WHAT'S WRONG WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP91-00587R000100590034-2
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RIFPUB
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K
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2
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
March 8, 2011
Sequence Number: 
34
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Publication Date: 
January 30, 1985
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OPEN SOURCE
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Approved For Release 2011/03/08: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100590034-2 SA;y FRANCISCO c'- PONICLF BRIEFING WHAT'S WRONG WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES The problems that plague the intelligence commmity are so deeply rooted that only hcmdamental changes can improve performance 551 a1Sre III W SIN rrr rIr w I_ .reel I?r1 W AS.Id r-In rr Inn 1.n.15r w Ir TI5 r SrrrT1 Sere W P IIrS IWI Ilrr .r Jrq Or.. TrSet r S.5 SI.II ar.IS. r Ir ISI rlre/ M.s ZIIrrI. YI_.1 II SI. nil. r.r.t SrOSrr MLrt rti ur III Srerr. r rs W II IIl -SIW41.rrr5. r1. wr IW11T Start r W I.S.I-IT wwy 1.1T Mee R er.r Nw W S.rYa. - Y rIr . fa I IIMI IIIr-I ra~rrl.r .I. rrr./y In lr y r-r In Sir Sr r w~Slr 5e. rrrT SASS S Ir rr~.v~ weer r rrr rl~r rr .Is s_S r.rwY 4rl5uarrr~- rn+I.11.r.~.rw r In - -Ilr. irr. .`IArS_a S-Srwr .sII IrI..I r Sal In . f /rR I.1..Ia ylllrr brr Mrs rrr . - yr ..I. I...?rr r r errSrr wrYS.A? Ia, 4.Yrr rII 70I- rr.r lrr l ir. Or1~5 r Irrr S 1151 rlrl Nrrl r II I. - _5__ rr .r.Ilrla? III5 i.I.rlslr.I. 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IY. 151..5 .I?.I - - IIIIr1r I.nA^r Cad/, ?'I- Renner 154 Approved For Release 2011/03/08: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100590034-2 Approved For Release 2011/03/08: CIA-RDP91-00587ROO0100590034-2 How to improve U.S. Intelligence fromhge1 - waw an for p anti til Intent -genes to 10 cnunrrwr ahmr atahl- sty was judged dtr""-v toafrtxr ma? jor American it The group i. tended more tecourtea to hire expert political an? atysla - not collectors - and do. creed greater coordination in the collection of political tntelllgertcd between the Foreign Service and time tauNllgeece community. ? the ' only tangible result achieved by the group, however, was a substantial expansion of re. porting requirements that fell largely on clandestine collectors be cause the Foreign Service was not given the staff resources to re .pond. During his 1900 presidential ClM21ign Reagan pledged to make I ved intelligence 3ne of his top ust. Once elected, he appoint. d'= campaign manager William d as director of central lnteUl- Pk- CIA Director William Casey CIA director to the Reagan adminla trauon. The appointment of Casey and his elevation to cabinet status have put the intelligence community deeply Into the poUe7making areas. in the atmosphere of a National Security Council meeting, the obi- net room, and the Oval Office Itself, the central intelligence director can be tempted, If not basically Ino, cUned, to take sides and to express a polity preference. dent Anita Gemayel, and especially its army, were not viable and that they would not be significantly strengthened bye U.S. Marine peas ens. Charge that reports have been shared have also attrfaced in can. neetlon with the CIA's work on Cen- tel and South America. Two senior analysis resigned recently claiming that Carry ordered their finding to be rewritten to inflate the threat to US. security. Senate Minority Leader Robert Byrd, DW.Va" has asked the Senate fivlect Cutmnlttee on Intelligence to conduct a thorough evaluation of their allegations. If accurate,". Byrd sold in a letter to the commit- tee's vice chairman, `thee reports indicate there has been a shocking misuse of the CIA for political pur? le," from ng ~ .> luenty. whea edMrtan a enatyasa In out port of the rnmmenlty find rtes date that rhellr?ner aw, vvntlona ayannrn? their first ut- eUnrt h, I. squirrel them away. What Is MCad.4 7116 Immediate need b for of the a an analytic car star. vice and produetfou process that W ect Mtn of thinking and of Cement that Save eta trlbuted W past lntettigdoce faOE artsc A central. commudty voMe for. eignanteligence data base should be created to asters that an analyst waking on a specific problem would have accost to all the nation Infer- collected. Analysts also should be pro- vided with Incentives to do more reflective writing and rsearch. Work and travel abroad should be facilitated and a tborottgh, sub stantive review procedure for all products and publications should be developed. Thee steps would great. ty improve the accuracy and quality of the Intelligence product Analysis must also pay more atuntlon to distinguishing between what they know and do not know, to Identifying judgments based on ape- cif c evidence va those based op speculation, and to making proje_ Was about the future, Reorganizing the way U.S. it, . telligence service collect, analyse and disseminate the knowledge as. sential for national derision-making should be a high priority. In particular, a return to the concept of central intelligence Col- lection and analysis would help lm. prove the performance of both tasks. Such ceatraUaton, along with the separation of collectors from analysts, would break down agencyvected barriers to the bad- Casey moved decisively and rapidly to bring in his own team to reorganize the analytic part of the CiA along geographic tines, to paral- kl the organization of the opera. tiorti directorate, and to substantial- ly increase the National Foreign In. -elligence Program budget. According to a Jan. 16, 1$S3, New York Times Magazine report by Philip Taubman, the CIA Is the Cutest-growing major federal agen- cy. Its 25 percent budget increase in fiscal year 160 exceeded even the Pentagon budget's 1S percent growth that year. Although the Intelligence bud. get's also is clasUled. Taubman quotes congressional source IS peg- ging the cat of annual CIA opera. ,tons at more than $13 billion. in his exhaustive 1957 study, -fbe Puzzle Palace," James Dam ford reports that eallmats of the Z rsecret National Security ry s budget run "as high as Sit billion." ,Yet little improvement is ap- ptQgtt with respect to the accuracy et- the Into ligence community's lxoduct. Marge. of Intelligence failures have surfaced over estimates of the 5ovlet military buildup, the occurs. ' of arms-control monitoring, the treat against the U.S. Embassy and to Marine barracks in Beirut, the ability of the Lebanese army, the tsure and extent of the Cuban eaence in Grenada. and the likely nctxne of elections in El Salvador, well as that country's domestic ditlta in general. Another major congressional ad public concern has been the atlticiation of the position of the Yet the tempuUon is an into portent one to rslst, especially for the prsldent's cake. As the Israel? dent's principal adviser, only the CIA director can provide the ..cu6 ty council with assessments lode Pendent of policy prefereaat import en LOW** The tread today at the CIA and elaewbere In the Intelligence coal-- munity to to sailor the product to the needs and nuances poky de. bate. As one senior intelligence of. facer said in an interview, "Casey comes back here from the White House loo for reports to but. -tram his stand. He doe Dot ask to for a review of an in,* or a altue. ion. He wants material bt can use to persuade his colleagues, justify controeertiel policy, at expand the agency's involvement in covert ac lion." A case in point is Lebanon. Ca- sey repeatedly returned drafts of one National Intelligence E Umate for revision with the notation "try again.' Many analysis think Casey was dtaatisfled with the National Intel. llgena Estimate's conclusion that the government of Lebanese Prel? In addition, the Senate select: needed sharing of all Worms-tim committee has repeatedly 6x4-- Dressed "concern about whether' Thus the United Sutm should Casey would keep the emmittee establish a central collection ages "fully and currently Informed 01 411 .. cy. able to command and max his. Intelligence acou"Us .' .man and technical Intelligence eel. These anxieties proved lectors to use each most effectively well-founded when It was revealed 1 Also needed h a central agency by the New York Ttms that the CIA' . for research and analysis where, had launched i covett action b'-' sin, the boo talent can -be do. mine the harbor of Ni aragea to work on a problem In as without adequately biding tbe? itch depth se required now two nominates. go tic should replacto the CFA. Unfortunately. some of tone and other m urgent. problems art not new. Pollty.mak. .aborts krs constantly seek intelligence to C.TW raMC~yb s"4...r support their policies and frequent. ly encourage the CIA director U; ', EzrerpN hem the W4trerkave of For, provide It. And intelligence officlais ` a'e" Poky moO ?J "a snO1 E. C1ood have always tried to tell congrexlo. non served it ae,wcl ?:ar ahrHpesi? sal oversight committee as Uttle IS to aO"' in Ow Coeftv4 I n 4ofty apaxy emso. vat op rations. Co. dwb+ali~peeraGreOx msio ilo-49en,:a. Fit it auociate hest of Mw One fundamental problem isj School of fon.'pn Semis. el Georps- that the current reporting system izsm tic lt?sfy. (t Approved For Release 2011/03/08: CIA-RDP91-00587ROO0100590034-2