THE CARIBBEAN LEFT: NEW TACTICS FOR OLD PROBLEMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T01298R000100130001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
The Caribbean Left:
New Tactics for Old Problems
r
ALA 85-10116
November 1985
ILLEGIB
Conv?ON !
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
The Caribbean Left:
New Tactics for Old Problems
with contributions by
Directorate of Operations.
Office of African and
Latin American Analysis. It was coordinated with the
Division, ALA, on
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
addressed to Chief, Middle America-Caribbean
Secret
ALA 85-10116
November 1985
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The Caribbean Left:
New Tactics for Old Problems 25X1
Key Judgments Caribbean leftists,) are trying 25X1
Information available to polish their image-tarred by the Grenada debacle-by toning down
as of 10 October 1985
was used in this report. their rhetoric and aligning with political moderates. As part of this broad
front strategy, leftists are trying to build grassroots support among such
key interest groups as unionized labor and youths. Because of the region's
social, economic, and political complexity, tactics vary widely from country
to country 25X1
The Caribbean area's prolonged economic crisis is providing fertile ground
for leftists to gain support and to portray themselves as a moderate force.
We believe the left's chances of harnessing discontent are brightest in two
key countries, Jamaica and the Dominican Republic. Should Jamaican
Prime Minister Edward Seaga be forced to call early elections-a distinct
possibility-leftist patriarch Michael Manley would stand a reasonable
chance of winning. No matter what the outcome, Jamaican elections could
be a crucial turning point for leftist tacticians because of Manley's close
identification with the shift to the moderate approach. We expect leftists in
the Dominican Republic to increase their congressional representation in
elections scheduled for May 1986.
Elsewhere, disunity, lack of resources, public suspicion, and government
countermeasures-backed by economic aid from Washington-work
against quick leftist gains. Consequently, despite the left's solid showing in
recent elections in Dominica, we expect most leftists to make only gradual
inroads. Even marginal increases, by providing a forum and an opportunity
to sabotage necessary austerity measures, could be disruptive, however.
Actions taken by Caribbean leftists make clear that their primary strategy
now is to win power through the electoral system by focusing on the
economic shortcomings of the centrist administrations now dominating the
region. Nevertheless, some radical groups, particularly in the Dominican
Republic, are apparently considering a two-track policy and are trying to
enhance their paramilitary capabilities. In the French-ruled Caribbean
territories, the radical proindependence minority is considering improving
its capability for armed action,
Elsewhere in the region, opposition leftists show few signs at present that
they have seriously considered adopting a more violent tack.
Secret
ALA 85-10116
November 1985
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Cuba and the USSR see the region's deteriorating economic conditions and
rising political tensions as working in their favor. Aware that efforts to
rebuild their influence will take time, both countries are concentrating on
fostering regional leftist unity, providing aid and advice that promotes a
moderate public image for the left, and building links to organized labor.
For its part, Libya is cultivating a broad range of contacts among
Caribbean leftists.
Tripoli has concluded, but not yet implemented, a military agreement with
Suriname that may include transshipment rights and involve militar
training.
Given the low-key approach to the Caribbean that the USSR and Cuba
have adopted since the Grenada intervention, we believe Cuba is likely to
be increasingly concerned over Libya's activist role in the area. Havana's
concern will be deeper if, as appears likely, Qadhafi continues to encourage
violent tactics. Caribbean leftists probably will try to play Cuba and Libya
against each other to gain more assistance, thus adding to tensions between
the two countries.
Increased leftist-led violence appears likely over the next few years. For
example, recent Libyan offers of funding and training to French Caribbean
separatists, already adept at coordinated bombings, would upgrade their
existing terrorist capabilities. Increased military training and the apparent
belief of some leftist leaders that the climate in the Dominican Republic is
conducive to revolutionary upheaval suggest that leftists there may resort
to terrorism. We believe leftists throughout the region will capitalize on
mounting economic discontent by attempting to turn spontaneous demon-
strations against austerity into sustained antigovernment protests.
Based on the left's weaknesses and public distrust of it, we see little chance
of a Grenada-like regime emerging in the region over the near term. Still,
regional decisionmakers' concern over gradual leftist electoral inroads and
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an increase in the leftists' paramilitary readiness probably will lead to
requests for increased aid from the United States. Because Manley's return
to power in Jamaica would bolster area leftists and undermine already
fragile regional organizations, his reelection would pose special challenges
Should the leftists' current tactics prove more effective than we expect,
Washington's problems would quickly grow. To preserve stability, regional
leaders would intensify calls for more direct US economic aid, additional
purchases of strategic materials, and increased security assistance. Cooper-
ation among the states of the region on security issues since the Grenada
events is closer, but is still at a rudimentary level; this raises the risk that
Washington might again be called on to take action should violence
threaten another leftist takeover.
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Near-Term Prospects for the Caribbean Left: 19
A Country Survey
1. Major Leftist Parties and Front Groups
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The Caribbean Left:
New Tactics for Old Problems
To broaden their appeal and popular support in the
aftermath of Grenada, according to US Embassy
reporting, Caribbean leftists are playing down Com-
munist rhetoric, trying to form alliances and front
groups with political moderates, and targeting union-
ized workers and students.' In Dominica, this strategy
paid off in a solid leftist showing in the July 1985
elections. Most leftists seek power by operating within
existing political systems, but intensified paramilitary
training by several groups, particularly in the Domini-
can Republic, suggests that leftists there are consider-
ing a two-track policy. A resurgence of leftist parties
in the Caribbean in challenge to incumbent adminis-
trations, by intensifying public opposition to necessary
belt-tightening, would lead to wider social unrest.
This paper analyzes the left's present and potential
role in the Caribbean and examines the internal
dynamics of leftist parties in individual countries and
the general strategies and tactics leftists are employ-
ing to bolster their public appeal. The paper also
assesses the role of foreign actors in the region and the
implications for the United States of increased leftist
activity-and of a potentially greater Cuban, Soviet,
and Libyan role-in the area.
A Disparate Group
The Caribbean left is complex and multifaceted. It
includes the former ruling parties of Jamaica and
' The Caribbean area for purposes of this paper includes the
English-speaking countries (Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, The
Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman
Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St.
Christopher [St. Kitts] and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, and Turks and Caicos Islands),
the French territories (Guadeloupe, Martinique, and French Guia-
na), the Dominican Republic, Haiti, the Netherlands Antilles, and
Suriname. The total population of these states and territories is
Grenada; influential supporters of the Surinamese
Government; the ruling party of Guyana; and vio-
lence-prone, proindependence groups in the French
departments. We judge that at present only 15 leftist
parties and front groups have demonstrable or poten-
tial electoral significance, but numerous splinter
groups, as in the Dominican Republic, push the total
number of leftist groups in the Caribbean to well over
100. Several have existed for more than two decades,
but most, reflecting the upswing in leftist sentiment in
the English-speaking Caribbean during the mid-
1970s, are of more recent vintage. The majority have
had close links to Havana and Moscow.
The record shows that leftists have been particularly
influential in the English-speaking Caribbean. Guy-
ana under Forbes Burnham (1964-85), Jamaica under
Michael Manley (1972-80), and Grenada under Mau- 25X1
rice Bishop (1979-83) moved forcefully leftward: in-
creasing state control of the economy, expanding ties
to Havana and Moscow, and, in Bishop's case, at-
tempting to establish a single-party state. In St. Lucia
and Antigua, according to academic studies, calls by a
new generation of leftist leaders to distribute political
power and income more equitably attracted consider-
able support during the late 1970s and early 1980s. In
St. Lucia, leftists took control of the government in
general elections in 1979.
The Grenada Debacle
Bishop's overthrow and murder in 1983 was a water-
shed for most Caribbean leftists. Those in the
English-speaking islands, whose appeal was already
tarnished by Bishop's and Manley's inability to sus-
tain economic growth, were particularly hard hit,
Bishop's death at the 25X1
hands of pro-Soviet radicals in his inner circle height-
ened public perceptions of the left as a destablizing
force and helped to fuel a sharp swing to the right in
the area. Equally damaging, in our view, was the
effect of the Grenada debacle in crystalizing the
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Ideology. The Caribbean left is an ideological hodge-
podge. According to academic and US Embassy
observers, Social Democrats and Marxist-Leninists
predominate, but pro-Albanian, pro-Maoist, and
Trotskyite splinter groups crop up periodically, espe-
cially on university campuses. Highly personalistic
parties whose leaders have close ties to Havana and
Moscow-such as Juan Bosch's party in the Domini-
can Republic-also are significant. Some academics
say that the deep roots many Social Democrats had
in the influential Black Power movement that flour-
ished in the Caribbean in the early 1970s have helped
boost their appeal.
The fluidity of Caribbean politics frequently blurs
ideological distinctions. In Jamaica, for example,
Marxists have long participated in the Social Demo-
cratic People's National Party. Because most Carib-
bean countries have so few resources and opportuni-
ties for economic and social advancement,
government offers unique rewards. Political jobs earn
international and national status. As a result, shifts
in party affiliation are common, and many leftist
groups display little staying power.
Organization. Academic studies indicate that most
Caribbean leftist parties are organized from the top
down. Party leaders, especially those in the English-
speaking islands, are members of highly educated,
middle-class elites with few contacts among industri-
al workers or farmers. Intellectuals are particularly
prevalent at the upper echelons of Marxist parties.
Reflecting the hierarchical structure of leftist parties,
Support Bases. Caribbean leftists enjoy wide freedom
of action. Leftist publications circulate openly, and
several prominent leftists have their own radio pro-
grams. Building grassroots support, however, has
proved difficult. Manley's party in Jamaica, in our
view, comes closest to being a mass-based party. It
has a strong trade union foundation but also draws
support from middle-class and business elements.
Elsewhere in the English-speaking Caribbean, party
membership is small and overlapping, and support is
localized.
Social Democratic parties, reflecting their deeper ties
to the Caribbean community, generally have more
extensive grassroots support than Marxist parties, in
our view. Academics indicate that Marxist organiza-
tional efforts, hindered by public suspicion of intellec-
tuals and their image as radical outsiders, also have
suffered because politics in many Caribbean nations
center on nonideological concerns. Trinidadian and
Guyanese politics, for example, are largely racially
motivated.
Attitudes Toward Violence. Traditionally, most Ca-
ribbean leftists reject armed action. Bishop's over-
throw of the despotic Gairy regime in Grenada in
1979 was the first coup in the English-speaking
islands. In Jamaica, however, the use of armed thugs
as pressure groups by major parties often makes
politics a bloody business, particularly during elec-
tions. Sporadic outbursts of proindependence violence
have plagued the French departments since the 1960s.
decisions are dictated from above.
tactical and ideological differences among regional
leftists. Moreover, because Moscow and Havana ap-
parently backed opposing factions in Grenada, Bi-
shop's fall strained relations between them, according
to US Embassy reports.
Leftists in the French departments and the Domini-
can Republic, however, were affected much less by
Bishop's death and the subsequent US-led interven-
tion than their counterparts elsewhere. Indeed, based
on US Embassy reports, we believe that leftist parties
in these two areas probably are stronger now-in
terms of membership and electoral appeal-than at
any time in the recent past. For example, Communist
and Socialist parties in the French departments-who
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oppose independence from France-won numerous
mayoralties and council seats in local elections earlier
this year. Moreover, leftist proindependence groups,
offshoots of the mainstream Communist and Socialist
parties, have also scored some recent successes in
broadening their popular base. In the Dominican
Republic, public opinion polls show a rise in support
for the left, especially Juan Bosch's party. Leftists
there also have made significant progress in recent
years in expanding support among unionists; US
Embassy officials estimate that leftist groups control
30 percent of unionized labor and are cultivating
support among peasant groups.
Leftists are working hard to show that they are a
serious and moderate force in the region. We believe
their overall strategy is to win power through the
electoral route by focusing on the economic shortcom-
ings of the centrist governments now dominating the
area.' Ideological differences, the uneven impact of
the Grenada debacle, and country-specific circum-
stances result in varying short-term tactics. In the
English-speaking Caribbean, leftists, in our view, have
emphasized rebuilding public trust. Relatively well
established groups elsewhere have focused on broad-
ening popular appeal and mobilizing antigovernment
sentiment. Efforts by Communists and other radicals
in the Dominican Republic to upgrade military capa-
bilities, however, strongly suggest that they are pre-
pared to adopt a two-track policy, especially if public
discontent with falling standards of living rises sharp-
ly.
Toning Down Rhetoric
In our opinion, leftists generally see a reduction of
their radical rhetoric as the most effective, low-cost
means of rebuilding public confidence and broadening
appeal. The trend is most noticeable among the small
leftist parties in the English-speaking islands, which
were hard hit by the fallout from Grenada. US
Embassy officials, for example, say leading leftists in
St. Lucia, Dominica, and Antigua are trying to
project a moderate image. Indeed, Dominica's Mi-
chael Douglas, a prominent leftist spokesman, public-
ly promised to strengthen ties to Washington during
that country's recent election campaign. Underscoring
the potential payoffs of this strategy, the left in
Dominica tripled its parliamentary representation-to
6 of 21 seats-in the July 1985 elections and gained
43 percent of the vote.
Opposition efforts to tone down rhetoric in Jamaica
date to Manley's electoral defeat in 1980 and, based
on US Embassy reports and polling data, are bearing 25X1
considerable fruit. According to the Embassy, Manley
has removed radicals from influential positions within
his People's National Party (PNP), indicated that
Cuban technicians would not return to Jamaica if he
were reelected, and played down confrontational tac-
tics to force Prime Minister Edward Seaga to hold
national elections before the 1989 constitutional dead-
line. His mild criticism of the recent US trade
embargo against Nicaragua also appears designed to
reassure both Washington and a domestic audience
that strongly supported US action in Grenada. Addi-
tionally, in part to reassure foreign investors, Manley 25X1
has publicly indicated he would honor the Seaga
government's international obligations, presumably
including its accord with the IMF.
In line with their efforts to dampen radical rhetoric,
more moderate leftist leaders throughout the Caribbe-
an are refusing to cooperate with extremist parties in
their countries. In Jamaica, for example, Manley has
distanced himself from the violence-prone Marxist
Workers' Party of Jamaica. According to the US 25X1
Embassy, PNP leaders have publicly rejected involve-
ment in "any political alliance with any other party."
leaders of 25X1
the more moderate Maurice Bishop Patriotic Move-
ment in Grenada are refusing even to discuss possible
joint projects with the radical New Jewel Movement.
US Embassy sources indicate that general animosity
between moderate leftists and Marxist hardliners in
the area continues to hamper regional leftist coopera-
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Table 1
Major Leftist Parties and Front Groups
Estimated Comments
Membership
Antigua-Caribbean Libera- Leonard "Tim" Hector 75 to 100 Highly nationalistic; favors socialist economic system; work-
tion Movement (ACLM), ing to build support among youth. Nonviolent; pro-Cuban,
1970 anti-Soviet. Hector active in regional unity efforts. Boycott-
ed last general election in April 1984; holds no seats in
Parliament.
Barbados Workers' Party George Belle
(BWP), 1984
Labor Party of Dominica Michael Douglas
(LPD), 1985
Dominica Liberation Move- Pierre Charles
ment (DLM), 1972
Dominican Liberation Party Juan Bosch
(PLD), 1973
25 to 50 Marxist; pro-Cuban; outgrowth of small Movement for
National Liberation (MONALI). May field candidates in
upcoming national elections, although MONALI did not
participate in June 1981 general election.
500 Social Democratic; one of few leftist front groups in Carib-
bean; fragile internal unity; holds five of 21 seats in
Parliament.
100 Marxist; anti-US; had electoral accommodation with LPD;
has small union affiliate; staying power suspect; two mem-
bers won parliamentary seats in July 1985 elections running
as LPD candidates.
16,000 to Country's largest and best organized leftist party; strong in
20,000 capital; controls seven seats in national congress; operates
within the system but has not discarded armed struggle as
an alternative; has links to labor through faction of General
Central of Labor (CGT); plagued by internal splits; pro-
Cuban, pro-Soviet.
Dominican Leftist Front No single leader, but 6,000 to
(FID), 1983 Communist Party Secre- 8,000
tary General Aris
Narciso Isa Conde is
best known. Rafael "Fa-
fa" Taveras is a rising
star.
Communist Party of Guy Daninthe 3,000
Guadeloupe (PCG), 1944
Martinique Communist Armand Nicolas 1,000
Party (PCM), 1921
Guianese Socialist Party Leopold Heder 1,000
(PSG)
Umbrella group formed by merger of some 13 leftist groups;
Dominican Communist Party predominates; loosely orga-
nized; ideologically disparate; most member parties tiny;
some endorse armed action; has links with labor through
CGT and Communist-controlled United Workers Confeder-
ation (CUT); strong support at National University; sponsors
numerous front groups, including so-called popular struggle
committees; no congressional representation.
Strongest leftist party in Guadeloupe; won 20 percent of
popular vote in March 1985 elections; has two representa-
tives in French National Assembly; has some union support;
moderate; supports greater autonomy but opposed to inde-
pendence; youth arm favors independence and privately
supports violent tactics.
Favors autonomy, not independence; plagued by disunity
and weak leadership; large following among civil servants;
affiliated with several trade unions; disgruntled members
have formed proindependence groups; has no national
representation.
Strongest single party in French Guiana; won 48 percent of
vote in March 1985 election; advocates greater local autono-
my but opposes independence.
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Table I (continued)
Party/Year Formed
Leadership
Estimated
Membership
Maurice Bishop Patriotic
Movement (MBPM), 1984
Kenrick Radix
George Louison
150
New Jewel Movement
(NJM), 1984
Ian St. Bernard under
direction of imprisoned
Bernard Coard
40 to 100
People's National Congress
(PNC), 1965
Desmond Hoyte
18,000 to
20,000
People's Progressive Party
(PPP), 1950
Cheddi Jagan
12,000 to
18,000
People's National Party
(PNP), 1938
Michael Manley
25,000
Workers' Party of Jamaica
(WPJ), 1978
Trevor Munroe
3,000 to
3,500
Progressive Labor Party
(PLP), 1981
George Odlum
25 to 50
Workers Revolutionary
Movement (WRM)
Earl Bosquet
50
United People's Movement
(UPM), 1979
Renwick Rose
50
Movement for National
Unity (MNU), 1982
Ralph Gonsalves
50
National Joint Action
Committee (NJAC), 1969
Geddes Granger
100 to 200
Comments
Social Democratic leanings; offshoot of Maurice Bishop's
New Jewel Movement; consists mainly of former Bishop
loyalists; won 5 percent of vote in 1984 elections; not
represented in Parliament; pro-Cuban.
Avowed Marxists; Coard and other party leaders on trial for
Bishop's murder; reportedly has formed insurrectionary
wing; did not participate in 1984 elections.
Only ruling leftist party in Caribbean; Socialist-oriented;
strongest among Guyanese blacks; solid Third World cre-
dentials; holds 41 of 53 seats in Parliament.
Marxist; well disciplined at top; membership largely Indo-
Guyanese; harassed by government; received almost 20
percent of vote in fradulent 1980 general elections; some
labor support; holds 10 of 53 parliamentary seats.
Social Democratic, but contains active radical faction;
strong support within labor affiliate, National Workers'
Union (NWU); largest opposition party in Jamaica; boycott-
ed 1983 elections but operates within the system; holds no
parliamentary seats; attempting to downplay leftist image;
hampered by internal splits; uses armed thugs as pressure
groups; party leader a Socialist International vice president.
Marxist; strong on university campuses and has some union
support; more radical than PNP
uses arme gans;
party leader active among regional Marxists.
Nationalistic, Social Democratic; hampered by internal
splits; party leader maintains high regional profile; member
of Socialist International.
Marxist; strongest support among Rastafarian religious cult.
Marxist-Leninist; won 14 percent of vote in last general
election; no parliamentary representation.
Splinter group from UPM; generally pro-Cuban; no parlia-
mentary representation.
Highly nationalistic; deep roots in Black Power movement;
trying to shed reputation for violence; no parliamentary
representation.
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Broad Front Approach
In addition to toning down their rhetoric, opposition
leftists, particularly in the English-speaking mini-
states, also are trying to enhance their legitimacy by
cooperating with nonleftist parties and front groups.
For example, the left-leaning United Dominica Labor
Party merged last January with the more moderate
Dominican Labor Party and several independent
groups
leftist leaders in St. Lucia and Antigua have
tried-so far unsuccessfully-to reach alliances with
centrist parties.
With an eye toward the future, leftists throughout the
region are organizing groups to exploit growing eco-
nomic dissatisfaction and to increase their grassroots
support. For example, leftist groups in the Dominican
Republic are trying to build links to the hard-hit
middle classes by forming neighborhood organiza-
tions, the so-called "popular struggle committees."
These committees have few visible links to established
leftist parties, and, according to the US Embassy
recruit from a cross
section of Dominican society: housewives, students,
teachers, and other workers. US Embassy sources
indicate that the committees-which probably now
number several hundred-played a key role in orga-
nizing a peaceful one-day nationwide work stoppage
last February.
Prime targets elsewhere include organized labor, the
most powerful interest group in many Caribbean
nations, and unemployed youth:
both factions of the New
Jewel Movement in Grenada are attempting to
build links to youth and labor groups.
? In Jamaica, the
Marxist Worker's Party is working to expand its
toehold among influential unions.
? In Trinidad,
(leftist unionists are considering forming a
labor-oriented party to mobilize antigovernment
sentiment.
Dominica's leftist-
dominated alliance plans to organize youths.
For its part, the proindependence leftist minority in
the French departments has tried to balance its
radical tack-bombings, assassination attempts, and
arson-with recent moves to build popular support at
home and abroad.
the radicals are trying to unify proindepen-
en oups, improve relations with established left-
ist parties, and expand links to labor and youth
groups. Their more sophisticated approach was under-
scored, in our view, by the success of July protests in
Guadeloupe, where they exploited the island's racial
tensions and high unemployment rate to mobilize
proindependence sentiment. These radicals have also
tried-so far with limited success-to gain interna-
tional backing by seeking support from the Socialist
International, encouraging ties to English-speaking
Caribbean countries, and hosting regional conferences
on labor and leftist unity.
Paramilitary Training
At the same time that most regional leftists are trying
to appear more temperate, several groups have en-
hanced their paramilitary capabilities. For example
about 350 leftists
from the Dominican Republic-mostly members of
parties affiliated with the Communist-dominated Do-
minican Leftist Front-received military training in
Cuba, Nicaragua, and Libya during 1983 and 1984.
In addition, we estimate that at least 20 members of
the Dominican Communist Party have served with
insurgent forces in El Salvador since 1983.
members of Juan
Bosch's party have received military instruction in
Nicaragua since 1981
Although we lack details on the location or duration
of the military training, we believe that Cuba trains
the largest number. Havana not only has traditionally
close ties to Dominican leftists, but, more important,
has the facilities to provide them with a broad range
of instruction-including ideological and organiza-
tional training-tailored to their specific needs.=
several
leftists sent to fight in El Salvador previously received
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political instruction in the USSR suggest a well-
coordinated training program.
We believe the large number of leftists from the
Dominican Republic receiving military training-a
substantial increase over earlier reported levels-
suggests an increased willingness by leftists there to
e have
no credible evidence, however, that leftist organiza-
tions in the Dominican Republic are pushing for
immediate revolutionary activity. US Embassy re-
ports indicate that Juan Bosch-encouraged by public
opinion polls showing an increase in popular support
for his party-continues to emphasize the electoral
path. In fact, the situation in the Dominican Republic
most closely parallels present trends in the Caribbean
Basin country of Costa Rica. There, too, traditional
leftist elements continue to pursue the electoral path,
while at the same time other factions are building a
more extensive paramilitary capability with Nicara-
guan and Cuban assistance.
Leftists from several English-speaking Caribbean na-
tions have the expertise to take more aggressive
measures
in Jamaica members of both major leftist parties
received military training in Cuba during the Manley
years. Each also maintains well-armed gangs.
So far, however, opposition leftists throughout the
English- and Spanish-speaking Caribbean show few
signs that they have seriously considered adopting
insurrectionary tactics anytime soon. Reporting from
US missions in the region clearly indicates leftist
leaders believe violent tactics would be counterpro-
ductive. Those in Grenada, for example, reportedly
fear that violence will provoke a US military retalia-
tion. Beyond Grenada and the Dominican Republic- 25X1
where even radical plans appear based more on hopes
of taking advantage of spontaneous popular protests
than on initiating violence-credible reports of recent
military-related training are limited to Dominica.
The picture in the French departments is mixed.
Influential Communist and Socialist parties, accord-
ing to US officials, reject violence.
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episode, while cooling the ardor between many Carib-
bean leftists and their Soviet Bloc mentors, has not 25X1
jeopardized their longstanding relationship. The ma-
jority of leftists, especially during elections, depend 25X1
heavily on foreign funding, according to US Embassy 2 DA1
reports. Leftist leaders also rely on Cuba and the
USSR, and to a lesser extent Libya, to provide 25X1
organizational training and-in some cases-military 25X1
instruction, according to US mission reporting. Al-
though Libya still lags far behind Havana, it is
rapidly emerging as an important player on the
Caribbean scene. During the past year, Embassy
reporting indicates that Tripoli's traditional contacts
with leftists in the English-speaking islands have
spread to opposition leftists in the Dominican Repub-
lic, proindependence radicals in the French depart-
ments, and the Bouterse regime in Suriname.
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Table 2
International Links of Major Leftist Parties
Antigua-Caribbean Party leaders maintain
Liberation Movement regular contacts with
Cuba and Libya; attend
Cuban-sponsored meet-
ings.
Barbados Workers' Party leaders have long-
Party standing ties to Havana.
tacts with Cubans and
Libyans. Cuba reported-
ly may train party youth
organizers.
Dominican Liberation Party leader travels fre-
Party quently to Cuba. Cuba
and USSR provide ad-
vice and training. Party
members also train in
Nicaragua.
Dominican Communist Cuba and USSR provide
Party a advice and training.
Some party members
(propaganda specialists)
are working in Nicara-
gua. Party leaders travel
to Soviet Union and
Cuba. East Germany
also provides political
and labor training.
Libya may have provid-
ed financial assistance;
Cuba providing handful
of scholarships and re-
portedly some funding.
Cuba reportedly has
made scholarships avail-
able. Libya may have
provided some funds to
party's predecessor,but
we have no credible evi-
dence of recent support.
Libya and Cuba bank-
rolled recent election
campaign. Cuba and
Guyana provided cam-
paign literature. Party
sympathizers reportedly
among 30 to 40 Domini-
can leftists studying in
Cuba.
Receives funds from
Cuba and USSR. Cuba
provides 30 to 45 schol-
arships yearly for party
members. In 1981, the
Soviets began providing
scholarships.
Receives bulk of funds
from USSR. Moscow
provides 100 to 150
scholarships per year-
the most to any Caribbe-
an leftist party.
Several party members
reportedly received secu-
rity training in Guyana
this year.
Party serves as channel
for dissemination of Cu-
ban propaganda in
English-speaking
Caribbean.
Has been focus of Tripo-
li's recent efforts to ex-
pand its influence in the
English-speaking Carib-
bean and to help contact
leftists in the French
departments.
Cuba and the Soviets
have provided military
training. Some members
now train in Nicaragua.
10 to 15 members cur-
rently are serving with
insurgents in Salvador.
Cuba and USSR have
provided military train-
ing. Vietnam recently
offered strategic com-
mand course.
Operates Soviet press
(NOVOSTI) office in
Santo Domingo. Labor
affiliate is a member of
Prague-based World
Federation Trade Union.
Party has representa-
tives in Havana, Mos-
cow, and Managua.
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Table 2 (continued)
Socialist Bloc a Embassy reports leaders
travel to Cuba to study
labor, journalism, and
peasant affairs. Party
leaders have ties to Nic-
araguan ambassador in
Santo Domingo.
Leaders of Communist
parties maintain active
and open relations with
Cuba. Havana and Lib-
ya are in contact with
proindependence groups.
Maurice Bishop Party leaders receive ad-
Patriotic Movement vice from Cuba.
New Jewel Movement Looks to Moscow for
advice.
People's National Party leaders frequently
Congress travel to Soviet Bloc
nations.
People's Progressive Party leaders look to
Party Moscow for advice. Fre-
quently travel to Cuba
and other Bloc nations.
Dominican Security Ser- Omembers re-
vice claims Nicaragua ceiving military training
provides funds. in Libya and Cuba.
Proinde endence radi- Libya has offered mili- Party leaders coordinate
cats tary training to radicals. Cuba's extensive pro-
have received funds gram of cultural, educa-
from Cuba, the USSR, tion, and sports
and Libya. exchanges.
Cuba has provided fund- Party members have re- Cuba and Soviets report-
ing, campaign material, ceived security training edly urging unity with
and scholarships. in Cuba. hardline New Jewel
Movement.
Soviets probably provid- Cuba and Soviets report-
ed funds for Coard's de- edly urging unity with
fense. moderates.
Soviet Bloc provides lim- Cuba provides some se- Cuba and USSR press-
ited economic aid in- curity training. North ing for coalition with
eluding agricultural and Koreans reportedly sup- Marxist PPP.
medical assistance. ply small-arms training.
Some scholarships also
granted. Libya has en-
tered into joint fishing
venture with George-
town.
Soviets and Cubans Soviets view party leader
probably provide funds. Jagan as ideological
kinsman.
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Table 2
International Links of Major Leftist Parties (continued)
People's National Party Party leaders maintain
especially close contact
with Cuba. Also have
range of contacts with
other Soviet Bloc nations
and Libya.
representatives in Kings-
ton to plan strategy.
Cuba also provides ad-
vice.
meet frequently wit o-
viet and North Korean
Progressive Labor Party Party leaders travel to
Cuba and Libya.
a Both the Socialist Bloc and the Dominican Communist Party are
part of the Dominican Leftist Front.
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Cuba, North Korea, and
the USSR offer small
number of scholarships.
They also provide fund-
ing. North Korea has
given funds to the par-
ty's union organization;
Soviets reportedly pro-
vide party's union affili-
ate with scholarships for
study in Eastern Europe.
Libya also may have
provided funds.
the USSR
provide funds. Party
sympathizers also study
in Moscow. Libya re-
portedly may have
passed funds in the past.
Hungary reportedly pro-
vided medical supplies in
1984.
Libya has
provided mancial sup-
port in the past. Prede-
cessor organization re-
ceived funding from
Cuba.
During the 1970s, PNP
members received mili-
tary training in Cuba.
Havana may also supply
some weapons to party
gangs0 re-
ceived on-island para-
military training from
North Korea in 1982.
Party members received
paramilitary training in
Cuba during Manley
years.
20 to 60 party members
received paramilitary
training in Grenada dur-
ing Bishop years. Efforts
to send members to Lib-
ya in 1983 dropped
when ruling party dis-
closed plans.
Overt contacts with
Cuba and the USSR
have been reduced as
part of the party's effort
to broaden popular ap-
peal. Party, for example,
has yet to fill liaison post
in Havana.
Party leader Munroe, a
Soviet conduit, particu-
larly before Grenada in-
tervention. Havana's dis-
pleasure with Munroe's
support for hardline fac-
tion in Grenada prior to
Bishop's death apparent-
ly easing. Munroe active
among regional leftists.
Party leader Odium a
frequent Libyan contact.
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the
Since mid-1984, Cuba has sponsored a series of
conferences for Caribbean labor leaders, while Soviet
labor delegations visiting the Caribbean have, accord-
ing to US Embassy reports, invited Surinamese union
region's mix of deteriorating economic conditions and
rising political tensions as providing opportunities for
exploitation. Havana and Moscow train regional
youth, labor organizers, and political activists, al-
though the Soviets are less visible largely because of
their willingness to let Cuba take the lead for them.
Moreover, Cuba-and to a lesser extent Nicaragua-
continues to provide paramilitary training to radical
leftists, Re-
flecting Cuba's and the USSR's awareness of the
region's prevailing political conservatism and, more
important, their concern over Washington's increased
attention to the area, neither is encouraging armed
action; reporting from US Embassy and other reliable
sources during the past two years suggests that their
main objective is promoting leftist unity. Neverthe-
less, both
Havana and Moscow maintain contacts with violence-
prone groups, such as the Marxist Workers' Party of
Jamaica, in hopes of taking advantage of any leftist
resurgence that might occur if the region's economic
problems grow.
We believe Cuba, in particular, is concentrating its
assistance on leftist groups that it perceives have the
best chance of making electoral gains-especially in
the Dominican Republic and Jamaica. According to
US Embassy reports, Cuban officials met frequently
with leftists from the Dominican Republic during the
past year, presumably to pass funds and help them
chart domestic tactics. Havana, in addition to provid-
ing military training, is reportedly urging the two
major leftist groups in the country to merge. To boost
Manley's chances of reeainine power in Jamaica,
leaders to visit the Soviet Union.
Cuba already has estab-
lished an organizational framework to oversee the
cultivation of regional unionists.
Libya
Tripoli's program to expand its influence in the
Caribbean is increasingly active; its clear objective is
to undermine US and French interests. F
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Underscoring the USSR's and Cuba's appreciation of
organized labor's strong clout in the region, both are
intensifying efforts to improve ties to trade unions.
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We believe that the increasing propensity of leftist
radicals in the French departments to use violence has
encouraged Qadhafi to establish contacts with these
proindependence leftists.
ripoli, with the help of leftists
from Dominica and St. Lucia, has focused on develop-
ing ties to the Popular Union for the Liberation of
Guadeloupe, the major proindependence group in the
departments.
Tripoli's goals in the French depart-
ments are to strengthen the independence movement
and to improve the capability of the radicals for
militant action. The Libyans also are trying to pro-
mote unity among the proindependence groups and to
help broaden their domestic support,
the Libyans have agreed to finance the establishment
of secretariats for the various independence groups in
Paris and Guadeloupe. Tripoli, has
made assistance contingent on each independence
group forming alliances with local students and labor
unions.
Libya has also moved to improve relations with the
leftist-leaning military regime in Suriname. In addi-
tion to opening an embassy in Paramaribo earlier this
year, US Embassy and press sources say Tripoli has
signed economic cooperation agreements with Suri-
name that could eventually total $100 million.
unspecified military aid and advisory and training
assistance to the Surinamese Army, Tripoli reportedly
obtained limited access to air and sea facilities in
Suriname that could be used to shuttle military
supplies to Nicaragua and other regional leftists. To
date, according to the US Embassy in Paramaribo,
the treaty has not been implemented, but 15 military
personnel recently accompanied a Surinamese cultur-
al group visiting Libya
So far, despite Libya's higher profile in the area, we
believe, based on Embassy reporting, that Tripoli has
made only limited progress in expanding its influence.
Libya's clients-leftist leaders in St. Lucia, Domini-
ca, and Antigua-have shown themselves to be oppor-
tunists, willing to pay lipservice to Qadhafi's ideology
to gain financial handouts. We believe these leftists
have resisted Libyan demands for armed action be-
cause of concerns that such activities would damage
their political standing and risk government retalia-
tion.
North Korea and China
P'yongyang maintains contact with left-leaning re-
gimes and opposition parties throughout the Caribbe-
an but has focused its activities in Guyana. Continu-
ing military aid-mainly training-and economic
assistance underscore strong interest in maintaining
Embassy reports, we judge that China's links to
regional leftists are exploratory and limited to the
English-speaking islands. As a result, we doubt that
Beijing has provided Caribbean leftists with signifi-
cant aid.
We believe the left's overall strategy is well suited to
capitalize on mounting economic discontent, but left-
ists still face a number of obstacles. Organizational
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aecrei
and ideological disunity, lack of material and man-
power resources, continued public distrust, and gov-
ernment countermeasures-backed by economic aid
from Washington-are, in our view, roadblocks to
rapid advances by the left.
Lack of Unity and Resources
Persistent ideological, tactical, and personal differ-
ences are a major obstacle to the emergence of leftist
parties strong enough to challenge incumbent re-
gimes. In our view, leftist infighting contributes to the
public's perception of the left as an assortment of
political amateurs, complicates recruitment, under-
mines access to outside funding, and provides ruling
party tacticians with valuable propaganda. By form-
ing an umbrella organization in early 1983, leftists in
the Dominican Republic took the first step toward
building a broad-based leftist political party in that
country, but Embassy reporting from elsewhere in the
region indicates that leftists have remained a fractious
lot.
Unity efforts on a regionwide basis also have come up
short. The Caribbean Regional Progressive Move-
ment-formed in December 1983 in Kingston to help
establish a unified front group of leftist organiza-
tions-appears to be foundering.
recent meeting of the group's leaders accomplished
little, and press reports indicate a followup meeting
scheduled for November in Trinidad is likely to be
contentious. Several other regional leftist groups ap-
pear inactive.
In many cases, the lack of material and manpower
resources limits the left's ability to create or exploit
opportunities for political gain and magnifies the
problems caused by internecine bickering. Available
evidence suggests that leftists find domestically gener-
ated funds scarce, reflecting the narrow bases of
support of most leftist parties. Foreign donors, partic-
ularly Libya, frequently deliver less than what they
promise and tend to favor more established parties.
Many leftist parties also lack a solid cadre of well-
trained and well-placed individuals capable of influ-
encing institutional policies.
ber 1985 has not caused much of a popular stir.
Public Suspicion
Despite the left's efforts to take a more moderate tack
in most Caribbean countries, we see little credible
evidence that pro-leftist sentiment has grown much in
the region overall. Several recent antigovernment 25X1
demonstrations in the Dominican Republic, for exam-
ple, have fizzled. Moreover, although the left in
Dominica recently turned in a good showing at the
polls, leftists in St. Vincent and Grenada since mid-
1984 have turned in poor electoral performances;
those in Antigua have refused to run candidates. In
Jamaica, although public opinion surveys show Man-
ley would win a general election, the same polls show 25X1
little support for new elections soon. Indeed, Seaga's
postponement of local elections at least until Decem-
Government Countermeasures
Reports from US Embassies throughout the Caribbe-
an indicate that regional rulers generally tolerate a
wide range of leftist activities but are determined to 25X1
fend off potential leftist challengers. Government
tactics vary. The Dominican Republic's Jorge Blanco
has used both a well-orchestrated campaign to edu-
cate the populace that austerity is necessary and
frequent deployment of security forces to head off any
leftist-led demonstrations against belt-tightening. To 25X1
buy more time for his austerity program, Jamaica's 25X1
Seaga has pointed to Manley's dismal economic re-
cord when he was in power. In our view, Seaga and
Jorge Blanco also have relied heavily on US aid to
check rising political tensions. Elsewhere, St. Lucian
Prime Minister John Compton has tried to diffuse 25X1
leftist support by increasing wages in step with infla-
tion, according to US defense attache reporting.
Despite Haiti's nascent political opening-this spring
the Duvalier regime laid the groundwork for legaliz-
ing political parties and installing a parliamentary
system-leftist parties remain outlawedF___-]
To prevent another Bishop-like coup, governments in
the English-speaking islands are trying to improve
their mutual defense arrangements. They have
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Leftist Funding: The Case of Jamaica
A review of recent US Embassy reporting from
Kingston indicates that Jamaican leftists, like their
counterparts elsewhere, derive funds from a multi-
tude of sources. Quantitative data are sketchy, but we
estimate that foreign assistance accounts for at least
half of operational expenses. Narcotics trafficking
also appears, directly and indirectly, to provide Ja-
maican leftists with an important, and perhaps grow-
ing, source of funds.
Jamaican leftists raise money at home by sponsoring
social activities and operating small businesses.
Dances, bingo parties, and sporting events reportedly
are favorite fundraisers.
the Workers' Party runs-
currently at a loss-a garment factory, farms, and
several taverns near Kingston. Money also is raised
the Workers' Party frequently resorts to criminal
activity-bank robbery and burglary-to raise funds.
The Soviet Bloc provides some non fiscal assistance.
In addition to providing campaign material, expenses
for Jamaican leftists attending Cuban and Soviet
Other foreign donors in recent years reportedly in-
clude West European socialist parties and trade
unions. Contributions from Jamaicans living in the
United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada are,
in our view, especially beneficial to Manley's party.
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agreed, through the so-called Regional Security Sys-
tem, to help each other put down potential threats
from a foreign or extralegal group.' Fiscal constraints
and domestic political pressures have aborted plans to
launch a standing regional army. At present, the
mutual defense organization consists of only about
500 specially trained police. Moreover, this defensive
umbrella covers only 5 percent of the region's popula-
tion.
We believe most regional leftists over the next few
years will stick to the gradualist approach that they
have adopted in the wake of Grenada. This is especial-
ly true in the English-speaking Caribbean. Available
evidence-primarily Embassy reports and press-
suggests that they have been encouraged by the solid
showing of the left in Dominica during recent elec-
tions. Public opinion polls showing leftists in Jamaica
gaining ground also are likely to strengthen the
conviction of leftist leaders that they are on the right
track.
We believe that because Jamaica's leftist patriarch
Michael Manley is known throughout the region as
one of the chief architects of the post-Grenada moder-
ate approach, results of national elections in that
country would be a crucial signal for leftist tacticians
elsewhere in the area. Manley's reelection would give
moderate leftists a boost and provide an additional
incentive for unity. Likewise, his defeat probably
would embolden radicals who advocate more militant
action. At present, we judge that Manley has an even
chance of regaining power in the next few years.'
' The Regional Security System was created as a result of the
memorandum of understanding signed in October 1982 by Antigua,
Barbados, Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent. It was designed to
fill the security gap left by the departure of British military units
after these states gained independence. The agreement provides for
the development of a self-defense capability by its members and
enables any state to call upon the others to handle potential
troublemakers. Since its creation, Grenada and St. Kitts have
A variety of factors suggests that the radical leftist
minority in the French departments-and possibly in
the Dominican Republic-will in any event pursue a
more militant course in the comine years. F-
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Although we believe that some 25X1
radicals will attempt more terrorism, we judge that
most proindependence leaders in the departments will 25X1
remain wary about being associated with terrorist
incidents to avoid jeopardizing their public relations
effort. Because of increased military training and the
conviction of some radicals in the Dominican Repub-
lic that the climate in that country is conducive to
revolutionary upheaval, we believe that leftists there
might try to disrupt stability through terrorist-type
incidents.
We believe that mounting economic problems will
cause sporadic outbursts of leftist-led social violence
throughout the region during the next few years. We
agree with US Embassy officials that the danger is
highest in the Dominican Republic and Jamaica.
Regional leftists also will try-as they did in Jamaica 25X1
last January-to turn spontaneous demonstrations
against austerity into sustained antigovernment pro-
tests. US defense attache reports indicate that recent
budget cuts have played havoc with morale, recruit-
ment, and equipment maintenance among military
forces in the area-and mutual defense capabilities
remain untested. Nonetheless, we believe most securi-
ty forces can handle the kinds of sporadic outbursts of
violence-riots and antigovernment protests-that we
foresee. In the unlikely event of widespread unrest,
however, security forces probably would be over-
whelmed. 25X1
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Libya is likely to intensify its efforts to subvert
Western interests in the Caribbean.
Tripoli plans to increase support 25X1
to leftists in the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Domi-
nica, St. Lucia, Antigua, and the French departments,
believing that Libya has the best chance of inciting
violence in these countries. We believe most English-
speaking leftists will continue to, welcome Libyan
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financial aid but will resist inciting violence. In the
French departments, however, we judge that Libyan
funding and training would improve the radicals'
organization and their capabilities for violence.
We believe Cuba's concern over Libya's expanding
role in the Caribbean will grow, especially if, as seems
likely, Qadhafi continues to advocate violent tactics.
Indeed, although their long-range goals are similar,
Havana probably sees Libya's recent moves as more
competitive than complementary. Unless Havana per-
ceives Libyan machinations as threatening to prompt
a strong US response, however, we judge that Cuba
will limit its response to urging leftists to continue
their moderate tack. A move by Caribbean leftists to
play Havana and Tripoli against each other to wring
more assistance from them probably would, at least
indirectly, increase tensions between the two coun-
tries.
Reporting from US Embassies in the region suggests
that Cuba and the Soviet Union will maintain their
low-key approach in the Caribbean area. We believe,
however, that external developments might encourage
them to initiate more activist policies. A dramatic
turnaround in leftist fortunes in Central America, for
example, almost certainly would embolden Moscow
and Havana. A perception on their part that Wash-
ington's interest in the Caribbean was flagging also
might cause them to consider a change of course.
The complexity of the area's political systems suggest
that over the short run, at least, leftist influence will
vary widely from nation to nation. In sum, we believe
leftist prospects for making sizable electoral gains
during the next few years are brightest in Jamaica.
We also believe leftists in the Dominican Republic
will gain in the May 1986 national elections there; at
the least, we expect Juan Bosch's party to increase
slightly its congressional representation. Elsewhere, in
large part because of growing public discontent with
austerity, we expect leftists to make gradual inroads
into the overwhelming parliamentary majorities en-
joyed by most moderate regimes. Even marginal
increases, however, could have a disruptive impact.
look at leftist prospects in the near term.)
In addition to providing a forum for leftist spokesmen,
we believe increased parliamentary representation
will afford leftists opportunities to sabotage necessary
economic adjustment measures. (See appendix for
more detailed country assessments providing a closer
Implications for the United States
Because most leftist parties in the region remain weak
and divided, and because the public is highly skeptical
of their abilities and intentions, we judge that the
chances of another Grenada-type regime emerging in
the Caribbean area anytime soon are remote. Never-
theless, we expect the concern of conservative leaders
in the region to grow because of some probable leftist
electoral inroads, improved-if latent-paramilitary
capabilities in a few countries, and Libyan activism.
These leaders are likely to ask Washington and other
Western governments for increased economic, and
perhaps military, aid. We believe failure to secure
adequate economic assistance might make leaders in
several countries, especially Trinidad, more receptive
to continued Cuban attempts to increase bilateral
commercial ties.
Manley's election could pose a significant challenge
for the United States. We doubt he would move
rapidly toward the Soviet camp, but-based on his
previous track record-he almost certainly would
intensify criticism of US Central American and Third
World policies. Cooperation with Washington on nar-
cotics eradication and regional security could also
diminish. Because many Caribbean conservatives dis-
trust Manley, we believe his return to power also
might disrupt the fragile unity of regional bodies,
such as the Caribbean Community, and undermine
their efforts to help find common solutions to the
area's economic woes
On balance, greater rivalry between Castro and
Qadhafi and growing Cuban determination to fore-
stall further Libyan inroads among the Caribbean left
could cause Havana to try to do more to support
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regional leftists. Still, we doubt that Cuba-fearful of
the likely US reaction-would press Caribbean radi-
cals to adopt armed action.
Should the left prove more effective than we expect,
Washington's problems obviously would be magnified.
To preserve domestic stability, conservative govern-
ments in the area almost certainly would press even
harder for direct US economic aid, additional pur-
chases by the United States of strategic materials,
and increased security assistance. Widespread leftist-
backed violence could raise the chances that Wash-
ington might be called on to take action to prevent
another leftist takeover. We believe a leftist resur-
gence also would stimulate illegal immigration, give
the Soviets and their surrogates new opportunities to
expand their regional influence, and open US and
other foreign-owned firms to threats of nationaliza-
tion. The absence of a common revolutionary ideology
among regional leftist leaders suggests, however, that
Washington would be unlikely to face coordinated
action by the Caribbean left
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Appendix
Near-Term Prospects for the
Caribbean Left: A Country
Survey
The English-Speaking Islands
Antigua and Barbuda. We doubt that the Antigua
Caribbean Liberation Movement (ACLM), a small
leftist-nationalist party and the most active opposition
group in Antigua, will soon become a serious threat to
Antigua's ruling party.
party chief Tim Hector, with an eye
toward the general election due by 1989, is trying to
soften the movement's radical image. To bolster its
support, the movement plans a number of community
service projects. We believe the ACLM could gain a
foothold in parliament if, as we expect, the 74-year-
old Prime Minister Vere Bird names his son, Lester,
to succeed him and the ruling party splits. Under
Hector's leadership, which seems secure, we believe
the movement will continue to seek power by constitu-
tional means.
Dominica. The chances for success of the left in
Dominica turn in large part on the ability of the new
alliance to hold together. Party leader Michael Doug-
las's job will not be easy. Internal bickering has
already led to the expulsion of one key lieutenant,
according to press reports. US Embassy sources spec-
ulate that Douglas also will be hard pressed to control
radical hangers-on.
Douglas is worried that the Marxist
Dominica Liberation Movement-two of its members
ran on the alliance's ticket and won parliamentary
seats in the recent elections-will try to take over the
coalition. Douglas, however, apparently can count on
Libyan financial aid to help preserve party unity.
Grenada. Grenada's fractionalized left will have to
work hard just to stay afloat. Despite attempts by the
more moderate Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement
(MBPM) to muster popular support through social,
cultural, and political activities designed to perpetuate
Bishop's memory,
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Kenrick Radix, leader of
Maurice Bishop Patriotic
Movement.
Grenadians spurn the MBPM because of
its leaders' perceived opportunism in trying to capital-
ize on Bishop's memory and their lack of political
credentials. The MBPM received some 2,000 votes in
the election last December, but active supporters
number considerably less,
In the wake of the party's resounding defeat, MBPM
leaders-Kenrick Radix and George and Einstein
Louison-are rethinking their options.
Radix regrets participating in the
election and realizes that it may take several years to
rebuild the left. He also believes, that
the MBPM must broaden its appeal before competing
in another election. For their part, radical leftists in
the New Jewel Movement, are concentrating on fund-
raising and rebuilding political support.
The left's main hope of regaining support over the
near term is linked to Prime Minister Blaize's perfor-
mance. Based on opinion polls, we believe that the
populace has high expectations that Blaize will reduce
the island's 35-percent unemployment rate, repair its
deteriorated infrastructure, rebuild the bureaucracy,
and oversee the establishment and maintenance of a
new police force. Should he falter, we believe popular
discontent would provide an opportunity for leftists to
foment unrest. Both leftist factions, however, appear
resigned to bide their time.
Guyana. The constitutionally protected paramount
role of the ruling party has ensured an apparently
smooth transition since President Forbes Burnham
died in August, and augers well for near-term stabil-
ity. Upon his confirmation, new President Desmond
Hoyte announced his intention to continue Burnham's
socialist policies, and we believe relations with Cuba
and the USSR will remain close in the near term.
Nevertheless, Embassy ndicate
that the influence of the radical left wing of the ruling
party will decrease as Hoyte-backed by party mod-
erates-strengthens his control. Moreover, without
Burnham's personal involvement, we believe Guyana's
efforts to help revitalize the Caribbean left may
suffer
Georgetown recently promised funds to regional left-
ists to form fronts and to work within the electoral
system; it also provided campaign material to leftists
in Dominica.
Jamaica. The electoral prospects of the People's
National Party (PNP) depend in large part on party
chieftain Michael Manley's chances of sticking to his
moderate course. Based on US Embassy reports,
Manley clearly recognizes that efforts to bury his
radical past have been a major reason for his rise in
the polls. At the same time, he must also convince the
populace that he has viable solutions to the country's
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People's National Party.(
economic woes. Indeed, according to the US Embas-
sy, the specter of Jamaica's economic collapse while
he was Prime Minister has weakened Manley's cam-
paign to force Seaga to call early elections.
Dissension within the party could undermine Man-
ley's apparent determination to steer a moderate
course. PNP radicals already have publicly questioned
upset party plans for antigovernment demonstrations
in recent months, and, potentially more damaging,
prompted maneuvers by D. K. Duncan and other PNP
radicals to gain control of the party. Manley's poor
ing questions about his ability to hold onto the
leadership reins, also has intensified party infighting.
In addition to emboldening the party's radical faction,
Manley seems worried that moderates are trying to
take advantage of his illness to increase their stature.
the party's
decision in June temporarily to abandon direct efforts
to force early elections in favor of working through
labor unions was a byproduct of Manley's concern.
An open split in the party-probable, in our view,
only in the unlikely event that Manley reacted harshly
to dissident machinations or became too sick to lead-
would further sap its vitality
On balance, we believe Manley will stick to the
center-of-the-road course he has charted. Despite
their grumblings, radical spokesmen probably recog-
nize that their best chance of gaining power is to stay
Trevor Munroe, Secretary
General of Workers' Party
of Jamaica. )
the course. Indeed, they played a low-key part in the
PNP's recent national convention, according to US
Embassy reporting. To help maintain leftwing sup-
port, we judge that Manley will make enough small
concessions to prevent a split in the party.
Trevor Munroe's Marxist Workers' Party of Jamaica
(WPJ), the island's second most important leftist
party, stands little chance of gaining power in the
foreseeable future. Nevertheless, we believe it is likely
to play a more pivotal, if indirect, role in the months
ahead. The party's apparent willingness to use violent
tactics, for example, could raise political tensions.
Any public backlash against WPJ violence would, in
our view, hurt Manley's party most. Should the WPJ,
as we expect, field candidates in the next general
elections, we believe much of its support would come
from PNP leftwingers-a development that probably
would benefit Seaga's party.
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St. Lucia. The left in St. Lucia shows few signs of
pulling out of the downward spiral that began in the 25X1
early 1980s. The public image of George Odlum's
Progressive Labor Party, the island's largest leftist
group, remains tarnished because of its plans, aborted
after being publicized by the government, to send a
group of sympathizers to Libya for military training
many party leaders, including Od-
lum's deputy, Mikey Pilgrim, have resigned. We
believe this development could spell the collapse of the
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St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Disorganized and
lacking popular support, the left in St. Vincent poses
little threat to stability in the foreseeable future. The
two most significant leftist parties-the Marxist Unit-
ed People's Movement and a splinter group, the
Movement for National Unity-are divided ideologi-
cally, according to US Embassy reports. Like other
Caribbean leftists, both lost support after the events in
Grenada. Calling itself a "progressive" party, the
Movement for National Unity failed in trying to form
alliances with moderate parties before the 1984 gener-
al election because of party leader Ralph Gonsalves's
leftist reputation. Both leftist groups were trounced in
the election and, in our view, will remain inactive for
Others. Elsewhere in the English-speaking Caribbean,
leftist influence is essentially nonexistent. Leftist ef-
forts to play a meaningful role on the Barbadian
political stage appear stalled; two older groups-the
People's Progressive Movement and the People's Pres-
sure Movement-are inactive, and the new Barbados
Workers' Party lacks mass support
No recognized leftist
political parties exist in the ministates of Anguilla, the
Cayman Islands, Montserrat, St. Christopher and
Nevis, and the Turks and Caicos. In The Bahamas,
the small Marxist Vanguard Party lacks popular
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Trinidad and Tobago. Leftists in Trinidad's powerful
labor movement are likely to try to exploit the
country's deteriorating economic situation. The Com-
mittee for Labor Solidarity controls several large
trade unions in Trinidad's influential sugar and petro-
leum industries, and, according to US Embassy offi-
cials, has become increasingly active in recent years.
We believe ideological squabbling within its leader-
ship, however, could undermine the organization's
ability to capitalize on worker unrest. Moreover, we
believe leftist political parties will be hard pressed to
gain much ground, despite Prime Minister George
Chamber's flagging popularity. The most prominent
leftist group, the small and highly fragmented Na-
tional Joint Action Committee, has yet to make a
significant showing at the polls
support, according to the US Embassy. C
The French Departments
The independence issue is likely to remain divisive for
French Caribbean leftists. We believe the mainstream
Communist and Socialist parties will continue to
support greater local autonomy short of outright
independence. Recent efforts to resolve their differ-
ences with the proindependence radicals in Guade-
loupe have faltered,
We doubt that even increased Libyan support
would lead to an early solution to the independence
issue. Senior French officials have said publicly that
France will not grant independence as long as the
majority of the local population continues to oppose it.
While the dim prospects for achieving independence
through the political process argues for greater leftist
militancy, the radicals' new comprehensive strategy
portends the development of a more sophisticated
independence movement. Apart from pursuing more
confrontational tactics toward French rule, we believe
the separatists will also try to participate in activities
that allow more public visibility, such as international
and regional political and labor conferences.
Dominican Republic
Dominican leftists see the country's worsening ecp-
nomic situation as playing into their hands. They
expect to make hefty gains among those dissatisfied
with Jorge Blanco's management of the economy,
especially the hard-hit middle class, according to US
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Lion Party leader
Embassy reports. The President's difficulty in main-
taining a working relationship with powerful ruling
party chieftains, particularly Senate leader Jacobo
Majluta, has presented further opportunities for his
opponents-on the left and right.
Although we believe opposition to government belt-
tightening has heightened the left's sense of purpose,
longstanding personal differences among leftist lead-
ers will continue to hamper cooperation. Juan Bosch,
according to the US Embassy, refuses to join the
Communist-dominated Dominican Leftist Front
largely because of animosity between him and the
leader of the Communist Party. Conflicts between
Bosch and Communist Party chieftain Isa Conde led
to a split last year in the country's major leftist labor
confederation. At the same time, the recently formed
front is weakening. US Embassy sources say members
of the front elect their own leaders, hold separate
party congresses, and sponsor competing organiza-
tions. Moreover, several of the component members of
the front have in fact split to form additional parties.
Narcisco Isa Conde, Secretary
of the Dominican Communist
Party.
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slogans and organizational techniques. The 25 Febru-
ary Movement, an embryonic radical party, is his
primary vehicle to instill a sense of nationalistic pride
and unity. About 50 left-leaning intellectuals-some
from the small pro-Cuban Revolutionary People's 25X1
Party-also are part of the loose coalition of political
opportunists who support Bouterse and affect deci-
sionmaking.
We believe bilateral relations between Paramaribo
and Tripoli will grow only slowly. Libyan doubts
about Bouterse's reliability as an ally are matched by
the oppositio
Moreover, Bouterse appears wary of antago-
nizing Washington. Given sufficient financial induce-
ments, however, we believe Bouterse would cooperate
with the Libyans in nonviolent regional leftist activi-
ties.
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Suriname
In Suriname, leftist-opportunist Army Commander
Desire Bouterse, in our view, is primarily interested in
staying in power but may take steps to ease the
political climate somewhat over the next year. Ac-
cording to Embassy reports, he is considering the
reestablishment of parties proscribed since 1980.
Meanwhile, to help consolidate his control and pro-
mote support for the regime, Bouterse has used leftist
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