DEMAND PLANE PROBE

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CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7
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February 2, 2004
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May 9, 1960
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MAY 9 1960 4111111 I?R1( N1144144'Proved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Dein'iid Plane Pro But the det$ r Wilt denied kon Hi I 1 etiplut,rh,edheAvi;Zerteciti:111:g eild Why Didn't Ike Know? By WEWARt HENSLEY , WASHINGTON, May 8' (UPI)..--Angry CongteSsional, leaders of both parties today demanded a full investigation into the flight of an American plane over Soviet territory for the purpose of obtaining in- telligence information. Several were particularly irked that such a flight would be made, as the State. Department said, without the knowledge of Presi- tent Eisenhower-- and just a week 'before the President goes to Paris for the summit conference with Soviet Premier Khrushchev. and !British and French leaders. One imktortant Republie,aarnem- ber's (-magi-est, who inSiSted his retalamitairosepiat. ' ex- ploded when aSked abolfrthe in- cident. "Dumb". and "stupid" were :some of the milder expletives he. used to describe the State Depart- ment's handling of the affair. AT THE SAME TIME, high Ad.' ministration officials said ,the in- cident, while embarrassing to this country, would not deter the President. from going to the Paris conference. There was a possibility the rresident would make a nation- wide raido and television address This week as is his custom before attending foreign conferences. If be does, he could scarcely ignore the plane incident. Among those calling for giie.?,?4wa1 investigation were en- ate Democratic Whip Mansfield (Mont.) and chairman Bridges (R.-N. H.), of the Senate GOP , committee. They said in separate inter- I views that. they expect the appro- priate Senate committees to call in Administration officials for a detailed explanation. THE CONGRESSIONAL ang- ger was prompted by the State Department's Frank admission yesterday that the plane doWned over Soviet territory a week ago "probably" was seeking intelli- gence information. It said such nights were designed to protect tie West against a surprise Rus- lair military attack. ? B. PoweM'ItIM A.s. night on ? W hi t ordersftom as pn o ci a s. It also cited as a ingating factor i the Russians' vast' 'corollate ef-, forts against the .West,' : Bridges said the Russians are constantly spying on this country through their far-flung network Jul ageflt(4014 he said 1-ho plane I incident ''eertairily weakened- our p0sition"44- the Nun-unit meeting. The White House declined all I comment on -the flights which prompted Khrushchev to unleash a new barrage ! Among other things, Press refused to say whel 1161-.11 t4iuld in any WaYall r?len 's pia s to visit t tlyTe- l'ol an in Juti,-. 0110111i HIGH officials 'Said the , President ?has no intentions of ; canceling the surnmit meeting. I Mansfield, a key Peynocratic spokesman on foreign af fairs, reed Eisenhower musE, abide by his decision to meet with- the ; leaders of Russia, France,. and I Britain. % 13 u t administration--officials said Khrushchev can etermine die fate of the summit conference within the next feW days: If he turas the plane incident into a public circus by staging a pre-summit trial of the cap- tured pilot, they said, it will dash any hopes of narrowing the East- West gap on such major issues as 1WJ1n. Germany, and disarma- A '4r.t0 0 0 - 441k,g4;4,,S6k0 ? ??o 41 , no '6. Their ird tr,fi- er and, other Wasinngton officials knew noth- ing" of this particular flight, they hoped to keep the way clear for the President and Khrushchev to meet in apparent friendliness at the summit. k411 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 ? proved For ease 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Symington Deplores Strife Regrets Intraparty Personal Attacks By ISABELLE sin," Senator Symington Star Staff Writat said. 'All 50 States must Senator Stuart_ Byrftagton have a; Vote in the selection. of Missouri last.7?'?iateff de, The place to pick our :nomi- plored the "seeds or,naity" flees is the national conven- which he said are' beingSoWil tion." in some Democratic prima- Several other Democratic ries. hopefuls?"announced, un- In an obvious reference to announced, favorite sons, the West Virginia prffnary, avowed, and unavoWed," in where his fellow-Democratic the words of Mrs. 'Katie candidates for the presidency, Louchheim, Democratie vice Senators Hubert Humphrey chairman and chairman of and John F. Kennedy, hate the conference ? also were, been slugging it otit. Senator parading their wares at the Symington', tad the'190 three-day conference which Campaign Conference ' f o r 3,000 women are attending Democratic Women at the from, all 50 States. Sheraton Park Hotel: ' Senators Humphrey and. Kennedy were to fly from West Virginia today long enough to address the final luncheon of the conference, sharing billing with Mrs: Eleanor Roosevelt. Thp two Senators "I know my colleagues Jack will be back in West Kennedy and itibert Hum- Virginia when the votes are I phrey well," the Missourian counted tonight. continued. "They are fine, loyal Americans. ' And they are great Democrats. Any- thing that has been said or . done which might soil the good reputation of these good men should be retracted and corrected. "It saddens me?and I am sure it saddens you?to read where 'good Democrats ques- tion the patriotism or ;per- sonal integrity of other good Democrats. "Bemocrats Care" The dinner also mark the launching of the Demo- crats' camPaign slogan foil' 1960: It is: "Democrats -Care." ? toisf New `Bind Up the Wounds" es votes as a favorite "Once these popularity con: os n, charged that this Na- tests are over." urgediti,- 4-Sion's conduct of foreign af- Senator, who has refuied --fairs has been "liberally enter any primaries, "Ietlistek-marked"` with "dis- move swiftly to bind up the -heartening, dangerous blun- Party's wounds and close ' ders." ranks for the fall election. Zvents of the last several "After all, the election that you and I want to win?the big one that must be won? is a great Democratic victory in Novernber," he said. That includes every level of gov- ernment, local, State and na- tional, he added. The West Virginia pri- mary, where ballots are being cast today, will not settle the Democratic presidential nom- ination "any more than it was determined in Wised).- days involving the United States plane shot do o? R be labeled. the suMMIceonference,' or 'How to 'friends among the nciaro: tiirmS.,r,:the vernor de- "It,: is clear tivisaggpis-? through the ; Na- t onal Aeronautics and Space Agency aila-ti*- state De- partment, - we violated the territo "intogrity of fhe Soviet Union': and we have suffered a formidable Rig? of prtige just before the- - start FO the Summit Conference," _c4n,y...,,,_1!yner assetted. Ifthat had _been a sorry state a affairs one week be- fore? the Summit Conference has now been made even more bleak," he coniplained. "We knew .the conference was corning (arid) its im- portsnee;! Yet "there has been no planning at all. It almost seems as if we have gone out of ota. way to under- mine our unite:- to force the . nations of the world to ques- tion critically our motives and our aims." Williams Echoes Men ilga Williams of iChigan27tokeF srini e administra- tion's handling of the plane incident in a press con- ference before the dinner. "It is wholly indefensible that we should have been dusetrapple.which 'IVAMPreirt e and cred- ibility of the American people in the government before the whole world," he declared. The governor, who will have much to say about how Michigan's votes will be cast at the Democratic conven- tion, repeated his insistence that he is "completely neu- tral" between the various Democratic candidates, with the exception of Senate Ma- jority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas. The Texan, said Gov. Wil- liams, 'Is not the, type of Deiinocrat that conforms to .,thinking og. Michigan. He harSomething less than the bold approach necessary, to meet the challenge of our times". . Senator Johnson "could not carry" Michigan in Novem- ber, while every other pres- ently mentioned Democratic Presidential 'nominee could. the Governor maintained. Available for Veep Gov. Williams acknowl- edged hisnwn availability for the vice presidential nomina- tion, but said he is not a "working candidate." In his speech, the Michigan governor said his party's job is "to wake America up." -He urged adoption of a "solid, tough,, fighting liberal plat- form' at the convention. - Senator Johnson confined his remarks at the dinner to warm praise of Speaker Ray- burn, whom he called "one of the most beloved figures in the Democratic party." In a new twist for such a gathering, Senator Johnson himself was introduced by his wife, "Lady Bird," the wives of other speakers also introduced their soouses. Senator Johnson. said his wife. is "an exciting man to Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 EVANSVILLE kliviokOved For Release 2614/05/43RA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 PRESS Circ.: e. 46,720 Front Edit Other Page Page Page Date:l.111Y 1 0 at Being Barred ? From Hearing irks Capehart By DAN KIDNEY re, WirhttrirtreVAlqiiindent WASHINGTON ? Hodsters have every right to know exactly what went on in the Soviet shoot, down of that U.S. sPS/-plane Sena- tor Homer E. Capehart (R-Ind.) told his Senate colleagues, in a colloquy with Senator Frank IL Lausehe (D-0.) on the Senate floor. Both senatbrs were taking the position that, as members of the, Senate Foreign Relations Com- mittee, they should hie been in-' vited, when committee chairman, .1 Wllhiai Fulbright and ranking committee members were given a "fill-in" on the mat- ler by Secretary of State Chris- inn A. Herter and CIA DIrectof? Allan Dulles yet "flip people of Indiana are en- titled to know what is going oni 1in this case," Senator?I'Capehar( 'said. "As a/mernbek. of the Sen- ate Eoreigh Relations Committee: I am charged' *sith finding outt, and telling; therMI ' Senator Lausche. backed up thisl stand and said that if membersf of the committee are to perform: their duties properly, 'Bey must he informed fully on the case.i Showing, that he was angry ati not being asked to attend the; briefing, 4,j0,1,4?;:gapabart "The EigethONVer administra-; lion should take Congress into itsl confidence. Perhaps we could be! of some help. God knows they; need help, if I can read the rec-! oil( and the times correctly." Lausche explained that he,went, lo the 'VkIfing room, suppoa Sin! II committeemen were invited': but he was told it was .a "closedi meeting foY'the leaders.": ' "PI my embarrassment, I hadi ia leave."?he concluded.".; I S-na o t? Ca peha rt contended I ha i this WaS a violation of "the: fJO io know_ Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 CINCINNATI (vAproved For Release 2004/561 :-plriepP90T00782R000100060001-7 .ip ENQUIRER Circ.: m. 203,960 S. 277,547 Front Edit Other Page Page Page Date: MAY 1 0 1A0 'Thrown Out' / Embarrassed Lati,che Leaves U2 Briefing Enquirer Bureau Special Ohio's. other Democratic , WASHINGTON, May 9? en. Senator, Ste h p. 1,1. Young., also took e oor-olf--triel , Frank .1........LallSche (D. 10) U2 -7iii ., KM' i'Vnaiksj ',vas. in his owri wotds. Th more -i-e d- at closing--; -thrown oat of 1A.1.? briefin We g the-ransweri-1 forl congressional eaciiiiThis ,afternocar:ton the spy-plane ingSt9.1.1.2=6..... .crisis. Lausche was told by a 'fellow Senator that Secretary of State Christian Herter and ' Allan 1.nall.CUP-::, .._r_21 the centrogence Agency, 'were about to brief members , Curtain In any manner-pos- of the Foreign Relations Com- ; sible .. -." Young declared. '1 i!1 ittee on the incident. ... ,Ilet,, then pointed out the kausche. a member of thej committee. rushed down to extent of Russia's espionage l in(!eting room in the activity, in "sub- capitol but was informed it ' ' ..arines off our shores." and . was a -closed" meeting, fin he fact that it is comp:. -1-. House and Senate leaders tively easy or them to gc, only. not for the Foreign Re- information' about rag mill- Jations Committee. tarv effOrtS just by asking, -To my embarrassment," reading or observing. flu' Ohioan declared on the' "In the United pIt'Lltes, we Senate floor, ''I had tolare confronted With a dif-! leave." :ferent situatita" he said.; Ho V' _disr.;_lond that ,The Senator' declared wei newsman, curious of hislea va:.t; wouldn't have- any way of iknowitig. what the.. Russian' illg. asxed him .wliy lthreat all4toUnts to "except by -I told him I' itlas thrownIthe enterte and Courage of (All t," Lauscht Vie ffte CIA and .:I suggestion at_trilkmorning't YOUltir Herter. t.ossiun of the Foreign Rela-fwith ..ivlib :e served, :tiaras Comrnittee they shouldin trk I-1611-se,,, esounding: 1 g'et the background of thelericithierhent, ITC-Said Herter', 'crisis. Senators having the re-,vas a 3ooteriRetetar7 wadi, 'sponsibIlities of foreign rela-bat he 4iltil1a: give "no' Itions "ought to know to theithought iithAtt-eve'r V) appease-i: .: ; . ., ; Iiillest degree pos asible Whatment . -?: ? ..t.??,%,?roluise" at! is happening," he said.the 1,-0?, . - - Ing. ' - -. ' -:,r. I "I AM DISAPPOINTED notThe _ , ,tqr said" or coutsei: 1 being given the right to atAte sum It &rife-rex-ice should', !tend this meeting," Lausch -OW JPrwaltd; trit4 Cciligres81' lstated. 1111.47the nation should "closet I He said he knew the Sovie Our ranks and back up with lUnion was active in espionageetermination our leaders' : jn this country but "that does!who participate . . ." He also f not Mean I condone what haS'Predicted the U2 pilot, Francis; happened . . . I'd like to} PciWers, would' be released by hagHe concluded by say-,trrefterrerME-7, 7---- - hng he hoped he still would!' - ...... . 'be given the right to know. ! I "1 am. neither surprisedi nor ?Nterlo . that . . .; thoSet044,1ave the defense' of this as their re-1 sponsfb11 ty should be com- pelled to penetrate the Iron, The Senattir,j,,1 he made Approved For Release 2004/05/13': CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 St LOUIS Approved For Relehtg2b61111W3 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 1O5T-DISPATCI-1 LOUIS PT-ilhiPATCii tounded lyy JOSEPH PULITZER '? December 12, 1818 MAtishel Puittzer Ptth&Amp: Co_ MI Olive- 1.4 (.7I ? MAin I-111! )uegrion ol Comr91 if it is really true that Secretary Herter and 1...17rThrector Allen Dulles still (16 not know wTio authorized -the-spy *pitite"-4-'S flight over Russia, then the need for a responsible eon, gressiortzttltisastigUtOn is r,?nforced. ? ? mo tio were "briefed" by ?,.,?",.,.;?? the -es onse the twa o bility tar_tte._ flight s1 a no oe pqjnied,,,, Yet it is nine days since the flight was made and five days since Khrushchev announced the plane was shot down. If that period Mr. Dulles cannot find out who decided to launch an espionage flight two Naturally, the existence of an irrernational weeks before the summit conference, then agreement providing safeguards against sur there is something Very wrong with the top Prise attack would make it unnecessary to con Policy control. over intelligence activities ca- ' duct espionage for that purpose. We are ail able of plunging the world into war. - leir such in agreement'. But.it will never he We believe Congress ought not to be con- attaineci)tO long purpose Is to legalize tent with a hrring to liniesti ate. the OP,servation wiit1i we now try itt carrv Tee inquiry should be oroug y o - Th t :principle of open Odes" and objective for the purpose not of e ?httt we cannot expect the Rus- bnrrassing the Eisenhower Administration- but, 1nfl i1frF 't? mal and clottrr dd?c a l- of determining whether military intelligence,.0.ioti tO secrecytro_ t the kind p rkiPr y activities are are sebject . to adequate polico n.Atio-wo Mirv esident ? control. * It is not enough to 'know that Pr'eSiclent# Eisenhower did not persOnally atethOrize this particular flight. Co hopli out Itw?s ou ' at safeguards" eiisf ?against irresponsible ? act ibn at lower levels Of command that may have the gravest international consequences. ' Secretary Herter's statement, in'which he tried 1r) make the best of a bad sittql'on, loaves much to be desired. While ft is Si hat our Government has a responsibility' I protect itself from surprise attack, Mr.'1-1e.rt did not offer any evidence to show 'th't ? was in fact the purposi of the U-2 flig t. Of course it is true-that the Soviet Uri, engages in 4pionage. ?? If it does not fly um ,- parable missions over, the United States, Oaf [nay be because it can get the desired infor- mation without doing Yet the fact remai,r; : that the same flight 'which one country re- ! -lt?Rs as a safequarctegainst surprise attnek ? Ap ,-prded by the other country as a vir it. ' s'ffltiowei'nti;opos 'the 1955 stuininit Cr. fett,:ence. 3prvallIttnce would have to bo uinely rtlattbOt: probably operated en- 44010.1,,,by *and accompanied by real , 4.4 , ? As'-for the pa ?,,r,clvpiture,Draiktr-2. ques 'Whether -ithTlltar ,ifieltrAs iustity such flights, but wJier they , cy- . There is no dissent to the 0-ty,AL ,_ vps disastrously el? COngreSS ck out who timed it and why. ......000.drit. ??101 ? Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 ? CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 An:D.101th SUN MAY 1 4- Morse Talks Talks To Collegians; 2,000 117 Cheer Kennedy "Neither can we justify having 1or the plane there. . . . Sooner or 3$g, later we are going to have incident! , .... .2, , i.....:?!4.4., its itwri,r B. Eviarits-bs. or' accident that will reelase the I A7t staff CarriOpOndrnt] first. bomb, and the liolci,ultilwill (liestertoWn, Md., May 1 .1-3--'',-1,1e0?nn.-4 teign polic litA ' '' Mr. IT14*. -'' - "3.11Lwii4ilitmo-af.' -K8 -had tinued his attaek on.Wtal, he-calls!,manship and s near-17 ,IV Senator John F. Kennedy' "re , the issues ha ?t' ar aetionary i;ecoed:',,today ,)..; nee -einting ' out the ballot oil ...#0 ding his Opponent on toreign poi- TilDP ,Administration's rcli,*0*'`Visr icy, tax issues, Public power .and "a prcdated declaration :of war,!" ,.. , ,,tri the Formosa Straits and-11W aid to educatio,h. - Mr. Morse got warm reJ-iPoilsetNlid*.ga'sl, . , from about 300 students at WaSh.. fli4ittoponenV also differ Oh ington ;College, where .Senat6r1,:bInt 1,40 approving'military 'el0`, tit Kennedy began his Maryland' prificrteral Tvgjillo:ot-Lhe Doin ft mary campaign two ,days tigo...,ki, epublic. he stated, , - The MassechuSetts. Sern'ttor",-, . A ! !..Publies Rowel' IQ crowd reached_nea0 ,.ti 1.000 with ' Mr, Morse zio said Mr. the advantage of:i.sktityig h'ild at ttev- hart ,,,,Leit sill favor o night. Senator tfel?2.0 !at. v a'" _changes bOnefititig7 bi ieic this akternoon, and:. at:hinged on if saysate,ppioses in ain- short notice.. ,t... -- -.,n, :?'!". - eottte tax ''exqMptfens ti The two are the.prinvipal 'con..2,1the loss irif; revenii it tenders tom Mary14. 's sopPoH.' yri Tuesday's DerneerAt.is Presiden- "His p,tiVicerStfor revektu Gal preferentee 'primary. .'lo. the; 'TreararrY 'fraly. 116,,The Oregon Sedaler also- sag .--,whert;Ve are coasiderin ldt he wanted to clarify bis-statdme tax Veatment for low all4i' mid yesterday that he was in p..--`'stiaP- die- laccllate 14xPUarks' II' Kennedy Thowetn?01-': ::.014-- is a char , ged ' ' 17.;t:- .- . d ',Mt'. ,..., k one-manrt momovement,lt, %.-pt'lll-ior on 1-Ie also sai lctrl agreed with the 1160-11lcati're by behalflof nor in alliance With any voting 'against : anacirdnient, one else, he statecl. , I "whereby ' the JrcentIS of ?Iittblic He :repcatet4 tdo, that he Was power were trying to heat hac'; l`no stalking hoc" for Mini E.' the Budget Bureau. and lbi, ap- Stetkenson, whom he., 'fias desig- ministration ,;it. ?the crill'lmq of nate&as his choice far President these'great;e0p,Ciess" after himself.. Finally, ;he 2 declared, bi... oti. Mr. Morse elaborated on this in ponent wori(ed againt inclpdii::; a '-Baltimore televik.don talk to- grants to ervice men under the till education bill and took the night, Saying he would fav6r nay position that Federal aid ;o of the Major Democratic, +Ranch. schools should cover only school dates-'`. even Lyndon ,Inlinsqii-Ji- construction help. Mr. Kennedy to Senatti Kennedy. All ru'e more did vqte for the entire education liberal., he ' said..1 " ' hod, including teachers' pay pro,- He previous134has said it would visions, he added Air be a "mistake%for the party In nominate Senator Johnson.. In his evening,tillt, fac,also said "the onlY thing :that's gnged up on Jack li:erintdilk.his own voting record.- ; Senator ,Miriv?.,?.alamk.4440,ghtt mned this eptaltry ;tila? ? .naissance flights over ussia. ttviet Premier's reac[io in denr- / Russian fighter planes could have "encircled it and forced it down." he said', but,i45.14404,4faiwi shoL4uatiii...4414,44iiiitolasli4g,,, pur- poses Approved For Release 2004/05/13: CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 INDIANAPOLIS (Ind.) TIMES Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 MAY I 0 19S0 Circ.: e. 92,756 S. 105,750 Front Edit Other Page Page Page ; itAbs Datei4., Tell All About Spy: Capehart Times Washington Bureau WASHINGTON, May 10 ? Hoosiers have every right to know exactly what went on in the Soviet shoot-down of that U. S spy-plane Sen. HCLMer , fiapehart, CB, Iner.1 told his Senate colleagues,, in a collo-4, guy with Sen. rank IL; Lausche (D. 0.) on the Sen-41 ate floor. Both senators were taking , the position that, as members of the /Senate Foreign Rela- ? tions Committee, they should have been invited, when Com- mittee rjugrrrian Fullaright Ark.) and rafiririEr COmmittee ' members were given a "fill-in"!, on the Matter by Secretary of State Her arid CIA Director:. Dulles,.yest . """*.lbe "THE PEOPLE of Indla.naL; are entitled to know what is& going nu in this case," Sen.;, Capehart said. "As a member, hi the Senate Foreign Rela4 ions, -Committee. I am charged '..vitivoifinding out and telling', them" Sen. Lausche backed up this stalfd-litici-laid"tnat if mem- bers of the Senate Foreign Re- ' lathtins Committee are to per- form their duties properly, they must be informed fully on the case. Showing that he was an. . gry at not being asked to. at t end the briefing, Sen. (.apehart said: ''The Eisenhower administra- tion should take Congress into its ebnfidence. Perhaps , we could be of some help. God' knows they need help, If I can read the record and the times correctly," Lansche explained that he. went to the briefing room, supposing all committeemen were invited, but he was told it was a "closed meeting for the lsaders." "TO MY embarrassment, I had to leave." he concluded." Sen. Cap ehar t contended that this was a violation of 'the right to know." Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 WMAL (Washington) 12 May 1960 REMARKS OF CONG. ASHLEY Today in Congress at 6:45 P.M. over WMAL (Washington): JOSEPH McCAFFERY: "Again the question today: what really happened to the U.S. plane over Russia, and should the President now go to Russia?-were the questions most often asked at the Capitol as elsewhere. It was revealed that CIA Chief Allen Dulles came to the Capitol again yesterday to outline the situation before a special House Armed Services Subcommittee. According to one who was present, the latest Males briefing, the plane apparently suffered what's called a flame-out(?) at about 70,000 feet, forcing the pilot to come down to a level where he was then forced to the ground. This source reports also that CIA officials have complete confidence in the integrity of the pilot, Francis C. Powers, and they do not know what was involved in his apparent decision to admit that he was a spy. ',Members of the subcommittee voted unanimously to cemmend Dulles and the CIA for their handling of the whole affair. "Today too the House Rules Committee put on the shelf several proposals to subject the CIA to closer Congressional scrutiny. Rules Chairman Howard Smith of Virginia said the committee feels this is not the time to conduct public hearings on the subject. Although no vote was taken, this decision too was apparently unanimous. However, some committee members indicated that they favored a closer look at this question at some future time. "One of several members of Congress I talked to today about the spy incident WAS Toledo, Ohio's congressman, Thomas Ashley. I asked him if, in view of the Now situation that has developed, whether the President should go to Russia next month." ASHLEY: "Well, I think if be has an opportunity to do so, it will be fine. I hardly think that the Russians will have any reason to welcome him, however." HOCAFFERY: "Do you think that our sky spy- incident has ruined any chance of anything happening positively at the coming summit meeting which starts on Monday?" ASHLEY: "I think that it is certainly?casts a very dark shadow over the summit conference. It's perfectly clear, of course, that the position of the United States at this time is far worse than it's been--well, in years, as far as world opinion is concerned. We have lost the initiative as far as world public relations is concerned?It's obvious?and I think that this recent U-2 plane incident has really given them a tremendous iniative that is very very unfortunate and will be for a long time to come." McCAFFERY: "There seems to have been some kind of a coalition cohesing (SIC) behind the administration on this incident. I noticed that in the news today, for example, there's not going to be any effort to press for a joint committee to keep an eye on our intelligence because the feeling seems to be on the Hill, according to the stories, that the less said, the better, about our intelligence service at this time. Looking a little ahead to November, do you -think that this Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 will still be a political issue, even though there seems to be some unity on the part of the Democrats behind the administration 6n their off-again, onpiaga policy/8 ASHLEY: Valls I think very definitely it will be an issue. You're q right when you say that as far as intelligence work is concerned, the less said the better--this is true. Now this is what makes totally outrageous the state- ments of the administration with respect to the plane incident. They wastedno -time whatever with respect to the plane incident. They wastedno time whatever in first denying, then admitting, and finally revealing all as far as this activity is concerned, and the opinion, both in this country-?the measure of opinion in this country, And world-wide too, is that this JO totally unnecessay and uncalled for." McCAFFERY: "It's not the incident so much, it's the handling of the incident after it happened?" ASHLEY: "Absolutely so. We're talkingabout intelligence work and intelligence activity does require a certain amount of secrecy, but this is true when things go wrong as well as when things are going right." Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Various radio stations MAY 15, 1960 in Louisiana: SENATOR LONG COMMENTS ON SPY PLANE INCIDENT Senator Russell B. Long, by tape recording, over various radio stations in Louisiana: COMMENTATOR: "Senator, this past week, probably the most important subject on the national scene was the supposedly shooting down of an American plane by the Russians. May we have your comments on that, sir?" SEN. LONG: "I don't know whether they shot it down or brought it dawn with a missile or whether the plane just ran out of oxygen in the high altitudes and had to come down ,but, in any event, they have an American pilot there and they have the remains of an American plane that this boy wasflying. The fact of the matter is that a lot of us have reason to believe, not by virtue of it having been given to us officially but by having heard informally or having heard rumors about it, that this country was sending planes behind the Iron Curtain. Those planes were unarmed and the purpose was to get information that we would need in the event that the Soviet Union decided to attack the United States. "Now, as you know, this country is so wide open and so are most of the free world countries that it is very easy for Russia or anybody else to get all the information they to know about where our defense installations areand New where our Army bases are, where our cities are, where our major industries are. For the most part, they can get it just by request, write the Chamber of Commerce and get the information; but, in their country, they that iron curtain and try to maintain such excessive secrecy that we have not been able to find out for certain about a great number of things we would have to know about the Soviet Union in the event that we were forced to go to war with them. Now, you know and I know that we are not planning to start a war with anybody, but if war is forced upon us and all these long-range missiles are exploded upon our country and our people are killed by the tens of millions, perhaps half of them killed in a single day, we would have to know how to go about striking back. Now if we couldn't get the information any better way, than I suppose the only thing to do was to do what we have been doing and, while it is too bad that they shot this boy down and we would just as soon that they didn't have the proof of it that we had been getting the information in the way that we have been getting it, I would a lot rather have done that than not to have the information. Now, there will be some problems about that in the future. oI think the biggest asset about it is that we have been getting away with it for four years and I think we have Russia pretty well photographed from the air and we know where most of their things are right now. They tell me that in a year or so we ought to have a space satellite developed which will circle in outer space and give us the same information we are looking for without coming quite as close to the Soviet Union. But, as a practical matter, what real difference does it make whether you are taking the pictures from a space satellite a hundred miles up or from an airplane that is 12 miles up?--it's still the same principle. You need to know what is behind that Iron Curtain and we are finding it out the best way that we canto Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 COMMENTATOR: "DO you think at this time that it will do any harm to the summit conference getting under way at this time?" 'ISBN. LONG: "I don't think it makes any difference. It certainly shouldn't make any difference. It's all according to the state of mind that the people go in there with. I certainly don't think that President Eisenhower is going to let that prejudice him--he shouldn't. As a matter of fact, Mr. Khrushchev knew we were doing this for the last four or five years and so did we, and the only difference is that while he would say it, at a summit conference perhaps) or in a conversation with President Eisenhower, and President Eisenhower would say, 'Well, I don't know anything about ti. I haven't been informed of anything of that sort. It must be somebody else's airplane that you are complaining about.' Well now, he knows it, but the fact of the matter is that both sides know to begin with that those were American planes flying behind Russia and getting those photographs and that information, and, incidentally, although we haven't had the good .fortune of shooting one of theirs down--and didn't particularly try-- they have bean flying over our advanced bases, they have been over Alaska, they have been over our bases at Thule, which is on Greenland, many ti as, repeatedly, and these bases which we have on foreign soil have been flown over many times by Soviet planes. How do we know it? Well, we see the vapor trails up there that are left in the sky after one of these fast jet planes go through, if there is a fair amount of vapor in the sky, so both sides have been doing some of this and my only objection is that, frankly) the Soviet spy system knows a lot more about us than we know about than even as it stands now." COMMENTATOR: "Another news making event this past week, Senator Long, was the Democratic primary--n SEN. LONG: "Before that, I said 'my only objection'--let me say this. I have great sympathy for that young Man Who is back there. He didn't go over there on his own mission. He went over there because we wanted that work done and he risked his life. If we paid him $2500 a month, which works out to about 30 thousand dollars a year, I still don't think that's any big pay for what he was doing for this country, and, to the best of our information there are several of our pilots that we were using on the same type of mission. They were not working directly for the Department of Defense. They were working, as I understnd it, for some other agency of the government, perhaps the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY but I don't regard those people as being anything other than patriots. That was their job and I would regard them in somewhat the same sense as I look upon Nathan Hale, whose statue is right down on ConstitAtion Avenue here in Washington by the Department of Justice of the, government. His famous last words were, 'My only regret is that I have but one life to give for my country.' You know, he was an American spy. He was a school teacher and he was trying to get information as to where the British troops were for the aid of General Washington's troops, and we don't regard him as anything other than agreat American who was trying to help his country, and the same thing is true of this young man. It takes a lot of patriotism far and beyond the pay, in order for a boy to do that kind of work. You know, a pilot who is that well qualified could get himself a good job at 15 thousand dollars or 18 thousand dollars a year for an airline anyway, so those young men who have been doing that work, just as this young man was doing, have been performing a great service to this country and the fact that they have been doing it, I think, is just one more reason why the Soviet Union will think a long time before they attack this country." Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 TAB Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 CONGRESSIONAL RECIatoved For Release 2004/N1131. hik-RDP9OT00782R000100060001-7 sTr,,aut!:orietr' Spy Ptr.o - -3 of Aliki FXTENSION OI o .U,EMARKS OF EON. J. CARLIOLLOSER OF TENNESSEE IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, May 11, 1960 Mr. LOSER. I Mr. Speaker, under icave to extei.d my remarks in the Ap- pendix of thellecoao, I call to the at- Lention Of.thejleSe 53 editorial appear- one of , pointing up a ing in the our great ? tie nalor cold war The editorial -!...'ollov,te: ?if NAITTETORIZED"`81.r 'PLANE IS POOREST KIND Now that th.e.?-i*.;-st,ory of the spy-plane over 5og4,:i6gasia, is coming to light, ).e American- pitbiii.; ii?entiticd to know who was . responsible Ier thia. .nia-jor cold-war `Tlie feet that iehave been trying to find what we s going on behind the Iron Our- i11 has been well Known. And we nifty Oe ure that our eaults have been ma unne, - 'iat Russia in .seeking out Arnerican. But it vdlbhar4 _tO.,explain. why the United States Ninci-Vtlok this latest venture in Russian.4.10.3F,t bore the May 16 summit meeting witilinin, ,,,Ilkoperly weighing the chances of detectiO...a.rid exposure. , To say that this was an unauthorized ex- ploit by a civilian filer is just another way of muddling the picture. For It has been . imacie clear that the supersecret U-2 single- engine jet was chartered froin.the Lockheed : Aircraft Co. by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, which in turn was be- ing serviced by the Air Force. One point that has been carefully skirted is the part played by Mr. Alien Dulles' Central Intelligence Agency, and this also involves the part played by the ,,National Security Counpianci?,President Eisenhower himself. ..? There was a good deal of cunning in the way Nikita Khrushchev misled the United States in his first announcement of the plane's destruction over the Ural Mountains, far from the nearest free-world border, for that led the State Department into a trap and brought forth excuses-which later proved to be without merit. The solar plexus blow came when it was revealed that the U-2 pilot has survived and, according to the Soviets, confessed his spy foie. Never has Mr. Khritshenev had better chance to denounce-the United Stajeti as an aggresspr, and he is making the rhea of it. Iris threat of a public trial for the tinfortu- nate pilot may never be carried out, but it is something for Washington to worry about. Coming at the same-time as the summit ses- sion, it could have a devastating effect. Spying between the United States and Rus- sia is old stuff indeed. For our part, there is a need to guard against surprise attack; but the Russians can say that they have reason to react strongly when shadow planes? traveling at great height, cross into Aheir territory. They are saying this now with a vengeance, , and the facts make it almostnyjposible for our best friends to defend, our' course. The. photographing of military instailatiLns, which seems to have been substantiatEd, cannot lightly be brushed aside. What, it may be asked, wa.3 the great emer-, gency that caused this infotirtaVier'r-gathering flight? We know of none. But we do know that its embarrassing fail- ure has damaged the position of the United States and its allies before the summit, and may make any kind of agreement harder to reach. rom Russia's standpoint, the opportunity leli(ven to make further boast of its rocketry, -though this is the point on which their story clOwn. For if the spy plane had been ii 'by the first shot from a ground-to-air *?uket,'It cannot be believed that the pilot Wbitrt have had the chance to bail out. Such- an inaccuracy, however, does not carry too- much weight in view of the rash of errors?-asttribUtetl. to the mate Depart- ment.14 trying.to,confuse the issue. Infortriatihr theriag, as it is termed in Wash* is pccesffiry paat of the cold it is the h yoiryears to d,re But leb! ihould be left in war, an o -se actions, at times, seers. ? 'risible. talk Of unauthorized 0 when it is all too plain that s dous venture Would never be by an individual unless someone hu echelons had given the word. Approved For Release 2004/05/13: CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 CONCY ApprOved For Release 2004/05/1 FH 1960 NIFE1A-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Former Congressman Phillips Declared U-2 Case Slums Need for Return of American Ideals- EXTENSION OF REMARKS HON. FRANK KOWALSKI OF' CONNECTICUT IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, May 11,190 Mr. KOWALSKI. Mr. Speak4, a dis- tinguished former. Member of' this body, Hon. Alfred N. Phillips, has sent me a telegram on the U-2 case which I bring to the attention pf my colleagues. Fenner pongressman Phillips points out how the honor of the United States has been sullied by the mishandling of this situation and pleads elo'qtiently for a return to high ethics and lofty ideals. Here is the text of Mr. Phillips' tele- '-u'am to me: Hon. FRAMS Hoven/Ala, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. Many people including the writer are utter- ly shocked at the-photograph on the New York Daily News fronorpw?Oant'Secretary of State Herter andi?splraotor _of !Intelligence Dulles las, slang_ river-the have otten ug intom.. Was this by the orders of the-PiSalderit Of the United States of Amer.. [Ca? How can these men or any American isugh when they have sent possibly to his doom an out.of-uniform, American held as spy. who can justly be shot under interna- tional law as a spy? ..Furthermore it is cer- tainly lopAughing matter when the foreign policy of our Olovernment has been proved to be based on falsehood, misstatements, and chicanery. It is hard to believe that anyone directing the destinies Of our country could guide it any way except through truthful honesty and integrity and that goes for every- one from the President down. I trust that in the House of Representatives of the United States you will do your part to see that those responsible for the low estate into which our country has fallen will be brought to account for it and relieved of their responsi- bilities no matter who they are and that the historic high standing an honor and ideals of the United States of America will be put. back again as standards by which all of us can Live best. Personal regards, Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 MAY '960 Hartford Courant -f,ibrari-CCr411 -.7?' Under unanimous consent, I bring the:. texts of these two, editori- Pr,b 'the* sati? tentiOn, of !liay Li-voin late U,1,9401. 1.7Norm sAs,r, a?py?',K.rro rusur?thom AppeientlY the -efiteleit-Soviet 'line is that the American sppplene mission was a piece ? of deldeenate Peel 0,NLioje,rrienW,Yeeirevent agreement at the sunnnl . But rinrely re- spoiaselale statesmexi?ofiThoth sides of the iron cUrtain. Tonvinik:VrEigiense. There May be some doctrinaire Conuntmists who stiliempeat ?the Alftexiatn. rItleal state- ment tritgftell eeeitrectlibliste- 'axe But feir the neeteentectetille IninaPPY inci- dent shove:eel-4A:: ,Sean sq, mitelck.as a warmonger as inept. Why ad the liessZeOreree, geeternment knows that every other government is en- gaged in spying. Soviet .nussia presumably more than most. After all, we have Russian spies sitting in U.S. prisons right now. PrOb- ably the incident sent tremors around the world not only becauee of its :unhappy timing just before the swami ut.top her i:easone ecief;Fst, it eva snectaeulat kind of spyin .nore linmettitanie it caught th erri- ment In_a.eie. And third and most Impor- tant, ? F.0 8t43.1 una,nswero quesuoo.5 to lc, qiup's left hand lets Ms ha ci at:it IS doing, - riteAriftt:...r 11 icrvii'Pler'Edre tarSrld hkitTwn, 'frOin(te asthe t efittitiede -Orif o land in teiikte; (Tie- ttgliiceofi'llbwn in the inki1."Kr;Matili, *lb% rho lived to tell ties? Then a;'ext down- right irtuniliating'tli -imminent, leader of the free hrough Re"! 'e tie 06p rtfle**n- t?met that" eittElitieVait abt0-4444' a's- a lie. Let / treat 4.11: lieffereittdri has now learriede eiteeleedlde eireetteielearned long ago: it4itler isteit eitiething at all, tell the, tiaidet. 'iAred, r3etariel; if you can't tell the el-teethe dont r,ay anything at all. =!vcn more distuebtrig is the hint of a lack of dieeipline and control in our Government. 'ClecilPresideeee and Secretary of State should certainly be aware of e,ny such intelligence ectivities, though not necessarily of the de- tails. But the CIA and Pentagon should elot only know the details, but should be serinitive enough to political arid diplomatic overtone!: never to risk such a mission at and Waterbury Re. on U-2 Fiasco It is tlistressing tO Teter that an Air Force menual claims the Nil/liege of flying infor- mation missions without specific authority from the President or 1T1S civilian advisers. Thie reflects an appalling lack of discipline. The prospect of thermonuclear war is so frightening that no responstelle.goeternment would allow one to Eitart, But -what if the armed services or intelligenerseivices of any nation, let alone the United States, feel free ,nioing,of Like rtconniuse!o4i.ci wjelatkied4erier the front pages or ne,wspapen: througlyM, pin world cou144?badiy be better advantage to the &NEW Union near the eve of the summit parley In Paris. One can unfeeretweet Ruseian *ennui* elieitit FehruelicteAets -ghee in annotraceng and de- nouncing the American akeeeeipt to pi obe the.) activity oC his ?Okuntry. At iirsE:America was slightly enraged -the t a U.S. pldne, supposedly under 'the siLpel- v%Qn of the National Space 044 Aeronautics plinistration and engaged in weather oh- servat,i'on,, should be downed or wandering, filikeeviiatever` reason, across the border into f*Sivist Ea:Spate. The State Department and adrefiniatralibtenelltials misinformed the U.S. public inadoettently, for the information 'given then, and the cause of much in our discomfituroAtz ates from that hush-nth agency ha.. teiligenceP It noWi that d out ell were sledded Allen Dulles, centre the flight was ordered by th ifin"-laye for ferreting ikille,atitnt the Russians . a epreeummit splurge, e 'Soli-let target practice t the ee,prier to. Khrushchev's firdettaken was immense, and know,_boomertinged. Kremlin. as might be expected, han- d11 tele incident With the best of its prone- ,galeifito lireeeetet. eherpening a ravor edge to pare Wet:rine eprestige and purpose at the coming eleedei of:- state meeting. The prin- cipal hope: Of the world's peoples, the re- laxation oLglobal tensions, has been some- what dashed,- ? efee Klirushchev Will doubtless use this wind- 'fen to preessure -Milt/es-term Allies on a stand orriBerlin ancroary ftill summoning of liftateriv moral anti military authority- will detee? desession of reckless and relentless bargaining by the Moscow agents. 'Arocticans were not only disturbed at the spy atm', they were surprised. They ieldorn realize that not only do we conienct highly secret intelligence and counterintelligence operations; lent we maintain a lethal ring of airbases hitund the Soviet 'Union. In times of militarj. or civil chagrin these in- stallations eneragencies 8,re given inordinate and ominotis pedelleity without the proper perspective and haderstanding of their pur- pose and necessit'Y.- - ' The cold war , a sud- e our mech. a delicate tixne,' E,REMARKS OF litANK-OWALSKI r .evy0 C011itigCTICPT TN Teleil'ITOIISE OF REeaEsENTATIvES 117,34*^;e,lay, May 11, 1960 ? -tq play with dangerous military bardWare eeelee Over another nation's territory? The risk SPeakerotkvoV , of an unintended, eccidental launching irif assment felt by ithe pushbutton war is 'already too great withOut mos. Government's: our adding to it. eekel&ident are re- It might be well if President and Con- gress were quietly and carefully to study the whole subject afresh. The first nec- essity is to make certain that nobody goes' off half cocked. The second is to make cer- tain that whatever is said on behalf of the U.S. Govermnent is the truth. Mr. K shock en American handling ,* .14 fleeted ,in.. " 1 torials- carried yesterday by two of Our leadinrlitgnieoticut news- papers, the Hartford &Want and the Waterbury Republican. The Courant editorial is summarized in its title, "Uncle Sam, Spy?and Stumblebum." The Waterbury Republican editorial points out that "The spy in the sky fiasco has shaken and embarrassed the American public." [Prom the Waterbury Republican, May 10, The spy in the sky fiasco has shaken and enibarrassed the American public. den flash by the chief agencies. *ke:n back. "Spy," by consensus, is aj ty 44.41,Intel- ligence is preferable. ni /tore, operate an intelligence network- %be Wend!, over. gleaning, as beet we can, informitti* knowledge otherWise uabtainable f tiOrtiebe- hind the Iron Curtain or, the' Bamboo Cur- _ tamn. or any ()metal upaciuStless. This data is demanded or a government competing for the leadership of ihe free world and the survival of democratic and capitabar institutions in other areas of the glolieez Communist spies in the Unitt.c1 Mates have been caught in number. T,heir espio- nage, Sabotage, and subversive activities make mandatory counterintelligence. Sae].) sys- tems are realities in international affairs, however unpalatable they may seem. The unfortunate error of judgment, and the consequences it may have, should in no way impugn the cardinal need of inkei- ligence work in assuring the security of the Nation. But it should prompt an examinit- tion of the lines of authority in such mat- ters and guarantee that similar action will not be taken at so crucial a time .svitaout. the consent of the President and titce Tesedi. ness to answer to the public conicitnice. Approved For Release 2004/05/13: CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 CONGRESSIONAL RINSitiqiiied For Release 2(1611/015q3196t1A-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Meriden (Conn.) Record Comments on "Bad Blunder" in U-2 Case EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. FROLLQWALSKI OF CONNECTICUT IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ' Thursday, May 12, 1960 Mr. KOWALSKI. Mr. Speaker, under unanimous consent I present the text of an editorial carried by the Meriden Rec- ord in my hprrie State of Connecticut on the U-2 incident and the handling of it by our Government. This editorial is another indication of the extent to which the American people are disturbed by the inept way in which this entire matter has been handled. Following is the text of the Meriden ReQATALeatorial of May 11: EXCUSES, UNLIMITED The United States has been caught in a bad blunder in the case of the plane and pilot shot down over Russian territory and the Reds are making the most of it. At a Lime and in a place where the greatest eix- ,enispe4.;tion were inclicateii; we have been ;.thi.110t aay awk*Ki; a:acl =lieavyhandsd. ovJt in Use.tws have handled our responses to the Russian roars witki all the finesse of a kid caught with jam on his face. There is nothing very remarkable about the Russians having caught somebody spy- ing on them; it goes on all the time. on both sides of the tense. There are plenty of Red agents in this country and in Can- ada, and every so often one of them is un- covered amid a big flurry of publicity, tried, and usually sentenced to prison. We may safely assume that their counterparts exist among our people on assignment in Russia. But sending somebody in to investigate the weather or anything else over Russian territory in a jet plane, however unarmed, is another and much riskier matter, and one which we would certainly protest if it were to happen against us. Sending a plane across this particular bit of border, about which the Soviets have been notoriously touchy, makes the violation gratuitous. And engaging in this sort of spying in the strato- sphere at this particular time, when chances of summit agreement deserve all the odds they can get, is timing so bad as to be un- believable. All of which Wouldn't matter very much If the Russians were determined, as they seem to have been earlier, that the Big Pour meeting be conducted in amity. Premier Khrushchev has his own way of manipulat- ing history and if his calculations had called for warm winds at the summit he would have held off on the cold blast here. Unhappily, the incident seems to have coincided with Red realization that no real concessions were planned by the West on Berlin and the general German situation, for which Khrushchev was stubbornly -hop- ing. It gives him just the excuse he needs to charge bad faith, stir up public opinion :igainst us, and generally sabotage the sum- mit chances while putting the blame on us. And while he probably could have found his own excuses anyway, there's no need for us Co supply them for free. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 1960 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? APPENDI summer, in July 1959. Until that date there were three different inches in use in the world. By international agree- ment, we shortened our inch by two- millionths of a measurement, and the British Commonwealth increased its inch almost by the same amount. These accuracies are all the more im- portant in an age of scientific accom- plishment such as ours. In the han- dling of atomic energy, in the making of guided missiles, we often demand ac- curacies to five- or ten-millionths of an inch. Albert M. Dexter of Pratt and Whitney says this requires an accuracy on the part of gages, therefore, to one- millionth of an inch. Not long ago, Pratt and Whitney participated with the National Bureau of Standards in pushing the frontier of precise measure- ment to one-tenth of a millionth of an inch. From Mr. Dexter's computations, that is the thickness of one sheet of newspaper sliced into 30,000 separate sheets. I should not pass this by without not- ing that Pratt and Whitney is familiarly called in the Hartford area by the name and by the suffix?West Hartford?to differentiate it from another firm of the same name?the Pratt & Whitney Air- craft Division of United Aircraft Corp. Each descends from the New England craftsmanship of Francis Pratt and Amos Whitney, the pioneers in metal working, but some time ago went sep- arate business ways to become parts of a different corporate family. Pratt & Whitney Co. of West Hartford is a sub- sidiary of the Fairbanks Whitney Corp. To provide further information, I submit an editorial from the Hartford Times of Saturday, May 7, which traces the industrial fame of the organization: PRATT & WHITNEY, 100 YEARS O' INDUSTRIAL FAME Many a manufacturing company points with pride to some outstanding contribution it has made to industrial progress or for the advancement of the general economy. At its 100th anniversay, Pratt & Whitney Co., Inc., would find it difficult to choose as its top achievement any one success among its long list of outstanding industrial triumphs. Much of the time of generations of Pratt & Whitney craftsmen has been devoted to the establishment of uniform standards for manufacturing precision. Fineness is taken for granted in an age used to measuring and working to a millionth of an inch. Before P. & W. took up the challenge there was no reliable standard measure of anything. There was no machine tool that could main- tain uniform quality in operation. Would the leading P. & W. contribution therefore be its devotion to precision and refinement of the international inch? But one must not forget that the company also brought out the means to make possible the introduction of standard threads on nuts and bolts. Much of the modern world is literally held together on the basis of this accomplish- ment. Jokingly, ours has been called a tin-can civilization. Yet, except for a P. & W. inno- vation, a special micrometer to measure and help control the thickness of moving ribbons of strip steel, the making of cans would have been a wasteful and makeshift business. The establishment of precision aids and the making of measuring devices was inci- dental to the main work of the shop. That has been the manufacture of machine to0 used to produce other manufactured pr ucts. During the great industrial period of crea- tivity 1900-1920, Pratt & Whitney contributed more new machine development than all other machine-tool manufacturers in the world combined. The company was the leader in design of entirely new types of ma- chine tools and gages. Out of its shops came the jig borer, thread miller, spline miller, vertical shaper, vertical surface grinder and reamers with right-hand cut and left-hand spiral, all of them rep- resenting major advances. Pratt & Whitney still is unexcelled in the field of design and innovation. It has auto- mated many of its machines with use of taped controls for their operation. Thurs- day the company will dedicate its Centennial Hall at the West Hartford plant with a permanent exhibit of the latest P. & W. products as well as of early products and mementos. It was no easy thing for Francis A. Pratt, the salesman and promoter, and Amos Whit- ney, the machinist and shop manager, to start this business 100 years ago. They did it in their own spare time after working a full day at other regular jobs. Their first large order was for production of Spencer's automatic silk winders for use in the Cheney Bros. mills in Manchester, and by the Willimantic Linen Co. Manufacturing had just been stepped up when Pratt & Whit- ney were burned out. They started again, and soon were producing arms for use in the Civil War. This led to making the machines by which armaments were produced. Pratt & Whitney made the first silent type- writer model, put together the Paige typeset.. ter in which Mark Twain invested a profit- less fortune, and produced tabulating ma- chines and envelope machinery among more than 2,000 items for the worldwide market. It would be impossible to sum tip com- pletely the economic benefits that Pratt & Whitney, Inc., has brought to Hartford and all of this region in its 100-year history. Certainly it has helped to make central Connecticut a famous leader in the machine tool industry. Gathered here as an experienced labor force in its factory were some of the world's best craftsmen. Of Pratt & Whitney's nearly 3,000 present employes there are 597 who are members of its Quarter Century Club. They grew to proficiency under outstanding con- ditions of production, excellence, and atten- tion to detail. And although the company has its vast plant in West Hartford, employees come from 97 Connecticut communities and more than a dozen towns in nearby States, an indica- tion of the widespread economic importance of the enterprise. The company's annual payroll is some $16 million, its purchase of supplies amounts to about $12 million, it pays annual town and State taxes of $558,000, and the company's gifts to charity and edu- cation are on the order of $50,000 annually. Such figures count heavily in the support of Connecticut prosperity. Governor Ribicoff rightly has called the company one of the foundation stones of this State's industry. Importantly, the Pratt & Whitney story and its success should serve as inspiration to the scores of struggling small new industries in Connecticut. Some of them, too, will become giants in their fields. To Pratt & Whitney Inc., industrially, fa- mous for 100 years, we pay our respects and look for the company to increase its fame in the years to come. A4077 oviet Deception Demands Drastic Sur-k, veillance Steps EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. SIR WOMOND OF SOUTH CAROLINA IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES Thursday, May 12, 1960 Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, on May 10,1960, cs1,,yaakip published an e? ? ? mou ? ..igaich merits the attenro-E7r..tirrearrm-and all Amer- icans interested in our national security. It is entitled "Soviet Deception Demands Drastic Surveillance Steps." I ask unanimous consent that this ex- cellent editorial from this outstanding newspaper be printed in the Appendix of the RECORD. There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD., as follows: SOVIET DECEPTION DEMANDS DRASTIC SURVEILLANCE STEPS Nikita Khrushchev's timely, propaganda- charged report to the Supreme Soviet is a reminder that global war has not ended. He told a shouting, applauding Parlia- ment that a U.S. jet plane had been shot down and that the American pilot had con- fessed that he was on a spying mission, photographing Soviet military bases and in- dustrial installations. The Soviets have resisted all efforts to establish effective disarmament controls. Even President Eisenhower's "open skies" proposal has been flatly rejected. It would merely permit international aerial inspec- tion to assure against a buildup for surprise attack. The United States and her allies cannot take a chance on the secret mounting of a Soviet sneak offensive. To avoid this pos- sibility the United States has developed, from a weak beginning early in World War II, what is said to be the world's best in- telligence system. State Department spokesmen admitted that planes have been making reconnais- sance flights along the frontiers of the free world for the past 4 years. It is a reason- able guess that these forays might extend into possible Soviet staging areas. In order to defend ourselves intelligently, we must know what our potential aggressor is doing. That involves certain risks, such as those faced when Francis G. Powers set out from Pakistan on a flight across the breadth of Soviet Russia. Even the fact that the Soviets had em- placements in the mountainous heart of the U.S.S.R. equipped to shoot him down from an altitude of 12 miles is valuable military information. Unless the pattern has changed recently, the Soviets are making almost daily feints by squadrons of planes against our Alaskan defenses. It is likely that they are carrying on similar probing operations all around the free-world perimeter. Soviet warplanes are flagrantly invading the airspace over Japan. Soviet submarines prowl off our Atlantic shores. One of their spy trawlers recently watched our submarine rocket tests 60 miles off the coast of Rhode Island. A pretty good indication of the effectiveness of Soviet spy- ing activities in this country is the fact that the Reds stole most of our hush-hush atomic secrets. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 A4078 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? APPENDIX On the other hand, there are strong indi- cations that we know what is going on be- hind the Iron Curtain. We are aware of many Soviet military strengths and weak- nesses. We know that certain of their rocket claims are hoaxes. We have made some mis- takes in intelligence that have cost billions of dollars, such as the Arctic dew line that was erected to stop a Soviet bomber armada that did not exist. Proper intelligence avoids such expensive blunders in defense, The United States has been criticized be- cause the ill-fated Powers expedition came just before the summit meeting, taking an unusually big propaganda risk. But we know from experience that Khrushchev uses his major peace gestures to cover up some big political or military excursions. While wav- ing an olive branch over the upcoming meet- ing, he has been able to establish an ideologi- cal beachhead in Guinea on the west tip of Africa. He could also use the conference to cover up military preparations inside Russia. The worst Khrushchev can say about the incident of the unarmed U.S. photographic plane over the Urals is that he caught us try- ing to find out what mischief his regime lksc ight be concocting. Petition EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. THOMAS J. LANE laws of physics and economy and without true moral aspects we can build only moral and political chaos. Looking at the 40 years of the history of communism, at its conquests and rob- bery, at its murderous and bloody march, not heeding any laws of God and morality and taking under consideration the false communistic philosophy, we must sound the alarm and call upon the conscience of the leaders of the United States to change their tactics and politics because the false com- munistic philosophy must be fought with a philosophy based on moral assets. There- fore all agreements made with the Commu- nists must come to an end and their false promises must be ignored. Conferences with Bloody Khrushchev must stop. Murder and communistic tyranny will remain forever a murder and an enslavement, an outrage against moral laws. Communism based on material and Marx- ist ideas for 40 years has not changed or altered its ideas, seldom does it change its strategy but very easily and according to need and necessity, it changes its tactics. is the reason for the latest travels, visits and revisits of Khrushchev. That is the rea- son for calling of the summit conference, for behind all this undercover is the polit- ical policy of Khrushchev; namely, to deaden the opinion of the world in regard to their communistic oppression. Therefore in writing this petition to the leaders of the United States, guiding myself not only with a feeling of loyalty to my native land, and with a fear of the future of Poland, but also taking under considera- tion the fate of the entire world, I plead with you leaders of the Nation. America, in protecting and defending the freedom of the enslaved nations, is protect- ing and safeguarding at the same time its own freedom and happiness as well as that of the whole world. We call today for an alarm; for tomorrow may be too late. We must put an end to communistic action and to its leader Khrushchev. We must destroy the diabolical plans of this Red Nero and this Bloody Butcher of Budapest. It must be done today?for tomorrow may be too late. Besides the danger of communism, there arises in the world today another reviving power, Germany, which destroyed and now again rebuilt by America, begins to voice its opinion and perhaps tomorrow in unity with communism may endanger the peace of the world. The Germans, with specialized officers, falsify facts and they take every opportunity to portray the American way of thinking and outlook for their own benefit. The result?that along with the com- munistic danger there appears another, that of Germany. Against these two dangers we must arouse public opinion and make realistic plans for a world peace. The fate of the enslaved nations is a steppingstone and a key to peace in Europe and in the entire world. The matter of freedom for Poland is precisely linked with the problem of peace. If today I permit myself to petition the leaders of the West, I do it out of duty and love for my country and those to whom I am indebted; namely, those who still remain on the fighting front and to those who work in the underground. I am informed that the most tragic deci- sions about Poland in the last years were made without the consent of the Polish people and outside of Poland. * * * "There- fore, let decisions of hope and peace come and arise today in the West. * ? * Let the voice of the Polish people reach the conscience of the American leaders through the efforts of our friend, Jozef Mlot-Mroz. * * *" This is the plea I receive from my friends: "We know of your protests through hunger strikes and if you are able and strong OF MASSACHUSETTS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Thursday, April 21, 1960 Mr. LANE. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I include the following petition from the Anti-Communist Confederation of Pol- ish Freedom Fighters in U.S.A., Salem, Mass., April 11, 1960: PETITION TO THE HONORABLE STATESMEN, DIPLOMATS, AND MAKERS OF AMERICAN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY, WASHING- TON, De. In a few weeks, in Paris, there will be held the so-called summit conference. The leaders of great nations will meet. The reason for the conference is, naturally, to talk over peace terms, especially the elimina- tion of fear for the new methods of warfare which may arise in a modern war situation. At the conference both sides will speak of peace but words are also a means and an effort of bringing about a realization of the fact. President Eisenhower, for instance, a leader of the Western Nation with true apostolic and missionary zeal will speak in favor of a just peace based upon friend- ship, justice, freedom and respect of human rights. Khrushchev on the other hand thinks only of peace in the terms of pos- sessing the world, thus making it impossible to hinder any communistic activities. Khrushchev's peace is the enslavement of millions of people through communistic op- pression, it's the desire to possess the entire world. There is then no reason for useless opti- mism. Secondly: Not long ago, an average Amer- ican thought that all American problems may be solved through the help of money and technique, since with money and mod- ern technique we won the war??That is true. But what is worse, we lost the peace. Therefore it is evident, that peace can- not be bought! Neither with gold nor the enslavement and captivity of nations. Peace is based on moral laws, justice, trust- worthiness and respect. The moral laws are as realistic and unchangeable as the May 12 enough to perform another such a hunger strike to protest against inhuman treatment, Poland once again pleads for it. * * ? Poland, with hopeful eyes, looks toward America and pleads for help." This appeal had been made by the leaders of the Polish fighting nation; therefore, their plea I will certainly realize and as my strength permits, I will carry out. This is the reason of my neW decision: a protest and hunger march to Washington, which a month before the summit confer- ence in Paris I will put into action. April 17, Easter Sunday, on foot I leave from Boston to Washington which I hope to reach within a span of 2 weeks. Then in Wash- ington for a number of days preceding the summit conference, I will continue my hunger strike, calling forth in this manner for freedom of Poland and the other enslaved nations, protesting against any negotiations with communism and with its bloody leader, Khrushchev. My decision is the result of my great love for my mother country, Poland, my loyalty to American happiness which my brethren in Poland do not possess. My decision is also a command of underground benefiting from the welfare and happiness of America. I take this step to remind the West of the Polish right to freedom and to arouse Americans to the near and grave danger of communism. West awaken. Today's S 0 S of Poland and the enslaved nations is a warning for you today and tomorrow. West, awaken today. Tomorrow may be too late. With respect, JOZEF MLOT-MROZ, President, Anti-Communist Confed- eration of Polish Freedom, Fighters in U.S.A. The Problems of Africa EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. EDMUND S. MUSKIE OF MAINE IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES Thursday, May 12, 1960 Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, on Feb- ruary 20, 22, and 26, 1960, Mrs. May Craig's column "Inside in Washington," which appears in several newspapers in my State, contained material of general interest to any thoughtful American who has an interest in foreign affairs. In the column which appeared on Feb- ruary 20, Mrs. Craig explained the im- portance of the foreign-aid program, as it might apply on the Continent of Afri- ca. At this time, Mrs. Craig was about to embark on an extended visit to that great continent. On February 22, she shared with her readers the ninny practical problems which face a reporter about to undertake such a journey, and she was also able to communicate the sense of excitement that one feels in approaching such a journey. On February 26, she summarized the briefing given by State Department per- sonnel who are experienced in African affairs. I ask unanimous consent that these three articles be printed in the Appendix of the RECORD. There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the REC- ORD, as follows: Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/0bWit 3,stIA9OP9OT00782R000100060001-7 1960 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? APPENDIX itself up 60 percent over last season with 116,500 people on the slopps. Nearly 14,000 people have used the ice rink, not counting the thousands upon thousands of spectators. "An old standby in the winter sports field is Yos te's Badger Pass. Superintendent John Pre writes that there have been 126,718 visit 4, by early April and they still were coming. A% average of 500 persons use the facilities on eekday and 1,800 to 2,600 on a typical Satur. or Sunday. This does not include 6,232 vis :.rs who ice skated on the valley floor. Badg ass opened In 1933 and the use has been gr ing constantly. "Stanley R. Zeger, ac supervisor at Eldorado National Forest, sa the year there was substandard as far as s conditions were concerned, but that did no low down the skiing enthusiasts. About 95 'rcent of the approximately 106,000 people g the Highway 50 and South Tahoe snowfie are skiers. The use was up about 7 per t. "The last two snow seasons have been poo says Supervisor Zeger, "but the trend steadily increasing." "The people on the east side of the moun- tains are sharing in this activity and Mam- moth Mountain of the Inyo National For- est is one of the fastest growing snow re- gions in California. Supervisor Joe Radel reports a 32 percent gain with more than 100,400 snow visits to the Inyo. "Although skiing is a major sport at Las- sen National Forest and Volcanic Park, Forest Supervisor V. A. Parker and Park Superin- tendent Edward Freeland say heavy family fun use attracts groups from all over north- ern Canifornia, including the San Francisco Bay region. "About 22,000 traveled to Lassen Forest, half of them going just to romp in the snow with the rest doing the skiing. Another 15,000 toured Lassen Park's snowfields. "There is a tremendous potential for fu- ture development in both the Lassen and Inyo regions as well as some of the lesser used forest lands. "Plumas National Forest's La Porte was one of the first ski areas to develop in north- ern California many, many winters ago. With that facility and the new Johnsville State Park coming in, the potential winter sports development is considerable. "I look for development of the Plumes, Cedar Pass, Nnion Valley, and many other regions similar to Mount Shasta's Ski Bowl in the Shasta-Trinity National Forest. Ob serving its second year of winter sports, For- est Supervisor Paul Stathem says Shasta Bowl use is up 25 to 50 percent this year over the initial season there and Snowman's Hill continues to provide an excellent com- munity place to play in the snow, which means most of the increase consists of visi- tors from outside the immediate region. "The reputation was spread this year to the benefit of all the Sierra Nevada, and everyone concerned must continue to work together to provide the facilities to meet this demand. The investment will be repaid many times." Medical Care for the Aged -XTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON,, RAY J. MADDEN \el' INDIANA IN THE HOUSE iLkF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, y 16, 1960 Mr. MADDEN. Mr'peaker, one of the major issues whicli this Congress must act upon before adjournment, is the problem of practical legislation whi will provide hospitalization and medica care for millions of folks in the upper age bracket. The following letter from Benjamin Saks, president of the Northwest In- diana Jewish Welfare Federation, 708 Broadway, Gary, Ind., reflects practical thoughts concerning this problem which involves so many millions of our elderly citizens throughout the Nation: NORTHWEST INDIANA JEWISH WELFARE FEDERATION, Gary, Ind., May 2, 1960, Representative RAY MADDEN, House Ways and Means Committee, House Office Building, Washington, D.C. DEAR REPRESNTATIVE MADDEN: At a meeting of its board of directors held on the evening of April 27, 1960, the following resolution was passed by this organization, with the instruction that it be submitted for your attention and study: "Whereas medical care for the part of our opulation 65 years and over is a major con- rn of the Nation and of this welfare fed- e tion; and areas the admission rate to hospitals is t e as large as for persons who are young( and whereas they stay longer after adrnissio ? and "Wherea many of them have incomes of $3,000 or le and "Whereas e-half of the residents of homes for the ed require medical care in residence; and "Whereas 80 per t of residents of homes for the aged are par lly supported by pub- lic assistance funds; a "Whereas less than 40 ercent of the per- sons over 65 are covered 15y. private medical insurance: Now, therefore, be Itt "Resolved, That we favor the use of the mechanism of the old-age and survivors pro- gram of the Social Security Act to provide an expanded program of health services for per- sons 65 and over." We earnestly hope that you will give this resolution and the sentiment that it ex- presses your very earnest consideration in the debate on this issue in the current Congress. Sincerely yours, BENJAMIN SANS, President. ? 144144, Reflections on the U-2 Plane Incident EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. JOHN J. WILLIAMS itaingled. Each of these emotions is under- ndable, and it is not easy to strike a bal- nce among them. The causes of pride are simply stated. Ever since sputnik the American people have had a vague but strong uneasiness that somehow we were falling behind the Rus- sians in the struggle. There was not merely the concern over the scientific competition and basic military capabilities; there was also worry about intangibles, that we were soft. bungling, lacking in initiative, energy and alertness when compared with tly ruthless. monolithis Communist empire. Then suddenly we learned that our de- fense forces were not so listless after all. Hearts were bound to leap with pride at the knowledge that an American reconnaissance plane had penetrated deep into Russion ter- ritory, and that furthermore this was but one of many. Here is tangible evidence that our Government is not "asleep at the switch," that our intelligence forces have diligence and the equipment and skills to apply it. And not the least of our pleasure at events is the way in which this incident has shaken the Russians. For make no mistake about it, the fact that their vaunted defenses can be so readily penetrated is not something that Mr. Khrushchev and his colleagues can blithely dismiss. Reflect for a moment on the dismay, and the fear, we would feel if we discovered that Russian planes had been flying over the United States for months undetected. This country would suffer a psychological trauma of major proportions; it would be a national scandal and heads would roll all over the place, Something like this may be happening in Russia now. Because of that, Mr. Khru- shchev's anguished outcries are not all tears and flapdoodle. His military men have a lot of explaining to do to him, and he has a lot of explaining to do to the Politburo and to the Russian people. Whatever posture Mr. Khrushchev puts to the world, his arrogance has been humbled. That, in turn, is bound to have an effect on the affairs of the summit conference which begins this morning. For all that the spy plane incident has given Mr. Khru- shchev something to scream about, he can- not now be so cocksure. The repercussions of this affair are by no means all to Mr. Khrushchev's advantage in the realms of di- plomacy. In a world that everyone knows is perilous, there is comfort and reassurance in all this. Not only has our side scored on their side, but when this incident is added to our recent successes in space and under the sea we can feel less intimidated by Russian prowess and more confident in our state of preparedness. . As President Eisenhower put it, "no one ; wants another Pearl Harbor" and so we re- joice at anything that increases our knowl- edge of military forces that might launch a massive surprise attack in which survival ' would be the prize. This being so, then, why should there be any cause for uneasiness over the events of the past 10 days? It is not simply stated. For it stems from less readily apparent consequences, and in some cases not so much from immediate consequences as from anxieties about the future which have here been sowed. Part of it, perhaps, comes from the per- . formance put on by the State Department 7 that famous weekend. Either the State De- partment was ignorant of what was going on, which is quite possible, or else it had given no thought to anticipating that a plane might be caught and planning what it should do then. In either case, the Government of the United States was caught not only spying ? but lying. It did not make a pretty spec- tacle. Part comes, perhaps, from the fact that the confusion extended all the way to the A4135,4? OF DELAWARE IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES Monday, May 16, 1960 Mr, WII2Ljare. Mr. as iMmimmcinsent to have printed in the Appendix of the RECORD a very timely editorial entitled "Reflections on an Incident," which was published today in the Wall Street amaku. MormoilOnMea...".6.24,, There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: REFLECTIONS ON AN INCIDENT The pTitinT8rgtrirranta181,1t,rd the major affairs of life we all have moments of ambivalence, that we can suffer all at once the mixed feelings of joy and anxiety. If we can judge by the samplings of pub- lic opinion, and by our own feelings Ameri- cans have had something of this same ambivalence in their reaction to the spy- plane incident. Pride, relief, uneasiness of mind, and even dismay, have been inter- Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 3,6 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? AP White House. It's very clear that although President Eisenhower had authorized the ( .,, .1. to do "whatever is necessary" to obtain lrformation, he was as surprised by this , particular plane incident as everyone else. But bureaucratic bungling is something to which, sadly, we have grown accustomed. The anxiety strikes much deeper. It comes precisely because we do all know this is a perilous world and that the prize in the next war will not be victory but survival. And for some of the older among us, because we do indeed remember Pearl Harbor. Whatever mystery lies behind that naval 1. disaster, it was no fault of military intelli- gence. We had the-Iaraffebe'ciille; we knew 4' what they were doing, even unto the hour. ' Besides, Pearl Harbor was no moment's in- spiration of the Japanese; it came as the culmination of events in which our own mistakes played some small part. The next world war, if it comes, can come as well from bungling as from design. An adventurous American, a trigger-happy Rus- sian, a moment of panic?these can easily be the seeds of holocaust. And just because we can understand the panic that would come from Russian planes over Kansas City, we need have anxiety about American planes over Sverdlovsk. It is all very true when we say we have no aggressive intent but it wholly misses the mark. For fate depends on some Rus- sian with his hand on a button believing that that plane overhead is not on a warlike mission. It also misses the mark, though true enough, to see the hypocrisy of Mr. Khrushchev crying out against spies. We ourselves would see a difference between a Colonel Abel, spying in Brooklyn, and those planes over Kansas City. So the uneasiness of mind has nothing to do with spying; we all accept the necessity for it and desire that it be done diligently. Mr. Khrushchev's self-righteous screams on that score can be dismissed for what they are. The concern is over an adventure which, by its very nature, risks bringing on the very thing against which it is supposed to be guarding. Yet even all this, we think, might be accepted as a hazard under different cir- cumstances, anxiety has become a daily habit which we have learned to wear pa- tiently. But it would be one thing to know that these risks were recognized, measured, and accepted by the highest elec- tive officers of the State into whose judg- ment we have put ourselves. It is quite another thing to feel that things are done by subordinates left free to do "whatever Is necessary." Here is the Government of the United States engaging in an act that by its very nature must carry always the sparks of an explosion, and yet so far as anyone can see it was an act thought up, initiated, and car- ried out in secret not only from the enemy but from ourselves. Their zeal is commendable; perhaps even their judgment in this case may be right. But if they have done this, unknown, what else is unknown? And if subordinate offi- cers, not responsible to the people, are to have in the future a blank check to fill in as they please, who can know what de- mands their zeal may put upon the world tomorrow? And there is one other matter. The strength of this country in the free world has always been that, unlike the Russians, we could be trusted not to do provocative things and that whatever our Government said was true. We hope that image is too strong to be shattered by any one incident, but we think it too precious to risk having it sullied. So for our own part,c., in discovering that here,711-1511YMbre-WW,- \we are not being outdone by the Russi.Ans, NDIX and we do not .hide our human natIsfa. tion at the consternation that must now be wide among them. And yet for all of that, we confess that in this incident we, too, have anxieties that will not down. Health and Medical Care for the Aged ? EXTENSION OF REMARKS HON. JOHN W. McCORMACK OF MASSACHUSETTS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, May 16, 1960 Mr. McCO MACK. Mr. Speaker, in my remarks I elude an informative let- ter sent to me sy the Honorable Patrick A. Tompkins, mmissioner of Public Welfare of the irnmonwealth of Mas- sachusetts, in. co ection with the ad- ministration's plan s provide health and medical care for the ed. The letter of ComMissioner Tompki to me points out the weaknesses in the clministration's ; Proposal. The views oit Commissioner Tompkins are worthy of rofound con- sideration because he is o of the best- qualified persons in the fi Vtcel of public welfare throughout the Uri d States: THE COMMONWEALTH Tik OF MASSACHUSETTS..4 DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELF E, Boston, May 1 1960. Hon. JOHN W. MoCottmacx, House Majority Leader, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. MY DEAR CONGRESSMAN MCCORM FE: Thank you for the copies of the stateIlnt by Mr. Arthur S. Flemming, Secretary of te Department of Health, Education, and W fare on presentation of the administration plan to provide health and medical care foia the aged. I have, up to this point, only been able to devote my observations, as to the impact of these proposals upon the aged of the Commonwealth and upon the Com- monwealth of Massachusetts and the constit- uent cities and towns, in a limited manner, as no data seems to be available on the pre- mium' costs that would be charged by either commercial or nonprofit insurance carriers for the coverage proposed in Mr. Flemming's statement. We do, however, have some facts as to potential eligibility that we can draw from Mr. Flemming's statement on page 4, under item 1, "Eligibility for Participation in Pro- gram." Apparently, all persons receiving so- cial security benefits over the age of 65 would be eligible, plus others on whom I cannot secure up-to-date data. This would mean at least 350,000 persons over 65 currently receiving old-age insurance benefits, either primary, or dependency, or survivor benefits, would be eligible. We also know that the standard monthly budget of an aged person living alone is $127.80 under our old age assistance program. We also know that the means test to be applied for participation in this program Is to be rather liberally interpreted and applied. If not so applied, it would mean that these 350,000-plus persons, if given the opportunity by State legislation and if desir- ing to participate in the administration's insurance health program, would, in fact, have to apply? for and be subjected to the Indignities of the old-age assistance means test. Moreover, I think that, in view of our old-age assistance standard, all such persons May 16 applying for old age Insurance under the administration's proposal would have to have their personal portion of the premium paid for by the State governmental agency with- , out any matching fund from the Federal Government. As this _involves 350,000 per- sons, it would amount to a new unmatched expenditure of $8,400,000. For the current 80,000 recipients of old-age assistance, it would amount to an additional cost of $1,920,000, or a total of $10,320,000 as the individual's share of the premium at $24 per person per year. Since Mr. Flemming suggests on page 2 of his statement under paragraph 4 that less catastrophic policies on major medical ex- penses available to persons over the age of 65 called for annual premium payments ranging from 860 to 8130 a year, it would appear obvious that, since most major medi- cal expense insurance policies are limited to 60 days of hospital care, the full coverage for nursing home care for the entire year and for one-half year of hospital care plus the other itemized benefits for surgery, drugs, X-rays, home care, etc., would result in a prohibitive premium and certainly one at $250 per year per person upward. If the premium were $300 a year and under the financial formula that the State govern- ment was to pay $200 or two-thirds in Massa- chusetts?one of the wealthier States accord- ing to the Hill-Burton formula employed in this insurance plan?the .State's share of the premium matched by the Federal Govern- ment would be 875 million. This, added to the absorption of the individual's premiums, represents a total of $85,320,000. I have checked with both the Blue Cross and one commercial carrier, and there are no rates available for year-round nursing home care for persons over 65 or under 65 in operation or even contemplated at this point. There are no policies available for 6 months' care In a hospital for persons over 65. , However, to apply this proposal to the typical expensive hospitalization of a per- son over 65, as we know it in Massachusetts, the hospital costs for the acute illness or accident will run about $1,000. To have this bill paid in accordance with the admin- istration's formula, the breakdown would be s follows for the sick patient over 65: (a) Initial premium, $24. (b) Initial payment for sick patient, $250. c) Twenty percent of the remaining hal- a e, $150. ( Paid by the insurance company, $600. T refore, for the privilege of electing to be I red for the usual catastrophic hospi- tal bi under the administration's proposal, the in vidual over 65 must pay $424, and the ins ance company pays only $600--- pretty e ensive insurance. It shou be pointed out that, under the Forand bi the entire $1,000 hospital bill would be id at no premium, deductible payment, o oinsurance obligation on the part of the k elderly person over the age of 65. In short, th cost to the Individual and the cost to the ndividual States and their municipalities b omes prohibitive. (a) No indivIdl, dependent solely upon old-age and survi rs insurance, can find in free money the inial $24 premium and the initial $250 to be iaid against a hospital bill?a total of $274 lus 20 percent of the cost of the illness. (b) No State can a rd to spend $85 mil- lion to save 831,600,006,k-, the present old-age assistance expenditure filtr hospital care and nursing home care on annnual basis; and, also note, that not all okthe hospital bills of $11,250,000 would be paW, as $21/2 million for annual chronic hospit care would not be paid, as only 180 days of ospital care are Included in the administrati 's proposal. In short, the proposal is nc a health in- surance plan for the aged as its costs are so Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved FOFikleiie 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD MAY 16 1960 Congress Must Reassert Its Right To Know EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. FRANK KOWALSKI -cbi,x4kairred,r IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, May 16, 1960 Mr. KOWALSKI. Mr. Speaker, I know that no Member of Congress wishes to say or do anything that might interfere with the President's freedom of action at the summit meeting. However, once the summit conclave has been concluded, I believe that the Congress must move quickly and decis- iVely to reassert and reaffirm its right to know _what goes on in the executive branch of the Government. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 c ficall the legialative branch "t its 'Constitutional powers infringed upon by any depart- r agency including the Central e CongresTgliould further insist that foreign policy be conducted by the De- partment of State, under the supervi- sion of the President, and that extreme care be taken to prevent the making of decisions in this critical field by the military. The dangers of the present situation 'are pointed out in an editorial printed Friday, May IL in the Wall Street Jour- nal. I commend this editorial to the careful perusal of all Members of the House. The text follows: A NEED FOR INTELLIGENCE In all its recent statements, the State De- partment has been careful to note, . that President Eisenhower had not "authorized' the particular flight of the U-2 plane 'that penetrated more than 1,200 miles into Russia before it fell into Russian hands. At his press conference the other day Mr. Eisenhower made plain that this was a mere quibble; the gathering of any information that will protect the United States was "authorized" by him long ago. Intelligence operatives are to use "whatever means neces- sary short of the use of force" to learn what Russia may be up to. Implicit in his state- ment was that while he had not "author- ized" the specific flight of May 1, he had "authorized" any and all such steps. His statement clearly backed up Secretary of State Herter's announcement that the United States would continue to do what it had been doing for some time past about aerial reconnaissance of Russia. But it did nothing to clear up his own statement of just a year and three months ago that "the orders were very strict" about flying near Russia's borders. In answer, to a question in 1959 whether a missing Air Force research plane had been lost testing Russian preparedness procedures, the President then said; "Actually now, I have forgotten the limit, but I established it personally some time back a couple of years ago, and I am sure this happening is accidental." It is hard to see how anyone can infer from that statement anything ex- cept that U.S. planes were under orders not to cross Russian borders. Perhaps the President means to make a distinction between using Air Force planes, which could be considered as the "use of force" he has said will not be employed, and using National Aeronautics and Space Ad- ministration planes engaged only in gence. It is a distinction, however, that wilVP escape the Russians. And it is a distinction that certainly will:. continue to escape some Members of Con-- gress. The other day Speaker RAYBURN de- manded firdr---erts'atate Elepartment and the' Central Intelligence Agency tell Congress wile ordered that pilot into the air over Russia. Senator WILLIS ROBERTSON said he.' had attended many meetings of the Appro- priations Committee, but nobody had ever: 4 said anything about flying planes over Russia; certainly CIAgjAlleIl Dulles, hadn't. Senn't STYLES BRIDGES de mantled that the State Department and grA; explain the whole story to Congress. A dayt or so later Representative .r,i,,mayipitiaaraimpsis,,, chairman of the House Appropriations Com!. mittee, said right out that the aborted flight over Russia was one of a series planned br 4, approved by the White House, and to a few Members of Congress as well.; So to say that Congress is somewhat con- fused-over- -the-operations, as well as the role, of the CIA is, to nete,aia obvious. Even tilititleflOte.- -Herter nolirt -says that our "ex- tensive aerial surveillance by unarmed civil- ian aircraft" was apparently not a secret to the Soviet leadership, it was obviously a sec- ret' to many Members of the House and Senate. But if the President's orders of 15 months ago liPter at:Tiled to tiagaf,?1.,A? if the limits have been lifted, and if flight's into Russia are no longer accidental happenings and drily a handful of Congressmen knew about the changes, Congress is in poor position to complain about the matter. For Congress has consistently declined to keep itself?or even its leaders?responsible for_,A19,yyp&what goes on lii the CIA. Sen- ators antritepresentalives have acted as though this Agency, whose farthing opera- tions are answerable only to one man, is somehow not only beyond an accounting but also above the errors that are common to all men. What Congress learns of CIA's activities Congress learns only if and when Mr. Dulles is inclined to disclose some information, and then only what he wishes to tell. The sole missien_ol....the_cut is to gather intelligence and assess it, and it may very well be doing this job in an able manner. The point is that Congress does not know vaelaisr, CIA is or not. Therefore Congress should require that Mr. Dulles give an accounting of his steward- ship so that it will know wh4e,r,SIA is soundly,mathied and directed' or whether it is perhaps more adventurous than it ought to be to serve the Nation best. In a word, Congress ought to choose a committee of responsible men to whciiA,,,,C4A is, inade re- sponsible by statute. And Congress should waste no time doing so. It is not our purpose here to pillquAir. Dulles individually, for his responsibilities dirrery-great. But tbe fact is that in a country where, by the Words of the Consti- tution, only Congress has the power to de- clare war, Mr. Dulles' responsibilities seem to us to be far greater than they ought to be and his power of decision far broader than it ought to be. '*!* We are not suggesting that Mr. .Dulles iihdtilrbe forced to expbse hts';espionage apparatus to the full gaze of the American public and thus to its enemies. But clearly an agency whose enthuisiasm for gathering intelligence and whose lack of judgment in doing so can actually endangef-our oversea bases, our alliances and our reputation for candor and truth shall no longer be per- mitted to remain almost a law unto itself,:0, Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 ,INGRESS.( Rm,F,(8- Release 2004/05/13.; CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 MAY 1 6 1960 iFlight on the Eve of the Summit Was a Colossal American Blunder ExTENfaitV tit*" REMARKS HON: ji JI9fLitS imlAuo IN THE HMI* Ctiq.E.PHESENTATIVES Ma2ia3MVIcty 16,1960 Mr. ROGERS:Of Colorado. Mr. Speak- er, I ask unanimous COnSent.t0 have in- serted in the APPendio of the Race:MD an editorial "SPY Flight On the Eve of the Summit Was 0, COlOSSal American Blun- .1Pr" that appeared in the Denver Pest, Colo on Tuesday, feffrifirritO? I know this will be of great interest to all the Members. 'the editOrjal is as follow: The may plane incidt brings home to Americans as never heaure what the cold war is really like. adt 'ia a a' ? It shows how difficult ft is .for a free and open society to operate openly and honorably against the secretive, monolithic Communist empire. It shows how badly coordinatid our na- tional leadership is, with the peace-seeking right hand knowing little or nothing about what the war-deterring left hand is up to. It shows how a calculated risk can back- fire when the risk is not properly weighed. Por the tragedy of this incident goes be- yond the fact that we got caught. The tragedy is t that we lokt 'Mar more, at this delicate rconat in history, than we stood to gain by heaocelixig the spy- plane flights some thagattago 'until the summit meeting and other,negotiations were over. There is a military argument that recon- naissance flightsi'llsound and over Soviet territory give is data thafmakes it easier for us to deter or repel. aggreSsion. It is a valid argument. ? .a, ? The flights 'tellrt about the buildup of Soviet missile potential, wherelhe pads are, Which are cornhat7ready, etc.. They also serve aa part cf.; free world's warning line agaiaaa,Opurpr ile strike. This information Vatalci frike back quickly and acetirty a " missilet bases, to knock th,ek put e a accond strike could be lauriChecl, From a strictly mtary iita point, this information, so essential both? to defense planning and striking ability, 16,worth risk- ing the loss of a few planes... But as a contribution to deterring world war III; this spy-plane technique has gravel disadvantages, too. Iu his. era of pushbutton War, the neces- sity oil split-second decisionmaking to avoid annihilation, a misinterpreted spy-plane in- , 1E/OD of _Russian airspace could touch off ever-widening exchange a:if missiles. Evell more likely, if the United States con- tinue to probe the Soviet periphery, would be constant clashes of American aircraft and Soviet air defenses, with possible Soviet re- prisals against American air bases in nearby nations. This in turn could spread into gen- eral War. WAR BY ACCIDENT? presuannit period, sugg 'ta.ati*.? store need, closer mincOnoy.fa Our right hand has obviouSly afgalst our left hand, iinettno CSl L ea confusion over what our itrategy prior. it- really are as we head for the summit. Nor is this the only recent occurrence creates this impression. , Two others are the announcement thin weekend that we shall resume Unti,nTr?o 07), . nuclear testing, despite the Geneva caa. ence now dealing with the problem; and r,r President's recent armouncernent that Vie President NIXON might aSsumc his snip seat if the meeting lasts more than 7 day. Both showed not only a lack of fait: la international negotiation, but also a. wili;.ii- ness to take action that could make ; aa. negotiation even lead likely to bear fruit. The spy-plane incident shows the aan, attitude. What about the effect of the expos-or these ht s on our cold war position? e long-range effect is consid re. r: In preparing for the wa to fight, we have injured oualy in the political, econorrar al war we are already fighting. ? SGTE/MIT POSIT/ON /TORT have put ourselves on the defensive an we are about 'to step into an impor- taftt cold war encounter?that is, the sum- intF conference. We have lost the solid ground of fairness and' bpennese from which we could have negotiated. We have given Khrushchey a solid issue against us, in which international law is all on his side. = We have opened the way for him to reap as? propaganda Coup bigger than anything he ,Ilas yet accomplished. ut perhaps even more important is the age done to the U.S. ultimate cold war thin we this pasterated aboveboard, in contrast to til weekend, we could still say ercover Soviet activities. We could claim that we tell the truth and the Soviets lie. Now we can no longer assume that pose. and the consequent damage to our moral leadership of the free world has suffered, especially from the point of view of the un- committed new nations of Asia and Africa. This shows hoW thortsighted is the argu- ment that we can justifiably engage in spy- plane flights because the Soviets engage in much more farflung spying activities. UNITED STRATEGY NEEDED ? If we, like the Marxists, argue that the end justifies the means, it makes the war of ideas--which the uncommitted nations take Very seriously?all the harder to fight. If we 'adopt techniques similar to those of our enemies, how are bystanders to appre- ciate the vast difference between us? For all these reasons, the game turns out to be not worth the candle. We must now take all precautions possible to keep from threatening our summit posi- tion more than we already have, lest world opinion blame us for the failure of the meeting. We must also insist that our leaders de- fine cold war priorities, and make sure that the pursuit of one does not endanger the pursuit of others. .( thi Iio Finally, the spy-plane flights could lead to ever-increasing tensions, and just when some relaxation seemed possible. The more tense American-Soviet relations' become, the more likely one side or the other orht, by design or accident, pass the point no return. It is precisely because of this danger that the United States?or at least part of our Government?has been trying to bring about a relaxation of tensions. It was why the President had Khrushchev visit him, and why he' l,planning to return the Visit. It was the reasefaca the 1955 summit con- ference, and fore tlisarmament confer- ences now in progress. It is the reason far this month's summit conference, too. ? Though tbere may be military justification for the spy-'plane flights, it would have been merely prudent to suspend them just before the summit meeting, and act as the little boy, who "jes' before Christmas" was as good as he could be. In short, the military objectives should have been put aside, because of the threat they posed to moreimportant political ob- jectives. niLsfl In This lack of commeittense precaution, to- gether with the evidence from Washington. that the President had not specifically re-' viewed such a dangerous technique in this sts ti he Central In- , V'hlch favor a hard line a n mum 6f inter national negotiation, r re icy in an does thq . 'este That the White House has been unable to reconcile the objectives of these two camps. If American public opinion can now force a new effort to unify national strategy, then we ray have salvaged something out of anis c/,laraial blunder. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/ON ?-6019P90T00782R000100060001-7 1960 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?APPENDIX of a talk I made to the Clinton (S.C.) Kiwanis Club's annual farmers night program, April 14, 1960: FARM PROGRAM (Address of Congressman WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN DORN at Kiwanis Club's annual farmers night, April 14, at Clinton, S.C.) The most serious domestic problem facing the people of the United States is the farm situation. Farm population in the United States has dropped to 11 percent of the total, the lowest percentage in the history of the United States and the lowest of any major world power in the history of the world. This is a dangerously low percentage. The United States was founded by. men with a rural philosophy. The Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights were largely written by rural men. Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe were all outstanding farmers. The fact that Washington and Jefferson were great farmers made them good Presidents. Nearly all of the Presidents in the history of the United States were born and reared on a farm or associated with a farm. The membership of the Congress for 130 years was overwhelmingly rural. Farmers have initiative. They are independent. They think for themselves. They cannot be herded or coerced to the polls by goons and ward bosses. It is difficult to get up a mob or overthrow the Government with busy, contented landowning farmers. A man who is busy milking cows and tilling the soil is not going to lead a march on the Nation's Capitol to overthrow representative gov- ernment. We do not find Communists and Socialists engaged in the pursuit of agriculture. Our rural areas are no breeding ground for juve- nile delinquency. Rural people go to church and support good schools. The rural home is the bedrock of a democratic society. Under the price-support and acreage-con- trol programs, the American family-size farmer has been reduced to a state of peon- age. One-half of the burley-tobacco growers in the United States, under this Government program, are permitted only one-half acre or less?in a nation that originated the cul- ture of tobacco. Under these Government programs, cotton acreage has fallen off in the United States 60 percent since 1930. We have lost cotton markets at home and abroad. One-third of the cotton farmers in the United States grow 5 acres or less. The percentage is even greater in the Southeast. It is im- possible for a farmer to clothe, support, and send his children to college with less than 5 acres of cotton or one-half acre of tobacco. What opportunity is there for a young man with an ambition to be a farmer? He cannot possibly become a farmer unless he inherits a farm or marries into one with allotted acres. Farming is the only business in this so-called free nation that a young man can- not go into?he is not permitted to do so by a government of free people. Under these Government programs, the situation gets worse and worse. Surpluses mount and the rural population decreases, with more and more people on the welfare rolls and more looking to Washington paternalisfn. These farm programs could not have served Russia's purpose more if they had been writ- ten by the Kremlin's planners of world con- quest. America's population is being con- centrated in the great cities, easy to annihi- late with the atomic bomb, easy to herd into political machines, and easily subjected to propaganda and agitation. In fact, the first farm program inaugurated in the United States was written by questionable charac- ters?one of whom has since served a term In the penitentiary. The farm program was written by Alger Hiss, Nathan Witt, Frank Shea, Rex Tugwell, Lee Pressman, Henry A. Wallace, and Felix Frankfurter, presently a Justice of this notorious U.S. Supreme Court. These E were principally bright young attor- neys, most of whom knew nothing whatever about agriculture. Under the programs these men inaugu- rated, we grow less and less, our farm popu- lation shrinks, while Russia grows more and more and every nation in the world increases her farm acreage. Soviet Russia since 1955 has added over 100 million new acres to agri- cultural production. Rhodesia exempts her farmers from land taxes to grow more and more. Turkey exempts her farmers from in- come taxes to grow more and more. In this country we passed a soil bank to get our farmers to grow less and less. Incidentally, the average farmer in Rhodesia plants 65 acres of tobacco; in Canada, 30 acres; and in the United States, may I repeat, half of the tobacco farmers are permitted to plant only one-half acre or less. The same is true with cotton and wheat. Foreign nations grow more, with American foreign aid, while we grow less. We send them marketing experts, fertilizer experts, and the net result is to put our own people out of business. Under the cotton price-support loan pro- gram, in the year 1958 358 farmers in the State of California received $50,000 or more; Arizona, 194; Mississippi, 237; South Caro- lina, 1; Georgia, none; North Carolina, 2; Alabama, none. Here in the Southeast we are not only being forced and tricked off the land, but we are paying the bill for others to become bigger and bigger. The atmosphere is being carefully created so that someday a campaign of land reform will ex- plode in the United States along the lines of China's and Cuba's agrarian reform. The only segments of our farm economy holding its own, growing, free, and with hope, are those outside of Government control an price supports?for example, livestock, pine trees, citrus fruits, and vegetables. On ray farm I grow beef, pine trees, and grass, because I can do so without Govern- ment regulation. The pressure was put on Congress to put price supports on livestock, but I am so glad today we resisted these pressure groups. The beef surplus simply vanished through increased consumption. Livestock today ac- counts for 54 percent of the farm intome. Yes, we need a farm program, a new farm program, a positive program, one that looks to the future, one that will offer hope to the youth of this country, one that will beckon to the teeming millions in the crowded cities, one that can assure us food and part-time employment for the unem- ployed during times of depression. 1. The No. 1 plank in this farm program should be gradual elimination of price supports and all acreage controls. Our free Nation cannot long survive as long as its farm population is regimented, controlled, and paid to do less and become weaker. 2. The Government subsidizes certain business operations to stay in business, to expand, grow, and to employ more people. On the other hand, we subsidize the farmer to plant less and less, to employ fewer people and to buy less fertilizer, machinery, and supplies. We are simply paying him directly to go out of business. It would be much better for the Nation if we paid the farmer to grow more, not less, and if we paid him directly to stay on the farm instead of mov- ing toward the overcrowded cities. 3. Get rid of the surplus by promoting markets abroad and expanding our markets at home. 4. Develop new crops and new uses through expanded research and advertising. Dr. Herty kept thousands of farmers in business by research on the pine tree. 5. Expand the rural development program. 6. Give the farmer more Federal tax ad- vantages so he can compete with the tax exempt farmers of foreign nations. Give him a break with local taxes by making him pay less for improved rural property. The A4163 policy now is to tax a farmer if he paints his* house and improves the appearance of his farm. The local taxes of many farmers have doubled since improving his place by sheer initiative and effort. 7. Imports?the farm problem could be solved in one stroke by prohibiting imports of livestock, cotton goods, and other farm commodities we already have in surplus. Over 100 million new acres could be used in the United States to produce the beef, wool, sugar, cotton, tobacco, grain, and other farm commodities now imported from foreign countries. South Carolina needs new industry, but more than anything else we need to save our old industry which consumes cotton from our farms. We need new industry, but we also steed a South Carolina Planning and De- velopment Board for Agriculture. South Carolina's agriculture development must keep pace with its industrial development. It will be tragic for the future political and social welfare of our State if we become all industrial. We must have a balanced econ- omy. We must preserve our South Carolina rural heritage, traditions, and philosophy. We have a great agricultural college at Clemson. Clemson's agricultural program needs the full support and backing of all of our citizens, both urban and rural. Through research and planning, South Carolina was able to switch from indigo to rice, to cotton, and now to livestock and pine trees. South Carolina must and can con- tinue to be largely agricultural. Congress Shod .11.4040404.0I4 EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF jasikalliS OF TENNESSEE IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, May 16, 1960 Mr. EV1NS. Mr. Speaker, the events of the past week on the international scene are highly disturbing. They point out dramatically that in the delicate state of relations between the nations of the world it is necessary to maintain the highest degree of responsibility in all actions we take that might affect our international relations. Mr. Speaker, in view of these recent developments I want to join with others in expressing the hope that Congress will take a look at the CIA and its operations in the public interest as suggested in the editorial of the_N_Ashyllle_Tenpsean 441*killi which rfflgrMIRMMr6Fill kit in the Appendix of the RECORD. The editorial follows: IF CIA CHIEF IS, 0 IS? WN V,,oyartnss Days afte in Russia, the truth is beginning to come out in Wash- ington, and to that extent the United States position is being improved. Having been mouse-trapped by Mr. Khru- shchev, Secretary Herter has clarified the question of authority for the gathering mis- sion which came to such a calamitous end. The broad policy of aerial espionage, we are told, came from President Eisenhower, acting in accord with the National Security. Act of 1947. Since the beginning of his ad- ministration, Mr. Herter said, the President has put into effect directives "to gather by every means possible the information re- quired to protect the United States and the free world against surprise attack and to Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 enable them to make effective preparations for their defense." Under the President's directives, therefore, various programs have been carried out, in- cluding "extensive aerial surveillance by un- armed aircraft," it is revealed. In a burst of candor, it is emphasized that flights over and near Russia will continue as needed. The earlier claim that there was no sponsibilit for the U-2 flight as as a g on-Txra-s?eo"TiCerlieCtritertrevealed as double4=ige of a kind that has IiWed tb.5:aminieMtion's claim to open dealing in international matters. We can believe that the President did not press the buttom, as it were, for this par- ticular flight, and, that brings up the question of hozap...coutpllettthe Central Intelli epee Agency Tay:beust berr:Tp . irel; has not been enter= VIrrPret for: s Part in the colos nder, it would be surprising. For i s o vious at even if he had not been told to cease his activities lest the summit be wrecked, he should have acted to this end on his own. Yet there is a good deal of evidence that when.Nr,Dulles acts ezr1.4,_aid..ine,nt, yesz_attiWtrong- Albhg-Vr ...-en- eral MacArthur, he is charged with having goofed on the Chinese C9,painunist participa- tion in ,Tika,s? and his organization allegedly was taken by surprise when ._a_s_Eo? seized the sikkmagilg, Other instaneer31" missed signals could be listed. Regardless, therefore, of wItsai.4?,.01),[fr. Dulles becomes the goat of thIS-Tarticular brilitifiW, there is ample reason for Congress to revive the proposal that a permanent joint committee be established to make continuing studies of th CI 's secret activities, for which it is no acccititerreEr-body which created it and appropriates operating funds estimated at from $100 million to $1 billion annually. While there is general fear lest mistakes lead to nuclear war, a free-wheeling intel- ligence agency calls for some sort. of scrutiny and direction. Confidence in White House direction has been hard hit by the latest turn of events. And for this development Qp,L1 Resto,nof,the ;slew York Times has a sirrige ekpranation: "He [the President' is not even managing his own departments preliminary to the summit, and this, of course, is precisely the trouble." Insofar as it can help correct this strange situation, the Con ess has eve eason for inves Washington Report EXTENSION OF REMARKS ov HON. BRUCE AL OP TEXAS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, May 2, 1960 Mr. ALGER. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I include the following newsletter of May 14, 1960: WASHINGTON REPORT (By BRUCE ALGER, Fifth District, Texas, 11.1494a).., The Department of Agriculture appropri- ation bill, just enacted, presented the con- tradiotory though not too unusual spectacle of Congressmen debating and agreeing to the expenditure of public money for a pro- gram that practically everyone, for varying reasons, thought wrong, yet the bill passed IONAL RECORD ? A make- andily without a record vote. The bil called for approximately $4 billion in vari- ous agriculture subsidies. The Appropria- tion Committee's own report on the bill highlights the inconsistencies. Here are some quotes: "The Federal Government is now spending far more in the name of agri- culture than ever before in history *? ? * yet farm income in 1959 was at the lowest level since World War II. * * * Since 1953 the following 'cures' have been offered, tried, and from the record found wanting, so far as solving the problem is concerned." Then are listed reduced price supports (lower as- sured prices), soil bank (to pay farmers for acreage left untilled) , Public Law 480 (to give surpluses away at home and abroad), Agri- culture Department personnel increase of 28 percent, appropriations increase of 300 percent, and producticin controls lowered (reduced acreage control). And still the problem remains unsolved. "The cost to the Federal Treasury since 1952 now totals $25.8 * * * Farmers tend to increase their production as farm prices are reduced." The soil bank failed, according to the re- port, because we paid farmers for land that already lay idle; further; that if 56 percent of all farms were retired at $10 per acre per year, costing us $2.75 billion, we would cut production only 9 percent. The problem, as the report states, "will never be solved until Congress attacks the problem at its base, which is overproduction." The report then shows that the $13.5 billion in food given away at home and abroad under Public Law 480 since 1951 has not eliminated the sur- pluses, but rather "has contributed to a con- stantly deteriorating situation for Americ agriculture by getting these huge surpluses out of sight abroad and thereby postponing action to prevent the increase in the surplus problem." Also, the report states that Pub- lic Law 480 "should be considered a foreign aid program and should be paid for in the mutual security bill." Speaking of acreage controls, the report states, "while efforts to control production through acreage controls have not been effective, it appears unwise to eliminate them." Under the heading, "Cor- rective Action Urgently Needed", we find, "the situation becomes progressively worse. " * It is imperative the present approaches to this problem be reversed if the agricul- tural industry of this country is to survive and if we are to prevent a bankrupt agricul- ture from pulling down the rest of our economy." Yet the bill passed perpetuates e present programs. The forthright report stopped just short of the truth. The truth is that Federal sub- sidy (Federal money and Federal control) will kill private enterprise ultimately. True, to a degree, industry can live on, through accumulated productive strength, against the debilitating Federal regulation, much as a ship nioves despite barnacles. True, tax- payers can survive economically despite the weight of taxation much as a strong man can carry a heavy burden and still do other tasks. But in either case or in combination of the two, subsidy and taxation, free enter- prise, private initiative, and individual free- dom go down the drain. We are now wit- nessing the struggle of a dying, free industry, originally a free industry?agriculture?be- cause of the Federal Government. The solu- tion? Get the Federal Government out en- tirely. Only then can normal market sup- ply and demand react and result in the right prices, which in turn will result in a good income to the farmer, balanced against the costs of other commodities. So the effort of Congress should be directed toward freeing the farmer, not regulating and subsidizing him deeper into trouble. The bill passed Without a record vote. I voted against it and desire to be so recorded. I predict that if Congress will not take the statesmanlike position, then the people will force action, May 16 just as happened in the labor reform bill, passed despite House leadership opposition. It would be better, and hurt the farmers less, it seems to me, if the Congress and the farm industry effected the changes voluntarily than to have it forced on them. Russia'sEirozaistisl .31ustering con- cerrffittite Amefffan "SPr-was answered forthrightly by the chairman of the Appro- priations Committee in a floor speech. Mr. our failure to ae- 'Dft nt at ejaCgittirtgunist Korean attack which cost our own unready troops dearly. So it is that for j,years _QI41.Sgen:LE,g2Ittelligence A y ovelt-trussia to observe in order to protect ourselves, so far as possible, against buildups for surprise attacks. He likened the appro- priation of funds for this work to the secret atomic work at Oak Ridge which preceded the atom bomb, unknown to all but a few of the Members of Congress. Es=?Zsigg is a part of,modern warfare an9Lpurtavar. Ours is hardly comparable to Fetts-sTa's infiltration and subversive efforts. It was a refreshing statement. Russia needs to be told once and for all that we are deadly serious in our intention to protect freedom-loving nations, and if they don't like it, that's just too bad. Tough and direct action is all that blusterers understand. Only as we are strong, tough- minded, and tought-talking, will we prevent war and strengthen and attract the only kind of allies we want, specifically those equally dedicated to preserving freedom for mankind against the godless, slave-state alternative of communism. ''Pensions for World War I Veterans EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. AL ULLMAN OF OREGON IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, May 16,1960 Mr. ULLMAN. Mr. Speaker, it seems to me that the time has now come when Congress must take action to fulfill its obligations to the veterans of World War I. A most important step toward obtain- ing a World War I pension is support from the major veterans' organizations. It will therefore be of great interest to the Members of Congress that Willamette Heights Post No. 102 and Ontario Post 67 of the American Legion and Willard An- derson Post 2471 of the Veterans of For- eign Wars, have endorsed the passage of a separate pension program for World War I veterans. Their resolutions fol- low: RESOLTJTION ASKING THAT THE AMERICAN LE- GION Go ON RECORD AS SUPPORTING A SEPA- RATE PENSION FOR THE VETERANS OF WORLD WAR I Whereas veterans of the First World War did not participate in the generous postwar benefits afforded veterans of World War II and Korea, nor comparably in social security or retirement, health and insurance plans which were not generally available prior to World War II; and Whereas it does not seem fair to such vet- erans of World War I now of an average age level of 65 years, that they be lumped to- gether with the younger veterans of later wars in a single pension program that does not take into consideration their particular needs as is the case with the War Pension Act of 1959; and Whereas the veterans of First World War now number only a small segment of the Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Releaseleg04/05/1131Z13CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 BriIlsurt Cont.). Sunday Herald Calk Announced yin Policy Provocative, and Dangerous EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON FRANK _KOWALSKI OF CONNECTICUT IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, May 16, 1960 Mr. KOWALSKI. Mr. Speaker, I bring to the attention of my colleagues, under unanimous consent, an editorial published yesterday in theatal.a.Her- ald, of?pActoport, Conn. The Sunday Herald has one of the largest circulations in New England, and its editorial on this critical subject is worthy of close attention. Following is the text of the Sunday Herald's editorial: , UNITED STATES it,' 110 ?=NUB POLICY Presiden .er'& defensive and/or aggressive cxplsalatift. of the "whys" and "whereforea7 .41._?.6iir :spy plane, which was brought down over Russia, makes our an- nounced future_pt1ge4r bdtla provocative and dangerous. ,?-? ? Walter Lippitatiti, in analyzing "rhe Spy Business" Writes that "our position now seems to be that because it's so difficult to collect information iiiside the Soviet Union, it will be our alloWeirpelicy to fly over Soviet territory, illAng tile territory of our allies as bases. ? "Although the intention here is to be can- did and honest and also to make the best of a piece of very bad luck," he continues, "the new policy, which seems to have been impro- vised between Saturday and Monday is quite unworkable. "To avow that we intend to violate Soviet sovereignty is to put everybody on the spot. It makes it impossible for the Soviet Govern- ment to play down this particular incident because now it is challenged openly in the face of the whole world. "It is compelled to react because no nation can remain passive when it is the avowed policy of another nation to intrude upon its territory." ? An American broadcaster, repeating what an English commentator said, summed up the lessons which we should have learned long before the American spy plane crashed * inside Russia. The Enzlishman, dwelt_cm.. two rules of eltttcrA 'tlinirsi" is never to be and the second?in an unfortunate eventuality?is never to admit anything. Because the Eisenhower administration seems to have kat?Tr'- .,?airwel fit min- '0- proach to the intrigue' of-esioTitige, Our natitthal and international embarrassment, we hadn't learned either lesson. And the unforgivable third mistake was to permit thrifirYTIMrireeVrarifie summit meetings. The summit meetings might as well be can- celled because the only dubious advantage they will give us is to answer Mr. K's propa- ganda. And as for President Eisenhower's visit to Russia, he can only invite national humilia- tion by going after he's been told to stay away. Finding ourselves trapped, we are trying to extricate ourselves by improvising a new and unprecedented policy of openly declared sedret spying on Russia. Can it work? Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 1960 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? APPENDIX phere of cooperation and mutual under- standing. I am pleased by these recent develop- ments and am hopeful that major labor- management "explosions" over increased automation can be avoided through con- certed and sincere efforts along these lines. I want today to call attention to a forthcoming top-level conference on au- tomation to be held in Cooperstown, N.Y., from June 1 through June 3. It is spon- sored by the State of New York and ac- tively championed by Governor Rocke- feller. The program for this conference is indeed impressive. Those chosen to address the delegates are among the top people in their respective fields. They include educators, labor leaders, and business executives. I am certain that all who are able to attend will benefit greatly and that those who are in a position to read and study the various conference reports will find them valuable and'enlightening. To this end, I hope in the next few weeks to bring to the attention of the Members various papers and addresses printed in conjunction with the New York State 'Conference on Automation. Mr. President, I should like today to ask unanimous consent that an an- nouncement containing the schedule of events to take"place at the Cooperstown Conference on Automation be printed in the Appendix of the RECORD. There being no objection, the program was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: STATE OF NEW YORK EXECUTIVE CHAMBER, ALBANY, MAY 10, 1960 Details of the conference on automation which Governor Rockefeller has called in Cooperstown June 1-3 were announced today by the Governor's office. More than 50 lead- ers in business, labor, education, and gov- ernment will participate in the discussions. The conference will open with a dinner Wednesday evening, which Governor Rocke- feller will address. Three sessions will fol- low, at which four major aspects of automa- tion will be examined iin depth. Paper on each of these aspects will be circulated to the participants in advance of the conference, and will be summarized by the authors at the Thursday and Friday sessions. The program follows: WEDNESDAY, JUNE 1 Reception and dinner, address by Gov- ernor Rockefeller. THURSDAY, JUNE 2,4 Morning session: "Automation, Its Mean- ing and Dimensions," prepared and sum- marized by John T. Dunlop, professor of eco- nomics, Graduate School of Business Ad- ministration, Harvard University. Discus- sion leader, Dr. Thomas Hale Hamilton, president of the State University of New York. Afternoon session: "Basic Economics of 'Automation," prepared and summarized by John Diebold, John Diebold & Associates, Inc., management consultants, New York City. Discussion leader, Charles Stauffacher, executive vice president, Continental Can Co. "Manpower for Automation," prepared and summarized by Eli Ginsberg, professor of economics, Graduate School of Business, Co- lumbia University. Discussion leader, Ar- thur J. Goldberg, general counsel, United Steel Workers of America. Dinner: speaker, Lt. Gov. Malcolm Wilson. FRIDAY, JUNE 3 Morning session: "The Community and Automation," prepared and summarized by Solomon BarkIn, director of research, Tex- tile Workers Union of America. Discussion leader, Prof. Frederick Harbison, director, in- dustrial relations section, Princeton Univer- sity. Summation: Dr. William J. Ronan, secre- tary to the Governor. The conference will conclude with a luncheon Friday noon. Arrangements for the conference are be- ing handled by a committee composed of In- dustrial Commissioner M. P. Catherwood, Commerce Commissioner Keith McHugh, and Dr. Ronan. Primary Boost for Nixon Election EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. ROBERT H. MICHEL OF ILLINOIS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Tuesday, May 17, 1960 Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the REC- ORD, I include the following article from the Evening Star, May 13, 1960: PRIMARY BOOST FOR NIXON ELECTION?KEN- NEDY PEEN WINNING NOMINATION AND DE- FEAT BY VICE PRESIDENT ? (By David Lawrence) Analysis of traditional habits in politics and the habits of thought of organization leaders tells far more about who is going to be nominated at a political convention than do polls or primary elections. Based on just such an analysis this cor- respondent wrote on March '7, just before the New Hampshire primary, that Senator .KENNEDY "is likely to win the Democratic nomination" and that, "if he is blocked, the compromise candidate will be Adiai Steven- son." On April 7, after the Wisconsin primary, this writer said in these dispatches: "The Wisconsin primary, by all the rules of politics, should mean that Senator KEN- NEDY will be regarded as the front-runner fr9m now on. This means that the other Candidates will tend to combine against him. There are other primary contests, to be sure, but Senator KENNEDY will gain ground in all of them, as he has the organization and the finances back of him to win the neces- sary delegate strength. What is really meant by "the organization and the finances"? Certainly there is not the slightest basis for any implication that votes are bought. Nor is it to be assumed that the word "organization" means the reg- ular party machinery. In preconvention campaigns, each candidate develops his own organization and, if he has money enough, he will engage precinct workers everywhere to get voters to the polls, transporting the in autos when necessary. More important still, the organization will know where to find the indifferent voters who can be per- suaded by friends to vote for the candidate such friends favor. These "organization" workers carry sample ballots printed in advance, and in a State like West Virginia, where there are few pre- cincts with vothig machines, it means that the citizen takes the sample ballot into the voting booth and is not bewildered when confronted with a long list of -state and local candidates. He is enabled to go right to the spot on the ballot and put his mark down. 4.1611111114. mid. mit. us,. A4173 This is an old pattern in American politics, and it takes a lot of money to pay for a big organization that really gets out the vote. The total Kennedy vote in West Virginia was about 220,000, which is less than half the Democratic vote cast for Adlai Stevenson in 1952, when he carried the State against Gen- eral Eisenhower. It isn't difficult to line up a minority bloc in any State primary if you have the money and the organization. The Kennedy forces can do it hereafter in every primary, and they will confront the Demo- cratic National Convention with the legiti- mate query: "Since we have won most of the primaries, ho W can you turn us down?" This correspondent believes the West Vir- ginia primary result not only has helped Senator KENNEDY toward the Democratic nomination but actually has helped toward the election of Vice President NIXON.. who is certain to be the Republican nominee. Once the so-called religious issue is out of the way?and it now will be so viewed by many politicians because West Virginia has a relatively small number of Catholics in its voting population?the tendency will be to appraise the Massachusetts Senator on his merits. The Republican strategists, for instance, don't want to see the religious issue raised, either. They would rather go before the country with the argument that, in these fateful times, "You don't elect a boy to be President of the United States." The biggest point the Republicans think they will have in their favor is that Vice President NIXON is trained In and intimately familiar with the tasks of the White House and that Senator KENNEDY would have to start from scratch to learn how to function In the Presidency. But doesn't the voting in the primaries, it will be asked, indicate that Senator KENNEDY is popular and a good vote-getter? As against a less colorful and less known candi- date, such as Senator HUMPHREY, it has not been difficult for Senator KENNEDY to win the primaries thus far. But the real reason the Massachusetts Senator upset so many observers who were forecasting the outcome of the West Virginia primaries is that they paid more attention to hit-or-miss polls than to two key factors?"the organization and the finances." In a national election, "the organization and the finances" tend to be balanced as be- tween the parties. As of today, it seems very likely that the Nation's voters will have to choose between Senator KENNEDY and Mr. NIXON next November. This writer believes that?on the basis of, first, satisfactory eco- nomic condiitions in the major part of the country next autumn, and, second, the argil- ment as to the executive experience that the Republican nominee will offer to the public, and, third, the active support of President Eisenhower?the Republicans will win a de- cisive victory. atement of Hon. Robert Lo tt to Na- tional Policy Mac mery u committee EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF . HON. JACOB K. JAVITS OF NEW YORK IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES Tuesday, May 17, 1960 Mr. JAVITS. Mr, President, earlier in this session, Robert A. Lovett testified before the SdIrelffifffirttot-National Policy Machinery, of which Senator Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 / 174 4 JACKSON is chairman, and of which I have the honor to be a member. This testimony attracted widespread interest and comment when it was subsequently released, but a number of articles pub- lished subsequently interpreted certain comments of Mr. Lovett as being critical of . President EisenhOwer. In order to make clear that Mr. Lovett's testimony was both in word and intent directed at the institution of the Presidency and not at President Eisenhower personally, Sen- ator MUNDT, ranking Republican mem- ber of the subcommittee, wrote Mr. Lo- vett and received a reply making this intent completely clear. I ask unanimous consent that the ex- change of correspondence between Sen- ator MUNDT and Mr. Lovett, and an ar- ticle on the subject by Arthur Krock printed in the New York Times of April 14, 1960, may be printed in the Appendix of the RECORD. There being no objection, the letters and article were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: MARCH 30, 1960. Mr. ROBERT LOVETT, Brawn Bros., Harriman ex Co., New York, N.Y. DEAR MR. LOVETT : During March you gra- ciouslY appeared as the leadoff witness before the Subcommittee on National Policy Ma- chinery, of which I am a member. At the close of your appearance, the subcommittee went into executive session to receive your comments_ogirtheldattonal Sectififir-e'ciune . ?Thrtnrghotlr-TOur discussion of the NSC you referred to "the President." At the time, it was my impresstolt mar/Mr-Were analyzing the position of president. Subsequent pub- lished articles have been based on the as- sumption that you described the activities of the present incumbent of the Presidency, Dwight D. Eisenhower. One of these articles was a column by Mr. Walter Lippmann on March 1. Several days later I attempted to clarify the matter through a statement for the RECORD. At- tached is a copy. - Unfortunately my clarification statement seems to have clarified nothing. Your testi- mony still is be interpreted as applying to President Eisenhower. I would appreciate very much having a short note from you as to the meaning you intended to give the phrase "the President" in your executive testimony. I hope to insert it in the com- mittee record. Again may I say that your basic statement before our subcommittee was most interesting and pertinent. With kindest regards, I am, Cordially yours, KARL E. 1)./formr, U.S. Senator. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? APPENDIX ROBERT A. LOVETT, New ,,York, N.Y., April 4, 1960. Senator KARL E. MUNDT, U.S. Senate, - Washington, D.C. DEAR SENATOR MUNDT : On my return to the office today from the Pacific coast, I found awaiting me your letter of March 31 requesting clarification of the meaning of certain language in my comments on the National Security Council given in executive session before the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery. You are curect Ix your understanding that my use of the expression "the President" meant "a President,nrmtffirrfrfs Mt' and not specifically the present incumbent. I e stBtans -n-caremrtray, special assistant to the President, who made the same inquiry of me by telephone while I was in California. You will recall that, in my opening state- ment, I said (last sentence, p. 12, of the subcommittee printed record, pt. 1) that "It should be clear, therefore, that none of these observations is intended to be critical of any individuals or of operational deci- sions." The few paragraphs I had written dealing with NSC were excised from my public statement and were given in executive session in accordance, I am informed, with the terms of an understanding reached at the request of the White House regarding the handling in executive session of questions on NSC matters, The sentence quoted above naturally applies, as you rightly understood, to all my testimony in both open and execu- tive sessions. In view of the public interest shown in the subcommittee's hearings, it is wit sur- prising to find some agencies or individuals who feel that the shoe might fit. I know of no way to keep them from -dying it on for size. With my thanks for your kind letter and cordial personal regards, I am, Very sincerely yours, ROBERT A. LOVETT. HOW TO MAKE A SHOE FIT ANY FOOT (By Arthur Krock) WASHINGTON, April 13.?Since Robert A. Lovett testified before Senator JACKSON'S subcommittee several weeks ago, the impres- sion has been growing that he definitely subscribed to some of the harshest criti- cisms of President Eisenhower and the Na- tional Security Council in their mutual relationship. Some news dispatohes and analyses of Lovett's testimony, and a Senate speech by Senator FULBRIGHT, are important sources of this public understanding. The chairman of the Foreign. Relations Committee concluded that the former Sec- retary of Defense "indicated that the Presi- dent (meaning Eisenhower) leads a danger- ously sheltered life as Chief Executive." Also, that Lovett "said * * * the NSC pro- tects Mr. Eisenhower from the debates that precede policy decisions." The transeript of Lovett's testimony, both in open and executive session, does not es- tablish either of these conclusions, or the assumptions in the press that when Lovett referred to "the" President, he always meant Eisenhower. What the transcript does establish is this: 1. At the outset of his testimony Lovett stated a caveat. It was that his remarks would be "based for the most part on notes made" during the Truman administration, and that he intended "no direct reference to any individuals or specific decisions." 2. But he did not regularly repeat this caveat. Therefore, when he answered, mid agreed with, questions about cli...g.:tile-gr.eaMe.17.t.'! so para,secl they cm?frd?have been taken to apply to the Eisenhower tenure, it was possible to assume that the witness replied in kind. 3. But close inspection of the transcript shows that the former Secretary of Defense conceived he was discussing "a" President and the National Security Council as an in- stitution, and he has since said as much. Apparently he relied on his opening caveat to prevent hypothetical exchanges in execu- tive session from being interpreted as ap- plying specifically to Eisenhower and the current procedures of the National Security Council. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS The following are such exchanges: Mr. JACKSON. Do you think the Security Council can operate effectively, as it was de- signed originally, if you have a large number of participants? May 17 Mr. Low:Tr. I Would have very great doubts about its ability to operate in a mass at- mosphere. I think it would inhibit fair dis- cussion * * * [and] be an embarassment as regards the vigor with which a man might want to defend his position. I think It would limit the quality of the debate which the President ought to hear. Mr. JACKSON. You do not necessarily light- en the load of the President by bringing to him a reediaoLaapats,where deciaon is Ig_aay, "we will go ahead s.' Don't you think there is confu- sion on the point that there is a tendency to help the President, to lighten his load, by trying to do his constitutional work for him? Mr. LovErr. I think the President in his own protection n9,4tdJasiat Ra, being in- formed nier,e1LprotECTed,by his aides. [it 'Being; a tenden.cy of younger assistant - * * * to tsy:to jis,cp ,tha4) thersome,probiems away from the'desk. Pro-IA-try- it was because the witness did not steadily invoke his caveat, like takers of the fifth amendment before racket in- quiries, that many concluded Lovett had con- ceded the points of criticism involved as cur- rently applicable. But if he fears that Presi- dent Eisenhower's temperament, his military preference for having issues intensely screened for him, and his awesome renown, inevitably have diluted the essential concept and function of the National Security Coun- cil in this administration, Lovett neither "said" nor "indicated" this. And the Na- tional_Qiin il's tatistical rOCord? ortre Presidentli ec arG Percent of the National Security Council meetings, sharp debates in his presence over fundamen- tal eillereliceh trrtfttrtcrpttparr--4trutes many assumptions on which major criticisms are founded. Tribute to the Eagle Rock Sentinel EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB OF CALIFORNIA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Tuesday, May 17,1960 Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Speaker, the 24th Congressional District of California, which it is my privilege to represent in Congress, possesses a number of top quality local newspapers which make an important contribution to the district in reporting news of special interest to the community, expressing area views on matters affecting it, undertaking cru- sades in behalf of the community where its interest is concerned, and generally performing many other valuable serv- ices in behalf of the residents of the community. The 24th district is very fortunate to have these public-spirited institutions. One of the line community newspapers serving the 24th District, the Eagle Rock Sentinel, is celebrating its 50th anni- versary this year. The Sentinel is a source of pride to the district and I wish to add my heartiest congratulations on this important occasion. There was no doubt as to what kind of newspaper the Sentinel was to be from the very beginning. When it first ap- peared, in March 1910, the Sentinel an- nounced that it would defy the then existing trend toward journalistic sen+ Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 4-0N(.?;1 WON A144?PG-VitirFor Release 2004/A N314 CIA9ROP9OT00782R000100060001-7 Addresses of Congressman John Brad- -. eines, of Indiana, and Martin c- Knpally,_ jiational Commander of the American Legion, at Dedication of New Post Home of James Lowell Corey Post 68, Americaetiltitin Argos, Ind., May .15, 1960,,,, - EXThTS m 4AF HEMARICS HON'ffellitrOADATASL--"IA . ?1. qtViii?ThisTA' IN TILE Hca,asz 1)19 REPIalliSAFIWP4VMS Thurtelttrifirart; f1,6114 t , Mr. BRAIMI/fs. , SPeakgr, on Sunday, NI if- "go,s Ind., meMbers of the Jan1 r, .4;14 Corey Post' 68 of the Aineric t bk tart in cere- monies 44,04 bf a new post 'that burned in 1958`. ? Among thp_peLsons ,partipipakint in this everif-Wile. clistirigUiShed former ntit r Gover %tate a Indiana, the Honorable Henry,:. Schricker; the In- diana department commander of the Arrterican'Legion,1Donald Hynes; and the commander Of-the -James Lowell Corey Post, BruCe Vattrier Weele. Of pa4p etest to the Legion- ,. mores. Fillies was the moving addre? cornmarikr,of the- ion, Martin B. 'Mc- Kneall 4 ork, who dedicated the new post" home. , CONGRESSMAN PfRADEMAS PRESENTS AIVIERICAN FLAG It was my honor 9n 'this occasim to to present to the members of the James Lowell Corey Post a 49-star flag whi had flown over the Capitol of the Unte States on July 4, 1959, the day when4lafo 49-star flag became the official nag-of our country. I was aLsOpleased to pre- the post with four pencil drawings r .til(i "Four Fortresses of Freedom," the WI:1,o House, the Capitol, the Suprenv Cc uft, and the Declaration of Inclepond.. ,ice. -etreA14 Mr. Speaker, under unanimous C6 I include my own remarks on this oc7 casion and those- of .National Ameilea4 Legion Commander McKrieally : der Hynes has been named by the Governor of Indiana to serve as Indiana State chair- man of the observance. The recognition of Armed Forces Week is therefore a. splendid symbol of the continu- ing devotion of the American Legion to the ? security and defense of our country and to the cause of freedom. The slogan of Armed Forces Week is "Power ? for Peace." All Americans want -peSeel Democrats want peace. Republicans want peace. :You want peace and I want peace Yet yeti and I know that today the world- is standing on a tightrope, with peace depend?; inxSn !large measure on the capacity of a (PLYKSjel wqr/d to maintain its balance and ?40- 44, intO:lhe volcano cif nuclear war. . REPUSLICANS AND DEMOCRATS ereerres ARMS ? It is encouraging to see tnat political lead- ers of both our great politieer Parties are now discussing the problem of arms control more seriously than it has ever been discussed be- fore. For as Secretary of State Christian Herter made clear in February in his famous. speech to the National Press Club in Wash- ington, D.C., the only sure longrun way to defend ourselves in this troubled world is to Work out an effective disarmament agree- ment with our adversaries in the Soviet Union, an agreement which, I hasten to add, will of course require effective inspection guarantees. WE MUST BE MILITARILY STRONG IN ORDER TO DISCUSS DISARMAMENT But I am sure Commander McNeally would agree with me that We in America must be strong militarily if we are to have bargain- ing power in dealing with the Soviet Union, even on the subject of disarmament. We ca:nnot lead effectively from a position - of military weakness. That is the meaning of the slogan, '''Power for Peace." We must be strong not only militarily but economically and diplomatically as well, for our Communist adversaries do not fight the cold -war on one front alone. We have al- ready seen, for exellnple, howIcheitsbchey has la en,exploiting the unhappy blunZAT'orts all 'the anti-American prcip- agenda lie can make of it. I have no with to exploit this matter for partisan gain for we want our President to enjoy the united support Of. the American people as he goes into tatilks at' the summit which may directly affect the destiny and peace of the entire-World. We nonetheless nattat. recognize how our Government has .laced, 9n t4 si3Ofitt,trOrttalii61- , by heway in which Khrhshchev iting it. MERICA FACED WITH POWERFUL CHALLENGE IN SOVIET UNION We must realize more than ever by the events of recent days aterby the trip which Ithrushrhev made across our country last year that, in him and in the Soviet people wheartehe left& we are confronted with the rahstPoWerhil challenge to our survival as a free a'ealety, in all the history of the American Re!pulalte":-.377e' Must be prepared to under- irta?nd the nature- of the challenge we face.: We believe .in a free society. The Com- munists believe in a slave society. We believe' in an. Open societyi The Com- munists believe in a closed society. If we are effectively to meet the challenge of the Communist world, we must be pre- pared to sacrifice. We must understand why we must be strong if we are to con- tinue to be free. WE MUST HAVE POWER IF WE ARE TO HAVE PEACE Better than most organizations in our country, the American Legion understands the dangers of the Communist challenge to freedom, understands why we must have power if we are to have peace. tEMARKS OF CONGRESSMAN MAY 15, 1960,ftg" Governor 'Sehrtieget, Commander McKneal- ly. Commander Hynes, Commander VaneDer Weele, fellow Legionnaires and friends, today is a great day not Only for Members of the James Lowell Corey Pest of the diner/Call Legion but for all Hoosier Itgionnaireee algt often do we have an opecartwilty tobrae 9.1.1r distinguished national cOininand_er, McKneally, in our midst and We vielcOnie here today. ?- a - I want to congratulatalCcanznandar. Van Der Weele and all the mtrnbers of ;Ames Lowel Corey Post 68 of Airgos for theirded- icated efforts which babe made possible the construction of this fine new home. ARMED FORCES WEEK SLOGAN: POWER FOR PEACE It is fitting and proper that we should ded- icate this new home on the eve of Armed Forces Week, which begins tomorrow and runs through May 22. Commander McKneal- ly has asked all Legionnaires to support the 11th observance of this week and Comman- . / therefore deem it a high honor and a privilege, as your Repr,,,erii,ativ in Oongfess, in the presence of our national and State commanders and of Commanclef Van D,:r Weele and all my fellow . Leginimairee to present to 'tlie members of- the James nerell Corey-Pnst.88 'of the American Legion this America& flag which was Fowl) over the Capitol of thefftrilited --3-tates on July 4, 1059, the day the glafaataar flag became the official flag of our catantey. I have anet - ift which I am plesed a ' at this time te reaent to you, four paned drawings of .tnb'. Our Fortresses of America a Freedom: TheAWIfiite Douse, the Capitol, the Supreme Cokiltt /Wilding and the Declare-D.0e of Badepe.zulatits;: -.. May these,cifeaviingh and may this fie ,s serve as an ever constant reminder to Cl. members of the,,,anaerican Legion of Um. greatness of our -dbun try and the freedom : which, is the birthright of the America: , people. REIVIARICS OF trA,TIONAZ COMMANDER D.2ARTTIT B. MCKNEALLY ?- I _ AEU:RICAN LEGD5Nrrit 'TTIE: , .E.NEW HOME OF THE JAME...? LOWELL CO=? POST. ARGOS, IND., MAY ID,;.' ,I 441 delight:04j? 'be in Argos and to as cia t Ifi the declicatfOtt of thio beautiful new bu1ld . ing wherein Allhe housed not only the men and women of James Lowell Corey Post OW, their ideals eel Well. This new post home R s a fulfillment of the hopes and labors of the men and women of Argos for 40 years. It la a monument and at once a milestone 01 progress in the history of the Amen ear Legion. The American Legion stands solely as :,he architect of the rehabilitation program With Its rietwork of hospitals across the lane wlfth is monument' enough for any group of founders, but what of the millions 01 hours spent in hospital visitations? Arial. of the millions of dollars spent in child wel- fare? What of the original thinking Dial chartered the course of the country in way:: Of preparedness or national security? Wilat of the GI bill, vrritten by the American '.,e- gion and sponsored (aver the protest of pro- fessional educators? What of the develop.. ment of a strong, ant-hex:Ale voice in the field of Americanism? What of the mul- tifarious arts nf. charity that have become a legend in the land? What a heritage?what a perfect description of this heritage of char- ity was written ,by the immortal Shakespeare when he penned the lines which read: "Ihear far that. little candle throws its beams so shines a good deed in a naughty world." THE PURPOSE OF THE AMERICAN LEGION I have said on previous occasions that I he American Legion purpose in our day was t he sustaining of the doctrine of belief upon which this Nation was founded and witheut which it must perish, and that is the beeef iri the, existence of God and in the dignity of human personality. I need not point out to YOU that today it is those twin beli,f.F. Which are under the mast relentless and ine Most powerful attack in the history of ras 0- kind. CALLS OR CONTINUED ATTENTION TO U.S. GRAVES ABROAD The American Legion holds in high es- teem the profession and the office of t mt. soldier. If it were not for the soldier the (: would be no America and there would be ee hope for men who love freedom. Ii ma. ". ceaseless struggle to be free, he r at willing to pay the enormous costs of a-, r It is the melancholy record of fallen ini. . that his motivations conflict and coin. !. His will to do evil and his baseness me ;t be reckoned with and the reckoning some- times enslaves and it very frequently kills. I commend to your most reverent attention the thousands of graves abroad in ecru, teries cs; ed for by the An-writ-en Coven, Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 merit and I direct you to the fact that five new cemeteries are to be dedicited -Una year. Hardly a word is wr,itn, a picture published concerning this subject and I ani informed that this is eo because the pres- ent-day rationale of the American people ili not to be reminded of the ugliness of the cost of freedom.. Freedom and the cause qf America we say to you, must never be com- puted in the terms of dollars and cents. 'glib only item to be considered is the cost or men's lives. Remit-11800;ot and reminders of this fact Most laectlie /40. 1 item on the agenda Of *out flaily lives; depression, and sadness tole 4ontrary notwithstanding. "WE Ann ifrtittit'ir-IflitgeOlit OR WE ARE AGAINST Et" For we have an enemy, an enemy that opposee eterything 'that we hold dear and that entrayenakes .our age one of tremen- dous risks. And in this age there is no neu- trality, we ores-either for freedom or we are against, it Peer, of. atomic destruction does not provide us with the solution of the di- lemma.. There is a considerable body of intellectuals whem the fear of atomic was has obsessed. They have made their ob- jective Ili lite only the preserving of exist- ence. Mee reads of their thinking with a certain horrifying fascination. Phillip Toynbee states as follows: "In the terrible contest of nuclear war even the vital dif- ferences between communism and western freedom become almost unimportant." The West he declares should, "negotiate at once with the Russians and get the best terms that are available." Since Russia in his estimation is now and will continue to remain stronger there is nothing to do for the West "but to negotiate from compara- tive weakness." He admits that this may well set up the total domination of the world by Russia in a few years. The Soviets would impose on us a regime which most of us detest but this is better than allow- ing the human race to destroy itself. And one of Toynbee's confreres observes, "I might not much mind living under Soviet domi- nation." ? These men are not Communists but they have lost their will; they have lost it to fear and to despair, in the pursuit of existence. They have lost sight of the truth which is simple enough and, that is that we in our day are faced with taro destructive forces of incredible dimensions. The bomb repre- cents material devastation, the Communist, party political CIESIMEII0II. THE SOLEMN enzmivr./i OF OUR TIME ?This is the solemn dilemma of our time , and this is the foremost 'consideration of our people this afternoon. The administra- tion in Washington has chosffiftri* eon- titillation of nuclear testing, by t e flight of the ,T.772,ipyg the seeret-AM , rtire`ti= victs to pursue the Wel, q poll cal free dM '1101tat" kind of a nation with the holy intston of preserving Ltd, sovereignty, its people, and its freedom, WOuld do less in the face of the gigantic dilemma? To sit by knowing what we know, facing what we face, and do.nothing, would make the ceme- teries of Europe where Otir honored dead are enteenhed, find the whole history of this Republic a gargantuan jest. The adminis-' tration lifiLirgecl thro? Ca service .,4)1.ty. ,,z re -i. iiitiiiii I. pviding fdrelfaeff&Y of Itse; s ? uty is plain? and it lit to gather the facts With which it inthy AiSeharge that duty. Must we act as \if Up dikty were less? Must we act as if the ohtairgia Of information necessary to our Owb. defense against a Secretive and threat- ening Power was to commit a sin? Are we to assume the abasing role of the boy calight with his hand in the cooky jar when we know the food there obtained is the only I means of sustaining freedom and hope,,..I t tila?One American, suffer no. erahatrasament =. and highly praise all those in authority wile aril' the bitter dilemma of these days. We of the American Legion do not seek to impose our views but we do propose to ell that there is no flight from the serious TYLISi- ness of cidr days and that is the survival of Me malt_ um/ or cotnigre, iaifn, IDEALS NEEDED - The late -Albert Carnes tells us, "with 'every dawn an assassin slips into Setae cell, murder is the question before.tuf..":,:This is the solemn-keynote of =Alum ihitimircier of men and the murce,4l3lM. 40 Arne-- leans, let us conduct efik %ten. Men of courage, men of fai ppm of ideals. There is no other way op n to up, for Amer- icans may not be craven, they may not be pacifistic, they may not be mefi of despair. In the world there is but one city in which we can dwell, it is the city of the halt, the blind, the maimed, but it is the city of charity, and it is the city of courage, the city of freedom. It is the City of God. Outside It is the night. 060 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004,mi 33:1981)-RDP90T00182R000100060001-7 1960 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?APPENDIX This is in line with what the local council now proposes to do. The strength of this campaign to bring a transformation to La Crosse lies in its appeal to everyone?those able to buy one share and those able to purchase multiple shares of stock bor significantly is taking an active part, joi ng with all forces in the community to see is investment plan through to ultimate succ Ss. -M ing industrial park sites available has been der consideration by the council for many oaths, yet it has been unable to move for la of!80Drporation financed and auth ized t aer,. 4tlph a corporation now is in exists It is to la'e hoped that support for its efforts ay be readily enlisted, and that the hopes have envisioned for years may take a turnin toward realization. conservation program represents the finest kind of cooperation in research, educati ublication and constructive action betwe Federal, State and local units of gover ent. But even as we commend the soi nservation districts of Colorado, let us e forward to fur- ther the cause that th ye thus far so nobly advanced. Soil S wardship Week in Colorado SION OF REMARKS OF HON. YRON L. JOHNSON IN THE HO OF COLORADO OF REPRESENTATIVES Wedn day, May 18, 1960 Mr. JOHN 'N of Colorado. Mr. Speaker, the c servation of topsoil is essential. We o live with aridity and wind erosion kn this. Those who live with abundant inf all also know the erosive power of ter. Next week is So Stewardship Week in Colorado. I take is opportunity to pay tribute to those w i more than 25 years ago saw the great ed for action to con- serve the Nation's oil. As a result of their vision, some 1/2 million farmers and ranchers have ited to form 2,822 soil conservation d tricts. These dis- tricts include 1.7 bill acres of land, or a major portion of e United States. These soil conservat" districts repre- sent groups of land ners who have joined together to pr ect our land so that future generatio may enjoy its blessings. All Americ owes them a debt. We are not real the owners of the land?we are but ustees for this generation, and we sho view our ob- ligation as involving ste rdship. The work is not fin' ed. It may never be finished. But i is going for- ward. This Congress or he next one should establish a soil mo ture conser- vation laboratory to help dvance this work. The soil moisture onservation laboratory would study the inciples in- volved in increasing the int e of water from the soil, improving the oisture re- tention characteristics of the s il and in- creasing the efficiency of so moisture use by plants. In the great ins area, holding 8 percent of the mo ure that now .evaporates back in the s until it can be put to work growing crops is equivalent to adding 3 inche to the scarce rainfall. Such a laboratory could well b ocated at Fort Collins, Cola, but wher er lo- cated, it is needed. Similarly, research in weather Aiaodi- neaten can contribute toward imprqving the productivity of our soil. The -soil he Quest for Safeguarded Disarmament EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. HUBEWimulTailaNX .40101101.11 OTA IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES Wednesday, May 18, 1960 Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Appendix of the RECORD an ad- dress entitled "The Quest for Safe- guarded Disarmament Must Be at the Heart of. 'U.S. Foreign Policy," which I delivered in Washington, D.C., April 27, 1960. There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: THE QUESI.s...24 egr ,ELzrz Mett- A'rYHE RT OF .S. FOREIGN POLICY (Address delivered by a - :Lutror_1;11,11 H. Democrat, of tinnesota,at Washington, D.C., az...*ll Ala.= It may seem a long way from the real mountains of West Virginia to the metaphor- ical summit of next month?but it is not. Like the people of Arizona and Alabama, Wy- oming and Wisconsin, like people everywhere, the men and women I have been talking with In West Virginia are deeply concerned with peace. I have no crystal ball, and I will not at- tempt to predict what the outcome of the summit meeting will be. I do earnestly hope, however, that the four leaders will give seri- ous and thoughtful consideration to the problems of arms control and disarmament, and will be able to achieve real, even if lim- ited, progress. I recognize that the armament race and the lack of political settlements are as closely related as, for example, racial prejudice and. racial discrimination. Both are vicious cir- cles, and it would be easy to sit down and give up trying on the theory that you can't eliminate one unless you eliminate the other. As a practical and optimistic people, how- ever, we Americans like to break in on these vicious circles somewhere. For example, in recent years we have been enacting laws against racial discrimination. That does not mean that we fail to recognize the need to banish prejudice by education; it does mean that we recognize that education alone would take a long, long time to achieve results, and that having to cease some acts of discrimination by law has in itself an ed- ucational effect. So it is with disarmament and political settlements. The Soviet leaders have given little ground for hope that they are ready to consider a practical political settlement for Berlin, let alone Germany as a whole, The same is true of other political problems which clutter the international agenda. OUR MAJOR EFFORT SHOULD BE IN DISARMAMENT That does not mean that we should forget them, or cease trying. It does mean in my view, however, that our major effort should be in the field of disarmament?a field in which, during recent years, the Soviet leaders have done rather less propaganda and rather more serious negotiation than over political questions. If we do manage to achieve some real progress in disarmament, we can return to the political questions with greater hope of success. There are obvious reasons for this. Un-, fortunate as it is that there are?for exam- ple?two Germanies, two Koreas, two Viet- nams, peace can conceivably survive this division. We can live with it for the time being, even if we do not condone it. But the armaments race threatens both sides with the imminence of mutual annihilation. Furthermore?as the recent news of strikes and riots among Soviet workers emphasizes? the Soviet leaders have urgent domestic rea- sons for seeking to beat some of their swords into ploughshares. SOVIET UNION NEEDS PEACE Over a year ago, on returning from' my visit to the Soviet Union, I noted Chairman Khrushchev's urgent need for peace, and pre- dicted that he would launch a big push for disarmament. We should have been pre- pared?but we weren't. The four leaders at the summit might well take their text from Shakespeare?who, I understand, is in Boris Pasternak's excellent translations as popular in the Soviet Union as in the Western World. Be might have been speaking directly to the summit when he wrote: "There is a tide in the affairs of men, Which, taken at the full, leads on to fortune; Omitted, all the voyage of their life ' Is bound in shallows and in miseries." Such a tide is running now for disarma- ment?and I profoundly hope that the sum- mit leaders will take it at the full. TWO STEPS AT THE SUMMIT There are two major steps that they can and should take. One of these is to resolve the most difficult obstacle standing in the way of a nuclear weapons test ban agree- ment?namely, the number of onsite inspec- tions. The second is to give directions for the future course of the 10-nation disarma- ment negotiations. DEFINITE POSSIBILITY OF TEST BAN AGREEMENT There is a very definite possibility that a test ban agreement?the first real break- through toward peace?may be achieved this year, even if it is not concluded in time to be submitted to this session of Congress. Most of you in this well-informed audience are familiar with the broad features of the proposed test ban treaty. I shall review them briefly: 1. The treaty would ban permanently all nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space. It would ban underground tests down to a certain level? the level suggested by the United States being 4.75 on the earthquake scale, that is 19 kilotons of TNT in magnitude, roughly the size of the Hiroshima bomb. 2. A minimum of 180 control posts would be erected around the world to monitor shocks to the earth's surface, and to iden- tify them as earthquakes or as nuclear ex- plosions. 3. Up to a certain number of times each year, a mobile inspection team could make an on-site investigation of an event reg- istered at the control posts which could not be identified as being natural in origin or an earthquake. 4. A coordinated program of research would be conducted by the three nuclear powers to improve the techniques of de- tecting and identifying nuclear explosions. There is also the possibility of a separate agreement that, while this research is going on?and at least for a 2-year period?the Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 10570 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE May Mr. McCORMACK. The only bill I was going to put down for Tuesday was the recla tion project in Oklahoma. The PEAKER, pro tempore (Mr. JONES of issouri). Is there objection to the re st of the gentleman from Massachuse ? There was o objection. PROGRAM FO WEEK OF MAY 31 Mr. HOEVEN. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent ? roceed for 1 min- ute in order to ascerta the program for next week. The SPEAKER. Is th e objection to the request of the gentlem from Iowa? There was no objection. Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. aker, will the gentleman yield? Mr. HOEVEN. I yield. Mr. McCORMACK. On Tues next I have calendared the bill S. 1892, ;eal- Ing with the Norman reclamation pr ct in Oklahoma. Let me say, frankly, that if the pr ponents of the bill would prefer that not bo brought up Tuesday I will accom- modate them. I have been trying to get In touch with the author of the bill to have a talk with him so I could have definite information about Tuesday. I talked with him yesterday, and my impression is he was agreeable to it coming up on Tuesday. I want to get rid of these bills as fast as we can be- cause I know what is going to happen on the other end 4 or 5 weeks from now. I want the Members to have their day in court. I am putting consideration of that bill down for Tuesday with the qualification I have stated. Wednesday is District day, and there Is one bill to be considered, H.R. 12036, relating to sewage disposal in the Dulles International Airport. It involves au- thority to connect up with the District of Columbia system. Then there is House Resolution 530, giving the Committee on the Judiciary power to investigate certain compacts. That is out of the Rules Committee. Mr. HOEVEN. That will come up on Wednesday? Mr. McCORMACK. I am setting that bill down for Wednesday. If the pro- ponents of S. 1892 for any reason prefer not to take advantage of my assignment of that bill for Tuesday I cannot guar- antee that the bill will come up on Wednesday because the District bill has been, agreed to by unanimous consent and Im putting the Committee on the Jud1eiati bill, House Resolution 530, down for at day. Mr. A . Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yid? Mr. HOEVEN I yield to the gentle- man from Karts Mr. AVERY. said he would want sponsor of S. 1892 as would come up on e majority leader o confer with the whether or not it sday. If that does not come up on Tu day will there be any business schedul before the House on that clhy? -Mr. McCORMACK. No. am glad the gentleman asked that question. For the remainder of the week, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday and Sat- urday, and of course I do not expect there will be any Saturday meeting, but in case anything arises I mention Saturday, the following bills will be considered: H.R. 10572 relating to forests out of the Committee on Agriculture. That was on the program this week but we did not reach it. H.R. 1176:1, Farmers Home Adminis- tration. House Concurrent Resolution 661, Joint Committee on National Fuels Policy. House Joint Resolution 402, transit regulation compact for the Washington metropolitan area. The consideration of some of these bills is dependent on whether or not a rule is reported out. As far as I can see at this time there is no major bill to come up next week, that is, of a national na- ture. These are important bills, of course. I d.o not want to downgrade them. There is the usual reservation that any further program will be announced later and conference reports may be brought at any time. There was one reported terday on the Post Office and Trees- Department's appropriation bill. the gentleman in charge will want g that up I am unable to state now. HOEVEN. Can the majority us what progress we are mak- propriation bills? oRMACK. There is one bill, onstruction bill, that is still gentleman will remember hen that came up con- ostponed because au- t been finally passed. onferees on that bill er, even if the con- d to and the Presi- h it is reasonable refer to the au- erstanding is ber handling me up until ereabouts. to b Mr. leader Ing with Mr. Mc the militar pending. T that last wee sideration wa thorization had I understand the have agreed. Ho ference report is ag dent signs the bill, w to assume he will, an thorization bill, my that the desire of the the bill is that the bill not week after next, June 9, o That bill will not come up nt week. It will be week after next. The other appropriation bill, of course, is the bill referred to by my friend from Iowa, the mutual security appropriation bill. Or, as my friend, says, the foreign handout bill. Mr. GROSS. I thank the gentleman. Mr. HOEVEN. I thank the gentle- SUMMIT CONFERENCE COLLAPSE The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentle- man from Illinois [Mr. Pocumal is rec- orgnized for 15 minutes. (Mr. PUCUNSKI asked and was given permission to revise and extend his re- marks.) ardignagii? Mr. Speaker, the other has launched an in- vestigation into the collapse of the sum- mit conference and what effect this col- lapse will have on international rela- tions. The wire stories this morning carried this item as to the purpose of this in- vestigation and the four points or the four areas that the other body will con- centrate its direction or attention on: First, the events and decisions resulting from the 13-2 incident; second, the effect of these events and decision upon the summit; third, the policy of our Govern- ment regarding the summit meeting; fourth, the policy of the United States in the future and possible improvement In the execution thereof. Now, I think a great deal can be learned from these hearings and this in- vestigation, and certainly I am very happy to learn that the other body has undertaken this type of investigation. However, I am disappointed, in reading from this agenda, that apparently no in- vestigation is going to be made of the in- cidents leading up to ,?Icilpastrous mo- ment when the U-2 MT into Corthrturdst hafield' on the ?Of the summit confer- ence. I would like to make clear one thing: I do not support the criticism being hurled against our Government for send- ing these flights over the Soviet Union at a time so close to the summit meeting. I would say, on the contrary, I think that our Government would have been dere- lict if it had not sent these flights over the Soviet Union as it has been doing for the last 4 years. I believe that we are living under great tension and at this time, more so than any other time, we should know what the Soviets are up to. We know that Mr. Khrushchev did not expect any success at the summit meet- ing. We know that Mr. Khrushchev realized that he was going to have to leave the summit a defeated man since the Western Powers had agreed on any number of occasions previous to the sum- mit meeting that they would not yield on Berlin because the people of their re- spective nations did not want the West- ern Powers to yield to Khrushchev. Mr. Speaker, I myself had written the President a letter on the eve of the sum- mit conference, on the eve of his de- parture for Paris, in which I told him that in a survey made in my awn district, 90 percent of my constituents replied "No" when I asked "Should the United States yield to Soviet Russia's demand that we abandon our position in West Berlin?" And also I wrote the President ? pointing out that 85 percent of my con- stituents answered "Yes" when I asked them if they believed that the President ought to take a firm stand in demanding freedom and liberation of the captive nations behind the Iron Curtain when he met with Khrushchev at the summit. I sent President Eisenhower this letter to let him know that the people of my district will support him in a firm stand against the Communists. Certainly, prior to the summit meet- ing, the Western Powers unequivocally agreed that they were going to remain firm in their position. Khrushchev knew this, and there is no question but what Khrushchev needed a provocation to torpedo the summit conference before it got started. I think it behooves us, all of us, as Americans, to go beyond the scope of normal assumption in evaluating all as- pects of the events that preceded the summit collapse. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/05MAY:tkile090T00782R000100060001-7 1960 CO RESSIONAL RECORD ?HN,SE sped in the second the nature and to their by no means 1 Selfishness, softn and disinterest ca America's future as power. The crises of t patriotism of the highest o pie understand this fact, I that they will rise fully to the demonstrate that the strength o is far superior to that of any system huma, subjugation and slavery. requirements of any one group wit mework of our citizenry must take e. They must fully understand the total threat to their security dam and that this threat is ted to the military sphere. lack of understanding e just as deadly to lack of military e times demand If our peo- e no doubt asion and ee men sed on ESPIONAGE IN EMBASSIES aamiraretootireapoin"..Akee4o0., (Mr. PF,T,LY asked and was given per- mission to address the House for 1 min- ute and to revise and extend his re- marks.) AlritfirliasT , Mr. Speaker, yesterday Ai Lodge revealed to the Se- curity Council of the United Nations a Soviet gift to our Moscow Ambassador which had contained a clandestine lis- tening device to enable the Soviet intelli- gence agents from outside of our Em- bassy to listen in to the U.S. Ambassa- dor's conversations. Unless one is very naive, it is conceivable that this Rus- sian "Trojan Horse" is only one of hun- dreds of similar acts of espionage being practiced in our American Embassies in Iron Curtain countries. All of which, Mr. Speaker, leads me to refer to remarks I made on the floor of the House on 12?g, Attila time I criticized We personnel procurement policy Of the State Department in em- P11:0-1W.. -141411s,of ?Xnaa;;Curtakk;,..KW,11- trim,-1444x4X4311100$444.44.41.4947.,Goun- tries. In view of recent events i should like to again urge that the State Depart- ment divest itself of any nationals of Communist countries in their employ in Iron Curtain country Embassies. A year ago when I took this matter up with the State Department it defended its personnel policy, but I felt the argu- ments advanced to me were extremely weak. In the first place, I was told that the employing of Communist nationals In these sensitive spots created no risk to national security. I was also told that from a budgetary standpoint it was not possible to employ American citizens in the positions presently occupied by for- eign nationals, and finally I was told that Americans would not be willing to accept many of these positions now filled by aliens either by reason of inadequate pay or because of the character of the em- ployment. ' I said then and I say now such argu- ments do not hold water. Certainly, with our national security involved, Congress would furnish whatever funds were nec- essary to support employment of Ameri- can citizens in these spots, and further- more, I am sure that there is an abund- ant supply of American youth who upon graduation from the colleges and univer- sities of this country?especially lan- guage students?would jump at the chance to spend a year or so working in our Embassies, regardless of the so-called menial character of the positions that .rt%.e available. No. 97-7 10569 In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, I atate foreign handout bill is going to come again this policy presents a real risk to before the House? the security of the United States and I Mr. McCORMACK. I do not know suggest in light of recent events that the anything about the handout. The gen- State Department reexamine its person- tleman r eans the mutual security bill? nel policy with reference to the employ- Mr. G OSS. That is what President ment of these aliens in our Embassies Eisenhow r calls it, the handout bill. behind the Iron Curtain. 4e Mr. Mc ORMACK. You can call it the hando t bill if you want to, but I cannot go long with that designation. THREAT OF SOVIET POLITICAL AND Mr. GRO S. I want the gentleman to ECONOMIC EXPANSION understand 'at is-not original with me; that comes ? om President Eisenhower, the handout. McCO ACK. That was w/gen he was runn for the Presidency. Mr. GROSS. That is right. Mr. McCOR CK. But now that he is in the Office o resident, responsibility has caused him change his mind. Mr. GROSS. ut they are still his words. Mr. McCORMA K. But he said it; JOHN MCCORMACK d not say it; he said it when he was candidate for the Presidency. Mr. GROSS. Yes. Mr. McCORMAC But not now that he is President. Mr. GROSS. Yes; ell, I will not ac- cept that amendment. I am still waiting to d out when the handout bill is going t come up. Mr. McCORMACK. to the mutual security appropriation b , from the best information I have it 1 s as though it would be ready for fl action about June 13. I cannot give t e date specif- ically but I had inquiry ade within a day or two because I wan d to get in- formation myself, and the st informa- tion I have is that it will robably be ready for floor action abou June 13. Mr. GROSS. I thank th gentleman and withdraw my reservatio of objec- tion. The SPEAKER. Is there o ection to the request of the gentleman om Mas- sachusetts that when the HousOadjourns today it adjourn to meet on" Tuesday next? There was no objection. (Mr. BATES asked and was given per- mission to address the House for 1 min- ute.) Mr. BATES. Mr. Speaker, I am con- fident that the events of the past week have given many Members of the House caus to reflect on the position of the Unites.States and its role as a bulwark against the threat of Soviet political and econom Man that per of a new one of IN ferred to common t Khrushche was prompt at peace wi Now we k and the pat contempt for the American throughout the In a few day opportunity to American people tives in the House may prove to be a relations with the I refer to the comi priations for the m gram. This progra troubled times as weapon in arming, mi nomically, the free wo were summarily torn actions of Mr. Khrushch cal power-hungry group i for whom he speaks. I hope that the deba will be one which will hearten rather an dismay POSTPONEMENT OF ROLLCALLS TO the nations which today st d athwart WEDNESDAY the Soviet Union's approach to the free world. I pray, that the results of t coming debate will reflect a determina on by the House to support the Presiden his able Secretary of State and Secretaw of De- fense, and the Joint Chiefs of at aff and their estimates of the minimut needs of this vital adjunct to our lational defense?the mutual security p ogram. Let not the pruning knife weaken he tie that binds4 us to the rest of the free world. c expansion. if us I am sure shared the hope aps we were on the threshold ra. Some called this new era ceful coexistence?others re- as a nuclear stalemate. But all was the hope that Mr. s visit to the United States d by a burning desire to live the rest of the world. w that beneath the smile n the back was a cynical he peaceful yearnings of people and their allies orld. the world will have an ge the reaction of the nd their Representa- o these events which uming point in our oviet Union. debate on appro- ual security pro- looms in these most powerful tarily and eco- whose hopes under by the and the cyni- the Kremlin ADJOURNMENT TO MAY 31 TUESDA Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that in the event of a rollcall on Tuesday next in connec- tion with the passage of a bill, a motion to recommit, or any amendment, such rollcall be postponed to the following day, Wednesday, because there is :a pri- mary in Alabama. Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, what is the legislation to be called up on Tuesday next? Mr. McCORMACK. The only bill I have on Tuesday that might be called up in the event of a rule being reported by the Rules Committee, is S. 1892, the Nor- man Federal reclamation project in Oklahoma. Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker I Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, I withdrew ask unanimous consent that when t e my reservation of objection. House adjourns today it adjourn to mee Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts. Mr. on Tuesday next. Speaker, reserving the right to object, Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, reserving the gentleman, I understand, expects the right to object, could the gentleman nothing of any great importance on give us any information as to when the Tuesday? Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RpP90T00782R000100060001-7 1960 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE real meaning in life to many of our hard-of-hearing citizens. Angone who has studied this problem is aware of the great need for specialists to help the deaf. The national shortage of trained personnel in this field has been critiCal in recent years. It will be- come desper te if steps are not taken soon to over It is my un mated there wil 350 classroom te the 1959-60 school help is not provided. proposal before 'us prov cut into this backlog of It is important, in evalu for this legislation, to note of the deaf are probably mo to obtain than are teachers in a field of special education. In a the training and preparation of tea in this complex field is an expen undertaking, thus bolstering the case f providing special scholarship help for those who enter this profession. The grants-in-aid authorized by Sen- ate Joint Resolution 127 will serve as a powerful incentive for more young people to enter this great field of humanitarian endeavor. It is hoped that the financial assistance made possible by this legis- lation will result in the establishment of much needed regional training centers geared to the special requirements of each particular area. The authority contained in this meas- ure will certainly go a long way toward providing the trained personnel so des- perately needed to assist our deaf citi- zens. It represents a unique opportunity for the Congress to approve an invest- ment in human resources of incalculable worth. The reduction in the severity of the handicaps with which the deaf are af- flicted through expert therapy, the ac- quisition of special skills such as lip- reading, or through the miracle of learning to talk?these are some of the fruits which can follow enactment of this measure. There are literally mil lions of Americans who can benefit fr Senate Joint Resolution 127 and who In therefore become more happy and -ful members of our society. Surely the tremendous hum prob- lems involved in this field, ombined with the demonstrated i equacy of present training facilities nd the in- ability of States and lo ities to meet the need, argues eloq ntly for sound Federal assistance, is measure has the backing of Ie ing organizations 'which deal with t deaf and its enact- ment is strong recommended by the various instit ions which are now plagued with shortage of trained per- sonnel to p .vide help. It is m ope the Senate will approve With a V this measure, so that the Fed- eral ernment can play its part by maki a lasting investment in the burn. resources of our deaf citizens. The ncouragement of the recruiting and training of teachers of the deaf, speech pathologists, and audiologists is a vital step in minimizing these tragic handi- e it. standing that it is esti-. a shortage of some ers at the start of ear if additional Fortunately, the s the means to s, g the need teachers difficult other ion, caps and better preparing those afflicted with the means to contribute more fully and more happily to our society. Mr. President, I have received a great many communications from my con- stituents about this resolution. They have come from private individuals, from parents and friends of deaf people, and from leaders in the field. They argue most persuasively for the pressing need to enact this measure. I ask unanimous consent to have a few of these many fine communications printed at this point in the RECORD. There being no objection, the com- munications were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: NEW YORK SCHOOL FOR THE DEAF, White Plains, N.Y May 9,1960. Senator KENNETH B. KEATING, U.S. Senate, Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C. DEAR SIR: I am writing to ask your support for the Senate Joint Resolution 127, which we hope will come up for the consideration the Congress during its present session. is bill deals with the problem of pre- p g desirable young people to beco tea rs of the deaf. Like all schools the ? in this country, we, too, have en deeply ncerned by our inability to ? :in teaching ersonnel. The parents the children e lied in this school ar kewise concerned. of us hope that en pre- sented for c ideration, the b will meet with approval. Thanking you or your sideration of this important pli, of lel ation, I am, Sincerely you T. CLOUD, Superintendent. ROCHESTER S OL F Rochester .Y Nov Senator KENN B. KEATIN MS. Senate, Washington C. DEAR SE OR KEATING: Thank ou again for seein e in your office in Roc-star on Friday, ovember 27, and giving m ppor- tunit o bring to your attention S.J. so- luti 127, sponsored by Senator HILL nd co. .anion resolutions introduced in ? e se by Senators ELLIOTT and FOGAR ich would alleviate the critical shortag of trained teachers of the deaf, speech, and hearing pathologists and audiologists. I am? particularly interested in title I of S.J. 127 which relates to teachers of the deaf. For over a decade it has been impossible to get more than 150 trainees into our ac- credited training centers in the 'United States, when our annual need for trained teachers has been at least 500. This has resulted in a deterioration of programs in schools for the deaf to a point that is actu- ally alarming. Something must be done to motivate young people to come into this field. The U.S. Department of Education has stated that it is harder to obtain teachers for deaf children than for any other kind of handicapped child except the deaf- blind child. S.J. 127 and its companion resolutions are heartily endorsed by the Conference of Ex- ecutives of American Schools for the Deaf, the Convention of American Instructors of the Deaf, the Alexander Graham Bell Asso- ciation for the Deaf, the American Hearing and Speech Association, the American Hear- ing Society as well as parent organizations. After 2 years of hard work on a national level, it is finally in a form satisfactory to everyone. I would very much appreciate your study- ing this bill, as I am very sure that you will THE DEAF', bar 28, 1959. 10539 find it worthy of your wholehearted support Very truly yours. J. H. GALLOWAY, Superintendent. ST. MARY'S SCHOOL FOR THE DEAF', Buffalo, N.Y., May 14, 1959. The Honorable KENNETH B. KEATING, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. DEAR SENATOR KEATING: A proposed reso- lution is being prepared to alleviate the shortage of teachers of the deaf through Federal legislation. Sptiator Hui, is expected to introduce the bi this month, we hope, with the names o enator KENNEDY, Sena- tor SALTONSTALL, d Senator CLARK on It RS cosponsors. We wanted ou to be familiar with this problem?to alize the great need for teach- ers of the . f. The nationwide shortage of trained c room teachers of the deaf has been cr al over a period of years, but has now b me desperate. A shortage of 350 class m teachers faces this profession at the art of the 1959-60 school, year. e problem is national in scope, so the tion must be approached from a national vel, since training centers for the prepara- tion of classroom teachers of the deaf must be regional. At present there are 22 ap- proved training centers equipped to train at least 300 teachers of the deaf per year, should this incntive legislation be enacted and the expected flow of applicants ma- terialize. May we solicit your valued support in this endeavor? It would be most helpful if you would go on record as being in favor of this bill when it is introduced. We shall con- tact you again when we receive a copy of the bill. Your help in this problem that seriously affects children afflicted with deafness will be deeply appreciated. Most respectfully yours, SISTER ROSE GERTRUDE, Principal. BUFFALO, N.Y., April 20,1960. Senator KENNETH KEATING, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.: Shortage qualified personnel in field dic- tates we urge your support of speech path- ology and audiology graduate program de- scribed in title 2 of Senate Joint Resolution 127. ELMO KNIGHT, President, Speech and Hearing Asso- ciation of Western New York. PARENTS' ASSOCIATION OF INGTON SCHOOL FOR THE DEAF, ew York, N.Y., September 9,1959. H B. KEATING, Hon. KEN U.S. Senate, Washington, C. DEAR SIR: S organization, which repre- sents 220 sets o .arents of deaf children, is writing to ask r help in securing the passage of Senate tint Resolution 127. This legislation designed to help al- leviate the national ortage of classroom teachers of deaf child , speech patholo- gists and audiologists t ugh scholarships and grants to training cent As parents of deaf chil we are par- ticularly concerned with the acher short- age. The Department of Hea , Education and Welfare states that the Ere.' est teacher shortage exists in this area of exoikptionality. Approximately 500 additional teffehers are needed for next fall, and training, centers have turned out only-125 this year. As parents, we are vitally concerned that our children not be denied educational op- portunity because of the teacher shortage. There are some 30,000 deaf children of school Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 20040/y1 9JODP90T00782R000100060001-7 10540 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENA age whose parents are anxiously concerned about the increasingly desperate teacher sh tage. With proper education we can exp ct that our children will grow up to be use 1, productive citizens. Over the past 10 s enrollment of deaf children in school for the deaf has increased about 400 per yea Last year the increase was 900. Provi g trained teachers of the deaf must be ? e a Federal concern because in- dividual ates have no training facilities. There are accredited training centers in this countr With additional funds they could provide substantially greater number of teachers. Organizatio which have united to se- cure the pass.ag f the proposed legislation are the Alexande Graham Bell Association for the Deaf, the ference of Executives of American Schools f the Deaf, the Conven- tion of American I tructors of the Deaf, and the 'Parents' Se on of the Alexander Graham Bell Associatio We would appreciate ur support of this legislation. Sincerely yours, MILDRED SHAROFF, President. THE CENTRAL NEW K SCHOOL FOR I AF, Rome, N.Y Janua 15,1960. Hon. KENNETH KEATING, U. S. Senate, Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C. Sm: May I respectfully suggest thaI. ouse Joint Resolution 494 (13.3. Res. 127) is o tal importance. I have joined with parents, teachers, the deaf of America in presenting Infer tion before the House of Representati Subcommittee on Education and Labor a the public hearing in New York on Octobe 28, 1959. The stated purpose of the legislation is" help make available to those children in o country who are handicapped by deafn the specially trained teachers of the needed to develop their abilities and to elp make available to individuals suffering s ech and hearing impairments those spI tally trained speech pathologists and audi ?gists needed to help ORM overcome the i andi- caps." While I speak on my own behalf, con- fident that what I say essentiall expres,ses the views of the following groups nd organ- izations working in the interests the deaf: The Conference of Executives f American Schools for the Deaf; the Alex der Graham Bell Association for the Deafj the Conven- tion of American Instructorj of the Deaf; the Empire State Associatiti of the Deaf; and the National Associatio of the Deaf. These bills would provici grants-in-aid to training centers which uld enable them to recruit and train )4 fessional workers for the presently seriouiry understaffed area of special education, thtspeech handicapped and hearing handicadaped. Grants-in-aid would be a powerful rabruitment boost in in- teresting young people to enter this special field. The main fa tor that keeps them out is money, for special training programs means an. extra liege year, so the easy alternative is to ter the regular teaching field immediately after graduation. Believe me, please, this has had consider- able study, and to my way of thinking there Is considerable merit to the bills. Those for whom I speak strongly support the bill in- troduced by Mr. ELL/OTT, House Joint Resolu- tion 494, and its counterparts House Joint Resolutions 488, 503, 507, 512, 516, and 526 introduced respectively by Congressmen FOGARTY, BOLAND, THORNBERRY, LOSER, BAKER, and MOORHEAD. The degree of effectiveness with which one is able to communicate with one's fellow man has a profound influence on one's whole so- cial and economic life. The reduction of the severity of a speech handicap through expert therapy, the acquisition of ski in lipreading by one who is hard of hearing or the miracle of learning to speak by one ? orn deaf who, because he cannot hear, wo never learn to speak unless specially taug , makes it pos- sible for those so helpe to meet more equally the challenge of o r competitive so- ciety, and broadens the ?ase of their con- tributions as citizens. ? ere are millions of Americans and childr with varying de- grees of speech and h ing difficulties who need the services of s daily trained people to help them reach t is higher level of per- formance. Many o these are denied this help because of th ery serious shortage of trained workers in is field. Financial ass's ce would definitely im- prove a most desirable condition?the great teacher ah tage that exists in the area of the deaf--a would undoubtedly make possible the blishment of regional train- ing centers i the different sections of the country whi mild more effectively meet the needs o ach particular area. Only tra ed speech pathologists can prop- erly serve is vast group. A serious short- age of tr ed personnel exists in this field of excep nality, and detailed studies of the conditi were presented to Mr. Ertiorr and memb of the House of Representatives Subc mittee on Education and Labor at the publ hearing; this detailed statistics and stu s will be furnished you if you wish it. ish to thank you for giving me the rtunity to bring to your attention the cal nature of the shortage of trained sonnel in the field of the speech impaired d hearing impaired, and express the hope hat our combined efforts to relieve this con- dition will be successful. Sincerely, FRED L. SPARKS, Jr., Superintendent. Sen r K. NESTING, Sena Office Building, Wash on, D.C.: Stro y urge your support of Senate Joint Resolut 127. Title 2 in that resolution should a aterially in training more speech pathologi and audiologists who are in much too s1.rt supply. 3r. KATHERINE P. THORN, Director, niversity of Buffalo Speech Clinic. BUFFALO, N.Y., April 20, 1960. OVERALL LIMITATION ON FOREIGN T CREDIT Mr. MANSFI ask. unanimous co proceed to the cons . Mr. President, I exit that the Senate eration of Calendar No. 1456, H.R. 10087. The PRESIDING OpFICER. The bill will be stated by The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H.R. 10087) to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to permit taxpayers to elect an overall limitation on be foreign tax credit. The PRESIDING onacro,. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Montana. There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill, which had been reported from the Committee on Finance with amendments. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the bill will be the pending business. May LEARN FROM TORPEDOING OF SUMMIT CONFERENCE ur_yippwctot, Ohio. Mr. President, th- Piete 661Tapie of the vaunted summit conference before it took place is now a matter of history. It has shaken the free people of the world as nothing has since the dark days preceding the Second World War. Nobody is against expressions of sym- pathy for President Eisenhower on this unfortunate conclusion to his efforts. The cruel fact is that our humiliation and diminished prestige left in the wake of the breakup in Paris are such that little can be gained by closing our eyes to the true situation and wishing it had never happened. To do so would only prove to the world that our mistakes are not to be corrected and that Americans are satisfied with slipshod leadership. It is evident there should be a demand for better administration, both domestically and in the conduct of foreign relations. This is not likely to take place if we Indulge in self-pity or, even worse, self- deception. What is required Is, not divisive parti- sanship, but a rational, free, and open discussion of the situation and of what can be done to correct it. It is our duty, as Senators of the United States, to clarify the issues, clear the air, and take steps toward restoring the damage that has been done to the prestige of our country and to hopes for world peace. I commend the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the dis- tinguished Senator from Arkansas [Air. PULER/CHI'] and our distinguished major- ity leader [Mr. JonNsoN of Texas] for the statesmanlike course they are follow- ing in connection with this matter. The occurrences and statements just before the summit conference was to be held and the series of sensational events that followed point out?as nothing else has done?the inherent weaknesses in President Eisenhower's concept of the Presidency. Despite the fact the Presi- dent conducted himself with dignity and restraint, quite in contrast to the bully- ing tactics of Klirushchev, we know now that at this critical time, important and often vital decisions cannot be delegated to subordinates. At a time when Presi- dent Eisenhower needed them most, some appointive officials let him down. Mr. President, our citizens generally are questioning the series of incredible blunders and the almost unbelievable administrative confusion that both pre- ceded and followed the disastrous U--2 flight. What excuse is there for the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency did not coordinate the timing of those flights with the summit plans of the State De- partment? DI, the President ordered tha ? stop, after the downing of one o our planes? If the flight was so necessary 2 weeks before the summit conference, it seems peculiar that there s no need for such aerial reconnaissance rom now on. The President went on to say that he directed the flights be stopped because.. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 A with the downing of the U-2, their use- fulness was impaired. Why? The So- viets had known of these flights all along. No secret was involved. If the flights were useful 2 weeks before the summit, wh .....y1Lrel_tliey_not useful War li?ii 7rVil.': '0? W1177that the administration's alibis do not hold water. Appointive officials erred in risking the U-2 flight so near to the date of the summit conference. What justification an there be for considering the U-2 jtlights unnecessary after May, but for onsidering them advisable on May 1? Khrushchev eagerly? seized upon the panic of Eisenhower administration of- ficials and their ineptness and sought to diminish the esteem with which our country is held by the heads of state of friendly nations. Let us hope Khru- shchev failed. i i d ( our Pres- j) 175 who apparen kined by appointive aofeggr. s airnnno 6n l'hne- At ? gStiaetaetceespDAgye;nLganr,ctpya;aetdnItduinnrttthtfirmsxhoeeffir Ccinieandlsticraa:t1deIdmifti,tetilleaid-t the policy of aerial reconnaissance over the territory of the Soviet Union would continue, as it was, so they stated, the only way by which we could secure in- formation to expose any Soviet buildup at missile bases and airfields for a nu- clear attack. Even the Vice President made a public statement along the same line. He was justified in doing so on the basis of declarations which came from State Department officials. Then, too late, officials of the State Department backtracked; and the Presi- dent, while in Paris, announced that such a policy would not be continued. Unfortunately, that development came after Premier Khrushchev's blustering and demands for apology and punish- ment. Due to the lateness of Presiden Eisenhower's statement, it even ap- peared that America quailed before Khrushchev's shouting, which was not a fact. The confusion has been unequaled. One wonders whether leaders of our al- lies had not every reason to lose respect for us and confidence in us. We gave the Kremlin dictators a propaganda vic- tory of great magnitude. The adverse effect on our prestige throughout the world is great, and is due almost entirely to the co used efforts te .e?....plain the iU-2 nci en . 6.---? =-Tilierby ' Iffdirerfir78- own enough to remain silent. The apparent panic of officials in Washington and the issuance of con- flicting statements impaired President Eisenhower's usefulness in Paris. That situation was made to order for Premier Khrushchev, and he took maximum ad- vantage of it. Now that President Eisenhower has returned, we may well consider the policy questions involved in aerial re- connaissance, the resultant differences of opinion among the leaders of our allies, and the possibility that hereafter the leaders of neutral nations may be less inclined to trust us. Who can blame them if their faith and their confidence In a strong America are diminished? In reality, there probably is no in- creased danger of war between this Na- Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE tion and the Soviet Union. But, in truth, the tension of the cold war has been aggravated, at least temporarily. Unfortunately, also, here in our-own country the very small minority who, in reality, favor preventive war against the Soviet Union, and who are so opposed to the Communist system of Russia that they abhor face-to-face conferences in an endeavor to work out disarmament and permanent peace, have been heart- ened by our failure. This is a tragic aftermath; but President Eisenhower personally cannot be blamed. He dele- gated authority which other Presidents have customarily retained; and the offi- cials he appointed proved unable to cope with a sudden mischance. We would like to forget, if we could, the 13-2 plane incident, and, in particu- lar, the utterly untruthful statement is- sued by a high administration official? that the plane was in the air, investigat- ing weather conditions, and mechanical trouble developed. In many parts of the world, we are on the defensive, among officials of friendly and neutral nations, largely because of that state- ment. This is muck, to our regret. Our President must have seethed inside over he ineptness of officials he had caused o be placed in positions of responsibility. Mr. President, although awkward handling in that emergency gave the Soviet dictator an opportunity to scuttle the conference, and to rant and rave, as if he had no knowledge of our spying, and as if the Soviets had no spies of their own, there is still the hope that we shall pick up the pieces and shall resume peaceful negotiations. Our ship of state has plowed along un- damaged through heavier seas. We, in America, will ride out this storm. In fact, it will abate with time; and it is cer- tain that beginning in January, there will be in the White House, a strong leader, a President who will not delegate much of his authority. Above all, we shall then have a Chief Executive who will devote full time to his duties as President, and will have personal knowledge and direc- tion of the conduct of all parts of the executive branch of thhe Government. The Paris fiasco of a summit confer- ence that failed to "get off the ground" proves that it is essential that there be complete coordination of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of State. Above all, it proves that the demands of the time call -for a vigorous, strong President who will devote full time to his duties as Chief Executive. It seems to many that if it was safe to discontinue the 1172 flig1WW May 13, it thirely would have been safe to.pancel tifiTtY-2 fliartn. May 1.. But that was litettolitfitiorthelinne that face-to-face conferences with Khrushchev might re- sult in steps toward ending the arma- ments race, plus adequate safeguards, plummented downward with the U-2. Perhaps a great lesson for us to learn from this setback is that there must be strong leadership in the White House, in- stead of too much delegation of authority to underlings, and that we must proceed with the greatest speed to close the mis- sile gap between this Nation and the So- .1111.1111* nalabx .0.41.11.* Olt 10541 viet Union. Then we should easily re- gain respect and confidence of the lead- ers of the free world. SEISMIC WAVE DAMAGES Mr. LONG of Hawaii. Mr. President, the seismic waves which rolled across the Pacific following the earthquakes in Chile d mous 1 in Sout Philipp' damage Tahiti, mosa. by the f spread earth's su In 1946 ing down Hawaii wi 159 perso lion of pr time, ther waves, or assaults, ev Pacific and I call the the followin Tribune-Hera Hilo was crus waves. Mana raised the que the present sys ings. Without work which our ing in detecting which cause thes If a more extensi Ing service might I ask the same why the Congress ? the funds necessa Federal Flood Ins That act sits on th piece of deadwood. appropriated the mo vate the program, th the people of other wail, California, and fered damage from wave would have re with which to restore business properties. As it is, in Hilo alon property losses are estimated at more an $25 million. Since it is impossible t obtain regular insurance against tide., wave damage, only a tiny portion o the destroyed property is covered by urance. We must appropriate the fun necessary to put the Flood Insurance to work. I ask unanimous consen that the edi- torial from the Hilo Trib e-Herald be printed at this point in t RECORD. There being no objection, e editorial was ordered to be printed in he RECORD, as follows: [Prom the Hilo Tribune-Hera 1960] IT'S A SMALL ISLAND (By A. E. P. Wall) I walked down Kamehameha .A nue this morning, and what I saw looked e a city on its knees. I looked for Walakea Town and wasn't there. I looked for the handsome w Cafe 100, where Sally and I enjoyed lunci Satur- day, and all I could find was broke dishes aid broken hearts. ring the past week caused enor- s of life and property damage America, Hawaii, Japan, the es, and Okinawa, and lesser in California, Alaska, Mexico, stralia, New Zealand, and For- e death and destruction caused rfully powerful waves were ound virtually half of the face. a series of seismic waves emi- r= the Aleutians also hit catastrophic force, killing and causing some $25 mil- rty damage. Since that have been smaller tidal arnings of possible wave few years in the central ng our western shores. ention of the Congress to editorial from the Hilo , printed the day after by the recent seismic g Editor A. E. P. Wall on of how adequate is m of tidal wave warn- nsaying the wonderful ientists have been do- he earth movements ayes, he asks whether international warn- e developed. uestion. I also ask as not appropriated to implement the ance Act of 1956. statute books as a Had the Congress y required to acti- people of Hilo and unities of Ha- laska which suf- e recent seismic ved some funds heir homes and May 23, Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Releas 10542 The manager of the Hilo Theater invit me in for a look at the swampy desolat of his auditorium. He was looking for organ but couldn't ilnd it. The theater and the street on both des of it looked like something out of a nuclear war film that might have shown there. The damage, desolation and death raise important questions of State and Federal aid to meet immediate needs of the people who have suffered?although everyone who lives in Hilo and loi)ks it has suffered. It raises another important question, and perhaps an international one. It was nearly lunchtinie yesterday when I first heard that a tsunami- might be headed for Hawaii. I drove at once to the Volcano Observatory to see what Dr. Jerry Eaton's seismographs had to say about it. The story traced in thin lines 'on long sheets of paper was a startling on. The paper wasn't big enough to tell it. There were three quakes in Chile. The third one registered at the Volcano Observa- tory at 8:56 yesterday morning. It weal, recorded with such violence that the seismo- graph needles bounced back and forth in arcs wider than the cylinder on which they write. The Volcano Observatory doesn't track seis- mic waves and doesn't have the responsibil- ity of forecasting them. That is the job of the Coast and Geodetic Survey at Barber's Point on Oahu. It does keep track of earthquakes. It found that yesterday's Chilean quake regis- tered 8.25 on the Richter Scale. I asked Dr. Eaton how high the scale goes. He said all newspapermen ask that ques- tion?but there's no answer. He said the largest ever recorded was 8.6 and that the Sunday morning quake was about as strong as the one that shook San Francisco to pieces in 1906. Can a plane observe a wave in action and give warnings of its strength? No, Dr. Eaton said, because it doesn't show that clearly on the ocean's surface. He said it is something like dropping a pebble into a pan of water. There's a great train of ripples spreading out from the point of disturbance. The strength of the ripples or waves depends on the depth of the water. When a wave approaches an island with a sloping ridge drifting down into the water it gains force. So it might be only 5 feet high in the broad open sea, but 50 feet high in shallow water. Waves from Chile have caused trouble in the past. Hawaii was hit hard by tsunamis originat- ing there in- 1837 and 1877. Chilean waves struck here but caused no damage in 1906, 1922, and 1943. Nobody really knew whether to expect a wave, even after examining seismograph re ports and checking the gages in Chile a the Canal Zone. In view of the fact that several wave ve headed this way from Chile, includin vere ones in the last century, it seems t the time has come to set up an in ational war g service to cover the are lack of such a system have con- tr d to an incredible I of lives and ey. lilt happen again? ATTITUDE OF T RUSSIAN PEOPLE Mr. WILEY. "Meet r. President, on the program of May 22, awrence E. Spivak, the guest was ..,.!_: , I, azaPS e 1.9-5,.= a fo 8. -I4Ilbld jfel"19,DT I' - my t e ques ions which were asked d the answers which were given. Tho who questioned him were Ernest K. indley, of Newsweek magazine; 04/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 SSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE May kit arry Schwartz, of the New York Times; Fletcher Knebel, of the Cowles Publica- tions; and Herb Kaplow, of NBC News. I wish to call attention to some signifi- cant information which the former Soviet intelligence agent supplied. Mr. Knebel asked: Mr. Kaznacheyeev, I understand that last fall after the Khrushchev and Eisenhower exchange of visits was settled upon, you predicted then that you doubted that Ike would ever go to Russia, because Khrushchev would find some reason to cancel the visit. Is that true; and, if so, what is your reasoning? Mr. KAZNACIIEYEEV. Well, yes. It is a com- pletely logical doubt. Definitely the Soviet government and the Communist Party?in other words, the Soviet Communist regime-- are in no way interested in allowing so popular a man as the American President to come to the Soviet Union. He continued to say: I am going to say that there are several ,factors which constitute the stability and strength of the Communist regime inside the thkviet Union. The first factor is cold war, thaInternational tension and the armaments racea, The second factor is successes of in- ternaltonal communism abroad, and the suc- cess of soviet foreign policy. And the third factor, and I think primarily and above all is 'the ignarance of the entire Soviet people of reality, oltiife abroad, of the real reasons Inc armaments tace ? This ignoranceVs created by two kinds of' *x Iron Curtain. Ili first Iron Curtain is physical which all oI ou know about, an e second Iron Curtain al am going to is inside the brains of ' -Ue majority 4 the Soviet people, created consta propa- ganda and ideological ind rinatl I continue to read: The Soviet government way can be interested in allowing for sts, espe- cially one so prominent as. Ame n Presi- dent, to bring some liglfnto this orance and in this way under e it. They are definite afraid of the ? act such a visit can rq on the Soviet pe e. The other d , when I was speaking the floor of ti Senate, before I had th' particular ater brought to my atten- tion, I s that Khrushchev was afraid of the esmanship of the President of the ed States, that that was why he ca ed the visit. . the conclusion of this particular eet the Press" session, this young man as, in answer to a question, about to give some very important information; but the time for the broadcast was up. He said: My mental processes were very compli- cated and long. I was abroad. At the last of this. But I think I will reply to the ques- tion in another way. I am going to bring to your attention the fact that there is very little known in the West, that is the new Soviet generation, the new generation of Soviet youth. This is people born in the thirties. They are strikingly different from elder generations of our fathers and the generation of our brothers. Mr. Rash said: I am sorry to interrupt. I asked someone what he was driving at. That person said just this: The new generation is not satisfied with the standard of living, with the wages. They are not satisfied with their opportu- nities to have something to say about government. They are feeling the fer- ment that is evident all over the world. That undoubtedly was what the young man was about to say. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent that the entire "Meet the Press" broadcast be printed in the RECORD fol- lowing my remarks. There being no objection, the broad- cast was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: MEET THE PRESS (Produced by Efitittiti&--E. Spivak, pl. 22, Moderator: Brysor,r1960)01. Guest: Alexander ,msler(or Kaz- nacheev) , Lopae,?x-f3O'Viet inte ?ice agent. Panel: Ernest K. ewsweek maga- zine; Harry Schwartz, few York Times; Fletcher Knebel, CowlettiPublications; Herb Kaplow, NBC News. The ANNOUNCER. Ladies and gentlemen, we invite you to "Me--4,r the Press," the unre- hearsed programragiich has won every major award in its field: Our guest toteay is a former Soviet intelli- gence agent,- Alexander Kaznacheyeev, who is now liv14 in this country. In just a mo- ment, Mr,Xavnacheyeev will meet the press. Remeigber that the questions asked by the merabati of the panel do not necessarily re- flecteir point of view. It is their way of ge,t3lig the story for you. a And now here is today's moderator of Meet -We Press, Mr. Bryson Rash. Mr. RASH. Welcome once again to "Meet the Press." Three weeks ago today an Amer- ican U-2 jet ,plarle, was brought down deep 4ortfelitYltik Soviet Union. Premier Khru- shchev made the startling announcement in a few days that this plane was on a spy mis- sion. The U.S. Government some days later finally admitted the Charge. Now in a complete, or feigned, or real rage, Khrushchev seized upon this particular in- cident to insult and also humiliate the Pres- ident of the United States. The Paris sum- mit conference was wrecked in the process, the background and practice of espionage became a subject of intense discussion. Our guest today is thoroughly familiar with espionage from the Soviet Union's side of the Iron Curtain. He is Alexander, Kaz- nacheyeev, born in Moscow 28 years ago. He ebaine a specialist in Eastern affairs and as assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Ran- Burma. Ile was recruited as, an valkt of ,5oxint Intelligenceakiervice and worked in Communist espionage system in south t Asia. Eight ars of hostility to the Communist regime i Moscow culminated in June of 1959 when Kasnacheyeev defected to the West and ught asylum in the United States, where e now makes his home as a private citizen. Seated around e press table to question our guest today a Mr. Ernest K. Lindley of Newsweek magazin r. Harry Schwartz of the New York Times, r. Fletcher Knebel of the Cowles Publicatio Mr. Herb Kaplow of NBC News. Mr. Lawrence Spivak, gular member of the "Meet the Press" pane , ill be back with us 2 weeks from today. And now we will start the estions with Mr. Kaplow. Mr. KAPLOW. Mr. Kaznachey v, in de- scribing the activities of Soviet telligence agents in Rangoon, Burma, you sa1pr wrote somewhere rather recently that ort of the main functions was to penetrate find out precisely what was going on in thii for- eign embassies in Rangoon, especially- tile American Embassy. Did the Soviet agents find much out? Mr. KASNACHEYEEV. In Rangoon, no. At the time when I was working in the Soviet Embassy as a diplomat and as an agent of of the intern Venal tension, cold war and Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 u. s. News g w6wirimplifor Releasej1004/0/1960CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE U-2 AND THE "SUMMIT" BREAKUP The Record as Told to a Senate Committee Details of the U-2 episode and its aftermath were pro- duced in the questioning of Secretary of State Christian A. Herter and his Under Secretary, Douglas Dillon, as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee started its inquiry on May 27, 7960. The Committee chairman, Senator Fulbright (Dem.), of Arkansas, opened the questioning of Mr. Herter by asking when the decision was made to halt the U-2 flights. Follow- ing is from the official transcript of the testimony before the Committee: Secretary Herter: My impression is that it was taken on the Thursday before the President went to Paris. Senator Fulbright: That would be Thursday, is that it, the twelfth? Mr. Herter: Yes. Senator Fulbright: What were the considerations which led to this decision? Mr. Herter: Mr. Chairman, I think I answered that in my own statement, in which I said that, since the U-2 system had been compromised, it was discontinued?as any other intelligence mission would be in such a case. Senator Fulbright: It had been compromised some time before the twelfth, wasn't it? Mr. Herter: No, sir. The examination then turned to whether or not it had been agreed some time earlier to halt the flights in May. Senator Fulbright continued the questioning: Q: Was any moratorium on the flights agreed upon prior to May 1, to be effective at any time after May 1? Mr. Herter: I have heard reports to that effect, but, of my own knowledge, I do not know. Q: Was such a moratorium ever discussed or considered by anyone in the State Department? Mr. Herter: Not by Mr. Dillon nor myself. Q: Or anyone? Mr. Herter: I don't know of anyone. Q: Do you know whether the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] considered such a moratorium? Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA 68 Mr. Herter: I do not, sir. Q: Did Mr. plaa,Lxitiavp,0144.41P44,,of,..g43,9nyone else order arKUSliension of flights after the loss Of the plane on May 1? Mr. Herter: That, sir, he will be able to testify to. I can't tell you as of what date he did that. Q: Were any other planes lost on these same ventures prior to May 1? Mr. Herter: Not over Soviet territory. Q: None had been shot down or lost over Soviet territory? Mr. Herter: No. Q: The flight referred to, that Chairman Khrushchev re- ferred to on April 9?you were aware of that, were you? Mr. Herter: Yes. Q: It was a successful fly-over? Mr. Herter: It was. Q: If the President decided to suspend the flights prior to Monday, May 16, which you stated he did on the twelfth, why was this announcement delayed until the meeting with Chairman Khrushchev on the sixteenth? Mr. Herter: Because the President reserved that decision to make the announcement in Paris. Q: What was the reasoning for doing that? Mr. Herter: I cannot give you the answer, sir. In an opening statement to the Committee, Secretary Herter said he was convinced Nikita Khrushchev went to the Paris conference determined, in advance, to wreck it. Sena- tor Fulbright asked the Secretary if the U-2 episode contrib- uted to Khrushchev's decision. Mr. Herter: Yes, I believe it did. It was one of the factors, as I tried to explain in my statement. * Q: Mr. Secretary, why do you think Chairman Khru- shchev left a way out for the President by suggesting in one of his earlier statements that he believed the President did not know about these flights? Mr. Herter: I can there, of course, only speculate that he had himself committed himself very strongly in Russia with regard to his friendship for the President, and wished to, -RDP90T00782R00001)0s0 9sPJiJRLD REPORT, June 6, 1960 U.S. News & WorIAPPYPd For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 idea of what to expect from costs noted at this time in key resorts. Bahamas and Cuba. Nassau, in the Bahama Islands, is one of the resorts especially attractive to Americans. Seven- day cruises from New York start at $170 a person. The ship is your hotel while you are on the island. By air, a night-coach flight costs $135, round trip. You can count on spending about $15 a day per person for a first- class hotel room, with breakfast and dinner provided. A rental car will cost you $10 a day, or $60 a week, but you must supply the gasoline. Cuba, once a favorite vacation spot for Americans, is offering inducements to lure back tourists who have been frightened away by the anti-American attitudes of Fidel Castro's Government. A double room in one of Havana's lux- ury hotels now costs $12 to $15 a day, and in first-class hotels, with air condi- tioning, such a room can be found for $9. On request, the luxury hotels will pro- vide you with free tickets to the horse races. Costs of lodgings and food outside the capital are considerably lower. In the best night clubs of Havana, minimum charges for food and drinks range from $3 to $5.50, depending on whether you prefer an early or late show. Puerto Rico, Haiti. From now to De- cember, the cost of a comfortable hotel room in San Juan, Puerto Rico, is shaved by as much as 45 per cent. You can expect to spend about $25 a day for first-class accommodations, including all meals. A fashionable hotel at Dorado Beach, 20 miles west of San Juan, has lowered its rates for a double room, with breakfast and dinner, to $28 a day. The same accommodations cost up to $60 during the winter months. Puerto Rico has about 3,000 miles of good roads? many of them offering un- usual scenic attractions. You can rent a car for $8 a day, or $40 a week, plus 10 cents a mile. Haiti's distinctive music, art and at- mosphere combine to provide a big draw- ing card for American tourists. A car can be rented for $10 a day, plus 10 cents a mile. You can fly from place to place on Haiti at low fares. Port-au-Prince, Haiti's capital, is a free SOUTH AMERICA?For the most part, visitors will find modest prices and political calm and modernized hotel facilities. Above: view of Rio de Janeiro Harbor, Brazil. THE CARIBBEAN?Improved air and sea transportation makes "island hopping" in- creasingly easy for U. S. tourists. Below: Caneel Bay Plantation, St. John, V. I. Photos: Monkmeyer, Canadian National Railways, ITSN&WR ;RD port. Such items as watches, china, Irish linens, gloves, sweaters, French perfumes and liqueurs can be purchased at bargain prices. About hurricanes: These occur in the Caribbean most frequently between Au- gust and October. About four or five hur- ricanes a year is the average, but new warning systems now in effect help ships and planes to avoid the big blows and reduce the dangers. SOUTH AMERICA Americans who elect to visit South America in 1960 will find that hotels are improved as a result of a modernization program. Prices in most places?Vene- zuela being the gold-plated exception-- are lower than in the U. S., Canada, Eu- rope and the leading resort areas of the Caribbean. As a tourist, you need have no real worry over getting caught in political un- rest, although some revolutionary excite- ment is a possibility this year in Bolivia and Ecuador. Hotel prices vary from country to country and from city to city, but the average cost for a double room in a first- class hotel is $13 to $16 a day. Meals are inexpensive in most parts of South America. In Buenos Aires, for ex- ample, a steak two inches thick and nine inches long is served in the best restau- rants for $1.25 to $1.75. A complete din- ner can be obtained for $3 to $4. The average daily expense for hotel, meals and use of a car with driver runs between $25 and $30 a day per person, including taxes and tips. For top luxury accommodations, figure on $50. Leave auto home. Travel by car on a drive-yourself basis is not recommended in South America. Local drivers have a dangerous propensity for weaving in and out of lanes and speeding through inter- sections. Also, unless the visitor can speak Spanish or Portuguese, he can easily get lost for some time. Hiring a car with a driver is relative- ly inexpensive. In Brazil, for instance, you can arrange with the hotel door- keeper to get a car for as little as $1.25 an hour. However, if you want an Eng- lish-speaking driver, it will cost more. For sportsmen, South America abounds in good fishing and hunting of all kinds. Skiing in the Andes is at its peak when it's summer in the U. S. One f)recautionary note: Sot nrncr ended in March in the lower half of the continent, and a cold, wet winter is due in June. For those who are looking for sun and beaches, plan to stop in a place like Rio de Janeiro, where the weather is balmy the year around. Latest on U. S. and Canadian dollars, page 109. 782R000100060001-7 67 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 U. S. News & World Report . . . "Telling truth was better than fabricating excuses" in that way, continue the possibility of the President dis- claiming any responsibility for the flight. Q: What was the reason for not accepting this way out on our part? Why didn't we accept that suggestion? Mr. Herter: Mr. Chairman, that was a question, as you know, of judgment. Q: That was what? Mr. Herter: It was a question of judgment. As to when the essential facts had been revealed by the capture of the pilot and the plane with all its instrumentation intact, the United States Government should admit the fact that this overflight had taken place, that it was an intelligence over- flight, and that decision was made, of course, by the Presi- dent himself. Senator Fulbright noted that President Eisenhower had assumed personal responsibility for the U-2 flights? and asked Secretary Herter if there was any precedent in history for a head of state to assume "personal responsibility for espionage activities." Mr. Herter: No, I do not know of any firsthand. It may be that there have been some. On the other hand, I would point out, Mr. Chairman, that this particular incident was of a very unusual nature. Q: As a general policy, do you believe it is wise for the head of state to assume responsibility for espionage activi- ties? Mr. Herter: Well, very frankly, I don't think it makes a great deal of difference from the point of view of what the public believes. On the other hand, I believe in a ease of this kind the tell- ing Of ? the truth was the better course than getting deeper into fabricating excuses or disavowing responsibility. "The Unusual Circumstances" Q: What precisely were the reasons that persuaded you to depart from precedent in this case? What were the Un- usual circumstances you referred to? Mr. Herter: The unusual circumstances were the facts that the materiel and the statement of the pilot?not every bit of which was accurate, but a great part of which was ac- curate?had been revealed, and were being presented to im- partial tribunals for examination. Under those circumstances, which was very different from the ordinary espionage case, I think it would have become extremely evident, and was extremely evident, that this in- cident had taken place. Senator Green (Dem.), of Rhode Island, said that division of authority within the Government appeared to have cre- ated "a great many misunderstandings" at the time the U-2 flight was exposed by Russia. He asked: "How far did the President act alone and how far the State Department acted alone before they came together and agreed on the situa- tion?" Mr. Herter: I would say there was consultation right through in this period. May I make this observation, Mr. Chairman: From the point of view of firsthand knowledge on these matters, I asked Mr. Dillon to come up with me because for the--until May 6, I was out of the United States, he was Acting Secre- tary of State, and some of the questions that may be di- rected to that period rbVed9n6PfRtkenet2004/05/13 U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 6, 1960 0 answer from firsthand information, whereas I would have to do it only from secondhand information. Senator Green: Mr. Dillon, then will you take up the an- swer to my question? Mr. Dillon: All I can say is that, in the period that I had responsibility, we were in contact regularly with the Presi- dent with full co-ordination. Senator Humphrey (Dem.), of Minnesota, opened up a new line of questioning by asking the Secretary of State what agency of the Government was in charge of such things as the U-2 flights. Mr. Herter: The_Central Intelligence Agency,, Q: Do you have constant information?do, you have con- tinuing information as to the number of these flights, the course of these flights, the purpose of these flights, in the State Department? Mr. Herter: The general programs had been gone over with the Department. Obviously, it is impossible to tell when these flights are going to take place because they are so dependent on the season of the year and on weather con- ditions. The agency has to plan numbers of alternatives, so we never know at any particular time of any particular flight. But the general approval of the program has been received from the State Department, of course, as one of the advisers to the President in this matter. Q: Did you kaiak of this specific flight ahead of time? Mr. Herter: I did not. No, I didn't know it was in the air even When I was overseas, nor do I think any of us did until it came down. Q: Is that your understanding, Mr. Dillon? Mr. Dillon: I was not aware that it was in the air until was informed that it was?it was overdue, as I stated pre- viously. Q: When something goes wrong on one of these flights, who is responsible to give the cover story, the cover-up story, so to speak? Mr. Dillon: Centrat-lut-effigence-Agemyl-But we are also responsible for agreeing with them that this is a reasonable story, and it is proper in the circumstances. But they have the responsibility for executing it. If Red Plane Flew Over U. S.? Q: Mr. Secretary, what do you think would happen in the United States if, on our radar screen, we should dis- cover a plane flying at high altitude in this age of the fear of surprise attack, over our territory? Mr. Herter: I think we would do everything we could do to identify it right away. Q: Just identify it? Mr. Herter: Yes, identify it. We have 11 wherewithal, I think, to do that. Q: In other words we?would we dispatch interceptors? Mr. Herter: I think so. Q: What would be our view of such a flight? Mr. Herter: Certainly there is very little that such a flight could ascertain that would worry ,us much. Every bit of in- formation that we have got in this country seems to be avail- able through public means to anyone who wishes to collect documents. In fact, in the whole Russian espionage system they have collected maps, documents, and photographs of every part of the United States. : CIA-RDP90T00702R00t11(00 tu OD1 -7 69 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 U. S. News & World Report . . . Flights over Russia "were of very great value to us" [continued from page 69] Q: I realize this, but, in light of the danger of surprise attack, this is what I am getting at: This is a little different, may I say, from a spy working the railroad yard or taking photographs or even a submarine off our coast, even though this gets to be a little serious, too. But, in the light of danger of surprise attack by air power, there is some difference, is there not? Mr. Herter: There is some difference. On the other hand. I think we could identify it very quickly. This is the type of plane that no one could possibly mistake for a bomber when you get close enough to look at it. This is entirely an unarmed glider type of plane. Q: Have we ever shot down any Soviet planes over Amer- ican territory or over any friendly territory in which we have bases or alliances? Mr. Herter: Not that I am aware of. Q: Have we ever intercepted any Soviet planes?in Ko- rea, for example? Mr. Herter: I think we have been able to identify them from time to time. Whether we could say that they were deliberate espionage planes or whether they wandered over the line from the border or not, I can't tell you. Senator Hicken/ooper (Rep.), of Iowa, asked whether the high-flying U-2 was shot down from its maximum altitude, as Khrushchev claimed, or developed engine trouble that dropped it down to the point wherqS1 became an easy target for the Russians. Mr. Herter: Senator, there has been a good deal of specu- lation on that point. I think that we are very skeptical as to whether it was shot down from a very high altitude. Q: Well, I think there is considerable difference in a situation where this plane might have been shot down at 60,000 or 70,000 feet, or whether it was shot down or shot it at 5,000 or 7,000 feet. Mr. Herter: We are very skeptical and there are certain evidences that it was not shot down from that altitude. * Requests to See U-2 Pilot Q: I understand that we have requested in Moscow .that representatives of this Government be permitted to interview the pilot. Have we had any replies from those requests? Mr. Herter: As yet they have not given us that permission. They have said that when "we have finished interrogating him we will give consideration to it." Q: Do we have a reasonable idea as to where he is held? he is being held? Mr. Herter: That I can't tell you. We have been assured that he is in good health, and beyond that I can't tell you whether we know where he is held or not. Perhaps one of my colleagues knows that. I don't think we have any information on that. Q: Would you care to give an opinion on the value to this country, in our defensive posture, of these flights, this series of flights which have gone on over Russian territory for the last several years? Mr. Herter: Yes, sir, I will give you this opinion. It is a layman's opinion rather than an expert's opinion, but I think they were of very great value to us. Senator Morse (Dem.), of Oregon, turned the inquiry to a line of questioning_ about what knowledge the U. S. has of Approved For Release 2004/05/13: Soviet missiles, and the censored transcript as released showed that the hearing had moved into highly sensitive territory. Senator Morse: Mr. Secretary, do our experts believe that Russia has a land-air missile? Mr. Herter: I think you are having both the Secretary of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency that can testify to that better than I could. Q: Have they ever informed you as to what their opinion is as to whether or not Russia has a land-air missile? Mr. Herter: We, I think, assume that they do. "For Security Reasons" Q: We assume that they do. Is it on the basis of that as- sumption that they have been asking Congress for some time for a speed-up in our land-air-missile program?because of the assumption that Russia may have one? Mr. Herter: Yes, sir. I am being purposely cautious for security reasons, as you understand. Q: I understand. And yet, I think, from the standpoint of our own security, it is rather important that we have some information as to the possibility, on the line of Senator Hick- enlooper's question, the possibility of whether or not this was shot down by a land-air missile. [Whatever the reply was to this observation, it was de- leted in its entirety for security reasons.] Q: What international-law rights do we have, Mr. Secre- tary, over capture of American spies captured by foreign gov- ernments? Mr. Herter: We have no rights over them that are in con- travention of domestic law. We have no international right. Senator Carlson (Rep.), of Kansas, asked whether, despite Khrushchev's tactics at Paris, the U. S. would continue ne- gotiations on disarmament and a nuclear-test ban. Mr. Herter: Yes, sir. I have indicated in my prepared statement that we will continue to do this. As you know, however, the condition that we have always adhered to is that the controls have got to be controls that one can rely upon. In other words, reliable controls on both sides. I think that with the very real danger that exists in the world today of accidental events that may lead to a nuclear war, that we should pursue the course of doing whatever we can to minimize within the bounds that we have stated; namely, that of reciprocal and effective control. Q: Mr. Secretary, do you feel that we are making any progress on these nuclear-test suspensions at the Geneva Conference and other places? Mr. Herter: During the last few weeks, really the last few days, they have been meeting in Geneva examining a co-ordinated program of research for improving instrumenta- tion so that small shots can be detected underground. Those conferences have moved, I think, pretty satisfac- torily. They are halted at this moment, awaiting some in- structions from Moscow. In the next few days, we should know better whether or not there has been any radical change of position on the part of the Russians or not. There is some chance of reach- ing agreement. It will be a limited agreement at best, but that again depends on full agreement with regard to the control mechanisms. As you know, those talks have been going for a long time. Until they are shown to be hopeless, I think we will continue with them. CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 o U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 6, 1960 Approved For Release 200445/11:*irRDP90T00782R000100060001-7 yolw 4FR.k E. TRIBITNTI- Fr ared ? AssoCiated Press WirePhot,o IllfSH-TITTSFI?MiN 'Dune' dir er tor of the Central Tntellizera T' A gency,' arriving at 1.1-2 probe vester...ay. 710e0/11/11$ 2r, nno.,Nnifie - ? ? ? ii SJlr( se Iis 5i Hrs. At Inquiry Kept Secret iieit onatkisoo For the Flight By Rowland Evans Jr. WASHINGTON, May 31.. The chairman of the genate Poi eign Relations Committee cleared the Central Intelligence Agcricy today of all ? respOn- sibility for controversial policy decisiOns in. the U-2 spy-flight affair. Sen. J. Wiliam Fulbright, D., Ark.. talked' to reporters after one of the most secrec:v- shrouded briefings in congres- sional history. The witness wan Allen W. Dulles, director of the C. 1. A. All Is Secret Not a single ward uttered in the five-and-a-half hours of Mr. Dulles' testimony will be released to the pUblic. 'Sealed and bound, it will be locked uo in committtee files, and the stenotype tapes and duplicating master sheets will be burned. Sen. Fulbright, while refus- ing to give reporters a shred of hard information on the all- day testimony, said: !. That "Me;;Mulles "was candici.as tCltiliri in his position , could tle7Atti4 gave' the corn- mittqitili4ch clearer .under ? standire_oi the agency's role his whole platter." Gave Flight Details g That Mr. Dulles cleclinRe b y precisely why the fliknt of pilot Francis Gary Power w...s ordered, although "he vol- unteered quite thorough detP11?. abolit the May 1 hieht " Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 NEW YORK TIMES MAY 2 8 1960 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 SovietEx lains Preservation / rediage Despite Fall Survival of Fragments Is Laid to Light! Weight of Germanium Metal?Parts Are Said to Have `F loatedyIown By MAX FRANKW a spectrtntioro'i.:k ;eim MOSCOW yay 27?The sur- prising survival of so much of the American U-2 reconnals- - sance plane that was forced down in the Urals on May 1 is being explained in some detail at an exhibition of the wreckage here. The question how the plane's wings and tail assembly and , much of its equipment could be :preserved after it had been hit by a rocket at an altitude of , more than 60,000 feet, as re- ported here, has titiZzled many who have seen the eX4hibition in Gorky park. Sortie vialtOrs have .now received the follOwing ex- !planation The high-flying' ahigle-engine plane was not hit directly by a rocket but by fragments from a roet that exploded in the air nearLby. As a result the U-2 ?rapidly lost altittida and began to "disintegrate." This appar- ently meant that it began to fall , apart. Because most of the plane's parts were made with extremely lightweight germanium, the wings and other sections did not hurtle to the ground, but floated down and were not smashed on impact. Parts of the plane were retrieved in an area of about eight square miles near the city of Sverdlovsk. Francis Gary Powers, the pilot of the U-2, is presumed to have found that his automatic ejector mechanism had been damaged beyond use. He therefore worked to free himself from the de- scending fuselage and bailed out from an altitude of about 30,000 feet. ."He was very lucky," vis- itors are told at the exhibition. Only pieces of the fuselage of the U-2 are shown in the sons daily. Gorky Park display, presum- ably because it was weighted! down by the Pratt Whitney / J-75 engine and suffered most in the crash. The jet remains in recognizable shape.' So do other parts of the plane's' equipment. A tape recorder that the plane carried to pick up Soviet radar signals was still usable when it fell into Soviet hands. The plane's high-altitude cam- era was badly 'smashed but is usable. The Russians say the equipment was built to with- stand a crash. Holes in the wings that hang in the Gorky Park display had led laymen to believe from the start that projectiles tore through the plane's skin. The new explanation supplements but does not contradict official accounts of the incident given by Premier? Khrushchev on May 7. The Premier said the plane had been brought down by a single rocket, and it was pre- sumed he had meant a rocket fired from the ground. A group of Soviet artillery officers and enlisted men were decorated for their part in bringing the plane down, Mr. Khrushchev said the pilot had been brought to Moscow "alive and kicking," but -no foreigners have been permitted to see him so far. He is said to have confessed to espionage and an early trial is expected. Mr. Khrushchev said Mr. Powers would be tried "severely." The Gorky Park display, whose opening on May 11 was attended by the Premier and other Soviet officials, is said to be attracting 8,000 to 9,000 per- Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RD MAY 2 7 1960 ASHINGTON STRR Following is the text of Secretary of State Herter's analysis of the Soviet actions at the Paris summit confer- ence and his comments -on the outlook for the future de- livered before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this morning: We have naturally given a great deal of thought to the reasons for this extraordinary action by the Soviets in corn- ing all the way from Moscow to Paris for the sole purpose of sabotaging the conference. I should like to say right off that there are many obsc aspects of this Soviet behavi and that we do not know et considerations a n d factors which went into its deterMina- lion. We probably, 'sever I hardly need to -emphasize !here to the members of this Committee the complete se- crecy in which decisions are arrived at in the Soviet Gov- ernment and in the hierarchy of the Communist Party, which is the effective ruler of that country. It is only possible to try to deduce .from Soviet actions, after they are taken, the con- siderations which brought them about. What I give you now, therefore, is at best a tenta- tive estimate of why the Soviet Union behaved as it did, an estimate which may have to be revised in the light of further Information and future events, dent and with President de Gaulle, with only interpreters present. The best guess as to the sig- nificance of this new factor is that (1) in view of the brutal and threatening attitude he (itde .ft eris it was con- y; cif a e to have some g 1:?19 e ,n.ce - of Soviet armed strength' in' liq person of Marshal Mal' Sec- ondlyGrolpyko ', linov- , 4 sky wp ,,, be able Uri testify upon iiii1 ' to Moscow that he had etbck strictly to the agreed position. Decided in Moscow ' There is one thing, however, that can be regarded as cer- tain: This is that the decision to wreck the conference was made prior to Khrushchev's de- parture from Moscow. At no point during his OW in Paris?neither when he:dis- closed his true intentions to Gen. de Gaulle at. 11 a.m. on Sunday, the 151 is nor subse- quently?did Khrushchev devi- ate 1 inch from his demands that the United States: (1) Denounce the overflights; 2) apologize to the Soviet Union; (3) punish those "directly re- sponsible," and (4) promise not! to repeat these flights. Neither the statement made by the President at the one meeting held on Monday nor, the serious and responsible ef-; forts of Gen. de Gaulle and Mr. Macmillan in bilateral talks with Mr. Khrushchev before and after the President's an- nouncement of suspension of flights could persuade him to withdraw these unacceptable demands. Indeed, it is a logical deduction from his behavior in Paris that he had no authority to modify his position to any! significant degree. The fact that he was accom- panied everywhere, and lit- erally everywhere, by Foreign Minister Gromyko and Marshal Malinovsky is an interesting sidelight on this point. There is much speculation as to this change from his previous atti- tude during his visits both to the United States and France, when he insisted upon having meetings alone with the Presi- F It also the decis vita tion to made before Moscow. Decision "certain that scanned the in- nt was rushehev left As to what led the Soviets to this extreme position, in regard to the summit meeting which had previously appeared so much desired by Mr. Khru- shchev, we enter into the realm of pure speculation, as I indi- cated earlier. The most we can hope to do in the absence of reliable information is to eval- uate the elements and factors which appear to have entered into this decision. I shall try to list them briefly. 1. There was considerable in- dication, particularly during April, that Mr. Khrushchev had concluded that there was little likelihood of his having his way, particularly in regard to Berlin, at the summit. Evi- dence of Western determlna- ton and unity on this point in speeches and statements by Western leaders appears to have brought him to this eon- elusion. Thus in his Baku speech on April 25, he not only , reiterated with the utmost fi- nality his position on Berlin. including his intention to con- clude a separate peace treaty with the East German regime. but he also began for the first time seriously to cast doubts upon the success of the sum- mit. By this, of course, he meant success on Soviet terms. 2. Although the evidence is highly inconclusive, there are a numer of indications that Mr. Khrushchev's conduct of Soviet foreign policy, particu- larly his over - personalization and in Communist eyes over- commitment through personal visits to the United States and France, was arousing at least serious questioning if not op- position in the Soviet hier- archy. It would seem a logical deduction that some of the opposition to his conduct of foreign relations which was openly voiced by the Chinese !Communists found a .sympa- thetic response among some of SPORT OFJOTER $ PLAZA SPORT SHOP his ass tates, an very prob- ably among the Soviet miii- tarY. 3. It was against this back- ground that the U-2 incident occurred. Basic Miscalculation , A combinatlof these three factors in our judgment is what resulted in the definite and brutal decision to cti4upt the Paris conference. To?ceiter- mine how each of the st factors should be weighed is, for the moment, beyond our reach. -"rii4 'U-2 incident was most certainly. seised upon and mag- nified beyonit. its true propor- tions as a justification for this decision. It is.debatable wheth- er?it would have been possible foi Mr. Khrushchev to devise another pretext for so radical and violent position. It might well be that a lack of success at the sumrhit would have confronted Khrushchev with a much more difficult choice, from his point of view, than no conference at all. He and his associates may have therefore much preferred to avoid facing the consequences of failure of negotiation by the simple expedient of torpedoing the conference. It may seein incredible to you that responsible leaders of a great power should have come all the way to Paris mere- ly for the purpose of wrecking the conference, thereby incur- ring worldwide condemnation of, the., !Alnion,',and en- hancing,the of unity and purpose a the Western Pnwlit* -retiresented there but also the North Atlan- tic Treaty Organization and free nations everywhere. I believe the answer lies in a basic miscalculation in Mr. Khrushchev's and the Soviet.; thinking. Hoped to Divide West Mr. Khrushchev undoubtedlyi hoped?and this explains his; early arrival in Paris?to dividel the allies and isolate the United States. He anticipated that the United States would refuse the demands-;.he .bad set forth and that the conference would then collapse, with the United States bearing responsibility for the rupture before World opinion. His plan miscarried because our two allies stood solidly and loyally and refused to be partners to Mr. Khrushchev's scheme. The result, as the whole world knows, was that the position which Mr. Khrushchev brought to Paris resulted in the com- plete isolation of the Soviet Union rather than the United States and in placing the re- sponsibility for the disruption of the conference squarely where it belongs?on his own shoulders. This estimate of the reasons for Mr. Khrushchev's behavior is strongly supported by the attack which he made at his press conference on Gen. de Gaulle and Prime Ministei Macmillan for What he termed their lack of objectivity. lack of will and subservience to the allied relationships?in other words, in plain 'English, for their solidarity with the United States, their loyalty to our common 'Purposes and their re- Mad to play the Soviet game. The Future What conclusions should we draw for the future? I believe the signs are that there has been as yet no rad- ical alterations in Soviet pol- icy, so we can expect the con- tinuance of a propaganda ef- fort designed to split off the United States from its allies. This conclusion is .suptiorted by Mr. Khrushchev's Paris state- ments, including those at his press conference. It is sup- ported, somewhat more zpecif- ically and definitely, by the statements which he made in Berlin on his way home. We must remember, how- , ever, that given the nature of the Soviet state, the men who run it can meet in secret at any time and change existing policy without public debate or even foreshadowing any such change. It is for this reason that any statement about a phase of Soviet policy must be regarded as qualified, with no certainty that it will remain valid in the future. Thus, though the world's hopes have been keenly disap- pointed by the fact that the summit conference was not held as planned, the signs so far are that the basic realities of the world situation have not been greatly changed. Whether this continues to be so depends. as I have indicated, on actions of the leading Communist countries. Main Policy Sound Provisionally. however. I con- cluded that the implication for United States policy is that the main lines of our policy remain sound and should be continueci. The lesson of Paris is that we should prosecute those lines with renewed effort. Propo- nents within the Communist bloc of an aggressive course must not be encouraged by signs of weakness on our part. Proponents of a peaceful course should be encouraged by our readiness to get on with out- standing international business in a sober and rational man- ner. We must remain prepared to , withstand aggressive pressures not only in Berlin but also else- where. I trust that our evident readiness will deter such pres- sures. Stresses Aid Programs ; Among the lessons of Paris. the most important, for the free world including ourselves. :it seems to me, is fresh realiza- tion of the dangers we face and consequent need for clos- ing of ranks and moving ahead :with our own and our allies' !programs for strengthening the free world. We came back from ;Paris with a keener sense of what it means to have a We and I am sure that our ances will take new life from this experience. At the same time I would stress equally the need to ex- : nand imaginatively and gen- erously our collaboration with the newly developing countries. I Union. To do so is not only to deflect our gaze from the grim reality that confronts us, but even more to plunge us inevitably into fruitless and 'damaging domestic recrimina- tion. We mitt 'now, as in the , future, maintain a vigilant, :calm and resofute posture and. insofar as it lies in our power ,to do so, be accurate in our estimates and effective in our actions. I would close in expressing the hope that we will not be- come so fixed in preoccupation with the Soviet challenge as to lose sight of our own construc- tive purposes?which are larger and more important that- . merely resisting or reacting ti 1 external threats. We have 011 own vision of the future tows: which we want to see the woi On both accounts I hope the Congress will give whole- hearted support to our mutual security programs as author- ized by this committee, which are now more important than ever. We must continue, as the Presi has said, to seek in a businesslike way to make prog- ress on outstanding problems with the Soviet Union. We in- tend to go ahead with existing negotiations, to stand by our commitments, and to foster open communication and peace- ful exchanges. Above all, we shall not cease from the most !ful endeavor to find ways to bring the arms race under con- trol and thus to meet the nu- clear menace that hangs over mankind. , I believe in this period it is incumbent upon us, all of its, to keep a calm and steady gaze on the world scene and to avoid actions, statements and atti- tudes which might tend unnec- essarily to increase international tension. If such an inrrep is to occur, clearly the faun of thc \ and we should not do Clem favor of providing pretext for action by them which would have this effect. Cites Constructive Goats We should not dene 'hard'' or "soft" our at: or policy toward th 5-4m ;et Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 evolve. We have our own progrs for helping to bring that flit) bOut?for holding high !light of freedom, for shai its message and rewards emerging nations, for tryin create an international c munity in which the rul law will replace the rul force. It is to these prof that our talents and en should be rededicated it uncertain times.that lie 0111001111.111100.11.01111?11.1111111114411?111 Trtt,, itvcm,4pr0ved For Release 404114/p5A13961:11A-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 You, Too ? You, too, you, too, whoever you are, Wherever you are, now must decide ? Dare we let these anti-human mechanisms, Brains wired to bank accounts, Trembling with every tremor of stock rise, The procreating of generations of paper profit Their ecstacy, orgasm, psmotic absorption, The tegument, tissue, cartilage of their being; Dare we let these ex-human univacs, - Make their October, 1929 decisioh? Tumble ,thernselves (and us) Out their 20th story window? U-2 U-2 is their symbol and cr Dealing from iii-e---foTran ottom of the deck, The supreme, perfect, triuniphant gamble: Heads you win a :gestiare for peace, (Withdrawn at their Whim and convenience) Tails they min a?cold war manouver, , Prices rising, ticker racing, business as usual, ? While, swag over shoulder, they run Shouting through the streets, "Stop, thief!" You, too, you, too, now must decide: Will our united voice and action% Atomize, in a puff, their U-2's and outlawry, Or silence and acquiesence push us One step nearer that 20th story window? t-2 or you, too, you, too? 4.....M3...4".0,,,.....410ftroas.011,101/0?1100?00411?Minf Saul Gross .4 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 NEW YORK TIMES All Ay 2 el 1960 Approved For Release_2004/05/t3 :_c_IA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 II-2 Case Perils Project For Higher-Flying Plane 1;y HANSON W. BALDWIN The future. of a new reconnaissance aircraft capable of cruising at an altitude of-more than 100,000 feet has been jeopardized by the U-2 incident, in the opinion of Wash- .iout? or fali etf thousands of ington experts. The loss in a of the 1.7-2's planned successor feet below tneni. Some of the flight over the Soviet Union in doubt. interception attempts were pho-I ' ()gra , May 1 of a Lockheed, 13-2 The Lockheed U-2, which had ' phed. authorities are plane had led to indefinite stoppage 9f 4..nte1lige , gathering "overflighta;'_whi had been going on With major incident for four /eikrs. The II-2 planes, capable q OP If?e vulnerable even at graphs altitude of about 70,009 feet, 0;000 feet. argument ' have not penetrated betycmd 'herefore a successor to the bower s Communist frontiers sinCe'MAy t-2, described by some writers ? ',,_,, t. President Eisenhower htt?:tlb` as the U-3, had been designed and was being built. It was ex- They other flu hely promised that these 4497 t)raphic flights will not be re- lected to cruise at altitudes future than 100,000 feet. Thc, .,....suences,s,f,d1,,. a timed during . his Achzeiniptra- of this plane, and in fact ',."-`", 1-IttS, tion, ? ., t), of the entire air reconnaissance,um?11 4 t Iprogram, is now in doubt 4military'tec Soviet Aim Aceodired ' Y intelligence l ? From the-militar int ? stat Senator John F. Kethe4y, a,point of view the halting of the at the leading candidate for ,!' flf ht " i viewed as f tressed about a - .oeratic nomination fOV,'..Rresi.filiticulable ince importae,be at least all the dent, has said he will_noi aP-It*two or three years before re- ore so s it willnc Prove their resumption it itlebe-IrAtinaissanet satellites are avail- come? President. ' , 1, ,iable to replace piloted planes. preasion, is During repeated flightI$:iit, the,l The II-2 program Of recon- vaunte nOwe i last four years the U-3%....ha,vetna ssa.nce was the roost Impor-IA v ga, T- Ico..p--- photographed Moscow, Peiping.- ? . . Release flying 'tart secret source of informa- /ton about the Soviet Union' ot ? rt flying over the Soviet Un- 0..high 'altitudes for four 'faced increasing risks as e wertt?on. Anticipated ad- ?in the capabilities of So- , fenSe 'weapons would time that the U-2 Wash' debati leasing the - Soviet tail an so at dylsability of re- Ifektion some of 'en 6Vei The: do- said to he :the. ?Vboio-: As povverful d? Visen- Rlan for rprise serve au- on of the -continued e Soviet 'American Ad' scientific tries that re dis- n's han- dling of the U- ? Soviet Pow In these cqu to Washington Von Abrding , The im- Vat the A Soviet and found the photo-I , it is believed, would 1Soviet nuclear, explosgwri:?so-available to the Central Intelli-'m provide it of United States viet missile-launcilainsi-. air- gence,Agency. The data it pro. : icolds ?and some, of the ,,Area. ?vided vied in importance iingenuity and power and might th e.ompen. sate somewhat in pay- supposedly most . heavily , de. that collected by the National . cnological gams for the halting' I ended in "04 SOViel Vnion, Security Agency, a separate Mil of the flights. ligente - gatherin organiza4t g ? On the oIthe'r hand those who t3hina and the satellite en un tion, 'which intercepts, analyzes _ , ,? re arguing again,st publication tries. and, if possible, decodes Sovic . nterid that release of the pho- Washington experts feel that 4pmmunieations. ^remier Khrushchey's exploita- The 15-2's were flying his would compound the over4thcilteP tion of the 13-2 incident na %lett a the. U-2 mc!- In and during his visit to Paris toecyithLedreAuoidinitedc f -mni ,.' viet -Union, since it would strike lias thus accomplished one oi pgordtiicginu, a. record of elfgaineerTir; P another blow at the prestige of its objectives?the halting of an and production skill that dem- moth remier Ithrushchey andthe Sev.iet Army. air intelligence operation that onstrated what ample funds, In striking a balance sheet of had provided the United Statesifull? support. and elimination of U-2 gains and losses, with information of tremendousired tape could mean._ . ton experts, though disturbed Washing- value that could be acquired in 13-2 Defied Interceptor6 at the Government's handling r no other way. The Communists had detected (h?, the case after May 1, are be- Moreover, the public "corn- by radar some, but by no means ginning to think that in the long view of history the l'resi- ,irtielising' of i it. ,iii intern- all, of these flights, but had not been dent's frankness in assuming tiee prOg alli leavt's Ole iiiiiiiro able to stop them. T.J-2 pi- personal responsibtlity for the lots had seen Soviet intereep- flights may pay dividends Th tors rise to attack them, only to their ceilings and 'mush add, too, that Allied unit3 'Witch -1......... -b.-en strengthened. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 YORK TIMES MAY 3 0 1960 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 ar This prioritylargeting list was . S. Ti work was reduced to a mini- me Flight of u.2 4 'MUM in the interests of security. I, I closely held, however. Peeler - J?Few subordinate officials knew tthat the U-2 reconnaissance pro- gram existed. Dulles in Charge Thus, in this sense- every U-21 mission received the policy ap-, Pr oval of top officials of the Government before the flightl not known perscihally of th.'.! was authorized. Once a flight' Worth the Dangers flight on May 1 until he sub- was placed on the,priority list, I sequently heard news that the however, the management and plane had 1?egii; downed, but hei direction of the program neces- By HANSON W. BALDWIN , defended the Continuation ?of sadly was, to a large extent Favorable weather and the, the flights in the pre-surnmitdecentralized In. Washington, 4Vr. Dulles advent of long periods of day-1 period as 'a "sound" policy. wat the over-all manage, and light over northern Russia Much criticisin has been ley- director. A group of Al I. F:orce were important factors in the eled at the Administration be Stehnicians was assigned *o bis decision to send a U-2 recon-1 eauee the Lockheed U-2 that' naisance plane over the Soviet' was 16at Wa;s permitted to fly office and their was close hal- Union May 1, just prior th the OW Soviet territory so short son erce. and the Air, Fo projected summit conference. a ?time before the scheduled Washington experts explained, Die :Four meeting in Paris. In the efd, operational part !of the program was the to this reporter last week the The policy decision to eon- res ofisibility of the Air Force significance of these two fac.-; tinue the flights despite the a 4119;Cteritral Intelligence' tors and described the man -I scheduled conference was taken .A ey The pilots who flew' agement system that carefully Weelts before 'May 1, it was ?"'r'theliloviet Union, working controlled the reconnaissanceiexPtaked. The IT-2 overflights, on thesek- flights in rotation,1 were civilians, though. most or To Weather, Not Summit ? Aides Say In ormationCo'rp, ig team Come* tce, said h Sought by Plane Was flights. Any scheduled flight could he stopped before the take-of by a simple order from Wash- ington to halt all flights. In the case of the May 1 flight, ai@ich had been gbing on for four ,years, were temporaril3z, suspended just prior to, during ancIoafter Premier Khrushchev's visit to' the United States, last Septet-fiber. all of them were, former mem- bers of the jrA Force. The slIpporting organization was largely draWn,? from the Air Force, ! . Once the list of target priori- ties, which was constantly un- the imminence of the summit Summit Meeting Delayed I der revision, reached 2the van- conference had not been over-n But with the subsequent?}13.. !ore IT looked, these experts said. It del4 of .l the summit meeting t t obnaesde s t Ir I 1 cd-msmander was believed that the informa; and of President Eisenhower's had 1 a oe'rtain amount of lati- tude about the timing of the tion to be gained was so im- portant that it outweighed the political -risks involved. Secretary of State Christian A. Herter indicated last Friday that there had been no Admin- istration policy review on the of continuing TT-2 wisdom schedaled visit to the Soviet Union, it was felt that the flights should be resumed. An flights. He could, for instance, under- take any one of the top two or indefinite susrlension, it was three flights listed on the prior- held, would close off to Wash- ity list, it was explained. His 'Ington a source of major in- decision 'as to which flight to formation during a vital period, undertake, and when, was die- Air For satisfactory cut-off date?" one eepOrti, the availability of day- an overflight started, it was e officials whenevef "Anyway, what wauld be a tatod in large part by weather observer asked last week. "One light over the areas to be photo- s month, one v.ei k one day be-igraphed and by other mtefli fore the summit?" !gence Information. The U-2 reconnaissance pro-l. The advent of long: spring and grain was under the direction summer days in the northern and control of the Central Intel- latittides after a *inter of dark- ligenee Agency. Allen W. Dulles, ness Was ,an iitiportalit ele.rnent: director df the agency, suggest- influencing. a .resurtiption of ed after the Ma' 1 incident that flights over such areas. he should take full responSibir- In the case .of the May 14 ity for the program, it was disr flight that ended with the loss closed. However, the PreSident explained. However, neither the! President nor the Secretary of State would necessarily be in- formed' of the start of each flight. Washington authorities thor- oughly familiar with the I.1-2 operation feel *ere can be no justifia,ple criticism of the pro- gram oil teeMAcal and intelli- gence grounds, 'though some of observe that the Govern- decided to assume full respen- of, the ciirst 1.1-2 destroyed over nil sibility after variouS inaccurate any Communist 'country, there 111-ell;., ..:_talkecl. tip, , ,much after had been indications that the iv16-Y ,.1 Statements hd been made by Russians were prepsfring a Mrisl Plans Not Known .minor official S litho had norspectaeular space shot for May Actually, it was learned, .the' DaY' There were' specific tar- x .1:-, Major interest in Washington knowledge of the program. policy responsibility was widely gets to be photographed, rang- ontifivrs to be focused on distributed. E very IT-2 fligh t ? ing from the borders of Afghan- ;rraneis Gary Powers, pilot of was scheduled in Washington. to b al sass; istan to the Arctic Ocean. FthieRiAdyowinTneidtedU-4ateUsp E Tilt scheduling wtts done by a Clear Skies Important officials hi Moscow had had no ts4TPowers Washington does spgaiSe to their request to see ieareful determination-in which . The U.-2's cameras, which ? ithe Air Force, the Central Intel- take pictures ite great precision . th h,1 ` ere lig,ence Agency and ttther agen- no even know w e pilot Associated Press Allen W. Dulles cieS joined?of the Objectives to e photographed by the high- flying planes. Each flight was listed on a priority list, with specific rout- ing and objectives shown. This list, constantly revised, was ap- proved not .only by Mr. Dulles but by top officials in the Air lights over Soviet territory as Force and the Pentagon and, as the summit conference ap- secretary qf State Herter indi- cated in his testimony last week, ? proached. by senior officials in the State Approved For .1WA and clarity from 70,000 feet up, require daylight and freedom from cloud cever for effective results. Good weather?a pre- diatom of either clear skies or scattered clouds over the route he is -tried publicly, Washington to be taken?wag therefore believes, the Seviet Gevernment may littempt to stage a papa- ganda eirchs.7 The pilot, already -probably brainwashed and subjected to eing held, although he is presumably in Moscow. _Whether he will be brought to-iniblic trial is not known. If 'always a major factor in timing. This was a factor that could not possibly be controlled , from Washington. ! The local commandeer dect. psychological and perhaps,phys- IsiOn on precise scheduling of 44 ical tdeture may be expected !flight ,was accompanied by a to answer questions exactly a RDP90T 00782R0001 0o0 08n0 001-7 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 the Russians wish. It is believed' ;that he will, probably be pre- sented as a.. typical representa- tive of "deeadenty capitalism." Though this COMAittniet cari- cature of the be dis- counted, the question of moti- vation, be rv. Mit': Powers acted at. he did When, his plane was etdowned, cbntinues to trouble some Washington ob- servers. Mr, Powers Is a new, kind of spy, if indeed he can lee defined as a spy Eit all. He wore no uni- forte and Was got in active military service. He i;Ild net penetrate the territory" Of the Soviet Union, as Such. He did fly at, high altitude over the Soviet ..13:nipin and by his own admission, as reported by the Russians, he Operated cameras and electronic record- ing instriments. But no defini- tion of sovereignty as ? far as air space is concerned has ever been agreed upon. Pragmati- cally, sovereignty extends up- ward as far, as a nation can en- force 'it?in other. words, to the limit of the range of its anti- aircraft rockets, Pilot a Skilled Technician Nevertheless, Mr. Powers was a kind of modern spY7a Skilled technician trained to. operate technological instrftents. of espionage. The embarrasSment to which the United States was sub- jected when the ,ti-2 was downed arose , frairthe fact that the Russians recovered irrefutable' evielence of Mr. Powers' espionage mission. Large parte of his plane, earn- eras, films, equipment, and the pilot himself atteSted to what normally are clandestine activ- ities. Mr. Powers. apparently has told the Russians about his assignment and thus hag added to the physical evidence they collected. Yet the downed U-2 was _ fitted with a self-destructidn mechanism and Ar. Powers himself carried with him means of killing himself- -a way out for many espionage agents in the past. The main questions teeing asked 4n Washington and else- where itre;:p giWhy id the plane and equipment escape destruction and the pil et shrylve ? ilWere Mr. Powers and his fellow "spies in the sky" care- lully, selected and well &allied? IlWhat are the qualifications of a good intelligence ageftt?f The inadequacy of evidence available to Washington and the inability of. men to predict the reactions of other men makes complete answers to these questions impossibe; to- day. But some suggestive in- formation is available. No Communication With Bases was never pressed n: was in-he teas to tell it, -"By and large,l operative, as far -as we krinig, he hasn't! 'The pilot c' 's subsequent ac anything', they don't know ,"i tions, iesofar as they are la spokesnlan Said. known, are defended by Wash-1 What about the hypodernticj ington pfficials. Gem ge V. Al needle with deadly poison that! len, cifeector of the United the pilot carried? States Information Agency, de -I This, Washington authoritiesi fended ,.the pilot wipe li, saidindicated, Was Mtended to be en a televisicrii program:, ;used only in a last resort -1.43 When he went dowel: he told escape torture. But how the; exactly what his missian was pilot could have used it, once he and exectly what he was ex- was captured and searched, was pected 1;10, and he was under unekplained. instruction ' to do that - The pilot had no hard and! 014r?-? solutes in Washington Cast instructions to commit sui, mare oreleas verified the gist'cide to avoid capture, an au- tof't,Mr. 'Allen's statement. As thoritative spokesman declared. t the authorities explained it, if You tell a Japanese to do circumstances were such that it: maybe a Ruesianebut not an the pdot had to tell the truth. American," was one observation.; On the quesen io of, why the U-2 plane and its equipment Were not destroyed in the air, Washington has no answer. Contrary to published reports, the U-2's never communicated with their bases while over So- viet territetry, since to 'do so would r'eyeal their presence to the Ruseians. There Is official skepticism, bolstered by the visual evidence of what appear to be bullet holes in the wings of the U-2 on display in Moscow, that the plane was struck by a rocket' at a65,000-foot altitude. Offi- cals believe a "flame-out," or engine failure, coprimon in rare- fied altitudes, they have oc- curred and that the pilot may 'have been forced to descend to lower altitudes where the U-2 could easily have been brought down by interceptors or ground missiles. In any case, the "destruct" button, which would have blown up the plane in 'thee air after the pilot had escaped, either ? -- - Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 coNG.-i-z-LwAgyeALF pr, Release 2004/05/13M004-RD1MT00782R000100060001-7 Some Thoughts on the SAM, ? EXTENStON'OF REMARKS HOY:IMULDAF or PENNSYLVANIA ftpii OA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, May 18,1960 Mr. DAGUE. Mr."Speaker, like every patriotic American I 'am incensed over the treatment accorded our President at /,be now wrecked. Paris, Conf erence . and herewith set down my reactions;itioint by point, to the news reports ,Eifi they have rValed us by Press and rio.. . First Presidth Eisenhower 'under eAlitt the firmconns - 6 la-16: :;'31111 roder Dulles, steadfaOty isted the idea 01 summit /neap* Until he Was finally pressured fittiOtt by Macmillan., Second. inlet British are criticizing Ike not beeatigeltdAYSied on Russia but becaute-varmrt ...t it. rfirirti. - .1-11F,MrIlflptilatin, the Olym- plan:Oraele,;, Oitibizes Ike not he-Cause we got caught at, spying -but rather because he refused to lie 04out it Volarth.....De,bat,e.' oil our ``.right " to make reconnalsaiiinglits over -aril-Other (lotion is acadenild WI the light of the liussian space Vehicle presently passing over most of the CddfitrieS of the world every 90 minutes, phis the obvious fact that in a few short months we will have )n orbit observer satellites that, can col- lect all the inforritation, to be gleaned by a U-.2 plane and no one will be able to do a thing about it. Fifth, Mr. Khrushchey came to the summit with his own hands ied, with ltloody repression of free people and with ,i, record of infiltration and espiona,ge ,1T HT, matched by, any riatiiii in history. Irt spPairint of .aelritir surveillance, how ,.. Russian observer planes find their way over our Sixth Fleet in the Medi- 1-erranean without violating the air cor- -,,dors of other poWers? 1#11.1Lis_reilatnring to have con- tinned by most editorial writers my firm 1.:onviction that Mk. K. is not the unfet- tered dictator, somt.,-.believe him to be. The wily .RuSsi te evidently has been brought to -b by the military 22-td political hierarchy in back of him -2-nd told by them to baek away from the summit. Sevcrith. Khrushchev, in my opinion, 'never intended that anything- construc- tive toward peace should come out -of the Paris Conference. He lives on cen- . troversy and unrest and he weitild slib a peaceful world. The ne in- eident.gave him an easy. ElgAtILThe effect o lase? should ,be the enlia f the stature of RICHARDt next Presideutt.sliame-ket.haS 'alrea mon- Arated ,his -.-a.billtr,to slug it oiit with ';.hrusheheV That 'Dem- ocrat front uipp ither temperam ,Such .1, slugging con for former one ? con!.' back to...0k. to his lk 4 11S never for- get at ?e not, rea- sonable Men,. ,They: ehmpletely ruthless iii flae fulimeaning of that term. They are a4enable only to force and as a result it behooves _us to keep our de- fenseeintact and rOur bombers and Mis- siles on the alert.; And then as reason- able people let lit abandon tills fiction of international'bdiffity and let's forth- with sever diploinatip r,elatio.a.3 that we should ncYcg hae:4.b.tered into in the first instance: T n nd .as a final thought, it gra i y ng o see the alacrity with which the American people arre_iti!,y bacl- of their 'President, that ,crats t?,n6 Republicans have closed rani.s, 4_14, back of Ike then in opposition tcia 'dab- agog who in-.111ts our intelligfrice and casts aspersions on our integrity and na- tional honor. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 MAY 1 996O 1960 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? APPENDIX Comparison of area redevelopment bills A4273 Subject .., S. 722 as passed and vetoed H.R. 4878, original form H.R. 12290, H.R. 12291, and H.R. 12298 , I. Organization ,... Separate Area Redevelopment Ad- ministration. Department of Commerce Department of Commerce. 2. Division of redevelop/ilea areas Administrator to designate industrial Only industrial and public facility loans in areas of . Same; removed reference to rural. ''':? 3. Revolving fund loans and rural areas, 75 persistent and substantial unemployment. Note technical assistance can cover. Industrial $100,000,000 $100,000,000 $75,000,000. Rural $75,000,000 None None. Public facilities $$$J,00Q $25,000,000 $25,000,000; reference to machinery removed. 4. Federal participation in loans 65 percent-I... 331/4 percent class I areas, 50 percent class II areas, and 75 percent class III areas. 35 percent; area classifications removed. 5. Maximum loan period 40 years; 10 percen e contribution. 25 years; not less than 15 percent State contribu- tion. Same. O. Grants for public facilities $35,000,000 N.,...?.., $25,000,000; Federal participation 33J,a percent class II areas, 75 percent class III areas. None. 7. Retraining subsistence payments $10,000,000 000,000 $5,000,000. 8. Vocational training grants $1,500,000 Re y of Labor to determine needs; Secretary of Education, and Welfare to provide through facilities. Same. 9. Technical assistance $4,500,000 $3,000,000 $3,000,000. 10. Criteria of unemployment At least 6 percent at time of applica- tion and 12 percent for 12 months preceding, or 9 percent for 15 of 18 months preceding, or 6 percent for 18 of 24 months preceding. An average of 6 nt, excluding seasonal, throughout qualifyin 'od, and 50 percent above national average for 14 of 5 years pre- ceding in class I areas, or 75 pertentobove no- tional average for 3 out of 4 years preceding in class II areas, or 100 percent above national average for 2 out of 3 years preceding in class III areas. Same; area classifications removed. 11. Interest on loans Maximum permitted, 2 to 7 percent... To be determined by Secretary based on going rates. Same. 12. Cost $251,000,000 $158,000,000 $108,000,000. The Nation's Agriculture EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. ARCH A. MOORE, JR. OF WEST VIRGINIA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Thursday, May 19, 1960 Mr. MOORE. Mr. Speaker, there is Increasing evidence that this Nation's griculture is being more severely hit by politically inspired adverse publicity tout the farming business than by the reopgnized economic pressures which the present administration is striving to ease (xis of the Nation's leading farm mag- azines,, the Farm Journal, is currently conducting an admirable campaign of advertising promotion. The Farm Journal is attempting to put farm, economics into a reasonable perspective by refuting some of the dis- tortions. Taking note of this was the Charles- ton (W. Va.') Mail which treated the subject editorially in its issue of April 11. Under urlanimous consent I insert the editorial the RECORD: THE MYTHS OF /HE FARM PROBLEM DO A GREAT INJUSACE TO MOST FARMERS The farm situatton, as it is called, is bad enough as it is, bu't, it is not so bad as it is generally misrepresepted. So says Carroll P. Streeter, editor of tip Farm Journal in its current issue. Take, for exampl the myth that all farmers are living o a generous handout from the Government Livestock farmers, who account for more an all farm income, have never accepted GQvernment supports. And to clarify the pictu a little more, less than one-fourth of all akricultural produce gets so much as a cent f 1 cent of price supports. Well, then, what is all th talk about farm subsidies costing the Unit States billions of dollars every year? That gure, says Mr. Streeter, is the amount in tl Federal Gov- ernment set aside for all agri lture, includ- ing research and education, foc grading and inspection, soil conservation, nrket report- lng, and he Forestry Service. Of this total says Mr. treeter, "probably not more than one-half n be charged to farmers alone, and not al 31 that to subsidies." Twice in,-cent years 55 percent of the farmers polle by the Far& Journal have voted to elimi te subsidies entirely. Who, then, is responsi e for maintaining a system which most far s regard as both unfair and unsuccessful? "Three groups," says Mr. Streeter: "a substan al minority of farmers, politicians who come om subsidy crop area and?surprise--busine men in the wheat and cotton belts who s farm supplies, proc- ess the crop and mar t it. This is the combination which mak it so hard for the will of the majority to pre 1." There are other myths ich Mr. Streeter disposes of just as factuall but these are a fair sampling and enough to, ake his point: Sure there is a farm problem, but at its worst it does not arise with or seriously affect the great majority of American farm- ers. Most of them, with no subsidy from the Government, go right ahead making their maximum economic and social contribution to the Nation's welfare. rushchev's Behavior at the Summit Does Not Create the World Cleavage; It Only Makes It More Apparent to All?His 'Tirades Came From His Weak- nesses Which U-2 Flights Had Re- vealed EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. WALTER H. JUDD OF MINNESOTA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Thursday, May 19, 1960 Mr. JUDD. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I include the following article by ,We gazAnoal-Mowrer: SUMMIT FAILURE WAS VICTORY FOR WEST (By e PARIS.?Essentiam conference that died aborning was great victory for the particularly or Eir.J.111Meeor,, Ad- y fieVerZyfeMItted any knowledge of the fateful 17-2 wliose detec- tion by Moscowistliteff trouble. alitsince then the President, so irritable?Iii-small matters, has revealed statesmanlike dignity and patience that won him the e t ad- miratlnil and support of De Gaul e ab- infrfttiVag -Well as the Prefich peaple. iir `pieitIction that thanks to the downed plane, this conference would be concerned with situations and not with verbal cobwebs labeled relaxing tension. By torpedoing the conference, once he became sure that he would get no sub- stantial concesions on Berlin or any Ameri- can scalps, the Soviet boss in an excess of sustained vituperation and insult, simply created the stink behind which he backed out altogether. But with a bloody nese Mr. , ow knows ca.u.nalthej?) .1,49,1wojd or a Igate the .son` wont be lost at the next United Sta .? ws...5, Digit time he learned ?amnia conference after the American elec- tion?if there is such summit. For Khruwhchey's policy of political pres- sure through public tantrums reveals not strength but weakness. The best observers here are convinced that what, Wart Nikita mosgojpj1Teirwaas the shrieking relTItbn 9,.f goviet vuTheralpility. Ever since the firefIputfrIrteditethreets to destroy Paris and London by missiles, Nikita'has built up a legend of an invincible U.S.S.R. It could?according to the legend?crush any enemies while remaining impervious to their counterattacks. Such a story, endlessly re- peated, found credence throughout the world. People accepted Soviet claims, first of parity with, then of superiority over the United States. Such boasts were the basis for Soviet threats against Berlin. Then what happened? wnd American plane revealed that f niteffig iff4tTerrititte, the 17E.E.E7' conlerbe pene- trated and overflown at any spot away from chief centers. Not only could it be overflown but such flights had been undetected for 4 years. This meant that militarily the Iron Clatailas.a.s a irWh?tha Yaders uriraibTrifeteltie fullest possible list of all necessary Soviet targets in case they were compelled to reply to Soviet sneak at- tack. Far from being stronger than the United States,..tigKe,&.vsa,lur?sluce airplanes neerhfUrge-rwould more than cancel out Soviet superiority?if any?in hal- Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 A4274 CO RESSIONAL RECORD ? APPENDIX listic missiles. Moscow's ability to terrorize the world was henceforth severely limited. ,64,u,s,,,the..constematiOn of the So- vi t people, officially doped with illusion of suprtiOrity. It also explains why other Bol- sheviks, especially military, must have _be- come extremely critical of Nikita's manage- mmt of Soviet affairs. What else could DT kita do but bluster and threaten? _,J44.talLe mastfr spy and liar overplayed his hand. 'IT'S weakness was not lost upon America's allies. His threats and his intolerable attempt to humiliate Eisenhower created full allied unity. For if the West yielded to Khru- shchev on such points it would never again be able to resist his ultimatums. For the first time since he succeeded Stalin, the wily Mr. K. was caught in his own noose. Whatever politicians at home say about the failure of the "conference that never happened," officials here, both American and allied, agree that responsibility for failure rests upon Khrushchev. Rather than face a meeting where he could win nothing, he sought to mobilize public opinion against the United States and talk himself out of his embarrassment by insulting Eisenhower. The attempt has completely backfired. Even the eager British who arrived sure that the U.S.S.R. was ready for conciliation are now convinced that Russian Communists are enemies of both the West and real peace. In this sense the Paris summit has been a real success for the West. Medical Care for the Aged EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. THOMAS B. CURTIS OF MISSOURI IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, May 18, 1960 r. CURTIS of Missouri. Mr. Speak- er, ran across an article appearing in the ewspaper Labor, dated May 14, 1960:t eacllined "Says United States Lags in M ical Care." This article purports to q te our colleague Congressman Moss follows: The ited States is the only large indus- trialized ountry in the world where the Governm t does not, in some form or other, provide in ical care for most of its citizens. All Euro n countries, with the exception of Finland, perate some type of gover ment health and maternity program, most of the countries of the globe w ch have such p rams provide medica care benefits under ome sort of a social:nsur- ance program. I think this ticle lets the t out of the bag, just as ? 'lar state ents made by other propon ts of th orand bill call attention to at th people really have in their bag ers. Our society has est health pro- gram, and this incl s health care for the aged, of any, ciety in history. t/t/ These other syste ave the Govern- ment in some r other provide medical care f of its citizens. This results in system inferior health care for the itizens, as study of the health pro " ams of the other indus- trialized s cieties reveals. Shoul that not suggest these other societie that socialism is the wrong way to ac eve success in this area, even if it does not convince some of our own po- litical theorists? I must add a further statement to try to forestall what the Forand bill pro- ts usually fall back on to answer ritics. Their critics, they say, are tters and want no progress. This Any program, no matter how good it iy be, can be improved. There is plenty room for improvement in the health pr am our society has, even though it i the best program ever set up. Howeve to improve it and not damage it, must first understand what it its. The,Forand bill supporters Imply th at thek is no program even though the Feder Government today is spending over $12 illion a year on care for the aged. Let first lay the facts of our present prog m for health care out on the table, th?ebate the issue of how we can impro it. Is this such an illogical suggestion. The article follows: SAYS UNITED STATES LAGS MEDICAL CARE "The United States is the y large indus- trialized country in the world there the Gov- ernment does not, in some or other, provide medical care for most o ts citizens," Congressman JOHN E. Moss, mocrat, of California, noted last week. ..f!All European countries, with e excep- n of Finland, operate some t of gov- ment health arid maternity pro m," h said. "And most of the 59 countri of globe which -have such programs medical care benefits under some so f a social insurance program." Moss prednie that Congress thi also enact al insurance leg those over 65 years Of age. Descendants of Israel rmount Over whelmin dds EXTENSIO F REMARKS OF HON. CH ES C. DIGGS, JR. OF MICHIGAN IN THE USE OF REPRESENTATIVES hursday, May 19, 1960 Mr IGGS. Mr. Speaker, the 12th e sary of the rebirth of Israel, 2, recalls a saga of a suffering peo- as potent, fraught with drama as a ovie spectacular, and as intensely his- trionic as the journey of Moses and his followers to the Promised Land. Fiction writers would not dare the literary license of depicting the trials and tribulations of the wandering tribes of Israel. It is unbelievable to conceive the perpetuity of the dream of indepen- dence for Israel as it has coursed through generations of exiles without loss of one spark of its original fire. Descendants of Israel, surmounting overwhelming odds in pursuit of their dream of a homeland, have worked to build Jewish pride and world respect, and clung tenaciously to the idea of re- building a Jewish commonwealth in the face of international manifestations of anti-Semitism and Nazi cruelty. For 2,000 years the vision of a new Zion has spurred a decimated people, tottering under the yoke of bloodthirsty attacks, yet faithful to the vow that "their hands would lose their cunning and their tongues cleave to the roofs of their mouths" if they forgot Jerusalem. In the pilgrimage to Israel exiles came from 4 continents and 70 countries? singly, in single family groups, and in May .19 patriarchal clans; from behind the Iron Curtain; from behind store counters in the United States and Canada; from the remote Atlas Mountains and the bazaars of Casablanca; from the foggy grotes- querie of England and the parched des- erts of the east. They came to pool their skills, their knowledge, and their finances, to be the forerunners in the creation of a great country, culled out of barren, acrid land; the earth to be tilled and cajoled into verdancy with loving hands and willing, if not strong, backs. Exiles seeking the promise of this new frontier taxed the sparse,resources to the bursting point. Prime Minister -Gurion, on the 10th anniversary o e rebirth of Israel, commended the ws of the world for embodying the le ally of infant Israel, "when the ted Nations and all the nations of e world failed to come to Israel's " They sent money, and arms, d fighters, from 60 different coun es to suckle and nurture the nes g state. rael has met in 12 years every threat national security and integrity--com- munism, economic struggle, domestic strife, and the necessity for living within its narrow borders and absorbing all who wanted to come to Israel. The people of Israel and the Jews of the world have the right to flex their muscles with pride of accomplishment and tenacity of purpose. It is our hope that Israel in its struggle will serve as a criterion for African na- tions, now straining at the leash of colo- ialism and near to breaking the yoke of rvitude. n a century when man has mastered ?physical hospice, and his struggle is ted toward the human barriers of diee, hatred and poverty, igno- and intolerance, Israel represents stone to the United States from t may renew its standard of jus- rty, and the pursuit of happi- 11 its citizens. Po pre ran a to which tice, 11 ness for American inng Congress Convention EXTE ION OF REMARKS O HON.. IIN P. SAYLOR OF NNSYLVANIA IN THE HOUS ? F REPRESENTATIVES VVednes ,May 18, 1960 Mr. SAYLOR. r. Speaker, last week I had the honor accompanying the Secretary of Interi ? on a visit to a coal mine. At the inst ce of our mutual friend, Stephen F. unn, president of the National Coal A ()elation the Sec- retary's party toured the Thomas Portal area of Mathies Mine, *hich is operated by the Pittsburgh Coal Division of Con- solidation Coal Co. Other members of the group included Michael J. Widman, assistant to the president, United Mine Workers of America; Marling J. Ankeny, Director of the Bureau of Mines; Royce A. Hardy, Assistant Secretary of the In- terior; Consolidation Coal executives George A. Shoemaker, 'Walter F. Schul- ten, S. M. Cassidy, and D. L. McElroy; and G. Don Sullivan and Mr. Dunn, of National Coal. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00 1960 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SEN by this afternoon, he was as hard as Vyach- eslav M. Molotov and as vivid and vitupera.- ' *se as Andrei Y. Vishinsky. 4141011 The last time Mr. Khrushchev saw Paris he was the benign and jovial Mr. K. He made a special point then with President de Gaulle that their conversations should be held without anyone present except the in- terpreters. JOVIALITY IS PUT ASIDE This week all was changed. The jovial Mr. K became the arm-waving naughty Nik, and Marshal Malinovsky was there as a wit- ness of his every word and move, even when Mr. Khrushchev said goodby to President de Gaulle. None of this was missed by the press of the world or the diplomatic corps of Paris, and the inevitable reaction, was not only that the giants were quarreling?which al- ways terrifies the world?but that they were blundering in a most extraordinary way. This was particularly true of Mr. Khrush- chev after he got well into his new role. He overplayed every card he had. He was rude and primitive. He was not only a boor, but what is worse in Paris, he was a bore. And instead of splitting the allies, he even drove the press of London and Paris to the Presi- dent's support, which is not easy to do. There are the things that have spread the feeling of uneasiness about the leader- ship of the great powers. The two men who started out to reduce tensions ended up by increasing them here in Paris, and the ques- tion now is how far the present "dukes- up" attitude will go. About this, no one really knows, probably not even Mr. Khrushchev. For until he gets back to Moscow and reports to the 'Central Committee, there is no way of knowing what will happen to Berlin, or for that matter what will happen to Mr. Khrushchev. [From the Washington Post, May 19, 19601 IKE'S HOPES CRASHED WITH U-2 / (By It is apparent that a lot more than a for- mer Air Force officer and some photos of Soviet airplanes came down with that U-2 plane May 1 flying 1,300 miles inside Rus- sian borders. With it came down Ike's great- est ambition and, more important, man- kind's hopes for better understanding and eventual world peace. Also gone aglimmer- ing may be the Republican chances of elect- ing a President in November. Mr. Eisenhower's greatest ambition after 40 years as a military man was to go down in history as a builder of peace. This became more and more apparent to those who talked to the President weekly at his legislative conferences in Washington and to Republican Party leaders. One of them confided shortly before the summit conference here that it was difficult to get the President to concentrate on domestic problems any more. When the subjects of water pollution, education, and taxes were raised in conferences Ike would listen impa- tiently and then change the subject to for- eign aid or international problems. When THRUSTON MORTON, Republican na- tional chairman, tried to persuade Mr. Eisenhower to take Vice President NIXON to the summit, he urged that NIXON go from its start to the finish. Ike flatly refused, finally compromised that Nnrox come as a standby, all of which caused the frank GOP chairman to exclaim to friends: "This guy doesn't seem to know that we've got to win an election. All he's interested in is peace!" HOPES GO GLIMMERING All this of course has now gone glimmer- ing?both political hopes and personal peace hopes?gone with the flights of Pilot Francis Gary Powers over Russia. Regardless of the considerable fumbling of the Eisenhower administration there are two great things Ike has had as a salesman for peace. One is his background as a mili- tary man which made it possible for him to sell better relations with Russia to the iso- lationists and the GOP doubters as could few other American leaders. Second, Ike has had the smile, the per- sonality, the gestures that won millions of people to his support. The Spaniards have a word for this contagious charm: sympatico. Ike had it and used it effectively to win friends for the United States all over the world. Recently he confided to ace leaders that he planned two more trips abroad fol- lowing the scheduled, now canceled, trip through Russia before his term ended. He loved this type of international salesmanship and wanted to devote to it the rest of his months as President. However, big dreams are sometimes upset by small details. And bad administration shows also that no man can serve as Presi- dent of the United States on a part-time basis. LOOSE ADMINISTRATION For '7 years extremely efficient Press Secre- tary Jim Hagerty plus a sympathetic Ameri- can press have been glossing over the fact that President Eisenhower doesn't know what is going on in a large part of his administra- tion and that it is impossible for any man to be an effective President yet spend several days every week away relaxing at golf and almost every evening relaxing over a bridge table. Franklin Roosevelt spent almost every night until 1 a.m. in pyLvate study. Mr. Truman knew the intimailb details of gov- ernment as few others in his administration. On the eve of such an important conference as the summit here, with great hopes for permanent peace at stake, they would have required that all flights over the Soviet Union be,cleared with the White House. But the looseness of the Eisenhower adrninistra- tion permitted the left hand to do what the right hand knew not. The tragedy of this great anticlimax to President Eisenhower's fine work for peace is that we have been posing as moral leaders of the world and as custodian of honesty and righteousness. We have caught many Soviet spies, but catching spies doesn't absolve us from getting caught spying. And once we were caught, all the Madison Avenue tech- niques which had been so effective in selling Mr. Eisenhower in election campaigns seemed to evaporate. We have let the Russians outpropagandize us at every turn. Even here in Paris the Russians got the first headlines Monday by issuing their ultimatum before Hagerty, sup- posedly trained in the best newspaper and Madison Avenue techniques, could get his statement to the American press. THE DEPARTMENT OF MODERN A CLASSICAL LANGUAGES, UNIVER- SITY OF WYOMING Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I have in my hand a summation of the record of a very outstanding department of the University of Wyoming, the department of modern and classical languages. The dynamic head of this department a the university is Dr. A. J. Dickman. This summation records the partici- pation of the special students in the Ful- bright exchange program during recent years. Considering the relatively lim- ited numbers of students coming under Dr. Dickman's tutelage at the university, one is at once impressed by the high per- centage who have met the severe require- ments of the Fulbright program and who have represented both our University of 2R000100060001-7 TE 9897 Wyoming and the United States very ffectively overseas. r. President, I ask unanimous con- sent that the summation be printed in the RECORD at this point. There being no objection, the summa- tion was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: WYOMING FOREIGN LANGUAGE BULLETIN (Editor, Adolphe J. Dickman) (Published by the Department of Modern and Classical Languages, University of Wyo- ming, Laramie, Wyo., spring 1960) GOOD NEWS: FeULBRIGHT AWARDS OF LANGUAGE STUDENTS FOR 1960-61 The department of modern and classical languages is happy to announce that three of our students have been granted Fulbright scholarships for the year 1960-61. Miss Kay Kepler, from Laramie, Wyo., ma- jor in zoology and minor in French, will study at the University of Melbourne in Melbourne, Australia. Miss Katherine Ann Wells, from Kansas City, Mo., major in art and minor in Span- ish, will study at the Central University in Caracas, Venezuela. Miss Patricia O'Melia, from Rawlins, Wyo., major in French and minor in Spanish, will study at the University of Besancon, France. These students are proof that the Univer- sity of Wyoming graduates continue to re- ceive excellent preparation in their studies and are able to compete with the best in the country. We are listing below those University of Wyoming graduates who have received pre- vious Fulbright awards in foreign lands: Byrl D. Carey, Jr., University of Glasgow, Scotland, 1950-51. Michel Hoch, University of Paris, France, 1952-53. Beverly Rogers, University of Nancy. France, 1952-53. Elizabeth Beresford, University of Rennes. France, 1952-53. Virginia Evans, University of Bordeaux. France, 1953-54. Stanley Brooks, University of Rennes, France, 1954-55. Appointed recturer, 1955-56. Sally Jackson, University of Bordeaux, France, 1955-56. Robert J. Hall, University of London, Lon- don, England, 1955-56. Larry S. Slotta, Delft Technical University, Delft, Holland, 1956-57. Thomas L. Hanks, University of Paris, France, 1956-57. Robert ahoney, University of Oslo. Nor- way, 195 8. Don Ericksen, New South Wales Uni- vers of Technology, Sidney, Australia, 19 -58. ary Lee Herman, University of Durham, England, 1958-59. John B. Morgan, Delft Technical Univer- sity, Delft, Holland, 1958-59. Barbara Smith, University of Clermont- Ferrand, France, 1958-59. Appointed lecturer. University of Grenoble, France, 1959-60. Don M. Ricks, Bri:stol University, Bristol. England, 1959-60. Joan Anderson, University of Oslo, Norway, 1959-60. Robert Sullins, Ecole des Beaux-Arts, Paris. France, 1959-60. We should like also to mention that Dar- lene Huhtala, graduated in 1950, won a French Government award as as.sistante d'Anglais at the College de Jeunes Filles at Amiens, France, for 1951-52. Charles Sar- gent, Jr., graduated in 1958, received a Rotary scholarship for the year 1959-60 to study economics at the University of Lyons. France; his major was economics, his minor, French. Hjalma Person, graduated in 1958, won a Scandinavian seminar scholarship for 1959-60 to study in the Scandinavian coun- Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 9898 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE tries; her major was art, her minor, French. James Couch, who graduated in 1947, won a Mexican Government award for 2 years of stu at the National University of Mexico _ a r obtaining in 1948 his master of arts de- ee in Spanish at the University of Wyo- ing. HOW TO TUNE IN ON THE WORLD Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, the im- portance of an informed public opinion in all the countries of the free world is emphasized by the recent collapse of summit talks in Paris. In this process of getting the facts to the people of all the countries, including those behind the Iron Curtain, radio is an indispensable instrument. Nier.,twe radio partigu- larly makes possibrztercuritiriental --aarctiauJaigartioaat By this means there is an exchange between our people and those of the rest of the world on points of view, approaches to international problems and also their cultures and characters. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an article which emphasizes the importance of listening to worldwide shortwave broadcasts, en- titled "How To Tune in on the World," by Arthur Settel, which appeared in P s' me for 60. There being no o ec ion, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: How To TUNE IN ON THE WORLD (By Arthur Settel) If ? 'd like intelli ence "iralmslikihriiiWarjalemeolilernsrplaining those incomprehenifErreTheadlines from Laos and the Chinese-Indian border? If you enjoy live entertainment from such exotic spots as Nyasaland, Quito or Cairo, a ringside seat at a real-life drama of rescue at sea, a listening post in the war of nerves as the great powers hammer away at one another? All you need are: 17-2rirrivettro set. 2. The patience of Job. 3. The stamina to go without sleep in- definitely. 4. An ever-loving wife willing to go visiting alone, sleep alone, virtually live alone. 5. A soundproof den where you can fiddle with static-laden frequencies without bring- ing the house down on your head. These are the requirements of the bona fide shortwave radio listener who seriously undertakes to become an eavesdropper. You will not need: 1. Knowledge of any language except your own?English. 2. A skyscraping antenna built at stagger- ing cost on the roof of your home. 3. An initimate knowledge of electronics. The rewards for the conscientious listener to shortwave are varied. Whether it's tom- tom music from Ng'oma, hot jazz from Mos- cow, or the chimes of London's Big Ben? it's all for free, available in unlimited volume. There are analyses of political prob- lems from sources of every hue in the spec- trum; commentaries on architecture, reli- gion, rock 'n' roll; folksy chatter and banter- ing tidbits; anniversary celebrations, inter- views and book reviews--from every corner of the globe. You can eavesdrop on fatuous chit-chat among radio hams, ship-to-shore telephone calls, exchanges between com- mercial airline pilots and their control towers. Shortwave listening has been compared to photography: you get as much out of it as you put into it. You can buy a short- wave receiver for as little as $25 (RCA), or a shortwave transistor portable for as much as $275 (Zenith). Shortwave listening corn- bines the features of travel without motion, rubber-necking without fear of detection. But perhaps its greatest dividend is the power it gives you to ransack the world's most elaborate and expensive storehouse of ideas?elaborate because virtually every cul- Vine known to man is ceaselessly airing its views there days; expensive because sending shortwave--as opposed to receiving?costs a very pretty penny. The United States, for instance?one of the smaller spenders?has appropriated $22.3 million this year to operate the Voice of America 84 hours a day in all languages. The Soviet Union and its satellites are on the airwaves 387 hours a day in all lan- guages, at an estimated annual cost of $170 million. European, Latin American, African and Asian Governments have lower time and money budgets, but all consider short- wave broadcasts vitally important to their information, propaganda and communica- tions programs. So within the span of a single-evening's the folloWTh , your-SiTtintotrfor.V111 Asff ,prOgrafh- ing: German language lessons; a Bible les- son from the Andes; a biography of Nikita Khrushchev from Moscow; a discussion of country houses from London; yodeling from Switzerland; a talk on astrology from Ma- drid, and a police call from your own neigh- borhood. The most important listening usually comes after dark, when the air is suddenly shot through with verbal fireworks. The not-so-cold war warms up perceptibly as ords and ideas rather than bullets and ?ornbs fly crazily in the great artillery duel between East and West. With your dials twirling, you hear the most dramatic strug- gle in history for the minds of men. Although there are no nerve-rasping corn- mercials an international shortwave, there Is hardly a broadcast without a hard or soft sell behind it?sometimes shyly peeping out from under a thin veil of kultur. At other times, the propaganda is so obvious that it will send your blood pressure soar- ing. particularly madden . to 24 frequencies simultaneously, Radio Moscow can perform breathtaking acrobatics in its policy postures. Take, for instance, the case of RICHARD MXON. Until his visit last year to the Soviet Un- ion, where he officially opened the U.S. ex- hibition, the Vice President was among the top 10 on Moscow's hate parade, second only to J. Edgar Hoover in the number of times he was de:nounced for his views on Soviet expansionist aims and communism in gen- eral. But when it served the Kremlin's pur- pose, NIXON'S name was dropped from anti- American broadcasts, and his statements paying tribute to Russian industrial prog- ress and the people's desire for peace were freely quoted. For the time being, Nixon was no lo:nger included among the ruling circles bent on atomic war. The erstwhile "missile rattler" was now "well informed," "a believer in coexistence." But once he had returned home, NnioN: again?on Russian radio?resumed his role as provocateur, supporter of the policy of encirclement, and a member in good stand- ing Of the ruling circles driving America toward the, brink. Moscow Radio was back in form. While others thammaiiiiGhw tRigliminscow. for ins jO : May 1'9 the United States last September. Amer- ican shortwave listeners were told of the Soviet Union's peaceful intentions, but every broadcast included a clear threat that the Kremlin was ready to fight to have its way, and had the means to do so. And what did the programs beamed to Russia say? (This is an advantage of short- wave listening?not even the Kremlin can prevent eavesdropping.) "America is a rich, capitalist country," said a Captain Vasiliyev over Radio Volga early in September in a program intended for Russians. "But it is a paradise only for a small number of imperialist magnates. The billionaires use the money they make from sucking the blood of the workers for golden bathtubs, swimming pools filled with champagne, and carousing." Such statements were somewhat different frcim those Premier Khrushchev was deliver- ing in New York, Washington, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Detroit. What are the short-wave broadcasts- -most of them government-sponsored?trying to sell us that we don't already have? The Rus- sians, the Red Chinese, the Czechs, the Ru- manians are all, of course, trying to sell us communism. But what about the naughty songs coming to us over the airwaves from Paris; the opera from Rome; the symphonies from West Germany; the folk songs from Mexico; the travel talks from Montreal? Chiefly, they are designed to acquaint lis- teners with the broadcasting country; per- haps entice us ,to go there one day and spend a vacation?and some dollars. With all this mass persuasion going on, language is no clue to the identity of the country whose broadcast you're hearing. A Russian-language newscast is usually the Voice of America trying to catch some ears in the Soviet Union. Polish-language broad- casts come from London, Greek-language broadcasts from Warsaw, discussions in Turkish from Bucharest in Rumania. Radio National de Espafia in Madrid broad- casts in Chinese; Radio Luxembourg in Hungarian. Radiotelevision Italiana trans- mita in 24 European languages, plus Hindi, Urdu, Bengali, and Esperanto. The Vatican City Radio?perhaps most logically of all? programs in Latin. Radio Cairo broadcasts in Hebrew to Israel, although the Egyptian Government, which owns the station, doesn't are officially recognize Israel's existence. onsvp,??, But you can't twirl the dial without bumping into a program that is perfectly understandable to you, because nearly every country in the shortwave business broad- casts part of the time in English. se heard about it secondhand, V toured .""*.ss,,ssiosswaisasoso,simas,:ssusdititsweSsigskteeler4alet So, if the corny comedy and the contrived drama of domestic television begins to pall, if you become weary of giant, economy-size, commercial commercials?get a shortwave radio set. You'll find uncontrived drama, unconscious comedy, and a wide, wide world ready to entertain you, confound you, or invite you to visit lovely Tanganyika and r exotic Singapore. A GARDEN Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, why do people put a geranium, or a lily, in the window instead of a book, or a p tograph, or an article of cloth- ing? do people plant morning glories an c bushes and rose bushes In their meat yards? Why do men who have ach d a degree of inde- pendence and a c etence buy a place in the country? is there about the country which draw e majority of mankind like a magnet, n if all their ys have been spent in roar and t and smoke of a great c Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/05/13: CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 MAY 7 97960 1960 CONGRSc?rAL RECORD ? APPENDIX Nobody can be sure in any industry that a competitive fight will be won. But you can be pretty certain that no industry will win the fight for world markets hiding be- hind a domestic barricade. emorandum Decision?Khrushchev Versus Powers EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HilkLiklausomf-famita. OF WASHINGTON IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, May 18, 1960 Mr. PELLY. Mr. Speaker, last night as I watched television and listened to the irresponsible and unstable ravings of the egomaniac, Khrushchev, during his unbelievable press conference in Paris, I was carried back 20 years into the past to the height of Adolph Hitler's bid for world domination. Only the physical appearance of the two speakers was different. I witnessed the same hysterical and vitriolic name calling and saber rattling and I said to myself, Here again the peace of the world and the very future of mankind is at the mercy of a phycho- pathic dictator. 144epeatecl references to the flight as a spy mission and his an- nounced intention of trying its coura- geous pilot, likwitring4,Rwer?-,KIA_sPy prompts me to iiitrude-with my remarks the following ledik944kignisigLIAMPAAILUY Judge Raymond Royal of the Swerior Colfittate orWaShIngton. -Judge 'Royal is one of the most highly regarded jurists in my State and is an authority on international law. He tells me that this memorandum decision is a joint effort of the entire class of inter- national law which he teaches at the Naval Reserve Officers School at Sand Point Naval Air Station in Seattle, Wash.: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF WORLD OPINION FOR KING COUNTY--KH USIICHEV V. PO'- ERS-144.1=141,410 bk y 13, RdirflOy-al, judge: "The headline writers and the columnists, together with the man on the street, seem to assume without equivocation or question that we were caught redhanded in acts which make us guilty of the crime of spying. The small voices of the wife and the father of the pilot who flew the plane cry out that 'our husband and son is not guilty of being a spy.' Has no one thought to look up the law and to see what is the law with regard to snying? "As a lawyer and judge trained and ex- perienced in the common law approach, and also as a student and teacher of interna- tional law, I have researched this question. My ultimate conclusions follow in a form typical of a trial judge's informal memo- randum decision." It is contended by the Russian Com- munists that the free independent and sovereign people of the United States have committed the offense of spying and have also broken international law because one of its citizens flew in the stratosphere above the surface of the sovereign nation without the consent of its government. Let us take a look at what the law of nations says about espionage and about the law of territory. There is no simple clear-cut document codifying international law such as one would find with reference to the ordinances of a city or ? the statutes of a State. Inter- national law arises out of custom and usage over a long period of time or by mutual agreement and consent, and has been defined In various ways by the legal scholars throughout the ages. Among the definitions which have been generally and widely ac- cepted iy the persons dealing with interna- tional law is that of Sir Henry Maine: "The law of nations is a complex system, composed of various ingredients. It con- sists of general principles of right and jus- tice, equally suited to the conduct of in- dividuals in a state of natural equity, and to the relations and conduct of nations; of a collection of usages, customs and opinions, the growth of civilization and commerce; and a code of positive law" (International Law, 1883, p. 33). Another is Black's definition of the term, as follows: "International law. The law which regu- lates the intercourse of nations; the law of nations. The customary law which deter- mines the rights and regulates the inter- course of independent states in peace and war. "The system of rules and principles, founded on treaty, custom, precedent, and the consensus of opinion as to justice and moral obligation, which civilized nations recognize as binding upon them in their mu- tual dealings and relations."' As a corollary to the definition itself, Commander Brittin, in his book "Inter- national Law for Seagoing Officers," at page 48, makes this statement with regard to the process of international law: "As is so often the case in the develop- ment of international law, the insistence of so many nations upon a Similar right and their vigorous Measures to enforce the claimed right evolve into a rule of customary international law." There are many authorities who have commented upon the rule of law among the nations with regard to spying. There has been a general agreement and concurrence among the family of nations and the schol- ars in this field that The Hague regulations of 1899 expresses the customary law in this regard. The essence of article 29 which deals with this subject is that spying consists in acting "clandestinely or on false pretenses", having the objective of obtaining informa- tion in the zone of operations of a belliger- ent, and of communicating it to the enemy. It is a further part of this customary law that soldiers not in disguise, properly known as "scouts", might penetrate the enemy lines to obtain information without being con- sidered spies. Dispatch bearers, whether soldiers or civilians, have not been consid- ered spies if they carried out their missions openly. The occupants of balloons who might find themselves over enemy territory for the purpose of delivering dispatches or maintaining communications came within the same class. Where is the cloak and dagger? The clear undisputed facts are outside the definition of a spy. It is clear that the wife and father Of this American pilot are correct when they contend that Pilot Powers has not engaged in the crime of being a spy. The evaluation of whether or not we have offended the territorial rights of a nation is more complex. We cannot dismiss this lat- ter charge by simply citing the definition. The rule of law regarding the extraterri- torial rights of nations is far more complex and currently in a state of flux. There Is no clear-cut agreement among the experts as to where it is or where it is finally going to develop. A4315'\. There had been a general concurrence among the nations that the air space above a nation's territory is subject to the exclusive sovereignty of that nation. This general and uniform insistence upon such a right by the various nations, of course, was in light of the facts with regard to the use of the air in existence at the tme of the general concurrence. It also took into account the hard, cold, practical fact of international life that the nation over which the airspace lies had an effective method of controlling those who might desire to use that airspace. The antiaircraft defenses generally had been able to give some substantial enforcement in that the range of aircraft did not exceed the range of antiaircraft defense. Undoubtedly this contributed to fixing of the rule just as the 3-mile rule of territorial extension into the high seas grew out of the range of a cannon ball. Prior to the 3-mile rule evolv- ing, many nations asserted sovereign rights offshore without limit. Due to lack of agree- ment or uniform acquiescence by custom and usage, these claims ultimately failed. However, in the past few years the space above a nation's territory has been invaded by manmade objects at a far greater alti- tude than can be controlled by the nations whose territory is under the particular air- space. We know today that there is a con- currence among the nations of the world that nations have the right to put satellites into space. Various nations have done so, thereby asserting their rights in that regard. There has been no voice raised against the assertion of this right. While this use of outer space cannot be said to be a custom of long standing, it nevertheless has all the ear- marks of a custom except antiquity. The law with regard to extension of ter- ritorial sovereign rights into airspace must be limited to the actual use and ability to control which existed at the time the custo- mary rule evolved. This generally follows the practice emnloyed in the development of the extension of territorial rights which in- fringe upon the freedom of the seas. The nations of the world for a number of years have been whittling away at the long- established customary 3-mile rule to the point now where the rule is regarded as un- certain. But this does not mean that none of the seas are free and open. Similarly at some height above a nation's territory, the exclusive territorial sovereign right over space ends. The fact that the nations have not agreed as to where it ends does not mean that the rule of law is that the nations be- low have the right to airspace ad infinitum. Nor do they have it above that which they can control and is currently used by all na- tions. Even though there exists no concurrence as to the boundary between free airspace and territorial airspace, there in fact is a portion which is free and open to all. It is clear that the altitude at which this ..Amer- !can plane was flying was above that which was current practice when custom and usage established the present rule of the sov- ereignty of airspace. It is also clear that the altitude at which this. plane was flying was above the practical ability of every nation to effect significant control. Therefore, be- cause of the vacuum of positive law pro- hibiting the flying at this altitude, the free- dom of the airspace applies to the altitude at which this plane was being flown before it was either forced to seek a lower level by reason of either being shot down or suffer- ing mechanical difficulty. The United States and the pilot of this plane were no more violating a rule of international law than do the Russian submarines when they lie outside of the 3-mile limit of the coast of continental United States and engage in peacetime reconnaissance and scouting. We had the right to use the freedom of the air- space above that which was fixed by positive Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 /4316 custom and usage in international law just as we have the right to exercise freedom of the seas. The general concurrence about the use and projection of satellites clearly indi- cates that there is a limit to this doctrine of absolute sovereignty of the space above the territory. Where that limit lies we do not know, but we can safely say that it is some- where lower than the elevation at which this plane was flying. The legal ceiling to the airspace subject to territorial control was fixed by (1) the then current usage and (2) ability to control the occupancy of airspace. There is another area in which the rules of international law relative to airspace rapidly are being modified. Even within the recognized territorial sovereignty control upon airspace, virtually all of the major nations of the world involved in air travel have by treaty agreed to a limit. There ex- ists by treaty among these major nations the privilege of flying across territory of the country without landing. There also is the privilege of landing for nontraffic purposes. The International Air Service Transit Agree- ment arising out of the 1944 Chicago con- ference so provides. While this cannot be considered a rule of law it does give evidence of a substantial and growing dissatisfaction with the rule. It is such dissatisfaction and resultant treaties which give rise to new customary law and define areas of uncertainties in the old. In summary, it is clear that the flight of the 11-2 single-engine jet piloted by Francis Powers was not spying. The undisputed facts cry out against bringing the case within the definition of a spy as customarily fixed by International law. There was no illegal invasion of the cus- tomary sovereign territorial rights because the territorial airspace could only be estab- lished by c,ustom and usage under interna- tional law: 1. The scheduled operating altitude was above the air customarily used. 2. The scheduled operating altitude was beyond the ability of the sovereign territory to effect any semblance of control. 3. The rule relating to exclusive sovereign territorial rights of airspace related only to the airspace to which a continued used could establish a custom, and of necessity this customary rule of law had to fix the exclu- sive airspace at an altitude below that in- tended to be maintained by this plane. SSIONAL RECORD ? APPENDIX This is indeed a dangerous period in the history of our country and the world and every precaution should be taken to see that we are prepared for all eventual- ities. No appeasement, please?ap- peasement wherever and whenever prac- ticed holds for the world only a catastro- phic nightmare. Under leave to extend my remarks, I include an editorial from the New York Daily News of May 19, 1960, which gives a good summation of tke situation: IF KIIRUSHCHEV WANT IT THAT WAY For reasons best known o himself, N. S. Khrushchev this week re wed the East- West cold war by torpedoin the Paris sum- mit conference which had be set up chiefly because Khrushchev had insi ed on it. Speculation as to why he ecked the parley is interesting but not ? erly useful, it seems to us. What matters in this ugly situa on is that the cold war is on again at full last, and that Khrushchev wants It that ay. Since that is the Red czar's h, the Western Allies can choose one of two urses. They can knuckle under to this ant, beg him for another summit, han him some more concessions, and thereby ush communism a long way toward the id conquest which the Communists never h ve ceased to intend. Or the West can stand up to Khrushch as it did at Paris this week, go on calling h bluffs, and defy him to do his worst. Sue a position, of course, calls for intensified Western preparation to fight in case Khru- shchev, by accident or design, triggers a war. Judging from the disgust and indignation Khrushchev's wrecking of the summit has kicked up all over the free world, the West? except perhaps for a few weak-kneed neutral nations--will accept Khrushchev's challenge and take up the cold war with renewed vigor and determination. Khrushchev's obvious effort to divide Americans has flopped on its face, at least for the time being. Yesterday four leading Democrats cabled to President Eisenhower in Paris a message for the Red Czar, snubbing his demand that the summit conference be pc? tponed until after our 1960 Presidential ction. The four were Adlal Stevenson, Senators Lyndon B. Johnson, of Texas, and J. Wil- liam Fulbright, of Arkansas, and House Speaker Sam Rayburn, of Texas. PATRIOTIC CABLEGRAM These gentlemen thus made it clear that U.S. political differences, as always, stop at our shorelines whenever we are threatened by outsiders. We think they deserve na- tionwide applause for a patriotic and realistic gesture. As for various smaller-minded Democrats who hope to make political capital by a Congressional investigation of the spy-plane incident, we think Vice President RICHARD M. NIXON answered them adequately at a news conference yesterday in Syracuse, N.Y. Go ahead and investigate, NIXON told these politicos in effect?if they think Eisenhower should have yielded to Khrushchev's insult- ing demand for an apology for the spy- plane affair, and if they think the admin- istration should have left a gap in our in- telligence operations. We'll be interested in hearing what these would-be investigators have to answer to that NIXON challenge. Now that the cold war is on again, let's make our next move at Geneva by pulling out of the long palaver with the Russians about stopping nuclear weapon tests. Khrushchev is 'willing to keep this con- ference going?arid for an obvious reason. He hopes to stop our nuclear weapon de- velopment while his goes right on, and ICKhrushchev Wants It That Way EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. ALBERT H. BOSCH OF NEW YORK IN ? HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Tuesday, May 17, 1960 Mr. B SCH. Mr. Speaker, the spec- tacle in is this migek put on by Nikita Khrushch has "appalled all self- respecting ericans. I think that any- one who had ? rffidence in the good faith of this man as now seen his true colors?people o good faith cannot deal with him. The United Stat ust be ever vigilant so that another P rl Harbor cannot happen. We must re ember that at the very moment of Pear arbor negotia- tions were allegedly ng on in this country supposedly to ? out the dif- ferences between Japan and the United States?negotiations are no assurance against aggression. May 19 eventually to trick the West into scrapping all its nuclear arms under an agreement containing no safeguards against Red cheat- ing. We've been suckered at Geneva these 18 months. That's 18 months too long. Now that Khrushchev has renewed the cold war, we should call off this particular sucker operation of his as fast as we can get our Geneva representatives back home. What with jet planes cruising at just under 600 miles per hour, that can be a fast pull-out indeed. Central American Economic Integration EXTENSION OF REMARKS Or HON. CHESTER E. MERROW OF NEW HAMPSHIRE IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, May 18, 1960 Mr. MERROW. Mr. Speaker, as a member of the Subcommittee on Inter- American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and as one who feels that Central American peace and secu- rity is a crucial link in the chain of an effective inter-American system, I have for some time followed developments in that area with great interest. The movement toward Central Amer- can economic integration, which is tak- ng place under the leadership of Gua- mala's courageous and forward-looking esident, Gen. Miguel Ydigora,s Fuen- , is most encouraging and worthy of o support. The recent consolidation of ti-Communist forces in that coun- try as strengthened free forces not only in s atemala but in the other Central Arne an countries as well at a critical time Latin American history. Ano er great and enlightened Latin Americ leader is Dr. Ramon Villeda Morales President of Honduras. Dr. Villeda p viously served as his country's Ambassad to the United States, dur- ing which signment he gained many friends in t United States. As Presi- dent of Hon as, he is working hard for his people. Much progress has been made, but muc emains to be done. The progress d problems of Hon- duras are describ in the following ar- ticle by Virginia well entitled "Hon- duras New Regim rogresses," which appeared in the Ap 11, 1960, issue of the Washington Dail News: A young democracy no getting underway in Honduras is a hemisph c bright spot. In a little over 2 years, a rd-working con- stitutional regime there h cleared away a great deal of the underbrus that has hin- dered national growth for g erations, and has taken concrete steps aid Central American economic union. Honduras is a mountainous aauritry that lives by exporting tropical prolcts grown on narrow coastal plains. The size of Pennsylvania, it has.about 127 million inhabitants, mostly of mixed Span- ish and Indian descent. In the decade 1947- 57, Honduras made the stormy passage from dictatorship to constitutional government. President Ramon Villeda Morales, the Hon- duran physician who took office in late 1957 with moderate liberal backing, had to start building from the constitution up. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 'MAY 2 3 1960 1960 CONySIONAL RECORD APPENDIX ganization and ours are interested in a com as the basis for sober reflection for ev- mon cause." Jesse Clark, president, Brotherhood of Railway Signalmen of America: "You may be assured that we are in full sympathy with the Eagles in your actions regarding the practice of many employers in invoking job discriminations against men and women over 40 years of age." Ray Ross, president, Ohio CIO Council: "We are very much interested and highly elated that the Fraternal Order of Eagles is turning its attention toward eliminating job discrimination in the hiring of men and women over 40." T. C. Carroll, president, Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees: "You are -to be complimented on this endeavor?an all-out Eagle campaign to enact State and Federal legislation barring discrimination against men and women over 40 years of age. We will be glad to cooperate in any way we can to make the campaign a success." Mitchell Sviricioff, president, Connecticut State Labor Council: "It is most gratifying to learn of the Eagle concern with the prob- lem of discrimination in hiring against men and women over 40. Our State organization will cooperate with your local chapters with respect to this program." Ed S. Miller, president, Hotel and Restau- rant Employees and Bartenders International Union: "I am familiar with the long history of support on the part of the Eagles for social security. The order Is certainly to be congratulated for its present campaign on behalf of workers over 40." Statement of the Honorable James F. Byrnes on Summit Conference EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. STROM THURMOND OF SOUTH CAROLINA IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES Monday, May 23, 1960 Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, on one?Orilirinost outstanding 6outn Carolinians of all times, the Hon- orable Jaw?p&Z?..4,1"kgsr, delivered an address Wore the annual South Caro- lina Medical Association Convention at Myrtle Beach, S.C. Governor Byrnes' record of exemplary public service is proudly remembered, not only by South Carolinians, but by Americans every- where. His dedicated service to our Na- tion includes top positions in all three branches of our Federal Government and to his beloved State. With his background in every branch of our National Government and in the position as chief executive of his beloved State of South Carolina, the observations of Governor Byrnes command the atten- tion of all Americans. In his role as Secretary of State, James Byrnes' con- tributions to the cause of peace will al- ways be remembered by grateful Amer- icans. He has had great opportunity to observe the sincerity of the Russians as to their alleged desire to effectuate a genuine and lasting peace. He is, there- fore, well qualified to speak on the sub- ject which he chose as the text of his speech to the convention to which I have previously referred. His comments on t reeent disastrous summit conference should beirea-Oralicrefititt serv-e eryone who desires a lasting peace with honor and dignity. I ask unanimous consent that this speech be printed in the Appendix of the RECORD. There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: [From the State, May 20, 1960] TEXT OF BYRNES SPEECH BEFORE MEDICAL ?irgrginivro toylor 11 (Following is the text of an addre s which Gov. James F. Byrnes, formerly Secretary of State, Supreme Court Justice, and Assistant President during World War II delivered be- fore the South Carolina Medical Association convention at Myrtle Beach Thursday night.) Nikita Khrushchev sabotaKed the summit nrcerii -d-oTirr a ar o millions of people who are more interested ha having war tensions lessened than any other question. For 5 years Khrushchev expressed the de- sire for a summit meeting. The President doubled his sincerity and showed little in- terest. About 2 years ago the British Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, became an en- thusiastic advocate of a meeting at the sum- mit to lessen tensions, and other European allies expressed the hope we would agree. Because we have bases within the territory of our European allies and they are on the firing line, we finally agreed to go along with them. My personal opinion was that even though we had little hope that any good would be accomplished, we should confer. We could not refuse even to talk with the Soviets and it would do no harm provided we stood firm and realized that they would not keep their promises and provided we main- tained and increased our military defenses. Khrushchev after his visit to this coun- try stopped jamming our radio broadcasts to Russia in the Russian language, and gave other evidence of a conciliatory attitude to- ward the Western powers. But a few months ago there was a change of attitude. Khru- shchev for the first time in many months repeated his threat that if the Western Pow- ers adhered to their position of not with- drawing from West Berlin, the Soviets would make a separate treaty with East Germany and would insist upon the withdrawal of our troops. He threatened that if we failed to with- draw, war would follow. We cannot be sure of what caused this change of attitude. We do know in a general way, that Red China was bringing pressure upon Khrushchev fearing he had become too friendly with the West. There was evidence of unrest among his people and also evidence of some dissension in the Soviet high command. The recent removal of several men holding im- portant positions in the Government, gave proof of this. Then Khrushchev learned that recently there had been complete agreement among the United States, Great Britain, France, and West Germany, that there would be no modi- fication of our position as to West Berlin. In view of his continued threats, this una- nimity of the West as to Berlin posed a seri- ous problem for him. He did not know how to retreat gracefully, and was not prepared for the consequences of carrying out his threat. He saw little evidence of accom- plishing anything at the summit and feared that if the President made his promised visit to Russia and in his sincere and earnest manner assured the Russian people that we want only to live in peace, they might be convinced and that might cause trouble for Mr. Khrushchev. 11.'pitu ? cjy_fpx.1.1g,_tke r9wers Incident oc-6.?irred-Tust at this time, and rtjaire"thltr= A4329 shchev n se to sabotage the summit meeting. aving thousands oegigro world, was cainly not the reason for his aTtkin. It was only his excuse. If Mr. Khrushchev did not intend to con- fer with the Western leaders unless the United States apologized for the Powers mis- sion, why did he go to Paris? He was the first to arrive in Paris. He asked to call on President deGaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan. He deliberately refrained from asking to see President Eisen- hower. For propaganda purposes, he wished in a formal meeting to demand a formal apology from the United States. He knew full well? or he should have known?he would receive no apology, but decided it would give him an excuse to blast the meeting. If, to his surprise, the President should have apolo- gized, then Khrushchev would have made no agreement as to West Berlin or disarma- ment, but would return to Moscow with the prestige of having humiliated the United States. In his mind and heart there is no gratitude for the $11 billion loaned them during the last war and they have not repaid. There is only the hatred born of the knowledge that our economic and military strength prevents them from dominating the world. Because the worl of ?.Ze.,r?y- ice necessarirrh-Faria ee inad---Ciiiibfic, it fs''TirtersTaldaVg were dnaw? of our spying, and it accounts for some of the criticisms of our Government. How- ever,v- )L_Lkeeam.1,1sect tlie_c_aticisrp toe or o "es.ntir-dff know for what purpose he was appropriating vast sums of money for intelligence he could have learned by makin: in uir of 7n?crarrinaii?Or tile Ap o.rat.n. m.i s. _ few days after Khrushchev announced the capture of Powers, when some petty partisans criticized the President for per- mitting a plane to fly over Soviet territory without the knowledge or authority of Con- gress, congsessmary 11,43.nicgai .091,jagg.0.7 a Democrat-,'End chairman of the Ho-use--- Ap- propriations Committee, told the House that Allen Dulles, direc...r tuv g_eatrig nitoii- delitrA!ency, haeptillazzozez,,,tompri- a 0-0114,,te ?tilliiitttaci of the spy pro- gram. e sairthalliferttin met with the approval of both Democrats and Republi- cans on the committee, who a imes h plolyleiLkadies to make to- sec.'n .ritta on nit a tions in the Soviet Republic. He said they knew of the reconnaisance missions of the IT-2 planes over Soviet territory and felt the information obtained would be effective in deterring the Soviets from making a sur- prise attack against the United States or its allies in Europe. The House gave him a hearty ovation. His statement was candid and courageous, but CLARENCE CAN- NON always places the welfare of his country above political partisanship. Unfortunately, all politicians are not like Congressman CANNON. Some think only of the coming election. They say we must do some spying and the reconnaisance program is justified by the secrecy of the Soviets, but the timing was bad. The only thing wrong about the Powers mission was that Powers was caught. Fo 4 years we have sent similar planes ove Soviet territory. If 'Powers had not been. caught, there would now be no criticism of- the timing. It was just our misfortune that he should have been caught. That was bad timing. We have had only limited experience in spying, but during World War II we came to realize the extent to which governments engaged in spying and we resorted to it our- selves. Donovan7476---iiiia inchW="1.ce-of Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 4330 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? APPENDIX May 2, Strategic Sefselwe to a re.xecmik VirSaliallIfekk: chiefThf police of Shi1. It was an amazing show. It was referred to as the "Cloak and Dagger" service. Men volunteered for the work, not for -the compensation, but for love of country, and sometimes for love of adven- ture. Later when President Roosevelt advised me of our eitorti?frZe-Wfi3P1ie atomic bomb, he told me that Germany was engaged in a similar effort and isys_lWall- ence service we Were ens7Ta ugon"the'aernian project al=aliTtor- m ?ess. They had? started first. The race was close, and our fear was that if Germany won the race, we would lose the war. Now it is difficult to recall conditions existing at the close of the war. Most of us thought the peoples of the world would be so weary of war that no government would take steps calculated to bring about an- other world conflict and we could look for- ward to a half century of peace. Three months after the surrender of Japan we joined Great Britain and Canada in an- nouncing to the world that we would volun- tarily surrender the military advantage of our exclusive possession of the "know-how" to produce atomic weapons. We agreed to ask that the United Nations establish an International Commission having the power to see that the atomic bombs in existence were destroyed; that all nations renounced the right to produce bombs and that atomic energy should be used solely for peaceful purposes under the supervision of the Inter- national Commission. At the meeting of the Foreign Ministers In Moscow, in December 1945, I introduced a resolution asking for the appointment of such a Commission and providing that the use of atomic energy should be subject to inspection by the International Commis- sion, with safeguards to guarantee there would be no violation by any government. The Sovi&s agreed to this resolution. The Commission was appointed but when it met a few months later, the Soviet objected to the provision for international inspection. .Breamea jjekernber 1949 whea_illea_had agreed to the resolialter -ea t& meeting of the Commission in_ early 194q, Soviet ambi- tions had changed. ?77hange probably was due to informationsalned t117.ii their spies in. thgrriVMSTe'tes a.-i7FaT1SiTarn, siMEnrolITaliseilrihMlo firdruce -atomic bombs. They decided international inspec- tion would interfere with their policy of secrecy. Early in 1946 several Soviet spies' were ar- res. "TromIliallifrie country and in Britain, there have been thousands of Soviet spies. We do not forget Judith Cp?nlos, who was tried for spying, nor Klaus Fuchs, who was sentenced to prison for .6757 atomic secrets to Russia, and is now in East Germany, after being re- leased from prison. Later Harry Ueld was arrested as a Soviet spy. In June 1950 David Greenalass confessed to giving certain mili- tary secrets to Russia. porrtssorees secured atomic secrets from the British and then disappeared behind the Iron Curtain. So did Burgess and Maclean. The Soviet spies, Julius and Ethel taseilikerg, were sentenced to death for spying in the United States. Several employees of the Soviet Embassy in Washington who were found to be spies, were forced to leave this country. Another Soviet spy, Col. Rudolph_Abewas sentenced to 30 years for espionagrThnly a few weeks ago that sentence was upheld by the U.S. Su- preme Court. All Soviet spying was not done in the long ago. t a few weeks ago aSoviet trawler was off the bOasriSrli CeoneCtiait-earfreon the experimental tests of a new submarine. And on the very day Khrushchev was criti- cizing the 'United States about the Powers case, two Russian officials were expelled from Switzerland for ,.spying on. Swiss activities andirelr"tter- snal* SOVIET TI-IREATS Stalin first, and later Krushchev, have continuously threatened to make war upon the United States, while erecting an iron curtain around the Soviet Republic and her satellites. They have made progress in the development of new weapons of war and have succeeded in keeping secret, detailed knowl- edge of those weapons. With their secret weapons and bellicose threats, they menace the peace of the world. In spying, the Soviets have an advantage. They do not have to spend much time or money spying on the United States. Ti eir en xligig,gon?s.an learn from o cia aps the location of our military installa- tions and from the daily press can read even the confidential statements made to congres- sional committees. Because of Soviet secrecy, President Eisen- hower at Geneva in 1055, pleaded for what was called an "open Ins" agreement. He offered to grant Teaftission for Russian planes to fly over the United States, taking pictures wherever they wished, if the Soviets would grant the same privilege to the United States. The Soviets refused and have con- tinued to refuse. In the light of this his- tory, what is the duty of our Government to its people? Should we sit idly by and await a surprise attack that would destroy our lives and our freedom? We can never forget Deco,'. 41, when this Japanese by a i ? . ack de- stroyed our fleet at Pearl ? ? .r an. used the death of hundreds of American boys. Thereafter we succeeded in breaking the Japanese code and by intercepting naval messages, were able to destroy most of the Japanese fleet. It was retaliation for that surprise attack. Nor can we forget the !prjae attack,in Koran ireeted by the Soltts, which caused e death of thousands of Americans. We know that if the Soviets ever carry out their threats to make war on us, they will do it by surprise. There was a time when by ordinary espr- onage, a government could learn of the mo- bilization of an army in the territory of a government threatening war. But in this day of atomic weapons, missiles and rockets, the situation is different. A missile fired from Soviet territory, in less than 30 min- utes, can hit a target in the United States and utterly destroy that target and the in- habitants of the area. The only thing that deters the Soviets is the fear of immediate and massive retaliation. To retaliate successfully, we not only must have bases in Europe, but we must know the location of Soviet military installations. We cannot wait until a missile has devastated a great area and then make a reconnais- sance to locate military installations. That would be too late. Because tlls9uJ.in- tern e ce_essWat for Jwyears as een send- g unarmed pTanes over 46oviet territory, solely for the purpose of securing informa- tion. Regardless of the information we secure, the Soviets are in no danger of attack from us. But Khrushchev now howls with rage because he learns that in his Iron Curtain there is some glass, and 65,000 feet in the air a pilot has taken pictures which he believes has lessened the secrecy with which he has surrounded the Soviet Republic. a.r.11,21ici1ev makes...act also y for sending to1ii taed-e-oun s S viet Lpies. But in Paris he dema e e Plesident apologize and promise to punish those re- sponsible for the Powers mission. That would include the Republican President and the Democratic congressional leaders, who provided the money, knowing how it was to be used. President Eisenhower refused even to dis- cuss the demand. I am proud of the manner in which he represented our country, with dignity and courage under trying circum- stances. He was subjected to intolerable in- sults by the bragging bully from Moscow. A man of less stature might have lost his temper and walked out of the-conference room. The President preferred to suffer the Insults rather than give excuse for the charge that he had broken up the conference. Time and again he agreed to return to the confer= ence to discuss with Khrushchev the subjects that had been agreed upon prior to the meeting. He thus prevented Khrushchev from shifting to the United States the re- sponsibility for failure of the meeting. He left unnoticed and unanswered Khru- schchev's contemptible insult that he would be willing to confer only when there was a new President. Every loyal American resents that insult. It was an inexcusable effort to interfere in our election. It was stupid of Khrushchev to think the American people will elect as President any man approved by him. His crude insults in Paris Wednesday only serve to unite our people. He will learn as did the Kaiser and Hitler, that while we divide politically on domestic affairs, we are truly united in foreign affairs. Heartening indeed was the news report this morning that several influential Democratic leaders wired President Eisenhower assur- ance of their support. While that was comforting, / hope the President and the Democratic congressional leaders, in a practical way, can prove our unity by diverting to our defense programs some of the billions of dollars now earmarked or recommended for controversial social pro- grams. In this crisis we can postpone even meritorious social reforms but we should not postpone even for a day, any expenditure that will contribute to the defense of our lives and liberties. The Times of Havana?A Brave News- paper Cries Out EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. CHARLES 0. PORTER OF OREGON IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Thursday, May 19, 1960 Mr. PORTER. Mr. Speaker, freedom of the press is essential in a democracy, as is the freedom to elect those we wish to govern us and the freedom to worship and speak as we please. Today in Cuba the essential freedoms of a democracy are being stifled. We who are friends of the people of Cuba regret these confiscations of democracy, be- cause they leave only fear, confusion, and oppression. There is today in Havana a brave newspaper publisher who twice weekly prints his English-language tabloid, the Times of Havana. Publisher Clarence "Poppy" Moore is a friend of mine. His courage in printing the truth gives hope to those Cubans who see too well what can happen when democracy gets side- tracked. An article describing Peppy Moore's work appeared in the Wednesday, May 18, 1960, issue of the Washington Daily Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD MAY 231980 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 ?????????.11111011????? Saysilow Is the Time T.o, 2, ? Swelling Questions 4, EXTENSION Or. REMARKS HON. CHARLES' O. PORTER or OttEt.= IN THE HQUSE 1:* ItEPRESENTATIVES Thursday, May 19, 1960 Mr. PORTER. Mr. Speaker, my able friPnd, "mei= t, IVIarqlgs,political sowek prollMrlit the `Univerpty_ of Oxe.tron, Asserts that now is the time for ostatitifi and that now is the time for Congress to ask searching questions about administration policy. A number of us have just addressed such questions to the President. We await his replies. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 (D Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T0 782R000100060001-7 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPE IX Under a previous unanimous consent, I am including the entire text of the letter written to me by Professor Mar- quis on May 13, 1960: EUGENE., OREG., May 13, 1960. Rspresentative CHARLES 0. PORTER, House Office Building, Washington, D.C. DEAR REPRESENTATIVE PORTER: r am writing to you out of deep concern because of the U-2 pl incident and because of the ad- n s On's anouncement of the proposed .resumption of underground nuclear testing. As a teacher of political science I realize that intelligence activities are one of the hard facts of life. At the same time I won- der whether we can afford the luxury of this type of intel11gen75:-Teliar`arPowerarrif-sAC tens- us Ifitrt nussians have the capacity to strike at American targets and to destroy them. What assurance do we have that the Russians do not misread the incursion of a single plane? Are the gs,ins,,of sucton in- telligence inislioirgiv-orth the risk of nuclear war?'---"`" When some years ago a Soviet spy was ap- prehended in Brooklyn, the Russian Govern- ment could and did completely dissociate itself from his activities. Aerial i tegence, on the other hand, direct y an mmediate- ly implicates the sponsoring government. Eqtrally-distiffbrng is the question of re- sponsibility. While the administration in Washington acknowledges its general policy decisions on this kind of flight, it was not aware of the particular timing. The disturb- ing implication is that immediate decisions which could be of the most far-reaching consequences, viz the unleashing of nuclear war, are made at some lower echelon. Quite apart from this irresponsible delegation of power what might be the tactical conse- quences? Were our SAC bases alerted to the possibility of a Soviet reprisal to the 13-2 in- cursion? Would President Eisenhower have been available to make an urgent decision? On the basis of the evidence (including the unpreparedness of the administration to give any decent explanation of the incident) we were in no way prepared. This in the face of the administration's argument that through these flights we wish to avoid another Pearl Harbor. As to the ramifications of this incident? the impact on world opinion prior to the summit, the ace it places into the hands of Soviet negotiators, the distrust is engenders among allies w120,,Aave not.. beka SCinajaled (witness Norway's protelt to our State De- partment)?are these to be subordinated to the possible VMS to intelligenet?'-'-. 'The- administration's justification of its policy is couched in the most fanciful doubletalk. It is saying to the Russians in effect?If you weren't such bad boys, ring- ing down your Iron Curtain, we wouldn't have to fly over your territory. What would be the administration's reaction after a Soviat,P1a4e 1184 been shot down over Kansas and the Russians will-ftrremsi?thst 'They were compelled to such illegal flights because we barred their diplomats from large parts of the United States? And finally, in a kind of postscript to this sad affair, the administration announces the resumption of underground nuclear testing at a moment when some slight but hopeful progress had been made at Geneva?the Russians having agreed to holding joint technical tests. What justification can be given for this decision? May this not appear to the rest of the world as a desperately spiteful act? It has been argued that this is no time for criticism. But if we do not criticize now, if theagA-mp. now ask sear_ehang questans abotittration policy then when else is the time? Are we blindly to accept administration decision to continue such flights? Are we entitled to know who Makes Immediate policy deci- sions which can have such far-reaching consequences for us and for the world? What justifications are there for the resump- tion of nuelear testing? These are not carping questions. Unless they are asked now it may be too late. I should like re- spectfully to urge you to further bring these sentiments, which are not merely confined to myself, to your colleagues in Congress and to continue to exercise to your fullest power your constitutional prerogative of checking the executive branch. Truly yours, LTJCIAN C. MARQUIS. Iowa Citizen Praises Birmingham EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. GEORGE HUDDLESTON, JR. OF ALABAMA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Tuesday, May 10, 1960 Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. Speaker, re- cently there appeared in one of Birming- ham's two daily newspapers a letter to the editor which was, in effect, a thank you note to the citizens of our fine com- munity and a refutation of a widely pub- licized false impression of the city ema- nating from a New York newspaper. This letter was from a citizen of Water- loo, Iowa, Mr. Edward J. Jacobson, who in a time of crisis and in a strange city, found in Birmingham and her people what he calls a needed "warmth and comfort." In addition to his eloquent expres- sion of commendation and appreciation of the people of Birmingham, Mr. Jacob- son, in his letter, praises the facilities and personnel of an institution in which we in Birmingham and Alabama take great pride, the University Hospital & Hillman Clinic of the University of Ala- bama Medical Center. I am pleased to insert a copy of Mr. Jacobson's letter in the CONGRESSIONAL REcortu, under leave heretofore granted, and earnestly commend it to the atten- tion of my colleagues: VOICE OF TIIE PEOPLE?IOWA MAN TELLS STORY OF BIRMINGHAM'S HELP I read the article in the Birmingham News which appeared in the New York Times. If that reporter had come to Bir- mingham under the circumstances Mrs. Jacobson and I did, I am sure his version of Birmingham and the very good people there would be entirely different. On Saturday, April 9, my wife, our daugh- ter Jean and I were having our lunch when we were interrupted by a phone call. It was a long distance call from University Hos- pital in your city to inform us that our older daughter Joan was there and had been involved in an auto accident. She was thrown out of an overturning car and seri- ously injured. She was en route to Florida with friends for Easter vacation from Rock- ford College at Rockford, Ill. Several of your kind citizens who were passers-by made it possible for her to be assisted and brought to the hospital. The doctor requested we come, and plane con- nections being poor, we started driving. I stayed behind the wheel for 20 hours while my wife studied road maps and signs. The cups or coffee and one piece of pie our limit on food, only to reach Bir- A4371 mingham, it place we had never been or even had any idea of what It was like. We arrived on Sunday, April 10, at 12:30, at the edge of Birmingham, asking our way around. Everyone went out of their way to help us' find the hospital. We arrived there at 1 p.m. to see our daughter. We had not been there long when we could see she had the care and love of the best doctors and nurses available. We were strangers in this big city but yet we felt like this was a sort of home. We knew our daughter would be well again. Later, we rented an apartment and our ,,landlady was just like a mother to us. The minister called on our daughter, and we attended the church of our faith on Easter Sunday. It was wonderful to be in church a thousand miles from home and feel the warmth and comfort that we so needed at that time. When our daughter was out of danger, we went _shopping, only to be treated royally again by the good people of Bfrmingharn. We will never forget the fine meals we were So graciously served in the various eating establishments. The service stations and garages, too, afforded us the same courte- ous service. Then the good word came that we could start home, taking our daughter with us. This meant a great deal to us knowing that in 5 or 6 weeks she will be able to walk again. As we stood on the 10th floor of the hospital the night before we left, we were somewhat saddened looking out at the beautiful lights of the city. It is a second home to us and there will always be a warm place in our hearts for the good peo- ple who made our life so wonderful while In that big and beautiful city. Can this be Birmingham? It sure can. EDWARD J. JACOBSON. WA , IOWA. Being IntelikentAtairtteDiAnce EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. EE19.2.2911RJO OF CONNECTICUT IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, May 2, 1960 Mr. DADDARIO. Mr. Speaker, a good many words have been spoken in recent days about this Natilrice op- el:41w glad thgr e,....siigLYLEErn_ireffec- tIvenew, When pMETa?ecis ort.s ineffe on the basis of secret intelligence material, there is a conflict which can be settled only by full and frank discus- sion of these policy matters by the re- sponsible political authorities without disclosure of agencies, sources, or methods. When political authorities allow the impression to gain currency that they are not in full command of their decisions, or that their information may have been faulty, they encourage speculation and comment which is not in the national interest. In that connection, I would like to sub- mit for the RECORD an editorial which appeared in the and which containsyi pAmder- standing, of tha_inigence Cygle The editorial states that one reason why in- telligence activities of this Nation often appear to be both inept and amateurish Is that there has seldom been an ade- quate appreciation of the importance of Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 CO RESSIONAL RECORD ? APPENDIX intelligence on the part of responsible Persons in the Government. It seems to me that the recent events, when coupled with incidents that have occurred over more than a decade now, Indicate a need for a continuing reyiew ant-6.1=1:1=trEVICC-11405.,,,,_rialjiel- ligewAPJAUXADerY. The article which is cited in the editorial, and which I have not included at this point, believes that cazt,42.11Ljae? 4v4R,Avagi.,the res onsi- bilites assigned its Diredor are'too greailffJ746-tonvio. 51r6r6 art?iiilTThtMs W le eserv On- gres v.tudy Ancl decision. e en- t is i e field, deserves con- tinuing congressional supervi I by a committee organized along the lines of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Zile editorial follows: BEING INTELLieerp-Ittotrr INTELLIGENCE Elsewherrarttirpage today appear some penetrating comments on the organization of the Central Intelli ence A ency, and per- haps , whole ap- proach to the subject of military intelli- gence. The article, which shivered in the London? vtac?retwith, was Wri/I by D /laid ac lan-,-IiirneeTra'Briiish intelli- gence ur ng World War II. Although Mr. McLachlan's article is rea- sonably comprehensive, it fails to mention the principal reason why our intelligence activitielfire often both 111'915rIlifffertina- tete& Trier reason is there-is not now nor has there ever been an adequate appreciation of the importance of intelli- gence on the part of responsible persons in the government, whether in the armed forces or in high elective positions. During the entire period between World War I and World War II, aside from such routine tasks Irs-sstfriZinitmed by the attaches, military intelligence received little attention from anyone. And the intelligence commanders of the various corps area commands, the 0-2 assistant chiefs of staff, were principally public relations officers and nothing more. Even today, in the Department of the Army, all of the top General Staff officers but one have the title of Deputy Chief of Staff and the rank of lieutenant general. The one officer who does not have this rank is the director of intelligence, who is only an As- sistant Chief of Staff, with the grade of major general. Perhaps Washington's failure really to understand and appreciate the importance of military intelligence is a reflection of the attitude of the Amalgan_nsople who, gen- erally, look with distaya_upon es ionage of any,. lcind.-15TEr Ili this wor n ch we live our national existence demands that we make every effort to learn all we can of what our potential enemies are up to. Whether we like it or not, we must have well-trained and efficient intelligence agen- cies, and the sooner we realize that fact the better It will be for all of us. It might be pertinent here also to suggest that all intelligence activities must of neces- sity be conducted with the utmost secrecy, and that all governmental agencies con- cerned give consideration to what_ they are to say or not to say should anything resem- bling 14,e,...1/7-2 ingtilsot4e again. Here, too, we can rnkaaj4 n ou.a.sjar1Lirsh. After the U-2 inciden a leen- discussed by Prime Minister .,1)4acrAillan and Selwyn the Foreign Secretary', the British Foreign Office spokesman was asked for comment. : "It would appear to be an intelligen e operation and it is not the habit of the British Government to comment on operations of that nature either of its Chances for Milk Sanitation Legislation Have Become Brighter EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. LESTER R. JOHNSON OF WISCONSIN IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, May 16, 1960 Mr. JOHNSON of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, the Dairy Record, one of the Nation's leading publications in the dairy field, has commented editorially on the ever-increasing support for my national milk sanitation legislation. Under leave to extend by remarks, I would like to include this editorial from the May 4, 1960, issue of this magazine in the RECORD: BEHIND THE NEWS While the possibility of passage of the Na- tional Milk Sanitation bill did not change materially as a result of the House hearings last week, its chances are brighter today than they have ever been. The nominating convention of the two parties will call for an early adjournment of Congress which makes it appear doubtful at this time that the bill can be passed at this session. How- ever, there is the remote possibility that it ' could be brought up for action on the floor of both Houses before adjournment. Last fall it appeared almost hopeless that the measure would receive much attention at this short session, but it is evident that pro- ponents of the bill introduced by Repre- sentative LESTER Jonwsox, of Wisconsin have been extremely busy in gaining supports for the legislation. A major victory was won by backers of the bill when Arthur S. Flemming, Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, in a letter to Representative OREN HARRIS, chairman, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, reported favorably on the bill and Assistant Surgeon General, David E. Price of the HEW, at a commerce subcommittee meeting of the House endorsed the measure. Secretary Flemming stated that the objec- tions of the Department to previous sanita- tion bills had been eliminated in the Johnson measure and he pointed out that HEW has consistently held that health regulations should not be used as domestic trade barriers to the interstate shipment of milk and milk products of high sanitary quality. He stated further that despite the vast impravernent that has been made in the sanitary quality of milk accruing from State and local milk sanitation programs, there still remain many areas where the sanitary quality of milk and milk sanitation practices do not meet presently accepted standards. For this reason, he declared that the bill would result in? added health protection for a substantial segment of the Nation's pop- ulation. Appearing at last week's hearing, speaking in favor of the bill, were representatives of consumers groups, State health boards, agri- cultural groups, Congressmen, Governors, and State agriculture departments from the Midwest, the East and the Southwest. All presented strong arguments why the bill should be passed and one of the strongest offered was that in actuality the measure is for the protection of the con- sumer. It was pointed out that in many areas when there is a period of shortage, milk is purchased from outside sources and It is in many cases of dubious quality. Appearing in opposition to the Johnson own or of its friends." bill were for the most part representatives of /That should be our policy, too, producer groups, principally from the East, May 23 South, and Southwest. Philip Alampl, New Jersey Secretary of Agriculture, stated in his brief that the milk markets in the Northeast have very adequate milk sanitation regula- tions and that health standards can best be determined at the local or area level. He declared that enactment of the bill would tend to lower the quality of milk shipped into receiving States and that lowering of quality standards would be detrimental to the promotion and expansion of market out- lets for milk. He also argued that the pur- pose of the bill is to permit the shipment of milk for fluid use from States of surplus production into distant markets but that goal would not be accomplished because the price differential between surplus States such as Wisconsin and Minnesota and northeastern importing States is not suffi- cient to induce the movement of a perma- nent supply of milk from the surplus pro- ducing areas. Also appearing in opposition to the measure was Paul R. Jackson, executive officer, Milk Inspection Association of the Oranges and Maplewood, N.J., who repre- sented the New Jersey Health Officer Asso- ciation. He argued that the bill will give authority to the Surgeon General to promul- gate and amend the Federal Milk Sanitation Code and that this would be an unwarranted delegation of authority. He also declared that the bill would abrogate the home rule of local agencies. Libraries, Education, and Society EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. JOHN E. FOGARTY OF RHODE ISLAND IN tilt. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, May 23, 1960 Mr. FOGARTY. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks I include an address which I delivered at the Drexel Institute of Technology, Phila- delphia, Pa., on May 17, 1960: LIBRARIES, EDUCATION, AND SOCIETY (Remarks made by Representative JOHN E. FOGARTY at Drexel Institute of Technology on May 17, 1960, on occasion of his re- ceiving the Distinguished Achievement Award from the Graduate School of Li- brary Science and the Library Alumni Association) Today I saw for the first time the impres- sive new quarters of the library school here at Drexe1.1 I am sure they bring to you a deep sense of pride and gratification?much as your Distinguished Achievement Award, and this opportunity to meet with you have given me. It is a fine thing to feel that one's efforts have played some part in strengthen- ing the American heritage. A library school?or legislation to aid li- braries?can do just that: It can enrich society and strengthen the Nation. It does this mainly through the enduring contribu- tion of libraries to education. America's strength was once felt to lie predominantly in her agricultural and geo- graphic advantages. Since the turn of the century, industry and natural resources have been paramount. Both, of course, remain essential to our country's strength and her 1 The Graduate School of Library Science (third oldest in the United States and among the first five in enrollment) and the Drexel Library are housed together in the Library Center, opened in the fall of 1959, and the latest addition to the physical plant in the current expansion program. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 7- 1960 Under a previous unanimous consent, I am including the entire text of the letter written to me by Professor Mar- quis on May 13,1960: EUGENE., OREG., May 13, 1960. Representative CHARLES 0. PORTER, House Office Building, Washington, D.C. DEAR REPRESENTATIVE PORTER: I am writing to you out of deep concern because of the U.,2 plane incident and because of the ad- ministratibrit anzhincement of the proposed resumption of underground nuclear testing. As a teacher of political science I realize that intelligence activities are one of the hard facts of life. At the same time I won- der whether we cAllafford the luxury of this type of intelligence: treittla Powers of SAC tells-us-that the Russians have the capacity to strike at American targets and to destroy them. What assurance do we have that the Russians do not misread the incursion of a single plane? Are the gains of such an. in- telligence inissiGer Weit'E-"the'rlair` of "nuclear war? When some years ago a Soviet spy was ap- prehended in Brooklyn, the Russian Govern- ment could and did completely dissociate itself from his activities. Aerial intelligence, on the other hand, directly and imniedlae- ly implicates the sponsoring govermnent, Equally disturbing is the question of re- sponsibility. While the administration in Washington acknowledges its general policy decisions on this kind of flight, it was not aware of the particular thning. The disturb- ing implicaticErcirthat immediate decisions which could be of the most far-reaching consequences, viz the unleashing of nuclear war, are made at some lower echelon. Quite apart from this irresponsible delegation of power what might be the tactical conse- quences? Were our SAO bases alerted to the possibility of a Soviet reprisal to the.U-2 in- cursion? Would President Eisenhower have, been available to make an urgent decision? On the basis of the evidence (including the unpreparedness of the administration to give any decent explanation of the incident) we were in no way prepared. This in the face of the administration's argument that through these flights we wish to avoid another Pearl Harbor. As to the ramifications of this incident? the impact on world opinion prior to the summit, the ace it places into the hands of Soviet negotiators, the distrust is engenders among allies who have not been consulted (witness Norway's-a Treirdiir 'ter crar StKto De- partment)--are these to be subordinated to the possible gains tointelligertee? -Yile?adralrilatration's Justification of its policy Is couched in the most fanciful doubletEdk. It is saying to the Russians in effect?If you weren't such bad boys, ring- ing down your Iron Curtain, we wouldn't have to fly over your territory. What would be the administration's reaction after a Soviet plane had been shot down over Kansas and theRussians were to reply that they were compelled to such illegal flights because we barred their diplomats from large parts of the United States? And finally, in a kind of postscript to this sad affair, the administration annouhces the resumption of underground nuclear testing at a moment when some slight but hopeful progress had been made at Geneva?the Russians having agreed to holding joint technical tests. What justification can be given for this decision? May this not appear to the rest of the world as a desperately spiteful act? It has been argued that this is no time for criticism. But if we do not criticize now, if the Caugreaa does not .now - ask searching questions about administration policy then When else is the time? Are we blindly to accept administration decision to continue such flights? Are we entitled to Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? A NDIX know who makes immediate policy deci- sions which can have such far-reaching consequences for us and for the world? What justifications are there for the resump- tion of nuclear testing? These are not carping questions. Unless they are asked now it may be too late. I should like re- spectfully to urge you to further bring these sentiments, which are not merely confined to myself, to your colleagues in Congress and to continue to exercise to your fullest power your constitutional prerogative of checking the executive branch. Truly yours, LIT,CIAN C. MARQUIS. Air ,400V- Iowa Citizen Praises Birmingham EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. GEORGE HUDDLESTON, JR. OF ALABAMA IN THE HOUSE OF' REPRESENTATIVES Tuesday, May 10, 1960 Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. Speaker, re- cently there appeared in one of Birming- ham's two daily newspapers a letter to the editor which was, in effect, a thank you note to the citizens of our fine com- munity and a refutation of a widely pub- licized false impression of the city ema- nating from a New York newspaper. This letter was from a citizen of Water- loo, Iowa, Mr. Edward J. Jacobson, who in a time of crisis and in a strange city, found in Birmingham and her people what he calls a needed "warmth and comfort." In addition to his eloquent expres- sion of commendation and appreciation of the people of Birmingham, Mr. Jacob- son, in his letter, praises the facilities and personnel of an institution in which we in Birmingham and Alabama take great pride, the University Hospital & Hillman Clinic of the University of Ala- bama Medical Center. I am pleased to insert a copy of Mr. Jacobson's letter in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, under leave heretofore granted, and earnestly commend it to the atten- tion of My colleagues: VOICE OF THE PEOPLE?IOWA MAN TELLS STORY OF BIRMINGHAM'S HELP I read the article in the Birmingham News which appeared in the New York Times. If that reporter had come to Bir- mingham under the circumstances Mrs. Jacobson and I did, I am sure his version of Birmingham and the very good people there would be entirely different. On Saturday,. April 9, my wife, our daugh- ter Jean and I were having our lunch when we were interrupted by a phone call. It was a long distance call from University Hos- pital in your city to inform us that our older daughter Joan was there and had been involved in an auto accident. She was thrown out of an overturning car and seri- ously injured. She was en route to Florida with friends for Easter vacation from Rock- ford College at Rockford, Ill. Several of your kind citizens who were passers-by made it possible for her to be assisted and brought to the hospital. The doctor requested we come, and plane con- nections being poor, we started driving. I stayed behind the wheel for 20 hours while my wife studied road maps and signs. Three cups of coffee and one piece of pie was our limit on food, only to reach Bir- ( A4371 ingham, a place we had never been or even had any idea of what it was like. We arrived on Sunday, April 10, at 12:30, at the edge of Birmingham, asking our way around. Everyone went out of their way to help us find the hospital. We arrived there at 1 p.m. to see our daughter. We had not been there long when we could see she had the care and love of the best doctors and nurses available. We were strangers in this big city but yet we felt like this was a sort of home. We knew our daughter would be well again. Later, we rented an apartment and our -landlady was just like a mother to us. The minister called on our daughter, and we attended the church of our faith on Easter Sunday. It was wonderful to be in church a thousand miles from home and feel the warmth and comfort that we so needed at that time. When our daughter was out of danger, we went shopping, only to be treated royally again by the good people of Birmingham. We will never forget the fine meals we were so graciously served in the various eating establishments. The service stations and garages, too, afforded us the same courte- ous service. Then the good word came that we could start home, taking our daughter with us. This meant a great deal to us knowing that in 5 or 6 weeks she will be able to walk again. As we stood on the 10th floor of the hospital the night before we left, we were somewhat saddened looking out at the beautiful lights of the city. It is a second home to us and there will always be a warm place in our hearts for the good peo- ple who made our life so wonderful while in that big and beautiful city. Can this be Birmingham? It sure can. EDWARD J. JACOBSON. WATERLOO, IOWA. Being Intelligent Mout Intelligence ,wSikitif01.314 .E.,/s-CENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. EMILIO Q. DADDARIO IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, May 2, 1960 Mr. DADDARIO. Mr. Speaker, a good many words have been spoken in recent days about this Nation's intelligence op- erationCWel their efficiency and effec- When policy decisions may be makre`on the basis of secret intelligence material, there is a conflict which can be settled only by full and frank discus- sion of these policy matters by the re- sponsible political authorities without disclosure of agencies, sources, or methods. When political authorities allow the impression to gain currency that they are not in full command of their decisions, or that their information may have been faulty, they encourage speculation and comment which is not in the national interest. In that connection, I would like to sub- mit for the RECORD an editorial which appeared in the Hartford Couwt and which contains an litftreirtatlie under- standing of the intelligence cycle. The editoilal States that one reason why in- telligence activities of this Nation often appear to be both inept and amateurish is that there has seldom been an ade- quate appreciation of the importance of Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 A4372 C GRESSIONAL RECORD ? APPENDIX intelligence on the part of responsible persons in the Government. It seems to me that the recent events, when coupled with incidents that have occurred over more than a decade now, Indicate a need for a continuing review and supe . .5.1,:ftiv.114,) ; in- ice Anil is JIt -44t.e.c1.41t ul. rial, and which I have not included at this point, believes that , CIA is far too 1 44,,,,tcaP9,1107 igiAlbe Ir or are too great to peri?i e ec ive co p. `ese are reb nlarrilttter8 which .eserve con- ress cly and decksioeritreti- re field, if is 115VaTelt, deserves con- tinuing con ressioilal vision by a committee w ich miglif we I be organized along the lines of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. '44111"-The4,?wen,, ...:t451t?1114416?941?.;,,, ..._ ............-., ...,...1Z?ontrr ABOu a INTELLIGENCE , Elsewhere on this page today appear some Ipenetrating comments on the organization of the Central Intelligence _Agency, and per- haps nitire 1rip6ftant; ori our whole ap- proach to the subject of military intelli- gence. The artiele.. WV:c1:1_11Ppeared in the London baily Telegraplai_yes, written by Donald: Meinehletti,- hirhs'dlrb,Iiritish intelli- gtitelatifffeer 'dining World War II. Although Mr. McLachlan's article is rea- sonably comprehensive, it fails to mention the principal reason why fa Igence. act1=1ty.c.?9/ten lepttLinep_ an ama- ft-U.1.141T- That reason is tlia---tiLere'TC not 'new- trill* has there ever been an adequate appreciation of the importance of intelli- gence on the part of responsible persons in the government, whether in the armed forces or in high elective positions. During -the entire period between World War I and World?War II, aside from such routine tasks as were performed by the attaches, military intelligence received little attention from anyone. And the intelligence commanders Of the various corps area commands, the 0-2 assistant chiefs of staff, were principally public relations officers and nothing more. Even today, in the Department* of the Army, all of the top General Staff officers but one have the title of Deputy Chief of Staff and the rank of lieutenant general. The one officer who does not have this rank is the director of intelligence, who is only an As- sistant Chief of Staff, with the grade of major general. ? Perhaps Washington's failure really to understand and appreciate the importance of military intelligence is a reflection of the attitude of the Aseet0616661.1fecvle who, gen- erally, look w4Atik Allgfaypr upon espionage .01.., kind. But in this World in which we live our national existence demands that we make every effort to learn all we Can of what our potential enemies are up to. Whether we like it or not, we must have well-trained and efficient intelligence agen- cies, and the sooner we realize that fact the better it will be for all of us. It might be pertinent here also to suggest that all intelligence activities must of neces- sity be conducted with the utmost secrecy, and that all governmental agencies con- cerned give consideration to what they are to say or not to say should anything resem- bling the- 1.1.-2 incille,44,...axisa again. Here, too, we can take a ArS0413., gro,rn the, British. After the U-2 iiitillent had been discusled by Prime Minister Macnialex and Selwyn the Foreign 86617Tary, the British "ni?eign Office spokesman was asked for comment. JIA.sa,j,(1: "It would appear to be an intelligence operation and it is not the habit of the British Government to comment on operations of that nature either of its own or of its friends." That should be our policy, tot). hances for Milk Sanitation Legislation Have Become Brighter EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. LESTER R. JOHNSON OF WISCONSIN IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, May 16, 1960 Mr. JOHNSON of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, the Dairy Record, one of the Nation's leading publications in the dairy field, has commented editorially on the ever-increasing support for my national milk sanitation legislation. Under leave to extend by remarks, I would like to include this editorial from the May 4,1960, issue of this magazine in the RECORD: BEHIND THE NEWS While the possibility of passage of the Na- tional Milk Sanitation bill did not change materially as a result of the House hearings last week, its chances are brighter today than they have ever been. The nominating convention of the two parties will call for an early adjournment of Congress which makes it appear doubtful at this time that the bill can be passed at this session. How- ever, there is the remote possibility that it could be brought up for action on the floor of both Houses before adjournment. Last fall it appeared almost hopeless that the measure would receive much attention at this short session, but it is evident that pro- ponents of the bill introduced by Repre- sentative LESTER JOHNSON, of Wisconsin have been extremely busy in gaining supports for the legislation. A major victory was won by backers of the bill when Arthur S. Flemming, Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, in a letter to Representative OREN HARRIS, chairman, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, reported favorably on the bill and Assistant Surgeon General, David E. Price of the HEW; at a commerce subcommittee meeting of the House endorsed the measure. Secretary Flemming stated that the objec- tions of the Department to previous sanita- tion bills had been eliminated in the Johnson measure and he pointed out that HEW has consistently held that health regulations should not be used as domestic, trade barriers to the interstate shipment of milk and milk products of high sanitary quality. He stated further that despite the vast improvement that has been made in the sanitary quality of milk accruing from State ' and local milk sanitation programs, there still remain many areas where the sanitary quality of milk and milk sanitation practices do not meet presently accepted standards. For this reason, he declared that the bill would result in added health protection for a substantial segment of the Nation's pop- ulation. Appearing at last week's hearing, speaking in favor of the bill, were representatives of consumers groups, State health boards, agri- cultural groups, Congressmen, Governors, and State agriculture departments from the Midwest, the East and the Southwest. All presented strong arguments why the bill should be passed and one of the strongest offered was that in actuality the measure is for the protection of the con- sumer. It was pointed out that in many areas 'when there is a period of shortage, milk is purchased from outside sources and t is in many cases of dubious quailty. Appearing in opposition to the Johnson bill were for the most part representatives of producer groups, principally from the East, r.110116111411111111.11111111.111, r May 23 South, and Southwest. Philip Alampi, New Jersey Secretary of Agriculture, stated in his brief that the milk markets in the Northeast have very adequate milk sanitation regula- tions and that health standards can best be determined at the local or area level. He declared that enactment of the bill would tend to lower the quality of milk shipped into receiving States and that lowering of quality standards would be detrimental to the promotion and expansion of market out- lets for milk. He also argued that the pur- pose of the bill is to permit the shipment of milk for fluid use from States of surplus production into distant markets but that goal would not be accomplished because the price differential between surplus States such as Wisconsin and Minnesota and northeastern importing States is not suffi- cient to induce the movement of a perma- nent supply of milk from the surplus pro- ducing areas. Also appearing in opposition to the measure was Paul Ft. JaclEson, executive officer, Milk Inspection Association of the Oranges and Maplewood, N.J., who repre- sented the New Jersey Health Officer Asso- ciation. He argued that the bill will give authority to the Surgeon General to promul- gate and amend the Federal Milk Sanitation Code and that this would be an unwarranted delegation of authority. He also declared that the bill would abrogate the home rule of local agencies. Libraries, Education, and Society EXTENSION OF REMARKS HON. JOHN E. FOGARTY OF RHODE ISLAND IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, May 23, 1960 Mr. FOGARTY. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks I include an address which I delivered at the Drexel Institute of Technology, Phila- delphia, Pa., on May 17, 1960: LIBRARIES, EDUCATION, AND SOCIETY (Remarks made by Representative JOHN E. FOGARTY at Drexel Institute of Technology on May 17, 1960, on occasion of his re- ceiving the Distinguished Achievement Award from the Graduate School of Li- brary Science and the Library Alumni Association) Today I saw for the first time the impres- sive new quarters of the library school here at Drexel.! I am sure they bring to you a deep sense of pride and gratification?much as your Distinguished Achievement Award, and this opportunity to meet with you have given me. It is a fine thing to feel that one's efforts have played some part in strengthen- ing the American heritage. A library school?or legislation to aid li- braries?can do just that: It can enrich society and strengthen the Nation. It does this mainly through the enduring contribu- tion of libraries to education. America's strength was once felt to lie predominantly in her agricultural and geo- graphic advantages. Since the turn of the century, industry and natural resources have been paramount. Both, of course, remain essential to our country's strength and her 1 The Graduate School of Library Science (third oldest in the United States and among the first five in enrollment) and the Drexel Library are housed together in the Library Center, opened in the fall of 1959, and the latest addition to the physical plant in the current expansion program. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 1960 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? APPENDIX Unfortunately, the study was started; ?nen progress was interrupted and post- poned. Today, I was pleased to receive from Marvin Fast, Executive Director of the Great Lakes Commission, a resolution urging that the study of water level prob- lems of the lakes be resumed, and that adequate appropriations be provided for carrying out the study. Representing the thinking of this fine organization on a major problem of in- terest to the Great Lakes region and the country?the resolution, I believe, de- serves the consideration of Congress. I ask unanimous consent to have the reso- lution printed in the Appendix of the RECORD. There being no objection, the resolu- tion was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: GREAT LAKES WATER LEVEL STUDY?RESOLU- TION OF THE GREAT LAKES COMMISSION MAY 11, 1960 Whereas the water levels of the Great Lakes fluctuate in irregular long-range cycles in a range of approximately 5 feet; and Whereas extreme high levels result in in- undation of shore lands and beach ero- sion, difficulties in the docking and loading of vessels and damage to clock facilities, in- terference with land drainage, and aggrava- tion of floods on tributary streams to the Great Lakes; and Whereas extreme low levels reduce the cargo-carrying capacity of vessels on the lakes, require extensive harbor and dock improvements, expose unsightly flats, de- crease the area of waterfowl nesting 'grounds, and cause excessive shoaling; and Whereas following extensive damage from high water levels to Great Lakes shoreline properties officially estimated by the U.S. Corps of Engineers at $61 million in the single year 1951-52, the Committee on Pub- lic Works of the House of Representatives on June 28, 1952, directed the U.S. Corps of Engineers to make a comprehensive study of survey scope to determine; 1. The feasibility of a plan of regulation of the levels of the Great Lakes which would best serve the interests of all water uses, including the reduction of damages to shore properties, the use of the Great Lakes for navigation, and the use of the storage and outflow from the Great Lakes for power development; 2. The advisability of adopting local pro- tection flood .control projects for areas along the shores of the Great Lakes and tribu- tary streams that are subject to inunda- tion as a result of fluctuations in the levels of the lakes where such projects are found to be feasible and economically justified; and Whereas the report on this survey, origin- ally scheduled for completion in fiscal year 1957, still has not been completed because of lack of funds; and Whereas the great significance and im- portance of the report and its findings to the further development and optimum utilization of the waters of the Great Lakes underscore the desirability of its comple- tion at the earliest possible date: Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Great Lakes Commission at its semiannual meeting in Detroit, Mich. on May 11, 1960, That it strongly urge the Congress, the President, and the Bureau of the Budget to provide sufficient funds to meet the capabilities of the U.S. Corps of Engineers in fiscal year 1961, stated to be $65,000; for furthering work on this survey; and be it further Resolved, That the Commission urge the President, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Congress to provide the additional funds which will be required after June 30, 1961, in order that the report win be completed without further delays; and be it further Resolved, That copies of this resolution be transmitted to the President, the Bu- reau of the Budget and the Great Lakes States' delegations in the Congress. GREAT LAKES COMMISSION. ANN ARBOR, MICH. America Could Use More Patriotism EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. JOHN DOWDY OF TEXAS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, May 23, 1960 Mr. DOWDY. Mr. Speaker, Charles Walton Evans, son of Dr. and Mrs. C. W. Evans, of Lufkin, Tex.' is the owner of a large U.S. flag, a gift to him last year from his grandmother.. Since becoming the flag's owner, he has flown it each national holiday during the year. This young American is living proof that pa- triotism is not dead in the United States by any means. The Lufkin (Tex.) News, for May 17, 1960, had a story about this young Texan who is proud to fly his U.S. flag, and the next day an editorial, each of which I request be incorporated in the Appendix of the RECORD: YOUTH FLIES FLAG, AND PROUDLY, Too (By John W. Moody) "It's the Star-Spangled Banner. Long may it wave, o'er the land of the free and the home of the brave." These words are part of our national an- them. The man who penned them would be mighty proud today of a Lufkin lad on Southwood Drive. The lad is Charles Walton Evans. He i the son of Dr. and Mrs. C. W. Evans of 10 Southwood Drive. He is also one living example that pat - otism in the United States is not dead?yet. For the last year, he has been the owner of an Old Glory almost as big as he is. And he hasn't missed a chance to display it. He has seen to it personally the Nation's symbol flies proudly from a staff in his front yard each national holiday. "Well, I did miss San Jacinto Day," he said. "But that is a State holiday instead of a national one." Federally, he hasn't missed once. In Lufkin, you may be certain of seeing the 'U.S. flag on Veteran's Day, Abraham Lin- coln's birthday, Armed Forces Day, George Washington's birthday and other national holidays. "The day that everyone forgets is Mother's Day," he said. "The flag is supposed to fly that day, too." Young Evans is particularly proud of the flag he flies. It is large and looks like one owned by a school, government or large corporation rather than a private individual. However, it is easily handled. The staff is about 10 to 12 feet long, about 2 feet of which is stuck in the ground, ac- cording to young Evans. "The flag is a gift from my grandmother In Apple Springs," he said. "She gave it to me about a year ago." NATION COULD USE MORE PATRIOTISM, FLAG FLYING Heart-warming indeed was the story pub- lished on the front page of the Lufkin News ...01111111.1111111111101111111.110011.? 1111.1.1. A4337 Tuesday about the youth who is proud to fly the U.S. flag. Charles Walton Evans, son of Dr. and Mrs. C. W. Evans of Lufkin, places the U.S. flag in the front yard of his home on every na- tional holiday. Sometimes the very young show the way. With each passing year it seems that Ameri- cans have become less aware for the need of proudly displaying Old Glory, the symbol of freedom in the world. Such organizations as the DAR have con- ducted drives in recent years in Lufkin in an endeavor to get business firms and indi- viduals to fly their flags on designated na- tional holidays. Only scattered response is usually obtained. Certain elements in this Nation have con- tinually pooh-poohed anything that smacks of patriotism. Perhaps this attitude by many people who live off the fat of the land, yet condemn it with word and action, has had some effect on a dying patriotism. Apathy among American citizens has been another factor. There is no doubt that what this Nation needs and needs badly is a resurgence of patriotic spirit?the kind of spirit which brought pioneers to this country in the face of dangers, the kind of patriotism that the early colony settlers exhibited in fighting for this country's freedom from England. We face one of the most crucial periods in the long and storied history of the United States at this moment. Khrushchev has sa- botaged the summit meeting and insulted our President. There is now no doubt that, compromise with the Communists is virtu- ally impossible, and Americans must be pre- pared to back the principles which they hold to be true and upon which this Nation Was founded. Patriotism, which is just another word for love of country, is an element we need more of in this day and time. We need more people like the Evans youth who are proud of his Nation and proudly displays the U.S. flag at every opportunity. Let's Trade Quemoy and Matsu for Bishop Walsh EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HUSL-1-WiN144}EALL- OF MARYLAND IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES Monday, May 23, 1960 Mr. BEALL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Appendix of the RECORD an article appearing in the May 13, 1960, issue of .1.11.3m...grza.ld, a weekly labor union paper published in timore, the arti- cle being entitled, " e s Trade Quemoy and Matsu for Bishop Walsh," and writ- ten by Charles S. Bernstein. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: LET'S TRADE QUEMOY AND MATSU FOR BISHOP WALSH (By Charles S. Bernstein) President Eisenhower at Wednesday's press conference was asked by Holmes Alexander of the McNaughton Syndicate--"Mr. Presi- dent, Sir, this is a question about Quemoy and Matsu; and two of the Democratic can- didates have said that if elected they would try to get rid of that responsibility." The President's answer is open to all who want to read it. But the issue this writer Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 M338 Xishes to point to is that of humanity. Eve a lowly scribe can understand such an ele- mentary subject, although he may not un- derstand the military importance of the two islands. One should be willing to sacrifice political prestige for human values. If by giving the Communists in China an opportunity to get satisfaction in having the two islands re- turned to them, we can secure the release of Americans from torture and life imprison- ment, it is worth our try. If the United States could accomplish this exchange of a little real estate for human beings, we will have done an act of mercy and justice. According to the New York Times of March 19, 1960, there are in Red China prisons, besides our own Marylander, Bishop James Edward Walsh, a group of other 2tnier- ic5Thri is The account: The charge against Bishop Walsh, Hong Kong; /reported March 18 was: Bishop James Edward Walsh, of Cumberland, Md., was con- victed today in Shanghai having directed a group of Chinese Roman Catholic priests in plots, majavage, and other counterrevolu- tionary activitier against Communist China. Of course, there is not a man, woman, or child in America, other than a Commie or fellow traveler who believes this charge. Yet Bishop Walsh and other Americans are kept in prison. Since the Communists took control of China in 1949, they have imprisoned or held 158 Americans under arrest. Five died in prison from maltreatment. The rest have been released, except for Bishop Walsh and the following four: Robert Ezra McCann, of Pasadena, Calif., arrested in 1951 and sentenced to 15 years; John Thomas Dopy, of New Britain, Conn., arrested in 195T and given a 20-year sentence; Richard George Fecteau, of Lynn, Mass., ar- rested in 1954, ancr sentenced .to life im- prisonment; and Hugh Francis Redmond, Jr., of Yonkers, N. Y., arrested in 1951 and given a life sentence. All were charged with e:spionage. .1vfefoi: Ttiha filVe all to gain and nothing to lose, by trading some real estate for these lives mentioned above. Not only that, but, if we are forced to defend these islands, with our fleet and our Air Farce, it will mean many thousands more lives of Americans. All that can be avoided by a graceful offer by the President to ex- change a little real estate for human beings. Right now, when there is a lull in the in- ternational situation in the Far East, let us try to test our scheme of trade. Surely we will get the best of the bargain.?Labor Herald. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 CO nactivation of 449th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron, at Ladd Field EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. RALPH J. RIVERS OF ALASKA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, May 23, 1960 Mr. RIVERS of Alaska. Mr. Speaker, I consider it my duty to call to the at- tention of my colleagues in the House an alarming development with regard to our national defense. I refer to the in- credible decision of the Air Force, re- cently armoulfeRMIVIrinfrin; and phase out the 449th Figh er- n er- ceptor Squadron at Ladd Field, near Fairbanks, Alaska, iii-Treenntmorr: This unit, which is the only one of its kind in KIONAL RECORD ? APPENDIX ska north of the Brooks Range?the nly other fighter-inceptor squadron in Alaska being at Elmendorf Air Force Field near Anchorage, Alaska?has for many years been regarded by the high- est military authorities as anlramensa- ble s:hiskj_kgajzsti, izotential _assression Write :=?2,ans. Ladd Fierd, only- 100 nitrern Siberia, is a part of our northwest bastion of defense; a vital link in our perimeter of national defense, which includes Alaska as the corridor between Asia and North America, being an area once characterized by the late great Army officer, William "Billy" Mitchell, as "the most important stra- tegic place in the world." As :recently as last March the Air Force programed replacement of its 25 F-89 aircraft at Ladd AFB for F-101Bs, in line with strengthening the defensive power of the 449th Fighter-Interceptor Squad- ron. This occurred at a time when in- ternational tensions appeared to be re- laxing. Now in the midst of a wors-ed ,fum, our observation flight ver Russia, we are canfrolTeriiithlte Alr?Paiee's sudden plan to withdraw from Ladd Field, soundly established on American soil in the shadow of the Iron Curtain, as con- trasted with many of our foreign air- bases which are built on political quick- sand. On July 4th last, at Auburn, N.Y., I had the privilege of speaking at a cere- mony honoring our 49th State, in which I extolled the foresight and wisdom of former Secretary of State, William Henry Seward, in effectuating the purchase of Alaska from Russia, and noted the dis- advantage the rest of North America would now be suffering if Alaska were yet in the hands of the Russians. Both the audience and I visualized the idea of Russian bombers and missiles being lo- cated in Alaska pointed toward the great industrial centers of the older States and Canada, and we did not like what we saw, which lent enhanced meaning to the memory of William Henry Se- ward. Now we are told by Gen. Curtis LeMay, ho :requested the construction of Eiel- son AFB a decade ago as a launching ground for SAC bombers just 26 miles from Fairbanks, that Alaska is now of subordinate strategic importance and that for economy reasons the risk of phasing out the 449th Fighter Intercep- tor Squadron may be taken. This, in the face of the fact that said squadron has been on the alert for years to defend not only Ladd Field and environs against the possibility of a Russian paratrooper attack or destructive bombing mission, but to likewise defend the great SAC installation and runway at Eielson APB with resultant protection of our whole country. Since long-range missiles presently under development are presumably not yet operational, the Russian airpower according to Gen. Thomas D. White, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, is still Russia's most dangerous weapon. To my mind this makes the problem ele- mentary and the answer apparent?this is no time to inactivate any part of May our manned fighter-interceptor forcer Comes the day when East and West wi have each other thoroughly pinpointed '46 with adequate arrays of ICBM's, there may be no further use for Air Force bases as we know them today, but the time is not now, any more than it is time to phase out the Air Force itself. I realize that the Air Force is hurting because of the recent congressional ap- propriation cutback on Bomarc widely regarded as an extravagant fifth wheel in our overall missile program, but do not think this justifies the economy re- action displayed in the plan to chop down our manned fighter strength. This reaction is equivalent to saying to the Congress, "You want economy so we will give it to you?where it hurts." Instead, the money saved on Bomarc should be made available to strengthen our manned fighter defenses. Such approach would be consistent with the fact that the top stratum of the Air Force has turned down the request of Lt. Gen. Frank A. Armstrong, Jr., Commanding General of the Alaskan Command, for intermediate range missile installations in Alaska to offset the 27 Russian missile installations in Siberia across the Bering Strait. If Alaska is not an area usable for ex- changing missile blows with the Rus- sians, it must be regarded as an area vulnerable to attack and attempted oc- cupancy by the Russians for use against the rest of our country as a nearby launching platform. An excellent and more complete treat- ment of this whole subject is found in "4**. the remarks of Senators BARTLETT and GRUENING of Alaska set forth in the CoN- CRESSIONAL RECORD of May 17, 1960, be- ginning on page 9665 with the speech of Senator GatiENTNc. I invite all of you to read the able presentations of the two Senators, for the vital interest of all the people of the United States is at stake. a400" World Refugee Year?Resolution of Na- tional Council of Protestant Episcopal Church EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. PHILIP A. HART OF MICHIGAN IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES Monday, May 23, 1960 Mr. HART. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Appendix of the RECORD a resolution on World Refugee Year, adopted at the Greenwich, Conn., meeting of the Na- tional Council of the Protestant Episco- pal Church. There being no objection, the resolu- tion was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: WORLD REFUGEE YEAR--RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE PROTES- TANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH APRIL 26-28, 1960 Whereas World Refugee Year, as estab- lished by the United Nations and cospon- sored by the United States of America, comes to an end on June 30, 1960; and Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2006165/233: WIRDP90T00782R000100060001-7 1960 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE know no reedom from want, can know no freedo from fear, so long as the grim specter sudden and costly illness hovers over th We in the Sen faced with the re- alities of the intern nal situation, ac- knowledge the need fo onomic aid to the peoples of other lan ut how can we expect the older people our own land to understand why, in same breath, we deny millions of the ny real opportunity for medical care their old age? This is especially shock- ing in view of the far greater sacrifice other countries of the free world make to assure adequate medical care for their elderly people. This is the question posed in many of the letters we receive. I ask unani- mous consent to have one letter of this sort printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: DEAR Sin: Was wondering if and when you fellows are going to do something about giving those on social security hospitaliza- tion and doctors care. Maybe you can tell me what we are supposed to do when we're sick. The hospitals charge from $15 to $25 a day and that's only for board and room and the doctors bills are extra. I had ray wife in the hospital last year one afternoon and overnight and the hospital charged $49. Do something to get hospitalization added to our social security. They raise the taxes on gas and parcel post and everything else and give to the foreign countries but never anything here at home. Sincerely, EDGAR E. W[TT, OF TEXAS, HAS OUTSTANDING RECORD OF DE- VOTED PUBLIC SERVICE Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, a dedicated, able, faithful public official Is soon to leave the Washington scene. Edgar E. Witt, of Waco, Tex., Chief of the Indian Claims Commission, has written a record of fairness, of diligence, and of successful service with that Com- mis, which could serve as a model for any p 'lie official serving on any com- mission Washington. Govern Witt?as a former lieuten- ant Gave of Texas, he is called "Governor" his native State?was a leading Public cial of the State of e to ?Washington. Texas before he After having serve on other Govern- ment commissions, h ecame Chief of the Indian Claims Cofiission at the age of 68, an age at whJi most men have retired. In the 13 years he has serv. Chief of the Indian Claims Commi--...?n, he has written as many opinions as h all the other justices of the Comm n combined. In every case in which has dissented, his dissent has been up held on appeal. When Edgar E. Witt retires to Texas, he should take with him the thanks of officialdom of Washington and the appreciation of the citizenry of this Na- tion for a job well done. In the Dallas Morning News for Mon- day, May 16, Mr. Walter C. HornadaY, the able chief of the Dallas News Wash- ington Bureau, has written a very fine article entitled "Retirement Due for Claims Chief." ' As a long-time friend of Edgar E. Witt, I am glad to see him receive this recognition, and I ask unani- mous consent that the article be printed in full in the RECORD. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the REC- ORD, as follows: [From the Dallas Morning News, May 16, 1960] RETIREMENT Dux FOR CLAIMS CHIEF (By Walter C. Hornaday) SHINGTON.?When Edgar E. Witt of Wac as named Chief Commissioner of the In s Claims Commission in 1947, he had reach n age when most men are tak- ing it easy s tirement. Witt, a for ? Lieutenant Governor of Texas and a le d and skilled lawyer, assumed his duties e age of 68. He has been the Co ission's only head during its 13 years of exi e. He and his two colleagues on the lesion have wrestled with some tough qu ons involv- ing Indian tribes who claime ? ey were cheated and otherwise financially sed in years gone by. Witt is retiring from his job on Ju 0 at the age of 81. It was time and the ru of bureaucracy, not ill health or lack of physicl and mental vigor, that is causing him to step down. Under the regulations, Chief Witt should have been moved out some years ago, but no one noticed his calendar age as the Com- mission continued to function as well, per-. haps even better, than it ever had. The Indian Claims Commission, under Witt's direction, charted new courses in the law as ft handled the cases brought before the agency. The act creating the Commission gave It authority to settle claims in law and equity and on other bases and then added: "Claims based upon fair and honorable dealings that are not recognized by any existing rule of law or equity." "This means applying the yardstick of fair and honorable dealings by our Govern- ment with the Indians," Witt Said. "No other act I know of writes that into law." The Indian tribes had 5 years in which to file claims. The cutoff date was in August 1951. Through 1959, the Commission al- lowed claims involving 20,602,341 acres of former Indian land and final judgments of $17,655,606 out of claims amounting to $123,824,395. Some of the cases go back more than 100 years and a:re steeped in history at the time the white man, frequently backed by the Federal Government, was seizing Indian lands and paying the tribes little, even threatening them with disaster if they re- fused to accept the offers. Edgar Witt was born near Salado, Bell County. He received his academic and law education at the University of Texas and began practicing law in Waco in 1906. He served as a State senator 12 years and was elected Lieutenant Governor in 1930 and 1932, serving under Ross Sterling and Mrs. Miriam Ferguson. In seeking his second term without opposition, he received at that time what was the largest vote any person seeking State office had ever piled up. Witt made an unsuccessful bid for Gover- in 1934. ortly atter leaving the Lieutenant Go pr's office, Witt was employed by the Dall' ;hamber of Commerce and other in- terests ?work for a $8 million legislative appropria n to help finance the Texas Centennial. t,Witt's efforts were successful and Congress Wowed with a similar appro- priation. Witt's long-time friend, Senator Tom Con- nally, told then President Franklin D. Roose- 10007 velt about Witt, and the Waco man was named chairman of a special Mexican Claims Commission to distribute $5,500,000 the Mexican Government had offered to make available to settle claims resulting from de- struction of American property during revo- lutions. The Commission finished its work ahead of time. When Witt asked Roosevelt to terminate the agency, a shocked Presi- dent said: "I never heard of a Democrat quitting office before his job terminated." Witt returned to Waco to resume the practice of law but was recalled to Washing- ton in 1943 as chairman of the American- Mexican Claims Commission. This was an- other agency to settle claims of American citizens against Mexico due principally to ex- propriation of American-owned land. This job ended in 1947. Senator CONNALLY and President Truman decided Witt was the perfect man for the job of heading the Indian Claims Commis- sion when it was cerated. Witt knew little If anything about Indians, and a mild ob- jection was raised against his Senate con- firmation on that score. One group thought an Indian should be picked but the Senate believed otherwise. Connally, with a twinkle in his eye, told Witt at the time that he thought, when he had urged his apoointment to the Mexican aims agencies, that he was lining him up a job that didn't require any work. a lot of lawyers who have seen you e urging me to recommend you job," Connally added. others having contact with n Claims Commission ur- s want him to remain opera for this Lawyers Witt on the ing the last 13 in spite of his 81 ye They have pointed t that during the last 2 years he has rend almost as many opinions and findings of f t as have been rendered by his two colleagiles. They also refer to the fact that when the 'Chief Com- missioner dissented from his colleagues, the 1.7.8. Court of Claims has agreed with Witt's viewpoint in every instance. Chief Judge Marvin Jones of the Court of Claims, a Texan, has indicated he would tell President Eisenhower that Witt shouldn't be allowed to retire if the White House asked his opinion. Witt and his wife, the former Gwyn John- stone of San Antonio, plan to live in either Austin or Corpus Christi when they return, to Texas. Witt said almost all of his friends in Waco are dead EAKUP OF THE SUMMIT CONrEVENCE President, many corn- mM".& have been made about the breakup of the summit conference, and we can expect many more comments to be made. I doubt whether we can expect any more reasoned or more moving comment than that made in an editorial published on yesterday in the Detroit News. The title of the editorial is "Requiem for a Sum- mit?Innocence Age Ended." I hope the editorial will receive very wide reading, and I ask that it be printed at this point in the REcoso. There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: From the Detroit N 9601 REQUIEM FOR IIMMIT?INNOCENCE AGE ENDED Man must always look up, but today we look up to a summit that no longer is there. /t is lost in a sky red with abuse. Yet the angry storm clouds that have made a mock- ery of our hopes do not have to be the shroud for our good intent. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T0078 R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 10008 C GRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE ,.. The forecast is for more storms. But in I the winter of our discontent and demolished hopes we cannot retreat to the foothills. We must go on, persevering for peace. We have failed, but we must still look upward. We learn from failure. What have we learned this time? We have learned something about our- selves. - We have learned that we have spy planes. We learned that we had violated another nation's aerial sovereignty and that because of equipment and men and luck we had been doing so unscathed for some time. We have been engaged in a dirty business which is made no more clean by the fact that neutrals who plan no war are engaged in it, too. Our age of innocence is past. We were glad to think that the men who lead us had taken this elementary precaution to give us somewhere near an even break in a nuclear world where surprise attack and evil are concomitant. We were sorry we had been caught. But also we were dismayed by the Washington bungling that followed the de- nouement. WeJlpat sux V-2 arrow in the 11%,,alld, w1W fell we wereffeedrrIt`eWere just plilTrallrfer Neveir in l'Ebnield of human handouts have so many owed so little to the few in authority who confused ourselves, our allies, and the uncommitted world by saying what they did not mean and meaning what they did not say. - We and the world have learned about Nikita Khrushchev and what he represents. The last few yards to the summit for us were the toughest. Yet when we got there it was the bully boy who had baited the propaganda trap for us, who saved us from a fate worse than obloquy. He who professed to want a world with no arms threatened to unleash his. He whose protestations of peace had given hope to the smaller NATO nations so near his frontier shattered his own loving cup. In fact, the only spirit of Camp David left in him was a raging hangover. He tore off his own mask. He was revealed as a Santa Claus with horns and an empty sleigh when the world had been led to expect from him the priceless gift of peace. If we 11aLUmagled with a 17-.2 he fell fiat ori 111rWin expinithirMirfor. Some of our allies, nervous at being involved in our spying, were fortified in their will to maintain the Western alliance. We didn't get them back into line. Khrushchev clubbed them back. He had won neutral goodwill by being a prime organizer of a meeting to reduce world tensions. He lost it by breaking up the meeting. He had nothing to offer but tears and blood. Where do we stand now? It is the tragedy of a generation that can split an atom that it cannot splice a divided world. We have created a nuclear terror and now are scared at living with it. And we know that if our ring finger was not on the pushbutton marked "retaliation" we might not even be living to be scared. We and the Communists talk of uncom- mitted nations in the cold war, forgetting that in a hot one we commit all mankind because radioactive fallout knows no fron- tier of neutrality. We must, therefore, still press on to try to save ourselves, the neu- trals and the Russian people themselves. All this we know as the requiem for a summit begins. Yet it is not a time for morticians. We may beat our breasts, but we need not bury our hopes. Man never has, and that is why he can still look up even when no summit is there. e role of the trade-union movement in political action, and the role of business in political action, have been hotly de- bated. Because ours is a society which requires the broadest possible under- standing and participation in developing the answers, to our public questions, I have alway felt that participation by both groups wa.s proper and to be en- couraged. Ii recent months, a great American cor oration, the Ford Motor Co., has plann d, and has now put into action, an irna mative and responsible program which vill encourage political action and par ipation by all of its employees. It is y hope the program will prove most e I tive. The manage- ment of the Ford otor Co. must have devoted much time a d effort in the crea.- tion of this program, hich is known as Ford effective citizen p program. I ask that a speech hich Thomas R. Reid, of the Ford Mor Co., gave at Detroit, Mich., on May outlining the program be printed in t RECORD fol- lowing my remarks. I this in the hope the speech may come i the atten- tion of others who share tht concern of Ford, and who may be mov to under- take a comparable effort. S e politics is .the housekeeping job of a ? ocracy, it is imperative that this free pr ple pay close attention to this housekee g job, lest we fail the test which is our this 20th century. There being no objection, the a ess was ordered to be printed in the RE D, as follows: POLITICAL PA-RTICIPATION: THE 1960 SI TION?MAHAGEMENT PROGRAMS TO ENCOU AGE PARTICIPATION (Remarks of Thomas R. Reid, of Ford Motor Co., at Industrial Relations Research Asso- ciation, Detroit, Mich., May 6, 1960) The great game of politics in America has become a spectator sport. It is like base, ball?everybody loves to read about it an talk about it, but only a few of our million, of people participate actively for the season in the two major leagues of el er politics or baseball. I have no plea to offer today for/ ore sandlot baseball players desirable that may be, but I do urge that factory rkers, farmers, housewives, businessmen, d other citizens of whatever occupation pJ a more active role in public affairs and itics. The encouragement of politi participa- tion is not a union-manag nt matter. This is something which cle y should be outside the realm of labor- siness contro- versy and just as clearly is inatter of tran- scendent importance to aA ',of the American people. Anyone who approach this subject in the context of business ve us labor reflects an tli attitude already far tod-prevalent in America that practically eve#thing in the public domain, including even the American system of representative gnvernment itself, has a labor side and a management side. I say these things so bluntly at the outset of my remarks Abecause I have been con- cerned from ti time I first was invited to appear on this rogram about the wisdom of duling separate treatments of the labor int of vieWrand the management point of view on this subject. The format itself sug- gests a debate or a disagreement. In spite Of this concern, I wanted to accept the invoicrion. to partioipate in your pro- gram t y because: 1. Tints abject of encouraging political par- ticipation is of such vast importance to the American people that free and open discus- POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: THE 1960 SITUATION Mr. HART. Mr. President, American political history reflects periods when May 23 sion of it should take place wherever the opportunity is presented. 2. There is active participation of the aca- demic profeS-sion in the association. The widespread influence of what professors and teachers will be saying on this subject in our schools and colleges is so vital to a clear understanding of the topic for years to come that every opportunity to present the facts to the academic world should be welcomed. The course of public affairs customarily has been shaped by the professiona ' poli- ticians and a relative few interest indi- viduals. This has come about not fnly be- cause they have had so much to on the subject while others have remaineifapathetic and silent, but because the pol cians and these individuals too, oftentime ave taken the trouble to inform themse s and work at this business of governmei while others have not. I would be the t to while, those who are active and art4ulate in public affairs. My contention is imply that there should be more activity, *re participation, more voices raised from ag segments of Amer- ican society, if we are r retain government of, by, and for the peo e. Government in thi untry cannot be the private preserve of t professional elite, the political elite, the i ancial elite, or the or- ganized elite of a' category. In this age of specialization, is interesting that two of the most fun ental responsibilities we have in a demo cy?parenthood and polit- ical participat ?are largely entrusted to amateurs. P ents have no choice. Once the offsprinrives he has to be taken care of?and pa ts learn by doing. It is differ- ent with 41,, political responsibilities, how- ever. No e really is forced to assume them.. We can ays let George do it?let him and Sam a Bill make the decisions and run our to or our country, for us. It s far less important to me who does the ?ouraging of citizenship participation th hat there be a great deal of encourage- ie all quarters. I don't think of as a question at all of whether unions usiness should encourage participation-- imply think that everybody who loves his untry should encourage participation. lis movement toward greater interest in. ical affairs that we have seen just in the pa year or so should not be confined to bus ess people. Everybody belongs in the act, is every bit as desirable that lawyers, doe housewives, bricklayers, and bank- ers be ncouraged toward more active eiti- zenshi articipation by the organized groups to whic hey belong. In sho there is absolutely nothing wrong In any gt p in our society with organize- tional infl flee over any category of citizens encouragin more active participation by such citize There is everything right about it. Now, I reco alone will not ticipation In pu to see the great battering down clubhouses seekin always be with us their human shortco But I am not too hold to the optimistic ful measure of achieved by: 1. Creating a climate agement; 2. Repairing the unfavo of politics and politicians; 3. Making politics fend and convenient for people. Business, and in particular e public rela- tions and advertising !rate ty, likes to think it knows something stout shaping public images. Probably no grottp in America is in a better position than business to do something to correct the unfavorable publics image of politics. One reason is that busi- ness is itself partly responsible for creating ze full well that exhortation uce wholesale citizen par- e affairs. We are not going ss of the American people doors of their political dmission. Apathy will long as men retain ngs. ouraged by this. ew that a meaning- newticipation can be Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 positive encour- le public image , acceptable, r?Fbt Release 2004/05/1 00060001-7 ofiE-STIONS ON NATIONAL POLICY (Mr. KOWALSKI asked an.d.was given permission to address the 140use for I minute.) To Mr. Speaker. speaking on behalf of a large number of MeMbers of this body who last Friday asked the President to answer. a series of questions on the U? cident and re- lated subjects, tA te remarks made by the chaknlan- of the Republican C ,o1 igressi :,Qampaig n Committee. ?? The questi,)n, which, , .1.aised are questions which the Kiheic:--,1 pee- ple have been tiskring. They are ques- tions of naden,:i polley affect every American. When the ublican Congression1,1 Caikipalgn cjonirnii,Lr ac- cuse-5'1T1 -frolloWing closely..the .1,.Thrti- shchev line," he , patriotism and cait),ng, an mai:ranted reflection on us as ihdi'vidnals ,:and elected representatiiies o' 1 ie aeiicau people. ^ I suggest, Mr. Stre*Mil.Mat apologY is in order. I suggest further, Mr. Speaker, that the answers to our questions should come from the President of the United States.' The Congress and the p right to know.eqpje haVe Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 x1NGRESSIONAL REWARved For Release 2004/05/13%IA-L1P96900T00782R000100060001-7 it/ Farley Critical of Stevenson's "Crowbar" Talk EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. CHARLES B. HOEVEN T' bIWA- IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, May 23, 1960 Mr. HOEVEN. Mr. Speaker, ? under leave to extend my remarks in the Ap- pendix of the RECORD, I include the fol- lowing hews story which appeared in the Washington Sunday Star on May 23, 1960: PARLEY CILITAL Or STEVENSON'D "CROWBAR" TALK NEW YORK, May 2l.-44114,esAa1ity today ? called upon the forthcoming Democratic Na- tion Convention to condemn and repudiate incident. Mr. Farley, former Democratic national AdliFILZ?Sthyenson's criticism of the Eisen- hower administration over the U-Z spy plane chairman, accused Mr. Stevenson of "at- tempting to use the incident to 'sledgeham- mer and crowbar' another disastrous nomi- nation for himself as the apostle of appease- ment out of the Democratic Party." Mr. Farley supported and campaigned for Mr. Stevenson In both the 1952 and 1956 presidential campaigns.' Mr. Stevenson had said, that Premier IChrushchey of Russia wrecked the summit conference but that the United States gave ikm the sledgehammer a,nd crowbar to do it. 'UNWARRANTED ATTACK Mr. Farley said, the unwarranted attack by Mr. Stevenson "on the President's con- duct of the summit negotiations, in my opinion, in no way represents the thinking of the Democratic Party." He called on.Damocrats "to keep the sym- bol of our part, the Democratic mule and not Mr. StevenOn's umbrella," and added: "For Mr. 3tievenson to state that the ad- ministration gave the Soviet a sledgehammer and a crowbar to wreck the summit confer- ence indicates te, me that Mr. Stevenson Con- tinues to be as Misinformed on the facts as he is infatuated with his own writing style." The Postmaster General in the late Presi- dent Franklin,D, Roosevelt's Cabinet said, "It has been my experience that adroit phrase- making does not necessarily indicate sound policymaking, a view which I find fortified by the rejection of Mr. Stevenson on two oc- casions by the American electorate." giMtil;0414: "It is a pity that the course of history cannot be reversed by a well-turned phrase, in which case hundreds of .millions of en- slaved people mad at least 3 .captive coun- tries, liberafed by Mr. Stevenson's apt phrases, would have occasiOn to think pro- fusely about this overpolished literary com- bination of Don Quixote, Pagliacci and Ri Van Winkle." Approved For Release 2004/05/13: CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD MAY 23 1960 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 On 1.1--2 and Its Summit Collapse After- math Let's Have the Inside Facts EXTENSION OF REMARKS HON. WILLIAM S. MOORHEAD OV-I,ENNSYLVANIA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, May 23,1960 Mr. MOORHEAD. Mr. Speaker, today at United Nations Headquarters in New York there opens another chapter in the U-2 incident and its summit collapse aftermath. Again, for propaganda purposes, the American people and the American Pres- ident are likely to be attacked by spokes- men for that same nation which came to the summit with the now all too appar- ent purpose of wrecking it. AgailaSt such propaganda attacks and against efforts to intimidate the Ameri- can people by fanatical saber rattling, we should demonstrate our unity as a nation. rorthe past week this spirit of unity has tarvAiled as it should have. Very soon, 4401Vprer, Congress and the Ameri- can people must take a critical look at events leading up to the;sumnq it collapse to determine why and how it was that the administration apparently gave Khrushohev the tools for his summit? wreeking job. - Yester4ay, the Pittsburgh Press, an Influential nowspaAer In t7s c , said editoria14: '`Ccongrig?kiguituscLto know the 'inside baSett1r Of the events lead- ing up to the Paris debacle and pf all the incidents and policies which figure In the story." Under leave heretofore granted to in- sert my remarks in the Appendix of the fl RECORD, I include a copy of the editorial for I also believe that the "inside base- ball" of this grim affair should be made known: LET'S NOT pup A LID Ike came home from his dismal experience in Paris to a warm and cheering welcome by thousands who turned out for his arrival in Washington, plus flag flying and other dem- onstrations around the country, All this was highly appropriate as evidence of American unity. The country shortly will hear a TV talk by Ike, centered on the summit collapse. We hope he will lay it on the line, as to Just where we stand, and that his audience will be the biggest ever. And then let us go about our business in dead earnestness?the everlasting business of staying strong. If Khrushchev pipes down temporarily, that is no excuse for an- other spasm of dreamy thinking that the cold war is over. No more than his explosive rantinas should set us off on reckless and feverish crash programs. This is a continuing problem and there is only way to deal with it?on a steady, continuing basis. This is an election year, always a time for partisan excesess. There is no cause for muffling any issue, or gagging any platform orator. But there is such a thing as reasonable restraint, and our politicians can get across their messages and achieve their purposes by making use of it. Congress is entitled to know the ,,,inside baseball" of the events leading up to the Paris debacle and of all the incidents and policies which figure in the-Z(5'41". If there are differences in Judgment, let's ' hear them. But let's not merely Indulge In the old political game of all brag or all blame. And let's not forget whose side we are on. he:?cold war has been taxing our resources for 13 years. It will be with us for an in- definite time to come. We will best live with it if we manage our strength consistently and with alert responsibility. . There is nothing like a level head, and a sensible tongue in it. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 1960 Approved For Release 2/04/0511#96VA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE Luckily for the citizens of New York State, and for all Americans because of the precedent it may have set, the lioekefeller hideaway project is now in a. s of innocuous desuetude. *IPtiatippears to me it is our duty, Mr. esident, to put an end to the super- uated, boondoggling national civil nse agency. he entire character of warfare has drastically changed since the end orld War II?since 1945. We are living in the jet-missile-space age, age of challenge. Civil defense as ow conducted in this country is as ded as allow dips, mustache cups, e flintlock musket and the cannon- the Civil War period. fact that since the end of World civil clefense in this country has taxpayers of the United States billion; and yet today our civil rogram is a myth. This bil- r waste of taxpayers' money stopped. ident, the only sensible cour to abolish the entire present its place we should depend s of our Armed Forces to civilians in any war waged Finally, Mr. President, we e a vigorous and continu- of first-aid education on in the event of any at- Nation, using all media ion at our command?. an de ? bee of now ane it is outm and t ball o It i War I cost t over $1 defense ? lion do should ? Mr. Pr of action setup. I upon lead defend o against us. should initi ing campai self -protectio tack upon th of communic television, rad4 newspapers, magazines, and our schools1 Hundreds of /chousands of patriotic Americans havelvolunteered their time and efforts, ofted,at great risk to them- in times oftiloods, fires, and other 1 disasters. I pay tribute to these I peo , who perfO ed valuable service while paid Civil efense officials di- rected them . front behind safe desks. These fine men and women can, and will, render equally'fine services as aux- iliary firemen, policemen, and special deputy sheriffs. In 'time of disaster by fire or flood, our citizens have always come to the aid Of their neighbors. That is our AmericantwaY. Mr. President, a p posed appropria- tion for the Office of ivil and Defense Mobilization will be fore us shortly. I urge that every Se tor scrutinizing such request with utm t care. Here is a place where we can eally save tax- payers' money by for bly wielding a meat ax. The Administrator o the Office of Civil and Defense Mobili tion, ex-Gov- ernor Hoegh, of Iowa, s ed one term at a $12,000-a-year salar We do not need to feel sorry becaus he was de- feated at the end of his fir term, when the people of his State e ently were not satisfied with his ad istration. Following his defeat, the Pr ident im- mediately appointed him Ad inistrator of the Office of Civil and Def e Mobili- zation, at a salary of $22,50 He is now serving as the head of a utterly useless organization with ma thou- sands of men and women feedin at the public trough, but rendering no -useful ervice. Fjnally, Mr. President, I urge that :al of my colleagues individually scru- No. 99-4 tinize the request of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization for additional appro 'atm o of millions of dollars. rytki This or ization always seeks increased appropri Ions. Here is one place where we Can reallysave the taxpayers' money, without doi any harm whatever to the public and vithout doing any harm whatever to t safety and welfare of our country. Nv is the time to put an end to this wasf of money for an in- ept, utterly worth ss, outmoded boon- doggle. ... All of us know thatin a time of grave 1..., national emergency, dee Armed Forces of our country will defend the citizens of the United States at, they always have. Surely the defenskof our citi- zens is too important to be'left to any- one other than the trained and expe- rience, men of the armed services?the me the Army, the Navy, and -the Air F e of this Nation. THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMIT- TEE INQUIRY INTO THE SUMMIT MEETING the MT elitirhs*? d347gr. Mr. President, expressed some mis- givings about the inquiry by the Com- mittee on Foreign Relations into the summit meeting. Of course, I meant no aspersions on the competence of that committee. But I felt, and feel, that most of the iiii.,12,_eXotth1117-?g_ad- ?iggrroir-A-4-94?111115-a-r1, Q. arCintenigence c area' and therefore ought toismain cire importantrt-feltzLand a great mischief will be done by any investigation which proceeds un- der the assumption that there was an American "failure" at Paris, and that those "responsible" must be brought to book. Now that the inquiry has begun, I think all of us are obliged to try to put into proper perspective the events of re- cent weeks, so to keep the mischief to a minimum. The decision to inveStigate flowed di- rectly out of the contention that the American Government bears a large part of the blame for the collapse of the Paris talks. This contention was based, in turn, on the theory that two American acts? P 04:lent's afflp.Mpttgli, pf re- v sponsi i ?rine-4M flights, and the stet-eft& 15ii Viii and Mr. Herter, im- plying that the flights would continue? left Khrushchev no choice but to break up the summit. This theory, in its es- sentials, has been adopted by several authorities: by Khrushchev himself, of course; by Governor Stevenson; and by a number of lesser American person- ages. The copyright, however?at least in virtue of first usage?belongs to Mr. Rillictittil da,ys before the summit alaraW.09, ,,A,Peaa t_ cl 'Iout in bItt*sbirtritet token, if Mr. Lipp- mann is not the ar_if A,22,ki,c.Y critici jie is at? .1 , - 'Mean Pr and continuing counselor. It is not my habit to take public issue With newspaper columnists; but this is not an ordinary occasion, and Mr. Lipp- mann is not an ordinary columnist. He Is, in addition to being a columnist, a political force, I have never quite un- derstood why this shOuld be so, but I 11410?11111111.111111r \`* 10699 have been around long enough to know that it is. Some people seem to be im- pressed by the solemnity of his writing, and heaven knows it has that. Others say that he is "wise." Whatever the reason, he is quoted all over the place with a deference one ordinarily reserves for one's superiors. His words carry undoubted weight in strategic quarters, including strategic corners of this Cham- ber. I do not say these things in criti- cism of Mr. Lippmann, or to suggest that there is anything sinister about his activities or influence; but I say them by way of explaining why I am discussing his theory. Mr. Lipprnann's campaign to picture the United States as the offending party in presumnalt diplomacy began on May 12. That was the day after the weekly Presidential news conference at which the President confirmed his own respon- sibility for the flights, and implied that they would continue. _.11.:!resident's poiqi, L. mann advieed'ii, un- He continued--and this is the key passage, the kernel of the Lipp- mann theory: To avow that we intend to violate Soviet sovereignty is to put everybody on the spot. It makes it impossible for the Soviet Gov- ernment to play down this particular inci- dent because now it is challqnged openly in the face of the whole world.. It is compelled to react because no nation can remain pas- sive when it is the avowed policy of another nation to intrude upon its territory. Mr. Lippmann has repeated this argu- ment, in one form or another, each time he has written since that day. Last Thursday, for example, he again be- labored the President for not having taken what he called "the conventional way out which Mr. K. offered." The "conventional" response, Mr. Lippmann explained, would have been to disclaim responsibility for the U-2 flight, and to- accompany the disclaimer "as Senator KENNEDY has quite properly suggested, by a formal and perfunctory expression . of regret." Miga.....Vosicl,any.,k so loajik.ancl?,,act aTtriorcigize was, hided, "a fatal erro ? reparable mistake."- NeelY these assertions, for if they are correct?and if the Stevensons and Kennedys were correct in endorsing them?then Khrushchev was fully jus- tified in blowing up the summit. If it is true, that is to say, that it was "im- possible" for K. to play down the inci- dent, and that the Kremlin was "com- pelled" to react violently in order to preserve its self-respect, then it is also true that we, not the Soviet Union, bear the responsibility for the collapse of the Paris talks. Note, too, that Khrushchev himself fully appreciates the"-ranrerthis argu- ment. It has been his central propa- ganda theme for 2 weeks It in lItittitrtefore he left for the summit meeting. He used it in his opening state- ment at the Elysee Palace. He used it again in the course of his vile tirade against the President during the Paris press conference. As late as last Satur- day, the argument was the cornerstone of Khrushchey's official report to the Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 ,11110111111110?111MMOMI 40700 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 , CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE Soviet Union. Here are Khrushchev's words: Numwoompokapast* We * ? ? resolved rafter the Soviet dis- closure of the U-2 flights] to do nothing that would prevent the United States President from getting out of this embarrassing pre- dicament. We even declared that the United States President harcUy knew or approved of such actions and that evidently t 0,?theVs from the Pentagon and Alle s' his rill'Oretsional spy, "they are to Maine. Eisenhower did not 'taie -advantage of the opportunity granted him. He declared that the spy flights had been approved by him and made with his knowledge. *? * That is when it became obvious that the purpose of the aggressive actions by the United States was to torpedo the summit meeting. Now, it does not follow that because the Lippmann line corresponds with the official propaganda line of the Soviet Union, it is the wrong line. All of the presumptions, however, run strongly in that direction. Especially is this so when, as we shall see, the line is incom- patible with some of the major facts of the case. The first fact on which the Lippmann theory runs aground is that it wa the United States, but the Soviet UTt tat' rilade an inteinational incident out of Me 1r-2 ePisode. The subsequent brealtatNIT Of the Paris talks will never be understood unless this initial event is kept clearly in mind: that Khrushchev deliberately chose, in a flamboyant speech before the Supreme Soviet on May 5, to publicize the American spy flights, and the fact that one of our planes had been shot down. Now let us be sure that we understand the magni- tude of this decision to draw public at- tention to the flights; that we appretiate the great risks Khrushchev was running and therefore the high stakes for which he was playing. For many months Soviet propaganda had traded heavily an the claim of So- viet military invincibility. The claim that the 'U.S.S.R. was as strong, or stronger, than the United States, was a key propaganda tool in Soviet attempts to intimidate the uncommitted nations, our allies, and ourselves. The Kremlin knew, of course, that the claim was false. Soviet leaders knew, among other things, that for 4 years American intelligence aircraft had roamed at through Communist airspace?over_China as well ?aswgzes t2?4?ssia. The Kremlin knew that it had neither the rockets nor the air- craft to prevent this activity. During these 4 years, however, Khrushchev did not make a public issue of the flights? for the obvious reason that to do so would be to expose and acknowledge the astonishing weakness of the Soviet air defenses. On May 5 the Kremlin decided to abandon this policy. ILlaw,,wag_cf...our plam.?_ga,?slied?and I MiThonvinced it was definitely not shot doyila#,,pruis- inft,Altitude, as Khrushehev eltilined? Ithrushchev chose to blow up the matter into a full-scale international incident, thereby admitting to the world that So- viet air frontiers were indefensible. Let us postpone the question of what Khrushchev hoped to accomplish by creating this incident, and note, simply, that it was Ike not we who created it. It was "impossible," Mr. Lippmann wrote, "for the Soviet Government to play down this particular incident." How absurd. Having created the incident, Khrushchev quite obviously had no desire to "play it down" until he had achieved the purpose for which he had originally played it up. Khrushchev, above all, is not a frivolous man. We may be sure he did not create an international crisis that involved great damage to his country's prestige and the possible loss of his own power, only to let it die?as Lippmann suggests he would have?by accepting President Eisenhower's disclaimer of responsibility and regrets. Khrushchev had other fish to fry, as his conduct in Paris was soon to make clear. The second fact that makes trouble for Lippmann's theory is that Khrushchev refused to go ahead with the summit? even after President Eisenhower an- nounced the U-2 flights would be dis- continued and would not be resumed. Before the Paris meeting Lippmann had written that his only criticism was that the President had made spying our "avowed" policy. The further recom- mendation?that the President should have apologized?did not find its way intoihe?Lippinann doctrine until after Khrushchev had demanded an apology irc Whs. It was the avowal that had made it "impossible" for Khrushchev to play down the incident. Well, the Presi- dent disavowed the policy: I cannot Imagine a plainer disavowal than a promise to discontinue a past policy. And still Khrushchev blew up the sum- mit. My personal judgment is that it was unwise to have disavowed the policy once it had been avowed. The point, however, is that once it was disavowed, there as no further excuse, under the Lippmann theory, for Khrushchev to re- fuse to hold the summit talks. Let us now approach the problem along a somewhat different route. Sup- pose the President had done exactly what his leftist critics Wanted him to do?that he had carried out the Lippman theory to a "T." Suppose he had taken "the conventional way out which Mr. Khru- shchev offered," and had made some such statement as this: The U-2 flight was conducted without my knowledge or permission, and the U.S. Gov- ernment regrets that it took place. And I emphasize that this is only a hypothetical statement. Does anyone seriously think?in the light of what had already happened and of what was to follow?that Khrushchev would have let the matter drop at that? Having persuaded the President to eat that much crow, he would surely have tried to force him to eat the whole bird. It is not difficult to imagine Khrushchev's rejoinder to such a statement by Eisen- hower, if he had made such a state- ment--which he did not; and this is a hypothetical rejoinder that I ascribe to Khrushchev: We are delighted to learn that President Eisenhower had no part in the infamous spy mission, and that he has not known any- thing about these aggressions against Soviet territory that have been carried on for 4 years by his subordinates. Moreover, we are pleased that he regrets he has been unable June 1 to prevent these flights. It is therefore with great sorrow that the Soviet Government finds itself unable to accept the U.S. state- ment. How is it possible for a self-respecting power to do so? If the President master of his own house, what as have we that these fights will stop'neipi.e- ly it is intolerable that these international bandits should remain at large. The So- viet Government cannot be satisfied with anything lees than public exposure, trial, and punishment of those who perpetrated these outrageous crimes. We know in the inter- est of peace the U.S. President will take steps to assert his constitutional authority, and so forth. Would not Khrushchev have replied in this vein had Eisenhower followed Lipp- mann's advice? The logic of the sit- uation demanded it. Having deliberate- ly created the incident, Khrushchev was bound to squeeze out the last drop of rid- icule and scorn. Thank goodness our President and his advisers had the good sense to stand where they did instead of allowing the situation to deteriorate further. I repeat: Once it was clear that Khrushchev was determined to exploit the plane incident as far as he could, and once it was clear that he was in possession of physical proof that the spy flight took place, nothing could have been more foolhardy than for the President to have tried to deny it, or to have pre- tended he did not know what was going on, or to have apologized for it. This brings us to a point which has disturbed many people?many who re- ject the appeasement aspects of the Lippmann thesis. Would it not have been better, it is asked, for the United States slnipiy_ to have remained so -nt during'WEMEtheir'itiradeS in M Could we not, by that course at To have avoided the ernbar- avoidediompromising the CIA opera- MEM public acknowledgment that w were violating international law? Was there not something unprecedented and unusual in our behavior when we decided to talk openly about our spy 'policy? I believe the answer to these questions Is to be found?once again?in Khru- shchev's original decision to blow up the ? U-2 incident. Mr. Lippmann writes grandly about the "conventional" way of handling such incidents and indicts the U.S. Government for being un- conventional. But was, _really the United States whtli hte the convert- titriirr ltfht: LIPpmann tes .knowingly artht "double life" nations lead?the hidden life of spy operations, and the open life of normal diplomacy?and he accuses the U.S. Government of ripping off the veil from the hidden life. But was it really the United States which tore off the veil? Look at it this way. Can anyone re- member a previous instance in modern history in which the chief of state of a major power has gone before his coun- try's parliament to make a public expo- sure of another great power's spy activi- ties, and has coupled that exposure with a demand for public satisfac- tion? Spy incidents, to be sure, have been publicized before. When a Colone' Abel?or any one of scores of Soy; spies?is apprehended, our Justice L partment announces it to the pres1r? Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 A6 0 CONGRESSION AL RECORD ? SENATE speeches commenting on the arrest may be made in Congress; he is tried by the courts, and he may be convicted. But de, he President of the United States, irt,%i an instance, go before Congress aiw7Frave documents in the air purport- ing t,? prove Abel's guilt, and demand before the world that Khrushchev ex- plain whether he was personally involved in sending Abel here? Such a perform- ance would, indeed, break the conven- tions. 'ef.s..91 401Y ad attolawx atagut,,spy, op- eltThi-not unless one of them deliber- atelYIntends to kick over the traces. But this is precisely what Khrushchev did. It was he who broke the conven- tions by insisting that the American Government make a public accounting for a spy operation, the proof of which was already in Soviet hands. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi- dent, will the Senator yield? Mr. GOLDWATER. I am happy to yield. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Does the Senator have any doubt in his mind that it is a aption of internatiollal *.W to overfly an6tEer country's territory and to systematically photograph for intel- ligence purposes? Mr. GOLDWATER. I have no ques- tion in the world as to that fact. In fact, I have4i6expressed myself on that point. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I assume It is the Senator's answer that he would agree it is a violation of international law to conduct spy flights over another nation's territory. GOLDWATER. I must assume ii I do not recall having seen that down. That is the point to which I am addressing fflrbif. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The point I am getting at follows in a second ques- tion. Does the Senator know of any in- stance in history where any major power has conceded and admitted it was engaging in espionage activities either in or over another country's airspace? Mr. GOLDWATER. I cannot recall, from my limited knowledge of history? and particularly with respect to modern history, where aircraft have been used? that a similar instance has ever oc- curred before. Anticipating the Sen- ator's next question, I believe that had such an incident occurred, and had the situation been as I have been describ- ing it, we would probably have found the same type of incidents occurring. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Does the Senator believe that any agent for espi- onage purposes can be successful if he proceeds to admit things and tell the truth when he is asked any particular given question under all circumstances? Mr. GOLDWATER. I would say we would not expect them to have any suc- cess. If another fellow knows someone is spying on him, he is going to take steps to see that the person does not spy the way it is reported he is spying at the time. I would suggest that the Senator is correct in his assumption that 'lis would lead to a disruption of that aticular spy technique. LONG of Louisiana. The point I --IZd in mind is that in espionage activi- ties the agent who is operating can never afford to admit he is a spy. The moment he does so, if he is in another country's territory, he will be appre- hended, and his usefulness will be ended. Mr. GOLDWATER. Yes. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Regrettably, spying is against international law, and spying also is an activity which requires that the agent must lie, certainly so long as he is operating where he can be apprehended in some foreign country. Most major powers do conduct such procedures, but so far as I know, when agents are caught they never admit and never confess what they have been do- ing. At times an agent might be tor- tured into confessing,' but any confes- sion as a result of torturing, according to our system of law, is not a valid con- fession. The Senator knows that, does he not? Mr. GOLDWATER. I think the re- cent incdent was a little bit different from the usual Mate Hari type of spy who might be picked up in a saloon or a hotel as a result of suspicion. In my State we say that when some- thing has feathers like a duck, flies like a duck, and makes a noise like a duck, it is a duck. If a U-2 plane came down because of engine trouble and landed on Russian soil, any aerodynamic expert who looked at it would pretty well know the purpose for which it was built. If the cameras were intact?and we must assume they were?I would assume the Russians would have brains enough to say, .`"I'hiS is an espionage plane., It is certainly not a plane engaged in pleasure flying over Russia. It is in the air to spy on us." Having the evidence on hand, which is very unusual, as the Senator must -ad- mit, I think Khrushchev took advantage of this, as I have related, and as I shall further relate, to accomplish a certain purpose, whieh I am afraid he has al- most accomplished and will accomplish if we allow ourselves to be carried away much furthep. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The thought which occurs to me is that we did an unprecedented thing. In fact, so far as I know, no major power which was sovereign at the time, without enemy troops on its territory to compel a confession, has ever confessed or ad- mitted it has engaged in espionage activities. Perhaps Khrushchev thought his case was so strong that we could not get out from under, but the im- pression I have gained is that we would have been a lot better off if we had con- tinued to insist this was a flight not au- thorized by anyone, not even by the man's immediate superior, and if we had taken the attitude that, if the Soviets wanted to investigate spying activities, we have knowledge of some events of that sort on their part we want to pre- sent, to be investigated also, so that we could both go to trial together. .41,CALMA=R. I think the Sen- atoirinTaThlrfEheard my earlier remarks In which I took a similar stand. The incident has happened. Because It has happened, I am afraid the Ameri- can people are being "wishy-washed" in- 10701 to a position of operating from fear rather than pride in what has been ac- complished. As I have said, this is a most unusual ease of espionage being found out. Usually the spy disposes of himself. For some reason, that was not done in this instance, and the aircraft was not destroyed. We know for certainty that the radar capabilities of Russia are such that for 4 ears the Russians _must have been rac **These i3lana-acieS4 the skies. I imagine the Russian air forces and air defenses were about ready to tear out what hair they had, when they realized they did not have defensive capabilities of getting these planes down. They must have known from observa- tion that it was not a B-52 or a B-4'7, the only aircraft that we have capable of approaching a height slightly exceeding 50,000 feet. The Russians knew it was not either of those two aircraft because those planes do not have the necessary speed. I believe they knew all along what we were up to. I have never believed in the efficacy of summit conferences, but the incident came at an unfortunate time for those who believe in them. The U-2 plane came down. The Russians knew pre- cisely what our country was doing. We admitted it. There is a question as to what the Senator from Louisiana would have done had he been in the place of :..tlie,#resident, but, as I have recited, this sAlitp.flrst time in history that I recall the Chief hf State considered '10.4,14 question.oi psr it would hi'Ve seemed to thr9M-7147,75r any of our Presidents 'at thegtnt:lif the detection = of any hf the renTteroils Russian spies trhttm--We have , t*Cted, to come to a joint- session 0 Congress, waving pn.6".rPftIld -a'...tellianttlng a ul1 in- veStitatiMi y i.e:(Ittlexi?country. Mr: .11514d art'iiiiiSiatia. I suspect, and I believe I could, enpport my suspi- cion if need be, 'that there have been other occasions on which agents of this country have been apprehended, and this country denied any knowledge of them. That is the manner in which every major power operates. We do not like to operate in that way, but we are compelled by circumstances to do so, I assume. When the executive of our Nation says, "Yes, this was spying; I knew about it; I authorized it," it seems to me that he leaves us in no position to be self-righteous when we plead guilty. Mr. GOLDWATER. I am not at- tempting to be self-righteous. I have had enough experience in the military to realize that a nation cannot carry on day-to-day peaceful military operations without as full a knowledge of the enemy as we can possibly get. There is no ques- tion in my mind that the Russians have as good information on our military capabilities as we have, if not better. This action was merely an effort during the 4 years in which the activities were carried on to give us an even break. I am proud of this incident. vlAmslu ea a: out It. y great respec American ingenuity skyrocketed even higher when I realized that we were able :,;;;(1154- ? Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 702 to produce an airplane to accomplish this objective. As one who knows a little about aerodynamics, I say that if anybody had told me the U-2 airplane was doing what we now know it accomplished, I would have said, "I doubt it. I do not think it is possible." Now we know it is pos- sible. I am addressing my remarks today to those who wish to make out of this incident either a political issue--and I am sure the Senator is not one of those? or an issue that can bring weakness to the American people instead of the pride that should be in their hearts. I speak not necessarily of the pride of spying, because all of us dislike the word. But tel4,4Ct that we Aave been able to keep up with the military capabilities of the Soviet and ahead of them mili- tarily is a Fea, sourceb-freasS-urahbe to the $eri Arizona. 'Ffaslana. So far as I am concerned, I regret we do not have more information with respect to what is going on behind the Iron Curtain. I wish we had more. But I feel that when the decision was made in advance that if and when one of the U-2 planes came down over enemy territory it would not be admitted to be a spy mission, having made that decision, it would have been better to have stayed with it. Mr. GOLDWATER. Once Khru- shchev had decided on this extraordinary course, the United States had no choice but to react in kind. Once Khrushchev decided to make spy operations a factor in international diplomacy, the United States had to assume that his real pur- pose in creating the incident was diplo- matic in nature; that the decision to publicize the U-2 flight and the summit meeting were, in other words, inextrica- bly intertwined. What, then, was Khrushchev's pur- pose? What were the high stakes for which he was willing to sacrifice the myth of Soviet air invulnerability? Paradoxically, the fact this question must still be asked is evidence that Khrushchev has partially achieved his purpose. What is Pie mystery here? Why do we fumble for an answer that fairly leaps out at us? We are witness, surely, to a classic case of a failure to see the forest for the trees. Khrushchev wanted Berlin. Khrushchev told the world that if Ber- lin were not given to him, he would take it. CONGRESSIONAL Khrushchev became convinced, as the summit meeting drew near, that Berlin was not going to be given to him?that the United States had decided to call his bluff. Khrushchev thereupon decided? should the United States remain ada- mant?to torpedo the conference under circumstances that would conceal the fact his bluff had been called. The U-2 mishap was seized upon as a weapon with which to blackmail the United States into making last-minute concessions on Berlin or, if that failed, to be used as an excuse for blowing up the conference. In other words, because of the West's firmness on Berlin the Soviet Union was RECORD ? SENATE on the threshold of a major diplomatie defeat. It was Khrushchev's last-min- ute strategy to prevent that defeat, or, if it could not be prevented, to throw sand in the world's eyes so that the defeat would not be recognized or appreciated. Thanks to the steady nerves of our Gov- ernment at the critical moment, Khru- shchev failed in his efforts to pry loose concessions on Berlin. But Khrushchev's alternate objec- tive?that of diverting attention from the fact his bluff was called?is today close to realization. For far from cele- brating our victory, we are cringing be- fore the criticism and are haunted by the doubts of those spiritless creatures in our midst who ask, plaintively, whether we should have dared to win. Instead of taking to heart the lesson of the past few weeks, and proclaiming it to the ? world, we are?ourselves?trembling be- fore it. We cannot quite accept, even now, the moral of the recent ordeal? that firmness pays off. Is it not time to say that the summit has come and gone, and that there is no shooting, nor any danger of it, and that Berlin remains free? I do not mean to suggest that victories will always come so easily for the West? that we can always avoid shooting. But when the happy event occurs, and we are vouchsafed such a triumph, let us, for heaven's sake, recognize what has hap- pened. Let us not fall under the spell of our American Hamlets. Let us not collapse of shock for having made a right decision. 1Acve. .4.119;Ahr sec' summit meet- the gFOUrdS that the onlyprog= r ss they can produce is progress toward Communist domination of the world. Either summit meetings must fail for having achieved nothing, or they must fail for haying yielded to communism something of value to the West. The only summit meeting that can succeed is one that does not take place. Let us not forget that either. Mr. Lipprnann has hinted broadly that the Nation is obliged next November to turn out of office its present leadership, and to replace it with men more talented in the art of accommodation. He implies that the major Issue between the two parties may be precisely this: Whether the administration was correct in hav- ing refused to appease Khrushchev. I feel sure he is wrong. I feel sure, that both parties will nominate candidates who will support the minimum require- ments of firmness that were demon- strated in recent weeks by the Eisen- hower administration. But if I am proved wrong, then to the extent I can make it so, I promise the coming political campaign will be immersed in foreign policy right up to its ears. Mr. President, in connection with my remarks, I ask that there be printed at this point in the RECORD an excellent editorial entitled "Thanks, Mr. Khru- shchev," written by Mr. David Lawrence and published in the U.S. News & World Report of June 6,1960. There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the REcoab, as follows: June THANKS, MR. KninialiCativ. (By David Lawrence) Sometimes rroin unexsff quarters we are handed a benefit. Hence we oft-- say that "it is an ill wind that blows m Nikitie Khrushchev may be surprivt to learn the true consequences of his reiess action in Paris recently as he torpedoed the summit conference and publicly insulted the President of the United States. We are, indeed, indebted to the Soviet Pre- mier for the following consequences: 1. The credulous, naive attitudes adopted by various groups among us in their advocacy of summit conferences were revealed as hope- lessly impractical. No longer will we listen to the argument that these meetings can override the historic ways of diplomacy, supersede the United Nations, and leave it to four men to settle the disputes which threat- en the world with nuclear war. 2. The appeasers, who have thought that the way to get peace is by making concession after concession to the enemy, now have been proved illogical, misguided, and without per- suasive influence. 3. The leaders of thought who have urged that America maintain its strong defenses and place its reliance on the maintenance of deterrent strength have been vindicated and will now have an increasing influence with American public opinion. 4. The tactics of the Soviet Government, as it has sought to divide the Western allies, weaken NATO, and cause a crumbling of morale in the West, have been successfully thwarted. The Western alliance today has a redoubled strength?it has faith in the rightness of its cause and in its military power to deter war. 5. The world has at last been told many unpublished facts in the story of Soviet espionage. The opportunity to do this might never have been forthcoming if a counter- measure, undertaken by the United States, had not been detected and exploited b- Mr. Khrushchev when the U-2 was forced 1. 6. The knowledge of what really xsion g on in the cold war may have come as a7litck at first to the peoples of the West, but slowly they are beginning to understand the realistic truth. They now will read and be influenced by the facts revealed about Communist infiltration as well as aggression. 7. Publication by the United States of the list of Soviet spies arrested within our own territory as they sought military infor- mation has exposed the hypocrisy of the Soviet protestations concerning the plane piloted by Francis Powers. For Powers was merely taking pictures. His plane was un- armed and clearly marked with the initials of the National Aeronautics and Space Ad- . ministration, well known as a civilian agency of our Goverment. Is flying 12 miles or more above any country really a violation of international law? If so, then why have the Soviets launched space ve- hicles which can take photographs of U.S. territory? 8. Attention has been dramatically focused on picturetaking from the skies. In 1955 President Eisenhower made his open skies proposal to the Soviet Union as a means of providing "against the possibility of great surprise attack." He proposed that the two countries give each other a complete blue- print of their military establishments "from one end of our countries to the other," and then provide ample facilities for aerial re- connaissance and picturetaking of each other's territory. This plan was rejected out of hand by the Soviet Government and generally attracted little interest. Now, however, the world has been made aware of the importance of the plan and of the satel- lites already in orbit which can take pi, tures at great heights. 9. Emphasis has been placed on the " prise attack" issue. It has been difficult Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 ttlie Western governMent4 to alt111.60 World opinion on this contingency even though , everyone knows the West would not strikle the first blow. The world now, has had brought forcibly to its attention the vitit1 necessity of preventing or intercepting "surprise attack." The,,Kouse of Represent- atives, through one , its _ appropriation committees, has given larvial sanction to such a policy. - 10. The outcry of the Sollet Government about "aggression" and "spying" must In-.. evitably cause the world to ask when the Soviets will withdraw their agents from Cuba and other Latin-American countries., as well as from Europe, ,Asia and Africa, and really cease their "aggression." 11. Last but not rt, the Soviet chief,- tain has asserted a right to tell the Amerlr can people the kind of administration he wants to see elected 1t this country in No- vesnber. Let's grant, him that privilege on. the condition that..fme elections be held In. the Soviet Union and. that our radio mes- sages no longer be jammed as we exercise a. shriller right to tell the Soviet people whom they shall choose ns their ruler. Tee, we can say, "Tanks, Mr. Khrul shchev" for having opened not only our eyes but the eyes of free peoples everywhere to the simple feet that there can be no safety for any country as long as an arbitrary, au- tocratic regime, with the power to make sudden war., rules in MOBCOW. Mr. /I:MATING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. GOLDWATER. I am happy to yield. Mr. KEATING. Unfortunately I was absent from the Senate during the early part of the remarks of the distinguished Senator from Axixona [Mr. GOLDwATER], and heard only a part of what he said. Certainly, as he pointed out, the only way to deal with the men ha Kremlin is by a policy of Armnesa.,and strength. In this regard, I find Myself in complete aecord_with, the yiews....eAPressed by the Senata from ,AriZana. One does not deal with tyrants gad dictators in the same manner that iZe,,deals with normal human beings. Tq 4e, successfully with tyrants an,d diPtatqrs,, it is often neces- sary that we deny to .tbern what they ' want and instead giVe them what they do not. That is the only language they understand. President Eisenhower recognizes this fact. I share the view expressed by the Senator from Arizona that President Eisenhower's successor, be he _Republi- can or Me rat, must also recognize ,and I am quite certain that he b ide us if he does not. Certainly t &issue of who best can deal with this problem and who best can deal with the men in the Kremlin?Khru- Ehchev or his successor?is bound to be uppermost in the minds of the American people as they approach the forthconAng I ec tion. The Senator from Arizona has rage a great contribution to our thinking on this subject by his address. He and ; tales find ourselves in disagrAnne- tins, that, or the other issue; b et flr E's the distinguished Senator f pona takes the position that our y n- inent must continue its Policy, and mist, 17 anything, in the light of recent_evgnts, otill firmer and still stronger M this 'respect, I fully share his views. Mr. GOLDWATER, Mr. Presidents-I littened to the speech of the able Sena- tor from New York yesterday on this this fa will same subject. Whiie he and I are occa- sionally?but only rarely, I might say-- in di.sagreement, there is no issue on which we are more in agreement than 'the matter of the defense of the United States. My remarks today were addressed not onlY t45 the neressity of American lead- erg. 'reccegnizing this fact, which I be- lieve they do?and I agree with the Sen- ator from New York when he says that regardless of who the next President may be, he will lead from strength?I am concerned in these remarks today about the efforts being made by some people In this country?not purposely?to mis- lead the American people into thinking that we can deal with these tyrants? we would call them hoodlums in this country?by being nice to them, in the belief that they will treat us as they would want us to treat them. At the recent summit meeting?even though I do not agree with the idea of summit meetings?the heads of the American Government and all the agencies con- nected with that incident displayed ad- mirable courage, and their performance made me a little prouder of being an American. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 In., ? CPLICA.C.0 Approved ase 2004/05/13 : CIA-IRDP,,9QT00782R00014)0060?04-7// fhe Tribune Lists CMnotogy ot Events in Uottapse at the Summitl of Events in Web 13 Y WAMR TROHAN - Whims Maws Press Service] ashington, May 28?With Agressional investiga- der way in the U-2 e inciderit and the Gal the summit meet- heads of State, THE E presents a chrono- logy of the tangled web of vents. Members of the House for- eign. relations committee and the Senate foreign affairs committee are trying to un- snarl the incredible array of conflicting and contradictory ? statements. The editor of Tu s TRIBUNE asked for a detailed exam- . ination of the facts, available to date, without speculation about whether or not -t h e nnference would have been scuttled by Russia regardless of the spy plane incident- or about the justification of the spy policy. Here Is the Record The day by day record, as far as it is known to date, is as follows: MAY 1 ?Pilot Francis G. Powers took off from an un- named field bound for an un- revealed destination. T h e flight was ordered because clear weather was forecast, good weather which might not come again for several weeks. President Eisenhow- er has indicated there was an immediate photographic mis- sion in view?probably the site of the 5 ton sputnik launched on the eve of the summit conference. The same day there was a second U-2 meteorological flight from Turkey, gather- ing weather data for the Na- tional Aeronautics and Space administration. It has not been made clear whether the weather flights were made to " cover " the spy flights. Ike Approved Flight Central intelligence agen- cy officials say there was to have been an end to U-2 flights before the summit i conference. Just how soon be- fore the summit the cut-off was to come was not made _ clear. President Eisenhower said he fully approved the Powers flight. MAY 1-MAY 4 and the state de knew Powers and his plane were missing. powers carried a poison needle and a pistol, which is standard equipment for all strategic air command crews. It was said here that the pilot was under no in- ' structions to use the needle if captured, but he could elect to use it, if he were being tortured on capture. ? The pistol was said to be for shooting small game if brought down in wild areas. Confusion on Planes At first there was some confusion as to whether the weather plane or the Powers plane was missing. This was soon cleared up when the weather plane was located. There is no evidence that the administration made any plans on how to handle pos- sible capture of the pilot. It appeared that it was assumed here the plane had crashed and that no evidence of spy- ing was left. MAY 2?Russia asked for 'a 48 hour postponement of the projected visit to the United States of Russian Air ; Force Marshal K. A. Ver- i shinin. This was not con- nected to the missing plane. , On May 4 the visit was for- imally announced, but it was Icanceled May 13 after the U-2 plane disclosure. Tell Plane Missing MAY 3?It was announced from Istanbul, Turkey, that ' a single engine air force ; plane was missing near Lake Van, not far from the Rus- sian border. The report de- scribed the plane as one of two which had taken off ? from the United States base at Incrilik, near Adana, Tur- key, on a weathar reconnais- sance mission. It was said the second plane returned safely but the pilot of the first plane had reported his oxy- gen mask was not function- ing properly. To date there is no evi- dence that the U-2 was downed near Sverdlovsk, Russia, except Khrushchev's word. MAY 4?Khrushchev a n- nounced to a cheering su- preme soviet parliament that an American plane had been shot down over Russia. He deliberately withheld the fact that the pilot and spy films had been captured. President in Conference President Eisenhower had left for a national security council meeting in a secret hideout when news of Khrushchev's speech reached Washington. White House Press Secretary James C. Francis G. Powers did not know about the speech. Secretary of State Chris- tian A. Herter was in Athens en route home from a NATO foreign ministers conference in Turkey. Under-Secretary of State Douglas Dillon was acting head of .the depart- ment here. - A state dephrtment spokes- man, Lincoln White, who re- ceived his instructions per- sonally from Dillon; said that "it may be" the plane Khrushchev referred to Was the missing NASA weather plane. At this time it was known that the missing plane was not the weather plane. NASA Press Chief Walter T. Bonney said the plane was on a wholly peaceful mission. Whether or not Bonney knew of the spy flights has not been revealed. Calls Story Nonsense MAY 6?In Moscow it was said the U-2 was shot down by a single rocket on Khrush- chev's personal orders, but no further details were re- vealed. Russian Foreign Min- ister Andrei A. Gromyka said the American explana- tion was "nonsense." The state department said it was asking Moscow for "the full facts." White said "there was absolutely no? N-0 ? deliberate attempt to violate the soviet airspace." He repeated the May 3 story from Turkey that the pilot was having difficulty with his oxygen mask. Ilei-ter returned home to assume state department di- rection of the incident. It was evident that the affair was left in state department hands by the White House. Tells of Capture AY 7?Khrushchev, in a econd speech, disclosed the pilot had been captured and had confessed. He displayed spy photographs. Washington officials went into a series of huddles. The chief participants in the hud- dles were Herter, Dillon, Hagerty, White and Charles E. Bohlen, former ambassa- dor to Russia and now top adviser on Russian affairs. It was decided to issue a state- ment telling some, but not all of the truth. The state department said: "As previously announced, it was known that a U-2 plane was missing. As a result of the inquiry ordered by the President, it has been estab- lished that, insofar as the au- thorities in Washington are concerned, there was no au- thorization for any such flight as described by Mr. Khrush- chev. "Nevertheless it appears that in endeavoring to obtain information now concealed behind the iron curtain a flight over soviet territory was probably undertaken by an unarmed civilian U12 plane. Forced by Secrecy "Necessity for such activi- ties as measures for legiti- mate national defense is en- hanced by the excessive sec- recy practiced by the soviet union in contrast to the free world. "It is in relation to the danger of surprise attack that planes of the type or unarm- ed civilian U-2 aircraft have made flights along the fron- tiers of the free world for the past four years . . . Hagerty, when asked about a report that President Eisen- hower has ordered a halt t all further spy flights o Russia, said: "I know of no such _this is aveler uide Herter, in another state- Russia, said; "In accordance with the national security act of 1947, the President has put into ef- fect since the beginning of his administration directives to gather by every- possible means the information requir- ed to protect the -United States and the free world against surprise attack and to enable them to make ef- fective preparations for their defense. "Under these directives, programs have been develop- ed and put into operation which have included exten- sive aerial surveillance by un- armed civilian aircraft, nor- mally of a peripheral nature but on occasion by penetra- tion. "Specific missions of these MAY 8?President Eisen- hower returned from Gettys- burg to Washington and met with Herter. The conference reported was concerned with removing the impres- The United States replied sion the President did not to the Russian protest note, know what was going on in saying: spying. '? "In its note, the soviet Khrushchev sent notes to government has stated that Britain and France complain- the collection of intelligence ing about the U-2 incident but gave no indication of inten- tion to wreck the summit con- ference. Going on 4 Years MAY 9?In another state department statement, Her- ter said that "Penetration of the Soviet Union had been going on" by U-2s for four years. He said that this had been done on Presidential or- ders to gather intelligence, but added that specific mis- sions had not been subject to Presidential authorization. White was asked whether the Herter statement meant that the flights were to be continued. He said he would leave that to the interpreta- tion of newsmen. MAY 10?The Russian press described the Herter state- ment as "a frank attempt to legalize and justify violation of state frontiers of other na- tions for espionage." A Russ- ian note to the United States charged the flights were being carried on with the sanction of the United States government but did not ; blame President Eisenhower Iflights would continue. unarmed civilian aircraft have not been subject to Presiden- tial authorization." Allen Dulles, as head of CIA, made it clear that lie was prepared to take full re- sponsibility for the flight. _ Nikita Khrushchev hibition of U-2 wreckage and im?ent KIaiushchev pressed doubt of the earlier conclusion that President Eisenhower did not know of the flights. He said the Presi- dent would not be welcome as a visitor in Russia in June. MAY 12?In Washington, President Eisenhower took full responsibility for the flights at a press conference. He said nothing to counter the implication that they would continue. about the Soviet Union by American aircraft is a 'calcu- lated policy' of the United States. "The United States gov- ernment does not deny that it has pursued such a policy for purely defensive purpos- es. What it emphatically does deny-i,isi-that this policy has any agbessive intent or that Owl singoluildi. U-2 flight of 14051 vote ididertaken in an efforkftwirejudioe the suc- cess of the forthcoming meet- ing of the head' ek,govern- ment in Pari tv,:te return the state af Anlerican-Soviet Union relation to the worst times of the cold war. Puts Blame on Reds., "Indeed, it is the Soviet government's treatment of this case which, if anything, may raise questions about its intention in respect to these matters . . ." senflower or- dered flights over Russia stopped. This was not an- nounced at the time but dis- closed May 16. MAY 13?Herter arrived ;]]] in Paris. He denied that he warning against further use of their territory for spy flights. The Russians said the Powers flight originated in Pakistan and was to have end- ed in Norway. This has not been confirmed in Washing- ton. MAY 14?Khrushchev ar- rived in Paris. MAY 15?President Eisen- hower arrived in Paris. Khrushchev called on French President de Gaulle and British Prime Minister Macmillan, signaling his in- tention to torpedo the con- ference. He refused to join in a meeting with President Eisenhower, as suggested by de Gaulle and Macmillan, at which the U-2 situation could be explored. Khrushchev was also uninterested in sugges- tions he be satisfied with a promise that no more spy flights would be made. In Washington, George V. Allen, director of the United States information agency, tried to clear up some of the misunderstandings on the flights. He told a television quiz show: "I will say that I know that the spokesman of the state department who gave out the information was act- ing in entirely good faith when he said it was a weather plane. . . "There has been a great misunderstanding that I would like to correct today. Mr. Herter, the secretary of state, has not said that we are going to continue to fly. He said that there is an ob- ligation and a responsibility on the part of the govern- ment of the United States and of the free world to try to obtain information to guard against surprise attack, but he has not said that we are going to continue to fly. He hasn't said one way or an- other . . ." Nixon Traces Blame The same day Vice Presi- dent Nixon, on another tele- vision question and answer program, traced some of the blame for the erroneous statements to persistent de- mands of newspaper men for fads. He said the state depart- ment leaders were confronted with a situation in which they did not know wh t the Russians knew. He said It was decided to engage in evasive actions when news- paper men descended on the department, in order to pro- tect the pilot and not to in- form Russia about the nature of the flight, if that nature was unknown to Russia. Nixon said officials here had to "make a snap deci- sion at the moment and it proved that?it turned out that the decision was wrong." Nixon added: "There is never a right time to make one of these flights if you're going to get caught. "The plus is this. You realize that his flight clearly demonstrates the feasibility of the 'open skies' proposal of the President. Worz't Cause Harm "This flight demonstrates that unarmed planes can take photographs without causing any damage, any harm at all to commercial aviation or the national security of the coun- try over which the flights are made. . ." MAY 16. ? At the only meeting of the big four in Paris Khrushchev charged that the United States had torpedoed the conference. He demanded an abject apology for the flights, punishment of those responsible and an end to the flights. President Eisenhower r e- sponded by branding Khrush- chev's demands as an ultima- tum which could not be ac- cepted. Only for Protection He continued: "We pointed out that these activities [plane flights] had no aggressive intent but rath- er were to assure the safety of the United States and the free world against surprise attack by a power which boasts of its ability to deva- state the United States and other countries by missiles armed with atomic warheads. "There is in the soviet statement an evident misap- prehension on one key point. It alleges that the United States has, thru official state- ments, threatened continued overflights. - . .In point of fact, these flight were sus- pended after the recent inci- dent and are not to be re- sumed. . personally. " had given any intimation the Rejects Ike Visit Russia sent protest notes to MAY 11?At a Moscow ex- Norway, Pakistan and Turkey TODAY, SUNDA 4 AND COMPANY introduces JARMAN'S EVERSHINE LEATHER . with a built-in shine Moccar!n style blucher in black or brown Evershine leather $1695 '`Evershine" is an amazing leather. (1) It - repels dust and dirt and moisture; (2) It requires only a simple cleaning and buffing with a soft dry cloth or brush when shoes get dirty (exclusive with Jarman in men's shoes). Come in and try a pair *William Yates fakes you along on a springtime visit to the Left lank of Paris and tells the one best way to see this effervescent city. * Carl Rogers describes attributes which make Puerto Rico a wonderful vacation choice for both the fisherman and his nonfishing wife. * Estelle Atwell tells how $208 can buy a go-everywhere wardrobe that enables milady to travel abroad in style and comfort. 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Could you not try your espionage cases before the United Nations as well as they could? SECRETARY HERTER?We can. But espionage cases we try before our own courts. SENATOR LONG?Yes, but If they want to try a case be- fore the United Nations, couldn't you just as well have insisted on trying the espionage cases with them in the United Nations simultaneously? SECRETARY HERTER?Yes, we could, but in that particular case the issue was a rather different one. SENATOR LONG?Here is the thought that occurs to me. Under the Russian system if he admits he made a mistake he has to resign more or less as Malenkov [Georgi M. Malen- kov, former Soviet Premier] did or more or less throw him- self on the mercy of the party. But when we plead guilty to espionage in this case, how can we plead guilty on the one hand and contend that there is no punishment in order when we plead guilty to violating inter- national law? * * * Distinguishes Cases SECRETARY HERTER?Sen- ator, the cases to which you are referring, of which there have been quite a numbber, have all ben border cases where there was no espionage involved, where it was a question of a border patrol or weather patrol or something of that kind where the issue was as to whether or not there was an international overflight or not which is en- tirely different from this par- ticcular case. SENATOR LONG?Yes, but the thought that occurs to me is we didn't have to plead guilty to anything, and I know lawyers weresent guilty clients. Now, lawyer, when you plead "panty, aren't you more or less btposition that you do have to either apologize or take correc- tive action, or even under our system of law more or less offer to take your punishment if you are going to plead guilty? SECRETARY HERTER?As you may recall, the President had stated that he had taken corrective action. He has characterized this as a re- grettable incident. When t de- mand was made on him, these 0' her demands on him, I don't - think you, sir, or anyone else could have accepted those de- mands. SENATOR LONG?I don't re- quire my part of your examina- tion be made a part of the pub- lic record, Mr. Secretary. I don't insist on it at all, but I don't very well see how we can take the atitude we are going to ,plead guilty in the matter and then take the attiude that no 4 apology is forthcoming * * * SENATOR CARLSON, Re- publican of Kansas?Mr. Secre- . tary, I want to ask questions , on two items that I have select- ed from the mail I have received on the summit conference. The first is that people that write me are concerned because of the fact that Mr. Khrushchev ? hurled such epithets at us, our ur President and the nation as they have?a coward?a bandit and 'aggressor. Will that influence our course of action in getting information that is necessary for our security. Will Protect Security SECRETARY HERTER ?I think we will do whatever we feel is essential for our secu- rity. I am not saying in that respect that we are going to deliberately utilize the U-2 again. I have never said that. SENATOR CARLSON?Can we assure the American people that despite all this tirade, there will be no slackening in our efforts to secure, by any meas- ures or means, the information ; that is necessary for the secu- rity of this nation? ? SECRETARY HERTER ? I think both the President ? I think the President in particu- lar, has made that very clear.*** Cooperation of the Allies SENATOR CARLSON?Can J the American people be assured that the United States has the full cooperation of our allies in maintaining our position on the Berlin status? SECRETARY HERTER ? Senator, one of the most im- pressive things that I have ever seen was the meeting of NATO that took place after the aborted, so-called summit con- ference. I have never seen such unanimity, such firmness, such determination as exhibited at that meeting. SENATOR CARLSON?Mr. Secretary, do you feel that we are making any progress on these nuclear test suspensions at the Geneva conference and ? other places? SECRETARY HERTER ? During the last few weeks, realy the last few days, they have been meeting in Geneva examining a coordinated pro- 'gram of research for improving instrumentation so that small shots can be detected under- ground. Those conferences have !moved, I think, pretty satisfac- torily. They are halted at this moment, awaiting some instruc- tions from Moscow. In the next few days we should know better whether or - not there has been any radical change of position on the part of the Russians or not. There is some chance of reaching agree- ment. It will be a limited agreement at best, but that again depends on full agreement with regard to the control mechanisms. As you know, those talks hopeless, I think we will con- tinue with them. The First Information SENATOR GORE, Democrat of Tennessee?When did the department first receive in- formation that the U-2 flight was down in Russia? MR. DILLON?That informa- tion was received in the depart- ment during the day, on Sun- day, the 1st of May, at about the middle of the day, our time. SENATOR GORE?What was the nature of that informa- tion? MR. DILLON?The nature of the information as conveyed to me, which had been received in the department through the Central Intelligence ..ageney, was that this p1ant-3E9101*er- due at its destine/AOC ?itildAhat the time beyond wilarMitirifuet supply would carr- it had run out and so therefore, it was presumed down somewhere. SENATOR GORE?The ques- tion I ask is when did you first have some notice, some in- formation, some hint that the plane was actually down in Russian territory? I was not referring to your presumption that because of its flight pat- tern and the amount of fuel that it must be down. When did you actually receive some intelligence , some hint that the Soviet had the plane? MR. DILLON?That the So- viets had the plane, I think the first information tve received on that was at the time Mr. Khrushchev made his statement on Thursday morning before th e, I think it was the Supreme Soviet, on the 5th day of May. SENATOR GORE?Are you sure you received no hint, no information, no report from either your embassy in Russia or the intelligence agency that the plane might actually be down in Russia? Mr. Dillon?It was our as- sumption, since most of the flight pattern of the plane, its mission was to spend most of its time over the Soviet Union, it was our assumption that that was most likely right from the first, from when the plane did not return. But we did rot re- ceive any specific information that it was down over the Soviet Union, in the Soviet Union, the Russians had either the plane, the pliot or any parts of it, until Mr. Khrushchev made the statement on Thurs- day morning. SENATOR GORE?When did you first receive some hint, some information, some indica- tion that the Soviets might have the pilot alive? MR. DILLON?The first in- formation we received on that was received in the department in the afternoon of the 5th day of May, after we had put out our first statements. Got Report From Embassy This was in the form of a re- port from our embassy in Mos- cow saying that various other foreign diplomats had heard at cocktail parties or receptions from various Soviet officials that this plane was down and at one time, to one of these for- eign diplomats, a Soviet official said that they had the pilot and that report reached us. We didn't know whether it was accurate or not, but it gave us pause. That reached us the ofternoon of Thursday, and I think it was on Friday that we identified the fact that a photo- graph of the wreckage as put out by the Soviets was a fraud and so then at that time we as- sumed, we acted on the assump- tion from then on, that they probably had the pilot and that they possibly had a good deal of the plane. SENATOR GORE.?A mem- ber of your department informed me in the offices of the cOmmit- te on Friday morning of the 6th that the department did, in fact, have information indicat- ing that the Soviets may have this pilot alive. MR. DILLON.?That was probably reporting the informa- tion which I said was received the afternoon of the 5th regard- ing that. SENATOR GORE.?Yes. Now you say that you knew of the flight, you knew of the flight pattern; and you assumed that the plane was down in Russia. You say now that on the 5th you received this information that the pilot was probably alive and yet, on the afternoon of the 6th, this Mr. Lincoln White, official spokesman for the department, said this: "There was absolutely no deliberate attempt to violate the Soviet air space and there has never been." Did you authorize that state- ment? MR. DILLON?No, not spe- cifically. Mr. White was not one of those in the Department of State that had any knowledge of these operations. Conclusion Was Drawn The statement which we au- thorized the day before, which Is in the record, was not that categoric. But I don't think that Mr. White, that there was any reason why he shouldn't have made such a statement. He drew that conclusion from the N. A. S. A. statement of the day before and when he was asked questions?he didn't vol- unteer this statement. He was being questioned apparently in a press conference and he made that statement, * * * SENATOR GORE?Is Mr. White authorized to speak to the United States press on be- half of the Department of State? MR. DILLON?Yes, he is. SENATOR GORE?Are you saying that he was making statements about this, but that he was not informed on the subject? MR. DILLON?I am stating that he was not informed as to the facts of this intelligence operation any more than the people who made the press statements for N. A. S. A. were informed of the facts of it. SENATOR GORE?Do you call that responsible and coordi- nated performance? MR. DILLON?We are get- United Press International Telephoto CENSOR HERTER TESTIMONY: Charles E. Bohlen, left, State Department adviser on the Soviet Union, and Richard Helms of the Central Intelligence Agency go over the testimony of the Secretary of State on the U-2 plane case, before making it public. tion of intelligence. When you have something as important and secret as this, it is impor- tant to limit the knowledge to the minimum number of people and this was strictly limited throughout the Government and we did limit it in the State Department. We dicl-not t hink it was proper ba-vtiform our press peo- ple. There' was a special pro- cedure for people who were in- formed of this, and the press people were not so informed. SENATOR GORE?Mr. Sec- retary, lain questioning you about the initial cover state- ment issue you had in Turkey. I am asking you about an offi- cial falsehood on May 6, after you say the Department knew of the flight pattern, assumed the plane was down, a whole day after you received informa- tion that the pilot was prob- ably alive and in the afternoon of the day after even I had been Informed, I ask you again if you think this is an example of the coordination whicii, you earl- Her told us the Department had. MR. DILLON---BeniterviF answer that. I think it took a major decision to reach a deci- sion which was reached the fol- lowing day; that we were going to abandon our cover story and tell the truth. That decision could not be reached rapidly and quickly. It was reached aft- er long sessions with the Secre- tary on Saturday and until that was reached, we saw no reason to inform our press officer of anything but the cover story, which is what we were standing by up until that time. White's Statement Explained THE CHAIRMAN?Senator, may I interrupt? I didn't understand why Mr. White wasn't required to clear his statement at this time with you. MR. DILLON?I am glad to answer tkit. Mr. White sees the press every day, and he does not know in advance necessarily the detailed questions that he may be asked. If a question comes that he thinks he does not know the answer to, he does clear it with us. Now, the day before, when he put out our statement, it was given to him and he followed exactly what he had been told. He did not make any statement that was quite as categoric as this state- ment he made the following day. THE CHAIRMAN ? Why didn't he stand on the one that had been cleared? MR. DILLON?This was just an answer to a question. Why he did it, he thought he was telling the truth. I think he acted perfectly all right. He did not think that this was a new question. He thought he was following the cover story, whihc he was. So he made this statement. It wasn't a state- ment; it was in answer to a question. I want to emphasize that. THE CHAIRMAN?It was a very categorical statement that went far beyond the other state- ment. That is what begins to complicate your ssituation, doesn't it? MR. DILLON?Possibly to some extent, yes. THE CHAIRMAN?Mr. Sec- retary, there are one or two statements in your own state- ment I would like to have de- veloped a bit, for clarification * * * on Page 5, point 2: "The decision not to suspend this program of flights, as the sum- mit meeting approached, was a sound decision." * * * I understood from your pre- vious statement and others that the program was agreed upon, and it was running along with- out being suspended. But this statement seems to leave the implication that a specific de- cision was taken not to suspend them in view of the conference approaching. Was such a decision taken? SECRETARY HERTER ? That I can't tell you. I was not a party to that. THE CHAIRMAN ? Well, this says "the decision not to suspend this program of flights, as the summit meeting ap- proached was a sound decision." Was there any decision taken not to suspend it? SECRETARY HERTER ?I know that when the matter came before me, which was some time previous from the point of view of the continua- tion of the program, when con- ditions were appropriate, I did not interpose any objection to it because of any diplomatic event that was coming up. Decision on Suspension THE CHAIRMAN?Is it fair to say then no specific deci- have been going for along time. ting at this stage, Senator, into sien not to simnel-id them was Pilot of U-2 Spy Plane Termed in Good Health WASHINGTON, May 27 (AP) ? Secretary of State Christian A. Herter said to- day that "we have been as- sured" Francis G. Powers, the American spy pilot now being held in the Soviet Union, is in good health. Mr. Herter made the report to the Senate Foreign Rela- tions Committee when asked about the flier whose U-2 plane went down inside the Soviet Union on May 1. The United States Embassy in Moscow has asked to see Mr. Powers, but Mr. Herter said it had not yet obtained per- mission from the Soviet Gov- ernment. "We have been assured that he is in good health and be- yond that I can't tell you whether we know where he is being held or not," Mr. Herter said. "Perhaps one of my col- lea knows that. I don't any informa- elfore trat. along without any decision being taken to suspend them? SECRETARY HERTER ? I think that is correct. THE CHAIRMAN ? There- fore, the other way around is that no positive decision was taken not to suspend them, is that correct? SECRETARY HERTER ? That is right. THE CHAIRMAN ? That statement, I think, needs clari- fication. I think to me, it means that at some point prior to May 1, a specific decision was taken not to suspend them in view of the summit. Isn't that a legitimate interpretation of that sentence? SECRETARY HERTER ? I think that is correct. May I read what the President said on that subject: He said, "As to the timing, the question was really whether to halt the pro- gram and thus forego the gathering of important infor- mation that was essential and that was likely to be unavail- able at a later date. The pro- gram went forward." *5* THE CHAIRMAN ? Then that decision was made by the President? SECRETARY HERTER?Oh, he was certainly consulted with regard to the continuation of the program. THE CHAIRMAN?Do you known when that was made? SECRETARY HERTER?No. THE CHAIRMAN?Was it prior to May 1? SECRETARY HERTER ?I couldn't tell you. THE CHAIRMAN?Mr. Sec- retary, do you know whether there was a rnoritorium on these flights during the meeting at Camp David? SECRETARY HERTER?No. As- far as I know, that. question never arose. THE CHAIRMAN?So that there was not, as far as you know? SECRETARY HERTER?As far as I know, there was not. * * * The 'Plight' Statement THE CHAIRMAN?Mr. Sec- retary, what were the consider- ations which led to the decision, not only to assume responsibil- ity for the flight, but to imply that the flights would continue in the future? SECRETARY HERTER ?I have to take responsibility for the statement that was inter- preted and, if I may, I would Like to read you exactly what was said on that score. This is a statement that was interpreted that we were going to continue the flights: "The Government of the Unit- ed States would be derelict to its responsibilities, not only to the American people, but to free people everywhere, if it did not, in the absence of Soviet cooperation, take such measures as are possible unilaterally to lessen and to overcome this danger of surprise attack. "In fact, the United States has not and does not shirk this responsibility." That is the statement that was interpreted that we were going to continue the flights, and it seems to me it was a pretty far-fetched interpreta- tion. THE CHAIRMAN?Then, do you mean that that statement, that you did not intend to con- vey the view or the possibility that the flights would be con- tinued, is that correct? SECRETARY HERTER?No, what I. was, savine there wee today; that from the point of view of our own interests and that of the whole free world, it is essential for us to do what- ever we properly can in order to acquire information to avoid surprise attack or to be pre- pared for it. Statement Acceptable THE CHAIRMAN?But in view of that statement, do you think that Mr. Khrushchev could accept it and continue the conference? SECRETARY HERTER?Yes, I certainly do, if he had wanted to. THE CHAIRMAN ? Do you think our President would ac- cept such a statement from any other power? SECRETARY HERTER ? If he wanted to go to a confer- ence? Certainly. SENATOR MANSFIELD ? Were there any indications that Khrushchev plattned to scuttle the conference before the U-2 plane was shot down on May 1? SECREARTY HERTER?No. SENATOR MANSFIELD ? Did Khrushchev's Baku speech precede or follow Mr. Dillon's speech to the A. F. L.-C. I. 0. convention? SECRETARY HERTER ? It followed it. SENATOR MANSFIELD ? Would you classify Mr. Dillon's speech as very much in the spirit of Camp David, the kind of speech which any official of the State Department might have made before that historic meeting? SECRETARY HERTER?I would say this, that Mr. Dillon's speech was almost a require- ment as an answer to the alle- gations that had been made by Mr. Khrushchev against Ade- nauer and the Germans and his continued repetition, which I have given the chronology of, ofthe fact that they were going to take this unilateral position sooner or later without its being an absolute ultimatum on the subject of Berlin, Germany. SENATOR MANSFIELD?In other words, Mr. Secretary, speeches which you and Mr. Dillon made were a counter- action to the gradual hardening of Mr. Khrushchev's speeches in the period preceding that? SECRETARY HERTER?En- tirely. Knew of 11-2 Program SENATOR MANSFIELD ? Did Secretary Dillon propose that a U-2 flight be undertaken prior to the summit conference? MR. DILLON?No. SENATOR MANSFIELD ? Mr. Dillon, as acting Under- Secretary, were you aware be- forehand of the scheduling of the U-2 flight over the Soviet Unoin on May 1? MR. DILLON?No, I was not aware of it. [Deletion] I was aware that there was a pro- gram of flights that might take place at some time when the weather was right, but I think -I was informed of- that maybe a month or two before this actual time, and I had nothing to do with it afterwards be- cause I didn't in the ordinary course of my duties. SENATOR MANSFIELD? Your knowledge was, in effect, general knowledge? MR. DILLON?Yes, SENATOR MANSFIELD? Mr. Herter, happening to be out of the country at the time, was, I assume, unaware of any specific flight but perhaps had general knowledge that these flights were being undertaken and had been over a period of years. SECRETARY HERTER? The first knowledge I received was when I was in Ankara. I didn't know there was a flight under way. AU I heard was this same report that a plane was down. SENATOR MANSFIELD-- Now, both of you have had gen- eral knowledge of this: Would it be a fair assumption a say, despite the fact that the Presi- dent undertook, in a certain sense, personal responsibility for this particular flight, that he, too, likewise, had only gen- eral knowledge but that because of his position as the Chief of State, he would be held repson- sible under any circumstances because of his position of re- sponsibility? SECRETARY HERTER? That is correct. Enters Qualification Might I just qualify one thing? When you say he was familiar with this particular flight and his timing, so far as I know all of us were fa- miliar with alternate possibil- ities of flights but not this mart iei leer fjjoilt That would apply to the De- partment of State and the president. SECRETARY HERTER ? That is correct. SENATOR HUMPHREY ? Did anyone ask as to whether or not you had any personal knowledge of the U-2 flight? SECRETARY HERTER ? It was included, I said it was included?I am sure it was in- cluded in a group of flights that I had been asked whether I had any objections to them. SENATOR HUMPHREY ? If you wanted to, could you have effectively vetoed such a policy? SECRETARY HERTER ? No, I could only have given my advice to the President. SENATOR HUMPHREY ? Would the Vice President be aware of these decisions? SECRETARY HERTER ? I think that in the matter of the National Security Council, he was aware of the program in the larger sense. I doubt if he was familiar with any of the individual flights as such, but he may have been. SENATOR HUMPHREY ? The reason I asked that ques- tion was that the Vice Presi- dent intimated on a television program, I believe the day be- fore the President announced in Paris, that the flights should continue, and the next day the President announced that he had already canceled them. The Vice President said they would continue, and the next day the President announced that they had been suspended. What I am asking is, would the Vice President, as a mem- ber of the Security Council, have any opportunity of know- ing the decision that had been made by the President? SECRETARY HERTER ? There, the days followed so quickly one on another that I just couldn't answer that, whether that opportunity had been offered or not. SENATOR HUMPHREY ? The program of the flights, the reconnaissance flights, was an established program, apparent- ly was agreed upon by the Se- curity Council, is that correct? SECRETARY HERTER?The Security Council was aware of it, yes. SENATOR HUMPHREY ? The Vice President is a mem- ber of the Security Council? SECRETARY HERTER ? Yes. SENATOR HUMPHREY?If the Vice President states on a television program that he un- derstood that the flights would continue, yet the President an- nounced the next day in Paris, that as of the previous Thurs- day they had already been sus- pended, do you think there was any lack of communication be- tween the responsible officials of this Government? SECRETARY HERTER ? There, sir, I am trying to think of the dates. The Thursday on which the President gave that order was the day that I went to Paris. I went to Paris that night. The President followed two nights later and whether or not in that two-day interval any- thing had been distributed with regard to that order, I just don't know. SENATOR HUMPHREY?Do you have any changed views, Mr. Secretary, as to the value of the so-called summitry diplo- macy as a result of this recent meeting? SECRETARY HERTER ?I think as a method of carrying out negotiations it has taken a hard knock. Functions of NASA Cited SENATOR MORSE?Mr. Sec- retary, I think it would be help- ful for this record if you made a statement in regard to the functions of NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Adminis- tration] and the part that NASA played in connection with the U-2 flight * * *. I raise the question because I want to do what I could in order to clarify the record in regard to the allegation made that there is not the best of coordination between the State Department, C. I. A., Pentagon building and now NASA, and that there may be a need for a centralization in the State Department of the authority to authorize any statement by any of these agen- cies in regard to a situation such as this, because of some possible reason to believe that if this had been centralized more we would not have been having different statements coming from different agencies. MR. DILLON?We were not aware of the fact that N. A. S. A. was going to make such a for- mal statement as this, and I am not sure that the Central Intel- ligence Agency was either. All the relationships?as I said in my original statement? there was coordination, there was a decision that the state- ments were going to be made by the State Department. That decision was taken and made known to the other agen- cies concerned, which were the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency, then on the morning of May 5. The Central Intelligence Agency had the relationships with N. A. S. A. and undertook to pass that on, since we had no relationships so far as N. A. S. A. was concerned. They didn't know we were in this thing, and somehow this statement was put out by N. A. S. A. some- what more complete than we expected, but it was along the lines of the material that they had been furnished. The President Is Qroted SENATOR GORE?The Pres- ident, in his statement to the American people, the other night, said this: "As to the timing, the ques- tion was really whether to halt the program and thus forgo the gathering of important informa- tion that was essential, and that was likely to be unavail- able at a later date. The deci- sion was that the program should not be halted." Now, as I understood your reply to the chairman of the committee, you did not partic- ipate in the making of a deci- sion to halt or not to halt this particular flight. SECRETARY HERTER ? I had approved of it. SENATOR GORE ? On this particular program. SECRETARY HERTER ? And approved of it as a part of the program. The question of the halting of it was not in issue at that time although I Herter Hints the Loss Of U-2's Elsewhere WASHINGTON, May 27 (UPI) ? Secretary of State Christian A. Heter said today that the United States RV plane downed in the Soviet Union May I was the first lost in Soviet territory, but he hinted that others had been lost elsewhere. Mr. Herter's hint of other missing U-2 aircraft was given in the first censored section of his close-door testi- mony before the Senate For- eign Relations Committee. Chairman J. W. Fulbright, Democrat qf Arkansas, asked him: "Were any other planes lost on these same ventures prior to May the 1st?" Mr. Herter replied: "* ? * [deleted matter] not over So- viet territory." "None had been shot down or lost over Soviet territory?" Senator Fulbright asked. "No," Secretary Herter an- swered. There have been published reports in the past that a U-2 exploded over southern Ger- many several years ago. There also have been reports that one crashed in the western United States. know that the summit con- ference was coming. SENATOR GORE?Well, my specific question is this: did you participate in a conference or were you aware of a de- cision, did you make a decision? What is the full extent of your knowledge of a decision that- the flight would not be dis? continued. SECRETARY HERTER ? I know of no conference at which that matter was discussed. * * * SENATOR GORE?How long ago did you approve the pro- gram? SECRETARY HERTER -- I can't tell you exactly but it was some time prior to the time I went abroad. SENATOR GORE?Is it a matter of weeks? SECRETARY HERTER ? A matter of weeks. * " FUN FESTIVALS SET Family Events Slated at 110 Spots Here June 11-12 Family Fun Festivals will be conducted at 110 places in the city June 11 and N by the Park Department end the Po- lice Athletic Leagtra-The events will mark National Recreation Month. 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At that time, it was deter- mined that a cover story would . be used as was stated by the President the other night, which had been previously prepared for such instance. There was full coordination in this. I knew that the cover story was to be issued and it was discussed that it would be issued as usual when a plane Was lost at the base from which the plane was lost. There would be no statement from Wash- ington, and this statement, this information was given to the people who would be in charge of the flight at the base where si it flew from in Turkey. * * * In due course, the statement was put out there that a plane was missing. * " Circumstances Unknown After that statement was made no further action was taken here because we did not know the circumstances of how the plane had been lost, where it had been lost, whether it had been actually lost over Soviet territory or not, although the presumption was that it had been lost over Soviet territory, because that was apparently where it was going to be the greater part of the time in the flight. The next incident occurred on the morning of Thursday, May 5, when we heard of the first speech by Mr. Khrushchev in which it was stated that they had shot down a plane. They didn't say wher the plane had been shot down, but they said that an American plane was shot down. This required action and statements on our part. The news of that was received by me at last, during the course of a meeting, a regular meeting of the Security Council, Na- tional Security Council, which was being held that day as you will remember, somewhere out of Washington, as 'a part of a civil defense exercise. When we heard that news, it Wirs lialtdosL that-the State De- partment would handle all ques- tions regarding it and taking part in the discussion at that time, present at that time were myself, Secretary Gates [Secre- tary of Defense Thomas S. ig Gates Jr.] and Mr. Allen Dulles. "So we were all three aware of this decision. Meanwhile, back in Washing- ton, members of the State De- partment were meeting with members of the Central Intel- ligence Agency to try and work out a proper statement. ? When we returned to Wash- ington, as soon as we returned to Washington, that statement was finalized in agreement with the Central Intelligence Agency and the White House was ob- viously kept informed of the contents of the statement, and the statement was then put out at 12:45 in the State Depart- ment. * * Questions on N. A. S. A. Data , Meanwhile, prior to that, in the days immediately before . that, there had been also con- versations between the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency regarding information that might be given to N. A. S. A. [National Aero- nautics and Space Administra- tion] in case there were further questions of them in Washing- ton, for confirmation of state- ments regarding where the plane was down, something of that nature General guidelines on this were prepared. This was prior to the 5th, in the period of the 2d and 4th, and these, I under- stand, were transmitted to N. A. S. A. by the Central In- telligence Agency. The State Department at no time worked directly with N. A. S. A. on any of this publicity or anything regarding these flights. SENATOR GORE, Democrat of Tennessee?Did you say did, or did not? MR. DILLON?Did not. This is part of the cover operation. * * * So then the next item on this was that shortly after this statement, N. A. S. A. was asked a lot of questions about the plane and they, following the cover story that had been prepared earlier, put out the statement whic happeared in the press that same day. I think that came out about three quarters of an hour after our statement. They apparently utilized the general guidelines which they had been given, to answer questions and put them together into a statement which was then put out. SENATOR HUMPHREY, Demcrat of Minnesota?What was the date of that? MR. DILLON?This was done on May 5. This was right after Mr. Khrushchev's first speech in which he said a plane was down somewhere and this was? you will recall also at that time the Soviets printed a photo- graph of a plane that was supposedly a wreck and we very rapidly learned, I would say within twenty-four hours, that this photograph was a fraudu- lent photograph and was not a photograph of the U-2 wreckage, I but was a photograph of some Soviet-type plane. Aware of Fraudulence Almost immediately, I would say on Friday the 6th, we were aware that this was a fraudu- lent picture, and so that gave us some concern that the So- viets might have a greater knowledge regarding the air- craft than we had previously suspected, and that maybe they the aircraft and possibly had the pilot in their possession. So this was then followed on Saturday morning, the 7th, by Khrushchev's speech in which he stated that they did have the pilot, and gave for the first time actual information as to where it was shot down and so forth. The Secretary returned to Washington on Friday, May 6, from Istanbul and Greece, and I reported to him on the situa- tion as of that time, and at that time he naturally took over. Therefore, on Saturday morn- ing, we met with him to deter- mine what to do next, and at that moment as we met, we were faced with this new Soviet statement saying that they had the pilot, and a new situation had arisen, and his action at that time the Secretary will answer for. But that was when the decision was made to tell, to reveal the fact that this was an American plane. " * SENATOR WILEY, Republi- can of Wisconsin?In your opin- ion, is the matter of using what we have used in the past, the U-2's for a mere period of years, all in the interest of pre- serving the integrity of the United States and the integrity of the West? SECRETARY HERTER?I do indeed. SENATOR WILEY?And, in your opinion, if the U-2 incident hadn't happened?this is sort of a duplication of the question but I want to get to the main question ? would Krushchev have had an adequate excuse or would we have drummed up one? a SECRETARY HERTER? That can only be a matter of speculation. I think that Mr. Khrushchev has indicated by his Baku speech, felt that from his point of view the summit would not turn out satisfactorily, and that the U-2 incident was a convenient handle for him to use to torpedo the conference. SENATOR WILEY?Isn't it a fact that from his remarks that he made in his talk in Ber- lin that he knew that we were using what has been called spy planes, had been using the same for some time? SECRETARY HERTER ?It certainly does, and that was re- peated yesterday by Mr. [An- drei A.] Gromyko [Soviet For- eign Minister] in the statement that he made at the United Na- tions in which he said they had known of this for some time, that they had known of it at the time that Mr. Khrushchev was at Camp David [Md]. * * * Both Called Adamant SENATOR WILEY ? Then because of previous conferences, as you have outlined in your remarks, it is very clear that there was no real reason to think that a conference could have accomplished anything, be- cause isn't it a fact that both parties were adamant? SECRETARY HERTER ? That is true, sir, insofar as Berlin and the German situation was concerned. SENATOR HUMPHREY?Mr. Secretary, what agency or who is the person in, the official in this Government, who is in charge of these flights, such as the U-2 flights. SECRETARY HERTER?The Central Intelligence Agency. SENATOR HUMPHREY?Do you have constant information, do you have continuing infor- mation as to the number of these flights, the course of these flights, the purpose of these flights in the State Department? SECRETARY HERTER?The general programs had been gone over with the department. Ob- viously it is impossible to tell when these flights are going to take place because they are so dependent on the season of the year and on weather conditions. The agency has to plan num- bers of alternatives so we never know at any particular time or any particular flight. But the general approval of the program had been received from the State Department, of course, as one of the advisers to the Pres- ident in this matter. SENATOR HUMPHREY ? Did you know of this specific flight ahead of time? SECRETARY HERTER ? I did not, no, I didn't know it was in the air even when I was over- seas nor do I think any of us did until it came down. SENATOR HUMPHREY?Is Associated Press Wirephoto A BRIEFING FOR REPORTERS: Senator J. W. Fulbrightleft, Arkansas Democrat who heads Foreign Relations Committee, tells newsmen about developments at the clout hearing on the 11-2 plane and other recent matters. Herter Denies Pre-Summi Review of U-2 Flights tha your understanding, Mr. think we would do everything slim this, but in light of the Dillon? MR. DILLON?I was not away. we could do to identify it right cnger of surprise attack this i what I am getting at. This is aware that it was in the air SENATOR HUMPHREY?tlittle different, may I say, of until I was informed that itJust identify it. was?it was overdue, as I vpy working the railroad yard stated previously, where isubmarine off our coast, even SECRETARY HERTER?Yes, (taking photographs or even identify it. We have the SENATOR HUMPHREY?withal, I think, to do that, . tough this gets to be a little When something goes wrong on SENATOR HTJMPHREY?In aious, too. But in the light of one of these flights who is re-other words we, would we dis- anger of surprise attack by air sponsible to give the cover patch interceptors? ower, there is some difference, speak? think so. i story, the cover-up story, so to SECRETARY HERTER?I there not? SECRETARY HERTER ? MR. DILLON?Central Intel- SENATOR HUMPHREY? here is some difference. On ligence Agency, but we are also What would be our view of such he other hand I think we could responsible for agreeing with a flight? ientify it very quickly. This is story, and it is proper in the. SECRETARY HERTER-- he type of plane that no one them that this is a reasonable (deletion) * * * Certainly there ould possibly mistake for a circumstances, but they have is very little that such a flight omber when you get close the responsibility for executing could ascertain that would nough to look at it. This is it. (Censorship deletion.) worry us much. Every bit of ntirely an unarmed glider type SENATOR HUMPHREY information that we have got f plane * " in this country sems to be avail- SENATOR HICKENLOOPER, Mr. Secretary, what do you think would happen in the Unit-able through public means to tepublican of Iowa?Mr. Secre- ed States if on our radar screen ? ? h t collect .ary, we hear a great many we should discover a i 41 documents. In fact, in the whole tements about this plane plane --Y-Itusian espionage system they eriig shot down. What is the ing at high altitude in thisage have colected maps, documents, est evidence on that? Was it oeear of surprise attack, and photographs of every part Shot down from its maximum - --.-,---esi-aase-liesesesb-ileseteer--------ebeight- or did they consider that SECRETARY HERTER? I SENATOR HUMPHREY? Iit had a flame-out at that height and then came down to t lower altitude or what? SECRETARY HERTER?Sen- or, there has been a good deal 01 speculation on that point. I thnic that we are very skeptical as sa whether it was shot down from a very high altitude (dele- tion), SENATOR HICKENLOOPER ?Well, I think there is consid- erable difference in a situation where this plane might have been shot down at 60- or 70,000 feet, or whether it was shot down or shot at 5- or 7,000 feet. SECRETARY HERTER?We are very skeptical and there are certain evidences that it was ? tion to the world that they knew about these flights and that they could not stop them from going over the Russian territory with any consistency? SECRETARY HERTER -- I think that undoubtedly that played a considerable part in his own state of mind with re- gard to the whole incident, the feeling of frustration that they had not been able to stop these during a period of four years. SENATOR HICKENLOOP- ER?And that exposure to the Russian people and to many other nations of the world that had been propagandized per- haps into thinking that the Russians were invulnerable may very well have had some effect on the attitudes within the Kremlin? SECRETARY HERTER ? It may well have had very real effects. SENATOR MORSE, Demo- crat of Oregon?What evidence do we have, Mr. Secretary, that Russia knew of previous Amer- ican spy plane flights over Russian territory? SECRETARY HERTER ? Only the statements of Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Gromyko. SENATOR MORSE?When? SECRETARY HERTER?Mr. Khrushchev made it a number of times. He did so in his state- ments in Paris. He did so, I think, in his statements that he made to the Central Committee of the Presidium in Moscow before he left. Mr. Gromyko made that statement again yes- terday . . . SENATOR MORSE?To what extent, if any, do you think Red China has put pressure on . the Russian leaders to follow not shot down from that alti-Ithis adamant course of action? tude (Deletion). I SECRETARY HERTER ? That again, sir, is a matter of speculation. SENATOR MORSE ? You have no evidence? SECRETARY HERTER?But the articles which have appeared in the Red Star magazine, which is their official publication, have been of such a highly critical natur,e of the whole pol- iey of so called peaceful coex- istence, the whole d?nte policy that Mr. Khrushchev seemed to have been following, that they may well have a considerable influence. Asian Situation Discussed SENATOR MORSE?Do you SENATOR HICKENLOOPER ?Now, the Russians, I think it has been quite well-established from Mr. Khrushchev's state- ments, that the Russians were aware for same time in the past that flight of this kind had gone over their territory. I say I think it is quite evi- dent that Mr. Khrushchev was aware or the Russians were aware that flights of this kind had gone on over their terri- tory. At least they claim they were. Did they ever file a pro- test with the United States Government? SECRETARY HERTER?Not with respect to this type of flight * * * have any reason to believe that SENATOR HICKENLOOP- we may be confronted with a ER?Mr. Secretary, have you diversionary movement now Asia by Red China stepping up mili- had any opportunity to get a reliable cross-section reading on what other nations of the world think deaut the vulnerability of tary activities i n Asia seeking to embarrass us? SECRETARY HERTER ? I Russian defenses? In other think we should be very alert words, on the 'theory that per- to that. Associated Press Wirephoto haps a part of Mr. Knliushchey's SENATOR MORSE?Do we DIPLOMATS C()NFER f H t 1,44_ ,k2.2A .;1,a4=1,- atZ:( Ifyiderffirer *ng in the development of nu lear weapons, either on thei avn or assisted by Russia? SECRETARY HERTER?No le do not. SENATOR AIKEN, Republi 'an of Vermont?Mr. Secretary me of the missing links in that hain of information seems to 3e the circumstances surround- ng the capture of the U-2 or parts of it and the pilot. Has every effort been made on our part to see the pilot of the U-2 to interview him? SECRETARY HERTER ? Yes. * * * SENATOR AIKEN?Isnt' it a fact that the Russians had previously undertaken to secure a U-2, both by.interceptors and rockets? SECRETARY HERTER ? I can't tell you about that. SENATOR AIKEN ? Don't you know anything about that, or don't you want to talk? SECRETARY HERTER ? I can't tell you about rockets. I think there probably have been occasions when they might have tried by interceptor planes, but they couldn't reach that alti- tude. SENATOR AIKEN ? Then you have no comment to say about that undertaking to get one by rockets? SECRETARY HERTER?No, I think I can point out one bit of evidence that perhaps will be supplemented when Mr. Dulles testifies here, and that is that the picture of what seemed to be the genuine U-2 plane had bullet holes in the wings and they are not likely to have bul- let holes from any rocket. SENATOR AIKEN?No. Does seem unlikely to you that the -2 was brought down with a one-shot rocket? SECRETARY HERTER ?It seems to us very unlikely. SENATOR AIKEN?Leaving the pilot and much of the equipment intact, as has been claimed? SECRETARY HERTER ?It seems to us very unlikely. SENATOR AIKEN ? Wasn't the list of equipment which was given out by Mr. Khrushchev such equipment as would have been naturally carried on any plane that was undertaking to secure information of this type? SECRETARY HERTER ? That i'-right. SENATOR AIKEN? Of any country? SECRETARY HERTER ? That is correct. Arrangements if Plane Fell SENATOR LONG, Democrat of Louisiana?Mr. Secretary, I believe that U-2 flights should have bee nmade. I that publicly,. by that statement. I wondered if the department and those re- sponsible had not planned well in advance just what we were going to do when the Soviets ultimately got one of these U-2's. Had there been such plans made? SECRETARY HERTER ? I believe they had. * * * SENATOR LONG?Yes. But that also involves your respon- sibility because you would be the on ewho would give the ex- planation. SECRETARY HERTER ? That is correct. SENATOR LONG?While I don't see how the great powers can avoid conducting espionage and military intelligence, as a practical matter as long as it is conducted on the other person's soil, isn't that a violation of international law? SECRETARY HERTER?All espionage is a violation of sov- ereignty, all forms of espion- age. * * * SENATOR LONG ? The thought that occurs to me is, did we not ? would it not be the original plan that this na- tion would not under any cir- cumstances admit that it was sending those planes behind the Iron Curtain in the event that one of those planes was cap- tured? SECRETARY HERTER ? I think that, as Mr. Dillon has explained, a cover story was prepared for that contingency. I think the actual circumstances turned out to be rather different from anything that had been anticipated in the preparatory work that had been done. SENATOR LONG?Well, the previous planning had been that we would not admit it, is that correct? SECRETARY HERTER?Yes SENATOR LONG?Now, of course, the Russians are in no position to put us on trial. They won't go before the World Court en anything with us, will they? ? SECRETARY' HERTER ? They have not. SENATOR LONG ? As a matter of fact, have we not previously tried to get them before the World Court on the shooting down of our planes? SECRETARY HERTER?We have tried to get Bulgaria be- fore the World Court and have offered to take one of the cases, the border cases, to court, and they have refused. SENATOR LONG?And they have declined? SECRETARY HERTER ? They have declined. SENATOR LONG ? In the absence of any admission On the part of this Government, how could they have possibly placed us in position to force us to admit that that plane was deliberately sent there? 5 SECRETARY HERTER? Well, the other cases were all borderline cases of incursions over the edge of the border. This particular case the plane was shot down in the very center of Russia, some 2,000 kilometers inside of Russia. Questions Admission SENATOR LONG?But the point I have in mind, Mr. Secre- tary, is I don't see how they can force you to take the Fifth Amendment because they wouldn't get you before a tri- bunal to do it because they wouldn't do it themselves, and I don't see how they could have forced you to concede that that was an authorized mission un- less somebody, the President or you, elected to make that ad- mission. But do you see any way Mat they could have compelled you to admit that that espionage mission was a calculated plan and deliberately undertaken SECRETARY HERTER--No; Sir, the alternative for us was to continue denying any respon- sibility whatsoever for it. They would undoubted!. yas they saidt they would do, take it before the United Nations, submit id1( the evidence to the United Nations, and we would have dug Continued on Next Piro, LADY RYANBURY: TRAVEL COAT- charming light-weight travel coat of shower-proofed all-wool jersey, fully lined with shower-proofed taffeta. Navy, red, beige, light grey and black. Sizes 8 through 29. $59.50 Ryan Englisk kitps; Inc,. Opposite Canton House 681 Madison Ave., at 62nd Si TE 24630 New York Member of American Express,' CMCP, Diner? Club & Hilton Carte Blanche - ERE MEM Ma Em WIT" 430 MADISON AVENUE at 49th ST. PEAR SHAPE DIAMOND PLATINUM SOLITAIRE 2.78 carats $2,550 EMERALD CUT DIAMOND PLATINUM SOLITAIRE 3.07 carats $4,575 CLASSIC ROUND DIAMOND PLATINUM SOLITAIRE 4.05 carats $7,650 Other Diamond Platinum Solitaires, all set with Tapered Baguettes: rquisc .67 cls. 390. Round .67 cts 395. Marquise 1.12 cts. 895. erald 1.08 cts. 775. Emerald .66 cts. 425. New Oval .74 cls. 545. Prices include Fed. Tan : Secretary o State er, er, right, t Under Secretary Doug- and the Kremlin's infuration have any late information as - Z?; ft I e po pPogress Red China is mak- adj?nzrs Invited Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 z ? Illusb?aled -roc,,Ure Oil Requegt NEW YCSX LIMES MAY 2 8 1960 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 .1 4 Excerpts From Censored Transcript of Senate Panel's Hearing on U-2 and Summit Sheeiel to The New York Tire,. , WASHINGTON, May 27'? Following are excerpts from th 'censored transcript of today' hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations, Committee on the U- ' incident and the failure of th sUmmit conference. Senator resent inc14141( J. W. Fut lir Man4field -bright, Deraiwrirof .4rkinsas chairman; Democrat of Montana; Alber Gore, Democrat of Tennessee Frank J. Lausiche Democrat Ohio; AleadnalirkWiley, Repitb lican of W4consin; Bourke .Hickenlooper, Republican o Iowa; George D. Aiken, Repub :lican of Vermont, and Frank Carlson, Republican of Kansas. The primary witness was Secre- tary of State Christian A. Her- -ter. Also present were Under ..,Secretary of State Douglas Dil- lon, Charles R. Bohlen, special adviser to the Secretary of State, and others. The committee met at 10:07 ,.A.. M., pursuant to notice, Sen- ator J. W. Fulbright (chair- man of the full committee) pre- siding. final analysis understand our policiea if they are to be sup- e pcirttel by the people, we have a arranged for a high-ranking official st-thiskasecutive Branch 2 to deletirilleenV- the executive e transcript illirWiatements or in- s formation which might in any _ way jeopardize tBn*ttonal se- curity; Should any question aris as to whether such deletions go t beyond those necessary to pro- tect the national security, I will appoint a bipartisan subcoirmit- ? tee to coruuder Such sues- . tions * * * r e e, Mr. Fulbright Mr. Secretary, we apprecisfo your willingness to come herft today to discuss with the com- mittee the events of recent days and weeks which are re- lated to the collapse of the long-planned summit confer- ence. ? ,Chairman Khrushchev, pr for months has pronnitilitr a summit conference and invited -people throughout the world to believe' that an easing of ten- sions between the free world and the Communist world might be possible, has now dashed ,those hopes_ In a few Short hours he destroyed the atmo- sphere of negotiation which had been built up over long months. Mr. Secretary, you and the President have been frequent in your warnings in the past thta our hopes must not VIse too high lest they be da to pieces, as they have beer!, by a swing of the Soviet pen- dulum. Despite the fact that there are few in the free world who doubt that the principal onus SO the destruction of summit hopes must be borne by Chair- man Khruchchev, there are many who believe that our con- duct has not been without fault. They believe there are things we might have done, which were not done. They believe there were things which we did, which might better have been left undone?or delayed. I have long believed that one of the basic strengths of our democracy is found in our ca- pacity of self-appraisal ? our ability to be critical, without destroying our unity. Task Confronts Committee At this particular juncture of history, this committee is con- fronted with a most difficult task. Without furthering the objectives of the Soviet Union, we must subject our own ac- tivities to careful scrutiny to ascertain whether we have con- ducted ourselves in a way best calculated ot promote the inter- ests of this nation and to pre- serve the peace of the world. I am sure there are some who will feel that any such scrutiny of our own activities can serve no good purpose. As for my- self, however, I believe that fail- ure now to review and assess our conduct would be to neglect our responsibility and to lose an .opportunity to imprve the pro- cedures and the execution of our foreign policy. I take this occasion, Mr. Sec- retary, to assure you once again that I am certain there is no Intention on the part of any member of this committee to deal with this subject on a partisan basis. We are meet- ing here not as Republicans or Democrats, but as members of the Senate, who, in taking their oaths of office, swore, as did you, to uphold the same Consti- tution. We are concerned, as you are, that nothing that takes place here in any way damage the conduct of our foreign policy. Above all, we should strive to aVoid bitter partisan debate which might _prejudice the rea- sonable and effective conduct of our foreign policy in the future. The motives of par- ticipants in events of recent weeks are not at issue. At the same time we seek, as lam sure you do, to conduct this review in such a way that we may learn from the events of the past weeks what we can do to improve our foreign policies and our governmental procedures for their formulation and execu- tion. Sensitive Subjects I know that the subjects which we will be discussing are most sensitive and delicate. In- deed, we should acknowledge that there is one vast area of Executive Branch activity which is not subject to the usual type of Congressional control, or to the check of public opinion? that is, the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. Its operations, as similar activities of all great nations, are divorced and separate from the normal standards and the usual re- straints that are characteristic of other Governmental opera- tions. *4* There is no point in our pre- tending that the black arts of Intelligence operations no not now, and have not throughout recorded history, involved viola- tions of every commandment. They do. Lying, cheating, mur- der, stealing, seduction and sw- ede are part of the unpleasant business in which all great na- tions partieiptae?not because they want to, not because they - believe these acts are moral, but because they believe such activi- ties are essential to their own self-preservation. This is one of the ugly facts of life in this , As you know, the committee ' has agreed that these sessions are to be executive. However, in- order to make the maximum amount of information available to the public, which must in the - Mr. Herter * * * On May 1 oceured th unfortunate failure oflat-Intel ligence mission. Tl* U; at once seized on it to compli- cate the approach to the sum- mit. With regard to the role of the U. S. Government in this matter, I cannot hope to im- press on the lucid and straight- fgregard account which the President gave to the natio Wednesetay night. . . . Ifere--I would only like t re-enphasize four central point which stood out in the Presi dent's accolint: 1. The U-2 program was a Important and efficient intern ence effort. We knew tha failure of any mission unde this _program would have serious coneequenceS but we considere that the great benefit derived justified the risks involved. 2. The decision not to suspen this program of flights, as th summit meeting approached was a sound decision. Condition at a later season would have prevented obtaining very im portant information. There is never a "good time" for a fail- ure of an intelligence inission. We believe it unwise to lower our vigilance because of theta political negotiations. 1. Initial statements by 01 - S. Government properly sought first of all to protec the pilot, his intelligence mis sion and everything connected with it that might still be kep secret But when it became clear that plane and pilot were in Soviet hands we believed the Congress and the American people should be given the facts Thus up to May 7, U. S. states ments followed the general line of the cover story, and there- ter .weri idjuated to thiAitu- on ss it developed. _ 4 Since the U-2 system had been compromised, it was diss continued as any other intei genee mission- would be in suc a case. Announcement of its discontinuance was withheld until the President could convey the fact personally in Paris. Course Called Sound Based on these four points, I believe most Americans will agree that the main course of our actions, given what we knew at any particular time, was sound. In particular, I have doubts that any alteration in the language of United States statements would have made any difference in the arbitrary Soviet demands which fol- lowed. * * * On my arrival in Paris on Friday, May 13, there was al- ready considerable speculation at the news that Mr. Khru- shchev was arriving in Paris on Saturday, rather than on Sun- day, the day on which the President and Mr. Macmillan were due to arrive. * * * On Sunday at 11 A. M., at his request, Mr. Khrushchev, accompanied by Foreign Minis- ter [Anrei I.] Gromyko and Marshal Malinovsky [Marshal Rodion Y. Malinovsky, Soviet Minister of Defensej?which is in itself an unusual procedure which I shall revert to later? called on President de Gaulle at the Elysee Palace. During this meeting he left with President de Gaulle a memorandum setting forth the conditions which would have to be met by the United States before Khrushchev would be prepared to attend a summit conference. The French dele- gation provided a copy of this memorandum to the American delegation early that after- noon. * * * It was our general conclu- sion, subsequently borne out by the facts, that the position and totally unacceptable de- mands set forth in this docu- ment had been drawn up in Moscow prior to Mr. Khru- shchev's departure. In this sense it represented a fixed Soviet Governmental position from Which even Mr. Khrushchev- would not have the authority to depart while in Paris. Soviet Delegate Bound I might digress here to ob- serve that it had been our ex- perience at previous conferences with the Soviets, at least since the death of Stalin, that the Soviet representative, no matter how highly placed he might be, was bound by the collective de- cisions on basic policy matters made prior to his departure from Moscow. Any substantive changes in these positions ap- parently required reference back to Moscow before they could be undertaken. I should like to emphasize the opinion which was thus unanimously arrived at in the American delegation, since it bore directly upon the position which the President took at the meeting on Monday morning. It was out of the question, of course. that there should be any acceptance by the Presi- dent of the humiliating and ar- rogant conditions of Mr. Khru- shchev. We had very much in mind, however, the importance of showing the world that it was Mr. Khrushchev, and no one else, who was placing this summit conference in peril. President Made Decision The President, therefore, de- cided before the Monday meet- ing that the proper course of action, consonant with the great responsibility which he bore and the seriousness of the issues, was not to engage in vitupera- tion with Mr. Khrushchev, but to demonstrate the restraint and dignity which was incumbent upon the office he holds and which befitted the leader of a great country. In connection with this elect- United Pre.s International Telephoto BEFORE CLOSED HEARnisO: Senator J. W. Fulbright, standing, Arkansas Democrat, talks with Secretary of Statillterter. Mr. Fulbright heads Foreign Relations Committee. - sion, the President resolved to announce to the conference- his previously taken decision. to suspend further flights of 15-2 aircraft over -the Soviet Union. 4thOugh ting original inten- trim bad' been to rtRtfict the first meeting of confippinee t Abe e I 0 Stittellufdlitentli=of et# and to their interpreters, th President, on learning Gromyli and Marshal Malinovsky wouM attend, asked Secretary Gate and Mysfitlf to accomppny him to thfli meeting ? * ? This meeting completely con firmed our conclusion of th night before that Mr. Khru shchev was operating within the fixed limits of a policy se before his departure from Mos cow. It is significant in this connection that the statement he issued later that day, Mon- day, May 16, which was identi- cal with the one he had made at the conference, took no cog- nizance whatsoever of the dis- cussion at the conference, and in particular of the President's statement concerning the sus- pension of U-2 overflights * * * Thus the summit conference was ended by Soviet intransi- gence before it began, without addressing the great interna- tional issues with which it was supposed to deal. We have naturally given a great deal of thought to the reasons for this extraordinary action by the Soviets in coming all the way from Moscow to Paris for the sole purpose of sabotaging the conference. I should like to say right off that there are many obscure aspects of this Soviet behavior and that we do not know all considerations and factors which went into its determination. We probably never shall. I hardly need to emphasize here to the members of this committee the complete secrecy in which deci- sions are arrived at in the So- viet Government and in the hierarchy of the Communist party, which is the effective ruler of that country. It is only possible to try to deduce from Soviet actions, after they are taken, the considerations which brought them about. What I give you now, therefore, is at best a tentative estimate of why the Soviet Union behaved as it did, an estimate which may have to be revised in the light of further information and fu- ture events. brutal and threatening attitude he adopted at Paris it was con- sidered desirable to have some tangible evidence of Soviet armed strength in the person of Marshal Malinovsky. Sec- Gromyko and Malinovsky uld.,b able to testify upon ft Moscow that he had ASA "Vfictly to the agreed sitioiCA, ? ? Ito-kens certain that the 6 cbien to cancel the invitation to thefresident was made be- fore ?nnishchey left Moscow. As to what led the Soviets to - this extreme position, in regard e to the summit meeting which - had, previously appeared so much desired by Mr. Khruschev, t we enter into the realm of pure speculation, as I indicated ear- Her. The most we can hope to do in the absence of reliable in- formation is to evaluate the ele- ments and factors which appear to have entered into this de cision. shall try to list them briefly. 1. There was considerable in- dication, particularly during April, that Mr. Khrushchev had concluded that there was like- lihood of his having his way, particularly in regard to Berlin, at the summit. Evidence of Western determination and unity on this point in speeches and statements by Western leaders appears to have brought him to this conclusion. Thus, in his Baku speech on April 25, he not only reiterated with the ut- most finality his position on Berlin, including his intention to conclude a separate peace treaty with the East German Regime, but he also began for the first time seriously to cast doubts upon the success of the summit. By this, of course, he meant success on Soviet terms. 2. Although the evidence is highly inconclusive, there are a number of indications that Mr. Khrushchev's conduct of So- viet foreign policy, particularly his over-personalization and?in Communist eyes?over-commit- ment through personal visits to the United States and France, was arousing at least serious questioning, if not opposition, to the Soviet hierarchy. It would seem a logical deduction that some of the opposition to his conduct of foreign relations which was openly voiced by the Chinese Communists found a sympathetic response- some of his associates, and very probably among the Soviet military. 3. It was against this back- ground that the 15-2 incident occurred. A combination of these three factors in our judg- ment is what resulted in the definite and brutal decision to disrupt the Paris conference. Tto determine how each of thesei factors should be weighed is.1 for the moment, beyond our I reach. One Thing Is Certain There is one thing, however, that can be regarded as certain: This is the decision to wreck the conference was made prior to Khrushchev's departure from Moscow. At no point during his stay in Paris ? neither when he disclosed his true intentions to General de Gaulle at 11 A. M. on Sunday the 15th nor subse- quently ? did Khrushchev devi- ate one inch from his demands that the United States (1) de- nounce the overflights, (2) apologize to the Soviet Union, (3) punish those responsible for these flights. Neither the state- ment made by the President at the one meeting held on Mon- day nor the serious and respon- sible efforts of General de Gaulle and Mr. Macmillan in bilateral talks with Mr. Khrushiliev be- fore and after the President's announcement of suspension of flights could persuade him to withdraw these unacceptable demands. Indeed, it is a logical deduction from his behavior in Paris that he had no authority to modify his position to any significant degree. The fact that he was ac- companied everywhere, and lit- erally everywhere, by Foreign Minister Gromyko and Marshal Malinovsky is an interesting sidelight on this point. There is much speculation as to this change from his previous atti- tude during his visits both to the United States and France, when he insisted upon having meetings alone with the Presi- dent and with President de Gaulle, with only interpreters present. The best guess as to the significance of this new fac- toe i,r that (1) in -,,,i O5 of th Incident Seized Upon The U-2 incident was most certainly seized upon and mag- nified beyond its true propor- tions as a justification for this decision. It is debatable whether it would have been possible for Mr. Khrushchev to devise an- other pretext for so radical and violent a position. It might well be that a lack of success at the summit would have confronted Khrushchev with a much more difficult choice, for his point of view, than no conference at all. He and his associates may have therefore much preferred to avoid facing the consequences of failure of negotiation by the simple expedient of torpedoing ' the conference. It may seem incredible to you that responsible leaders of a great power should have come all the way to Paris merely for the purpose of wrecking the conference, thereby incurring world-wide condemnation of the Soviet Union and enhancing thel sense of unity and purpose among not only the Western powers represented there but also the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and free nations everywhere. I believe the answer Iles in a I Khrushchev's and the Soviet's thinking. Mr. Khrushchev undoubtedly hoped ? and this explains his early arrival in Paris?to divide the Allies and isolate the United States. He anticipated that the United States would refuse the demands he had set forth and that the conference would then collapse, with the United States bearing the responsibility for the rupture before world opinion. Flans Miscarried His plans miscarried because our two Allies stood solidly and loyally with the United States and refused to be parties to Mr. Khrushchev's scheme. The re- sult, as the whole world knows, was that the position which Mr. Khrushchev brought to Paris resulted in the complete isola- tion of the Soviet Union rather than the United States and in placing the responsibility for the disruption of the conference squarely where it belongs?on his own shoulders. This estimate of the reasons for Mr. Khrushchev's behavior is strongly supported by the at- tack which he made at his press conference on General de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan for what he termed their lack of objectivity, lack of will and subservience to the Allied re- lationships?in other words, in plain English, for their solidari- ty with the United States, their loyalty to our common purpose, and their refusal to play the Soviet game, I believe the signs are that there has been as yet no radical alteration in Soviet policy, though we can expect the con- tinuance of a propaganda ef- fort designed to split off the United States from its Allies. This conclusion is supported by Mr. Khrushchev's Paris state- ments, including those at his press conference. It is support- ed, somewhat more specifically and definitely, by the state- ments which he made in Berlin on his way home. Soviet Secrecy Stressed We must remember, however, that, given the nature of the Soviet state, the men who run it can meet in secret at any time and change existing policy without public debate or even foreshadowing any such change. It is for this reason that any statement about a phase of Soviet policy must be regarded as qualified, with no certainty that it will remain valid in the future. Thus, though the world's hopes have been keenly disap- pointed by the fact that the summit conference was not held as planned, the signs so far are that the basic realities of the world situation have not been greatly changed. Whether this continues to be so depens, as I have indicated, on actions of the leading Communist countries. Provisionally, however, I con- clude that the implication for United States policy is that the main lines of our policy remain sound and should be continued. The lesson of Paris is that we should prosecute those lines with renewed effort. Proponents within the Communist bloc of an aggressive course must not be encouraged by signs of weak- ness on our part. Proponents of a peaceful course should be encouraged by our readiness to get on with outstanding interna- tional business in a sober and rational manner. .We must remain prepared to withstand aggressive pressures, not only in Berlin but also else- where. I trust that our evident readiness will deter such pres- sures. Among the lessons of Paris, the most important for the free world, including ourselves, it seems to me is fresh realiza- tion of the dangers we face and consequent need for closing of ranks and moving ahead with our own and our allies' programs for strengthening the free world. We came back from Paris with a keener sense of what it means to have allies, and I lo oyo 1-3?_ ooy- ryllizyro,o, 3,1.11 take new life from this experi- ence. At the same time I would stress equally the need to ex- pand imaginatively and gener- ously our collaboration with the newly developing countries. On both accounts, I hope the Congress will give wholehearted support to our Mutual Security Programs as authorized by this cominittee, which are now more important than ever. We must continue, as the President has said; to seek in a business-like way to make prog- ress on outstanding problems with the Soviet Union. We in- tend to go ahead with existing negotiations, to stand by our commitments, and to foster open communications and peace- ful exchanges. Above all, we shall not cease from the most determined, patient, resourceful endeavor to find ways to bring the arms race under control and thus to meet the nuclear menace that hangs over man- kind. Asks Calm Outlook I believe in this period it is incumbent upon us, all of us, to keep a calm and steady gaze on the world scene and to avoid actions, sttements and attitudes which might tend unnecessarily to increase international ten- sion. If such an increase is to occur, it should be clearly the fault of the Soviets and we should not do them the favor of providing pretext for action by them which would have this effect. We should not define as "hard" or "soft" our attitude or policy toward the Soviet Union. To do so is not only to deflect our gaze from the grim reality that confronts us, but even more to plunge us inevi- tably into fruitless and damag- ing domestic recriminations. We must now, as in the future, maintain a vigilant, calm and resolute posture and, insofar as it lies in our power to do so, be accurate in our estimates and effective in our actions. I would close in expressing the hope that we will not be- come so fixed in preoccupation with the Soviet challenge as to lost sight of our own construc- tive purposes?which are larger and more important than mere- ly resisting or reacting to ex- ternal threats. We have our own vision of the future toward which we want to see the world evolve. We have our own programs for helping to bring that future about?for holding high the light of free- dom, for sharing its message and rewards with emering na- tions, for trying to creat an in- ternational community in which the rule of law will replace the rule of force. It is to these pro- grams that our talents and en- eries should be rededicated in the uncertain times that lie ahead. Suspension of U-2 Flights THE CHAIRMAN?Proceed- ing, Mr. Secretary, under our agreed regulations, can you tell the committee when the deci- sion to suspend any further flights over Russian territory was taken? SECRETARY HERTER?My impression is that it was taken on the Thursday before the President went to Paris * * * THE CHAIRMAN?What were the considerations which led to the decision taken on the 12th, I believe, This/v*9.y the 12th of May, that there should be no further flights over the? SECRETARY HERTER?Mr. Chairman, I think I answered that in my own statement, in which I said that since the IT-2 system had been compromised, It was discontinued as any other intelligence mission would be insuch a case. THE CHAIRMAN?It had been compromised sometime be- fore the 12th, wasn't it? SECRETARY HERTER?No, sir. THE CHAIRMAN ? Was a moratorium on flights agreed upon prior to May 1 to be effective at any time after May 1? SECRETARY HERTER ? Not that I know of. THE CHAIRMAN?Was any moratorium on the flights agreed upon prior to May 1, o be effective at any time after May 1. SECRETARY HERTER ? I have heard reports to that ef- fect, but of my own knowledge I do not know. THE CHAIRMAN?Was such a moratorium ever discussed or considered by anyone in the State Department? SECRETARY HERTER?Not by Mr. Dillon nor myself. [Douglas Dillon is Under Sec- retary of State.] THE CHAIRMAN?Or any- one? SECRETARY HERTER. I don't know of anyone. THE CHAIRMAN?Do you know whether the C. I. A. con- sidered such a moratorium? SECRETARY HERTER ? I do not, sir. Dulles Will Testify THE CHAIRMAN?Did Mr. Dulles [Allen W. Dulles, direc- tor of the Central Intelligence Agency] or anyone else order a suspension of flights after the loss of the plane on May 1? SECRETARY HERTER ? That Sir, he will be able to testify to. I can't tell you as of what date he did that. THE CHAIRMAN ? Were any other planes lost on these same ventures prior to May 1? SECRETARY HERTER ? Not other Soviet territory. THE CHAIRMAN ? None had been shot down or lost over Soviet territory? SECRETARY HERTER?No. THE CHAIRMAN ? The flight referred to, that Chair- man Khrushchev referred to on April 9, you were aware of that, were you? SECRETARY HERTER ? Yes. THE CHAIRMAN?It was a successful flight over? SECRETARY HERTER?It was. THE CHAIRMAN?If the president decided to suspend the ilaglyto May 16. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Senators Handicapped By Silent Microphones WASHINGTON, May 27 (UPI)?The $27,000,000 new Senate office building has an elaborate system of micro- phones for members and wit- nesses in each committee room. But members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Secretary of State Chris- tian A. Herter had trouble hearing and understanding each other throughout a long morning session on the ill- fated summit conference. Only when he moved down to the witness table for a news conference afterward did Chairman J. W. Ful- bright, Democrat of Arkan- sas, find out why. The micro- phones weren't turned on. which you stated he did on the 12th, why was this announce- ment delayed-until the meeting with Chairman Khrushchev on the 16th? SECRETARY HERTER?Be- cause the President reserved that decision to make the an- nouncement in Paris. THE CHAIRMAN?What was reasoning for doing that? SECRETARY HERTER ? I cannot give you the answer, sir. THE CHAIRMAN?I believe you stated very convincingly that Chairman Khrushchev came to the conference deter- mined to wreck it. Do you be- lieve that the U-2 incident con- tributed to this determination on the part of Chairman Khru- shchev? SECRETARY HERTER ? Yes, I believe it did. It was one of the factors as I tried to ex- plain in my statement. THE CHAIRMAN?Why do you think? SECRETARY HERTER?Mr. Chairman, might I for a mo- ment go back to the previous question you had asked as to the President's delay in an- nouncing the suspension of the flights? You may recall that he, at the summit or at the so-called meeting in Paris, coupled that with the offer of bringing into the United Nations a proposal for a general overlight program superintended by the United Nations, and wanted to couple those two things together. THE CHAIRMAN?Mr. Sec- retary, why do you think Chair- man Khrushchev left a way out for the President by suggesting in one of his earlier statements that he believed the President did not know about these flights? SECRETARY HERTER?I can there, of course, only spec- ulate that he had himself com- mitted himself very strongly in Russia with regard to his friend- ship for the President, and wished to in that way continue the possibility of the President's disclaiming any responsibility for the flight. THE CHAIRMAN ? What was the reason for not accept- ing this way out on our part? Why didn't we accept that sug- gestion? SECRETARY HERTER?It was a question of judgment as to when the essential facts had been revealed by the capture of the pilot and the plane with all its instrumentation intact, the United States Government should admit the fact that this overflight had taken place, that it was an intelligence overflight, and that decision was made, of course, by the President him- self. The General Practice THE CHAIRMAN?Mr. Sec- retary, you are a long-time de- votee of international relations and thoroughly familiar with precedents in this field. Is the public assumption and respon- sibility for espionage by the head of a state the usual and customary practice among na- tions? SECRETARY HERTER?No, the general practice has been, I think, for a long period of time to deny any responsibility what- ever. THE CHAIRMAN?Do you know of any precedent in our history or in the history of any great nation in which the head of state has assumed personal responsibility for espionage ac- tivities? SECRETARY HERTER?No, I do not know of any first hand. It may be that there have been some. On the other hand, I would point out, Mr. Chairman, that this particular incident was of a very unusual nature. THE CHAIRMAN?As a gen- eral policy, do you believe it is wise for the head of state to assume responsibility for espion- age activities? SECRETARY HERTER? Well, very frankly, I don't think it makes a great deal of differ ence from the point of view of what the public believes. On the other hand, I believe in a case of this kind the telling of the truth was the better course than getting deeper into fabricating excuses or disavow- ing responsibility. Unusual Circumstances THE CHAIRMAN ? What precisely were the reasons that persuaded you to depart from precedent in this case? What were the unusual circumstances you referred to? SECRETARY HERTER ? The unusual circumstances were the facts that the materiel and the statement of the pilot, not every bit of which was ac- curate, but a great part of which was accurate, had been revealed, and were being pres- ented to impartial tribunals for examination. Under those circumstances, which was very different from the ordinary espionage case, I think it would have become' extremely evident and was ex- tremely evident that this inci- dent had taken place. THE CHAIRMAN?Well, in our spy cases, isn't it a fact that the evidence of the par- ticular person being a spy, of some of those we had, was not in question? The difference is in whether or not the head of state takes responsibility for it, not that it was convincingly shown he was a spy. Isn't that the difference? SECRETARY HERTER ? That is a difference. THE CHAIRMAN?We often catch a spy. We have ourselves, it has been related, and there is no doubt he is a spy with all the paraphernalia which usually ac- companies a spy, but the point I thought that would be very interesting to the committee to know is why in this particular case, in spite of the convincing nature of the evidence that he was a spy, that the President and the head of state should assume responsibility for it. SECRETARY HERTER ? The first was that it was obvi- ous from the facts as to what had occurred. Second was that the situation which had led to this entire activity was the one which is probably disturbing the peace of the world the most and leads to the greatest tensions in the world, namely, the danger of surprise attack, and the secrecy behind the Soviet Union. When Parley Was Wrecked THE CHAIRMAN ? Was it not after the President said that he did know and took full re- sponsibility for these flights that Chairman Khrushchev be- came completely intransigeant and wrecked the conference? SECRETARY HERTER ? That is very difficult to deter- mine. If I may, I would like to cite at this point just one piece of evidence that I mentioned yesterday before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. On May 6 the Soviet Embassy in Washington, before any state- ment had been made accepting any degree of responsibility, be- fore the President had made any statement, this was on May 6, cancelled from the magazine which is published in the United States similar to the magazine which is published by the United States in Russia, called the U. S. S. R., stopped a press run of- that anagashie-snd.took, of it all references to the com- ing visit of the President to So- viet Russia. The magazine had in it a welcome to the President in his visit to Russia, pictures of the places that he was going to, and a good many photo- graphs indicating what a great success his visit was going to be. That was cancelled and taken out of the magazine en- tirely. * " SENATOR GREEN, Demo- crat of Rhode Island?May I ask a few more questions about the same matter, because I do not understand and perhaps it is my fault, how far did the President act alone and how far the State Department acted alone before they came together and agreed on the situation? Calls Consultation Steady SECRETARY HERTER?I would say there was consulta- tion right through in this peri- od, May I make this observa- tion, Mr. Chairman, from the point of view of first-hand knowledge on these matters, I asked Mr. Dillon to come up with me because for the?until May 6, 1 was out of the United States, he was acting Secretary of State and some of the ques- tions that may be directed to that period when I was out of the country he can answer from first-hand information, whereas I would have to do it only from second-hand informa- tion. THE CHAIRMAN?We would be very glad to have Mr. Dillon supplement the statement when- ever you would like. SENATOR GREEN?Mr. Dil- lon, then will you take up the answer to my question? MR. DILLON?All I can say is that in the period that I had responsibility we were in con- tact regularly with the Presi- dent with full coordination. SENATOR GREEN ? Well, the division of authority seems to have resulted in a great many understandings which have well been spread in the press, and the people are anx- ious to be informed on how it Continued on Next Page LD PRINT CENT 161 EAST 52nd SelWe ,en Loki ;nos, *glom: arid 3rd A - "-LIVW IT'S A DATE! this Sunday let's have BRUNCH AT THE ELMTREE ROOM FROM NOON TO 4 P.M. $2.75 HOLIDAY SPECIAL... BRUNCH ALSO WILL BE SERVED MONDAY, DECORATION DAY fit AL s r s 1,31, IY 3 r00 ? rni Approved For Release 2004/05/fiy Elit-NE9OT00782R000100060001-7 .1960 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?APPENDIX do? When a country declares war on you agai and again for over 40 years and the philo . y has done the same for nearly a hundre ? rs do you love them and forget their nam Judas? Communi ust be defeated to have civ- ilization, relig and mankind for none of them exist in a ue and honorable form under communism. ere is an old saying fight Are with fire a ? how can we serve liberty by placing it u.. the chopping block and giving the enemy a s ax? Patrick Henry once sal "Peace, peace when there is no peace," also, "Give me liberty or give me death." I am a conscientious objecto every- thing that sells our free Republic ort. Very truly yours, et" WILLIAM BERNARD. The Summit Meeting Exivt.NSION OF REMARKS OF HON. ALEXANDER WILEY OF WISCONSIN IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES Friday, May 27, 1960 Mr. 'WILEY. Mr. President, this morning, the Secretary of State, the Honorablerata, appeared before the Foreign Relations Committee and gave a very illuminating statement. I understand the statement was first re- leased to the press. I believe this statement by the Secre- tary of State and the President's remarks of the other evening, over the radio and television, give the complete story. From these two statements, the people of America can obtain all the facts neces- sary to be had in connection with the so- called fiasco at the summit which was caused by Khrushchev. I ask unanimous consent that the Watment by the Secreta iy of State be prin ? ppei?A?=TM-c o There being no objection, the state- ment was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTIAN A. HERTER, SECRETARY OF STATE, BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, FRIDAY, May 27, 1980 I. THrtriirsirV THE SUMMIT A. The threat to Frertire"a4*-" In order to understand what happened in Paris we need to look back over the preced- ing 18 months. In November 1958, the U.S.S.R. began a new strategy directed toward altering the situation in Berlin and East Germany in its favor. If the Western Powers refused to give up their present position in Berlin and make West Berlin a so-called free city, the Soviet Union stated its intention to proceed uni- laterally at the end of 6 months, turning over full sovereignty to the so-called G.D.R. and thereby confronting the Allies with the alternative of capitulation or resort to force which would be met by Communist force. Though the strategy as it unfolded proved to be more flexible than its original state- ment, it is still the official policy of the U.S.S.R. Its force lies in the Soviet ability to threaten Berlin, where we are morally committed but physically exposed. The Western Powers, of course, promptly rejected the Soviet proposal and reaffirmed their determination to stand by Berlin. In the months that followed, while the U.S.S.R. elaborated and pressed its strategy, the Western Powers concerted their plans to meet it. They sought to engage the U.S.S.R in negotiation, thereby clarifying its inten- tions and, either attaining solutions accept- able to the West or, as a Minimum, convinc- ing it that unilateral action against Berlin would not be sound. B. Engaging the U.S.S.R. negotiation It was by no means a foregone conclusion that the U.S.S.R. would negotiate on an ac- ceptable basis. In January 1959 the U.S.S.R. proposed a conference to adopt a peace treaty with the two parts of an indefinitely divided Germany. The Western Powers continued to maintain that a peace treaty could be nego- tiated and signed only with a unified Ger- many, hence that the reunification of Ger- many must be settled first. They also maintained that the only proper solution for Berlin lay in its becoming the capital of a unified Germany, and therefore they were unwilling to discuss Berlin as an isolated issue. But the U.S.S.R. had held for some time that reunification was solely the busi- ness of the Germans and therefore refused to discuss it. The West persisted. during February and March iii its efforts to get the Russians talking somehow. It proposed a meeting of Foreign Ministers, with the prospect of a possible summit meeting when due prepara- tions had been made. The U.S.S.R. had re- peatedly indicated a desire for one since 1956. Finally a compromise agenda, which did not prejudice the substantive views of either side, was adopted for a foreign ministers' meeting and a date was set in May, shortly before the expiration of the original Soviet deadline for meeting their arbitrary demands on Berlin. C. Foreign ministers' deadlock During the intensive preparations for the meeting the Western Powers developed a new version of their basic position regarding Germany,, which was submitted at Geneva as the Western peace plan. It consisted in approaching the unification of Germany through a series of stages, thereby offering the U.S.S.R. a chance to adjust its position gradually to the eventual loss of its hold on East Germany which free elections would presumably bring. The plan showed flexibil- ity and imagination; it appealed to world opinion, but its rejection by the U.S.S.R. was nonetheless flat. The U.S.S.R. stuck adamantly to its previously announced pro- posals for a peace treaty with a divided Ger- many. Thus the basic positions remained totally unreconciled. Finding no progress possible on Germany, the Western Powers and the U.S.S.R. ex- plored the possibility of an interim agree- ment on Berlin which, without contemplat- ing a basic solution of Berlin as a separate issue, would do something to mitigate diffi- culties which the U.S.S.R. professed to find there. Though some progress was made in this direction, the U.S.S.R. insisted on lan- guage which would have implied the eventual erosion of the Western position in Berlin. Accordingly, despite the labor of 3 months with only one short adjournment, the Foreign Ministers' meeting ended in dead- lock. D. High-level trips The failure of the Foreign Ministers' meet- ing did not result in a War crisis, however, because a parallel train of events had mean- while brought hope in a different direction. We took the opportunity of Mikoyan's visit to the Soviet Embassy here in January to arrange informal exchanges of views between the Soviet leader and top U.S. officials. This was followed in June and July by further visits and exchanges of Koz.lov to this coun- try and the Vice President to the 'U.S.S.R. A4553 The fact that these visits took place without public incident and made possible somewhat more realistic communication than usual with the Soviet leadership seemed to offer a possibility?only a possibility, of course? that means of avoiding war and eventually getting Soviet-Western relations into some- what less dangerous shape might be found by developing these informal contacts. Accordingly, the President decided to go ahead with a move which he and his advisers had long had in mind when the time seemed right. He invited Chairman Khrushchev to visit this country, and the visit was an- nounced before the Foreign Ministers ended their Geneva meeting. During that visit no progress was made, or indeed expected, on resolving outstanding problems, but a somewhat greater degree of mutual understanding was seemingly at- tained, particularly on the need to settle international questions by peaceful means rather than by force. There was also a sus- pension, later publicly acknowledged, of Whatever was left of the Soviet ultimatum on Berlin. E. Preparation for the summit After the Khrushchev visit it was judged feasible and desirable by the Western Pow- ers to move toward renewed discussion, this time at the summit. Some flicker of hope for progress on Berlin had appeared at Camp David, whereas Geneva had ended in dead- lock. During his American visit Khrushchev had also evinced an interest in the equally vital field of disarmament, and even though disarmament talks were to start in the Com- mittee of Ten at Geneva it was felt that Khrushchev might reserve his constructive moves, if any, for the summit. Accordingly, after due consultations among the Western heads of government an invitation to a summit was sent to Khru- shchev and accepted by him, and after some difficulty over earlier dates the time was finally set for May 16. This move found broad support in Western public opinion. There ensued an intensive and protracted series of preparations on the Western side, involving repeated meetings not only of the Foreign Ministers and of NATO but even of the heads of government. Within our own Government we also studied most carefully the possibilities of making progress not only on Berlin and Germany but most particu- larly in disarmament, as well as other aspects of general Soviet-Western relations. At the December meeting of Western heads of Government a consensus emerged that the May summit might be only one of a series of such meetings, and that it would be largely exploratory. Some modest prog- ress was hoped for, but no major solutions on any front. But if a beginning could be made, the series of talks, possibly in a grad- ually improving atmosphere over the years, might do substantially more. F. Summit prospects dimmed In the first weeks after the Khrushchev American visit there was a general improve- ment of atmosphere and people began talk- ing, partly in hope, partly in some confusion, about "detente." There were comparatively conciliatory speeches on each side; there was progress in the test-ban talks at Geneva; a new Soviet-United States cultural agree- ment was signed November 21, and on De- cember 1 the United States, the U.S.S.R., and other powers signed the Antarctic Treaty. But clouds began to gather even then. One of the earliest signs was the strong Soviet protest on November 11 against West German plans to build a broadcasting sta- tion in West Berlin. Another was the Khrushchev speech on November 14 which was harder in tone, boasted again of Soviet missile prowess, and began a concentrated attack on Adenauer and the German Federal Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 i/A4554 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- APPENDIX Republic which later increased and seemed to be a central feature of Soviet presuramit tactics. The reason for this attack is still " a matter for speculation. Perhaps they thought it would undermine the Western position on Berlin by helping to divide the Western Allies. It had no such effect of i course, but naturally rallied us to speak : out in defense of our German ally. Khrushchev as early as December 1 also I began repeating his threats to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany. He re- peated these threats in his speech to the I Supreme Soviet on January 14 and in his remarks during his visit to Indonesia and . other countries in January. On February 4, the Warsaw Pact powers issued the first formal blocwide commitment to sign a sepa- rate GDR peace treaty. Thus Khrushchev' threatening Baku speech of April 25, thong it was the most sweeping since Feb 1959, was only a harsher version of what h had been saying for months before. I sha make full documentation on his speeche available to the committee. Not until April did we reply, at length to this mounting crescendo of Soviet state- ments. We did so in order to keep the rec- ord straight?notably in the speeches of April 4 and 20, which Khrushchev attacked for starting arguments that he in fact had begun. The unity of the four Western Powers on Berlin meanwhile presumably signaled to the U.S.S.R. that prospects for eroding the West- ern position or obtaining Soviet terms on Berlin remained slight. President de Gaulle and other leaders were quite firm in dis- couraging expectations on this front. The NATO Council in Istanbul May 2-4 also reaffirmed the Western position on German reunification and regretted Soviet refusal to discuss specific practical measures of dis- armament. Thus as the summit drew near the prospects for important agreement seemed slender, so long as the U.S.S.R. re- mained committed to driving the Western Powers out of Berlin and to discussing dis- armament in terms of general principles rather than concrete steps. The Western outlook consistently re- mained, however, that the summit would be worthwhile. It would afford an opportunity for an exchange of views which would clarify each side's position; it might contribute to some reduction of tensions over Berlin and narrow some of our differences on disarma- ment. It could be at least a, small first step in a long process of improving Soviet- Western relations. rirerignict4iimmagrigru On May e unfortunate failure of an intelligence mission. The U.S.S.R. at once seized on it to complicate the approach to the summit. With regard to the role of the U.S. Government in this matter, I cannot hope to improve on the lucid and straight- forward account which the President gave to the Nation Wednesday night. I will, therefore, not attempt to go into detail, although I am of course ready to answer questions concerning my responsibilities. Here I would only like to reemPhasize four central points which stood out in the President's account: 1. The U-2 program was an important and eiXtertrant-#41114ering4r. We knew that nder this program would have serious consequences but we considered that the great benefit derived justified the risks involved. 2. The decision not to suspend this pro- gram of flights, as the summit meeting ap- proached, was a sound decision. Conditions at a later season would have prevented ob- taining very important information. There is never a "good time" for a failure of an intelligence mission. We believe it unwise to lower our vigilance because of these po- litical negotiations. 8- ;RIVAL Itatamenta by the U.S. Govern- ment properly sought first of all to protect the pilotak ini.Wence mission, and every- thing conteetU" with it that might still be kept secret. But when it became clear that plane and pilot were in Soviet hands we believed the Congress and the American peo- ple should be given the facts. Thus up to May 7 'U.S. statements followed the general line of the cover story, and thereafter were adjusted to the situation as it developed. 4. Since the U-2 system had been com- promised, it was discontinued as any other intelligence mission would be in such a case. Announcement of its discontinuance was Withheld until the President could convey the fact personally in Paris.- Based on these four points, I believe most Americans will agree that the main course of our actions, given what we knew at any par- ticular time, was sound. In particular, I have doubts that any alteration in the language of U.S. statements would have made any difference in the arbitrary Soviet demands which followed. NI. THE EVENTS IN PARIS A. Narrative / should like to give you an account of the major developments at Paris. I shall be as brief as possible, since the details have been widely publicized, But I would like to tell you of those events which in my opinion had a detriment effect there, and particu- larly those which influenced the decisions of the President. On my arrival in Paris on Friday, May 13, there was already considerable speculation at the news that Mr. Khrushchev was arriv- ing in Paris on Saturday rather than on Sunday, the day on which the President and Mr. Macmillan were due to arrive. Mr. Khrushchev's statement on arrival at Orly Airport gave no indication of his subse- quent position. It was mild in character and conveyed the distinct impression that he would proceed with the summit confer- ence despite the 11-2 incident. Subsequent events showed that this was deliberately de- signed to conceal his real purpose. On Sunday at 11 a.m., at his request, Mr. Khrushchev, accompanied by Foreign Min- ister Gromyko and Marshal Malinovsky? which is in itsself an unusual procedure which I shall revert to later?called on President de Gaulle at the Elyste Palace. During this meeting he left with President de Gaulle a memorandum setting forth the conditions which would have to be met by the United States before Khrushchev would be prepared to attend a summit conference. The French delegation provided a copy of this memorandum to the American delega- tion early that afternoon. The memoran- dum was subsequently presented by Mr. Khrushchev, without change, as the open- ing part of his statement to the four-power meeting on Monday morning, May 16. After visiting President de Gaulle Sun- day morning, Khrushchev called on Prime Minister Macmillan at 4:30 p.m. on the same day and read the same statement of posi- tion to him. The copy of the statement received from the French delegation was, of course, the subject of immediate consultation with the President and with members of the Ameri- can delegation as to its significance and meaning. It was our general conclusion, subse- quently borne out by the facts, that the posi- tion and totally unacceptable demands set forth in this document had been drawn up in Moscow prior to Mr. Khrushchev's departure. In this sense it represented a fixed Soviet governmental position from which even Mr. Khrushchev would not have the authority to depart while In Paris. I might digress here to observe that it had been our experience at previous conferences with the Soviets, at least since the death of May 27\ Stalin, that the Soviet representative, no matter how highly placed he might be, was bound by the collective decisions on basic policy matters made prior to his departure from Moscow. Any substantive changes in these positions apparently required reference back to Moscow before they could be under- taken. I should like to emphasize the opinion which was thus unanimously arrived at in the American delegation, since it bore di- rectly upon the position which the President took at the meeting on Monday morning. It was out of the question, of course, that there should be any acceptance by the Presi- dent of the humiliating and arrogant condi- tions of Mr. Khrushchev. We had very much In mind, however, the importance of showing the world that it was Mr. Khrushchev, and no one else. Who was_placing this summit conference in peril. The President, therefore, decided before the Monday meeting that the proper course of action, consonant with the great respon- sibility which he bore and the seriousness of the issues which were to have been discussed at the conference, was for him not to engage in vituperation with Mr. Khrushchev but to demonstrate the restraint and dignity which was incumbent upon the office he holds and which befitted the leader of a great country. In connection with this decision, the Pres- ident resolved to announce to the conference his previously taken decision to suspend fur- ther flights of U-2 aircraft over the Soviet Union. Although the original intention had been to restrict the first meeting of the conference at the summit to the chiefs of state and heads of government and their interpreters, the President, on learning that Mr. Khrush- chev wished to bring Foreign Minister Gromyko and Marshal Malinovsky, asked Secretary Gates and me to accompany him to this meeting. I do not need to describe this meeting in detail beyond saying that Mr. Khrushchev read a statement which, with interpretation, took fully an hour. He read this entire statement from a prepared text before him. The first part of this statement was the memorandum which he had left with Presi- dent de Gaulle, plus certain additions which were in the same vein as regards the United States and which referred to Soviet willing- ness to hold a summit conference within 6 to 8 months. The major addition was the can- cellation of the invitation to the President to visit the Soviet Union. Apart from his statement, which was made public, the President only once joined in the ensuing discussion?in order to make clear to Mr. Khrushchev and his colleagues that the suspension of the U-2 flights was not merely for the duration of the conference but for as long as he was in office. The balance of the discussion at this meet- ing, which I should point out was the only one during the entire period in Paris at which the Soviets were present, was largely devoted to attempts by President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan to dissuade Mr. Khrushchev from the irrevocable step of publishing his abusive statement, whose un- acceptable conditions would render impos- sible any conference at the summit, and to Khrushchev's adamant insistence that he would publish this statement and do so at a time of his own choosing. The meeting broke up on the basis of a suggestion by President de Gaulle that the conferees should reflect on this matter for 24 hours and then examine the situation. This meeting completely confirmed our conclusion of the night before that Mr. Khrushchev was operating within the fixed limits of a policy set before his departure from Moscow. It is significant in this con- nection that the statement he issued later that day, Monday, May 16, which was iden- tical with the one he had made at the CON- Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 1960 ference, took no cognizance whatsoever of the discussion at the conference, and in particu- lar of the President's statement concerning the suspension of U-2 overflights. The rest of the proceedings in Paris were anticlimactic. It was apparent to all the Western representatives that there was no possibility of a summit conference short of a changed position on Mr. Khrushchev's part. On Monday Mr. Macmillan visited Mr. Khru- shchev in a fruitless effort to persuade him to withdraw his impossible demands. On that same day President de Gaulle de- cided, with the agreement of the President and Prime Minister Macmillan, to call a ses- sion of the summit conference for 3 p.m. on Tuesday, May 17, which was after the 24- hour recess which he had proposed on Mon- day. He sent invitations in writing to the three other participants. The President, in accepting, made clear his view that acceptance by the Soviet repre- sentative would mean that the Soviets had abandoned the demands which the President had previously found completely unaccept- able. Mr. Khrushchev did not show up at the appointed time for the Tuesday meeting. After a great deal of telephoning between the Soviet Embassy and the French Foreign Office it became clear that he was refusing to attend a summit conference and would only join in what he termed a preliminary meeting to ascertain if conditions could be created for a summit conference. By this reference to "conditions" he obviously meant the accept- ance by the United States Of all of the condi- tions he had set forth previously, and indeed he so stated in a written communication to President de Gaulle later that same day. In the light of Mr. Khrushchev's refusal to attend the summit conference, except on terms which all three Western representa- tives deemed unacceptable, the three West- ern heads of government met briefly at 9:30 p.m., on May 17 to approve the final tri- partite communique, a copy of which I should like to insert in the record. Thus the summit conference was ended by Soviet intransigence before it began, without addressing the great international issues with which it was supposed to deal. The following day, Wednesday, May 18, was marked by tripartite meetings of the Western heads of government and their Foreign Min- isters to consider the situation. In these meetings we sought to analyze the reasons for the Soviet attitude, prospects for the future, and the measures that the three Western Powers might adopt. This day was also marked by Mr. Khru- shchev's press conference, which was fully reported by press, television, and radio. It was apparently an unparalleled performance of vituperation, abuse, and loss of temper. It should be noted, however, that despite the apparently uncontrolled nature of his remarks and actions at this press conference, Mr. Khrushchev was very careful not to com- mit himself to any specific course of action in the international field. B. Analysts We have naturally given a great deal Of thought to the reasons for this extraordinary action by the Soviets in coming all the way from Moscow to Paris for the sole purpose of sabotaging the conference. I should like to say right off that there are many obscure aspects of this Soviet behavior and that we do not know all con- siderations and factors which went into its determination. We probably never shall. I hardly need to emphasize here to the mem- bers of this committee the complete secrecy in which decisions are arrived at in the Soviet Government and in the hierarchy of the Communist Party, which is the effective ruler of that country. It is only possible to try to deduce from Soviet actions, after they are taken, the considerations which Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?APPENDIX brought them about. What / give you now, therefore, is at best a tentative estimate of why the Soviet Union behaved as it did, an estimate which may have to be revised in the light of further information and future events. There is one thing, however, that can be regarded as certain: This is that the deci- sion to wreck the conference was made prior to Khrushchev's departure from Moscow. At no point during his stay in Paris?nei- ther when he disclosed his true intentions to General de Gaulle at 11 a.m. on Sunday the 15th nor subsequently?did Khrushchev deviate 1 inch from his demands that the United States (1) denounoe the overflights, (2) apologize to the Soviet Union, (3) punish those "directly responsible," and (4) prom- ise not to repeat these flights. Neither the statement made by the President at the one meeting held on Monday nor the serious and responsible efforts of General de Gaulle and Mr. Macmillan in bilateral talks with Mr. Khrushchev before and after the President's announcement of suspension of flights could persuade him to withdraw these unacceptable demands. Indeed, it is a logical deduction from his behavior in Paris that he had no authority, to modify his position to any significant degree. The fact that he was accompanied every- where, and literally everywhere, by Foreign Minister Gromyko and Marshal Malinovsky is an interesting sidelight on this point. There is much speculation as to this change from his previous attitude during his visits both to the United States and France, when he insisted upon having meetings alone with the President and with President de Gaulle, with only interpreters present. The best guess as to the significance of this new fac- tor is that (1) in view of the brutal and threatening attitude he adopted at Paris it was considered desirable to have some tangi- ble evidence of Soviet armed strength in the person of Marshal Malinovsky. Secondly, Gromyko. and Malinovsky would be able to testify upon return to Moscow that he had stuck strictly to the agreed position. It also seems certain that the decision to cancel the invitation to the President was made before Khrushchev left Moscow. As to what led the Soviets to this extreme position, in regard to the summit meeting which had previously appeared so much de- sired by Mr. Khrushchev. we enter into the realm of pure speculation, as / indicated earlier. The most we can hope to do in the absence of reliable information is to evalu- ate the elements and factors which appear to have entered into this decision. I shall try to list them briefly. 1. There was considerable indication, par- ticularly during April, that Mr. Khrushchev had concluded that there was little likeli- hood of his having his way, particularly in regard to Berlin, at the summit. Evidence of Western determination and unity on this point in speeches and statements by West- ern leaders appears to have brought him to this conclusion. Thus in his Baku speech on Aprii 25, he not only reiterated with the utmost finality his position on Berlin, in- cluding his intention to conclude a sepa- rate peace treaty with the East German regime, :but he also began for the first time seriously to cast doubts upon the success of the summit. By this, of course, he meant success on Soviet terms. 2. Although the evidence is highly incon- clusive, there are a number of indications that Mr. Khrushchev's conduct of Soviet foreign policy, particularly his overperson- alization and in Communist eyes overcom- mitment through personal visits to the United States and France, was arousing at least serious questioning if not opposition in the Soviet hierarchy. It would seem a logical deduction that some of the opposi- tion to. his conduct of foreign relations which Was openly voiced by the Chinese A4555 Communists found a sympathetic response among some of his associates, and very prob- ably among the Soviet military. 3. It was against this background that the 111-2 incident occurred. A combination of these three factors in our judgment is what resulted in the defi- nite and brutal decision to disrupt the Paris Conference. To determine how each of these factors should be weighed is, for the moment, beyond our reach. The U-2 incident was most certainly seized upon and magnified beyond its true propor- tions as s. justification for this decision. It is debatable whether it would have been possible for Mr. Khrushchev to devise an- other pretext for so radical and violent a position. It might well be that a lack of success at the summit would have confronted Khru- shchev with a much more difficult choice, from his point of view, than no conference at all. He and his associates may have therefore much preferred to avoid facing the consequences of failure of negotiation by the simple expedient of torpedoing the conference. It may seem incredible to you that respon- sible leaders of a great power should have come all the way to Paris merely for the purpose of wrecking the conference, thereby incurring worldwide condemnation of the Soviet Union and enhancing the sense of unity and purpose among not only the Western Powers represented there but also the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and free nations everywhere. I believe the answer lies in a basic miscal- culation in Mr. Khrushchev's and the Sovi- et's thinking. Mr. Khrushchev undoubtedly hoped?and this explains his early arrival in Paris?to divide the allies and isolate the United States. He anticipated that the United States would refuse the demands he had set forth and that the conference would then collapse, with the United States bearing the responsibility for the rupture before world opinion. His plans miscarried because our two allies stood solidly and loyally with the United States and refused to be parties to Mr. Khru- shchev's scheme. The result, as the whole world knows, was that the position which Mr. Khrushchev brought to Paris resulted in the complete isolation of the Soviet Union rather than the United States and in placing the responsibility for the disruption of the conference squarely where it belongs?on his own shoulders. This estimate of the reasons for Mr. Khru- shchev's behavior is strongly supported by the attack which he made at his press con- ference on General de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan for what he termed their lack of objectivity, lack of will, and sub- servience to the allied relationships?in other words, in plain English, for their solidarity with the United States, their loyalty to our common purpose, and their refusal to play the Soviet game. IV. THE FUTURE What conclusions should we draw for the future? I believe the signs are that there has been as yet no radical alteration in Soviet policy, though we can expect the continuance of a propaganda effort designed to split off the United States from its allies. This conclu- sion is supported by Mr. Khrushchev's Paris statements, including those at his press con- ference. It is supported, somewhat more specifically and definitely, by the statements which he made in Berlin on his way home. We must remember, however, that, given the nature of the Soviet state, the men who run it can meet in secret at any time and change existing policy without public debate or even foreshadowing any such change. It is for this reason that any state.. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 .1111111?1111?11111111111110.?11.1.116 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 77A4556 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -,- APP IX nsent about a phase of Soviet. policy must be regarded as qualified, with no certainty that it will remain valid in the future. Thus, though the world's hopes have been keenly disappointed by the tact that the summit conference was not held as planned, the signs so far are that the basic realities of the world situation have not been greatly changed. Whether this continues to be so depends, as I have indicated, on actions of the leading Communist countries. Provisionally, however, I conclude that the implication for U.S. policy is that the main lines of our policy remain sound and should be continued. The lesson of Paris is that we should prosecute those lines with re- newed effort. Proponents within the Com- munist bloc of an aggressive, course must not be encouraged by signs of weakness on our part. Proponents of a peaceful course should be encouraged by our readiness to get on with outstanding international busi- ness in a sober and rational manner. We must remain prepared to withstand ag- gressive pressures, not only in Berlin but also elsewhere. I trust that our evident readiness will deter such pressures. Among the lessons of Paris, the most im- portant for the free world including our- selves, it seems to me, is fresh realization of the dangers we face and consequent need for closing of ranks and moving ahead with our own and our allies' programs for strength- ening the free world. We came back from Paris with a keener sense of what it means to have allies, and I am sure that our alli- ances will take new life from this experience. At the same time I would stress equally the need to expand imaginatively and gener- ously our collaboration with the newly devel- oping countries. On both accounts I hope the Congress will give wholehearted support to our mutual se- curity programs as authorized by this com- mittee, which are now more important than ever. We must continue, as the President has said, to seek in a businesslike way to make progress on outstanding preblems with the Soviet Union. We intend to go ahead with existing negotiations, to stand by our com- mitments, and to foster open communication and peaceful exchanges. Above all, we shall not cease from the most determined, pa- tient, resourceful endeavor to find ways to bring the arms race under control and thus to meet the nuclear menace that hangs over mankind. I believe in this period it is incumbent upon us, all of us, to keep a calm and steady gaze on the world scene and to avoid actions, statements, and attitudes which might tend unnecessarily to increase international ten- sion. If such an increase is to occur, it should be clearly the fault of the Soviets and we should not do them the favor of pro- viding pretext for action by them which would have this effect. We should not define as hard or soft our attitude or policy toward the Soviet Union. To do so is not only to deflect our gaze from the grim reality that confronts us, but even more to plunge us inevitably into fruitless and damaging domestic recrimination. We must now, as in the future, maintain a vigi- lant, calm, and resolute posture and, in- sofar as it lies in our power to do so, be ac- curate in our estimates and effective in our actions. I would close in expressing the hope that we will not become so fixed in preoccupa- tion with the Soviet challenge as to lose sight of our own constructive purposes? which are larger and more important than merely resisting or reacting to external threats. We have our own vision of the future toward which we want to see the world evolve. We have our own programs for helping to bring that future about?for holding high the light of freedom, for shar- ing its message and rewards with emerging nations, for trying to create an international community in which the rule of law will re- place the rule of force. It Is to these pro- grams that our talents and energies should be rededicated in the uncertain times that lie ahead. What Is Communism? EXTENSION OF REMARKS OP HON. JOEL T. BROYHILL OF VIRGINIA /N THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, May 4, 1960 Mr. BR()YHILL. Mr. Speaker, I should like to call the attention of the Members of this House to an editorial that appeared in the Alexandria (Va.) Gazette on May 23, 1960. It seems to me that this editorial presents a particu- larly well-reasoned statement of the issues and problems involved in the im- portant question of increasing the knowledge of our citizens, and particu- larly our children, of Communist propa- ganda and policies. The editorial reads as follows: WISAT IS COMMUNISM? At its meeting last week the Fairfax Coun- ty School Board went on record to have in- stituted in the county high schools, a course of study that would instruct as to the mean- ing of communism. Col. Waldron Leonard, a member of the board, made the suggestion. For some time he has been disturbed by the effect that communistic propaganda has been having upon the minds of some of the youth of our land. He feels that in order to combat the evil effects of the political, so- cial, economic and nonspiritual aspects of communism, it is most important that its true meaning be taught and understood. The admonition "to seek the truth and the truth shall make you free" led to Colonel Leonard's suggestion and the action of the county school. board. So often are we mis- led by labels that misrepresent products, ob- jectives, ideas, and ideals. We cannot ignore the great conflict in the world today between a society that recognizes the dignity of man and his relationship with his God, and a godless, materialistic society that makes of the individual a servant and instrument of the state. To some, commu- nism is made to appear as a perfect social order. To others, it evidences a political philosophy that is used by would be tyrants to destroy the rights, responsibilities, hopes, and aspirations of the individuals. It must be recognized that some risk at- taches to the teaching of the meaning of communism in our public schools. The sub- ject to be taught is one thing?the method employed in the teaching of the subject is something else. A responsibility will rest upon the school board and the superintend- ent of schools to make sure that well quali- fied instructors are chosen for such classes. As it is imperative that the real meaning of communism be understood, the risk of hav- ing the course slanted must be assumed and guarded against. The personality, thinking and the understanding of a teacher becomes, in varying degree, a part of a course of in- struction and give to it color as well as sub- stance. In our daily lives we are being continuously confronted with the facts of life. Our prob- lem is to discern the facts?distinguish them from fiction?and to properly interpret them In their relations, one to another. Every in- dividual hopes that society will permit and afford him a better way of life. This being a common aspiration of man, some of those May 27 who would give direction to the development of a better social order will emphasize ob- jectives and make reckless promises for their realization. We note little disagreement be- tween political leaders, whether on the local, State, National or world levels, as to objec- es. Who can publicly be opposed to the deals of peace end prosperity?to freedom, justice, and the opportunity for the individ- ual to develop his or her full potential? It is when we come to the means and methods to be employed to attain these objectives that wide differences of opinion appear and are advanced. A few years ago we heard much about the Four Freedoms. Only the idealist and the optimist can hope that these freedoms will ever be realized. Their attainment presup- poses a complete transformation of the na- ture of man?the elimination of selfishness and his ambition for power. Is there any evidence today that a communistic social order has or can cause to be made such a miraculous change in man? In recorded history, the nature of man has not changed materially. What changes that have taken place in different forms of society, have been occasioned primarily by self-interest. Wars, with their destruction of life and property, show how easy it is for us to revert to the laws of the jungle if self-interest so dictates. Our search for a utopian social order, whether called com- munism or by some other name, should not lead us to accept false promises?promises of a way of life that will not and cannot be realized. There are more aspects to the Communist philosophy of society than just the promise of a better economic social order. Assum- ing that a Communist society could provide better for the economic wants of man, what price does the individual pay In order to accomplish such an end? What happens to the dignity and meaning of the individual in such a society? One who teaches the meaning of communism in our public schools must know the subject and be well prepared to answer all of the questions of an awakened and inquiring student mind. Much good can come from such a course if the teaching differentiates between what communism promises in theory and what it provides in performance. Those interested in our schools and what is being taught, should be concerned with how the new course of study will be presented. ? Neighborhood Center of Philadelphia EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. HERMAN TOLL OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Thursday, May 26, 1960 Mr. TOLL. Mr. Speaker, on Monday, May 23, I had the pleasure of attending the dinner celebrating the 75th anni- versary of the Neighborhood Center of Philadelphia at the Sheraton Hotel. The main speaker on this occasion was Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was also celebrating her 75th year. The Neighborhood Center today gives guidance to the young and old of all races and creeds, and provides them with the facilities which will contribute to their enjoyment of wholesome leisure. The aim of this great organization has changed from the original concern with the economically and socially under- privileged to helping people of all ages Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 /960 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? APPENDIX more information through reconnais- sance. To supplement these views, Mr. Speak- er, I submit, herewith, imy.ajjA, jazatiala of May 22, 1960, over s-tation WGAN of POrtlaliertialne, through the courtesy of the Gannett Publishing Co. and its able and alert Washington correspond- ent, May Craig: BROADCAST OVER STATION WGAN RADIO, PORT- LAND, MAINE, MAY 22, 1960, BY HON. JAMES watiktalaemi- C. OLivss. "fa7lreS and gentlemen, in the light of the world-shaking events of the past week at Paris, there can be only one subject to dis- cuss with you today, my friends. That sub- ject, of course, is the torpedoing by Khru- shchev of the long-publicized and, in most quarters, the desperately desired summit conference of the Big Four. I have used the words "in most quarters" advisedly, because the people of the world had been sold on the hope that this meet- ing of the leaders of the four big powers of the world could, and would, in some magi- cal manner, pull a rabbit out of the hat and irreconcilable, as it seems to me, issues would be amicably settled. At the least, the people of the world had been brainwashed with the illusion that a summit meeting could result in a relaxing of tensions be- tween the free and the regimented worlds. Inviting Khrushchev to visit America, without first obtaining from him some prom- ise, for what it may have been worth, was the first mistake that our policymakers made. Then, after his arrogant and con- temptuous attitude had been completely displayed, and we had been influenced to overlook his boasting and his insulting con- duct while he was a guest of the President, the Madison Avenue soap-selling technique came into fun tempo. Remember the hog- wash which sounded the theme song of the spirit of Camp David. The beautiful dove of peace was flying at tile masthead of prac- tically every newspaper in America. The summit conference was to be the culmina- tion of the dedicated efforts for settlement of these issues which have continued to be- devil the world in the form of the cold war. The irreconcilable ideologies of the social- istic-communistic and the capitalistic camps were to be submerged in compromise. Ev- erybody was to save face. Nobody would be an appeaser. In short, the wonderful rabbit was to jump out of the hat. But the leopard never had changed his spots. Khrushchev never did have any in- tention of yielding by one inch. His inten- tions, in my opinion, were as always to play the Western World for suckers. He intended and did use the sounding board of the still- born summit conference for the purpose of throwing his weight around. He merely re- peated in a more vigorous and a more in- sulting technique the same attitude which he expressed while on his visit to America as the guest of our President. I took the position, then, that we were making a mistake in our invitation to him to visit this country. We now find our gul- libility being paid off with insults such as no head of a great power would ever have thrown at another great power, unless he was prepared for the showdown of war. The Russia of today has not changed one iota from the Russia of Stalin, so far as its basic objectives are concerned. We never learn a lesson from being kicked around. When Stalin was as truculent, as demand- ing, and as doublecrossing as Khrushchev is today, we swallowed his insults in our ef- forts to get along with him. These butchers in the Kremlin remain butchers and compromise is practiced by them in only one way, and that is down a one-way street in which they are determined to control the right-of-way. Our yielding and mild policy for the hope of cooperation only results in continued yielding. Peace- ful coexistence in the language of the Soviets means only one thing, and that is on terms to be established by the Soviets in their own best interests. We cannot placate an attitude of implaca- bility except by yielding our own self-respect. They are hard and we have been soft. They know where they are going and use every devious and calculating means to get there. We indulge in wishful thinking and fail to evaluate the hard, uncompromising deter- mination of these ruthless despots. They are surging ahead with everincreasing momen- tum while we are beguiled along the prim- rose path of complacency and ill-advised optimism. It is no surprise to those of us who evalu- ate the Soviet leadership as unscrupulous, cunning, crafty, and tough dedicated men without any consciences whatseoever that Khrushchev would act like a Hitler. Any man, drunk with power, is certain to throw his weight around when he believes that he is serving his purpose ?in so doing. We should blame ourselves for allowing our- selves to be such dupes, as we have been. Khrushchev is still feeling his first sput- nik, which our present leaders did their best to downgrade. The Soviet shot at the moon; their photographing of the back side of the moon; their latest space vehicle which could mark another first in the very near future; their progress in the sciences, includ- ing oceanography with which I have some familiarity, and their drive with purpose to goals which we had estimated as unattain- able for them for many years have combined to develop the arrogance which Mr. K. threw without restraint at our President and at us at the Paris debacle. Once again, let me refer to the kind of peaceful coexistence which the Soviets en- vision by citing these words of Lenin: "The existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialistic states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must tri- umph in the end. And, before that end supervenes, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bur- geois states will be inevitable." Khrushchev has openly stated that Soviet Russia will never abandon its goal of world conquest. It is true that he may not have used those exact words; but, he did state at the Na- tional Press Club, last September, while he was the geust of the President that "the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is founded on the Leninist principle of peaceful co- existence of states with different social sys- tems." In the light of this stated philosophy which dominates the Soviet consecration to its goal and objective, is there any further need to beat our braint out, trying to find some other hidden or farfetched motivation for Khrushchev's brutal and barbarous treat- ment of the United States at the Paris fiasco? - It satisfies rae to take him as he is and not get all confused by trying to think of him as something different. He represents an economic and governmental system which is directly and completely the antithesis of America. As the leader and spokesman of this system he has boasted that "we will bury you." This is reason enough for me to be convinced that we should not fool ourselves any longer with wishful thinking that we only need to close our eyes to the realities of the world in which we now live and the big bad wolf will go away. We have been badly shaken by this epi- sode; but, we asked for it. We probably will be shaken again and again and again during these next few days, weeks and months. To me, this means that we must be tough without being truculent. We must be resolute without being rabid. We must be persistent without being punitive. Khru- shchev is rattling his rockets. To me, this means that we must transform our com- placency of dream world thinking into an attitude of action. We are in a race for survival whether we like it or not. The 44's. A4581 1, true face of the Kremlin was displayed at Paris. In short, the United States and our allies, as well, must heed these storm warnings. Mr. K. has been acting, under instructions from the Kremlin, like a hurricane and if we have the commonsense to meet this chal- lenge, we must batten down the hatches. It will be wise, in lieu of speculating why "Khrush" blew his top to check ourselves, for the purpose of urgent correction, and examine: (1) the reasons why we have slipped in prestige during the last 5 years among them being psychological negativism, loss of dynamism, the obvious subordination of defense needs to the sacred cow of the budget and refusal to acknowledge that we are in a contest in space as well as in every other phase of our national being. Cr n national croc Is the o mon, o y eps ru- ev o a s cause celebre to a manifest absurdity. One has only to know that the Soviets are making regular recon- naissance flights over England every day in order to place this defense activity of ours In its proper perspective. This is not the most sordid crime of the century. If we were not using every logical and possible means of gaining information concerning the activities of this avowed enemy of America, we would, indeed, be derelict in our respon- sibility even to the point of treason. Why do we think that we should have a guilt complex because of this effort to protect our own country against a communistic dictator- ship which has looted and murdered across half of Europe? Have we forgotten Buda- pest? Have we forgotten the murder of East Berliners who were fighting for freedom? Do we have to apologize to ourselves or to the world which knows from firsthand ex- perience in practically every corner of the globe of the operation by the Soviets of the most massive and, yes, the most malignant espionage system ever known in the history of the world? I think that we should not be beating ourselves over the head for acting in our own self-defense which is, by the same token, the defense of the free world. These cries of Khrushchev are just so much public relations fakerism and we certainly are ridiculous if we continue to upgrade them to anything different by our own breast- beating. Khrushchev, in my opinion, never did have any intention of making the summit conference a success in causing interna- tional tensions to relax, except upon his own terms. If this could not be done, then, he intended to do just what he did: Namely, use it as a sounding board for world atten- tion and propaganda by telling off the three leaders of the Western World, The U-2 episode only served to make his objective, more attainable and in his view- point, more justifiable. The real issue is where do we go from here? How do we pick up the pieces? Agree- ment on the halting of nuclear and thermo- nuclear testing, moves toward sincere mutual disarmament, and relaxing of cold war ten- sions are still on our agenda. But, I fear, that Khrushchev and the Kremlin will, and as a matter of fact, already have, planned more moves of brinkmanship. The free world must be prepared to withstand more shocks of psychological warfare. It could be that, within the next few days, the Soviet space vehicle will reenter the earth's atmosphere and make a landing with the first spaceman of all time as we know it. If this is accomplished, the impact on the world and, upon us, will be catastrophic. How will we protect and harden ourselves against this further softening technique of the Communists? What happens when, as, and if these pos- sible and even probable acts of brinkman- ship develop, namely: 1. The signing of a separate peace treaty with East Germany and the subsequent acts Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 A4582 of harassing and closing off the Berlin high- way and air corridor? 2. The march of North Koreans into South Korea? 3. The military aggression against Quemoy and the Matsu Islands? 4. Increased over acts by Castro? 5. Further agitation and overt acts in Panama? 6. Stepping-Up tensions in Turkey and in strategic areas of the Near East? Are we prepared, psychologically and mili- tarily to stand up resolutely against these acts of aggression, directed toward softening us up for the kill? The communistic art of disarming an op- ponent with smiles and tokens of good will and then, at the proper psychological mo- ment of withdrawing, scowling and threat- ening have been well demonstrated by the visit of Khrushchev to our land, followed by the phony talk about disarmament and world peace in the spirit of Camp David, then, concluding in the fiasco of the Paris summit conference. This should be sufficient indoctrination for us in communistic cunning to prepare us when more of the same treatment tails on our collective head. The only answer for us is to get the big- gest possible stick at the earliest possible date, speak softly but resolutely, say what we mean and mean what we say, fully re- alizing that further appeasement can only mean living on our knees for generations to come. The Soviets respect nothing except power and strength, both mental and physical. Our leaders must measure up to this yard- stick or else. This, my friends, is what the U-2 incident and the collapse of the summit mean to me. Approved For RIease 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 CO Sthool Construction Assistance Act of 1960 SPEECH Os, HON. HAROLD D. DONOHUE OF MASSACIMSETTS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Thursday, May 26, 1960 The House in Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union had under consideration the bill (H.R. 10128) to au- thorize Federal financial assistance to the States to be used for constructing school facilities. Mr. DONOHUE. Mr. Chairman, be- cause of the overwhelming evidence on record showing the urgent need of proving school facilities throughout the Nation, I rise in support of this bill grant- ing reasonable Federal assistance to the States for such purpose. In the development of a legislative proposal toward law enactment, it is our democratic custom to afford opportuni- ties for advocates and antagonists to submit their evidence and views through congressional committee hearings. There is no need for me to recount the convincing mass of statistical, and other objective evidence, presented by the fore- most educational authority in the coun- try and contained in the record of com- mittee hearings, over the past several years. Their concrete facts and figures leave no question about the great de- ficiency of educational facilities around the country. RESSIONAL RECORD ? APPENDIX There is also no need for me to re- iterate the testimony of the multitUdi- nous officials of States and municipali- ties demonstrating that their various States are wholly unable to provide, from their own drained resources, the urgently required improvements in school facili- ties. The two basic factors involved are the need for school improvements and the Inability of the States to construct them. Since these two factors have been proved beyond question, it appears to me that there should be no reasonable doubt that this measure should be approved. With full realization of the conse- quences that may follow from the col-. lapse of the Paris summit meeting, there ought to be no uncertainty about the im- perative necessity of accelerating our preparations to meet the Russian Com- munist on every front, including the edu- cational front. Realistically admitting our past mistakes and factually facing, the import of a long, continuing cold war atmosphere, let us wisely now take the steps to guarantee that our youth will be adequately trained to meet and beat the Communist challenges in the future. There can be no better or wiser eco- nomic planning for the future security of America than a reasonable investment for the superior schooling of the coun- try's children. Let us endorse and ap- p ve that practical investment today. If we can afford to generously grant, Christian concern, many billions of dollars for the advancement and train- ing of people in undeveloped countries throughout the world then surely we can afford to provide reasonable assistance for the training and development of the children of the burdened American taxpayers. Today, the "Edmonds"?Tomorrow, World Trade EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. AL ULLMAN OF OREGON IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Friday, May 27, 1960 Mr. ULLMAN. Mr. Speaker, last week the destroyer U.S.S. Edmonds made its way up the Columbia River to the inland port city of The Dalles, Oreg. My col- leagues will be interested in the follow- ing editorial from the Dalles Optimist, which points out that this historic visit of an American fighting ship some 185 miles upstream from the mouth of the Columbia marks the creation of a new ocean waterway of great importance to the future of the Northwest and the Nation: [From the Dalles (Oreg.) Optimist, May 19, 1960] , TODAY, TETE "EDMONDS"?TOMORROW, WORLD TRADE Arrival of the U.S.S. Edmonds, a destroyer escort of the U.S. Navy, in The Dalles this Friday for a 3-day stay, with open house aboard the vessel on Saturday?Armed Forces Day?marks a definite milestone in the long and varied history of this century old city. May 27, 1960 For one thing, it marks acceptance by the Navy of the existence of a usable channel from Vancouver upriver to The Dalles for vessels of this size?in the case of the Ed- monds, more than 300 feet in length with a draft of 16 feet. With completion of the deep-draft (27 feet) channel next month, port of The Dalles will technically be in position to serve the commerce of the inland empire region. Ac- tually, this is not the case since it will first be necessary to construct suitable facilities before the potential commerce of the region can be moved from The Dalles into world markets. However, potential commerce Is already here since savings can be achieved by Harvey Aluminum by the movement of alumina to The Dalles by ship and shipment of other cargoes to their plant in the Los Angeles area. Outbound cargoes of wheat for the Orient also are potentially available for return cargo on alumina ships since savings are possible. In industry and commerce, that's reason nough. As the potential of these two basic cargoes is realized, commerce will be expanded to a wide range of export commodities produced ? in the interior. Thus, the arrival of a naval vessel here is symbolic of future commercial use of this new seaway which will be of vast importance to the economy of the region, largely de- pendent upon marketing of wheat. Strangers to Portland, no doubt, are always somewhat amazed to find ocean- going vessels in the snug harbor provided by the Willamette River, and during rose fes- tival time, to note the presence of 'destroyers and cruisers. But Portland is truly a mari- time city, and the same some day can be said of The Dalles, 86 miles farther up the Co- lumbia?great river of the West. Flags will be flying on the U.S.S. Edmonds In The Dalles harbor as that vessel on Friday afternoon becomes the symbol of a new age of waterborne commerce for the city and region. All of us should join in welcoming the officers and crew of the Edmonds, and we're sure the reception, both official and public, will be a rousing one. This is an auspicious occasion, not unlike the arrival of the first trains a half century or more ago over highways of iron. In the wake of the Edmonds will move the commerce of an empire over the waterway afforded by Bonneville Pool. This week bids were called by the Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army, for modification of the channel just below Bonneville Dam to permit the easy passage of large vessels through this area now made difficult of pas- sage by strong crosscurrents. This project of the engineers is solidly based on the economics of the situation, promising numerous benefits to those of us who live and work in the area east of the Cascade Mountains. The Dalles for more than a century has been a crossroads of commerce, first as the point of contact between stagelines into the interior and the river boats which first plied the Columbia. Now railroad and truck and buslines serve the commercial and transportation needs of the area on land, and barge fleets handled by diesel-powered tugs, move water- borne commerce up the river as far inland as Pasco, and out of The Danes to all parts of the west coast and even to Hawaii. The potential for development of port of The Dalles as a world port clearly is here. How soon that time is coming will depend upon the vision and energy of the port com- missioners and their staff, and of the fore. sight of the people of the port district. Opportunity is knocking. The develop- ment of suitable deep-draft facilities must not be long postponed. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 :gkRDP90T00782R000100060001-7 MAY 3 I. iv 10638 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE bringing to the devastated areas of Chile food, lothing, blankets, medicines?In fact, eflre field hospitals and hundreds of doe s, nurses, and technicians to staff the Many p vate American agencies are carrying o nationwide fundraising drives to al our southern neighbors. They include e Red Cross, the Church World Service, tholic Relief Services, Lutheran World ervice, Seventh-day Adventists, and th Church of the Lat- ter-day Saints, to me just some of them. I urge every America to consider the plight of his neighbors Chile and to respond generously and tly to these fund appeals. The first needs, of course, e to take care of the sick and injured, bind up their wounds, to feed them, an house them in some sort of temporary elters. But after that, Chile will have to ? uild. It is estimated that 2 million Ch ans were made homeless as a result of ns enormous catastrophe, and the South Hemisphere's winter is just beginni Property damage amounts to at least billion dollars?maybe much more. I feel confident that the U.S. Govern- ment and its people will offer the brave and resolute people of Chile generous help in rebuilding their devastated com- munities. We will help them to rebuild their homes, churches, and shops, and to restore their means of livelihood?in a word, to make it possible for millions of sufferers to resume a pattern of every- day living once more. ' It may be that such help could not be forthcoming from the United States within the framework of our present aid programs to Latin America. Special consideration may have to be given to the problem and a solution worked out. That we should do. I think that one thing could be learned from America's response to the Chilean disaster. Help from our Government and people-to-people assistance have poured forth abundantly to the disaster victims of Chile?certainly not in the hope that we would reap gratitude or appreciation, but because it was the nat- ural thing for one good neighbor to do for another. RELATIONS BETWEPN CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, on last Friday it was announced that the President had ordered a halt to further technical assistance from the United St es to Cuba. I sought that the President's action was s ible and realistic. It has never made s e to me to have our Govern ment gi g aid and comfort to a g ernment ich is openly vilifying us our way of Furthernio I am certain that the President's sta s ent will clear the air of the confusio which exists in this hemisphere about position toward antidemocratic gove eats. Everyone in Latin America will know that the United States is not soft communism nor on dictatorships of th eft or right. I believe the people of Western Hemisphere and all of the"arid out- side the Soviet orbit will hail and approve.,, the President's action. It reaffirmg America's role as the leader in the many-faceted war against comnaunisi. and all it stands for. There is one more point. I hope that those who have up to now sought a con- tinuation of the very partial and prefer- ential sugar legislation as it pertained to Cuba will be willing to reevaluate their position and permit the Congress to revise the legislation in a realistic and up-to-date manner. The Washington Evening Star of yes- terday published a significant editorial, clearly setting forth our illogical posi- tion in granting Cuba a favored-nation status in our sugar purchasing. The Star points out that our technical aid to Cuba was halted because it was not In our national interest to continue such aid. Then it asks, Is it in our na- tional interest to continue the heavy subsidization of the Cuban sugar indus- try? I ask unanimous consent that this edi- torial be inserted in the RECORD. There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, follows: cm the Washington Star, May 30, 1960] CONTEMPTUOUS MR. CASTRO Cu 's Prime Minister Castro has shrugged off th Innounced ending of our technical assistan to his country as "insignificant," and has ded some contemptuous remarks about wha e may do with our aid money. It is corre of course, that the two pro- grams involv ?one in agriculture and the other in civil viation?are not of major importance to e Cuban economy. Their annual cost is mated at about $200,000, and less than a d n U.S. specialists are en- gaged in their oper ion in Cuba. But while emphasizing that mination of the pro- grams within 180 da should not be inter- preted RS retaliation r Mr. Castro's anti- United States words an policies, administra- tion spokesmen point explained that the programs no longer are c sidercd In the na- tional or hemispheric mt est of the United States. On this ground, it seems tting to ques- tion whether continued hea subsidization of the Cuban sugar industry ewise is in our national interest. Under isting law, expiring this year, Cuban sugar h a favored position in the big U.S. markek both in volume and in price. By far, suga Cuba's most important cash crop and a gu anteed market at a premium price is not insig ficant to the Cuban economy. The administration has recommended that the new sugar act give discretionary author- ity to the President of the United States to revise quotas and prices on sugar imports. We believe that the President should have this ,thority, and that it should be exer- ci national and hemispheric interests. MUTUAL SECURITY: THE MEASURE OF LEADERSHIP A NEW STAGE IN EAST-WEST MATIONS Mr. . Mr. President, we may ermg?and I think it apparent that vie are?a new stage in East-West relations. Our determination and our leadership of the free world will undergo new tests. Our allies will be searching our actions anxiously. Their resolution to stand inflinching against communism will depend in great part on the matu- rity and wisdom of our actions. May 31 The Communists are doing more than hurling brutal and arrogant threats at us. The Communists are hard at work building military strength. They are applying their scientific resources to new weapons. They are looking for oppor- tunities to penetrate the uncommitted areas of the world with tantalizing and spurious offers of economic and military aid. They are hoping to bully and bludgeon our friends, particularly the smaller ones bordering on the Soviet bloc, into abandoning their defensive alliances and their friendly relations with the United States and our allies. The Soviet Union has long recognized the importance of the underdeveloped areas of the world in relation both to the spread of Communist ideology and to the augmentation of Soviet world power. As early as 1920, Lenin changed the direc- tion of Communist Party international policy from direct attack on European capitalism to an undermining of the eco- nomic strength of Europe through activ- ity in the colonial areas. Thus, the rev- olutionary and nationalistic tendencies In Asia were to receive the fullest pos- sible support. With the subsequent emergence and growth of nationalism and the establishment of new States born out of the colonial areas in the Middle East and in Africa, this policy was ex- panded into these areas. A Soviet pat- tern of economic penetration for politi- cal purposes began to emerge. Today the U.S.S.R. offensive continues against the uncommitted nations on the Asian, Mid- dle Eastern, and African fronts, and in this hemisphere as well. In the years since Stalin's death, Soviet policy has emphasized what it terms, euphemistically or otherwise, peaceful coexistence. Development of trade and the export of technical assist- ance, Russian style, have been fashioned Into new policy tools. As a corollary, the tactical objectives of communism have emerged as exploitation of new nations' laudable and logical desires to achieve technological and social maturity. Rus- sia undertakes the exploitation of neu- tralist atmosphere to achieve a pro- Soviet attitude. She seeks substitution of Soviet for Western influences throughout the underdeveloped areas. By a combination of propaganda, tech- nical, and economic aid, plus espionage and subversion, the Soviets work almost fanatically to establish and extend their influence and power. Soviet intelligence services and the In- teffftriOnatcommu,nist movement play a maTO1 role in their activities. The sen- ior Soviet intelligence apparatus, com- posed of the State Security Service, and the military intelligence organization. controls 6Agatijuterj?oettugoletwork of foreign amtLAn.4 operations directed arrft*enibn, terror, aktsstifitibii?, Enid sabotage. In addition to attempted penetration of all levels of official and nonofficial groups in each country, where they have been singularly successful, this apparatus infiltrates agents whose iden- tity papers, passports, and the like are often stolen or falsified, in direct viola- tion of the sovereignty of the host na- tions. As a result of the secret support and direction supplied by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the local Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R0001000600017 4?10.10.0114 mord011.01?.1111.0111611.1111111/4111111111111MOOMIMME.O....... .a1M.M11?110MinimM ....11..111.111.1144,,t OW. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 1960 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE identified ambiguous events, a percentage sufficiently high to discourage evasion. This identification capability depends on only one method of distinguishing the signals pro- duced by earthquakes from those produced by explosions. It is expected that other methods of discrimination will be developed to reduce the number of unidentified events and thereby increase the percentage of sus- picious events that may need to be inspected on-site. For instance, the estimates of the capability of the Geneva network have been based on observations of the differing char- acteristics of only the first part of the low frequency signal emitted by an earthquake and an explosion. Use of other parts of the low frequency signal is expected to improve the capability of the Geneva network as al- ready agreed upon (testimony bi Dr. Oliver). In addition, study of characteristic differ- ences of high frequency signals produced by earthquakes and explosions may prbvide ad- ditional techniques of discrimination and identification (testimony of Dr. Roberts). TESTING IN SPACE By monitoring blasts in space from the earth's surface, it appears POSSIble that the Geneva network may be able to detect ex- plosions out to 300,000 to 500,000 miles. Be- yond that distance monitoring by a system of surveillance satellites may he possible. In addition, test vehicles going into space may be detected by other means at the time of launching. Techniques of shielding blasts in space to reduce the possibility of detection have been suggested. No tests in space are known to have occurred. SUMMARY The Geneva network as planned, with 21 well-equipped seismic stations in the U.S.S.R. supplemented by 20 on-site inspections per year, is capable of effectively monitoring tests of 20 kilotons (Nevada conditions) and above. A more favorable arrangement of the 21 stations would bring the limit down con- siderably below that level. If secret prepa- ration of an extremely big underground hole were possible without risk of discovery by other than seismic means, tests in such a hole up to over 100 kilotons could be sufficiently muffled to escape detection by this system. Construction of big holes ap- pears to be practicable only in salt forma- tions, which occur in regions constituting less than one percent of the U.S.S.R. and in these regions earthquakes are very rare. It is sufficient for control to be able to detect and locate a blast in such a region, without distinguishing it from an earthquake. The Geneva network can do this for a 30-kiloton blast partially muffled in a 200-foot-diameter hole. Such holes exist, filled with brine petroleum products. The Geneva netw is thus capable of controlling tests .. .ve 20 kilotons without big holes or a e 30 kilotons with such existing holes if mped out. It would also partially m or un- muffled tests considerably below, kilotons. Future improvements are finitely ex- pected in detection techniq and may be anticipated also in teehni es of evasion. Among the several promis g improvements expected in detection hniques is more knowledge of the char teristic differences between blasts and rthquakes, observed through the same logic formations. If necessary, a suspi us event can thus be checked by deton ng a blast near it. This method can also ? e used to locate the event more accuratel and to reduce greatly the area to be sea hed by an onsite inspection. If such imp vements should fail to make the Geneva etwork capable of distinguish- ing sulfide ly very small blasts from earth- quakes, g 1 atly increased capabilities may be obtaine by adding more stations to the system Even with present techniques, 30 well-e ? ipped stations instead of 21 in the U.S.& . would take the limit down below 5 kilotons. The addition of a somewhat greater number of very simple robot stations, with future techniques, may take the limit for dependable identification well below 1 kiloton. This would have the additional advantage of reducing substantially the area to be searched by onsite inspections. In short, the Geneva Network has the capability of adequately monitoring under- ground tests of a power down to about the size of the Hiroshima A-bomb; namely, one- tenth of 1 percent of the power of a large H-bomb; or two-tenths of 1 percent if a program of evasion were undertaken with the handicap of testing in big holes such as now exist in the limited salt-dome regions of Russia; or one-half of 1 percent if the con- struction of much bigger holes were con- templated. The capability of the monitoring system may be expected to improve markedly with future research and development. Mr. PROX:M1RE. Mr. President, the New York Times, on May 28, carried a detailed summary of the reopening of the Geneva talks which some of us may have missed. I ask consent that it also be printed in the RECORD at this point. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: ATOM TEST TALKS RESUME IN GENEVA?SOVIET 'ASKS ASSURANCE U.S. PLAN WILL NOT AID ARMS?SILENT ON 13-2 CASE GE/EVA, May 27.?The United States, Brit- ain, and the Soviet Union resumed today the negotiations for a ban on nuclear weapon, testing. No reference was made to the U.S., -2 reconnaissance plane shot down May 1ADver the Soviet Union as the delegates )Fecon- vened after a 2-week recess for th ummit meeting in Parte, However, Semychsi K. Tsarapki ? the Soviet delegate, asked for guarante that under- ground nuclear explosions nned by the United States under its p ect Vela would not serve in weapons opment in addi- tion to helping to find ective controls for a ban on tests. The Soviet nego or pirk the request in such a way, how r, that he seemed to be asking for no infe than the nbrmai guaran- tees that 130 sides would expect of each other to as e that all undertakings were observed. As a r It, Sir Michael Wright, of .Britain, the c erence's chairman for the day, was abl o describe the 206th session oT the 1 onth-old negotiations as a business- e meeting iln a noncontroversial atnios- here." James T. Wadsworth, the U.S. delegate, confirmed the chairman's remarks. "There was no recrimination?not even one echo from Paris," he commented after the 80- minute session. "As usual," was the way Mr. Tsarapkin de- scribed the atmosphere in the conference room. The Soviet delegate made a long statement to the conference emphasizing that the So- viet Union had no intention of holding nu- clear explosions as part of the projected co- ordinated program for developong controls on underground tests. Mr. Tsarapkin also emphasized that the Soviet Union had agreed to the idea of the research program only because the West wanted it. The Soviet Union remains per- fectly satisfied with the control system de- vised by the East-West experts who met here in the summer of 1958, he said. It was to remove the "obstacle" raised by the U.S. doubts over the effectiveness of the 1958 control system that the Soviet Union accepted the research program now being drafted here by the scientists of the three countries, Mr. Tsarapkin added. The Soviet Union will insist that any nu- clear explosions held by the United States under the research project be surrounded by 10637 "adequate safeguards." the Soviet delegate said. Mr. Tsarapkin said that this meant that the Soviet Union should be able to see fel- itself that none of the U.S. nuclear tests had military value. President Eisenhower announced on May 7 the Vela project for a series of underground nuclear explosions to develop controls for hard-to-detect tests. He emphasized later at a news conference that the blasts would have nothing to do with weapons develop- ment. Mr. Tsarapkin said that assurances of this kind were all very well but he ,thought that the nuclear tests for reseirch purposes should also have technicaloreguards. It is up to the United States to lake proposals on this, he added. WE MUST GRA IZENS FR OUR SENIOR CIT- M FROM FEAR Mr. PROX E. Mr. President, is it the will and tent of the Senate that the vast ma' rity of our senior citizens i face retir ent with dread? I think not; but ow else can history record our atti de if we continue to allow our elders o fear each passing day that brin them closer to mounting medical cos and little or no way to meet them? letter from a Wisconsin constituent describes the plight of a man approach- Ing this grim trap, and with nowhere to turn but to us. I ask unanimous con- sent that it be printed in the RECORD at this point. There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: SENATOR PROXM/RE: I am writing to request your wholehearted support of the Forand bill. I am a victim of varicose veins, which, as you probably know, can cause recurrent trouble. I am nearly 64 years old and have hospital insurance, which covers my present expenses when hospitalized, and these cost about $15 per day. On retirement I will no longer be able to qualify for insurance. My- self and other senior citizens are in need of such a measure of medical and hospital care as the Forand bill provides. It is my hope that you will give this bill your wholehearted support and help large numbers of senior citizens who are gravely concerned. Thank you in advance. Yours truly, THE DISASTER IN CHTTM Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, an unmerciful disaster has devastated a httge area of Chile. Thousands of Chileans have died in a series of violent earthquakes, tidal waves, and* volcanic explosions. More thousands are missing or injured. Whole yillages have been wiped out and great sections of cities destroyed. The scourgi of disaster has been felt along a line'-,.of distress 2,600 miles in length. Even-mow, the extent of suf- fering and horr)Ekr is not yet fully known. The United Stik tes, I am proud to say, has acted as a go neighbor should act, opening its heart tkthe people of Chile, and offering its hanNto help them over- come their suffering :land their wants. The magnitude of this? calamity is ap- paling, but our Government and our people are responding with a great out- pouring of help. Sixty huge U.S. Air Force planes are carrying out a wonderful mercy airlift, Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 1960 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE party, or one or more of its front organi- zations, carries out all political action within its means to promote Soviet ends. dut thinitts command posts for Soviet espionage, subversion, propaganda, and Communist Party efforts. Among the personnel assigned to such installations are i;n2aiv taft,tnembers of tDe jirtelli- gence services sea' 6.1ddica- to operate under the- gide of diplomats. The groups of Soviets assigned to technical aid missions, hospitals, and the like also usually include a high percentage of in- telligence personnel. The U.S.S.R. also exploits the acceptance in these areas of the official Soviet embassies and trade delegations designed to achieve on-the- spot manipulation of the newspapers and other information- media of the host countries. THE OVERALL SOVIET PROGRAM FOR UNDERDEVEL- OPED AREAS The overall Red program for under- developed areas has been focused around three major campaigns: First. Opposition to what is called "economic neocolonialism," including promotion of the nationalization of for- eign-owned enterprises, combined action to discourage Afro-Asian trade links with the West, encouragement of oppo- sition to the European Common Market and the Eurafrica plan, and resistance to new foreign capital investment in pri- vate enterprise. Second. Support for national libera- tion of colonies and recovery of so-called "alienated" territories. Third. Encouragement of that version of Afro-Asian unity in which Soviet bloc countries of Asia would be accepted as full and equal partners, entitled to pref- erential political, cultural and economic treatment. In developing these campaigns the in- ternational fronts have engaged in sev- eral kinds of organized effort: First. Expanding the international role and activities of their Afro-Asian af- Mates and leaders through organizing special gatherings, assigning major or- ganizational tasks to them, and holding broad meetings in which maximum Afro- Asian participation is invited and pub- licized; Second. Inspiring, supporting, and participating as much as possible in joint activities sponsored by unaffiliated Afro- Asian bodies of a similar character; and Third. Publicizing and supporting Afro-Asian aims and aspirations in Western areas and in such bodies as the United Nations Specialized Agencies, where such support is most likely to in- fluence Afro-Asian peoples, and to suck them into the Red orbit. AFRICA: THE OVERALL RED PROGRAM IN ACTION The enormous effort being expended in Africa by the U.S.S.R. clearly illus- trates the significance of the Soviets' total worldwide program. One of the most important centers for Soviet espionage and subversion directed against the entire African continent is found in Cairo, Egypt. Activities ema- nate from both the Soviet Embassy and the Communist-dominated Afro-Asian NO. 98-5 Permanent Secretariat of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. The signing of an agreement between the U.S.S.R. and Tunisia this month established diplo- matic relations; this action was accom- panied by the U.S.S.R. usual offers of aid and favorable trade agreements. The Soviets established diplomatic rep- resentations in both Morocco and Libya shortly after these countries attained their independence. In these countries, Soviet diplomatic representatives have been attempting to obtain strategic in- telligence on U.S. Air Force bases there and to acquire the information which would allow the Soviets to formulate plans for future sabotage or worse. The Soviets have also been active among the Communist parties of these areas, especially in Libya, where they have concentrated not only on Libyan Communists but also on the local Italian Communist group. Although the So- viets have not yet recognized the Pro- visional Algerian Government in exile, the Chinse Communists have extended official:recognition and offered arms and monetary aid as well. Members of Al- gerian nationalist groups have, however, consulted with Soviet officials in other countries, and it will probably not be long before Soviet recognition becomes official here as well. Soviet permanent installations in Ethiopia are the focal point for Soviet activity for the entire horn of Africa. There is a permanent cultural exhibition in Addis Ababa which disseminates Com- munist propaganda, offers courses in Russian language, and generally at- tempts to indoctrinate its visitors, mainly young Ethiopians and students from East Africa. A strong indication of the active Soviet interest in Africa and the heavy selling job the U.S.S.R.'s offers of aid without strings?Russian style?has done may be seen in the visit of Emperor Haile Selassie to the U.S.S.R. last sum- mer. An aid agreement of $100 million was signed with the Soviets, and an oil refinery and technical school staffed by Soviet officials are planned. In June, a Soviet industrial exhibition will be held in Addis Ababa, and it is reported that the Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade will travel there to officially open it. are plan- g to build a po y ec n cal institute at Giii,which will accommodate from UM-to 2,500 Guinean students. The in- stitute will be staffed by Soviet person- nel?the method consistently used by the U.S.S.R. to infiltrate their officials into positions of influencing long-range eco- nomic development and planning. These a _eernenWatre- .114. ,i,6611-ee Qffi,Semip strategic Conn- triei in =dem:ley-eloped areas, in techni- cal projects, hospitals, and similar re- cipients of Red aid programs. It is char- acteristic that such projects are estab- lished only on agreement -that the entire staffs are supplied by the Soviets. A significant aspect of Soviet assist- ance in this field may be seen in the willingness of the Soviet Government to sponsor and subsidize the study of the Russian language, Under a teacher ex- change agreement, Russian language Instruction at the university level is al- 10639 ready underway in such countries as Egypt, Syria, Afghanistan, India, and Indonesia. In the newly independent state of Guinea, Russian has been selected as the second language of the country?French being the first?and 40 secondary schoolteachers will arrive from the Soviet Union in the fall to initiate this instruction. English had originally been selected as the country's second language, but this plan was aban- doned when the U.S. Government was able to offer only one teacher. TWO CASE HISTORIES: PANYITSHEIN AND OGANESYAN A meshing of the activities of various Soviet Commiplist Party, espionage, and governmental, organs, in these areas is illustrated by such interesting items as the presence of Aleksander Semenovich Panyushkin in the CPSU?that is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union? delegation to the conference last Sep- tember of the Democratic Party of Guinea. In November 1959, Panyu- shkin was described in Pravda as a "member of the Council of the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cul- tural Relations with Foreign Countries." He will be best remembered in the United States as Soviet Ambassador from 1947 to 1952, and sometime member of the Soviet delegation to the United Nations during that time. This same Panzu- shkin was identifieds f6Tf-very kliMledgeable defectors from the Soviet intelligence services as a longtime career officer of the Soviet intelligence organ- izations, airriErt'firer61 'Soviet Intel- lire-rice activities in the United States during his official tour here. In the summer of 1953 he was chief of all the foreign intelligence activities of the Soviet state security service throughout the world. The presence of such a man as a friendly party representative in Guinea clearly indicates, I think, the im- portance of these areas to the Soviet intelligence services and to the Soviet Government as a whole. Soviet "friendship" to these areas of the world is also revealed in a more accurate light by the policy of sending as diplomats to these countries highly experienced intelligence officers whose real aim is to promote the supremacy of the Soviet Union and the theory of In- ternational communism by any means. The recent assignment to Iran of ehiJ Gevorlovich- Ogav.e.Wan as rst Secretary of the Foreign -Ministry of the U.S.S.R. is a glaring example. The na- ture of Oganesyan's true assignment in Iran can safely be predicted on the basis of his past career: From 1946 to 1950, he was the chief intelligence resident in Iran, ostensibly assigned as second secre- tary of the Soviet Embassy; from 1949 or 1950 to May of 1953, he was chief of the section for deep-cover agents of the state security service in Vienna, Austria, dur- ing which time he maintained contracts with Boris Morros, of note as a cocon- spirator with the Sobells in spying in the United States. This is a part of the Soviet record. vf,391kIEW MILITARY FORCES The Soviet Union is prepared to fight wars ranging in scope from small brush- Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 10640 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE fire conflicts, including limited nuclear encounters, to all-out nuclear war, in the words of their leaders. The Soviet Union's ground, force, with abd'arTftreriVitThiii-, is continuously en- gaged in a comprehensive training pro- gram designed to maintain peak combat efficiency. Soviet units in East Germany, which are considered to be the elite force of the Soviet Army, are known to be training in tactics reflecting new con- cepts of the nuclear age, and it is believed that such training is being conducted throughout the Red army. Equipment designed to increased mobility and fire- power is being introduced regularly. In fact, practically all Soviet units have been reequipped with military materiel of postwar design and manufacture. The Soviet Navy is rated as second onirtrtlie 1J.S. Navy in offensive and defensive power. Although the U.S.S.R. has no aircraft carriers, it has the larg- est submarine force in all the world. This force consists of over 400 units, nearly '75 percent of which are of the long range, ocean patrol type. There is some evidence that a few of these submarines have also been converted so as to be able to fire ballistic missiles. Submarines based along the Murmansk coast and in the Soviet Far East have continuous ac- cess to the open seas, and in recent years Soviet submarine activity in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans has increased, occa- sionally extending as far as the U.S. coasts. VIP,11.49.S-R. continues to build new submarines. It is quite probable that Some of the units under construction are nuclear powered. The Soviet Navy also has strong surface forces consisting of cruisers, destroyers, 'mine vessels and numerous patrol craft. I observed just a few days ago that a Communist nuclear-powered icebreaker is now in commission. For the past several years, the overall strength of Soviel,..aixj.or,,acs has re- mained at somewhat less than 20,000 aircraft, supported by a complex of mod- ern air facilities and a realistic training program. Khrushchey's statements re- garding the obsolescence of manned air- craft appear to be supported by cutbacks in their production. Some high per- formance aircraft are being produced, however, and research and development continues in the air weapons field. At the present time, the major Soviet strategic delivery force is still long range aviation, which is composed of more than 1,000 medium and heavy bombers. But it is clear from Soviet statements and programs that the U.S.S.R.'s current emphasis is in the field of missiles and rocketry. Sovi - el 1! in nuSgffes began immedia e y a er orld War II. For nearly 15 years the U.S.S.R. has conducted a thorough and well- planned effort. The Soviets now have operational missiles bath for defense against aircraft, and for offensive use, including types which can be launched from ground-based units, aircraft, and naval vessels. Their major ground- launched delivery systems include mobile missiles with ranges measured in hun- dreds of miles, capable of reaching most significant Western targets in Europe and Asia. Soviet space launchings and firings into the Pacific Ocean show that the U.S.S.R. has some capability to di- rect ICBM's at targets as distant as the United States. The importance of bal- listic missiles in Soviet planning is amply illustrated by the U.S.S.R.'s recent an- nouncement of the creation of a special rocket force. In the light of these sobering facts, our future course of action with our friends and allies throughout the world must and will be made clear for all to understand: We shall continue to search for means of advancing an honorable peace, by pa- tient urging of genuine negotiation for sound first-step progress. We shall maintain and make more ef- fective our own defenses?our nuclear arsenal, our missile development, and our limited war capability, all designed to deter aggression or, if necessary, to combat it. We shall reinvigorate our collective security alliances by demonstrating a willingness to contribute our full and fair share in manpower and modern arms to the defensive strength of the free na- tions of the globe. We do not intend, by neglect or dis- interest, to allow the Soviet bloc suc- cessfully to infiltrate the emerging na- tions of Asia and Africa. We shall continue the world's confidence in Amer- ica's moral leadership by extending an honest hand of friendship and of as- sistance to the underdeveloped nations in their fight for progress and freedom. rim COMING TEST We are all painfully aware of what happened in Paris. We have seen and been shocked by the arrogance of the Soviet Prime Minister, by his unre- strained vituperation, and by his callous destruction of the summit conference. These events have jolted every one of us into a fuller realization of what survival costs. The free world is once again faced with the naked threat of Commu- nist power, and with the more transpar- ent efforts to frighten our allies and friends and to split the free world apart. In the coming months our courage, strength, and resolution will be sorely tried. The crisis over Berlin could come to a head. Communist violence in other parts of the world may erupt again: bellicosity in the Formosa Straits, ter- rorism in Laos and Cambodia, pressure on Afghanistan or India or elsewhere, in- citement in South America and greater penetration in Africa. But we are not alone in the struggle to preserve freedom. Through the mutual security programs of economic and mili- tary assistance abroad, we are able to strengthen ourselves and the free world in deterring Communist aggression whether Soviet or Red Chinese. MSP-ITS HISTORIC ACCOMPLISHMENTS Let us look backward for a moment to see how the mutual security program came into being and what it has accom- plished. It is no exaggeration to say that this great program, initiated by a Democratic President and a Republican Congress and continued by a Republican President and Democratic Congresses, has been one of May j1N, the tremendous successes of our national history. In its very first years, it saved two highly strategic and important na- tions, Greece and Turkey, from Commu- nist domination. It made possible the recovery of war-town Western Europe with its civilization, love of freedom, its culture, its splendid people, and its great resources. Without doubt, it saved at least three nations?probably more? from Communist takeover at the polls. It preserved Iran on the edge of Soviet power. It helped to save southeast Asia from total Communist domination. It has preserved and reinvigorated all that remains of free China. It made possible the creation of our great NATO alliance and gave it its initial strength. It is the program which makes pos- sible the availability of 250 forward bases essential to the full meaning and effec- tiveness of our military strategy of deter- rence. It is this program which contributes to the strength among our allies abroad, so essential to the success of any neces- sary effort to wage a limited or other kind of war against aggression. It is this program which holds out to the people of the less developed nations of the world the friendly assistance they need in their tremendous effort to fight their way up from age-old poverty, ig- norance, and disease. It is this program, joined in by other free nations, which provides the free world's answer to the Communist bloc's attempt to woo and win the newly emerg- ing nations of Asia and Africa with lavishly proffered military and economic aid. It is this program which, in a most significant degree, is the symbol of American leadership in world affairs. In short, this program is the strongest, most flexible instrument available to our Na- tion and our Government in the conduct of our foreign relations in this most critical period in our history. If this program did not exist, we would have to invent it. ? What would have happened if we had not had this program? What would hap- pen if we did not have it now? Our whole forward strategy of defense would be weakened to the point of collapse. The sources of raw materials essential to our defense and our prosperity would be threatened. Our allies and other free countries would be left at the mercy of Communist threats and subversion; their confidence in and hope for a free world would be shattered. We would find ourselves more and more isolated in a narrowing world swamped by the widening and engulfing Red tide. We would be confined to a policy of fortress America?a policy we long ago examined and long ago realistically re- jected in this era of nuclear power in which we are now well entered. Under this strategy, we recognize that the maximum potential military theater of operations today is the entire globe. That underscores the importance of the 250 bases we now maintain abroad. An important segment of our defensive arrangements is dependent on the contri- bution by our allies in military forces, in land for missile and naval bases, in Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 1 60 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE military facilities of all kinds, in eco- nomic sacrifices by diversion of resources from consumption to military purposes. The constancy of our allies in making their contributions and in refusing to knuckle under to a Communist neighbor Is directly proportional to our own un- yielding purpose and to our contribution to the joint free-world defense. The day is near when we will be called upon to vote funds for the mutual secur- ity program. By approving the Presi- dent's program, both the Communist and the free world will clearly see our iron purpose in meeting full-on the Soviet threat. THE MSP FOR FISCAL YEAR 1981 I turn now to the program the Presi- dent has proposed for fiscal year 1961. It includes three major elements: the eco- nomic programs which we authorized re- cently; the Development Loan Fund for which the Congress authorized appropri- ations last year; and the military assist- ance program for which we haye pro- vided an open-ended authorization of funds for 2 years. Military assistance: Under this mili- tary assistance authorization, the Presi- dent has asked for $2 billion for fiscal year 1961. This is the sum recommended by a committee of distinguished experts headed by William H. Draper and desig- nated by the President to make the most searching study of the needs of our mili- tary assistance program in the context of our overall military security program. This is the sum recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Who have said in the most categorical terms that this rep- resents the most economical and effi- cient use of funds to bolster America's security, and that they would not want one dollar transferred from this use to our regular Defense Department budget. What is this $2 billion needed for? About $1.2 billion is simply to main- tain the present strength of forces on the Communist frontiers in Korea, the Republic of China, Vietnam, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Greece, and others of our NATO allies. But an essential part of this program is for the modernization and strengthening of the weapons avail- able to our allied forces; and the tragedy of any cut would be that it would neces- sarily cut into?indeed, could prevent? this very strengthening and modern- ization. I have heard it said as to our European allies that with their improved econo- mies they should carry a greater part of the load; that we should be able to re- duce our aid. I agree; and this is, in fact, being done. The percentage of U.S. contribution to NATO defense has declined from 20 percent to 4 percent since 1952. Last year alone the Euro- pean NATO countries increased defense spending by 11 percent. This is the first solid accomplishment I want to point to?a greatly improved NATO defense without increase in cost to the American taxpayer. In specific terms, this means: Thirty missile battalions under Gen- eral Norstad's command in Europe; The Thor missile with nuclear capa- bility deployed in the United Kingdom; Jupiter missiles being installed in Tur- key and Italy; Joint production of Sidewinder and Hawk missiles by European countries; Modern anti-submarine-warfare capa- bility covering the limited sea outlets of the Russian submarine fleet; and Greatly increased firepower of inte- grated NATO land forces which face the 40 Russian divisions in East Germany and Poland. About one-third of our military assist- ance money goes to the Far East. The forces we are helping in this theater are nearly all directly confronting superior Communist manpower. In some areas, our weapons and ammunition are used by allied forces in sporadic outbursts of fighting. Taiwan and the offshore is- lands of Quemoy and Matsu have been reinforced with strong retaliatory fire- power. In Vietnam and Laos, we have provided equipment and training against guerrilla warfare which now, thanks to our joint efforts, has been greatly di- minished and which presents no imme- diate threat. Eighteen Korean divisions defend South Korea against a new invasion from the North, allowing U.S. troops to be re- duced to two divisions. These vital land forces are reinforced by a modern Korean air force, naval units, and mis- sile battalions supplied by the United States. There are a few examples of what mili- tary assistance, under Mutual Security, has accomplished. Without it, our col- lective security agreements would be little more than contracts of good intentions. Without the forces which we help to arm, either the security of the United States would today be in grave danger, or we would have a defense budget increased many times over the $2 billion we are asked to provide for military assistance. ECONOMIC AID FOR MILITARY STRENGTH It would be worse than useless to pro- vide an ally with equipment for military forces if its economy broke under the burdens of supporting such forces. To prevent this, we help 12 of our allies with economic aid in the form of defense sup- port. The need for such defense support as a supplement to military assistance is self- evident. A war-ruined and underde- veloped country like Korea cannot alone maintain an army of well over half a million men in the free world interest. Small countries like Greece and Turkey cannot bear the whole economic burden of large armies for land defense on the flank of NATO and on the frontiers of the Communist bloc. It would mean eco- nomic chaos for these countries to try to meet the whole cost of troop pay and other expenses of outside military forces. We fill the gap through our defense sup- port program. It has a twofold effect. On the one hand, our dollar aid is used to import commodities and capital goods which, wherever possible, contribute di- rectly to economic development. On the ?other hand, these goods are sold on local markets and the proceeds are used by the local government to meet a part of the costs of their own military establish- ment. 1064. In countries like Pakistan, Korea, and Cambodia, defense support may be the margin between extinction and progress. In Turkey, largely due to defense sup- port, the gross national product has nearly doubled since 1948. Spain, where vital strategic air bases are now located, with defense support, has shown great economic gains in the past few years. Mr. President, at a luncheon in the White House today, I had the honor to sit in the presence of representatives of the SEATO countries. I met a, number of them. Many of them?perhaps most of them?have skin whose color is dif- ferent from yours and mine. They represent diverse religions, cultures, and economies. But they are all united in their fierce desires to advance the cause of freedom for themselves and for their people. They stand shoulder to shoul- der by the Government and the people of the United States in an effort to deter aggression?and I mean, essentially, potential Communist aggression against the free way of life. They, like Ameri- cans, decline to accept the complete regimentation of international commu- nism. I considered it a great honor to be present. It will be one of my moving recollections of my years in the Senate that I met gallant and proud and able representatives of countries which are members of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, all meeting together in this free Capital of ours, to determine the best means by which the security of Southeast Asia may be preserved?in- deed, may be strengthened. MUTUAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS I think that we are all keenly aware that the strength of the free world rests not alone on military power but on the economic progress of its peoples. This is particularly true in the less developed and the newly independent nations where there is a surging demand for a better way of life. The United States has been responsive to the aspirations of these peoples. We are providing assistance to them through our mutual security program. Our chief means for moving skills and investment capital to the underdeveloped countries are the mutual security pro- grams of technical assistance and the Development Loan Fund. The President has asked appropriations of $181 million for technical cooperation, together with $34.5 million for international technical cooperation programs. He has asked $700 million for the development Loan Fund. These programs are our response to the people of the world struggling for a better life. They make up our front- line defense against Soviet economic warfare. Through them, we heed the urgent pleas of the new nations of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa for help in meeting the enormous problems of their first months and years of existence. Six more countries will become independent in the coming months alone. They need encouragement in their efforts to move forward in freedom. TECHNICAL COOPERATION-WORKING WTTH PEOPLE Our technical cooperation program-- point 4, we call it?is undoubtedly the Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 10642 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE best known of all our efforts. I shall not dwell on it. Let me assert, however, that the need to build skills, to educate, to train is still fundamental to everything else. In the new countries of Africa, for example, the shortage of trained people is very great. In the Belgian Congo, there are said to be eight college gradu- ates who are not Europeans?and many of the Europeans are leaving as the Con- go becomes independent. Yet we have many solid accomplish- ments to point to, and together with the United Nations technical assistance pro- grams and efforts of other countries, we are beginning to fill the vacuum in skills, training, and literacy. For example, when the U.S.-financed Agricultural Technical School in Ethiopia opened, 690 applications were received for 68 open- ings. Each year, 120,000 Turkish Army recruits are learning to read and write under programs developed by American language experts. THE DEVELOPMENT LOAN FUND This recently created Fund is the ulti- mate source of capital for the underde- veloped nations to turn to. In a little over 2 years of operation, the Loan Fund has financed large-scale projects in the basic development fields of transport and communications, power, large industry, and mining. Of special importance, I think, is its success in lending to local de- velopment banks in other countries which in turn lend sums of less than $10,000 to small investors. These small loans stimulate private enterprise, create jobs, and help meet the demand for con- sumption goods in underdeveloped coun- tries. I emphasize that this is a loan pro- gram, not a grant program. For ex- ample, a single one of these loans, to assist rubber growing in Guatemala, will help employ 17,000 workers, supply rub- ber for a new tire factory, produce $30 million worth of exports a year, and open to the United States a nearby sup- ply of strategic natural rubber. The President has asked $700 million for the Development Loan Fund for next year. This is far less than the $1,100 million the Congress has authorized. It is, I think, a logical and laudable re- quest for funds that are desperately needed for the development of nations whose future is important to us. Cer- tainly it should be provided in full. SPECIAL ASSISTANCE There are several nations with which we do not have military assistance ar- rangements, but in whose stability and progress we have the greatest interest. Several of these nations, such as Libya and Morocco, provide us with base rights of the greatest importance. The democ- racy of Israel receives added strength from this program. Others, such as Jor- dan, could collapse, leaving the gravest danger of chaos or worse, were it not for our help which we provide through spe- cial assistance. I might mention Tunisia as an exam- ple of one country where our special assistance has borne fruit. Three years ago, this small Arab country cut its ties with France, and embarked on an at- tempt to steer a democratic course against the tides of Arab nationalism and the subverting currents of commu- nism. With the help of special assist- ance from the United States, Tunisia has recovered from the economic shock that accompanied independence, and has established itself as a dynamic and pro- gressive force in the Arab world. Tuni- sia's success in reaching its goals through cooperation with the West is carefully watched by the emerging African and neighboring Arab States. CONTINGENCY FUND Past experience has taught us that each year there will arise emergencies and contingencies we cannot foresee. Under these circumstances it is wise to have available to the President a contin- gency fund. The President requested for that fund for next year $175 million, and the Foreign Relations Committee recommended the authorization of that amount. I deeply regret that this fund was cut to $155 million on the Senate floor. The final conference action was $150 million. To my mind, it is only too obvious, under present circumstances, that at least this full sum should be pro- vided for the coming difficult year. Who knows what the coming year may bring? Why should the hand of any President of our country be shackled in such a way that he cannot have the means by which to meet unforeseen con- tingencies which might endanger the security of the people of the United States? ERRORS IN MUTUAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION We have heard much this year, as in the past, of individual mistakes in the conduct of the mutual security program. There will probably be mistakes in the future. This is bound to occur when we build complex projects in backward areas and within primitive economic sys- tems. In my comments, I have delib- erately stressed individual instances where we have succeeded. Almost none of these success stories have received at- tention in Congress or in the American press. For every publicized mistake in this program, for every disappointing project, there are thousands of cases where, because of our efforts, people are eating better, have jobs, are free of dis- ease, are protected against Communist guerrilla tactics or worse, have new land to till, can read and write, have new hope for their children, and have hopes for freedom for themselves, for their fami- lies, and for their countries. In the per- spective of history, this may become the most important thing the people of America do today as a nation. CONCLUSION I do not believe that anyone can hon- estly doubt the urgency of our need to bind together the nations of the world, still able to make a choice between tyranny and freedom. United in our common purpose, if we act with resolu- tion and determination, in responding to the needs of our free world friends and allies, we will prevent the aggressive plans of the Communist bloc from reach- ing fruition. If history teaches us any- thing, it is the tragedy of failing to stand together in times of crisis. In one of his most memorable speeches to the House of Commons, which occurred after the May 31 fall of France, Britain's great leader, Winston Churchill, said: If we can stand up to him (Hitler), all Europe may be free and the life of the world may move forward into broad, sunlit up- lands. But if we fail, then the whole world, including the United States, including all that we have known and cared for, will sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age made more sinister, and perhaps more protracted by the lights of perverted science. While the 1960's are not identical with the years of World War II, we may be sure that if we fail to stand up to inter- national communism, if we fail to make the exertions which providence requires of us, our failure will draw us closer to the abyss of which Churchill spoke. But we need not fail. We are on the eve of achieving complete mastery over the fallen forces of nature, on the seas, on the land, and in the air, reaching out toward the stars. It is within our power, as the leader of the free world, to bring a new birth of freedom to men every- where. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. WIL- LLAMs of New Jersey in the chair) . The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. OVERALL LIMITATION OF FOREIGN TAX CREDIT The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 10087) to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to per- mit taxpayers to elect an overall limita- tion on the foreign tax credit. Mr. GORE. Mr. President, the bill now before the Senate, H.R. 10087, should not be considered in isolation, nor can it be taken at face value. This bill would provide a privileged minority of American talEpayers with tax concessions not availabl to very many. The prob- lem here inv ved is part and parcel of the larger pr s lem of the proper method of taxing the come earned abroad by U.S. corporatio . At the present time, certain foreign taxes are allowed as credits against t U.S. income tax; and, furthermore, the cidence of the U.S. tax varies, both as ? rate and as to time levied, with the or ization of the for- eign operating arm i the U.S. corpora- tion. Specifically, the bill uld allow a U.S. corporation, in taking edit for foreign Income, war profits, a excess profit taxes against U.S. incom axes, to apply either the per-country itation, now in effect, or the overall lim ation, at the option of the corporation. his bill was originally section 5 of Hou bill 5, the so-called Boggs bill. For s e reason, this part of H.R. 5 was sing d out for special treatment. The Tre ury op- posed the provisions of this ll when such provisions were embodie , in sec- tion 5 of the Boggs bill, in heafing be- fore the Ways and Means Committee. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 MAY 3 1 1960 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 11-2 and Khrushchev Nonsense EXTENSION OF REMARKS . ? op; HON. WINT SMITH - OF KANSAS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Tuesday, May 31, 1960 Mr. SMITH of Kansas. Mr. Speaker, much comment has been heard and a great deal written about the recent MCI- dent in Paris?most generally labeled "The Summit Conference That Failed." It is well known that the men supposed to ascend to the summit never got off the banks of the lazy flowing Seine through the city of Paris. Recently I received a letter from an attorney, Charles A. Walsh of, Conan/tit, MY. Walsh has set forth some ,very perti- nent ideas in regard to this Faris con_- ference. In the 'letter accoMpanaring this article he says this:. The wild reactions now visible indicate very clearly that Elrusheiev's direction to his helpers in this country have already had effect. "Dump NnioN" is again a part of the plan now in operation. Of course, every ef- fort will be made to forestall his nomination, and to get internationalist, Rockefeller, to head the Republican ticket. GoLnwe'rza is even less acceptable to the appeasers than NIXON; Already the propaganda hounds of the press and radio are baying for Nrxow's hide. It is apparent to me that the political propaganda of the Communist Party la al- ready active in an endeavor to infineece both political conventions. Those who are grown up politically, know that the Cortimn- fist Party works very effectively inside of the Democratic and Republican Parties, It occurred to me in the course of the prepara- tion of the material I am sending, that the leftist elements of the Republicans would try to make another "dump ITialciN," attempt. The first intimation to t4at e,frort came yesterday when Rockefeller mmounced that he would accept a draft by the Republican National Convention, Although News seems to have more than enough votes to secure the nomination on the first ballot, we can ,,,be sure that powerful influences are now at work to undermine and destroy him. The internationalists and the Red appeasers can- not forget that he is the man who, more than anyone else, 'was responsible for the exposure Of Alger Hiss, Accordingly, we can expect to see a fight made on Maori by the Caine old NIXON allYlptIlg ? drowd. Already Achill Stevenson, Paul Butler, Sen- ator KennedY, Chester Bowleg, and Senator Fulbright, all of whom are able to qualify as internatiOnalists, extraordinary, and ap- peasers plenipotentiary are busy making trouble and intheiatipg phetthey can qualify in the Roosevelt twaVion of Communist ap- peasement: This fie no pretty picture, but it is the tigft-i4pe Of things as they exist. Here are Mr. Viralsh's obAervations. I commend them most highly because it proves that: citizens of the high plains of mid-America can see the international pitfalls even clearer than international -eiipe? Who are inclined to look too often thrtittilf the rose tinted glasses on the one-Whrldraspeot : ? U-2 AND KIIRIISNONAV,PONSWi It now seems clear that the U-1 incident which was seized upon by Khrushchev as a cause celebra was in fact only a trifling in- cident lathe world atruggIFITOW iteprogress. -7,:te411Yelitent was delibeTately bloyn Vie by Soviet propaganda Mere:Bit Menai-tin of evil and wroes. on the, part of the United States. It Wee deed as a handy instrument to insult the President, humiliate the American ,c.. ptopie. and ticit ?,,,ple the keg of moonshine diplomaty, cifile the Summit Conference. The whole zoos hev tantrum at the sum- mit reminds exiet,citthe town bully publicly insulting the maypr? setting WA(' dogs bark- ing, and breaking up the town picnic be- cause the Mayo; ?Would not apologize for stepping on. Vie eet's IV; The trifling. chkracter of the I.7-2 incident has been publicly disclosed by Khrushchev himself. Khiinsteliey knew of the photo- g.lic,nottgrani OljkLiv A trAgg..9 over Soviet teriltory 'fa'i a long period Of time. When he visited the Presidetn at Camp David last , fall, he was tempted to speak to Eisenhower abeut the matter. He disclosed this at his news conference in, Paris. He said that he finally decided after considering it, not to bring the matter up. He said that he and the President were on friendly terms, so he decided that the matter could wait. He was -then busy practieing the Camp David spirit. He said that the ates at was addressing ,Ialra.as friend in tha:R language, and .u t that he was rettunlhe , Aliatation in Eng- as lish. Only one cciencllsibb: can be drawn from this remarkable acknowledgment, and that is that while Khrushatiev was Irked and annoyed because our photographic ' planes were flying over Russian territory almost at will; and he was also further annoyed, be- cause Russian defenses were not equal to the task of bringing them down. However, he then needed to promote a friendly under- standing. While Khrushchev was visiting at Camp David, he did not need a peg upon which to hang a series of insults. He had no Occasion then to smash the dishes, break the furniture, or blow the house off of the foundation. Instead, he was anxiously en- deavoring to bring about a summit confer- ence. He was purring like a Communist kit- ten in capitalistic sunshine, and hoping that the President could be coaxed into another diplomatic corner. We must bear in mind that Khrushchev and the First Minister of Britain were, during those months, Crusting at the seems, so to speak, organizing another high-hat go, at personal diplomacy, with our President and the President of France. In view of all these circumstances and the pattern of other events, something more than the flight of an Air Force photographic plane over Russian territory Is needed to make a sensible ap- praisal of the Khrushchev reasons for wreck- ing the conference. "The spirit of Camp David" was touted throughout the world as a new era in the cold war; but the "spirit" lost a great deal of its appeal long before the scheduled meet- ing at Paris. For some weeks before May 16 there were a great number of symptoms evi- dencing Soviet displeasure with the prcs- peas of the projected summit meeting. While it is true that the British 'Prime Min- ister continued until the last tEl 'Ooze ap- peasement from all his diplometic pores; but the German Chancellor, President de Gaulle, and to a lesser extent, our President gave every appearance of standing firm arid standing for no further Communist appease- ment. Khrushchev and his advisers cer- tainly did not like the looks of the situation. They reacted in typical Communist fashion. They incited their stooges and dupes into a general , pattern of rioting. The fomented riots in South Africa, Korea, Turkey, and San Francisco. Everywhere the pattern was the sarrie. Students were incited and inflamed against wrongs or supposed wrongs of con- stituted authority. Khrushchev was show- ing Communist teeth everywhere. Those events were staged for the purpose of letting the people of the world know the capacity of the Kremlin for malting trouble. Then the U-a intident *came upon the , scene. -.The-plane Xenle, depaiaatare Russian territory onlIttaelahowelien it -waa substan- tially a week before .thei:incident jaegan ta take shape as an impertant sees& It was about 5 ,.days later before itheufilachev even mentioned the incident. Itawaie then seized upon by the Red rulers as A suitable means with which to damn Amer. and, the Presi- dent of the United Stateei ? 's - ? king up There are all sorts of lip*, ations concern- ing Khrushchevthia=eillpee,` ruabaletaaninlaelf worked assiduously for months itedaring,..about the meeting which he hireself ,eleseiroyed. Why was this done? It will/AMP:24 heCaUse at one time it suited the Kremilsaipurpose to hold! the 'conference and at the thitte appointed for the meeting, it no longer stilted the plans of the Kremlin. Since Khrushchev knew about our photographic planes flying over Russia for ilioinaiflyears, the flight Of the U-2 over Russia...Qat liday 1 was only a pretext .for the per-farina/Ice of Khrushchev at Paris in May. Ejalaalialase. is certainly not the person to be howling about spying since, tens of thousand Q4,jl . illMjects air pinitiiink that as yoca- tion. He might be likened to the man who nifirdered his parents and then asked for sympathy because he was an orphan. In view of these considerations' the U- incident at most is a trifling matter; and lo consider it of special importance, is to titia; Rusian propaganda at face value. No adult should be fooled by this thing. And no one should be fooled by .rxastbeatiaga-e4 Adlai Stevenson and Welter Lipprnarm. They easily" iquadify as Internationalists and ap- peasers in the first magnitude. It is sufficient explanation for Khru- shchev's conduct to remember that he needed some sort of an ass to beat, someone to insult, and some pretended outrage to up- set the conference. In this connection, the 11-2 incident was a convenient diplomatic windfall which served his purpose. The rulers of the Kremlin knew that they had nothing to gain by the Paris Conference. A delay was needed and a hope was enter- tained that the next tenant of the White House will have more inclination to appease- ment than its present inhabitant. Khru- alichev, in fact, said this at his "press con- ference." He not only blamed the President, he insulted and abused him in the worst fashion imaginable. Never in the history of the country has our Chief Executive been Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 *AY .1. Approved For Release 2004/05/13: CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 objected to insults such as were heaped to Khrushchev, and which or the nominees upon him by the Kremlin boss. Khrushchev can be sure of an invitation to Moscow, and. a1s0 made it clear that he despises the Vicz accepted as a participant at another summit" President. A week or 10 days before the eonference. 0 Paris Conference, the President mentioned that Vice President NixoN might be asked to sit in at the Conference in case the Presi- dent was called away. Khrushchev took note of this, and stated that to allow the Vice President to participate in the Conference would be like "sending a goat to take care of the cabbage." Whatever .Khrushchev's attitude toward Eisenhoarer may have been in Camp David, he decided to throw him out of his diplo- matic baggage like he might dispose of a ragged shirt. He made it very clear that he hopes for a later summit meeting, and that the presidential election is a matter of vital concern to him and to the Communist Party. Among the major purposes Khrushchev achieved in Paris last week was to notify the world and the Communist Party of the United States, in particular, that the new littler in Communist demonology is Presi- dent Eisenhower and the new Himmler is Vice President Nixox. Thus, Khrushchev added two names to the Commun.* litany of demons. This was his way of taking part in American politics. It was his way pi telling the Communist world and the Com- munist Party of the United States, its fellow travelers, dupes, and. fringe adherents, that they are to effeet a change in the political climate of the United. States. It was his Way of telling thenI,Aat the President is a dis- card and the Vice President unacceptable. Likewise, It Was his way of saying that politi- cal talks and summit meetings, must be held on the terms of the Kremlin. It ought to be clear by tJaie time that diplomatic inter- course With political crocodiles like the Communists, is nonsense. Those who remain addicted tOtlie belief that headhunters and cannibals will give up their first principles if you talk to them in a friendly fashion, are still convinced by their own propaganda. Khrushchev did a masterful job of telling all and sundry that talks at the summit cannot be resumed until there is a change of political climate in the United States. In effect, he told his stooges here to go to work and elect a respectable Preeident of the United States, who can be invited to confer with Communists. Re made it clear that Franklin Roosevelt was acceptable as a U.S. President. By inplication, it was clear to his adherents in the United States, that they must work for the election of a Presi- dent who follows the Roosevelt tradition. It is abundantly clear that Khrushchev's hand is in our political pottage; and it will be well for us to keep that in mind. It would also be well, to watch the propaganda and comments of the leftist section of the press. You may rest assured that the Krem- lin will make no further public statements about the presidential election in the United States. In fact, the Kremlin will deny that It is even interested. That is surely a part of the plan. That will be the best way of furthering the fortunes of Moscow's candi- date. Certainly no further public directions to Communist adherents in the United States are necessary. They know what they are ex- pected to do. If future orders from the Kremlin are necessary, they will not be made public. In connection with this, it will be inter- esting to see how the Kremlin Joh is done. This year in America, Walter IAN:en:anti can be counted on to set the pattern. Joseph Alsop, Drew pearson, and Doris Fleeson may be relied upon to carry the political torch for candidates drIth liberal leftist orientation. Those who have been the publie apologists and supporters of Alger Hiss, William Rem- ington, Owen. ?Lattamore, and Dr. Oppen- heimer can be counted upon to make clear by their writings which of the candidates for the presidential nomination are acceptable Approved For Release 2004/05/13: CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 196 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE he Chicago Tribune has been writ- ng a series of stories during the debate in the United Nations, pointing out the type of espionage carried on by the Soviet agents right here in our own country. This is an excellent series be- cause it demonstrates the hypocrisy of Khrushchev's anguished outcries against our planes flying over the Soviet Union. I am also glad to see our own Govern- tent start releasing hitherto secret in- ormation about the extent of Commu- *st espionage in our own country. I ope the PIA will make more of this in- formation available to the American people so they can see how tirelessly the Communists are working to destroy us. I hope in bringing forth the information, the CIA will surface Col. Jan Monat, the formerifeffertinfittlittlieeTor VieCom- munist regime in Poland, who deflected to our side last year. I am sure Colonel Monat can give us much details about the Communist conspiracy. The gentleman from Washington, just a few minutes earlier today, related how a microphone had been planted in the American Embassy in Moscow. Certainly, as I said at the outset of my remarks, while the present investi- gation being conducted by the other body is laudable indeed, I do hope and feel that some investigation should be made as to why at this particular time, at this crucial moment, when the summit con- ference was being arranged, this par- ticular U-2 plane should have fallen Into Soviet hands, thus giving Mr. Khru- shchev this wonderful plum that he needed to break up; to torpedo, the sum- mit conference. I feel that these things do not just conveniently happen; and while I am not prepared to make any accusations, I think that the American people would be a great deal more comfortable?I know I, myself, would be more comfort- able?if I knew that an investigation had been made, a thorough top-to-bottom in- vestigation, of all the incidents preced- ing this plane flight to ascertain whether in fact this was just an unfortunate coin- cidence. It may be reasonable to be- lieve that it might have been just a coin- cidence that the 17-2 plane went down at this particular time. We had been rrigijang tlyse flights forarS and the Soviet 1'7-Mon had not beeMmable to knock ii down any of these airplanes. It is quite possible the law of averages finally caught up with us. But I have been asked by many of my constituents whether or not anything is being done to I'\ find out whether possibly there had been Some collusion somewhere ,alopg, the line fl.iffier to give Mr.' lehrushcheir-this tilrifirglittrab not believe we should corn- pletely ignore this possibility in view of the Soviet's long and despicable history of espionage in our country. Since there is a tremendous overlap- ping of jurisdictions in any investigation of this type, with various committees of Congress having jurisdiction over cer- tain segments of this investigation, if it would be in order. I would suggest that perhaps the chairmen and the ranking minority members of the standing com- mittees which have jurisdiction over Some phases of all this activity conduct a joint investigation. I believe this joint committee should include the chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Af- fairs, the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, the chairman of the Committee on Science and Astronautics, the chairman of the Committee on Ap- propriations, the chairman of the Leg- islative Oversight Committee, the chair- man of the Committee on Government Operations and finally the chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, and of course, the ranking minority member of each. I am wondering if, perhaps, they could not get together and lay out some course of action, some plan of in- vestigation to get all the facts of this ill-fated but historic flight. I believe that since the Camp David meeting, since we made the tragic mis- take of inviting Khrushchev to this country?and I said on the floor of this House at that time that it was a mis- take to dignify Mr. Mikoyan, Mr. Khru- shchev, Mr. Kozlov, and all these other Soviet leaders who were brought to this country and welcomed in this country and shown the traditional American hospitality; I said then that it was a mistake to invite these men?I believe that since the Camp David meeting, there appears to have been a sort of lessening of the realization of the fact that if ever we needed security mind- fulness in this country, we need it now. I would like to have the chairmen of these committees get together and see if among themselves they could lay out a course of action to have an investi- gation of our entire internal security structure in a manner that would not in any way jeopardize our national se- curity. I am thinking of the many Americans who have been asking the question: Has this airplane really fallen into Soviet hands at this very critical time by pure accident or were there other factors that contrilbuted to it? These people are entitled to an answer. I am perplexed by one thing in this entire 17-2 spy plane affair. The Presi- dentmtirlfirTtlirthe other day said?and I think the President is to be congratulated for his firmness at the summit, for not yielding to Khru- shchev's scandalous demands of an apol- ogy; I am in complete agreement with the President on this?but I am a little perplexed in hearing the President say that the initial American reports re- garding this U-2 incident were designed as a "covers," and were purposely distor= -?prige-er the 17-2 pilot. The thing' that confuses me IS 't-l-iat'*hile the President now explains the original mix- ? up in handling the affair was the result of efforts to protect the pilot, t ? I ?ad CIA Ua4 earlierpold a CM o pAgress that the ,p0t or this air- Mae-had been instructed, if he should fall into enemy hands, to make,a_clean, confession of his activitlek wi1ttdfl who' gave srich instructions to this American pilot a spy mission? Certainly such complete disclosure would jeopardize our entire intelligence structure. This is one of the aspects into which I would like to have this joint commit- tee go more deeply. Why was Pilot Powers told that if he were caught, he should make a full, clean sweep of things? I know that during the war, when our own American soldiers were captured by the enemy?of course, Mr. Powers was not a member of the mili- tary, he was a civilian?but during the war, when our American soldiers fell in- to enemy hands, we had been instructed to give only our name, rank, and serial number, and that is all. I am perplexed and disturbed as to why these instructions, if they were in fact given to Powers, were given, and who was responsible for these instructions for Mr. Powers to go out, when he is caught, and tell his captors just exactly what he is doing; why he is doing it; how long he has been doing it, and everything else. This type of instruction, I believe, could jeopardize our American security sys- tem as much as anything else. There are many other aspects of this disastrous flight, which could effect the future of the world, that need to be studied by competent authority. So, while I am in full agreement that our American Government that it should have continued these flights over the Soviet Union?and I do not share the criticism of those who say that these flights should have been stopped?while I am in full agreement with the position that the President has taken, one of firmness at the summit, one of not yield- ing an inch to Khrushchev, I am dis- turbed that now when the smoke is be- ginning to clear apparently no investi- gation is going to be made as to the inci- dents precedent to the capture of this aircraft. I renew my request that, if it is in order, the chairmen of the standing committees of the House get together and sit either as a joint committee or work out some sort of a formula so that in- vestigation of our entire security pro- gram in America could be made. I emphasize again that we would make a tragic mistake if we as Americans did not go beyond the scope of normal assumption. The normal assumption quite properly is that there was nothing wrong, that this was an unfortunate in- cident where the airplane flamed out and came down to an altitude at which the Soviet Union could then force it down to the ground. That would be the normal assumption, and perhaps that normal assumption is completely justified. But today, when we are dealing with an enemy that is more brutal than the world has ever seen before; an enemy that will resort to any methods of sabotage or espionage; any tactics--and we know this from 15 years of experience in deal- ing with the Communists and we have ample evidence that they will stop at nothing to destroy us?it then behooves us as Americans to go beyond the normal scope of assumption and find out why these things happened at this particu- larly convenient time for Mr. Khru- shchev to torpedo the summit conference. Mr. HOEVEN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield? Mr. PUCINSKI. I yield to the gen- tleman from Iowa. vilisillebeifial. It is my understanding that there are two committees in the sen- ate, one under the leadership of the dis- Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE tinguished Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] and the other under the chairmanship of the distinguished Sen- ator from Washington [Mr. JACKSON] that are going to conduct full hearings on all matters relating to the failure of the summit conference. It is my understanding that this in- vestigation will cover all angles, both prior and subsequent to the landing of the U-2 plane, that these investigations will be held at a very high level on a nonpartisan basis, and with the concur- rence of the White House, so that the facts may be fully developed. As to the gentleman's suggestion that the chairmen of several committees of the House conduct an investigation, let me say lam sorry the gentleman has not had the benefit of some of the discus- sions I have had with relation to that very matter. In the meeting which I attended it seemed to be the general con- sensus that it would be a mistake to have the committees of Congress go into mat- ters which involve such a delicate- sit- uation as ptefieerl"ffilffirtve x ge the inf wernt the public should have from these committees that are already functioning in .the Senate, and that 1 - - t tbg pmiagms u e merman MAW- -Valasigi- If the gentleman will perMit me, it rather intrigues me why so many of the people who are in charge of our intelligence setup in this country take upon themselves the attitude that they are beyond the scope of Congress. I know from experience?I, myself, in 1952 was an investigator for a congres- sional committee which investigated a very serious crime committed by the Communists against some 15,000 allied army officers?I must say I was complete- ly unsatisfied, as I delved into these vari- ous aspects of American intelligence, with ? t.L.1.'f.11i- s. ?o"ifOrSg , a do not see anything incon- sistent with a suggestion that responsi- ble chairmen of standing committees in Congress conduct such an inquiry. I have complete confidence in these men. We stood here on the floor of the House of Representatives recently and ap- plauded the speech delivered on the floor of this House by the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations [Mr. CAN- NON] when he told us he had known of these flights for 4 years. I was very happy to hear that the chairman of this committee had been taken into the con- fidence of the military. The fact re- mains that our intelligence people can take into their confidence the chairmen of these standing committees who set up the appropriations and who set up the policies and the various other aspects of our national security. I am not, as a Member of the Congress, ready to sur- render those rights to the bureaucracy of any agency. Mr. HOEVEN. I can understand the gentleman's concern about having the in- formation which he desires. Mr. PUCINSKI. If the gentleman will permit me, I do not necessarily desire it for myself, but certainly I do want an ap- propriate committee of Congress to have It so that we can be certain that there was no collusion or just plain careless- ness in giving Khrushchev the tools with which to wreck the summit conference. The gentleman will agree that plain carelessness, when you are dealing in this complicated field of espionage, is just as disastrous to our Nation as outright trea- son. I think many of our agencies have been just plain careless in dealing with the Soviets and the investigation I am proposing might help improve this sit- uation. It is entirely possible that the U-2 failure ultimately, will be traced to sloppy operations. But when we are fighting for our very survival we can no more tolerate carelessness than we can tolerate espionage. Mr. HOEVEN. I understood you wanted the information as a Member of Congress. Again I say we are dealing with a very delicate subject, to wit, the in- telligence and national defense of this country. Would the gentleman want confidential information given to the public which might jeopardize our na- tional defense structure? Mr. PUCINSKI. No; I do not want to disclose anything which would jeopar- dize our national defense. I have said many, many times, where matters of national security are at stake, certainly, these things and the secrecy of these proceedings should be respected. I agree with the gentleman. I am not suggest- ing that. But I would like to say this. Too often I have found that inefficiency and mistakes are covered up by the label "top secret," and I would be glad to get another special order to go into greater detail on that. Too often we have per- mitted agencies in our Government to mark a situation "top secret" because they could not stand the scrutiny of a congressional committee to decide whether they were conducting them- selves properly. I, for one, feel it is the duty of Con- gress to see that the conduct of our Federal agencies is such a not to im- pair the safety of our Nation. I am not satisfied with self-serving statements of department heads who deal in broad generalities. I do not want this Nation to wake up some morning and find that we had failed to properly oversee the activities of essential agencies. In our dealings with the Soviet Union, we can leave nothing to chance and that is why I am suggesting this full-scale investi- gation. Not just a superficial inquiry, but a full investigation which would minutely check out every conceivable phase of this disastrous U-2 flight. A full-scale investigation conducted by responsible Members of Congress in a nonpartisan manner and in a way that would preserve the rights of indi- viduals. Mr. Speaker, I should like to in- clude with my remarka a column which appeared today in the Washington Daily News and which was written by one of its top columnists, Mr. Ed Koterba. I believe it demonstrates so well one of the points I have been discussing here today. May 2 Mr. Koterba's column follows: THERE'S LOTS TO BE SAID ON SECRET EAGLE , (By Ed Koterba) The press relations man at the Pentagon said, "I'm sorry, but that information is a military secret. It's classified." The reporter said: "But I have the infor- mation before me at this moment. And he reeled it off. It gave all the detailed facts on the air-to-air missile, the Eagle. On the Pentagon end of the phone there was shocked silence?followed by a dozen queries and, later, by a congressional re- quest for a full-scale investigation. This was one of several instances of ap- parent blundering by our side on military secrecy. Ironically enough, this case of open- ing up supposed secrets by the Pentagon came at a time when Russia was charging us before the world with obtaining military information from the Soviets. TEXAS NEWSMAN The reporter in this story is John Harris, Washington correspondent for a Houston, Tex., newspaper. His information came from the "1960 Mis- sile Handbook," which was distributed just down the hall in the National Press Building. A few days after his story was printed, a bigshot Communist, Valdimir D. Pavlov, third secretary of the Soviet Embassy, showed up and procured a copy of the book, paying the asking price of $2. Oddly enough, Mr. Harris' story did not identify by name nor location his source of information. Publisher of the missile handbook is Ken- dall K. Hoyt, director of the Association of Missile and Rocket Industries. When I confronted Mr. Hoyt, he said: "We have information on 300 UB. missiles." He showed me his bulging files. DATA Data on the secret Eagle showed that it was 15 to 20 feet tall, weighed a half-ton, had a range of 100 miles and flies up to 100,000 feet. All this information was marked classified at the Pentagon. "For heaven's sakes," I said to Mr. Hoyt, "-where did you get all this information?" Calmly, he said he got it from the Aircraft & Missiles magazine, which is distributed to 9,000 firms. Originally, he said, it came from?of all things?Pentagon handouts. But, to be on the safe side, he said, he checked with the Federal Bureau of Investi- gation when the Communist?who openly identified himself as a Soviet technician? showed up in his office. The FBI, Mr. Hoyt said, cleared the sale. And what is the Red official going to do with all that compiled information? Over the phone he said, candidly: "Some of our Soviet scientists may be interested." LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM Mr. ? OEVEN. Mr. Speaker, unanim consent to proceed for 1, in- ute in or to inquire of the majority leader as . 'ny changes in the program for next wee The SPEA pro tempore. With- out objection, F so ordered. There was no ection. Mr. MeCORM . Mr. Speaker, I am glad my frien kes that inquiry because I do want vise the House that since announcing program, and you will remember I ref d to the bill, S. 1892, having to do with project in Oklahoma, I have had the portunity since announcing the progr to talk with the chairman of the Co ttee On Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7