DRAFT DEFENSE, ENERGY AMD FEMA TESTIMONY ON INTERAGENCY ANTI-TERRORISM EFFORTS.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00005R001400120001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 6, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 12, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS
Routing Slip
ACTION
INFO
1. D/OCA
2. DD/Legislation
XX
3. DD/Senate Affairs
4. Ch/Senate Affairs
5. DD/House Affairs
X
6. Ch/House Affairs
7. Admin Officer
8. FOIA Officer
Constituent Inquiries
9. Officer
10.
11.
12.
STAT
STAT
.12:00 NOON TOD~Y
Date
~/'' i
~_~ 9/13/88
Name/Date
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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT ~'
OFFICE `~
OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET ,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503
September 12, 1988
LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM
- Legislative Liaison Officer
SEE ATTACHED DISTRIBUTION LIST ~~6 ~g~
SUBJECT: Draft Defense, Energy and FEMA testimony on interagency
anti-terrorism efforts.
The Office of Management and Budget requests the views of your
agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to
the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.
Please provide us with your views no later than
12:00 NOON - TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1988
Direct your questions to dim Brown (395-3457), the
legislative analyst in this office-
Assistant Direc~ for
Legislative Reference
Enclosures
cc: Jim Jordan
Francine Picoult Arnold Donahue
Frank Kalder
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DISTRIBUTION LIST
AGENCY
CONTACT
PHONE NUMBER
Department of Commerce (204) Mike Levitt 377-3151
Department of Defense (206) Sam Brick 697-1305
Department of Energy (209) Bob Rabben -586-6718
Department of the Interior (216) Philip Kiko 343-6706
Department of Justice (217) Jack Perkins 633-2113
Department of State (225) Bronwyn Bachrach 647-4463
Environmental Protection Agency (208) Hank Schilling 382-5414
Federal Emergency
Management Agency (210) Spence Perry 646-4105
General Services Administration (237) Al V}cchiolla 566-0563
National Security Council
Central Intelligence Agency
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (227) Trip Rothschild 492-1607
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UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON THE 1UDICIARY
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY AND THE lAW
OPEN HEARING ON TECHNO-TERRORISM
SEPTEMBER 15,1988
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS FOR THE~DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
MR. CRAIG ALDERMAN, JR.
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
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MR. CHAIRMAN, i AM CRAIG ALDERMAN,IR., DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY
OF OFFENSE FOR POLICY. 1 AM RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLICIES,
AND FOR GUIDANCE AND OVERSIGHT FOR PLANS AND PROCEDURES, BY WHICH
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROVIDES MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL
AUTHORITIES PEACE AND IN WAR.
THEREFORE, AS A GENERAL INTRODUCTION FOR OUR CONTRIBUTION TO
YOUR INQUIRY, 1 Wlll ADDRESS THE CAPABILITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE WITHIN THE CONTEXT OFTHAT INQUIRY INTO
'HOW THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH IS STRUCTURED, EQUIPPED ANO PREPARED
TO DEAL WITH TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE UNITED STATES -USING OR
AIMED AT ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES..., AND
'...WHAT MECHANISMS EXIST TO COOPERATE AND COORDINATE IN CRISIS
MANAGEMENT,...TOlNTERACT WITH STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND
LAW ENFORCEMENT,..AND
'...WHICH AGENCIES ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT ASPECTS OF
COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATIQN.'
THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S POLICIES AND PLANNING ARE FOUNDED ON
OUR ADHERENCE TO THE SEPARATION BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND CIVIL LAW
ENFORCEMENT, AND TO THE SU61ECTiON OF MILITARY POWER TO CIVILIAN
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CONTROL. WHILE THAT DISTINCTION MAY SEEM OBSCURE TO THE GENERAL
PUBLIC IF TERRORISTS WHO ARE COVERTLY SPONSORED BY A FOREIGN POWER ARE
OPERATING ON U.S. SOIL, THIS COMMITTEE IS WELL AWARE THAT THE PRIMACY OF
CIVIL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM IS FUNDAMENTAL TO OUR
GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY, AND THAT THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY CAN ONLY 6E
THAT OF SECONDARY SUPPORT, AT THE REQUEST OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES, WHEN
WW ENFORCEMENT NEEDS EXCEED CAPABILITIES.
(,THEREFORE, WANTTO INTRODUCE BRIEFLYTHE SPECIFIC ROLES AND
MISSIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IN PROVIDING MILITARY SUPPORT TO
CIVIL AUTHORITIES, AND OUR RELATIONSHIPS TO OTHER EXECUTIVE BRANCH
AGENCIES, AS A PRECEDENT FOR OUR ANSWERS TO YOUR QUESTIONS AND
DISCUSSION OF THE SCENARIOS YOU HAVE POSED.
FIRST, IN THE MOST OBVIOUS ARENA OF SUPPORT TO CIVIL LAW
ENFORCEMENT,THEMlLITARY RESPONSIVENESS WITH MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT,
TECHNICAL ADVICE, AND FORCES IS WELL COORDINATED, EVEN WHILE
MAINTAINING THE LEGALITIES OF CIVIL PRIMACY. WE HAVE PROCEDURES, PLANS
AND YEARS OF PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE IN ASSISTING BOTH FEDERAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT, THROUGH THE LEADERSHIP OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
(INCLUDING THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION); AND THE STATES.
THAT ASSISTANCE IS PROVIDED THROUGH MECHANISMS BY WHICH THE PRESIDENT
MAY AUTHORIZE MILITARY ASSISTANCE (WITH OVERSIGHT FROM THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE) IN RESPONSE TO A FORMAL REQUEST FROM ANY STATE.
THAT 5UPPORT, WHICH WE MANAGE UNDER A SYSTEM COVERING BOTH CIVIL
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DISTURBANCES AND COUNTERTERRORISM, IS COORDINATED FOR ALL MILITARY
DEPARTMENTS AND OOD COMPONENTS 8Y THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY AS
EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.
ADDITIONALLY, THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY IS THE EXECUTIVE AGENT
FORTHE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PROVIDING LOGISTICAL AND LIFE SAVING
SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES FACED WITH ANY FORM OF DISASTER. IN THE
RELATIVELY STRAIGHTFORWARD SITUATIONS OF NATURAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL
CONDITIONS FOR WHICH THE PRESIDENT HAS DECLARED A MAJOR DISASTER
UNDER THE DISASTER RELIEF ACT, THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IS IMMEDIATELY
ABLE To SUPPORT A FEOERA~ CIVIL GOVERNMENT RESPONSE THAT NORMAUY IS
COORDINATED BYTHE FEDERAL EMERGENCY?MANAGEMENTAGENCY. FURTHER,
IN THOSE EMERGENCIES IN WHICH IMMEDIATE ACTION HY A MILITARY
COMMANDER CAN ASSIST CIVIL AUTHORITIES IN SAVING HUMAN LIFE OR
PROTECTING FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS OR PROPERTY, THE MILITARY
AND OTHER DOD AGENCIES ARE AUTHORIZED TO RESPOND WITHOUT PRIOR
APPROVAL OF FUNDING.
FINALLY, WE HAVE A LONGSTANDING AND EFFECTIVE PROCEDURE FOR
OBTAINING A DECISION BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO APPLY DOD FUNDS FOR
EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITif S, IF NECESSARY PRIOR TO A
PRESIDENTIAL DECLARATION OF EMERGENCY. SUCH EMERGENCY REQUESTS ARE
RECEIVED DIRECTLY BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE (OR PASSED TO THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY IF RECEIVED 6Y OTHERS), ANO
EMERGENCY AUTHORIZATIONS ON BEHALF OF THE SECRETARY THEN ARE PASSED
CAA earn ?n~.t cu-~~rtnrt ter, ?oT co .cn .cn
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TO ANY APPROPRIATE DOD AGENCY. THOSE DECISIONS OFTEN ARE
IMPLEMENTED ON A JOINT SERVICE 6ASIS THROUGH THE EXECUTIVE AGENCY OF
THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY WITHIN THE 48 CONTIGUOUS STATES, AND BY THE
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND FOR HAWAII AND THE PACIFIC
TERRITORIES, BYTHE COMMANDER OF THE ALASKAN AIR COMMAND FOR
ALASKA, AND 8Y THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND FOR
PUERTO RICO AND THE VIRGIN ISLANDS.
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW
INTENSITY CONFLICT EXERCISES POLICY OVERSIGHT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS
FORCEi, WHICH MAY 8E EMPLOYED UNDER A VARIETY OF SCENARIOS, RANGING
FROM SUPPORT OF GENERAL WAR EFFORTS TO LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT
SITUATIONS, WHICH MAY INCLUDE RESPONSE TO INTERNATIONALTERRORISM. IN
THE ABSENCE OF OPEN, ARMED HOSTILITIESOR WARFARE IN THE UNITED STATES,
ONLY A RARE AND EXTREME CIRCUMSTANCE WOULD LEAD TO EMPLOYMENT QF
ANY UNITED STATES COUNTERTERRORISM OR OTHER SPECIAL OPERATIONS
FORCES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES; AND, EVEN IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE
FORCES WOULD BE EMPLOYED ONLY iN THE LEGAL POSTURE OF PROVIDING
MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL LAW ENFORCEMENT AT CIVIL REQUEST.
THE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ATOMIC ENERGY HAS
GENERAL OVERSIGHT OF A NUMBER OF HIGHLY SPECIALIZED TECHNOLOGICAL
CAPABILITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AGENCIES, WHICH CAN BE MADE
AVAILABLE TO ASSIST CIVIL AUTHORITIES IN RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL
OR CHEMICAL HAZARDS. IN MOST OF THOSE EMERGENCY CONDITIONS, OTHER
4
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THAN EMERGENCIES ON MILITARY INSTALLATIONS OR DEALING WITH MILITARY
WEAPONS, THE TOTAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO ACTUAL OR
POTENTIA! CATASTROPHE WOULD 8E ADDRESSED 8Y fEDERAI INTERAGENCY
ORGANIZATIONS UNDER THE LEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, THE
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, OR THE FBI, WITH DOD ONLY
FURNISHING TECHNICAL ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE AS APPROPRIATE. AGAIN,
MANY OF THE OPERATIONS FOR THE ACTUAL DEPLOYMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL
SUPPORT TEAMS FAIL UNDER THE EXECUTIVE AGENCY OF THE SECRETARY OF THE
ARMY I HAVE DISCUSSED EARLIER.
BEFORE WE AL! RESPOND TO YOUR QUESTIONS, I WOULD LIKE TO MENTION
ONE SPECIFIC DOD PROGRAM AND ONE GENERIC CAPABILITY WHICH GEAR
INDIRECTLY ON THE TOPIC AT HAND.
THE DOD KEY ASSET PROTECTION PROGRAM (KAPPy IS A 8A51S FOR OUR
PLANNING TQ ASSIST CIVIL LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES IN THE PROTECTION
OF CERTAIN C1VIlIAN?OWNED FACILITIES THAT HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS CRITICAL
TO DOD'S ABILITY TO MOBILIZE, DEPLOY OR SUSTAIN OUR MILITARY FORCES IN A
NATIONAL SECURITY EMERGENCY. THE LIST ITSELF !S CLASSIFIED, AND ONLY IN ITS
SECOND YEAR OF CONTINUOUS DEVELOPMENT. THE PROCESS OF MILITARY
PLANNING WITH THE CIVI! SECTOR WITH RESPECT TO INDIVIDUAL FACILITIES IS
DEVELOPING UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, FORCES
COMMAND, FOR THE 48 CONTIGUOUS STATES, AND THE COMMANDERS
MENTIONED EARLIER FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE UNITED STATES. HOWEVER,
THAT PLANNING PROCESS EMPHASIZES THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MILITARY
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CAPABILITY AT THE GRASS ROOTS LEYEL, WHICH MAY PROVE IN TIME TO BE THE
MOST EFFECTIVE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION?O PEACETIME DETERRENCE OF, AND
RESPONSE TO, TERRORIST ATTACKS ON TECHNOLOGICAL TARGETS IN THE UNITED
STATES.
KEY ASSET PROTECTION PLANS WILL BE DEVELOPED 8Y THE ARMY
NATIONAL GUARD STATE AREA COMMAND (STARC) FOR EACH STATE, IN
COORDINATION WITH THE OWNERS OF THE FACILRIES AND THE CIVIL LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES HAVING JURISDICTION. 1 EMPHASIZE, HOWEVER, THAT,
THESE PLANS ARE DEVELOPED AS CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
EMERGENCIES OR WAR; AND, PRIOR TO MOBILIZATION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD,
THEY WOULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED UNDERTHE AUTHORITY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.
THE EQUIPMENT, TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE NATIONAL
GUARD UNDER AUSPICES Of THE DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE IS
CRITICALLY IMPORTANT TO THE THE NATIONAL DEFENSE; AND THE MAJORITY OF
OUR WARTIME CONTINGENCY PLANS ARE DEPENDENT ON THE TIMELY
DEPLOYMENT OF THE NATIONAL GUARD UNITS. HOWEVER, IN THE EVENT OF
PEACETIME TERRORIST ATTACKS ON U.S. SOIL, THE NATIONAL GUARD FORCES
PROVIDE TO EACH STATE A VERY SUBSTANTIAL CAPABILITY FOR AUGMENTATION
OF STATE AND LOCAL POLICE AND CIVIL DEFENSE RESOURCES. WE HAVE
DESIGNED THE KEY ASSET PROTECTION PROGRAM WITH THE AWARENESS THAT
PLANS MADE FOR IMPLEMENTATION BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
UPON MOBILIZATION CAN BE EQUALLY EFFECTIVE FOR IMPLEMENTATION BYTHE
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GOVERNORS UNDER OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES AND OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITIES,
AND THAT PLANNING AND EXERCISES TO PROTECT SPECIFIC KEY ASSETS BUILD
GENERIC CAPABILITIES FOR RESPONSE TO A WIDE RANGE OF POSSIBLE THREATS,
INCLUDING TERRORISM.
TO CONCLUDE,THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MAINTAINS A BROAD RANGE
OF CAPABILITIES FOR RESPONSE TO TECHNO-TERRORISM USING RADIOLOGICAL,
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, OR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS; AND FUTURE
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS ARE EXPECTED TO KEEP PACE WITH
DEVELOPING THREATS. WITN THESE CAPA81LIT1ES, WE ARE READYTO SUPPORT
CIVIL AUTHORITIES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN MISSIONS,
WHICH MAY BE UNDERTAKEN BYTHE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ALONE OR 1N
CONIUNCTION WITH THE STATES. WE ALSO SUPPORTTHIS COMMITTEE'S
INITIATIVE TO REVIEW THE GOVERNMENT'S PREPAREDNESS FOR A COORDINATED
AND EFFECTIVE RESPONSE TQ ANY FORM OF POTENTIAL ATTACK ON THE UNITED
STATES, WHICH WE VIEW AS A CRITICAL ELEMENT OF CIVIL OFFENSE AND QF OUR
ABILITY TO EMPLOY THE NATION'S MILITARY POWER EFFICIENTLY DURING ANY
NATIONAL SECURITY EMERGENCY.
THANK YOU.
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DRAFT
STATEMENT OF EAwARb V. SADOLATO
DEPUTY .ASSISTANT 6ECRET7-RY FOR ENERGY EMERGSPTCIES
V.rc. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
BEFORE R'HE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
6UBCOMMiTTEE ON TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAw
UNITED STATES 8EKATE
6EPTF.t+~ER 15, 1988
DRAFT
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Mr. Chairman and Mletnber? of ttu tubcos~-ittse, S appreciate this
opportunity to appear bstore you today to discuss energy emergency
preparedness with.particulaz smphasis on oonesrns that terrorists
sight attack 4om:stie energy systems.
1Phils we have roads good progress in this area and there is a great
deal of activity taking plats, there is still much to do. 1~s you
s-ay imagine matters dealing with the winerabilities of our
domertic energy systems become quits sensitive an4 must be handled
delicately lest we create a shopping list for those who would do
them harm. l-ccordingly, we have undertaken a number of quiet
initiatives with federal and state agencies and the energy
industries with the goal of reducing the vulnerability of our
energy supplies. In view of the open style of this hearing, I
will restrain my remarks to acconm+odate these sensitivities. Same
details, if needed, should bs 4iseussed in closed session oz the
'- infos~-ation provided in classified iorn-.
As requested for discussion purposes, my remarks address an
electric power disruption, referred to as 2echnoterrorism Scenario
3. i will also ssfez briefly to the Department of Snsrgy's
capability to respond to another type of technotsrrozism, nuclear
terrorism.
In the hypothetical mid-winter electric power disruption scenasio,
terrorists ?imultansousiy bomb transformers and switches in the
northeastern Unitsd 6tates. The attacks cause a major disruption
of elsctrieity in the aorthsast. I-fter two weeks, only 35~ of
electzieity in the area has been restored, with New York City
receiving less than S0~ of its requirements. Related problems
include traffic light failures and abandoned vehicles causing
-~ massive traffic jasms which block sa,ergsncy vehicles, isolation of
a light water nuclear power reactor Isom the grid, and partial
failure of the gas pipeline system because of lack of power.
I would like to briefly discuss three aspects of this scenarios
First, activities undertaken in advance to saitigate the risk of
?xperiencinq such a disruption= Second, the Energy En+ergency
Management 6ystem for coping with a disruption, and finally. the
nature of response actions which would occur. l+iy discussion is
intentionally general in nature. home details, if needed, should
be discussed in closed session or the information provided in
classified form.
The specified electric power supply disruption is severs and
anpxecedented, with only 35t of elsctzieity supplies to the
northeast having been restored after two weeks. After past bulk
power supply system disruptions, service restoration time as been
s-easvred in terms of minutes, hours or a day or so at s~ost. For
sxample, full restoration took 13 hours in the 1965 flew York City
blackout. Restoration of the 1977 New York City blackout took 25
hours.
In sii past eleetrieity disruptions electric utilities have
restored service without federal assistance. Primary reliance for
service restoration continues to bs on electric utilities.
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Aov-ever,-much has been dons and more actions are arderway to
mitigate the risk of ?xperiencinq severe powsr supply disruptions.
!'or example:
o !'olioMinq the 1966 thew York City blackout, the
electric utility industry formal the porth 1lmerican
tlectric Reliability Council (I~RC) to ensure that
adequacy and reliability are properly considered in
utility planning and operations.
f~itti specific reference to electric power disruptions which might
sesuit from technoterrorism:
o DOE has oonducted ?xsrcise~ involving such
scenarios in the northeast in 11 nil 19e7 and in the
ban 9'rancisco area in Decunber 1987. 6imilar
?xescises have been conducted during the past five
months with participation by emergency personnel
from most of the "lowez t8" states' energy offices.
These exercises permit us to identify potential
pzoblems and to test erisi? s+aaagement plans.
o ~1t the sequest of DOE, tQ'ERC fortaed the National
Electric Security Committee to develop pzoposals to
seduce the vulnerability of electric po~+er systems
to technoterroristn. The Committee submitted its
recosronendations in July and the matter is on the
agenda of the NERC board's October meeting.
o l-t the request of the l~attonal 6ecurity Council, an
Interagency Group on tnergy Vulnerability (IO-Ev)
has been formed. b 6ubgroup is ourrentiy vozkinq
on tl) energy crisis management seflectinq national
dstense priorities, and (2) mitigating the sisk of
disruption of energy supply systams to
technoterrorism. On electric power systews, the
most vulnerable oomponsnts, as the 8ubcomaaittee has
suggested, are power transformers, particularly
axtra High Voltage (EKV) transformers.
o DOE is wozkinq with the energy industry to improve
physical security. Euch activities include
providing threat'bsiefings to industry officials,
and making available to industry the physical
security training expertise at DOE'? Central
Training 1-cademy, tot~meriy applied only to nuclear
weapons facilities and DOE properties.
o DOE has impismented a procedure for transmitting
inteiligonce community threat advisories to the
energy industry, when appropriate.
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? o The industry advisory oomaaittse of the National
Communications System has fot~ned an Electric power
Task yores. The Task Tores is meeting with
rspresantativss of tl+e electric power industry for
the purpose of identifying what each industry needs
from the other during unergeneies, and developing
cooperative service restoration procedures.
DoE's Office of Energy Emergencies tOEE) has isd the Depart.ment's
efforts to carry out its non'nucieaz emergency preparsdnsss
strategies. OEE's mission is to assure that .adequate U.6. energy
is available, at reasonable cost, to support national priorities
during emergencies. ~-s shown in !'iqurs 1, three Offices under my
lsadezship carry out this mi:sion.
1. The Office of Ener Emtr enc Polio and Evaluations
n~tors, ova ua es. ncorporates an Assam Hates
energy smergency initiatives and developments in support
of the OEE preparsdnsss mission.
Z. The Office of Energy Emeraency plans and Integrations
..~ . ~+..r.. ~..--? ----- - . - - _ -
the use of the Strategic petroleum Reserve and
strengthening commitments to the International Energy
7tgsncy and the North ~-tiantic Treaty Organization.
3. The Office of Ener Emer enc erationsc Ensures that
e v.S. nfrastsucture .e., ndustry~ state and local
govsrnmentc) is able to fleet national priorities in the
event of catastrophic and defense-related au-ezgenciss.
Sn the performance of its s:ission, OE'E draws apon the resources
and activities of other DOE offieec and also coordinates with
other government agencies and industry for energy emergency
planning and procedures. Its depicted in Fiquxe Z, a broad
spectrum of energy sa,ergeneiss..psacetime through Mar..involvs the
sesources of OEE. patuzal disasters, political disruption,
terrorism and sabotage have highest peacetime priority. Crisis
and wartime priorities involve energy emergency preparation for
ipObilization, conventional and nuclear Mar.
The way in which DOE responds to energy s~~9spudsetiandlvmost
general and operational planning, procsdu 5
important, hwnan resources. An effective crisis management system
requires an expsrienasd, mature, Mell trained staff that is
flexible enough Lo plan for and respond to a veristy of emergency
situations. The 71 professional and support staff ir- the current
organization of OEE include experts in oil, natural gas, electric
power and coal, as well as sconotnists, snginesrs, analysts,
computer programmers, data processors and administrative staff.
To bs =sally for an unexpected emergency, the staff receives, on a
continuing
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basis, advanced tiair-ing both in technical and managerial skill.
This emphasis on trsini.nq an4 preparation has the objective of
ensuring that DOE bas a selatively small, technically competent
staff that is well versed in energy crisis management policyy and
procedures and ii capable of rapidly responding to emergencies.
Many natural and man-made events can cause disruptions of the
domestic energy supply system. borne of these, such as equipment
failure or an act of vandalism, are routinely handled by industry,
while large regional problems, such as the aftermath of an
earthquake or potential multisits sabotage, may be serious enough
to require government coordination or assistance.
i
kultisite sabotage and terrorist incidents sepresent potential
threats in the united States. Korldwide, terrorism has been
rising about 10-15f a year. In the United 6tates, we have been
relatively fortunate because acts of sabotsge against our electric
power systems have r-ot reached levels of severity sufficient to
eauae a major sustained outage. ~iowever, some third world
countries have experienced substantial power system disruptions
te.q., E1 Salvador, Peru, Chile, Colombia, l~osambiqus, ~-fghanistan
and Guatemala).
Terrorist organizations else have attacked power facilities in
t~estern Europe. In the past, these attacks generally were poorly
designed an4 executed, but recent attacks by the same
organizations have shown a higher ltvel of technology and better
planning. This may portend ~aoze effective actions against power
~. systems in the future.
Energy-related terrorism in the United States would be a
particulsrly significant threat in a tiros of national defense
a+obilization. The Soviet Union has an unconventional warfare
capability (i.e., sQpetsnaz units) which has assigned missions to
cripple the 1~sst's industrial infrastzvcturs, pparticularly its
vuinezable energy systems,.pzior to an outbssak of hostilities.
While the fipetsnaz focus appears to be on postern Europe, the.
potential for such actions in the United States cannot be
dismissed. However, even in the absence of a superpower
confrontation, there is the possibility that potential third world
advezcaries could sponsor attacks on the energy infrastructure in
the United 6tates, and OEE is wprkinq with industry to mitigate
this problem.
lros~ an ta-ergency preparedness standpoint, OEE's first priority
effort is on the bulk electric power system which is vital to
economic and social stability and to national security. Electric
power is uniquely vulnerable because, unlike coal oz oil, it
cannot be stored and must be available at the instant of demand.
Over 225,000 miles of bulk power transmission lines..many
stretching over remote and unprotected areas..connect the Nation's
pourer plants to the distribution companies serving local
Consumers. J1lthough seldom the cause of a serious disruption to
supply, transmission lines have been the roost common targets for ~ ~
terrorist croups. Substations, moat of which also ors isolated
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and unprotected, az? particularly exposed. This problem is
exacsr aced because s-any ositiea oomponents cannot bt easily.
sepiaced, pith repair or replacement tis-es possibly sseasuzed in
Meeks or ~aonths .
The petroleum industry enjoys a high priority in ti.i. domestic
emergency preparedness polliey for coping Kith wlnerability. Its
major points of vulnerability are pipelines, refineries and
storage facilities. uvMever, both source and transportation
fiexibilitles tend to seduce the potential impacts of 4lsruptions
to petroleum supply. For example, crude oil and petroleum
psoducts can be purchased fsom other sources te.Q., imports} and
tzansporte4 by,several modes including Mater, rail and fuel trucks.
patural gas systems are particularly exposed Mith the most
vulnerable components being pipeline interconnections, river
crossings, compressor stations and city gate stations. The
natural gas transmission and distribution systems, consisting of
more than one million miles of pipeline, presents an extreaaely
complex set of targets. Dual fuel capacity in many industries
Mould mitigate, to some extent, the impacts of a ~aajor disruption
to the domestic supply of natural qaa.
Although coal supplies 25t of our energy, the dispersed nature
of the supply system makes it unlikely that even a large hostile
action could have a major national impact.
Ths DOE program of vulnerability reduction and mitigation consists
of four phases, as follows:
pha~ (DOE/Industry). In-house ease studies and simulations
to assess the vulnerabilities of candidate energy systemsr
Ph~sr (DOE/Industry}. Outreach to industry owners and
operators to advise of discovered vuinerab~litiss and to
obtain coopez~tiont
phase 3 (industry). Introspective vulnerability assessments
y systet~ owners and operators to determine enhancements
which may be in accordance Mith nonaai business objectives(
and
Phase 4 tSnteragency Group). Assessments of remaining
w rerabilities and 3udq?ments ss to Mhsther they constitute
an unacceptable risk to national security and, if so, the
nature and type of remedial actions which sc-ay be vazranted.
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The present status of our wirerability programs is ss lolloNSi
phase i phase Z Phas~3 Phase 4
Et3LRGY u es/ ooperation n ustry o2: ernment
SYSTEMS Sisavlations with industry 7-ctions Initiatives
o llectrie Done Done in progress
power tPILRC)
o Natural Done xn progress .. .
Gas ,
0 8etroleum Done Zn Progress ..
o Coal in progress
DOE utilises a gen?ralit?d emtrgency r?rponse process that
provides systematic decision-making in response to any energy
smezgency, whether in electric power, oil, gas or coal,- or in the
event of an international or domestic energy crisis. The Energy
Emergency Response 6ystem (FENS) is organised to assess the nature
and extent of an energy smezgency and, by drawing upon the total
support activities and expertise of DOE, to develop response
options. lesides establishing response procedures for each a-ajor
energy type, the GEMS process also is designed to sespond to ~
variety of possible emergency scenarios, such as an international
disruption in oil-supplies, defense mobilisation, major natural
disasters, energy system sabotage, or major accidents involving
?nergy systems.
Zn the draft DOE Order SS00.5, 'Energy Emergency Planr,inq and
Management". currently under Departmental revises !or concurrence,
the EEMS concept is de-fined and the policies and procedures for
administering the EEMS are clearly established as are the general
criteria for developing and coordinating DOE's energy eatergency
planning activities. 1-s the nonnuclear energy component of DOE's
overall Emergency Management System, the order describes the EEMS
organisational relationships and integrates its concept of
operations into the emergency processes of the Departanent. The
EEMS process has been successfully tested in several large scale
exercises.
The kay organizational component of SEMS is the l~ergy Emergency
~lanagament Team tEEMT), consisting of a cadre of dRpartmentai
experts and chaired by myself Tiqur? Z illustrates the EEMT
structure. 1-s DOE's principal internal ?nergy crisis management
body, the EEMT has met numerous times in recent months to provide
status briefings and projections tar the 6ecretary of Encrgy on
the likely ?nergy impacts of earthquake pipeline damage, the
Persian Guli USS Stark incident, oil tanker mining activities ofd
1CUwait, the Re ver washout of an oil pipeline in the M /
"1 ,~~Q
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?ovthwestern gnited !sates and, s-ost eurzsntiy, drought effects or-
the nation's ?nsrgy systems. in typical situation meetings, the
Sl.NiT is provided an up-to-data detailed in:nLiia~aclecso~a~ndations
analysis of .the ?nsrgy impact of the incid ,
for appropriate response actions.
The operational concept of EL)+iS is illustrated in !'iqure 4.
The continuum begins with routine monitoring of the energy
?ituation to 4stez~ains whether it is necessary to activate the
EEMT and the EEMS process. 1Qext, the ?ituation is analysed,
various rssponsa options considered, secom:c+endation made and
finally implemented. Each strocesstif itois noalongsrinecassary,
toz termination.oi the tEMS p
or rseyciinq if the smergsncy oontinuss.
In the ~bsencehofsaewarninq~cthe foilo++ingsohainpofesventsnwouidr
in the
b? set in motion.
1-ffected utilities would itmaediattly implement local curtailment
plans, begiincideat,aasesrovidednby fsderaltrequlation,ito~thsdDOE
~aorgeneyeOperatfons Center.
6 and Canada
NERC would notify other utilities throughout the U. .
of the incident, using its hotline. Ot~litiss would increase
-theilocaislawientorcem~ntspersonnslusandeprotsssionalisscvrityate
and
firms.
The report of an~incident of this ^,agnitude would trigger
activation of the Lnsrgy Emargsney Response System. 1- !ituation
i-nalysis would be performed by DOE in cooperation with utilities,
state goverrsments and fedezal agencies including yEM~-, the IiRC and
the !'BI. The DOE Energy !Sr-ergsncy Management Team would west to
assess the situation, as would the Snteragsncy Group on Energy
Vulnerability. The severity of this scenasio sugqgests a Mar or
pze-war situation. If that is tha oast, a Presidenend~d. pork on
declaration of a national emergency would be zecom~e
developing federal response options would begin.
public Infonaation aetivitiea on the incident would be initiated,
including:
_ o Drafte~c aapnd tuthorisinglactivation ofQthenNDERsaI
~r9 Y
p Develo ing public ?tats:e-snts and talking points for
~
spa esmen.
ksy D0
o Developing background papers and tact sheets
expiaininq DOE rssponsa saechanisms.
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esq.
o Coordinating public information activities with
other federal agencies, slats and local
govarnmsnts, and the utility industry.
o Responding to ~osdia requests for information and
interviews.
0 Holding or participating in press eontersnees.
o Responding to requests from Congqress for
information, brislings an4 hearings.
I-ftez a national emergency was declared, the President would
authorise tre gecretary of Energy to activate DOE's National
Defense Executive Reserves. The reservists would ti) relocate to
the appropriate Emergency Operating Csntersf tZl advise DOE
Headquarters of Damage to electric power facilities and
availability of power in the region/sub-regions t3) recommend
electric pourer curtailments as necessarys t~) recomn-and
sestoration priorities and monitor restoration works iS)
requisition a:sential equipment, fuels, material and supplies: and
t6) s?quest assistance from DOE Headquarter in obtaining
s-anpowez, pateriai, equipment, and fuels.
The Defsnse Department's plans for protecting koy energy nodes
would be implemented. The t~ationai Guard ar-d reserves would be
used to protect such facilities if necessary.
Under the Executive Wrench's isad agency concept, DOE would take
the isad for the ~sdsrai government. Overall, the sssponsss
developed and itapismented would into fall one of three eatsgoriss.
girst, responses to limited siectzieity supplies. 6uch responses
are primarily demand curtailment and implementing service
p=iorities refiectinq essential national security and state and
local needs. Xt should be noted that state energy plans do not
cursently consider essential national security reeds. decond,
reconatzuetion of the electric power transmission system.
Typical rssponss actions to limited sisctrieityY supplies and to
reconstruct transmission facilities are sum~aar3sed in Table 1
tattachsd).
Finally, responses addressir-g Other problems resulting iron the
incident, ?uch as physical security of key facilities, ensuring
?uDplies of fuel for the diessi gensrato.rs at the nuclear reactor
which is isoiste4 from the grid.
There is same concern regarding the disruption notification
process. DOE has no statutory authority to sequins sporting of
disruptions effecting national gas, petroleum or Coal. DOE
regulations require reporting of toajor electrical outages, but
reports are not always promptly received. Mlonitorinq of major
Mite servfces is used to help identify serious energy incidents.
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~q-
Turning to nuclear tsrrorista, tb? Department of En?r~y, 11953anis
to Lxscutiv? Order 11490, as amended by Exeevtiv Os er
assigned sesponsibility to participate in the conduct, Bisection,
and coordination of search and recovery operations for nuclear
material, weapons, oz devicsss to assist in the identification and
deactivation of improvised nuclear devices ISNDS) and/or
radiological dispersal devices t1tDDs)f and to render advice on
radiation and damage probabilities in the event of the detonation
of an SND. This authority complements and is in addition to the
Department's general authority under the lltomic Energy 1-et of
1954, as amended, and other generic legqislation to maintain a
technically based response capability in a state of readiness to
handle nuclear ~mergenei~s.
Thez? is a vasiety of actual or potential situations involving
nuclear materials which could lead to a DOE response. These
include:
o ~-ets of terrorism
o Extortion
o stolen material
o Lost or missing s-ateriai
o Dispersed material
o xateziai offered for sal? illegally
Countering nuclear threats requires tsamv+ork by federal, state,
and local agencies. The FBI has overall jurisdiction at the
federal level and is responsible for th? legal aspects of any
counterthreat actions taken. DOE bas the capability of providing
technical personnel and equipment to assist in locviees.
ehasaeterisinq, and neutrali:inq nuclear threat de
To provide appropriate technical assistanes proaaptiy, the pucleaz
Emergency Search Team tItEST},under the operational control of the
Manager, Nevada. Operations Office tNv}, has been created by DOE to
provide the capability to respond to these specialize4 r-uciear
emergencies. Many NEST capabilities are also applicable to
nonnvciear emergencies, and could be made available to assist the
Fai on a ease-by-case basis, as required.
IQE'ST personnel and equipment are prepared to:
1. Evaluate the credibility of a nuclear threat.
Z. 8eazch for a nuclear threat device or ssdioactivs
>p:teriai.
3. Identify the kind and Quantity of radioactive s+aterials
involved.
d. 7-ssess the psobability of nuclear explosive yield or
spread of radioactive nateriai.
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5. !-sses? the potential for personnel injurryy and property
damage in the went of ?etivation of a thrsat device.
6. 1-ssist in th? render saf? and disposal operations.
The reed for a specialised emergency respons? team such as NEST is
infrequent. Therefore, the majority of PEST personnel are
assigned to other tasks in their day-to-day work but semain
on'caii for a NEST activity as required. The majority of
personnel who have volunteered for NEST field assignments are
involved in other DOE nuclear progruas, especially the nuclear
weapons program. most of these pe rsonnel are from DOE/NV, Los
1-lamos National.Lsboratory {LJ-NL), Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory ILLNL),~>sandia ~tationai Laboratories t6NL), or EGiG/EM,
inc. Under an interagency cooperative agreement, Explosive
Ordance Disposal (EOD) experts from the Department of Defense
(DOD) will participate with DOE/NEST personnel in dealing with a
nuclear threat, when warranted by the nature of the problem.
The following outlines the appzoxisi,ate sequence of events in a
'classical" NEST scenarios
!'EI inforsas DOE/HQ that a nuclear throat has been received, and
provides the threat message together with any other available
pertinent information.
DOE/HQ/EOC passes the above information to the Cos@nunicated Threat
Coordination Center at LLNL which commences the threat aaseassAent
process.
EOC passes the same information to DOE/NV vhieh selays it to
appropriate members of the NEST Coimnunity.
If or when 3t appears possibi? that a deployment of NEST personnel
and equipment may be directed, ?ach 1QZST organisation is asked to
assume an alert posturef locate appropriate personnel and have
them stand by on-call! assemble appropriate equipment and prepare
it for shipx+ent~ maintain a cos~aunications watch so they can be
contacted an4 respond quickly if a deployment is ordered! etc.
Thin concludes my prepared tsstisaony. I will be happy to answer
your questions.
13
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OFFlCE OF THE DEPUIYASSISTANT SECRETARY
WR ENERGY EMER6ENClES
oeov~.Nra~ex~
mn
trewraexcuis
or~aF
e~crecY
~~
EyALI?'IION
? !'OLICY ~OORO~IIA110N
? }ip~~ ~II~YSIS
o~a~
e~crctr
~,,~,~
o?
? INTENNAI~ONAL ENERGY ? INIERAOG~Ef11NL L~ISGR
S6CIMa1Y PUNNING AND EAE~11lE E
? DOMESTIC ENEflGE EMER!' ? G~E~AZIa1S SI~'0~ AIN! eAfG
ItESPOIISE PLANINNG ~~IUIE~ANRIt~S
~,~,~Yr ,ryf,~~ MOeR~1lON ~ ~ONI~IRR
OF DOrFRNMENT
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IE126~4.017 IES2o2s Ssnuc:-z~ ':. `.
~Energr Emergency
G'w~ve
of
oocuaaE~
LEYEL OF EINERGEI~ICY SERIOUSNESS
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EEMT MEMBERSHIP
~`aRE GROUP
IN7'ERNA'110NALAFFAlRS
AND ENERGY EMERGEN
CONGRESSIONAL,
GOVERNMENTAL AND
PU6LIC AFFAIRS _
GEr1ERAti COtlNSEL
DEFENSE PROGRAMS
ENERGY INFORMATION
ADMNS'T'RAT10N
MANAGEME~' AND AO~NIN-~
ISTRATiON
POLICY, PLANNING AND
ANALYSIS
OFFICE OF THE UNDER
SECRETARY
AuG~aENi GROUP
PETROLEUM RESERVES
FOSSIL. ENERGY .(OTHER
TFIAN PRj
Nt~CLEJ~IR ENERGY
CONSERVATIOI~t AND
RENEIIYABL~ ENERGY
ENIIIROIMAENT, S-AIcE.1rY,
AND HEALTH
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Energy Eneergre?cy :i[anagement
System: Simplified Diagram
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STAT
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STATFN~NT OF
THE HONORABLE GEORGE WOLOSITYP!
ASgICIATE DIRECTOR
NATIOrJAL PREPAREDNESS DIRECTORATE
?- FEDERAL EMERGE~JCY t~APIAf~EMENT AC~PJCY
BEFORE
THF_ SUBCOPIMITTEE ON TECHP~lOLOGY ANP, THE LAW
OF THE COr1f~ITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SE!JATE
SEPTEMBER 15, 1988
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MR. CHAIRMAN, IT IS A PLEASURE TO APPEAR BEFORE YOUR COMN!ITTEE TO DISCUSS
THE ISSUE OF POTENTIAL TERRORIST EXPLOITATIOrJ OF TECHNOLOGY TO ATTACK THIS
COUPJTRY AND H06J THE ADMIlJISTRATIOPJ WOULD DEAL tJITH THESE TYPES OF TERRORIST
INCIDENTS.
THE PRINCIPAL FOCUS O` MY TFSTIMnNY WILL BF_ ON FEMA'S RESPONSIBILITY
IN PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO THE COrJSE9UEPICES OF MAJOR TERRORIST ATTACKS
ON THE UNITED STATES USING SOPHISTICATED TECHNOLOGIES. THE ADP1IlJ1STRATION'S
RESPONSE TO THE THREAT OF TECHNOLOGICAL TERRORISM IS FOCUSED IN THE INTER-
DEPARTMENTAL r,ROUP ON TERRORISM (IGIT), WHICH IS CHAIRED RY L. PAUL BREPIER,
III, AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
THREE .LEAD AGENCY ASSIGPlP~rJTS ARE IN PLACE FOR r14NAGING TERRORIST IrJCIDENTs
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATF_ FOR INCIDENTS OCCURRING OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES;
THE DEPARTMENT ff JUSTICE (FBI) FOR INCIDENTS WITHIN THE UrJITED STATES;
AND THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATIO"J
FOR HIJACKED AIRCRAFT I~~~ FLIGHT.
UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 12148, FEr1A HAS BEEN DELEGATED THE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CORRDINATION OF PREPAREDNESS ArJD PLANNIrJG TO REDUCE
THE COrJSEC~UENCES CF MAJOR TERRORIST INCIDENTS WITHIN THE UNITED STATES.
FEMA IS rJOT AN INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AGENCY AND MAINTAINS NO INTELLIGENCE
FILES. wF II~PFrJD UPON THOSE Ar,ENCIES t~NICH HAVE A LEGAL CHARTER TO COLLECT
AtJD DISSE~1Ir1ATE Ir~TELLIrEtiCE. WE AR lJOT A LAID ErJFORCEMENT AGErJCY AlJD DO
NOT COORDIr1ATE Ar1Y LAW ErJFORCEr1ErJT PLArJS. FEMA RESARDS COPISE~IIENCES OF
TERROR I Sf~ AS SIMILAR TO COPJSE(JUENCES OF OTHER TYPES OF LARGE SCALE
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. -2-
CATASTROPHIC EVF_NTS OR EXTRAORDINARY SITUATIONS. THE SAr~1E NEEDS MAY EXIST,
E.G. h'FDICAL CARE, FOOD, SHELTER, EVACIIATION, ETC., APJD THE SAID RFSPOPJSES
APJD CAPABILITIES ARE CALLED FOR; COORDINATION, EMERGENCY OPERATING CENTERS,
ANn Er~tERf,FNCY RESPONSE CAPABILITY.
FEMA ~iAS h14DE IMP(IR,TAPJT AND VISIBLE STRIDES IN IMPROVING THE CAPABILITY
OF THE FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES, TO RESPOND TO MAJOR EMERGENCIES OR
EXTRAORDI~JARY SITUATIONS. FEMA HAS HELPED DEVELOP PLANS, COMMUNICP,TIONS
SYSTEMS, RESP~PISE TEAr1S, INTERAGENCY PROCEDURES, AND TRAINING FOR ALL LEVELS
(~ fr1VERC~1r~NT.
F~'1A HAS ASSISTED T4F_ DOr?STIC PnLICY COUNCIL IN DEVELOPING THE NATIONAL
SYSTEM FOR Er~ERGENCY COORDINATION (NSEC), WHICH IS A MECHAUISM FOR ENSURING
THAT THE FEDF_RAL r,OVERNr1ENT PROVIDES TIMELY, EFFECTIVE, AND COORDINATED
ASSISTA~JCE TO STATES APJD LOCAL GOVERtJMENTS IN EXTREME CATASTROPHIC TECHNOLOGICAL,
NATURAL OR OTHER D0~IESTIC DISASTERS (~ NATIONAL SIGNIFICArJCE. RESPONSIBILITIES
CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO .FEDERAL DEPARTMEtTS AND AGENCIES BY STATUTE OR OTHER
AUTI~ORITY, AND EXISTING EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND CAPABILITIES, ARE
AN INTEGRAL PART OF THIS RESPONSE SYSTEM AND WILL BE USED ti11IEN POSSIBLE.
IN CONJUNCTI~rI kJITH rJSEC, THE ASSISTANT To THE PRESIDErJT FOR PJ,ATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS HAS ASKED THE DIRECTOR OF FEf~A TO DEVELOP A rATIONAL SECURITY Er~ERGENCY
PLAP( IIITH A FIJNCTIOrJALLY-ORIENTED STRUCTURE AS A COP~PAIdIOtJ APPR(lAC1i TO FIATIOriAL
SECURITY EP?ERGENCIFS? THIS WILL ASSURE A CONSISTENT RESPONSE RY THE FEDERAL
GOVERrIr~FP~1T REGARDLESS ~ THE PJATIIRE OF A1J EMERGENCY APJD I~~ILL ELIMIr~IATE THE
PJEFD TO CHntJr,E RFSPn1SE MECHAIJISMS IN THE M1IDST OF A CRISIS.
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_ ~ _
FUNCTIONAL GROUPS WILL BE ESTABLISHED AT THE NATIONAL AND, AS APPROPRIATE,
REGIONAL/FIELD LEVELS IN THE AREAS OF: ECOrIOMICS, ENERGY, HUMAN SERVICES, LEGAL
AND, LAW EJ+~ORCEMENT, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, AND TRArJSPORTATION. ADDITIONAL
FUNCTIONAL GROUPS 1~Y RE ESTABLISHED WHEN APPROPRIATE. EACH FUNCTIONAL GROUP
WILL BE CHAIRED RY A-LEAD DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY WHICH WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR
IDENTIFYIt`IG GROUP P~1EMBFRS, EMERGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES, OPERATIPJG PROCEDURES AND
EMERGENCY ACTIONS, AND FOR COORDINATING ITS EMERGENCY RESPONSE ACTIVITIES WITH
THOSE CF OTHER FIJPJCTIO~JAL GROUPS. IN ADDITION, THE PLAhJ WILL INCLUDE PROVISIONS
FOR THE PRESIDENT TO DESIGNATE LEADERSHIP RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATING THE
OVERALL FEDERAL RESPONSE.
ANOTHER EXAf~PLF IS THE DEVELOPPIENT OF THE FEDERAL RADIOLOGICAL E('1ERGE~~!CY PLAN
(FRERP). FEMA SERVED AS OVERALL COORDIrJATOR IPJ DEVELOPIhJG THIS PL4N.
THIS .JOINT I~JDFRTAKING fF ALL THE AGEPJCIES, WHICH WOULn RESPONn TO AP~Y
INCIDENT ICNOLVIPJG RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS, INCLUDING NUCLEAR TERRORISI~1,
CIILMINATFD Ihl t'aJP~EROUS P1AJOR FIELD EXERCISES, SOME INVOLVI"JG APPROXI~"ATELY
2,000 FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL AND PRIVATE SECTOR PERSOhJNEL. THESE EXERCISES
HAVE DEr~ONSTRATEn THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A FEDERAL RESP(?hJSE IN SUPPORT OF
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND THE ABILITY OF ALL RESPONDERS TO WORK
TOGETHER.
AIJOTHFR h~AJJQ STEP 6~AS THE CAPA6ILITY FEMA DEVELOPED I~~ RESPONSE TO t~HITE HOUSE
TASKING IIJ COORDIrJATIOrI 4~JITH OTHER FEDERAL ArENCIES FOR PLANNIrJG AND RESPONDING
TO POTE~~ITIAL CATASTROPHIC EMERGF~ICIES AT .THE 1gS4 SUf1~~ER OLYMPICS. THE PLAN h-AS
TITLED, "A NATIO~JAL CONTIrJGENCY PLOW FOR RESPONDING TO THE CONSEQUENCES- OF
AIJ EXTRAORDIF~!ARY SIT~1,gTI0f`J AT SPECIAL EVENTS." THIS NATIONAL CONTINGEPICY
PLAN OUTLIsJES H0~?! FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGERJCIES MOULD RESPOND TO THF_
COt`1SEn!IF_hJCES 0= A"~! EXTR.AORDI~JARY SITUATIOhI OR A~J EP~FRGFrICY THAT COULD THREATE~J
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THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY DURING SPECIAL EVENTS.. THIS PLAN WAS ALA
IMPLEMEPJTED AGAIN DURING THE FOLLOWING SPECIAL EVENTS;
? 1984 NEW ORLEANS WORLD'S FAIR
? 1984 APJD 1988 REPUBLICAN AND DE~?1nCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTIOPJS
? 1985 PRESIDENTIAL INAUGURATION
? 1987 PAN Af~1ERICAN GAMES
THE PIITIGATION ~ A~JD/OP, RLSPnNSE TO THE THREAT of HIGH TECHNOLOGY TERRORISM
AS OUTLINED IN YOl1R ILLUSTRATIVE SCENARIOS REQUIRES THE EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE
OF A SET OF I~~TEGRATED FUNCTIONS BY LOCAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL LEVELS OF
GOVERNP~ENT. AT EACH LEVEL OF GOVERIJNEPJT, MULTIPLE AGENCIES I'IAY EACH PERFORNt
SEVERAL nI STINGY PREVENTION/RESPONSE F~1rICTIOPJS. SOME OF THESE FUNCTIn~!S
ARE LARr,ELY OR ENTIRELY A STATE OR LOCAL PREROGATIVE AND RESPONSIBILITY.
OTHER FUNCTIONS ARE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF AND ARE PERFOR~~IED LARGELY BY
FEDERAL AGENCIES. YET OTHERS ARE PERFORh1ED JOINTLY BY STATE A~JD
FEDERAL Af,E~JCIES (OR LARGELY, PERHAPS FPJTIRELY, 13Y FEDERAL AGENCIES I'J
INSTANCES WHERE THERE IS A PRESIDENTIAL DISASTER DFCLARATIOPJ.
IF A ~~JOR TERRORIST EVFIJT OCCURS AS STATED IIJ YOUR THREE SCENARIOS, FEMA
WILL WORK WITH FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND THE
PRIVATE SECTOR IN RESPONDING TO, AND RECOVERINf, FROM THE CONSEOUEIJCES OF
ALL TYPES OF EXTRAORDINARY SITUATIOPJS, INCLUDING TERRORIST INCIDENTS.
O~IR PLA~dS (.AI_L FnR THE ESTARLISN~'ENT OF A FEDERAL RESPONSE CEP!TER AND
JOIPJT IhJFORf~ATIOPJ CENTF_R IIJ, OR NEAR, THE AFFECTED AREAS AND TO SUPPORT
THESE rIFI_n OPERATIONS !JITH EXISTING EPIERGEEJCY OPERATIr!G CEP!TERS AND
IhJFORf'~TION SYSTEh?S TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE.
AS PART OF A C~nROIr~IATFD FEDERAL RESPONSE TU A M!AJnR TER~IRIST IIJCIDENT, FEf~1A
'rdOULD DEPLOY A~J Ff~1FRGEPJCY RESPONSE TEAP1 (ERT) TO THE SCENE, LED BY A SENIOR
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FEMA OFFICIAL (SFO). THE ERT WILL BE SUPPORTED BY ArJ EI'~'ERGENCY SUPPORT
TEAM (EST) HEADED RY AN EST DIRECTOR. THE EST WILL OPERATE FROh1 THE FEP~A
EMERGENCY INFORMAATION AND COORDINATION CENTER (EICC) IN THE FEMA HEADQUARTERS
IN IJASH INGTOrI, D.C. THE SFO WILL BE APPOINTED BY THE DIRECTOR, FEMA,
AND WILL COMMUNICATE- AND PROVIllE IIJFORP~ATION AND REPORTS THROUGH THE EST
USING THE OPERATIOrJAL FACILITIES OF-FEMA.
TO SUPPORT THE SFO AND THE FEDERAL RESPONSE CENTER, FE1~A HAS DEVELOPED AN
INTEGRAT>=D NATIONAL EMERGENCY MArJAGEMENT SYSTEM (HEMS) THAT IS CAPABLE OF
SUPPORTING THE FULL RANGE OF IrdFORP~IATION RE9UIREMENTS IN EVERY PHASE AND
TYPE OF ACTIVITY ASSOCIATED WITH EMERGENCY MIANAC~EP'ENT. NEMS PROVIDES AN
OVERALL NATIONWIDE CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT EMERGENCY MIANAGEh'ENT DECISIOrJ
MAKING AT THE NIG!~FST LEVELS OF c~JVERNME~!T THROU(~i VARIOUS INFORMATION
PROCESSING AND COMr1UNICATION NETW!7RKS AS EMERGENCY SITUATIOrJS DICTATE.
IT ALSO PR(IVInES FOR Ii~1TERCONiIECTIVITY WITH SYSTEMS OF THE l-JHITF_ HOIJSE,
DEPARTPIENT OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFErISE, CIA AND OTHER FEDERAL, -STATE
AtJD LOCAL SYSTEPIS HAVItJG NATIO~l.AL FMERGFr!CY FUNCTIONS. IT CnrJSISTS OF THE
PHYSICAL FACILITIES, TELECOMfJUNICATIONS, AND ItJFORr~ATION SYSTEMS REQUIRED
FOR FEMA'S VITAL MANAGEP1EIdT MISSION. IIJITIAL TELECOMMUrJICATIONS SlIPFI)RT
WILL CONSIST OF FEMA'S FIXED AND MpBILE CAPABILITIES.
AS PART OF OUR MCIRILIZATIO'J PREPARFD,IESS, RESOIIRCES A~SFSSMEr,IT EFFORTS, FEMA
WORKS CLOSELY KITH OTHER DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES IN THE DEVELOPP?ENT AND
SHARI~JG OF S1ERr,F-~CY ~1A~IAGE~~EPJT DATA RASES AND AUTOMATED P~lDELING CAPABILITY
WHICN SIIPPORT INDUSTRIAL P'~BILIZATION PLANNING. DURING 1988, FE(~A SPOrJSORED
T!~l PATA BASE A-JD MODFLIr,1G -JORKS~iOPS TO PROr-~1TF_ r,LOSER RELATIOrJS!-LIPS Ai~1NG
F_r~RC,ENCY MANAGE~'ENT ORGANIl_ATIOrJS ICJ THE FEDERAL STRIICTURE AND THE CIVIL SECTOR.
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THIS DATA I S USED TO ASSIST EMERGENCY MANAGERS TO F'qN ITOR OUR STATE OF
READINESS AIJD TO ASSURE CONTIhIIIF_D PRODUCTIOtJ CAPARILITY IN A NATIONAL
SECURITY EMERGENCY. IT IS ALSO USED TO DEVELOP PROJECTIONS, ANALYSIS,
AND OPTIONS TO SUPPORT THE DECISI0~1-PIAYING PROCESS FOR POLICIES AND PROGRAMS
To AVAIL ESSENTIAL RESOURCES FOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN MpBILIZATION NEEDS IN
MAJOR Tl(1NFSTIC~ DISASTERS ANT) NATIONAL SECURITY EMERGENCY SITUATIONS. IN THE
EVEIJT OF TERRORIST ACTS, RESIILTItdG IN A DISRUPTION ON A POTENTIAL PORTION
OF NEW Yf1RK CITY'S "HI(~II TE'JSION ELECTRIC POWER GRID", FEMA IJOIILD RE ABLE,
USING THE INTEGRATED EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ItJFORMATION SYSTEM (IEMIS) ANO
THE INTF_GR4TE(1 PANAGEMENT AND ECONOr~IC A"JD ANALYSIS SYSTEM (It?'EASY), TO
DEVELOP AtJD DISPLAY MAPPING, GRAPHICS AND ANALYTICAL DATA IDENTIFICATIOPJ
OF INDUSTRIAL r.~PACITY LOST AND THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE WITHOUT PO!-!F_R. IF THE
~ISRUPTIOh1 SHOULD LAST FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TINE, FEMA WOULD RE
ARLF_ TO IDENTIFY SUPF~IRT, I.E., NEAT, FOOD, WATER, THE AFFECTED POPULATION
~JF.EDS.
E.O. 1?.1~;8 NAS GIVEIJ THE DIRECTOR OF FEP1A THE MANDATE TO PROVIDE A SIr1GLE
SOURCE TO tJHICH T1IE PRESIDENT CAN TURN FOR REPORTS OF THE DAMAGE IIJCURRED,
THE RESOURCES AVAILABLE T~~ RESPOIJD, AND THE RELIFJ= ACTIONS UNDERWAY FOLLOIJING
A MAJOR TERRORIST INCIDENT.
LET ~ TllRT~ t~blJ TO ~MF_ OF THE OTHER THINGS FEMA IS DOING TO Er,~NAf~1r,E THE NATION'S
CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIGH-TECHNOLOGY TERRORIST.
IhiTFRAr,FNCY hIICLF~!R RIOT nGICAL API1~ CHFr1ICAL TERRORISM RFSPrl1JSF PLA~1hJING
FFf~1A IS A f'Eh1BER OF THE NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL -AND CHEh~ICAL, (NBC) WOR~3Y LOOKIrJG AT
INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEr?S IN TERP~S OF THEIR wLrJF_RARILITY Tn A REGIONAL
OR NATIONAL LEVEL OUTAGES. TOWARD THIS END, FEMA HAS HELPED SPONSOR THE
DEVELOPF'E.NT OF rnr?PUTER-AIDED DELPHI ~~THODOLnc;IES THAT CAN I3E USED To
MITIGATE THESE KIND OF DISRUPTIONS.
OTHER Ir,-TERAGF~~CY AND JOINT I"JDUSTRY-(~OVFRIJMFIJT ACTIVITIES
THE WORK OF SEVERAL OTHER ItiITERAGENCY A!JD JOIh1T INDUSTRY-GOVERNNEMT GROUPS
CURRF~JTLY ADDRESSING P~RII_IZATIOt! ISS!JES A"1D PR~RLEN!S f'~AY HAVE SIGPJIFIC,AtJCE
Ind TERRORIST IrJCIDENTS !KITH NATIONAL Ir?PACT.
THE rJATIDNAI_ r~ORILIZATIOrJ INTERAr,ErJCY GROUP (Ur~IG) IS PART OF THE CURRENT
IhJTERAr,E!JCY NATIONAL SECURITY EI~'ERGEFICY PREPAREDNESS SYSTEP?. THE Nr~I G I S
COrgPOSFD OF RFPRESEr~1TATIVES AT THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY LEVEL FROh? THE MAJOR
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DEPARTMENT AND AGENCIES IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNh'ENT THAT WOULD HAVE A
SI~IIFICANT RnLF IN RESPOPlDING TO A SCENARIO (~ EVENTS LIKE A MAJOR ELECTRIC
POWER OUTAGE.
THE NMIG CONTAINS VARIOUS SUBGROUPS tJHICN ADnRESS SPF_CIFIC.ISS~JES WITyIRJ
THE MOBILIZATION ARENA: 1) THE ECONOMIC AFFAIRS SUBGROUP DEALS tJITH THE
ECONOMIC AND FINA~~lCIAL POLICY ASPECTS OF A MOBILIZATION; 2) THE MOBILIZATION
READINESS SUBGROUP ADDRESSES POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR h'IOBILIZING U.S.
IN1)IISTRY DIlRIh1O AN EP1ER(~ENCY; 3) THE STANDBY AUTHORITIES SUBGROUP EXAMINES
EMERGENCY AUTHORITIES NEEDED FOR A NATIONAL SECURITY EMERGENCY; AND 4) THE
ORGANI7ATIONAL Ih1PLEMF_NTATION SUBGROUP ADDRESSES WAYS TO EFFECTIVELY ORGArJIZE
THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO EMERGENCIES.
IN JA~~UARY, 19R6, A JOIIdT Ih1DliSTRY GrIVER~INENT WORKING GROUP WAS ESTABLISHED
TO LOOK AT IP~PORTANT ISSUES IN TELEC011P~1UNICATIONS INDUSTRY MOBILIZATION (TIF1>.
THE TIM GROi1P IS COMPRISED OF REPRFSF_NTATIVES FROh1 TELECOPIMUNICATIONS
MANUFACTURERS AND CARRIERS AND OF GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE
DEPARThftJT OF COt~~MFRCE, nFFEtdSF A~JD JUSTICE, THE GENERAL SERVICES ADP~INISTRATIOPJ
AND FEMA. THE GROUP IS CO-CHAIRED BY THE NATIONAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEM AND
THE TELECOMMUrJICATIOrJS IPJIIUSTRY.
FOR THE PAST YEAR, THE TIM GROUP HAS FOCUSED ON SEVEN ISSUES:
? PFRSO^JI:~FL STATUS, PROTECTION, AND RELOCATIOrI
? P~~AI"JTE~IANCE DF STOCKPILES ANn INVEt~JTORIES
? 1~PFNDENCF Or! FOREIGN SUIIRCES
? GOVERNMEPJT AND INDUSTRY ('ORILIZATION MANAGEMENT STRUCTURF_
? T)FPENIIE~~.!CF_ ON OTHER U~FRASTRUCTIIRE SYSTE~'!S
(ELECTRICITY, TRAPJS?ORTATION, ETC.)
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? TELECOMMUtJICATIOPJS SERVICE SURGE REQUIREMENTS
? J1IRISDICTIO~aAL ISSUES (FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL)
FINAL REPORTS ON THE FIRST FOUR ISSUE AREAS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED AND WORK IS
CONTINUIPJG OrJ THE LAST THREE ISSUE AREAS.
IN LATE JUNE, FEMA HOSTED AN INTERAGENCY ~'EETING ON PREPAREDNESS FOR WATER
SUPPLY EMERGENCIES WITH THE U.S. ARMY CORP OF ELJGINEERS (USACOE), EPJVIROt~INENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY (EPA), DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (D(1E), AND THE U.S. GEOLOGICAL
S1IRVEY (USGS). THE MEETING WAS REAUESTED RY THE WATER, SCIENCE AND TECH~!OLOGY
BOARD OF THE NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL. THE .MEETING FOCUSED ON THE
VULNERABILITY OF PUBLIC WATER SUPPLY SYSTEMS AND THE NEF~ TO IMPROVE O~1R
PREPAREDNESS FOR~RESPONDING TO DISRUPTIVE EMERGENCIES AND ON NATIONAL SECURITY
EMFRr,ErdCIFS AND THE RESPECTIVE DEPARTMErJTS AND Ac~ENCIES ROLES AND
RFSPOrJSIRILITIES. WF ARE WORKING CLOSELY WITH THESE AGENCIES AND THE COUNCIL'S
Wp,TFR SCIF_~lCE A~JD TECHr~OLOGY BOARD TO PURSUE WATER PLANNIt~1C tJITHIN THE COrJTEXT OF
NATIONAL SECURITY EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS.
HAVING hftdTIONED HOW WE DEAL WITH TiIE PHYSICAL CONSE(JUENCES OF TERRORISMi
WE IJOULD LIKE TO NOTE FEMA'S INVOLVEMEPJT WITH THE DEPARTMEtJT OF DEFENSE'S
KEY ASSET PROTECTION PROGRAt~ (KAPP). THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS PROGRAM IS TO
DEVELOP AtJD PROt'OTE THE SECURITY OF KEY ASSETS WITHIN THE U.S. TERRITORIES
AhID POSSESSIO~is RY PROVIDING To THE OIJf?~ERS OR ~'~~JAGERS OF SUCH ASSETS
APPROPRIATE ADVICF_, GUIDA~JCE A"JD PLANNING ASSISTANCE CONCERwING THE
APPLICATION OF PHYSICAL SECURITY ArID Et~1ERr,EIJCY PREPAREDNESS t-'F4SURF_S. THE
PURPOSE OF SUCH ASSISTANCE IS TO ENCnURAGE Ot~IERS AND CIVIL LAW EPJFORCEF'ENT
AGF_."!CIEs TO PROTECT KEY ASSETS FROM SAROTAOE, ESPIOIJAC,E, AND OTHER HOSTILE
OR DESTRUCTIVE ACTS, A~1D TO MIPdIMI7_E TNF EFFECT OF ATTACK DAMAGE.
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IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PROGRAM INCLUDING THE COMPILATION OF THE KEY ASSET
LIST HAS BEEN DELEGATED TO THE U. S. FORCES COMMAND (FORSCOP1) AT FORT
P1CPHERSON, GA. WE NOTE THAT MILITARY FACILITIES ARE RIOT INCLUDED OPJ THE LIST.
PROTECTION OF THESE FACILITIES IS THE RFSP(1~1SIBILITY OF THE RESPECTIVE MILITARY
COMMANDERS. -
FEP~1A'S INVOLVEMENT IN THIS PROGRAM STEMS FROM A h1EMORA"JDUP1 OF AGREEMEtIT SIGPJED
AUGUST 15, 1988, IN WHICH FEMA HAS AGREED TO COORDIEJATE P10h1IP1ATIONS FOR THE
KEY ASSET LIST FROM OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES AND PROVIDE THIS INPUT TO FORSCOt1.
AS A RELATED MATTER, WE WOULD LIKE TO CALL YOUR ATTENTION TO A LETTER THE
DIRECTOR FORWARDED TO THE ATTORt1EY GENERAL J!JLY 26, 1988, CALLIrJG HIS
ATTENTION TO TNE._SHIFT IN PHYSICAL SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES CONTAItdED
IN THE REVISED E. 0. 11490, A~!D RECOMMENDING THAT DFPARTI"JrNT OF JUSTICE
(DOJ) CHAIR AN INTERAGENCY GROUP 4~ITH PLANNING/OVERSIGHT RESPONSIBILITY
FOR THE ASSET PROTECTION- PROGRAM. nJJ HAS SIIRSEQUENTLY COPICURRFD < ITH
THIS RECOh1h'ENDATIOtJ AhJD DF_LEGATED THE RESPONSIBILITY TO THE FBI..
WITH RESPECT TO DEALIFJG WITH THE PHYSICAL CONSE(1UFNCES OF TERRr)RISO,
TITLE I OF THE DEFENSE PRODUCTIOPJ ACT, PRIORITIES SUPPORT CAN BE
AUTHORIZED TO OBTAIN THE NEEDED PIATERIALS AND Er7UIPP'EUT TO HELP RESTORE
THE ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM AND TO PRIORITIZE AND ALLOCATE DELIVERY OF
P0~1ER TO 3lEFEPJSE AhID ESSENTIAL CIVIL USERS.
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~JATIONAL FNERf,ENCY TRAINING CEPJTER (NETC)
NETC SERVES AS A NATIONAL FOCAL POIIJT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND DELIVERY OF
EMERGENCY MAPlGEMENT TRAINING TO ENHANCE EMERGENCY CAPABILITIES OF FEDERAL,
STATE, AND 1DCAL ~JVERNME~lTS AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR. THE NETC CAr1PUS OFFERS
A UNIf~UE OPPORTUNITY TO BRING TOGETHER SENIOR EXPERTS FROM THE U.S. AND
ARROAII Trl EXA!~1INE CRITICAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROBLEr~S. THIS SHARING OF
INFORr1ATION ArJD oPERATIPIG PRACTICES BETWEEN THE LAw ENFORCEWENT COMMUNITY
(FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL), THE FIRE SERVICES, Eh1ERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES
AND CIVIL E~IFRGENCY PLANEJERS IS PARTICULARLY GERMANE TO CATASTROPHIC
CONSE(~UENCES OF A TERRORIST ACT. OF PARTICULAR PJOTE IN OUR TRAINING WORK
IS THE OPPORTUNITY FOR PRACTICAL EXERCISES (CONSE9UENCES OF TERRORISM,
HAZARDOUS P'ATERI,ALS, NUCLEAR POIJER PLANT INCIDENTS, ETC.) STRF_SSING NOW
VARIOUS EhERGENCY r'~NAGEMENT SPECIALITIES AND LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT AND THE
PRIVATE SECTOR CA~J AND SHOULD !~10RK TOGETHER.
IN CLOSING, FEMA'S AUTHORITIES HAVE PROVIDED A STRONG BASIS FOR THE
AGFt'JCY'S ACTIVITIES TO PLAN FOR, RESPOND T0, AND CO'.1RDIIJATE EFFORTS To
MITIGATE THE CONSEt~UENCES OF A CATASTROPHIC TERRORIST INCIDENT. THE
AGE~,!CY'S RESPONSIBILITIES IN r~1nRILIZATION PLANNING IN RESPONSE AND
ASSISTANCE TO VICTIh1S OF DISASTERS AND IN THE BUILDING OF EMERGENCY
h1AIJAC~F!"FNT CAPABILITIES AT ALL LF_VELS ARE Ir~PORTAIdT EL.ErAENTS IIJ THE
NATIOFJ'S ABILITY TO DEAL ~JITH THE CO~~JSEOUENCES OF TERRORISM.
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