DEEP ATTACK IN DEFENSE OF CENTRAL EUROPE: IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00155R000500030027-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 27
• Content Type: REPORT

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3
DEEP ATTACK IN DEFENSE OF
CENTRAL EUROPE:
IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGY
AND DOCTRINE
by
John R. Landry
Colonel, US Army
Malcolm B. Armstrong
Colonel, US Air Force
Howell M. Estes III
Colonel, US Air Force
Wesley K. Clark
Lieutenant Colonel, US Army
Boyd D. Sutton
Central Intelligence Agency
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Colonel John R. Landry, US Army, has command and staff
experience in Europe, including an assignment as Special Assistant
to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. Colonel Malcolm B.
Armstrong, US Air Force, has served primarily in Europe with
forces committed to NATO. Colonel Howell M. Estes III, US Air
Force, has extensive experience in Europe, including a tour at HQ
US Air Forces Europe. Lieutenant Colonel Wesley K. Clark, US
Army, has served in various locations, including Germany, and as
Assistant Executive Officer to the Supreme Allied Commander, Eu-
rope. Boyd D. Sutton, Central Intelligence Agency, has specialized
in Soviet and European military subjects for most of his career. All
five authors are 1983 graduates of the National War College.
INTRODUCTION
In 1967, NATO's nations formally adopted the Flexible Response
strategy and thus acceded to a long-held US view that deterring Soviet
aggression requires strong conventional forces. Notwithstanding the bit-
terness and divisiveness of that decision, Alliance nations committed
themselves to a series of ambitious defense programs to implement it.
Execution of those programs has been neither uniform nor complete. But
they have yielded a remarkable improvement in NATO's conventional
forward defenses. In an absolute sense, Alliance forces are stronger to-
day than at any time in their history.
But although Alliance forces have never been stronger, concern for
NATO's ability to deter aggression has never been greater. The relentless
pace of the Soviet buildup, both in terms of added force structure and
improved armaments, outmatched Alliance defense efforts throughout
the seventies. By the end of the decade, many analysts questioned wheth-
er existing defense programs were likely to produce a conventional de-
fense equal to the needs of the Flexible Response. At the same time, few
suggested that increased reliance on nuclear weapons made any sense,
particularly in view of substantial Soviet strategic and theater nuclear
force gains.
Even so, many Western defense analysts and government officials
are optimistic that the Alliance can yet provide for a conventional
defense sufficiently strong to make credible the Alliance's deterrent
strategy. The source of this optimism is what are generally labeled Deep
Attack concepts. These concepts reflect a renewed faith in the superiority
of Western technology and the ability of NATO's forces to adapt tech-
nology to their tactical and strategic advantage. Emerging Deep Attack
technologies?capabilities to locate, target, and destroy or delay enemy
forces well forward of the line of contact?are believed to offer NATO
an opportunity to offset quantitative superiority of Warsaw Treaty
Organization (WTO) conventional forces.* Armed with such
*Integration of doctrine, technology, and force structure are discussed un-
der "Doctrinal Implications of Deep Attack Concepts." The key weapon de-
velopment programs and the timelines for their availability are discussed in
appendix A; cost implications are treated in appendix B.
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Deep Attack
capabilities?some of which exist now?and employing appropriate doc-
trinal and procedural modifications, NATO's forces are thought to be
capable of preventing the Soviets from breaking through Alliance for-
ward defenses.
While generating optimism and intense interest in various technolo-
gies, Deep Attack concepts have also raised a number of issues. Many
analysts, especially in Europe, question whether and how Deep Attack
concepts will restore credibility to NATO's Flexible Response strategy.
Some also question the wisdom of strengthening conventional capabil-
ities; they see it as a move away from reliance on the nuclear deterrent
that has provided for peace in Europe. In addition, whether potential So-
viet responses to NATO's adoption of Deep Attack could enable the
WTO to offset the new doctrine and weapons capabilities is not at all
clear.
Deep Attack concepts have also raised doctrinal issues. The most
fundamental question concerns the relationship between the objectives of
Deep Attack and the scheme of ground maneuver. Another question
concerns US and Allied views on allocation of airpower and procedures
for air-ground coordination.
This essay addresses those issues by attempting to answer three
questions. First, how can Deep Attack concepts be used to reinforce
NATO's ability to deter aggression in Europe, or to improve NATO's
chances for successfully implementing its strategy should deterrence fail?
Second, how should US and NATO planners address the doctrinal and
procedural issues that must be resolved if Deep Attack concepts are to be
implemented? Finally, how will the Soviets respond to Deep Attack con-
cepts, and how will their response affect the concepts' viability?
WHAT IS DEEP ATTACK?
Deep Attack concepts emerged from the interaction of three related
but distinctly different influences: NATO concerns with the unrelenting
buildup of WTO conventional forces in Central Europe since the late six-
ties; dissatisfaction with a defense doctrine widely regarded within the
US Army as excessively reactive; and emergence of technologies that of-
fer the potential for substantially better target acquisition and more
lethal conventional weapons.
Deep Attack
The outline of Soviet operational strategy in Central Europe has
been clear for at least a decade. That strategy seeks a quick penetration
of NATO's forward defenses and a rapid advance into the strategic
depths of Alliance territory. The Soviet goal is lo foreslali I lill
zation and reinforcement from the United States and to bring about early
military and political collapse of NATO.
On the ground, the Soviets pursue this strategy by concentrating
overwhelming force and by committing forces in succeeding echelons to
maintain the momentum of combat operations. First echelon forces fix
NATO's forward forces in position or destroy them. Second echelon
forces complete the destruction of NATO's forward forces and flow
through lines of least resistance to penetrate deeply into NATO's rear
and disrupt the Alliance's ability to reinforce. WTO follow-on forces are
thus critical to the overall strategy.
Meanwhile, WTO air forces hope to neutralize NATO's airpower.
They will concentrate virtually the entire Western Theater of Military
Operations' air capabilities against NATO airfields, ground based air de-
fenses, nuclear storage sites, and command and control systems in a se-
ries of theater-wide strategic air operations. The WTO anticipates heavy
losses but expects to cripple NATO airpower and to be able to deny
NATO air superiority.
By the mid seventies, the WTO strategy and Soviet improvements in
conventional doctrine, armaments, and force structure converged to cre-
ate severe doubts about whether NATO could mount a credible direct
defense. Two aspects of the Soviet buildup were particularly threatening.
First, the Soviets appeared to be aiming for a short-warning attack capa-
bility by reducing their reliance on early reinforcement from the western
military districts of the Soviet Union. Larger divisions armed with great-
er numbers of more advanced weapons, improved logistics support, and
increased readiness were all part of this effort. These improvements
threatened to reduce substantially both strategic and tactical warning.
Thus, they would reduce NATO's ability to countermobilize, deploy
forces forward, and prepare defensive positions.
Second, the Soviets launched an ambitious effort to achieve and
maintain rapid attack advance rates. The Soviets concentrated on sys-
tems to exploit a high-speed attack. These systems included infantry
combat vehicles, mechanized artillery, increased tactical aviation and
helicopter gunships to provide continuous close support, and more effec-
tive antiaircraft weapons to suppress enemy airpower. Additionally, the
Soviets emphasized development of more rapid and flexible command
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Deep Attack
and control procedures for ground, air, and air defense forces. Specific
efforts focused on improving their capability to commit follow-on forces
where and when they would achieve the greatest effect; to shift combat
effort from one axis to another, depending on rapidly changing circum-
stances; and to coordinate the efforts of adjacent combat formations?
Together, these trends attacked the credibility of NATO's Flexible
Response strategy. They threatened to force an early political collapse of
the Alliance before NATO could decide to escalate to the use of nuclear
weapons. NATO must have a strong direct defense, capable of providing
time for Alliance leaders to reach a nuclear decision, and confidence that
continued resistance is militarily and politically feasible. Without such a
direct defense, the very basis of Flexible Response is seriously eroded.
While US Army commanders in Europe were concerned with these
trends, they were also disturbed by the Army's existing land force doc-
trine?the Active Defense. Many believed this doctrine was inappropri-
ate to the nature of the Soviet challenge. They indicted Active Defense
on three counts. First, it was excessively reactive; it ceded the initiative to
the attacker by discouraging maneuver of forces against enemy vulner-
abilities. Second, it focused too much on massing firepower at the point
of an attempted Soviet breakthrough, where the enemy's strength was
concentrated. Lateral movement of friendly forces in the face of WTO
massed formations presents problems, and combat force ratios in these
areas continuously and overwhelmingly favored the attacker. Finally,
the doctrine seemed to endorse an attrition oriented defense. Therefore,
it seemed to risk early exhaustion of forward forces by subjecting them to
continuous operations against fresh, fully structured enemy units fed
into the forward battle from reinforcing echelons. In short, Army
commanders doubted the success of a doctrine that confronted wave af-
ter wave of echeloned WTO forces with a linear, positional defense.
As Army commanders wrestled with this problem, technological
developments converged to offer some promise of offsetting Soviet
quantitative superiority. Developments in a number of areas?partic-
ularly in sensors, data processing, terminal guidance, and conventional
munitions effects?offered a potential for more effective engagement of
mobile targets at extended ranges.
As the potential of these technologies became more apparent, pro-
posals for their strategic and tactical application proliferated. Some
spoke of strategically isolating the forward battlefield by destroying the
enemy's capability to reinforce; others envisioned attacking key WTO
command and control capabilities to deny the aggressor an ability to
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Deep Attack
employ his echeloned formations effectively. Virtually all proposals
suggested that emerging capabilities would reduce?some even said
eliminate?NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons, both by stiffening the
forward defense and by making conventional arms nearly as lethal as
low-yield nuclear weapons.2
By the late seventies, these factors converged to produce doctrinal
change, which incorporated emerging Deep Attack technologies. Two
doctrinal concepts emerged in short order: the US Army's AirLand Bat-
tle doctrine and SHAPE's Follow-on Force Attack (FOFA) concept. Both
of these concepts incorporated attacks on WTO follow-on forces to meet
the increasing challenge of Soviet conventional force improvements.
The key assumption behind all Deep Attack concepts is that NATO
and WTO forces in the first echelon are relatively evenly matched; there-
fore, NATO can provide a credible forward defense at the conventional
level if it can keep WTO reinforcing echelons out of the forward battle,
or at least allow them into it when and where most advantageous to
NATO. This essential equivalence in the first echelon exists because
NATO's forward defense policy requires placement of virtually all its
ground combat power forward in the "first echelon." And while the
WTO has more units and weapons theater-wide, terrain limitations, the
need to operate somewhat dispersed because of the potential for use of
nuclear weapons, and the basic WTO doctrine of operating from deeply
echeloned formations all but preclude the WTO from using its theater-
wide advantage at the line of contact. Using the inherent advantages of
defense, and so long as the WTO's large follow-on forces can be held out
of the forward battle, NATO's chances for a succesful forward defense
are improved.
We now turn to the specific proposals and the issues they raise.
AirLand Battle Doctrine
The US Army began reevaluating its tactical doctrine during the late
seventies. By early 1983, the Army's Training and Doctrine Command,
working closely with the US Air Force's Tactical Air Command, had
developed and gained the two Service Chiefs' approval for a new doc-
trine called AirLand Battle.* AirLand Battle doctrine focuses on combat
operations of the corps and subordinate elements. It seeks to win battles,
*AirLand Battle doctrine was published in a revised US Army Field Manual,
FM 100-5, on 20 August 1982. By early 1983, the Chief of Staff, US Air Force,
expressed his support for the new doctrine.
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not wars, recognizing that successful military operations are indispens-
able but are insufficient to guarantee victory.3 Finally, it seeks to employ
existing weapons and forces more effectively rather than prescribing
development of new ones.4 Thus, while recognizing that it would benefit
from technologies that should be fielded in the next several years, it does
not depend on them.
Within the limits noted above, AirLand Battle doctrine attempts to
deny success to an aggressor's attack by seizing and maintaining the
initiative.3 To do this, the doctrine specifies the need to break the mo-
mentum of the enemy's attack, to destroy synchronization among the
elements of attacking forces, and to defeat those forces piecemeal. Two
battles must be fought simultaneously and in close coordination: a for-
ward battle against committed units; and a deep battle against uncom-
mitted forces, both to delay and disrupt their commitment to the forward
battle and to create opportunities for subsequent maneuver against them.
While the doctrine seeks a balance between maneuver and firepower, it
particularly emphasizes maneuver. Maneuver is the way to concentrate
strength against enemy weaknesses and gain a position of operational ad-
vantage from which to mass effective fires against enemy vulner-
abilities.6
At the outset, AirLand Battle recognizes that Deep Attack?or the
deep battle, as it is termed?is a prerequisite to successful execution of
the doctrine. Because the doctrine focuses on corps operations, it envi-
sions the conduct of the deep battle out to 100-150 kilometers?the limit
of the corps commander's area of influence. US Army Field Manual
100-5 specifies that the corps commander's area of influence extends far
enough beyond the Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT) to "engage
enetny forces which can join or support the main battle within 72 hours."
The geographical extensibn represented will vary according to the com-
mander's mission, the enemy, the terrain, and friendly forces available.
In general, the geographic limits of the corps commander's area of influ-
ence will not exceed 100-150 kilometers.
Deep Attack delays and disrupts the reinforcement of uncommited
enemy forces and limits their availability for commitment to a time and
place in the defender's advantage. Thus, Deep Attack both creates the
opportunities for maneuver and permits its execution. All capabilities
under the control of or provided in support to the ground commander
(such as artillery, air support, electronic warfare, and deception), as well
as the maneuver of friendly ground forces, are available to execute the
deep battle. Of these, the Army recognizes that "battlefield air
Deep Attack
interdiction"?a NATO term not yet accepted into US joint doctrine?is
the primary means of fighting the deep battle at extended ranges?
The SHAPE Follow-on Force Attack Concept
Shortly after assuming responsibilities as Supreme Allied Com-
mander, Europe (SACEUR) in 1979, General Rogers tasked the SHAPE
staff to develop a concept for holding Soviet follow-on forces at risk with
deep conventional fire. The SHAPE concept seeks to locate and track
WTO forces during their entire process of deployment?from garrison to
battlefield commitment?and to attack them when and where they are
most vulnerable. The concept aims to exploit particularly critical enemy
vulnerabilities in the reinforcement process: the rigidity of planning for
an echeloned offense, the density of forces along limited attack routes,
and critical transportation facilities.
Like the AirLand Battle doctrine, SHAPE's Follow-on Force Attack
concept seeks to link the deep battle with the combat operations of forces
in contact. But the means of doing so are vastly different. The SHAPE
concept, unlike AirLand Battle, does not seek to synchronize the deep
battle with the ground commander's scheme of maneuver. Instead, the
SHAPE concept focuses on the centralized application of all Deep Attack
assets to separate first echelon and second echelon forces. Success in this
task will maintain NATO-WTO combat force ratios in the first echelon
at a manageable level.
Issues Surrounding Deep Attack
Deep Attack concepts have received enthusiastic support from
many quarters in NATO. But two major issues have caused continuing,
often heated debates: the ambiguity of the concepts' implications for
strategy and the persistence of doctrinal disagreements regarding the
relationship of Deep Attack to the forward battle, including the alloca-
tion and control of airpower. Moreover, questions have arisen regarding
the accuracy of underlying assumptions about Soviet doctrine and meas-
ures the Soviets might take to counter AirLand Battle, the SHAPE con-
cept, or Deep Attack in general.
The strategic issue in this debate derives from European suspicion
about American planning. The Europeans fear that strategic nuclear par-
ity has driven American planners toward either a conventional or a
limited nuclear defense option to escape the risks of a strategic nuclear
exchange inherent in NATO's Flexible Response strategy. Either option is
37
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Deep Attack
abhorrent to Europeans. The first raises the specter of a conventional
Central European conflict every bit as devastating for Europeans as a nu-
clear conflict. The second threatens to confine a nuclear conflict to Eur-
ope. Regardless of the outcome of such a conflict, NATO Europe would
emerge a strategic loser due to the devastation. Today, as in the past, US
strategic nuclear guarantees are viewed by West Europeans as indis-
pensable to a workable deterrent strategy.
Understandably then, any defense initiative that even remotely sug-
gests a modification of Flexible Response will draw immediate fire in
NATO. Deep Attack concepts have been caught in this fire, not because
they challenge Flexible Response but because they have not been recog-
nized as prerequisite to it. In short, Deep Attack concepts must be secure-
ly linked to NATO's current strategy if they are to receive Alliance
support.
Doctrinal issues are multiple. First, where on the battlefield should
NATO focus the brunt of its Deep Attack capabilities? (This question ad-
dresses both existing capabilities and those to be developed in the future.)
By its very nature, AirLand Battle generally favors attacking enemy
follow-on echelons located within the corps commander's area of influ-
ence (that is, within 100-150 kilometers of the FLOT). Other doctrinal
proposals seemingly favor attacking enemy forces at much greater
depths. The SHAPE concept seems to favor neither, although staffs at
both SHAPE and AFCENT appear to favor deeper interdiction. For now,
however, they recognize that the range of most current Alliance air and
missile systems precludes concentrating efforts in a deep interdiction bat-
tle. This issue affects both decisions on the evolution of air-ground
procedures and, more importantly, the design of future area surveil-
lance, target acquisition, and Deep Attack systems.
Second, where in the command structure should NATO integrate
air and ground operations? AirLand Battle seeks integration at the corps
level; the SHAPE concept favors integration at the army group and
region levels. Current procedures for allocating air support to and co-
ordinating air interdiction operations with the ground battle generally
support the SHAPE concept; they are inadequate to support AirLand
Battle.
Finally, Soviet strategy for conventional operations in Europe clear-
ly requires a consistently high tempo of attack leading to early, decisive
breakthrough of NATO's forward defense. Although Soviet doctrine
leads to the echeloning of forces?from the battalions in contact to sec-
ond echelon regiments, divisions, armies, and even fronts moving
38
Deep Attack
forward from the western USSR?the bulk of Soviet combat power is
forward with the first echelon divisions; that is where they believe the
decisive battle will be fought. Recent weapons developments and
changes in force structure have already added to the combat power of
forward forces. And the Central European terrain would allow the WTO
to put even more divisions in the first echelon. These developments and a
wide range of options available to the Soviets raise questions about the
underlying assumptions and the durability of AirLand Battle and the
SHAPE concept.
These strategic, doctrinal, and enemy force issues combine to pose
severe obstacles to the implementation of Deep Attack concepts. We
now turn to those issues.
DEEP ATTACK AND
NATO'S FLEXIBLE RESPONSE STRATEGY
Alliance deliberations regarding the political acceptability and mili-
tary utility of Deep Attack concepts will turn first and foremost on their
implications for NATO's strategy. To some extent, this is true because
various US authorities have emphasized the concepts' strategic value.
But more importantly, Europeans are concerned that new doctrinal de-
signs indicate possible shifts in the agreed strategy of Flexible Response.
The reluctance of US and NATO officials to state publicly the stra-
tegic implications of SHAPE's Follow-on Force Attack concept and the
Army's AirLand Battle doctrine has contributed to this unease.* In the
absence of such a statement, misconceptions have dominated the debate,
often in ways that cause many allies to suspect the worst. Consequently,
European suspicions threaten to derail valuable adjustments to NATO's
tactical doctrines?adjustments that could make NATO's Flexible Re-
sponse strategy more credible?and to slow the exploitation of promising
new conventional technologies.
We will now identify the sources of European concern; demonstrate
how Deep Attack concepts can be consistent with and essential compo-
nents of NATO's Flexible Response strategy; and recommend a way to
*This seems to be changing. For example, an article on the subject by Gen-
eral Rogers appeared in the February-March 1983 edition of NATO's Sixteen
Nations.
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Deep Attack
strengthen Flexible Response through adaptation of various elements of
Deep Attack concepts.
European Concerns
At the outset, we must recognize that influential segments of the
European NATO community have supported Deep Attack concepts as
potentially productive in strengthening the Alliance's conventional
capabilities. For example, Sir Julian Critchley, the British Conservative
Party's Defense Committee Vice Chairman, has given a strong endorse-
ment. In an article written for the Daily Telegraph in November of 1982,
Critchley supported both Senator Sam Nunn's call for NATO to adopt
AirLand Battle concepts and General Rogers' outline of the need for a
Deep Attack capability.8 Similarly, Manfred Woerner, Defense Minister
of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), has urged the exploitation of
emerging technologies.? And General Meinhard Glanz, Inspector Gen-
eral of the Bundeswehr, has stated explicitly the need to prevent the re-
inforcement of Soviet follow-on forces to assure a strong forward
defense.1? Despite these endorsements, however, major concerns remain.
Europeans are primarily suspicious that the new doctrinal concepts
will either provide the basis for a conventional deterrent capability
independent of nuclear escalation or lay the foundation for warfighting
in which the use of nuclear weapons is confined to the European theater.
The French explicitly communicated concern over the first of those possi-
bilities in response to a 30 September 1982 speech by SACEUR in Brus-
sels. In that speech, General Rogers noted the significant advantages to
be gained by exploiting technology to attack WTO follow-on forces. He
also observed that NATO's technological edge permitted development of
such a capability and commented that a 4 percent gross national product
(GNP) allocation to defense by all NATO nations would suffice to pro-
cure it.11 The French newspaper Le Monde charged that the concept was
a move toward a "no early use" policy for nuclear weapons?believed to
be no better than a "no first use" pledge. It also decried the apparent shift
in American perceptions of the role of nuclear weapons to deterring
destruction rather than invasion. Le Monde also questioned how firmly
the United States would continue to support Intermediate Range Nuclear
Force (INF) deployments if longer range nuclear systems became sec-
ondary to conventional Deep Attack capabilities.12
The French have been the most vocal and explicit in their critique of
Deep Attack concepts. Indeed, they have been the most critical of any
defense initiative that appears to erode the credibility of Alliance nuclear
40
Deep Attack
deterrence. But other European nations share the concerns from which
those criticisms arise. Many Europeans, particularly the West Germans,
share the French concern that the decoupling of US strategic nuclear
guarantees from the defense of Europe is one of the greatest dangers fac-
ing the Alliance today. While most Europeans?not the French?recog-
nize the need for improved conventional forces to make credible Flexible
Response, many suspect the US intention in pushing hard for such
improvements. They believe the US proposals are driven more by a de-
sire to avoid a nuclear decision altogether than by a desire to make cred-
ible NATO's threat to escalate a conflict if necessary. Those who hold
this view point to the "no first use" advocacy of former US officials as
confirmation of their position.13 Europeans fear this development be-
cause it would eliminate the incalculability of risks confronting the
Soviet Union. Thus, it would lower the threshold of conventional aggres-
sion.
We should not be surprised, then, that Europeans are distressed
when various Deep Attack advocates suggest that emerging conven-
tional technologies "may provide a conventional military power so
formidable as to rival in the tactical arena the deterrent effect nuclear
weapons have had on strategic war." 14 Such views focus on what many
Europeans believe is a dangerous conception?that a successful conven-
tional option by itself is capable of deterring Soviet aggression.
On the other hand, some Europeans believe that the new US con-
cepts of Deep Attack may call for both nuclear and conventional
capability, and that this could lead to plans for the use of nuclear
weapons in a warfighting role. They find such a strategy even more
frightening than the drive for a conventional-only option. During the En-
hanced Radiation Weapon debate in Europe, Manfred Woerner, then a
leading West German CDU/CSU defense spokesman, made clear the re-
jection of a theater nuclear warfighting doctrine confined to Central
Europe.
It is equally clear that a separation of tactical nuclear weapons
from the strategic nuclear level is absolutely unacceptable for us
Europeans.
The territory of the USSR cannot be allowed, in theory or prac-
tice, to become a sanctuary in the nuclear phase of a conflict in
Europe. The Soviet Union cannot be invited to contemplate a war
limited to Western Europe, or even to German territory. Moscow
must at all times be forced to reckon with the full ladder of
escalation.15
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Deep Attack
Some Europeans have noted with concern several briefings of Air-
Land Battle. These briefings reportedly discussed nuclear targeting deci-
sions that might imply the need for early, perhaps even preconditional,
release authority for NATO commanders to use nuclear weapons.16 And
of course, since AirLand Battle doctrine remains focused at corps opera-
tions or below, discussions of nuclear use are generally confined to war-
fighting implications. This fact is understandable, but it has disturbing
implications for Europeans nonetheless.
Some NATO nations, particularly West Germany, are also sensitive
to assertions that AirLand Battle doctrine envisions the conduct of
strategically offensive ground operations. The FRG has accepted Deep
Attack concepts in general. But the Bundeswehr's Inspector General has
been extremely careful to reject any notion that German forces are, or
will be, structured logistically to attack deep into WTO territory.17 In
part, rejection of such capabilities reflects NATO's defensive orientation.
But it also acknowledges that the spider of an offensively capable
Bundeswehr is acceptable neither to the Soviets nor to the FRG's
continental allies.
Finally, the European media have suggested occasionally that the
maneuver oriented AirLand Battle doctrine constitutes a retreat from the
Alliance's concept of a forward defense.
These concerns may be erroneous and inconsistent. But they reflect
considerable confusion regarding strategic versus tactical purposes of
Deep Attack concepts and the doctrinal context to which the concepts
are related. This confusion highlights the need for a militarily sound and
politically acceptable justification for Deep Attack concepts if we are to
continue the considerable progress attained to date.
Strategic Rationale for Deep Attack
The litmus test for determining the political acceptability of Deep
Attack concepts is to see how well they support and reinforce Flexible
Response. For the Europeans, doctrinal conformance to the Alliance's
agreed strategy is a measure of continued US commitment to the defense
of Europe and US willingness to share the risks as well as the benefits of
Alliance membership.
To be consistent with Flexible Response, Deep Attack concepts must
be clearly portrayed and understood as part of a strong direct defense.
As such, their purpose must be expressed as defeat of less than full-scale
conventional attacks and deterrence of massive conventional aggression
42
Deep Attack
by making credible Alliance threats of deliberate escalation. This sug-
gests that Deep Attack concepts must satisfy at least three conditions.
First, they must contribute to an effective forward defense of Al-
liance territory. Pact forces must be unable to force a political collapse of
NATO, either by a limited attack or by seizure of significant territory
early in a large-scale conflict. Deep Attack must contribute to a direct de-
fense capable of providing time for Alliance authorities to reach and
execute a nuclear decision. Reaching such a decision would be anguishing
for all NATO nations; each will seek to assure that all alternatives short
of escalation have been exhausted. Without time afforded by strong con-
ventional forces, such a decision probably could not be reached, and the
credibility of Flexible Response would be correspondingly eroded.
Second, conventional Deep Attack must not conflict significantly
with NATO execution systems or procedures for deliberate nuclear esca-
lations. In addition, it must not alter perceptions concerning NATO's
means and capabilities for nuclear escalation.
Third, insofar as Deep Attack vies with NATO's nuclear systems for
its development resources or political commitment, Deep Attack con-
cepts must be seen as inextricably integrated with NATO nuclear plans
and systems. Deep Attack must not be viewed as an alternative to
nuclear escalation, either in war plans or in forces developed for their
execution.
As concepts for Deep Attack continue to unfold, clearly they can,
but not necessarily will, meet these conditions. Surely all advocates in-
tend that their concepts strengthen NATO's conventional direct defense.
But the precise contribution of any Deep Attack concept to this purpose
will depend not only on funding levels, but also on the situation and con-
ditions extant at the outbreak of hostilities. Nor need the execution of
Deep Attack in a period of hostilities conflict with NATO's means and
capabilities for deliberate escalation. Separate attack systems can be de-
veloped, different control procedures can be employed, and different tar-
gets can be struck.
In this regard, however, we must note that efforts to portray sec-
ond- and third-generation improved conventional munitions as having
effects equivalent to those of low-yield nuclear weapons constitute a
two-edged sword. These portrayals support, on the one hand, the feasi-
bility of conventional Deep Attack. On the other hand, they suggest
Deep Attack's availability as a substitute for nuclear weapons. Careful
examination of the characteristics of these conventional weapons sug-
gests that they are substitutable for only the very lowest-yield nuclear
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Deep Attack I Deep Attack
systems?the systems that, for reasons of collateral damage restraint,
would tend to be employed relatively near friendly positions. By no
means can such conventional systems substitute for the effect of the me-
dium size nuclear weapons that might be contemplated for use against
deeper enemy targets.
This consideration also suggests that, properly articulated and un-
derstood, conventional Deep Attack concepts cannot stand as an inde-
pendent strategy for two reasons. First, the deterrent effects of the risks
attending escalation to nuclear weaponry would be absent. Convention-
al weapons, no matter how destructive, do not convey a threat of escala-
tion to strategic nuclear warfare. Therefore, they cannot substitute for
the deterrent effect of tactical nuclear weapons. Second, the strictly mili-
tary (warfighting) impact of improved conventional munitions could not
foreseeably compensate for the absence of these risks. However, the im-
provements in reconnaissance and attack means attendant to Deep At-
tack have immediate application for more militarily significant deeper
strikes with nuclear systems.
Strategic Pitfalls
Several pitfalls remain in developing and articulating the rationale
of Deep Attack. First, we must properly describe the effect of a Deep At-
tack policy on the nuclear threshold. To suggest that Deep Attack will
raise the nuclear threshold is to imply to some that the ultimate aim is a
conventional defense. To focus on the other alternative?a lowered nu-
clear threshold?seems to suggest some sort of nuclear warfighting,
which also raises concerns. The purpose of NATO's strategy is to deter
aggression, not simply to prevent the conflict's escalation to the nuclear
level. To the extent that improvements in NATO's defenses contribute to
the former, they will most effectively assure the latter. Deep Attack must
be viewed and addressed in precisely this perspective.
A second pitfall associated with emerging Deep Attack concepts is
that they complicate the establishment of priorities. NATO's capacity to
defend against a short-warning attack is eroding, and Alliance-WTO
balances in the forward echelons of the battlefield are becoming more
disparate. Even so, some Deep Attack advocates urge the Alliance to de-
vote significant resources toward development of a technological capa-
bility to attack deep into WTO territory. If economic constraints did not
exist, that capability, combined with greater capabilities in the first
echelon, would be most welcome. But constraints do exist, and the Al-
liance must ask where it would most profitably apply marginal incre-
ments in resources.
44
Strategically, first priority must be accorded to the most dangerous
threat to NATO. Currently, and for the foreseeable future, this is the
capability of WTO forces to quickly break through NATO's forward
defenses. As explained earlier, development of this capability has re-
ceived priority in WTO defense improvements and is believed to be a
prerequisite to Soviet operational strategy in Central Europe. So current
and projected Alliance initiatives must aim toward denying such a capa-
bility.
The Alliance must direct its priority efforts toward blunting the
attack of first and second tactical echelons of WTO forces and those
operational follow-on echelons close to the forward battle. Interdiction
of strategic follow-on echelons moving forward from the USSR must
take a lower priority. The forward forces are already located in Eastern
Europe during peacetime. They are the ones to be committed in the very
early days of a conflict and the ones that pose the most immediate danger
of a breakthrough. To focus too much on a more distant threat when one
closer at hand is already arguably overwhelming would be sheer folly.
We must take great care not to incur a strategic deficit by building for the
desirable at the expense of the essential.
A third, and at least equally dangerous, strategic pitfall to the cur-
rent evolution of Deep Attack concepts exists. This is the tendency of
some to speak as if emerging technologies offer an opportunity to substi-
tute deep conventional capabilities for theater nuclear forces. Tech-
nologists, in particular, favor such an approach by noting the growing
accuracy of delivery systems and the increased lethality and area cover-
age of conventional munitions. Moreover, many defense analysts are
growing disenchanted with the utility and survivability of battlefield
nuclear weapons and insisting that they be eliminated wholly or in part
from Alliance inventories. Together, these trends, whether intended or
not, appear to argue for some level of substitution of conventional muni-
tions for theater nuclear weapons.
Unfortunately, such a change fails to address the broader strategic
requirements of Flexible Response. Conventional munitions have and
will continue to become more militarily effective against many targets
that were formerly vulnerable only to nuclear weapons. But the fact is,
theater nuclear weapons have always had a greater purpose than military
effects on the battlefield; they have been a means for achieving political
results. Theater nuclear weapons threaten escalation of the conflict to a
level where the costs and risks of continued aggression are clearly
disproportionate to perceived gains. No matter how military effective
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Deep Attack
conventional munitions may become?and they are not yet nearly so
effective as nuclear weapons?they simply cannot convey those risks.
On the other hand, the utility of battlefield nuclear systems is clearly
suspect. But this is not because conventional weapons are able to replace
them. The problem with battlefield nuclear systems is that they are not a
credible means of threatening a NATO "first use." First, given the
tactical circumstances likely to provoke an Alliance resort to nuclear
weapons, battlefield systems will likely prove more devastating to terri-
tory and values of the Alliance than to those of the WTO. The FRG, in
particular, has been adamant that the destructive consequences of
nuclear escalation not be confined to NATO's territory. For that reason
Germany has supported an improvement in longer range nuclear sys-
tems. Second, given the necessity for continuing political control of
nuclear weapons, in war and peace, and the consequent restrictive
release procedures, doubt has increased over whether battlefield systems
are sufficiently responsive to threaten the mobile target arrays against
which they are aimed. Finally, NATO's political authorities have long
recognized that the use of battlefield nuclear weapons alone may not
achieve either the military or the political ends sought in an Alliance
"first use" of nuclear weapons.
However, we must recognize that, whatever the inherent diffi-
culties, battlefield nuclear systems have performed a critical function.
They have forced WTO forces to operate dispersed in a "nuclear scared"
posture. Despite the promised development of drastically improved con-
ventional munitions, nuclear systems still offer greater damage capabil-
ities. Without the threat of short range battlefield systems, opposing
forces would be able to concentrate with far less vulnerability, thus ag-
gravating NATO's conventional defense problem. Moreover, these
tactical nuclear systems constitute NATO's last remaining (though now
dwindling) measure of nuclear superiority. They serve a vital role in de-
terring the Soviets from using their expanding nuclear arsenal.
Implications for NATO Strategy
Several implications emerge. First, NATO's conventional and
nuclear capabilities are not separate entities but synergistic components
of an effective defense posture. They are not substitutable, and deficien-
cies in one cannot be compensated for by improvements in the other. For
that reason, conventional Deep Attack operations must be recognized as
complementary, rather than as an alternative, to proposed nuclear "first
use" options that rely on similar emerging weapons developments.
Deep Attack
One such "first use" option is to direct NATO's longer range nuclear
systems toward the disruption and destruction of Soviet operational and
strategic follow-on echelons in transit deep in Pact territory before com-
mitment to the forward battle. Such an option is politically useful be-
cause it would convey clearly to the Soviets NATO's ability to deny the
WTO its war aims; it would also threaten subsequent and more danger-
ous escalation of the conflict should hostilities continue. Further, such an
option meets the demanding criteria for a NATO "first use": it yields a
potentially significant military return to communicate the seriousness of
NATO's purpose; it signals a willingness to escalate further; and it pro-
vides for both central political control and military responsiveness of
nuclear options. Finally, given Alliance deployment of Pershing II and
ground launched cruise missiles (GLCM) and completion of program im-
provements to CI, NATO can achieve such a capability relatively soon.
The second implication is that NATO cannot afford to dispense
with the capability to target with nuclear means the forward attacking
echelons of WTO forces. This does not mean that obsolescent weapons
could not be removed from Alliance inventories, or that artillery-fired
atomic projectiles are necessarily the most effective means of accomplish-
ing the objective. It does mean, however, that NATO must retain a full
spectrum of nuclear capabilities to hold at risk the entire depth of attack-
ing forces in order to assure their dispersal.
DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS
OF DEEP ATTACK CONCEPTS
The two specific proposals for Deep Attack under discussion in the
Alliance, the US Army's AirLand Battle doctrine and the SHAPE Follow-
on Force Attack concept, are similar in several respects. Both recognize
the significance of the Soviet forces echeloned in depth; both recognize
the importance of seeing and attacking in depth; both recognize that air-
power is critical for this purpose; and both recognize that this air inter-
diction must be more closely orchestrated to affect the ground battle.
Despite these similarities, however, the two approaches are surprisingly
different, both in their underlying assumptions and in their implications.
Distinctions Between the Two Concepts
Origins and purposes. The two approaches reflect their differing
origins, the differing concerns of their originators, and the differing
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parameters within which they were developed. AirLand Battle was de-
veloped by the US Army, with Air Force participation, for corps level
and below; its purpose is to enable US forces to defeat in battle a techno-
logically equal, numerically superior opponent anywhere in the world.
Implicit in AirLand Battle doctrine is the concern that, to defeat even first
echelon opposing forces, US forces must alter their approach to warfare
by stressing maneuver and fighting in depth. The SHAPE concept, on the
other hand, was prepared by an integrated Alliance headquarters. It
deals solely with the problem of the opposing forces' reinforcing echelons
theater-wide, recognizing that corps will fight according to their various
national doctrines.
Allocation of airpower. AirLand Battle doctrine recognizes that a
commander must be able to detect and delay or disrupt opposing forces
echeloned in depth that could interfere with his operations against the
enemy's first echelon. The doctrine requires that a corps strive to main-
tain surveillance of an area large enough to give 96 hours notice of ap-
proaching significant enemy forces; the corps must be able to influence
those opposing forces up to 72 hours away from the main battle.18 With
these capabilities, the corps commander is to plan and execute battle
actions to wrest the initiative from the attacking enemy force. As this
planning-execution window is compressed, the difficulties and risks asso-
ciated with seizing the initiative will increase accordingly. In the
European theater, this 72-hour window, plotted on a map as the corps
area of influence, could extend as much as 150 kilometers forward of the
main battle.19
Some of the key procedural problems for implementing AirLand
Battle in NATO are allocation of battlefield interdiction sorties down to
corps and below; recognition of an area of influence beyond the Fire Sup-
port Coordination Line (FSCL), in which these sorties would be available
to supplement organic corps Deep Attack systems; and early allocation
of numbers of sorties to enable full integration of airpower into the plan-
ning of the ground force.
Current procedures allow for the first and are beginning to take cog-
nizance of the second, but have made little progress in the third area.
This notion of early commitment of significant air interdiction forces
runs counter to the notion of centralized control of airpower and its dis-
patch en masse to the most crucial portion of the theater. Indeed, this
conflict poses a key difficulty in the full implementation of AirLand
Battle as it was originally conceived.
Offensive air support, including close air support, battlefield air
interdiction, and reconnaissance, can be allocated down to corps level.
48
Deep Attack
The ground commander's area of responsibility forward of the close
battle normally ends at the Fire Support Coordination Line, approx-
imately 25 kilometers forward. Beyond this distance, targets are the re-
sponsibility of the air component commander, though some measures
are now in process to assure that air interdiction of targets to depths of
70-100 kilometers beyond the front line of engaged forces will be coordi-
nated with the ground commander. However, procedures for planning
centralized daily apportionment and allocation of air resources at the air
component command and subordinate air operations centers are time-
consuming. Therefore, procedures have not been developed to allocate
the critical battlefield air interdiction sorties far enough in advance. This
means that commanders at corps level and below have not been able to
adequately integrate the principal means of deep attack?airpower?into
their plans. Instead, they have been able to do little more than request air
reconnaissance and air attack of certain targets. The commander general-
ly does not know if he will receive such support until a few hours before
the battle.
The SHAPE concept, on the other hand, requires no new allocation
procedures. It was designed to take advantage of the very centralized air
allocation procedures that cause difficulty for AirLand Battle.
Thus, there is this disjunction between AirLand Battle and the
SHAPE concept: AirLand Battle thrives on the early allocation of air-
power to support the ground commander, a process that reduces the
extent of centralized control and application; the SHAPE concept, how-
ever, plans for more traditional use of airpower through centralized air
allocation and application theater-wide. This disjunction has profound
implications for how the ground war can be fought.
Contrasting Implications
Maneuver versus attrition. AirLand Battle posits maneuver by
forces up to division size to seize the initiative and defeat forward enemy
forces. To do this, however, the corps must have some assurance that the
enemy's echeloned follow-on forces will be prevented from interfering
with that maneuver long enough to allow a reasonable prospect of de-
feating the enemy's first echelon. Without some increased confidence
that required air assets will be available to support the ground battle, it
will be even more difficult and risky for the corps to assume the initi-
ative. In this context then, the disjunction between AirLand Battle and
the SHAPE concept in the allocation and application of airpower reflects
the tension between a doctrine that recognizes a need to maneuver and
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Deep Attack
(DD one that takes a more traditional (firepower and attrition) approach to
a the battlefield.
Warfighting versus deterrence. Alternatively, the disjunction may
a) ? be viewed as a conflict of focus. At corps level and below, the focus is
? necessarily on warfighting; the foremost consideration must be to prevail
a in battle against attacking Pact forces. At NATO and region levels, the
> focus has been on deterrence; the Alliance must "persuade" the Soviets to
1:33 call off the attack, either because they cannot win or because they cannot
afford the costs of winning.
The Army's doctrine is based on the conclusion that maneuver is es-
sential to defeat the Pact's first tactical echelon, and that this will require
greater synchronization of air interdiction with ground forces than cur-
rent procedures envision. But at the strategic level, air interdiction is
? necessarily the primary means short of nuclear exchange for attacking
al the Pact rear; therefore, it is an essential element of intrawar deterrence,
whose contribution exceeds any materiel damage inflicted. While this de-
terrent perspective does not rule out greater synchronization of air and
ground forces, it does constrain the amount of air resources that can be
N.) allocated to the support of ground forces. It also argues for the preserva-
tion of the centralized allocation of air resources so that airpower can be
? ? massed more easily to support theater requirements and priorities.
0
Immediate versus delayed impact. A third difference between these
7J two Deep Attack concepts is the time each requires to have significant
0
military (vice political) effect. In this context, the AirLand Battle implies
co
a near term impact through the synchronization of air and ground forces
- against relatively close opposing formations. Conversely, the SHAPE
- concept, though currently limited by the combat radii of some NATO at-
tack aircraft, may portend greater weight of attack at greater depths to
7i achieve, perhaps, more significant effects at a somewhat later time.
o During an acute crisis, more immediate military needs would tend to
oi receive priority. Faced with the choice between the interdiction of oppos-
ing forces still more than 3 days from the battle or the staving off of a
breakthrough in the Central Region, the commander would presumably
opt to trade future security for present survival. This consideration does
N.) not negate the desirability of possessing the capability to strike very
-1,1 deep. But it argues for the necessity of developing the most effective pro-
cedures and systems for applying airpower to influence the close battle.
Preconflict deterrence. Examination of the preconflict deterrent
implications of the two concepts reinforces the foregoing consideration.
To be sure, virtually all improvements in NATO capabilities will tend to
Deep Attack
strengthen the overall deterrent. But the two concepts have somewhat
different impacts on what might be called the crisis stability of the deter-
rent. Insofar as the capability for deep interdiction is improved, Pact
risks in a "bolt from the blue" or limited mobilization attack will be in-
creased. Presumably, this will reduce Pact incentives to attack. But the
reduction in Pact incentives may not be as strong in the case of a full
mobilization attack. For such an attack, the Pact could bring forward its
major formations before the onset of hostilities, negating the full impact
of a Deep Attack concept. AirLand Battle, however, would be significant
against either a limited or a full mobilization attack because it threatens
the destruction of the opposing force echelon in contact.
Impact on NATO doctrine. Finally, we must note that since Air-
Land Battle doctrine was not designed specifically for the NATO context
of separate national corps, its implementation within the Central Region
poses unique problems. These problems are distinct from those of imple-
menting the SHAPE concept. For example, if other nations do not em-
ploy the concept of an area of influence forward of the main battle, then
the development of deep intelligence may be asymmetrical despite the
best efforts at inter-Allied intelligence sharing.* Also, the air allocation
system may find itself in the dilemma of either taking special cognizance
of interdiction requests from US corps?normally viewed as a subopti-
mization of airpower ?or frustrating the very procedures most likely to
employ airpower to its fullest effect. Together, these considerations sug-
gest that AirLand Battle may constitute a form of doctrinal encroach-
ment on the procedures of the other national corps unlike that previously
experienced.
*The development of intelligence is a function not only of raw data, but also
of the will and desires of the commander. Despite increased quantities of raw
information as a consequence of new technology and centralized distribution
systems, intelligence staffs at all echelons still must analyze, refine, and interpret
the data. If some corps concentrate on detailed interpretation of data out to
depths of 100-150 kilometers while others focus only on the opposing forces in
contact, then the clarity with which second echelon enemy units are detected and
tracked will vary significantly among the various corps. This means that Army
Group must work to compensate for the lack of attention-in-depth by some
corps, or else those corps must change the focus of their intelligence efforts to
"see" deeper. Without these compensating measures, commanders at Army
Group level and above will receive relatively detailed information on enemy
second echelon forces opposite US corps but sparse information on second eche-
lon forces opposite some other national corps. This "asymmetrical" intelligence
would inevitably be harmful to effective coordinated operations above corps
level.
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Deep Attack
Reconciling the Two Approaches
Must we choose between these distinct approaches? Should both
proceed independently? Can they in some way be combined? The Air-
Land Battle and SHAPE concepts seem to have both complementary and
competitive aspects. Certainly their differing implications with regard to
warfighting versus deterrence, the time periods required for military
impact during conflict, and preconflict deterrence appear mainly comple-
mentary. But the actual wartime allocation of resources for their various
purposes might be competitive. And the difference in the implied locus of
control of air assets implies alternative approaches to warfighting that
are definitely competitive. The tendency of the AirLand Battle doctrine
to infringe on other national corps-level doctrines also requires careful
consideration.
These complementary and competitive aspects may be examined
against three obvious standards. First, can the two different approaches
be made procedurally compatible, so that the theater commander may
employ either or both simultaneously? Second, can AirLand Battle be
fitted into the NATO national corps approach as one nation's battle doc-
trine? Third, is the military hardware to implement these approaches
similar and compatible, or will the theater commander's flexibility in
wartime be curtailed by procurements underway today?
Procedures. At present, the centralized daily air allocation proce-
dures clearly restrict the employment of AirLand Battle in Europe. For-
tunately, efforts appear to be underway in US circles to deal in part with
the air allocation issue. Army and Air Force authorities coordinated a
modification of existing air allocation procedures, entitled "Joint Air At-
tack of the Second Echelon," in December 1982. Under these modified
procedures, a Battlefield Coordination Element would operate at the
Tactical Air Control Center to prioritize the Army air interdiction re-
quests and insure Air Force appreciation of ground maneuver require-
ments.
This modification and the recent Air Force decision to endorse Air-
Land Battle doctrine represent very positive steps. But we still must
transform these agreements into operating procedures within the theater
and demonstrate their adequacy, especially their timeliness. In partic-
ular, various types of early allocation systems need to be explored care-
fully. These systems should aim at providing the flexibility to balance US
doctrinal requirements at corps level and below with Alliance opera-
tional necessities at Army Group level and above.
Deep Attack
Doctrine. Only initial measures have been taken to examine the sig-
nificance of the doctrinal encroachment problem within NATO. The
continuing discussions of doctrine at various national, service, and field
command levels, should carefully explore the area of influence concept
and revised air allocation procedures in the context of European exercises
and follow-on discussions. In particular, US corps initial areas of in-
fluence should be developed based on both general guidelines and spe-
cific terrain features, road nets, and enemy capabilities; how these areas
will affect other national corps should be examined.
Another area for attention is the development of intelligence for-
ward of the FLOT in the sectors of non-US corps. Compensatory efforts
at Army Group or ATAF level may be required to assure a balanced
interpretation of the battlefield beyond the Fire Support Coordination
Line.
Finally, we should analyze representative ground maneuver plans
with regard to available air interdiction support. We must strike the right
balance between providing adequate air interdiction to support the
ground commander's scheme of maneuver and assuring that air alloca-
tion achieves the most decisive effects theater-wide. As yet, it is too early
to determine whether the SHAPE and AirLand Battle approaches can be
harmonized to achieve this balance.
Materiel. The two approaches diverge somewhat in their implica-
tions for development and acquisition of materiel. Both are somewhat
ambivalent with respect to the extent of their reliance on anticipated
technological advancement and future procurement. The SHAPE ap-
proach requires area surveillance, target acquisition, and attack systems
of somewhat greater range while AirLand Battle does not require systems
capable of the longer ranges. But AirLand Battle might entail greater at-
tention to tactical C3, ground mobility, and logistic preparation of the
battlefield to support more maneuver oriented warfare and greater air-
ground synchronization.
Although both AirLand Battle and the SHAPE concept claim to be
viable with current weapons and technologies, official and press discus-
sions of them constantly refer to the opportunities afforded by enhanced
technologies. Most of these references are to area surveillance, target
acquisition, and attack systems still in development and not expected to
be available in significant numbers for another 5 to 10 years. Moreover,
very complex developments in all functions?surveillance, information
processing and dissemination, munitions, and weapon systems integra-
tion?must come on line successfully before their synergistic effect
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provides the anticipated quantum leap in operational capability. And
this increased capability is required for some of the advanced concepts of
Deep Attack (especially those involving attacks against units as opposed
to fixed facilities) to work to full effect. Given the procurement costs,
technological uncertainties, time lines, and interservice issues involved,
it is a high-risk force development process.
One of the greatest dangers is becoming too enchanted with the
future potential of emerging technology. We must continue procurement
of proven systems and incremental upgrades necessary to carry us
through until new systems are available; and we must not build current
plans, strategy, and tactics as though potential capability already exists.*
The materiel and force development implications of AirLand Battle
and the SHAPE concept are competitive but not necessarily incom-
patible. While no choice between these two doctrinal approaches seems
otherwise required yet, we must, at this early stage in the development of
Deep Attack systems, consider the problem of doctrine and its relation-
ship to force structure and materiel development. We must directly con-
front the desirability of attacking very deep with non-nuclear systems.
Otherwise, we may inadvertently set our sights on capabilities whose ex-
penses and technical difficulties compound rather than ease the more im-
mediate challenge of strengthening NATO's forward defense.
In any event, assuring that systems developed for deep interdiction
are capable of addressing immediate crises of the close battle is critical.
At the same time, having the capability to see and attack strategic
follow-on echelons will be useful. And we will always need intelligence
and command and control capabilities to allow timely choices between
battlefield needs. What we must avoid at this stage are procedures or
procurements that lock us into either approach. Much additional
analysis and careful consideration of the strategic and doctrinal implica-
tions of the concepts must precede firm choices.
As this review of the implications of the two Deep Attack concepts
has shown, the SHAPE and AirLand Battle approaches are at least as dis-
tinctive as they are similar. A choice between the two at this juncture
would obviously be premature. However, the most careful consideration
of their differing implications, and consequent measures to harmonize
these approaches, is warranted now. Otherwise, NATO may find itself
less interoperable and rationalized a decade hence than it is today, with
*Key technology and development programs are treated in some detail in
appendix A.
54
Deep Attack
enormous resources having been invested in measures lacking the flex-
ibility to meet the most urgent problems of the Alliance in crisis or con-
flict.
THE SOVIET DIMENSION
The open press here and abroad has given AirLand Battle, the
SHAPE concept, and Deep Attack technologies prominent treatment.
Undoubtedly, the concepts will have excited considerable attention
among Soviet defense planners. This chapter examines these develop-
ments from the point of view of a Soviet planner assessing their implica-
tions for his own forces and doctrine. It identifies current Soviet force
development trends and possible future countermeasures relevant to the
two concepts, evaluates their potential effects, and reaches conclusions
regarding likely Soviet actions and their consequences for the WTO.
Soviet Perception and Assessment
The Soviets are likely to see the AirLand Battle doctrine as a US at-
tempt to move away from an essentially linear, attrition oriented de-
fense. They will see it as emphasizing offensive action and maneuver
warfare, and as an attempt to move the focus of combat action into East
European (Warsaw Pact) territory. They may see little new, however, in
the concept of deep attacks by air and missile forces?something that has
characterized NATO operational planning for many years. AirLand Bat-
tle's emphasis on offensive maneuver and Western debate over its role in
an essentially defensive alliance could heighten Soviet concerns about the
possibility of NATO ground maneuver forces attacking through gaps in
Pact lines to engage second echelon forces moving in more vulnerable
formations.
The Soviets almost always credit the United States and NATO with
capabilities that actually are only in some early stage of consideration or
development. They also credit the United States with far greater capabili-
ty to work its will in NATO than it usually has. Therefore, although
Soviet analysts probably will recognize important limitations in US and
NATO capability to implement Deep Attack concepts fully in the near
term, they will probably take AirLand Battle doctrine and Deep Attack
seriously and, in some cases, exaggerate both the intent and the capabili-
ties involved.
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In terms of its immediate impact, the Soviets probably will see a
substantial gap between the newly published US doctrine and current
theater-wide Alliance capability. The Soviets could reach the following
conclusions:
? Because the ability to seriously delay or degrade Pact second eche-
lon forces (as opposed to damaging fixed targets) using conven-
tional weapons is based substantially on target acquisition,
command and control, and weapon systems that have not yet en-
tered US inventories, it is a doctrine that, for the present, even US
forces have only limited capability to carry out. In addition, dif-
ferences among the capabilities and doctrines of NATO air forces
will further impede implementation of Deep Attack concepts
aimed at integrating the interdiction campaign and the close bat-
tle.
? Because NATO forces have few operational reserves and are thin-
ly spread along the entire front, NATO will not have the forces
necessary to conduct large-scale maneuver attacks into the Pact
rear areas. Pact forces, given their size and depth, probably can
deal effectively with the smaller-scale attacks that NATO could
mount.
? Because AirLand Battle is, for the present, a unilateral US
doctrine applicable to corps level and below, it could not radically
alter the character of battle along the entire front, which is
manned predominantly by forces of other nations, for some time.
Nonetheless, the Soviet response will likely be ambivalent. Just as
others do, the Soviets tend to interpret US and NATO military develop-
ments from the perspective of "worst case" assessment. Whether this is
because they believe the worst case may occur or because the approach
offers them leverage in extracting the maximum share of resources from
their own leadership and from their WTO allies is not known. We are
likely, therefore, to see public Soviet expressions of concern and, at the
same time, expressions of confidence in their continuing ability to deal
NATO "aggression" a "crushing defeat." We will have to discern the real
impact of these new US and NATO initiatives from changes, or lack of
changes, in ongoing WTO force development efforts.
The Soviets likely will conclude that they still, for the present, pos-
sess decisive advantages on the battlefield. These advantages stem from
the considerable numerical superiority they continue to enjoy, coupled
with recent advancements in the technology and structure of their fielded
forces and what they regard as the superior moral and fighting qualities
56
Deep Attack
of their troops. Thus, they probably will not see any urgent need to alter
radically their ongoing efforts to modernize equipment and improve
their force structure.
In the long run, however, the WTO probably sees AirLand Battle,
Deep Attack concepts, and especially several important new Western
technologies as very threatening developments. And they are likely to
adjust operational planning, force development, and preparation of the
battlefield to meet the challenge of evolving Western doctrine and tech-
nology. The Soviets are likely to be particularly concerned about the po-
tential for new doctrine using new technology to destroy large armored
formations anywhere on the battlefield, shallow or deep. This would de-
feat the mainstay of their strategy: the powerful armored columns essen-
tial to a high tempo of attack, quick breakthrough, and deep
exploitation.
The Soviets are likely to mount a major political-propaganda cam-
paign. They will aim to gain time and perhaps forestall general NATO
acceptance of the new doctrine and acquisition of at least some of the
new weapons technology. They will also try to create opportunities to
exploit politically the inevitable dissension within NATO that attends
even modest reexamination of programs, plans, or strategy. This effort
probably will fall within the overall context of the Soviets' continuing
campaign to forestall deployment of new NATO intermediate range nu-
clear forces. It will focus on what the Soviets will characterize as a re-
newed and expensive arms race, the destabilizing effects of the doctrine
and the new technology, and the potential?according to the Sovi-
ets?for raising (rather than lowering) the potential for war and its ulti-
mate escalation to the nuclear level.
Current Trends and Possible Countermeasures
Both AirLand Battle and the SHAPE concept depend considerably
on attacks against deeply echeloned WTO forces in order to gain battle-
field advantage. Both also seek advantage through closer integration of
this interdiction effort with the close battle involving first echelon forces.
And both recognize that for the foreseeable future NATO air forces will
constitute the principal means for such attacks.
Both approaches seek to achieve their effect principally by isolating
first echelon enemy forces on the battlefield. This will maintain a combat
ratio between engaged forces that will not allow the WTO to maintain
the high tempo of attack and the early decisive breakthrough that its
strategy demands. With this in mind, there are four generic categories of
CF7
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Deep Attack
0 response, any one or combination of which would work against both
AirLand Battle and the SHAPE concept.
(I)
cn Add combat power to the first echelon. The Soviets could increase
ca the combat power of their first echelon in one of three ways. They could
reallocate units from the second echelon (i.e., place more divisions for-
ward); they could increase the strength of existing units across the board
> through changes to organization and equipment; or they could place
- 0 more Soviet, vice East European, divisions in the first echelon.
- 0
(1) Considering current WTO organization and operational doctrine,
20-25 divisions probably would be in the first echelon of an attack
o against NATO's Central Region." Almost half of these divisions are like-
-,
ly to be East European. Analysis of the terrain in Western Europe, how-
ever, suggests that this region would support well over 30 divisions in the
(T)
first echelon. To increase the combat power of their first echelon by at
cn
least 20 percent, therefore, the WTO need do little more than change
operational plans. This option is a relatively quick fix. The forces are
available in the more than 50 WTO divisions already located in Eastern
Europe in peacetime; so no more forces from the USSR would necessarily
n.)
be required, and the WTO would suffer no substantial mobilization or
movement time penalty.
. .
0
Alternatively, the Soviets could put more of their own divisions in
the first echelon. Soviet divisions are substantially more powerful than
0 those of their East European allies; they have more modern equipment
and heavier tables of organization and equipment. This option, how-
ever, would necessitate some advance movement of divisions from the
western USSR.
cn
cn Adding combat power to the first echelon would impose some
penalties on the WTO. It would require greater concentration of forces
than current Soviet doctrine regards as prudent when faced with the
prospect of nuclear escalation. It would put more WTO forces within
cn
range of the bulk of NATO's weapons. It would boost NATO's aircraft
sortie generation capability due to reduced turn-around time, and would
enhance NATO's ability to avoid WTO air defenses by using stand-off
N.)
weapons. It also would complicate the WTO logistic problem and proba-
bly would force the Soviets to revise their existing efforts to make ad-
vance battlefield preparations for routes of advance, logistic stocks, and
so forth. Finally, it would require substantial reworking of plans for em-
ployment of second echelon forces?in essence, a fairly fundamental re-
view of operational concepts.
Deep Attack
Another way to increase the first echelon's combat power is to field
more capable weapon systems or make organizational changes that add
more weapons to existing units. Indeed, the WTO has been doing both in
the past few years and might be able to increase their efforts in this re-
gard.
The Soviets have a continuing, dynamic program to modernize their
ground forces, and they give priority to their forces in Central Europe. In
the past few years, the Soviets have added a new generation of tanks and
have substantially modified earlier generations. They also have fielded
new towed and self-propelled artillery (much of which is likely to be nu-
clear-capable), substantial numbers of infantry combat vehicles, a new
generation of antitank weapons, and close support aircraft and helicop-
ter gunships.2' The Soviets' East European allies, however, are moderniz-
ing much more slowly. This could cause significant weaknesses in the
WTO combat forces opposite NATO's Central Region, especially if ?as
seems likely?the Soviets rely on Polish and Czech forces for the bulk of
the combat power in the north and south, respectively.
The Soviets also have been modifying the organization of their
ground forces in Central Europe. For example, the Soviets have recently
increased the infantry and artillery components in armored units; and
they appear to be increasing the number of tubes in at least some artillery
batteries. 22
Decrease time required to commit second echelon. A second way for
the WTO to respond is to decrease the time required to commit second
echelon forces. One development in this regard may be the creation of
what the WTO calls an Operational Maneuver Group (OMG). The
OMG appears to be a direct descendant of what in World War II was
called an "operational group." Tank and mechanized "corps"?in reality,
reinforced divisions?were assigned top commanders and given the best
equipment; then they were used to strike quickly and deeply into the ene-
my rear.
Today's OMG appears to be a tailored combat formation of division
or corps size, created out of the existing order-of-battle. It is intended to
be highly mobile and more survivable and self-sustaining than other
units. An OMG would be a heavily armored force reinforced with artil-
lery, air assault elements, and aviation. It would follow closely on the
heels of the first echelon and would be committed early, either to assist
the first echelon or to get into the NATO rear area. Once in the NATO
rear, the OMG's mission would be to seize important objectives, destroy
operational reserves, interfere with command and control, and interrupt
59
Deep Attack
o whatever NATO mobilization and reinforcement efforts were under-
0
o way .23
DJ
cn Improve counter-air capabilities. Counter-air improvements, or the
cn
=,
a) ability to interrupt air-ground coordination through physical and elec-
? tronic attacks on C3I systems, would also affect either AirLand Battle or
a
m the SHAPE concept because both depend on NATO's offensive air capa-
a
> bility. As noted earlier, the WTO hopes to neutralize NATO airpower
-0 by conducting a series of theater-wide strategic air operations against
-0
(7) NATO airfields, air defenses, nuclear storage, and command and con-
a) trol. Although anticipating heavy losses, they expect to cripple NATO
<
airpower. And with the air reserves available from the USSR, they ex-
? pect to be able to deny NATO the air superiority it requires to compen-
-,
7) sate for insufficient ground forces.
o
a) The Soviets are likely to continue, and could even increase, their re-
(T)
o cent emphasis on improving ground attack and close support fighters. In
cn
r\.) addition, the Soviets have a large and currently modernizing force of tac-
- tical ballistic missiles capable of attacks against NATO airfields and de-
o
---- fensive missile sites, and the command and control centers so essential to
_.
r\.) planning and synchronization in both the AirLand Battle and SHAPE
_.
6
-.1 concepts. With both the improved fighters and the ballistic missile force,
. .
? the Soviets could challenge NATO's ability to muster the number of in-
terdiction strikes envisioned by either concept. This would be especially
0
critical if the bulk of NATO aircraft capable of interdiction are tied up
7)
0 for several days trying to gain air superiority.
-0
o The Soviets have broadly reorganized their theater air defense struc-
ture. The reorganization more closely integrates the forces and opera-
-1
_. tions of their strategic and tactical air defense units. They have an air
0
cn warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft in advanced develop-
ment, are fielding true look-down/shoot-down radars on some intercep-
tors, have begun to field a new generation of surface-to-air missiles
0
cn (SAMs), and are assigning more SAMs to protect their maneuver units.
o
o They also have an anti-tactical ballistic missile system in development.
o
cd.) All of these will make penetration?especially deep penetration?of
o
o WTO airspace more difficult and costly.
o
\.)
Prepare the battlefield. The WTO also could do several things to fa-
cilitate rapid movement forward, support of forward echelons, defense
of the rear area, and quick recovery from interdiction damage. For
example, additional engineer units and prepositioned bridging and road
construction and repair equipment and supplies would facilitate rapid
and more dispersed movement and recovery from damage. Other
14
Deep Attack
measures could include advance preparation of road or rail nets to by-
pass choke points; advance preparation of river banks to accept rapid
construction of alternate bridge crossings, perhaps in conjunction with
nearby concealed stocks of bridging equipment; preparation of fords to
facilitate crossing by vehicles with amphibious capability; and prepara-
tion of buried tactical pipelines to move high volumes of petroleum, oil,
and lubricants (POL).
Effect of Trends and Countermeasures
Most US analyses of conventional combat with the WTO in
NATO's Central Region have consistently shown outcomes unfavorable
to NATO. Conventional WTO assaults lead to early reverses. The re-
verses require NATO to use nuclear weapons to redress tactical losses,
prevent decisive breakthroughs, and demonstrate Alliance resolve to use
all necessary means to defend against WTO aggression.
The early reverses seen by these analyses, and the subsequent escala-
tion to use of nuclear weapons, are brought on by the inability of
NATO's forward defense. That defense cannot match the combat power
of the WTO first echelon divisions and their rapid reinforcement by
closely following second echelon divisions and armies. Lacking large
operational reserves of its own, NATO's quick loss of the first echelon
battle is potentially catastrophic and requires immediate escalation. This
conventional force inadequacy weakened the conventional leg of the
triad of Flexible Response. Coupled with an increasingly unfavorable
balance of theater nuclear forces and parity in US and Soviet strategic
nuclear forces, this inadequacy threatened the very fabric of NATO's
deterrent strategy.
Analyses of this sort led US and NATO planners to seek improve-
ments at all levels, including some means to avoid such early losses re-
quiring escalation. The analyses showed that WTO second echelon
forces must be prevented from quickly reinforcing the first echelon. If
this could be done, recent NATO gains in weaponry, command and con-
trol, air defense, and sustainability, coupled with good leadership and
tactics, might enable NATO to hold its own against the first echelon and
establish a coherent defense. New analyses incorporating AirLand Battle
doctrine showed a decent prospect for success in the first echelon, but by
no means certain success. It remained a dicey battle.
Thus, any WTO trends or countermeasures that increase the combat
power of the WTO first echelon, unless matched by equivalent improve-
ments in NATO's first echelon, will likely diminish the efficacy of
0
(D
0
CD
(D
CD
(D
-n
(D
(T)
CD
(D
n.)
n.)
? ?
0
-0
0
0
0
cy,
cy,
0
0
0
cy,
0
0
0
0)
0
0
n.)
Deep Attack
either the AirLand Battle doctrine or the SHAPE concept. NATO must
view with concern the recent changes in the organization and equipment
of Soviet divisions and combat support units in Eastern Europe. These
developments are leading to substantial increases in the combat potential
of these divisions. And these divisions are opposite what will likely be
the decisive theater of combat?NATO Central Region. Further, if the
WTO were to increase the number of divisions committed to the first tac-
tical echelon?which, as shown above, could be done by reallocating ex-
isting forces before reinforcement from the western USSR?NATO's
forces could be quickly overwhelmed. Neither AirLand Battle nor the
SHAPE concept would be effective.
Other countermeasures could be equally damaging to the new con-
cepts. The Operational Maneuver Group's location close to the battle
area, its considerable combat power, and its ability to move forward
rapidly, make timely interdiction more difficult. This calls into question
some of the underlying assumptions of time and distance in both Air-
Land Battle and the SHAPE concept.
Soviet counter-air capability, as well as offensive air capability, has
grown in the past several years. As a result, NATO air forces will be tied
up and used up in the counter-air battle, especially in the first critical
days of the theater campaign. The very likely continuation of this trend
is another matter of considerable concern. US and NATO aircraft
modernization, deployment of the AWACS system, and improved air-
to-air munitions capabilities and stockpiles have relieved NATO some-
what. But all of these have been factored into assessments that showed
the near term value of AirLand Battle and the SHAPE concept. NATO
hopes for more improvements through more effective reinforcement
from the United States, better air-to-ground munitions, improved stand-
off capability, and better battlefield surveillance and target acquisition
capabilities. These hopes, however, depend on programs that either are
far short of effective implementation (such as reinforcement aircraft bed-
down and cross-servicing capabilities) or will not come to fruition for
several more years (such as advanced target acquisition and second
generation "smart" weapons). This is a highly dynamic area of competi-
tion, and the efficacy of either of the new concepts depends on the state
of the competition when combat begins.
Finally, WTO measures to prepare the battlefield can have a deci-
sive effect on what is otherwise a close calculation. NATO needs the
ability to isolate the first echelon battle. Given the large WTO second
echelon forces involved and the rigors of the air battle noted above, this
ability is by no means certain. Additional WTO measures to facilitate
62
Deep Attack
forward movement, support, and rapid recovery from interdiction
damage will further stress NATO's capability to make either AirLand
Battle or the SHAPE concept militarily effective. Moreover, most of
these preparations are especially difficult intelligence targets. If the WTO
is particularly thorough in such preparations, they may derive added
confidence from this "ace in the hole."
Probabilities for the Future
The Soviets are unlikely to take any dramatic new directions in re-
sponse to either AirLand Battle or the SHAPE concept for three reasons.
First, most of the possible WTO countermeasures against both concepts
represent a continuation of trends established over the past decade or
more. Second, the Soviets probably do not regard either new concept as
an urgent, near term threat. And third, the Soviets seldom make radical
changes in the development of their defense programs or doctrine.
What we are likely to see are steady and determined efforts by the
Soviets along established lines to improve the combat potential of their
weapons and units across the board. This greater combat potential will
improve their chances in the first echelon battle and their residual capa-
bility after direct combat or interdiction damage. The Soviets also are
likely to focus on more offensive counter-air capabilities; improved thea-
ter air defenses, probably including accelerated development of defenses
against cruise and tactical ballistic missiles; and improved theater infra-
structure to facilitate movement and damage recovery.
This is not to say that the overall results of their programs will not
be dramatic. A look at the cumulative effect of Soviet military achieve-
ments in the past decade shows clearly what a determined, consistent ef-
fort can accomplish. The USSR was already ahead of the United States in
numbers of most weapon systems. In recent years the Soviets have over-
taken us in the technology level of several fielded weapons and equaled
us in many more. Now they are beginning to threaten the former strong
US lead in three generic systems critical to both AirLand Battle and the
SHAPE concept: fighter-attack aircraft, precision guided munitions, and
surveillance and reconnaissance.24 And the Soviets will continue to strive
for and achieve advances in new technologies. They have been substan-
tially outspending the United States in military research, development,
test, and evaluation (RDT&E) for many years and are now at double US
levels.25
Many of the countermeasures discussed here would, however, im-
pose some serious difficulties on the Soviets and their WTO partners. All
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Deep Attack
exact money and manpower from economies that cannot spare either.
During the past two decades, the Soviets have achieved a position of
considerable strength relative to NATO; they have done this at the cost
of economic well-being and consumer needs at home. Therefore, the
Soviets probably were looking forward to relatively less need for mas-
sive military investments in the next decade. With the notable exception
of planning modifications?which, in addition to their relatively low
costs, might be the most effective?most of the countermeasures to either
AirLand Battle or the SHAPE concept would seem to cost the WTO more
than implementation of the concepts would cost NATO. Nonetheless,
the past record indicates that the Soviets would pay the price rather than
lose a hard-won advantage.
Indeed, the added investment burden on the WTO may prove to be
a side benefit of either concept. More pressure by the Soviets on their
WTO allies for increased defense spending would further strain an al-
ready reluctant alliance. This fact, and the fact of additional costs to the
Soviets themselves, could provide added incentives for them to seek re-
lief through arms limitation agreements of mutual benefit. If not, then at
least the added strains on the Soviet economy, society, and political sys-
tem may prove beneficial in limiting the Soviets in some other way, such
as reducing their willingness to exploit opportunities that might have
large resource costs.
To the extent that either AirLand Battle or the SHAPE concept
diminishes the WTO's chances for a quick and decisive breakthrough of
NATO's forward defense, deterrence is improved. The Soviets realize
that general nuclear war would devastate their homeland as well as all of
Europe. They have based their strategy for a war in Europe?a war they
probably don't want any more than we do?on three objectives: deter
NATO's use of nuclear weapons, overwhelm NATO's forward defense
quickly, and bring about the early political collapse of the Alliance. The
three are completely interdependent. The first allows the second, the sec-
ond facilitates the first and the third, the third may preclude the first, and
so on. But the key is the second: overwhelm NATO's forward defense
quickly.
If the Soviets do not achieve the quick breakthrough that this strate-
gy demands, then they face a serious dilemma. Nuclear weapons offer
them no panacea under these conditions; the Soviets would face the same
prospect of escalation and consequent devastation that guides their
strategy and deters use of nuclear weapons at the outset. A prolonged
war of attrition would bring to bear the superior economic, industrial,
and manpower potential of the West, open severe cracks in an already
4.1
Deep Attack
reluctant WTO alliance, and invite "periphery pecking" by other powers
that have had to endure Soviet arrogance for much of the 20th century.
The Soviets are likely, therefore, to calculate that they must be able
to achieve quick victory with conventional weapons if the attempt is to
be worth the risk. So long as they cannot be confident of gaining a quick
victory, NATO's deterrence efforts remain effective.
CONCLUSIONS
In the past several years, a number of initiatives aimed at
strengthening NATO's defenses have emerged, grouped under the head-
ing of Deep Attack concepts. These concepts focus on improving con-
ventional defense by attacking in the enemy's rear to disrupt or delay his
follow-on forces, thereby controlling the flow of enemy forces into the
battle. Two concepts?SHAPE's Follow-on Force Attack concept and the
US Army's AirLand Battle doctrine?have received particular attention.
Strategic Concerns
Alliance deliberations on the political acceptability and military
utility of Deep Attack concepts will hinge on their strategic implications.
Both the SHAPE concept and AirLand Battle doctrine have come under
attack because no strategic rationale has been developed to show how
each fits into the existing framework. For NATO, the strategic rationale
must be centered on support and reinforcement of the existing Flexible
Response strategy. Pursuing Deep Attack concepts that significantly re-
duce reliance on nuclear weapons creates severe problems for NATO
because such a move is viewed as an attempt to "decouple," thereby un-
dermining Flexible Response.
Support for Deep Attack concepts should not be based on the argu-
ment that emerging technology offers an opportunity to substitute Deep
Attack conventional capabilities for theater nuclear forces. NATO's con-
ventional and nuclear capabilities are not separate entities; they are
synergistic components of an effective defense posture. One is not substi-
tutable for the other, and improvements in one cannot compensate for
deficiencies in the other.
In the competition for limited resources, first priority must be given
to the most dangerous threat to NATO. Currently, that threat is
the ability of forward-deployed WTO forces to achieve a quick
6!
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Deep Attack
breakthrough of NATO's forward defenses. Deep Attack concepts, then,
must be directed as follows: first, against engaged forces and follow-on
forces close to the forward battle; second, against more deeply echeloned
forces and targets that become significant somewhat later in the battle;
and last, against targets that become significant only in a war of attri-
tion.
Tactical Deep Attack and strategic Deep Attack should be dif-
ferentiated. Tactical Deep Attack?done with conventional weapons?
should concentrate on enemy forces that can support a breakthrough at-
tack and targets key to fighting the ground and air wars. These are gen-
erally up to about 150 kilometers behind the line of battle. It would focus
on warfighting, although it would also enhance the conventional leg of
deterrence. Strategic Deep Attack, on the other hand, could be accom-
plished using theater nuclear weapons. (Strategic Deep Attack can be at
closer or longer ranges.) It should be directed principally against key
transshipment points and those strategic reinforcing echelons deep in
Pact territory. It would focus on deterrence and, should deterrence fail,
limiting war.
Tactical Deep Attack, then, provides a fertile area for the key link-
age between conventional and nuclear strategy. Threatening the area ap-
proximately 150 kilometers behind the line of battle and beyond with
nuclear weapons will hold strategic reinforcements from the USSR at
risk, and it will free conventional resources to concentrate on those
WTO forces which are the most serious and immediate threat to NATO's
defenses. Limiting conventional Deep Attack to tactical uses adds credi-
bility to NATO's stated objective should deterrence fail: to reestablish
NATO boundaries, not to carry the war deep into WTO territory and
threaten the Soviet homeland. It provides for intrawar deterrence by de-
nying the WTO its military objectives at the conventional level. And it
also, by clearly limiting the operational depth of the war, avoids ambigu-
ous signals and weapons employment that might either give the Soviets
cause for deliberate escalation or lead them into use of nuclear weapons
under the impression that they were under nuclear attack themselves.
Doctrinal Concerns
There are a number of doctrinal and procedural issues that must be
resolved before Deep Attack concepts could be implemented in NATO.
The theater commander's need for flexibility to allocate Deep Attack sys-
tems, primarily airpower, is most important. The commander must be
able either to reinforce the battle at corps level or below (through the
mechanism of AirLand Battle) or to destroy massed enemy reinforcing
echelons (concentrating Deep Attack systems at theater level).
66
Deep Attack
In practical application, AirLand Battle thrives on early allocation
of airpower to support the ground battle; this process reduces the extent
of centralized control and application. The SHAPE concept, however,
plans for more traditional use of airpower through centralized allocation
and application theater-wide; this reduces the corps commanders' plan-
ning window and, therefore, their ability to fully synchronize air attack
and ground maneuver. This implies that the more closely Deep Attack
concepts are tied to the ground forces battle plan, the earlier airpower
must be allocated to a specific ground commander.
Although there are obvious differences, AirLand Battle and the
SHAPE concept can be complementary. AirLand Battle seeks to integrate
airpower with the ground commander's battle plan more closely than
does the SHAPE concept. But that should be expected because AirLand
Battle is a corps-level doctrine while the SHAPE concept applies more ex-
plicitly to theater and region levels. Since they can be highly complemen-
tary, we must avoid temptations to choose between the two. Therefore,
we must avoid early commitment to procedures or procurements that
lock us into either approach to the exclusion of the other.
Soviet Responses
Deep Attack concepts are designed to strengthen NATO's conven-
tional defenses, thereby denying the WTO the quick breakthrough and
deep exploitation that its strategy demands. Therefore, these concepts
will undoubtedly demand considerable attention from Soviet planners.
The Soviets will perceive a substantial gap between Deep Attack con-
cepts and current NATO capabilities to carry out the concepts fully. But
they will see both AirLand Battle and the SHAPE concept as potentially
threatening in the long run.
The Soviets are likely to orchestrate a public campaign against the
new concepts and technology to gain time; to possibly forestall NATO's
early acceptance of some aspects of the concepts, and its acquisition of at
least some of the technology; and to show dissension in an Alliance that
shudders at the mere thought of modifying doctrine or strategy. They
probably will do this within the overall context of their existing cam-
paign against NATO's INF initiatives.
The WTO goal will continue to be a rapid breakthrough attack deep
into NATO territory, forcing a political collapse of NATO before it can
decide to use nuclear weapons. The Soviets will not alter this strategy be-
cause of AirLand Battle or the SHAPE concept but will continue efforts
to structure their forces to achieve rapid advance rates in combat. WTO
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Deep Attack
o nembers, particularly the Soviets, have made significant conventional
0(1) rorce improvements in the past decade; and we are more likely to see
:ontinuing efforts in this regard than to see any substantial departure
(?).:rom established trends.
(T)
However, the WTO does have some options that could offset the
Sa advantages of the new concepts and compensate to some extent for the
a new technology. The WTO could increase the combat potential of its
-0> forward echelons by adding divisions (the terrain could support at least a
20 percent increase), by assigning more Soviet (vice East European) divi-
sions to the first echelon, or by adding more and better equipment to ex-
a..
'sting divisions. The WTO also could increase the speed and ease with
o-n which follow-on forces could move forward and recover from interdic-
tion damage. Some examination of all of these options should be ex-
pected, and the WTO likely will adopt at least some of these measures.
(T)
WTO strategy is to achieve a quick conventional breakthrough of
c
(D NATO's defenses and inhibit NATO's first use of nuclear weapons. Any
0" decrease in the WTO's confidence in its ability to carry out this strategy
=,? increases the risks to the WTO of a conventional attack against NATO.
Thus, unless the Soviets are confident that AirLand Battle and the
SHAPE concept will not work, that the new technology will not prove
-`1 out or will not be acquired in significant numbers, or that they can over-
o whelmingly compensate for the concepts' combined effects, these devel-
opments will enhance deterrence. The Soviets, inclined in any case to be
7i conservative planners, are unlikely to have such confidence.
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APPENDIX A
WEAPON SYSTEMS CHARACTERISTICS
The destruction of enemy targets in war involves a complex sequence of
events that must be conducted with timeliness and precision. As timeliness and
precision improve, lethality becomes great enough to significantly reduce the
enemy's ability to fight.
These sequential events may occur in a few short seconds, as in close com-
bat; or they may take hours, even days, with variations in distances and in mili-
tary and political circumstances. But the basic requirements remain the same.
1. Detection. Determining that something of interest is within the area of
concern.
2. Recognition. Determining what is out there, to include as many charac-
teristics as possible, such as location, movement, size, and vulnerabil-
ities.
3. Decision to attack. Determining if and when the target is important
enough to warrant expenditure of resources, based primarily on a combi-
nation of the threat it poses and target vulnerabilities.
4. Weapons choice. Determining which weapons to use, based on weapons
availability and capability combined with target vulnerabilities.
5. Weapons allocation. Determining source of weapons, based on location,
inventories, condition, and comparative capabilities of possessing units.
6. Weapons transport. Determining whether the strike will be conducted by
surface or air, aircraft or missiles, etc., to put weapons in position to en-
gage the target.
7. Target acquisition. Once in the target area, the delivery vehicle must ac-
quire the target to release weapons within their effective envelopes.
8. Weapons delivery. The weapons must be released under parameters
which allow them to engage the target.
9. Target destruction. The weapons must have sufficient lethality, through
a combination of accuracy and power, to effectively remove the target as
a threat.
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. .
Overlaying this sequence of events is the necessity for a command, control,
and communication (C3) system to distribute information vertically and laterally
among the actors. Because C3 takes place at every event in the chain, it is
simultaneously the area of greatest potential payoff and greatest potential
vulnerability. More than any other factor, C3 can be responsible for enormous
success when conducted well, or disastrous failure when conducted poorly. Ulti-
mately, C3 is the line through which leadership is exercised, and wars are won
through leadership.
Research and development efforts in target detection and destruction re-
quirements are wide-ranging but can generally be grouped into three broad cate-
gories: surveillance, information processing and dissemination, and weapons
systems and munitions. Most current efforts in the first two categories are being
conducted under the auspices of major joint service programs. Weapons systems
and munitions are being developed in support of the major joint programs in
some cases and independently in others.
The Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) has com-
bined a number of service-directed efforts. The program aims to meet the Army
requirement to find moving targets within the corps area of interest and the Air
Force requirement to find moving and fixed targets of enemy second echelon
forces.'
A common multimode radar system will combine moving target indication,
fixed target indicating synthetic aperture radar, and real time weapon guidance
capabilities. The high altitude Lockheed TR-1 aircraft will carry the system for
the Air Force-wide area surveillance mission. The Grumman OV-1 Mohawk air-
craft will carry a less complex version for the Army corps area mission. In addi-
tion to the image intelligence gathering mission, both aircraft can be equipped to
gather and exploit signal intelligence.27
The initial JSTARS is not fully autonomous, but transmits data via data link
to automatic data processing (ADP) and tracking hardware in several large vans
at corps and theater levels. Decisionmakers in the vans then relay target assign-
ment information via data link to the platform aircraft and to strike aircraft or
surface-to-surface missiles. The radar system then continues to provide guidance
information to the strikers until they acquire and strike their respective targets.28
Later in the decade, when microcircuits with better ADP are developed un-
der DOD's Very High Speed Integrated Circuit and Very Large Scale Integrated
Circuit programs, the decisionmaking and targeting processes may be collocated
in-flight in a large "command center" aircraft. Such a system would greatly re-
duce vulnerability to communications monitoring or interference, but at the
possible cost of greater exposure of decisionmakers to enemy force.
The Army's primary OV-1 collection platform extends the eyes of the
corps. In addition, the Remotely Piloted Vehicle with Target Acquisition/Desig-
nated Aerial Reconnaissance System can be cued by JSTARS to extend the eyes
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of the division and brigade beyond ground line of sight to the full range of divi-
sion direct support artillery weapons.
The primary attack systems to be cued by JSTARS will be the Air Force
Stand-off Attack Weapon and the Army Corps Support Weapons System. These
weapons will be powered, guided dispensers, designed to carry a full range of
submunitions against armor, personnel, or fixed targets. They will give targeting
flexibility, and the "fire and forget" concept will reduce exposure to enemy de-
fenses during delivery. 29
Weapons under consideration for the Army surface-to-surface mission in-
clude the Vought T-22 Improved Lance and the Martin Marietta T-16 Patriot
missiles. The Air Force is considering modified forms of these two missiles for
the air-to-surface mission, as well as the Brunswick Low Altitude Dispenser and
a modified form of the General Dynamics Tomahawk cruise missile. All of these
would initially provide a stand-off range of 10 to 20 miles by flying a rocket
boosted profile to release terminally guided submunitions over the target with
appropriate kill characteristics.38
DOD is using an incremental preplanned product improvement (P31) ap-
proach to developing these weapons. They will start with pure inertial naviga-
tion system guidance and advance to more sophisticated systems like the Global
Positioning System and JSTARS as conditions allow. The weapons will have
modular guidance and control units, separate propulsion units, and a variety of
modular payloads. This approach should allow rapid integration of improve-
ments.31
Initially, these attack systems will serve a specialized role, concentrating on
soft, emitting targets, such as enemy high-threat terminal and battlefield de-
fenses like the SA-6, SA-8, and follow-on surface-to-air missile sites. The Joint
Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (JSEAD) program is managing this special-
ized mission. In the defense suppression role, these weapons will augment the air
delivered, long range High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) and the short
range Sidewinder with Anti-Radiation Missile seeker (SIDEARM), currently un-
der late development and early procurement.32
Information processing and dissemination to the right places at the right
times ultimately ties the sequential steps together for target destruction, thereby
determining the effectiveness of combat power. Two major joint programs and
numerous minor joint and service programs pursue these ends.
The Joint Tactical Fusion Program is developing automatic data processing
assistance for a common service requirement to reduce/correlate available sen-
sor data into single meaningful events, which can help decisionmakers or intelli-
gence users to reduce tactical uncertainty.33 The computer science goal is to
develop artificial intelligence to the point that "thinking" computers will sort the
glut of incoming information, evaluate the data, suggest probable actions by
enemy forces, and list the best responses.34
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After the information is fused, it must be disseminated with necessary deci-
sions, instructions, and amplifications to various users for differing functional
applications. The Joint Tactical Information Data System (JTIDS) is the largest
development program for this requirement. Information can be transmitted, us-
ing verbal, written, and graphic means that are secure and jam-resistant, to re-
ceiver terminals small enough for use by fighter aircraft and soldiers in the field.
This C3I development will allow users at all levels to monitor enemy positions as
well as the positions and conditions (such as fuel and ammunition state) of other
friendly forces in the area. The user can selectively screen his monitoring to
eliminate undesired information during critical activities. Included with JTIDS is
the Army and Marine Corps Position Location Reporting System (PLRS). This
system will automatically provide commanders with near real-time, precise loca-
tions of their forces on the battlefield, regardless of terrain, weather, or geo-
graphical location.38
The Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems
(JINTACCS) program is developing standards and testing selected joint service
tactical data systems to ensure that they are interoperable and compatible.36
The Joint Tactical Communications Program (TRI-TAC) is managing the
joint transition of the services from their current tactical analog equipment to a
modern digital communication system providing voice, data, and facsimile.37
Two major Air Force weapons systems under development are not being
managed in direct consonance with the broad-based joint programs but will
greatly enhance weapons delivery capability. They are the Surface-to-Surface
Airfield Attack Missile (SSAAM) and the Low Altitude Navigation & Targeting
Infra-Red System for Night (LANTIRN).
The SSAAM would be used to close enemy runways either before aircraft
could launch for attacks on friendlies or while they are airborne, forcing disper-
sal to much more vulnerable alternate recovery airfields. Candidate ballistic mis-
siles include variants of the US Pershing II, the French M-4, and the Lockheed
Axe, which uses the Trident C-4 booster for propulsion. Range would be ap-
proximately 350 nautical miles with a 14,000-pound payload. The warhead
would contain over 350 kinetic energy penetrator submunitions to be dispensed
in a pattern along a runway target. Each submunition would penetrate a runway
before detonation to cause an upheaval of the surface, making it time-consuming
and difficult to repair. One such submunition has completed the development
process by the Air Force under the name "clustered airfield defeat" munition and
is being further refined as the "boosted kinetic energy penetration." Circular er-
ror probable for the submunitions is 100-150 feet, depending on target range.
Dispersal pattern width is 200-500 feet, depending on dispensing altitude.38 As-
suming use of off-the-shelf hardware, development costs are estimated at $500
million, and production could begin within 4 years.39
This concept is believed capable of closing all hardened airfields in Warsaw
Pact nations within 10 minutes. NATO would gain immediate air superiority
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while conserving aircraft for other critical missions. It would require no data link
and, therefore, would be unjammable. It could be retargeted before launch in
less than 10 seconds.48
The LANTIRN system, or a Forward Looking Infra-Red system like it, will
add a day/night, adverse weather attack capability to single seat aircraft by per-
forming three basic functions:
1. Perform low-level day or night navigation and automatic terrain follow-
ing, using a Texas Instruments terrain following radar and a Martin
Marietta or Ford Aerospace wide field of view imaging infrared sensor.
2. Acquire, identify, and prioritize land targets, based on preprogrammed
recognition criteria. Target data is then transferred to the aircraft fire
control system, which will launch multiple Maverick missiles against
several targets on the same pass.
3. Acquire, automatically track, and laser-designate fixed ground targets,
using either FUR imagery or visual techniques.
The terrain-following radar, FLIR, and tracking/laser-designating technology
have been proven in previous systems. But DOD views the target recognizer sys-
tem as a technically challenging, high-risk item, and it has been classified as an
advanced development program. The recognizer has been under competitive de-
velopment since early in the program, and both systems seem on track.
Combined development and initial operational test and evaluation programs in
late 1984 could lead to rapid production startup at that time.41
In the munitions category, general-purpose bombs will continue to be im-
portant and will benefit from more precise fuses plus more sturdy retarding de-
vices, such as the air-inflatable assembly, for low-altitude releases. Glide bomb
units will continue in sizes up to 2,000 pounds, with TV, imaging IR, and laser
guidance. They will include low-level configurations that climb after release to
acquire the target and then dive onto it. Better guidance and shaped-charge ex-
plosives will upgrade the AGM-65 Maverick in reliability and lethality.
Various tactical munitions dispensers are under development to deliver sub-
munitions:
1. GATOR Mine disperses mixed antiarmor and antipersonnel devices to
wait in the target area.
2. Cluster Bomb Units have combined-effects munitions for real-time at-
tacks against combined armor and personnel targets.
3. Extended Range Antiarmor Munition will dispense "smart" antiarmor
submunitions in the target area. When the submunition's acoustic sensor
detects an approaching vehicle, it hurls an explosive above the vehicle.
An infrared sensor in the explosive detects when it is exactly overhead
and fires a shaped charge to create a self-forging projectile aimed at the
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heat source. If the IR sensor fails to detect a hot target against which to
fire a self-forging projectile, then late in its trajectory the charge deto-
nates in a different manner, producing a shotgun effect useful against
personnel and lightly armored targets.42
This exploration shows clearly that emerging technology holds great
promise for the future in dealing with enemy assaults. But we need to follow this
path with prudence.
While the least complex surveillance systems and limited smart munitions
are coming on line now, the more complex systems like sophisticated IMINT,
weapons system guidance, information processing, and information dissemina-
tion are not projected to complete development until the mid-eighties; meaning-
ful deployment will not be until the late eighties. Given the normal failures and
time-consuming solutions, plus our track record of delay in search of a more
perfect capability, fielding of these systems is doubtful before 1990. An even
later date is likely because this modernization, unlike others, requires that all
functions?surveillance, information processing/dissemination, and weapons
systems/munitions?come on line successfully. Only then will their synergistic
effect allow our capability to do anything more than creep ahead at the routine
rates of the past.
There is a great danger in this modernization process: we may become too
enchanted with the potential of emerging technology. First, this may make us fail
to continue procurement of proven weapons systems and C3 upgrades to carry
us through any war in the meantime. And second, we may build current
strategy, plans, and tactics as though the potential capability already exists. We
must commit to the new systems today, but only in terms of funds for develop-
ment and procurement setup. We must not commit away from our old systems
until the new systems are truly proven capable and reliable, and are fully de-
ployed to all using agencies.
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APPENDIX B
COST IMPLICATIONS
Any attempt by NATO to upgrade its defensive posture, whether through
modernization or increased force structure, will require economic sacrifices from
all nations involved. Such has been the case ever since the Alliance was formed.
But in the past, the European NATO countries relied heavily on US leadership
and dollars to provide a credible deterrent.
Following World War II, NATO's deterrent posture was based almost ex-
clusively on the US nuclear arsenal, with modest conventional contributions
made by NATO countries. At the time this arrangement made good sense since
Europeans generally were concerned with domestic economic recovery.
In the 1960s, the picture began to change substantially, at least from the US
perspective. Europe had recovered economically and could start sharing more of
the burden for its defense. WTO conventional forces became viewed as more of a
threat, primarily because of the buildup of forces in the GDR, Poland, and
Czechoslovakia. Soviet nuclear forces were expanding and, in the early 1960s,
were perceived to be stronger than they actually were. This in turn raised ques-
tions about the credibility of the US nuclear forces acting as a deterrent against a
WTO attack in Central Europe.
US leadership pushed for a NATO strategy that relied more on conven-
tional defense while still retaining "flexible" options, up to and including a strate-
gic nuclear attack by US forces on the Soviet Union should the WTO attack
Western Europe. NATO adopted the Flexible Response strategy (MC 1473) in
1967. The cost of implementing the strategy still fell in large part on the United
States. Efforts to coax the Europeans into paying a larger share for their own de-
fense resulted in burden sharing arrangements, particularly with the FRG. The
West Germans agreed to offset part of the costs for stationing US forces in the
FRG. Another tactic used by the US government was to threaten to withdraw
substantial US forces from Europe. The return of limited air and ground forces to
the United States in 1968, with the promise of their rapid return to Europe in a
crisis, partially carried out this threat.
While these tactics had some effect on the Europeans, they did not cause the
Europeans to assume the bulk of the responsibility for their own defense. In the
1970s, the United States continued efforts to reduce its costs for European de-
fense by establishing a series of force goals for all NATO partners. Specific areas
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of modernization or force building were specified for each NATO country over
each of the succeeding 5 years. The primary purpose was to give each nation a
series of challenging force goals early enough so they could be included in long
term budgeting processes. Some progress was made, but all of the nations
continually fell short of the planned force goals. In practice, although nations
agreed to the force goals, domestic politics and economics prevented them from
meeting those goals.
The conventional force buildup in the early 1970s provided a shell for con-
ventional defense. However, NATO's forward defense lacked credibility because
of clearly identified maldeployment of forces and severe shortages in manpower
and equipment. In 1977, NATO initiated the Long Term Defense Program to put
some teeth into its forward defense posture.
One could argue that all the US initiatives ultimately were designed to force
European NATO countries to bear more of the burden for their own defense. But
even with these efforts, the United States was successful only in coaxing the
Europeans to hold the line in defense spending during the 1970s. This was a vic-
tory of sorts because during the same period US defense spending as a percent of
the gross national product (GNP) was decreasing .4 3
Generally speaking, during the 1970s, economic conditions were reasonably
good for the primary NATO countries. Real GNP growth, while not as high as
during the 1960s, was substantial. Unemployment and interest rates were down,
and only inflation was considered high by most countries.44 During relatively
good economic times then, the United States was not successful in gaining sup-
port from the European NATO countries for any substantial real increase in de-
fense spending as a percent of GNP.45
Today the United States has tabled a new initiative to strengthen conven-
tional defenses in Europe. The efforts during the 1970s were deemed insufficient
to build a credible forward defense for the 1980s. SHAPE's Follow-on Force At-
tack concept, according to the United States, will significantly improve conven-
tional defenses and enhance deterrence, making war less likely. Estimates of the
concept's cost vary but are roughly $9.5 billion.46 This amounts to $1 billion for
development and $8.5 billion to field and man the systems for 10 years.47 Gen-
eral Bernard Rogers, SACEUR, has suggested that the concept could be paid for
if NATO nations would increase their annual real growth in defense spending
from 3 percent to 4 percent for each of the next 5 years.40
While spending on defense has been a difficult issue for the West Europeans,
it is more acute now because of the prevailing economic conditions in Europe.
While the rate of of inflation is decreasing in all nations, interest rates and unem-
ployment have not yet decreased.40 In fact, most nations, particularly the United
States, are running large budget deficits; money continues to be tight and interest
rates high, stifling economic growth.
The future does not look much brighter. Predictions are that interest rates
will remain high and unemployment will continue to rise, peaking sometime in
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1983.50 Under the circumstances we can expect European NATO countries to
attend to domestic economic problems more than defense spending against the
Warsaw Pact threat.
The following table shows selected NATO countries' past performance in
trying to meet the 3 percent target established in 1979 for annual real increases in
defense spending. These figures give further evidence that the Europeans will
have great difficulty meeting the 4 percent target.
NATO Defense Spending
Percent Change From Previous Year in Constant Dollars
Country
1979
1980
1981
FRG
1.8
1.9
1.9
Italy
2.6
4.9
?1.2
UK
3.0
2.7
2.1
US
3.4
4.9
5.4
Source: OSD, Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense, March 1982.
In summary, when economic conditions in Western Europe were reasonably
good, European NATO countries had difficulty just holding the line on defense
spending. The industrialized West is now in the middle of a deep recession.
Major NATO countries are experiencing high unemployment and economic
stagnation. Additional revenues are difficult to generate under current economic
conditions. European NATO countries are focusing on real domestic issues, not
on defense against a Warsaw Pact threat that, as viewed by the Europeans, was
never as strong as portrayed by the United States and is weaker today than in
previous decades. For the most part, NATO nations have not met their 3 percent
goal in real growth for defense spending agreed to in 1979. They do not appear
to be in a position to meet the 4 percent goal required to fund the SHAPE
concept.
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