..Communist _ International t"
The thing that mattered to Stalin was not the form, the outer
garb1.but...the.inner content. He.maie no attempt to conceal it in
his comments . on , the . dissolution.. of._. the. International. He. ,saw the
advantage of the act in making it impossible..to suspect Moscow of
.,the intention of interfering in the 'life of other peoples and of
bolshevizing them. At the same time, in his opinion, the dissolu
tion would facilitate the unification of..popular,.i.e., pro-Soviet,
moveminbs, "regardless of party affiliation or religious faith,
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into a single camp of national liberation." 1
.Similarly, the Executive Committee of the Communist Interna-
tional in its resolution of May 22, 1943, proposing to dissolve
the organization, referred to the precedent of the American
Communist Party, which had been out of the International-since
1940. Henceforth all the national parties were to have the same
status as that of the American party.
Plainly, nothing was farther from Moscow's thoughts than to
deprive itself of such a forceful weapon of world policy as the power #
to direct the activities of numerous parties in other countries.
Coordination and management of those activities are more necessary
to the Soviet government now than at any time before. Never in
the history of Soviet Russia was there a moment when aid from
inside Britain and America and from the neighboring European
countries was more important than it is towards the end of this war.
The mortality rate among international political organizations
is very high, and nearly always the cause of death is internal
strife. The latest example was the League of Nations. The Com-
munist International was spared this fate. Its existence was not
threatened at the moment of-its dissolution, by the internal
struggle of the national parties which composed it, and there
is today no reason to expect any disagreements or antagonisms
V
Stalin: Letter to Reuter's correspondent Sing, May 29, 1943.
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which would set the communists of one country against those of
another-- the communists of America or of Britain, for example,
against those of France or Russia. The single leadership, the
guiding iron hand, the instructions and material help continue
without the official Communist International.
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An independent policy in the countries of occupied Europe,
acting as a counterpoise to the policies of the London governments-
in-exile, has played a prominent role in the activities of the Soviet-
government both before and since the dissolution of the Communist
International.
As a military factor guerrilla warfare has played an impor-
tant part in this War for all governments. During the long period of
the German occupation each government-in-exile has worked out its own
system of relations with the fighting groups of its country, and at
the same time the strategy and tactics in the struggle against the
forces of the invaders gradually assumed a definite form in each of
these countries. Secret printing presses, counterfeit documents, arma-
ment, acts of sabotage, extent of military activity-- these are the
questions which guerrilla warfare has had to answer constantly, and
of which the outside world has known next to nothing. Every military
act of the guerrillas produced inevitable counter-measures on the part
of the occupying forces and inevitable victims from among the innocent
population. The more intense the fighting action, the greater the
number of victims; while an attempt at a popular uprising, even of
local scope, was doomed to be drowned in rivers of blood and to lead
to wholesale razing of towns and villages. The strategy and tactics
of guerrilla warfare therefore presented problems of exceptional dif-
ficulty. These were solved in different ways, according to the cir-
cumstances of each case. By and large, however, the dominant tendency
in this warfare has been not to stake everything on a single opera-
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tion, tp spare the population, and to wait for the approach of the
Allied armies before setting in motion a general uprising.
The governments-in-exile tried to time strong popular move-
ments to the moment when the Allied armies approach their particular
lands,,~and when national uprisings can be transformed into military
operations in line with those of the liberating armies. In the in-
terim they confined themselves to paving the way for the future and,
'through their agents, to organizing single acts of resistance. Re-
volts of disarmed populations having no chance of success without help
from outside, would only serve the Uermans as a pretext to drown whole
nations in blood. Great devastation, deep despondency and a break-
down of morale among the tormented nations would be the result of such
tactics.
In the ideology and practice of Moscow,.guerrilla warfare has
occupied quite a different place, Here is was viewed as a peculiar
synthesis of a military, anti-German organization with a popular revo-
lutionary movement. The largely voluntary character or the guerrilla
bands, their self-imposed discipline, their highly secret and danger-
ous operations, brought them close to the type of traditional under-
ground revolutionary organizations.
This view of guerrilla warfare was taken over directly from
the Russian civil war of 1918-20, in which guerrillas played a higiy
important role. 6ince those days the association of guerrilla war-
fare with revolutionary fighting has taken deep roots, whence the great
importance of the question of guerrilla movements in soviet interna-
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tional policy. In eastern Europe guerrilla organizations have be-
come the points of support for building the future sphere of ooviet
influence, and in western Europe they became nuclei of revolution.
At first their activities were directed only against the Axis
powers. 'xheir banners carried only patriotic, national slogans.
They promised all freedoms at home and accused Hitler of suppressing
religion, particularly the catholic religion. But what differentia-
ted them from other national movements was their methods, not slogans--
their mass attacks, uprisings, seizure of territories, whatever the
price that had to be paid for them. These popular movements of re-
volutionary character, as they spread wider, rose higher in their aims,
and changed with the change of political conditions, were to be trans-
formed into the great revolutionary movement which had been awaited
by the communists throughout the past quarter century.
Since the second half of 1942 this policy began to develop on
a growing scale in Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, France and other
countries. Everywhere its progress followed a more or less uniform
pattern, for it was guided from a single center. The question around
which everything revolved was this: Was the resistance to be active
or passive? Was the attitude to be one of expectancy or one of offen-
sive? Moscow broadcasts in all the Slav languages and Moscow repre-
sentatives in all the occupied countries were calling for an activity
which, growing from day to day, was to'lead spontaneously to great popux
lar uprisings against the German and Italian rule. Demands for such
activity were addressed from Moscow to all the London governments-in-
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exile, although everybody was aware that these demands would meet
with refusal.
"Partisan warfare", the Communist International wrote in Jan-
uary 1943, "is at present becoming the universal form of strength
of the oppressed peoples, and will play a role of the first importance
at the decisive stage of the struggle . . . Armed partisan warfare
is necessary in order to prepare a national armed uprising which is
to complete the struggle for the driving out of the occupants".
This was a clear statement of the program of revolution at the final
stage of the war.
The question of guerrilla warfare caused and intensified con-
flicts between Moscow and London. The first, although not the most
serious, conflict related to the Yugoslav question and the struggle
between the opponents and supporters of the War Minister, General
Draha Mihailovich.
The communist radio station "Free Yugoslavia" accused the Yugo-
slav government and its supporters of "proclaiming the slogan of in-
action, of patient waiting for better times"; because of this, "the
Yugoslav guerrillas had to engage in a struggle not only against the
troops of the occupation but also against the traitors, the Chetniks
of Gen. Mihailovich." This internal struggle which at times became
sanguinary was directed against some very influential and by no means
inactive military organizations of Gen. Mihailovich. The London radio,
speaking in the name of the Yugoslav government, demanded subordina-
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tion of all fighting forces to Mihailovich. But "Free Yugoslavia"
(from Russia) replied:
"How can the National Army of Liberation and the guerrilla
groups be required to submit to Mihailovich who, together with his
Chetniks, as has been proved by documents, is taking part in the of-
fensive of the armies of occupation against our resisting people? . . .
The struggling Yugoslav people are being stabbed in the back by the
so-called Mihailovich C,etiiks, who are everywhere fighting on the
side of the occupants helping them to suppress Yugoslav guerrillas."
Guerrilla bands entrenched themselves in some Yugoslav dis-
tricts (mainly in Bosnia), set up a local administration, and estab-
lished communications with Moscow. The Yugoslav government accused
these groups of having set up "small Soviet republics." The guerril-
las, for their part, called themselves "patriots", conducted their
propaganda on a national, not a class, basis and tried to enlist t3B
support of the clergy, while one of-the planks in their program was
freedom of religion in opposition to the German war on Christianity.
"Are these the soviet republics we are building?" "Free Yugoslavia"
asked. "Isn't it ridiculous to assert that Father Karamakevich and
dozens of other priests are building soviet republics in Yugoslavia?"
Actually, all the support of this movement came from Moscow
and, with its goal looming in the f t e, it was; if not officially
"Soviet", still the 'People's" Yugoslavia for which the government,
the army and the patronage of a great power were ready and waiting.
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5omeWhat later than in Yugoslavia; the situation in Poland
followed a similar development, except for the fact that neither the
Polish government in London nor the revolutionists in Poland had large
military forces to back them. The inner struggle, however, was over
the same question: passiveness or action?
"Can the people be mobilized under the banner of passiveness?"
the Polish WWVolna Polska (Moscow) asked. "Can the people be mobilized
under the banner of waiting? . . . They will be wrong who hope by means
of,insinuations to dip a gulf between the fighting gierrillas, the
people's vanguard, and the nation as a whole. who, giving ordersfrom
abroad, can forbid the people to engage in active struggle? . . . We
regard propaganda of the policy of passiveness, of waiting, as treason
to the interests of Poland . . . The lying arguments about avoiding
the sacrifices'of unncessary victims cannot withstand criticism."i/
To these appeals from Moscow and to certain guerrilla acts in
Poland, Premier Sikorski replied from London:
"I cannot give orders for a revolt because I.shoud risk down-
ing my nation in a sea of blood."
At that time the 6oviets were landing parachutists in Poland
for the purpose of. organizing "cells of resistance" and a series of
uprisings. ziikorski protested this "interference with Poland's inner
affairs". When some of the parachutists perished, Moscow put the blame
on the Polish government, but it was declared in London that "the
Polish government had given no such orders". Thus in Poland, too,
civil war was assuming a sanguinary form.
Wolna Polska, march 1, 1943.
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Sikorski's protest brought on himself and his government,
"the apostles of passiveness", a sharp attack from the "Polish
Patriots" in Moscow:
"The Premier has no need to offer excuses for not proclaiming
the slogan of uprising. But an uprising is not a Chinese dragon
which leaps out of a box when one presses the button . . . The
Premier cannot summon to an uprising, but he does proclaim the slogan
of waiting with clear conscience . . . Now those who set out to
battle the enemy must fear not only the German bayonet, but also a
shot from behind a corner, a treacherous stab in the back."
Similar events were taking place even in Czechoslovakia in
spite of her repeated protestations of loyal cooperation and of
friendliest relations with Moscow. Directions beamed in the Czech
language by Moscow broadcasts were of a much more radical nature
than those from London. While Premier Benes recommended "watchful
waiting", the Communist organis accused him of spreading "sentimental
slush". Far-reaching plans have been devised also in regard to
Czechoslovak units formed in Russia under Colonel Svoboda, whose
military sucdesses had been stressed in the Pravda.
On guerrilla warfare in Czechoslovakia the Communist inter-
national had this to say:
"The weakness of the Czech national struggle lies in the fact
that in Czechoslovakia they still wait for liberation from outside, as
a result of the defeat of the aitlerite armies on the war fronts. It
Wolna Polska, No.2
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is no longer possible m wait patiently ror the development of mili-
tary events at the front-- it is necessary to organize fighting ac-
tivity in Czechia and Slovakia. But among the members of the Popular
Front (i.e., between the Czech Communist Party, on one side, and the
Benes and socialist parties on the other) there are differences of
opinion as regards the possibility and expediency of armed partisan
warfare against the occupants.111/
Moreover, these tactics were not confined to the Slav nations.
The same problems arose in western Europe. On May 13, 1943, commen-
ting on leaflets which had been circulated in Holland and which called
for a general uprising, the Dutch radio in London said: "Do not let
yourself be proved".- This was accompanied by the statement that ap-
peals to direct action were actually playing into the hands of the
Germans who were waiting to pounce on Holland with heavy reprisals.
As in other occupied countries, the french communists 1,4ere
bdilding their own guerrilla movement. "Free Riflemen" argued bitter-
ly against those who denied: the possibility of rorming guerrilla
armies in France, in view of the absence of mountains in most parts
of the country.
Maurice Thorez, the leader of the French communists, who stayed
at Moscow during the war years (the r'rench military tribunal passed a
sentence on him as a deserter during the time of the Soviet-German
pact), came out in the autumn of 1942 with bitter denunciations of
J communist international, 1943, No. I.
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"believers in waiting who, it is said, are waiting for the Second
r'ront", "the irresolute people doubting the necessity of immediate,
energetic action", and the people who criticize "partisan activity
and all forms of fighting actioh". "Passiveness is dangerous: