WHY I WAS FIRED FROM THE CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000500020003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2000
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 9, 1978
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

i 'ARTICLE
ON PAGl'
STATINTL ESQUIRE STATINTL
ved For Release 20VJ'fb3/b%T CIA-RDP91-00
BY WILLIAM COLBY
The meeting with President Ford lasted. about
fifteen minutes. And In those fifteen minutes my thirty-year
career in intelligence came to an abrupt end
he plane landed at
Washington's National Air-
port just after midnight, so it
was already Sunday,
November 2, 1975. I was re-
turning from Jacksonville, Florida, where
I had gone for a meeting with visiting
Egyptian president Anwar el-Sadat. But
Barbara Walters had gotten to him first
and had overstayed her time, so I never
did get to see him. Happy to be back in
Washington, I was looking forward to an
agreeable Sunday. My wife, Barbara, and
I would go to mass and then go to a picnic
or go for a bike ride along the canal. But it
was not to be.
The security officer with my car, wait-
ing outside Page Airways when I disem-
barked from the plane. handed me an ur-
gent message: I was to call John Marsh,
counselor to the President, no matter how
late :l arrived. There was a phone in the
limousine, but for security's sake I went
into the terminal and placed the call from.
a pay booth. Marsh was. asleep. I
apologized for waking him. o, that was
all right, he said. Could I be at the Oval
Office at eight this morning? Of course I
could.
Ordinarily, on being summoned to see
the President, I would ask what for, so I
could bone up on whatever topic was to
be the subject of discussion. But this time
I didn't. Marsh, obviously, was eager to
get back to sleep, and I was tired too,
anxious to get home and to bed myself.
And besides, I could make a pretty fair
guess as to what it was probably about.
The previous day, Saturday, the press
had broken a story revealing that the CIA
had been covertly funneling aid to Kurd-
ish rebels in Iraq. We had talked of these
dealt with me in a fairly formal manner.
He did not stand up now; we didn't shake
hands. I said, "Good morning. Mr. Pres-
ident. Jack said you wanted to
see me:' --
"Yes;' he replied, indicating that I
should take a seat in the straight armchair
in front of the desk. "We are going to do
some reorganizing of the national security
structure."
He need not have said another word.
From that sentence I realized im-
mediately why I had been summoned: I
was about to be fired as the director of
Central Intelligence.
Ford did not put it quite so bluntly. In
the time-honored political tradition of
dealing with sticky things of this sort, he
said he wanted me to take a new job, as
ambassador to NATO. He then sketched
the reorganization-which is to say, the
sweeping personnel changes-he had in
mind. It was what later was to be dubbed
the Halloween Massacre, and it included
the sacking of Jim Schlesinger as Secre-
tary of Defense and Nelson Rockefeller's
withdrawal as Ford's running mate on the
1976 GOP ticket. At the time. however;
Ford didn't mention to me what was in
store for Schlesinger; for the perfectly
good reason that he hadn't yet mentioned
it to him. But he did tell me that. under his
reorganizational scheme. Henry Kis-
singer would be giving up his post as na-
tional security assistant to the President
and moving over exclusively to the State
Department, and that Brent Scowcroft
would take over Kissinger's role as pres-
idential assistant. And he told me that
George Bush was coming back from
China to replace me as the new CIA chief.
He then made a bit of a sales pitch for
me to take the NATO post. He said that it
was the job Don Rumsfeld had. held be-
fore being appointed White House chief
of staff. Obviously he was anxious for me
to take it, if for no other reason than to
and Schuss r late in May. ti nshi . Ford, while always cordial, have his rather politically explosive series
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ONTIl jIEV
leaks at the usual meeting in the White
House basement all that morning. So it
was more than likely that the President
was assembling a group of aides to dis-
cuss how leaks of sensitive material like
this could be prevented. All the usual
people would be there, I figured: Scow-
croft; Buchen; someone from the Penta-
gon, possibly Schlesinger himself; Mike
Duval; probably Don Rumsfeld; besides
Marsh and myself.
But they weren't. Aside from the secret
service on duty at the. side door, the West
Wing of the White House at seven forty-
five that Sunday morning was deserted.
The anteroom to the Oval Office was
empty until Marsh came in a couple of
moments after I arrived. Apparently my
guess at what this was all about was
wrong. Still, I took a crack at it.
"Boy, that Kurdish story, that's some
fine mess, isn't it, Jack?" I said. Marsh
nodded absently. "I'd bet anything that it
came from the House committee," I went
on. Marsh shrugged and looked away,
clearly uninterested, in pursuing the sub-
ject. I made a few more desultory remarks
and then let it drop, puzzled. We stood
around in a rather awkward silence.
Promptly at eight, President Ford
showed up. He came from the White
House residence along the enclosed
porch, passed the Rose Garden, and went
directly into the Oval Office without see-
ing us. He was accompanied by two se-
cret service men. After a few moments,
one of them invited us in.
Ford was seated behind the huge,
handsome presidential desk, looking a bit
grim, and, as he was to fly to Florida to
meet with Sadat later in the morning, he
had a thick black briefing book on the
Middle. East situation in front of him. He
William Colby is a former director of the set it aside as soon as Marsh and I walked
CIA. This article is excerpted from the in. I had seen the President regularly in
book Honorable Men, by Mr. Colby with the past year, but ours could not in any
P -,,,r Forbad: to be published by Simon way be characterized as a personal rela-
 Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500020003-1
of personnel changes appear to take place
smoothly and uncontroversially. I would,
wouldn't I?
"I would like to think about it a bit, Mr.
President," I replied. "I would like to talk
it over with Barbara." I was sure he
would understand that, I said, as he often
consulted with his wife on matters that
affected them personally. But I said there
and then that I had some reservations. I
was concerned, for example, about the
negative political impact that the naming
of a former CIA director to. the NATO
position could have, the political demon-
strations that it could stir up in the coun-
tries of the alliance, and the disfavor with
which the governments of those countries
might consequently view the appoint-
ment.
Ford was quick to try and reassure me.
I needn't be concerned, he said, because
the appointment would be as the Pres-
ident's personal representative and thus
didn't need the approval of the NATO
countries.
"1 realize that,.Mr. President," I said,
but went onto say, "nevertheless, I really
need to think about it and talk to my wife
about it."
. All right," Ford said. "Let us know
your decision as soon as possible."
"Yes, sir, I will. I'll get in touch with
Jack later in the morning," I said. He said
the changes would be formally an-
nounced on Monday and asked me to
keep them to myself until then. I agreed.
There was nothing further to say. I
stood up. The meeting was over. It had
lasted about fifteen minutes. And in those
fifteen minutes my thirty-year career as
an intelligence officer had been abruptly
brought to an end.
I should have been shattered, but my
old discipline of thinking of the next step
ahead took over. I wanted to catch Bar-
bara, who would be leaving home in time
to make a nine o'clock mass across town.
We were going to have to figure out what
we should do about the NATO job offer.
Marsh, at my elbow as we left the Oval
Office, anxiously asked, "You are going
to take it, aren't you?" revealing just how
important it was that the "reorganiza-
tion" go without a hitch, that all the
players in it be happily in place before if
was officially announced to the press. But
I suspected even then that I wasn't going
to oblige (nor, I later discovered, was
Schlesinger; he turned down Ford's offer
to be chairman of the Export-Import
Bank on the spot, and rather angrily).
Apart from the negative reaction I fell
the appointment could inspire in Europe,
a couple of other things bothered me. I
doubted, for one thing, that I would be
able to do anything worthwhile in the job
with Kissinger as Secretary of State, what
with his well-known preference for con-
ducting foreign policy personally rather
than through ambassadors. And it could
be a very short-term assignment, what
tion campaign just a year away.
I didn't say any of this to Marsh just
then. When he left me, I found a phone in
the reception area and called Barbara. I
caught her ready to leave and asked her to
skip herplanned activities and wait for me,
as we had to discuss something impor-
tant. Then, as I hurried to the basement
entrance to the West Wing of the White
House, I ran into Schlesinger. He was
somewhat surprised. "What the devil are
you doing here at this hour?" he asked. It
was clear that he had no inkling as to what
was afoot, but I didn't think it was my
place to inform him, so I muttered that I
had talked of the Kurdish exposure and
hurried on my way.
By the time I got home, talked the situa-
tion over with Barbara, and called the
White House, Marsh had taken off with
the President for Florida to meet with
Sadat. The White House operator put me
through to Air Force One. "Jack, the an-
swer is no, with great respect and appre-
ciation," I said to Marsh when I got him
on the phone. "Okay," Marsh said. "I'll
tell the President. I'm sorry.".
That done, Barbara and I set about in-
forming our family.; No one was sur-
prised. And I suddenly realized, now that
I had my first moment to reflect on what
had happened, that I wasn't either. In-
deed, I had been expecting this, steeling
myself for it for nearly a year, the year in
which the CIA had come under the most
intensive public scrutiny in its history.
I believe I was fired because of the way
I went about dealing with the CIA's crisis.
My approach, pragmatically and philo-
sophically, was in conflict with that of the
President and his principal advisers.
From their point of view, I had not, during
the turbulent year, played the game as a
appeal to the national security about what
they couldn't.
Vice-President Nelson Rockefeller
went so far as to warn me not to tell too
many secrets to his commission inves-
tigating the CIA. And after I had become
a regular performer before the Senate
select committee, Kissinger, in a sarcas-
tic reference to my Catholicism, cracked,
"Bill, you know what you do when you go
up to the Hill? You go to confession:'
loyal member of the White House
"team."
My strategy had been to cooperate with
the investigations. To say the very least,
most of the White House staff and, for
that matter, much of the intelligence
community were not enthusiastic about
what I was doing. Their preferred ap-
proach, bluntly put, would have been to
stonewall, to disclose as little as they
could get away with, and to cry havoc and
The family Jewels
The White House wanted to protect the
"family jewels" -the name given a list of
questionable CIA deeds. My involvement I
began when I read a newspaper story on a
trip to Bangkok back in 1973. It was the
story that reported that during Daniel i
Eilsberg's trial for disclosing the Penta-
gon Papers it had been revealed that the
office of his psychiatrist, Di. Lewis J.
Fielding, had been broken into by How-
ard Hunt, using CIA equipment, in search
of material on Ellsberg which was then
turned over to the CIA'and from which
the CIA prepared a "psychiatric profile"'
on Ellsberg for the White House. This
was a shocker, and I couldn't understand
how I had never heard of it before. But
more disturbingly, I wondered how the
news had hit James Schlesinger, then the
director of Central Intelligence.
. I didn't have to wait long after my re-
turn home to find out Schlesinger's reac-
tion. Schlesinger said we would tear the
place apart and "fire everyone if neces-
sary," but we had to find out whether
there were any other such questionable or
illegal activities hidden in the recesses of
the clandestine past that we didn't know
about and that might explode at any time
tinder- our feet. And to do this,
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 5chlesiciger s d that he waptgd to u a the President announced Schlesinger's
directive to aAk tr"iypmsrrt4c,I @ aSel2RQ /(3 e Af &1-00904 RGODWO
On
m
Wh d 1
t
t
t
ployces ordering; them to come forward
with any matter they knew of where the
Agency had engaged in an activity outside
its proper charter. And with that direc-
tive, which he issued on May 9, the CIA
family jewels were born, leading inexora-
bly to a year of congressional investiga-
tions and a whole new status for Ameri-
can intelligence.
The directives and Schlesinger's force-
fulness had their effect. And the inspector
general's office compiled a list of "poten-
tial flap activities," which consisted of
693 pages of possible violations of, or at
least questionable activities in regard to,
the CIA's legislative charter. Presented
to the director so that he would know
about them, they were promptly dubbed
by a wag the family jewels. Among
them were the Chaos operation against
the antiwar movement, the surveillance
and bugging of American journalists in
the hope of locating the sources of leaks
of sensitive materials, and all the connec-
tions with the Watergate conspirators and
White House "plumbers." In addition,
the list mentioned the mail-intercept pro-
gram that the Agency's counterintelli-
gence staff, under James Angleton, had
been conducting; and some of the bizarre
and tragic cases where the Agency ex-
perimented with mind-control drugs, in-
cluding the case in which a CIA officer
was given, without his knowledge, LSD,
which caused a deep depression and
eventually his death. (The list in the drug
area, however, was far from comprehen-
sive, since the records had apparently
been destroyed in 1972.) And there were
also a host of instances where the Agency
had become involved in the activities of
other government agencies, such as the
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs and local police departments.
Moreover, the list noted the exchange of
information on Americans who were
deemed to be threats to the security of the
Agency. And, in a separate and even
more secret annex, the inspector general
summarized a. 1967 survey of the CIA's
involvement in assassination attempts or
plans against Castro, Lumumba, and
Trujillo.
Security Check
But just as this process was going
on-in fact, just when it had barely
started-my career took an astonishing
turn. Just as Schlesinger was issuing his
May 9 call for the family jewels, I re-
ceived a phone call from Alexander Haig;
who had taken over as White House chief
of staff for Nixon after Haldeman had
been driven out of the job by the Water-
gate scandal. "Is your secretary on the
line, Bill?" he asked. It was normal pro-
cedure around Washington to have one's
the interview he
requested . and
could trust his
responsibility.
please?" I was somewhat surprised, but
Haig and I were friends from my time in
Vietnam and I said, "Sure." After she
dropped off, Al told me the last thing in
the world that I had expected to hear.
Richard Kleindienst because of his in-
volvement in Watergate had been obliged
to resign as Attorney General. Elliot
Richardson, then Secretary of Defense,
had been nominated to replace him at the
Justice Department, and Jim Schlesinger
was to be nominated to replace
Richardson at Defense. "And the Pres-
ident wants you to take over as director of
the CIA, Bill," Haig concluded.
I was both stunned and delighted, and I
finally managed to blurt out to Haig that I
was honored and appreciative and would
do the best I could. "That's fine, Bill,"
Haig replied. "The President would like
you to come to the Cabinet meeting on the
tenth, where he intends to make the an-
nouncement of Schlesinger's and your
nominations."
In retrospect, I must admit there was
something rather disconcertingly casual
in the process of elevating me to the top
CIA job. At the Cabinet meeting the next
morning, after a number of other items of
business had been attended to and just
before my nomination was announced, I
noticed President Nixon lean over to
whisper something to Haig, and then Haig
scribbled a note, which he passed over to
me. It asked, "Did you have any connec-
tion with Watergate which would raise
problems?" I looked across the room at
Haig and shook my head no, but it seemed
to me a poor way of conducting a security
was mos
imme La
a
e y
Jr
mind after my appointment was an-
nounced was still, of course, the family
jewels. By May 21 the initial summary of
them was available from the inspector
general. Schlesinger and I agreed that I
should let our congressional oversight
committee chairmen in both the Senate
and the House know that we had assem-
bled them and that we were determined
that the CIA remain within its proper lim-
its in the future. In that way we felt these
chairmen could help prevent my confir-
mation hearings from going off into an
anti-CIA extravaganza. Consequently, I
visited the courtly Senator John C. Sten-
nis at Walter Reed hospital, and after a
brief oral summary, he agreed that I meet
with Senator Stuart Symington and give
him the rundown as well.
Similarly, I made an appointment with
Edward Hebert, the former Louisiana
newsman who had become chairman of
the House Armed Services Committee;
he in turn sent me to see Lucien Nedzi,
the Michigan liberal Democrat he had
selected to chair the intelligence sub-
committee of Hebert's committee in
order to break out of the tradition of con-
servative southern protection of the CIA.
Three of these men listened to my ac-
count of the family jewels without much
excitement and accepted my assurances
that I would see to it that the CIA con-
ducted its activities in full compliance
with its charter in the future. And there
was a consensus that these matters of the
past should be left in the past in order that
the Agency could continue to do its posi-
tive work in the present and future.
The telephone call was from Seymour
Hersh, the Pulitzer Prize-winning inves-
tigative reporter for The New York
Times. He rang me up to say excitedly
that he had "a story bigger than My Lai"
(which, of course, was the story for which
he had won his Pulitzer) concerning il-
legal CIA domestic activities. Now, al-
though Hersh and I could usually be
found on the opposite sides of any issue
involving the CIA, I had every reason to
respect his journalistic integrity. Earlier
that year, in February, I had learned that
he was inquiring about a rumored deep-
ocean CIA operation (later to be revealed
as the Glomar Explorer project). I had
gone to him then and had requested that
he not only not write whatever he knew
but that he not even speak of it to anyone.
And he obviously honored my request.
So now I felt that I both owed him the
interview he requested and could trust his
responsibility as an American as well as a
hard-driving newsman: I invited him to
come to my office at Langley to discuss
the matter. I also warned Brent Scow-
502b 3 nd Con-
yes. "Could A RIC I dt ro4fea ' IlV' AC-i OJ1r-'O M4 K0~6 00
CONTINUED
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gressman Nedzi that something was up.
Our meeting took place on Friday
morning. December 20. 1974. From what
Hersh told me-that he had learned from
several sources that the CIA had been
engaged in a "massive" operation against
the antiwar movement, involving
wiretaps. break-ins, mail intercepts, and
surveillance of American citizens-I
realized immediately that he had come
upon some disjointed and distorted ac-
counts of'several items on our highly se-
cret family jewels list. I didn't have any
trouble imagining just who or what they
might be. After all. there were enough
former CIA officers around, especially
among the thousands fired or retired dur-
ing the Schlesinger purge of the Agency.
who had been privy to one or another of
the family jewels. With the unease preva-
lent in the Agency about Operation
Chaos, a journalist of Hersh's skill would
not have found it difficult to get a lead on
the CIA's activities concerning the anti-
war movement and quickly build from
there admissions about individual
wiretaps and other domestic surveillance
used by the Agency.
The important point. I emphasized.
was that the Agency had conducted its
own review of such activities in 1973 and
had issued a series of clear directives
making plain that the Agency henceforth
must and would stay within the law. "So
you see. Sy, you would be wrong if you
went ahead with your story in the way
youve laid it out. There certainly
was never anything like a 'massive illegal
domestic intelligence operation.' What
few mistakes we made in the past have
long before this been corrected. And
there is certainly nothing like that going
on now.
But. as subsequent events demon-
strated. Hersh didn't see it my way at all.
Indeed, the main thing he took away from
our meeting that Friday was the sense
that I had confirmed the reports he had
heard. And so there it was on Sunday,
December 22, splashed across four col-
umns of The New York Times's front
page: HUGE C.I.A. OPER;TION REPORTED IN
U.S. AGAINST ANTI-WAR FORCES, OTHER
DISSIDENTS IN NIXONYEARS. And that was
followed by the shocking lead paragraph:
The Central Intelligence Agency,
directly violating its charter, conducted a
massive illegal domestic intelligence op-
eration during the Nixon Administration
against the anti-war movement and other
dissident groups in the United States, ac-
cording to well-placed Government
sources:'
A press and political fire storm im-
mediately erupted.
I have to admit that I didn't im-
mediately foresee these traumatic conse-
quences. After all, the CIA had been
emblazoned unfavorably in newspaper
Kissinger had never
seen the "family
jewels".-a list of
questionable CIA
activities.
those storms. It seemed to me that we
could do so again-if we handled the
present crisis in a calm and sensible way.
And in my view, the calm and sensible
way in this case was to counter the distor-
tions and exaggerations of Hersh's article
by publicly telling the true story of Opera-
tion Chaos and the rest, conceding the
Agency's few misdeeds in the past, ex-
plaining how they had come about, em-
phasizing that they were few and far be-
tween and of a relatively minimal nature,
and, above all, stressing that they had
been terminated by the Agency itself and
reported to Congress in 1973 and that noth-
ing of the sort was going on now nor
would anything like it take place in the
future. More than anything else, it was
the CIA's experience in Watergate that
led me to this strategy.
But when I contacted the White House
that Sunday, I found that there was a
great deal of concern over there on how to
respond to the Times article, which
made much more serious charges than I
had expected it would when I first dis-
cussed Hersh's call and Friday's inter-
view with Scowcroft. One of the Pres-
ident's aides suggested that I phone the
President to give him a basis for some
comment on the story. He was at the mo-
ment en route to Vail, Colorado, for his
Christmas vacation, so the White House
operator put me on an open circuit to Air
Force One, readable by any listening
foreign intelligence intercept operators
and, so, hardly conducive to a detailed
sure you that nothing comparable to the
article`s allegations is going ot,"in tiT'
Agency at this time." I then went on to
tell him that Hersh had mixed a few dis-
connected aspects of the CIA's past but
that any such actions had been fully ter-
urinated. I concluded by offering to pre-
pare a memorandum, detailing in writing
what I had sketched out for him orally and
documenting the truth of my assurance
that all misdeeds of the past had been
corrected in 1973.
Ford thanked me for the call and asked
for the report as soon as possible. Then.
on arriving in Vail, besieged by the press
corps clamoring for a reaction to the
Hersh article, Ford issued a statement
that, in effect, repeated the assurances I
had given him over the phone---namely,
that the CIA was not engaged in domestic
spying or any other illegal activity at the
present time-and said that lie was ask-
ing Kissinger, as his national security as-
sistant, to obtain a report from me on the
subject.
Meanwhile, back at Langley, ) get
about drawing up my report to the Presi-
dent: "In response to your request foi my
comments on The New York Times arti-
cle of December 22 alleging CIA in-
volvement in a massive' domestic intelli-
gence effort ..." It took only two days
to prepare, summarizing the relevant
items on the 1973 jewels list, and I at-
tached a hefty appendix of the Agency
directives that. ordered a halt to such ac-
tions. When it was done, I topped it off
with a covering note that pointed out that
I had prepared the report in unclassified
form (omitting any reference to individu-
als or intelligence sources and methods)
and that it was suitable, therefore, for the
President to release forthwith to the press
in order to counter the grossly exagger-
ated impression of the matter given in
Hersh's article. But I did not make an
issue of the possible release-, as I diet not
believe in "crowding" apresidential boss.
In the middle of preparing this sum-
mary, I received a call from Jim
Schlesinger, and I went over to the De-
fense Department to show him how I was
going about handling the crisis.
Schlesinger, of course, was more aware
of what was going on than most. lie knew
all about Operation Chaos and the Agen-
cy's other questionable domestic activ-
ities on the family jewels list, since he
himself had ordered it compiled in the
first place. But what he also realized-
and what I had totally overlooked- was
the fact that neither President Nixon, nor
Ford, nor Kissinger, had ever been ap-
prised of the family jewels list.
Now it is important to recall here that
the family jewels consisted of nearly 700
individual items, of which the domestic
activities covered in the New York Times
story represented only a part, although
count
ed the
ing headlearsines, m o s t l e r ' e ~i4Y aN ft~e19` left.t'1't~ Pt4t;~t~?'aacq id,~"8t~i`t t 'abrg1- Y s t 029041 gains[
Chile operations, and had weathered in The Times this morning, I want to as- Castro, for example, which had not
 leaked to Herstl4ppromedl sQn Relea&s 2=1nzin~ ? r1 _~n: 1-(M ~i~ Q~ OyQQ b~ 1n en
said. at the time the list was originally
drawn up"--after my appointment as
director of Central intelligence but before
my confirmation heari ngs- Schlesinger
and I had agreed that I take it around to
the congressional committee chairmen
and fully brief them on it, assassinations
and all. But we had not done the same for
Nixon or Kissinger. which is something I
cannot explain to this day.
Shall We Tell the President?
That Tuesday evening when I went
over to Kissinger's office at the State De-
partment to give him my memo to take to
the President in Vail. I also brought with
me the complete family jewels list.
Kissinger went through it hurriedly.
But when he came to the part about the
assassinations he'slowed down. "Well,
Bill." he said, looking up. "when Hersh's
story first came out I thought you should
have flatly denied it as totally wrong, but
now I see why you couldn't." He then
took my report to the President in Vail,
where Ford and his staff discussed the
next step, and Kissinger filled him in oral-
ly on the rest of the jewels. And I hoped
Kissinger's greater knowledge would
now change his criticism of my strategy,
criticism that had been sufficiently stri-
dentin Washington circles to cause an old
friend to warn me that Kissinger was no
friend of mine, that he had been making
caustic comments about me in the past
two days.
Barbara and the children had left for
some Christmas skiing in Pennsylvania
and the plan had been for me to join them
as soon as possible. But the way things
stood. I felt that there was no way I could
leave Washington. Obviously Ford and
Kissinger would spend the next day or so
discussing my memo and the family
jewels, and I thought it likely that I would
be asked to join them in Vail. But even if I
wasn't, I figured that I had best be at my
CIA post during this period, because I
hoped the President would release my
memo to him clarifying and countering
the distortions and exaggerations in
Hersh's article, and I wanted to be on the
scene to handle the deluge of press in-
quiries that that would surely cause. So I
settled down to a bachelor's Christmas
week in Washington. waiting to hear from
Vail. I waited in vain.
Inside the intelligence community ten-
sions grew. One retired professional
asked me sharply whether I was going to
try to save the Agency. "Yes," I replied,
"but I won't lie and I won't do anything
illegal." "Does that mean I would?" he
hotly challenged. In the weeks ahead I
would have to repeat the exercise many
times, answering some officers who
asked in fury how a nation that had as-
Vice-President
Rockefeller even
warned me not to tell
too many secrets to
his commission.
wanted me to square the ugly revelations
of CIA past behavior with their plea,
"What am I going to tell my children?"
Yet during all this uproar I hardly heard
a word from Vail. Nor was my memo to
the President released, as I had recom-
mended. Ford. Kissinger, and a number
of top White House aides had gathered in
the Colorado ski resort, and the press re-
ported daily their discussions on the bur-
geoning CIA crisis and their strategy on
how to handle it. But I was not included. I
decided that if I would have to fight the
problem alone, I at least would be free to
use my strategy to save intelligence and
not have to defer to every tactical move
concocted in the White House,
On January 3, 1975, a day before my
fifty-fifth birthday, Ford returned from
Vail, and that evening he summoned me
to a meeting at the Oval Office. Kissinger,
Don Rumsfeld, Phil Buchen, and one or
two others of the President's closest ad-
visers were there. We quickly went over
my "Vail Report" on the New York
Times stories. I had brought a summary of
the family jewels, and we went through
them, including the assassination plots. in
some detail. The fact that these activities
had been terminated before Ford took of-
fice gave little solace in view of the politi-
cal difficulties they would nonetheless
surely raise for him.
I was then told that Ford was consider-
ing appointing a "blue ribbon" commis-
sion to conduct an investigation of the
CIA's domestic activities to answer
The New York Times's charges and,
hopefully, to still the outcry and thus pre-
vent a full investigation of intelligence
from getting started.
The Rockefeller commission stayed in
existence until June, its original three-
month mandate extended by two months
once its investigations were under way.
Its charter had been carefully drawn to
authorize it to look into only the CIA's
alleged improprieties in the domestic
field-Operation Chaos, the mail-inter-
cept program, and so on-and to stay
away from the other family jewels. My
testimony came down to little more than
reiterating and reviewing (and sometimes
updating with later revealed details) the
memorandum I had prepared for the Pres-
ident when he was in Vail. Of all the
members of the commission, only Erwin
Griswold, the former Solicitor General,
cy's improprieties, and from time to time
he would climb on me fairly hard. But
even in his case I had no ttauble in giving
him the full answers he sarazht. Indeed, if
anything, as it turned out I discovered
that I was being somewhat too open and
candid for some people's tastes. After my
second or third appearance.the cominis-
sion's chairman. Vice-President Rock-
efeller, drew me aside into his office at
the Old Executive Office Building and
said in his most charming manner, "Bill,
do you really have to present all this ma-
terial to us? We realize th tthere are se-
crets that you fellows need to keep and so
nobody here is going to takeitamiss if you
feel that there. are some questions you
can't answer quite as fullyaisyou seem to
feel you have to:' I got the atessage quite
unmistakably.
Congressional InveW
The first move by Congress occurred
on January 15, two days after my first
appearance before the Rodfeller com-
mission, when the inteltivnee subcom-
mittees of the Senate's Awed Services
and Appropriations committers called me
to testify at a joint sessiaw under the
cochairmanship of Senators Stennis and
McClellan. Now here, I ma say, I was
facing a reasonably friendlypanel.
So, here again, my tesfmony essen-
tially amounted to repeatianmy Vail re-
port. But there was one cmcial differ-
ence. These senators perceived the inten-
sity of the public clamor aid the strong
views of their fellow senatooes, and they
knew that a public answer wasneeded. So
they requested that my tesfmony be re-
leased, and since I had tesd&d in terms
that in my mind were not gdassified, I
consented. But on my wayn from the
Hill that afternoon, I reap that I had
not told the White House whetwas com-
ing out in the press the nea3 day, so I
stopped there to give Brent!cowcroft a
copy of the statement the Sate commit-
tees had released, the substance of the
statement being well-known at the White
House but the fact of its p blic release
being a new bombshell.
My testimony was reputed in the
media the following day, Jagq ary 16, and
the effect was enormous. TkrNew York
Times devoted two full pagestto the text of
my statement. And 1 have readmit that it
did not, as I had hoped, begiato quiet the
storm whirling around the Agency. The
years of total secrecy had nmde the CIA
extremely vulnerable to sWicion and
sensation. Public ignorance, of modern in-
telligence, the false popuiarpicture of it
gleaned from spy novels, and the twisted
romanticism of people like Howard Hunt
and Gordon Liddy provided. a poor
framework in which to unrstand my
signed them difficult and dangerous work was anything that could be called aggres- disclosures.
in the past could g~ f ReI (Si; 10 3 ?f CFAI JFb91-0t~0l`~ 19?3 ED2E# 3~ elect
ing them for doing'it today rid others sense tl-iat be felt cha I' was tenng to committee to study govemmentat up-
1TINiJED
 erations with p[pMgi9eltigc9@Jea 200 /fl~in~ ~1, _RnpA~ 099918 1PP,NAs2AQ4 O,ittees.
tivities. It took as its precedent the Senate With this splendid example oft he effec-
select committee that had investigated Senators were eager tiveness of its "investigation" and with
the Watergate scandal and set as its task its competitive instincts fully aroused, the
an inquiry into all CIA activities-not to play with the dart Church committee decided to hold its first
just the matters raised in Hersh's open hearing. So on September 16, 1
gun ? the impact on 7['V
article-past, present, and future. Its found myself describing, with some won-
chairman was Frank Church of Idaho. was of a wild cloak- derment, the story about the poisons and
dart gun before the TV cameras.
Presidential Leak and-dagger world. None of what I said mattered very
much. With the lights glaring and the
Ironically, the White House, which had compounded the President's mistake in cameras turning, and with every st'nator
been the most concerned that something this instance. My first answer left open eager to play with the dart gun and get his
like this should not happen and had in- the implication that CIA assassinations picture taken holding it, the overall im-
vented the Rockefeller commission to had actually taken place abroad. And on pact was of the wildest hugger-mugger of
prevent it from happening, was responsi- the following evening. February 28, the cloak-arid-dagger world. And the only
ble fora devastating turn of events. In late Schorr broadcast on CBS that "President consolation I had-and this I credit to
January, not long after the formation of Ford has reportedly warned associates lawyer Mitch Rogovin's careful fore- I
the Rockefeller commission, President that if current investigations go too far sight---was that I. as the director of the
Ford hosted a luncheon at the White they could uncover several assassina- CIA, wasn't photographed holding the
House for the publisher and top editors of tions of foreign officials involving the weapon, because Rogovin grabbed it and
The New York Times. It was strictly off CIA." passed it to the senators instead of letting
the record, and during its course, accord- There was no stopping the press or a staff member plop it on the table in front
ing to a later report, one of the Times Congress now. of me.
editors criticized the composition of the To a large degree, the circus that the.
Rockefeller commission, saying it didn't Cover-up Church committee and the media made
seem to be the sort of group that would do ---- out of the poisons and dart gun was the
the hard-nosed investigation that the pub- There were still some pretty sharp dif- last straw for the White House. From the
lic expected. Ford is reported to have re- ferences of opinion as to the degree to outset I had been aware, of courst-, that
plied that he had chosen the membership which requests by the congressional many in the administration did not ap-
with extreme care, because he had committees should be met. Kissinger, prove of my cooperative approach to the
learned from me (obviously referring to Schlesinger, and Scowcroft, for example, investigations, and I had felt myself in-
my briefing him on the family jewels) that were hard-liners, repeatedly arguing for a creasingly isolated from the White) louse
there were CIA activities that the mem- tough attitude and questioning anything "team" as the year progressed. The im-
bers might come across in their investiga- more forthcoming. I argued again and pact of the toxin spectacular, and espe-
tion that were a lot more sensitive than again that it was in our interest to respond cially the fact that I had delivered the. dart
those Hersh had reported on and that, in to the investigation in a responsible man- gun when Congress had demanded it,
the nation's best interest, he felt had to ner and endeavor to develop an under- blew the roof off. From that day for ward,
remain secret. "Like what?" hard- standing of intelligence, rather than an gossip and rumor spread like wildfire
driving managing editor Abe Rosenthal is adversary relationship, on the part of the throughout Washington that my days
said to have asked. "Like assassination," committees. It was when I had finished were numbered.
the President is said to have responded, making this argument one time that Kis
"off the record." singer made his crack about my going to fired
This juicy tidbit of information, in the "confession" when I went up to the Hill
atmosphere of those times when virtually to testify. On Saturday, November 1, 1 went out
all the media's efforts were concentrated As part of my continuing determination to National Airport to catch a plane for
on ferreting out any CIA activity, was that any illegal or questionable activity of Jacksonville, Florida, where I was
almost impossible to. keep from leaking. the Agency, past or present, be exposed scheduled to meet with Egyptian presi-
And, finally, leak it did-to Daniel and halted---in short, that the family dent Anwar el-Sadat to discuss intelligence
Schorr of CBS, who, in the middle of a jewels list be completely comprehensive matters in the Middle East. The meeting,
background interview with me on Feb- and up-to-date, even since its initial com- as I noted earlier. never took place be-
ruary 27, said that. the President had told pilation in 1973--I had issued a standing cause Barbara Walters had completely
The New York Times that he was con- order that all CIA officers be on a con- captured the Egyptian president's atten-
cerned about CIA assassinations and then stant lookout for any such activities and tion. And when I returned to Washington
asked me whether the CIA had ever killed report them to me. Thus, in the spring of that night, I was greeted by a message
anybody in this country. I was so stunned 1975, Carl Duckett, the deputy director from John Marsh asking me to be in the
at what motive the President might have for science and technology, informed me Oval Office at eight the following (Sun-
had in opening up this topic that I re- that he had discovered several bottles of day) morning. It was there and then that the
treated to a longtime practice-only an- lethal substances-eleven grams of President asked for my resignation as
swering the specific question asked. shellfish toxin and eight milligrams of director of Central Intelligence.
"Not in this country," I replied to cobra venom-along with some associ- After Barbara and I had alerted our
Schorr. To his follow-up questions, I lim- aced equipment with which they could be family so they wouldn't be shocked at the
ited my remarks simply to pointing out administered, including a dart gun and news, we went over to visit the Schlesin-
that assassinations had been formally other devices, which had been squirreled gers that Sunday evening to hold a bit ofa
barred in the jewels exercise in 19711 did away in a little-used vaulted storeroom in joint wake, since the news was now out
this partly because I didn't know how far his directorate. Now, the possession of that Jim had also been fired as Secretary
the President had gone and partly because these materials was unquestionably im- of Defense. He was surprised, and a bit
I had long decided that denying that the proper. In 1970, fulfilling a treaty com- pleased, that I had 'also turned down the
CIA had ever assassinated anyone (which mitment, President Nixon had ordered consolation-prize job Ford had offered,
is true) immediately evoked the question that all such materials be destroyed. We and then he smiled at me and said. "It
of whether it hy(p*? ,F a iCiager2(DO$/O 6 tl' (B4A!'4Ft 94-010@O1i1M O2 41)rrth of
it had, against Castro). But in my unease I and, with its approval, to the appropriate us." I1f
 lRTICLP'
C?1`d-AGE.
STATINTL
WORLDVIEW
JANUARY1FEBRUABY 1978
For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP91-0090
The former head of t 1eT' CIA sets forth a very
specific plan for interdependence between
rich and poor
STATINTL
Food Stamps
for International Neighbors
William E. Colby
A new international economic order, stra-
tegic arms limitations, the interminable
problems of the Middle East-these and many other
foreign problems swirl around the average American
citizen in a dazzle of complexity. The language of
concern in which these and other issues are debated falls
on ears that heard the equally serious and sincere
language leading to the massive and mistaken involve-
ment in Vietnam. And serious academics publish revi-
sionist histories that contend that the cold war that
mobilized the nation's energies for two decades came
more from American aggressiveness than from foreign
threat. A new generation of Americans turns its main
attention away from such faraway, difficult, and am-
biguous problems to ones closer to home, such as
energy, the environment, and the economy.
But close to home lies an easily understood danger to
the United States. It invites the engagement of the best
minds and the good will of our citizens. It might open
new avenues for the solution of some of the larger and
more distant problems of the future world. The danger is
not one. of immediate catastrophe, but its advent is
predictable and certain and calls for rapid preventive
action to avert enormous human and economic loss.
Simple mathematics displays the problem. The popu-
lation of Mexico today is slightly over 60 million and is
growing at some 3.5 per cent per year. Projection of the
Mexican population by the end of the century, less than
twenty-five years away, is about 120 million, with no
opportunity for population control measures to reduce
this by any significant degree. At present the number of
Mexicans illegally in the United States in search of the
jobs they cannot find at home is estimated at between 5
and 8 million. Among the additional 60 million Mexi-
cans who will be present by the year 2000 it is obvious
that a substantial proportion will make their way to the
United States. Our border and immigration services will
be helpless before this flood, dwarfing the flow that
already overwhelms them; the resulting social tensions
between the Spanish and English-speaking communities
will produce violence, misery, and turmoil. Mexico's
recently found oil may alleviate that government's bal-
ance of payments and budgetary problems, but it cer-
tainly cannot provide the basis for jobs and industry to
absorb its multiplying population in the few years avail-
able. Both within Mexico and between Mexicans and
North Americans the affluence of the favored will come
under increasing pressure from the misery and bitterness
of the poor who strike at the steadily widening gap
between them.
On a smaller scale there are equally predictable
problems with respect to the rest of Central America and
the islands of the Caribbean. The 19 million in the former
and the 17 million in the latter (including Cuba but
excluding Puerto Rico) face similar prospects of excess
population, limited economic opportunity, and illegal
migration to the rumored El Dorado of the north,
exacerbated in many situations by the presence in their
midst of dreamlike palaces for the holidays of the
favored northerners. A more explosive mixture would be
difficult to concoct, and the steady increase in pressure
inside the regional chamber will make more certain the
detonation when a spark ignites it.
S onto idea of the social costs of allowing this
process to run its course can be derived
from the analogous, if not completely comparable,
relationship between North and South within the United
States after 1920. Then, too, millions of poverty-level
black Southerners sought better lives in Northern cities
than the rural South could offer, crowding the ghettos of
New York, Detroit, and Chicago. The South sought
capital for development of its "sunbelt" by offering low
wages, minimum restrictions on new industry, and
financial incentives to factories to shut their doors in
New England and move, producing unemployment and
depression in sections of the North. The social, cultural,
between the new
arrivals and the
and racial chasms
j~ jJ~ North
~j ~
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Rt d more
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 Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500020003-1
routinely, flight to the suburbs, thus producing the
disaster of our central cities today.
The larger and more ominous process is already at
work. Puerto Ricans have been supplemented by many
others from the Caribbean to produce Spanish-speaking
subworlds in sections of New York; waves of "wet-
hacks- spread through Texas and the Southwest, and
Miami's Cuban colony is only different because. in great
part, it consisted of upper-class political emigres rather
than the barely educated rural poor. Much of this new
generation of -huddled masses" making their way to the
United States faces the extra hurdle to assimilation of
race, which we have not yet overcome even for our own
citizens.
The significance of this analogy is the degree to which
the social costs of the process were borne by the North in
the United States, not merely by those involved in the
migration. The lesson for today is that the costs of a
similar process with respect to Central America and the
Caribbean will bear heavily upon the U.S. In addition to
the social injury it would do to our society internally this
prospect has a great potential for outside harm. The
effect of aroused Caribbeans and Central Americans
anion,-, their ideological fellows of the Third World could
create frustrations leading to violence and terror, with
nuclear proliferation a nightmare prospect all too possi-
ble. Humanitarian concern about the Yrim prospects
facing our southern neighbors thus combines with simple
self-interest to compel a better solution than we in the
United States found for our internal migration. This
differentiates the problem from the more general one of
our relations with Latin America as a whole, as the
nations farther south do not face the kind of future our
close neighbors do.
The first step in meeting this situation is to get public
acceptance of the fact that it is indeed our problem; it is
not another call for charity. Interdependence with the
Third World as a whole is difficult for the normal citizen
to grasp, but the certain overpopulation and further
deterioration of our cities can be understood as some-
thing tangible. It is not difficult to perceive that it is a
joint problem facing our near neighbors and ourselves,
calling for joint solutions within our community. Coop-
eration will not be easy for either side. It is not easy for
the United States to seek help from these smaller nations
to meet its problem, nor for these nations to overcome
their emotional resistance to working with the Yankee
colossus in these days of Third World assertiveness.
But a structure can be developed for meeting the
problem on a common basis. Both we and they have an
incentive to do so, and collaboration as equals can
produce the mutual respect necessary tor a long-term
relationship as fellow members of an American commu-
nity. Political independence and sovereignty must be
recognized along with economic and social interdepen-
dence. The progress of the European Community, which
followed a strategy of working on the practical levels of
economic interdependence while leaving political ma-
chinery essentially unchallenged, provides confidence
that a similar approach is possible. Admittedly, the
imbalances around the Caribbean basin are of a different
order of magnitude than those of Europe,
rThe first element of such a strategy must
1 focus on the principal factor involved, the
present and probable future poverty of large numbers of
the population in the southern region. That produces the
pressures that push them north in search of jobs or simple
escape, that continues the high birthrates, and that
exacerbates envy and bitterness over the affluence of the
Yanquis. This poverty requires a frontal approach, not
merely the longer term hope of elimination through
development. The United States has a tool for the
purpose: the food stamp program that benefits almost 20
million of its own citizens. America's incredibly produc-
tive agriculture could easily supply food for the poor to
our south, rather than reverting to the unacceptable
policy of withholding production in the U.S. because of
an apparent market glut while people who cannot gener-
ate at market demand in monetary terms go hungry. The
food stamp machinery would provide a number of
benefits over other techniques of providing aid.
The key feature of the food stamp is that it would be
placed in the hands of the individual poor citizen, who
would not only receive its benefits but would clearly
recognize its origins. He would use the stamp' in the
normal market, where it would amount to an income
supplement for his food needs. The market machinery
would handle the logistics by using food stamps to pay
for the import of U.S.-produced food, and the banking
system could process this special form of "currency."
Distribution of the sumps would be through several
channels: voluntary and charitable organizations, na-
scent enterprises selected for incentive encouragement
(for example, agricultural development projects) for
partial payment of wage costs, and through government
machinery. Accounting controls and a joint inspection
service would be necessary to prevent abuse and partial-
ity but the visibility of the program and the stamps
themselves at the market would generate public protest
against substantial misuse. In addition, the impact of
possible termination would induce public pressure to
keep the program working fairly.
The use of stamps would provide another benefit, as
the supply of stamps could be related to the prices of
local agricultural products. The supply could be in-
creased when these prices rose as a result of shortages
and reduced when they fell, reflecting greater local
production. This would avoid the danger of disincentives
to local agricultural development and tendencies toward
permanent dependency. 'T'hese flexibilities show the
food stamp's superiority to the PL 480 Food for Peace
techniques. Under PL 480, shipment of the actual prod-
ucts is either for sale io the individual (and credit of the
proceeds to government projects [Title IJ) or distribution
rn kind, primarily through voluntary organizations (Title
11). In both cases the American source of the assistance
tends to be obscured by the intermediaries rather than
brought home to the individual recipient.
The second major element of a new strategy
would be to open United States borders to
free entry of citizens of participating neighboring coun-
tries for job openings that had been registered with
official employment services. Such jobs would have
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~Q NtJED
 beygppf vL-fdrFdrfRoleasts$0fl4tG,3$0&,--itttA-RfDO914O'OSO1 OO, 0 G$0i0O3a1surances with
priority to the agricultural sector. This would not likely respect to the payment of minimum wages. and adher-
generate a large flow, but it would produce some once to local regulations. There must also be negotiated
immigration and, to that degree, reduce the pressure of levels of reinvestment of profits within the country.
illegal immigration. It would also improve the control relative to the amounts repatriated to the foreign inves-
and care of migrant workers. Any individual entering tors. These arrangements should also require adherence
into such arrangement should be made eligible for to the OECD guidelines for international investment and
welfare in the U.S. for a period after such employment multinational enterprises. This combination of incentive
ceased if he could not locate another job. He would also and control could increase the speed of development,
receive food stamp assistance upon returning to his provide employment for many in the coming genera-
country of origin for a period of time reflecting his time tions, and preserve the dignity and independence of these
in the U.S. Social Security benefits proportional to his societies.
service (in a separate fund for this purpose) could be The fourth and final element of the strategy must
made payable in his country of origin. The purpose of consider the interests of established industries and work-
these provisions is to encourage legal residence in the ers in the United States. We need to avoid a repeat of
United States over illegal residence and also to encour- New England's crisis when its textile and other factories
age return to the country of origin. If it operates to fled to the cheap labor of the South. Countervailing tariff
increase official immigration, it would in fact replace duties could be imposed on directly competing products
only that degree of illegal immigration. Such official of fugitive producers whose new labor costs undercut
entry would also help ensure that minimum wage and those of the U.S. But to carry out the overall strategy
y
other protections for the immigrant are respected by his such duties should have a time-graduated scale, stepping
employers. Employers would no longer be able to plead downward over a period of a few years, and they should
the need to circumvent the employment machinery by be integrated with a program of adjustment assistance for
hiring illegal immigrants; the official employment ma- workers affected by the cheaper imports. They can be
chinery would be adequate to their needs. trained and assisted to relocate in other work of higher
The third element of the strategy is the familiar one of productivity more characteristic of the potential of
encouraging and aiding economic development in the United States workers. This would provide both the
countries of Central America and the Caribbean. The incentive for development investment and the necessary
need is to increase employment opportunities for poten- cushion for U.S. interests.
tial migrants in their home countries. In the U.S. scale Some idea of a price tag for such a total strategy can be
of priorities this area of the world should lead the list gained by projecting from somewhat similar existing
when it comes to foreign aid appropriations. In addition programs. To service the 19 million people who have
to official aid to and through governments and interna- benefited from food stamps-about 8 per cent of our
tional agencies, development assistance should be in- population-the annual cost to the federal budget in
creased from private investment. On the world scale 1976 was some S5.6 billion, or about $310.00 per
private investment now exceeds the flow of official recipient (individual and family). A direct application of
assistance to developing countries from member nations this experience to our southern neighbor nations presents
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and the following picture: y
Development (OECD). While touch of this goes to the
better-off Third World rather than to the poverty-
stricken Fourth World nations, several in the Caribbean
area-such as Mexico and Panama-already benefit
from a substantial amount of it. As part of an overall
strategy, `bilateral arrangements might be made with a
number of our southern neighbors, not only to offer
investment incentives to private capital, but also for the
United States to extend its present tax incentives for
U.S. cost
Population 8 percent per person
U.S. cost
Mexico
62,000.000
5,000,000
$310
51,550,000,000
Central
America
19,000,000
1,520,000
$310
S 471.000,000
Caribbean
17.000,000
1,360.000
$310
$ 421.000,000
Western Hemisphere trading corporations to invest in Of course the U.S. cost experience would not be
development projects in participating neighboring na- repeated exactly. The percentage of the population
tions. In particular these incentives should apply to needing assistance would be greater in several nations.
investment in labor-intensive agricultural development At the same time, several nations would likely reject the
programs and in mineral extraction and light industry for program initially; for example, Cuba with its 9.3 million
local consumption, ratherthan in capital-intensive heavy population would subtract almost 750,000 from the total
industry for export and competition with established of participants listed above. Since the program would
U.S. concerns. have to be negotiated with each nation concerned, the
O f course such investment arrangements
must meet the expectatiogs of other gov-
ernments that a new era has dawned, that the old days of
Yankee economic imperialism are past. Thus entry for
such private investment must be accompanied by re-
straints on its operations, such as limits on the degree of
percentage of participants could be controlled at all
times, increasing only after experience showed its value
for the costs involved. A reasonable initial target, then,
might be 15 per cent of the population of participating
nations.
The cost per person of $310.00 in the analysis above
would be far above the figure that would be needed in a
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 111Jf l
71
r '~
r'nt__._,
y~
~
}
!~}
F
'-O
This strategy is complex and subject to attack
as too sweeping. It would have to survive
the many hurdles posed by diplomatic negotiations and
domestic legislation. Butt the administrative togls exist
to implement it, from the Agency for International
Development to the United States Employment Service.
Variants in the design could emerge from congressional
debate and negotiations and could be incorporated within
its overall strategic concepts. Clearly governments of
partner nations would have the option to join or reject the
scheme; but the experience of the Puerto Rican people,
who have benefited from a somewhat similar relation-
ship in the field of welfare assistance and capital invita-
tion, suggests that it would possess substantial political
appeal. Puerto Rico's experience has not been perfect, of
course, but the contrast between Puerto Rico's average
hourly wage in manufacturing ($2.59) and the Domini-
can Republic's (70 cents) would be a high price for a
reluctant government to explain to its voters.
The charge might be made that this strategy represents
a new form of Yankee imperialism that limits the
sovereignty and independence of the smaller nations to
our south. Joint, bilateral management of the effort with
each nation involved would demonstrate that this need
not be the case. Indeed, for other nations this would be a
less humiliating way of solving a joint problem than
condoning a continued flow of cheap and exploited labor
to the United States. There must also be assurance that
the U.S. cannot abruptly and unilaterally terminate its.
part in the program. The smaller governments must not
be under the threat of either complying with U.S. wishes
on unrelated issues or else facing a, hungry popular
outcry. .
With such provisions for respect of their sovereignty,
an invitation to participate in the economy and welfare
system of the United States need in no way require these
nations to surrender their independence in the political
field. The obvious objective of the scheme is to forestal I
the growth of frustration and hostility and replace them
with an attitude of cooperation to overcome our interde-
pendent difficulties. Food stamps would bring this point
home to each recipient ,and voter to our south; such solid
evidence of United Slates concern for their personal
welfare would contrast with whatever hostile demagogy
}' a,r~e m ht be asserted by opponents.
that experier_,0bhVeCl TOrr elease 2001/03/06 : 6IA-RDP91-00901 R000500020003-1
WILLIAM E. COLBY, a Washington attorney with the firm of
Colby, Miller & Hanes, is former director of the Central
neighbor's program. The U.S. food stamp buys food on
the American grocery store shelf, with its processing and
packaging expenses included. A foreign program could
be limited to such basic foods as flour, rice, beans, and
so forth. Actually, that is the way the poorer markets to
the south operate anyway, with the family doing the
cooking and seasoning. This reduces the annual cost per
recipient by at least two-thirds; a $100.00 cost per
recipient would undoubtedly prove more than adequate.
Thus a substantial food stamp program among these
nations could readily be carried out within the following
maximum annual appropriations:
--~- -- -- U.S, cost
Population 15 per cent per person U.S: cost
Mexico 62,000,000 9,300,000 $100 $ 930,000,000
Central
America 19,000,000 2,850,000 $100 $ 285,000,000
Caribbean
(less Cuba) 8,x}00,000 1,200,000 $100 $ 120,000,000
Total $1,335,000,000
In addition these appropriations would, of course, go to
our own agricultural sector, where they would recycle
into the U.S. economy.
The other elements of the strategy would not add a
large additional cost. Assistance to legal migrants would
add little to the costs of reacting to the present flow of
illegal ones. The development aid could be found in
present appropriations for such assistance by favoring
the countries participating in this program. The adjust-
ment assistance for American labor also exists in present
programs, needing only new direction to support this
stragegy.
The costs involved are modest when compared to the
social costs to U.S. communities if the certain flood of
illegal migrants occurs. Add to this the costs of vainly
attempting to hold back the flood through enforcement of
present legislation, and the potential defense costs in a
very few years of facing a poor and hostile set of
neighbors on our southern borders. Again, the North-
South experience within the United States offers a sad
example of social costs. Those costs far exceed, even
toda the amounts required to prevent a repetition of