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June 30, 1981
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I WILLARD AVENUE, CHEW CHASE:, MARYLAND 20015 656-4068 470 STATINTL AI Fo lea1 10 p14" . DATE June 30, 1 9 8 1 Washington DC sur3JEcr Interview with William Colby and Anthony Cave-Brown . ROSS CRYSTAL; When we think of the Cold War we think of the '40s and on after. Well, we're going to to l k about the Cold War a few years before that. Joining me right now, here is former CIA Director William Colby, and Anthony Cave-Brown, British journalist, cur- rently an author of, his latest book, "On a Field of Red." And you, too, have the notion it was -- I think most people, the consensus was the '4'0s. And you found a lot doing research, didn't you? ANTHONY CAVE-BROWN: Yes. When we set out to write the book "On a Field of Red," the premise was that the Cold War really began, the present state of relationships between the West and the Eastern Bloc really began at Yalta in 1945. But during the research process for the book, we discovered, of course, that not only was the present tensions a permanent state of modern life, but also it was inherent in the relationship between the Western powers and the Communist Bloc, and was part of the doctrine of the 20th Century, and therefore was a -- as I've just said, a permanent feature of life today. standing? CRYSTAL: Mr. Colby, why do you think the misunder- WILLIAM COLBY: Well, I think we all refer to the Cold War. But there was a hiatus in it caused by Hitler's rise, and Hitler provided a threat to both the Western powers and to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union once made a pact with him, thin- king that that would turn him off for a while. But nonetheless, the basic Communist doctrine, espoused by Lenin even before he rnoro~ aT'v eta $v i arrs' iTSptfy'Dsgegq 19Q . . d~rc~S Cdr ~yT+143v rZtit Tes3fo`5 .'sa~f 3f ~fu i~F ~ rr~i~? ~xr sc red. Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500080007-1 2 went to Russia In 1917, was the necessity for a world revolution and a continuing conspiracy to create that, to create revolution, help history along, because history inevitably had to be advanced by revolution. That was their -- they were busy at it during the '20s and '30s, as well as during the '40s and '50s. CRYSTAL: In researching and finding out about Comintern, more of it, what did you learn? What right away struck you? CAVE-BROWN: I think what struck me most vividly were the known facts about the organization, that the Comintern, or the Communist International -- Comintern the term in brief for the Communist International -- was supposed to have been formed in 1919, As a matter of fact, it was formed a good deal earlier than that, for the purposes of prosecuting the Russian Revolution and the associated revolutions in Eastern Europe, and perhaps even in Central Europe. But moreover, the Russians claimed that -- Stalin claimed that the organization had been dissolved, that the world revolution of the proletariat, as it was cal led, had been dissolved in 1943. But In the course of our inquiries in the late '70s, we established quite clearly that while the organization called the Comintern may have been dissolved, in point of fact i n practice, the world revo- lution of the proletariat, as it was ca l l ed , had continued unceas- ingly ever since the formation of the Comintern in Moscow in 1919. CRYSTAL: Now, to get to t h i s book as a f i na l product, you gained access to some fascinating documents. And how did you go about doing that? CAVE-BROWN: Well, I mean, this is -- the essential source of the documentation, of course, was the Freedom of Infor- mation Act here In Washington, combined with certain private col- lections, such as the collection of Major General William J. Donovan, who was Mr. Colby's -- one of Mr. Colby's predecessors. Donovan being the founder of OSS and the conceiver of the Central Intelligence Agency. He, in his later years in life, collected every piece of documentation that he could find about Russia, the theory of the perpetual revolution, as Trotsky described it. And we are In a state of perpetual revolution, by the way. When you come to look at the last five or 10 years, you'll see that there's been nothing but revolutions all over the world, a systematic series of revolutions, many of which appear to me and appear to my coauthor, Charles McDonald, to have their origins or their inspiration in Moscow. But the essential source was unquestionably the Freedom of Information Act, and nothing more glamorous than the National .Archives in Washington. I mean all the paper is there. All that you have to do i s to have the time and the money to be able to go Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500080007-1 Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500080007-1 3 down there and dig Into the papers. There were certainly no secret revelations. COLBY: I think Mr. Cave Brown is not putting foward we I I enough h i s own -talent for making very alive and I i ve l y and amusing some of these rather dead documents. He can put them together in a fashion that makes them read like yesterday's spy novel or this morning's newspaper. And some of these stories of the early days in the Soviet Union and the revolution there, the actions against the revolution by the Western powers to try to stop it, the problems that arose in Germany as the revolution attempted there i n 1 9 1 9, and so forth. CRYSTAL: What struck you? What was the one, or more than one, fascin -- that struck you, that you might not have known? COLBY: Well, I'think the -- most of it, in gross terms, I was aware of. I was fascinated by the Communist Inter- national even when I was back in college in the 130s. And I was aware that there were Communist groups there that were promoting. We now learn that the man who almost became the head of the Bri- tish Intelligence Service was recruited as a Communist agent out of Cambridge in the late '30s. So that that plot, that effort to recruit people to conduct the revolution was going on at that time. Friends of mine went to Spain during the Spanish Civil War in the '30s, and there they fell under the control of the Communists. The Spanish Civil War was a war between an essen- tially right-wing fascist group that were trying to suppress a republic -- the problem was that the democracies refused to help the republic because they thought it was a little left. And the o n l y people he l p i ng it turned out to be the Communists, the Sov- iets. And with that, they asserted control over it. So they actually did achieve control. George Orwell, in his "[unintelligible] to Catalonia" puts this very clearly. He spent some time there. But that showed at that time that Moscow was thinking in terms of the expansion of its influence, aiding the revolution throughout the world. CRYSTAL: Let's move through the '40s, through the McCarthy era. How did Comintern change? CAVE-BROWN: Well., of course, the Communist Interna- tional was formally dissolved by Stalin in 1943, in an attempt to come to terms, or an apparent attempt to come to terms with the Western powers, and particularly with the United States, which was, of course, as It was called at the time, the arsenal of democracy. Russia needed American trucks, American tanks, Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500080007-1 Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500080007-1 American aircraft, American munitions. The only way it was going to get them was by modifying its revolutionary principles for the duration of the emergency. But immediately after the war was over, the Kremlin reverted to its old imperialist, Communist-imperialist stance. This was not immed iately recognized in the United States, nor was it immediately recognized in Great Britain. But the effect of it was to create a bureau called the Cominform, Communist Information Bureau, which was innocuous enough at its face, but which was in fact the recreation of the Comintern under another name. And its purpose was to propagate the Communist faith throughout the democracies, which were much weakened by war. But more particularly, it was also to reestablish and renourish the old roots of the Comintern so that the Russians could rees- tablish themselves and their undergroud apparats, as they called them, apparatuses, in the Western democracies, and especially in the United States of America, which, of course, was the one remaining capitalist democratic power which stood in the way of Russian ambitions. And over the years, they have consistently expanded, until practically every nation In the world is -- well, yes, every nation in the world, I would say, including, sometimes one believes, in Antarctica, has its own little cell of Communist -- of faithful Communists who are prepared to propagate... CRYSTAL: Can we for a second talk about the effect now on other countries, on Britain, on Germany, that have evolved from '40 to today? CAVE-BROWN: Yes. That was the object, of course, when we set out to do the book. We switched from one era of the -- of Communist manipulations to the second era. COLBY: Well, I remember a very vivid example of this. I n the fa l l of 1 94 1 , right after -- or just before -- the fa l l of, excuse me, 139 and '40, when Hitler had made a pact with Stalin, nonaggression pact between those two dictators, which really led to the outbreak of World War I I , but -- and led to the carving up of Poland and various other things and the assump- tion of power by the two dictators. Now, during that time, Hitler was trying to keep Amer- ica out of supporting Britain while he went to work to destroy Britain, then later to turn on Germany -- on Russia. But during that period, the object In America was to keep America quiet. And so I. remember at Columbia University in the fa l l of 1939 and early '40, and through the Battle of France and during that period, Communist groups in Columbia carrying coffins around In an antiwar protest: "Keep America neutral. Keep America out Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500080007-1 Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500080007-1 5 of war." That was the Communist line in 1940, until Hitler at- tacked Stalin In 1941. At which point, the call for solidarity with our embattled Soviet allies became the watchword. CRYSTAL: Gentlemen, I've got to break for one second. CRYSTAL: "On a Field of Red," the book by Anthony Cave- Brown and Charles B. McDonald. Anthony Cave-Brown with me right now, as well as former CIA Director William Colby. And the Cold War is being won, or has consistently, as we were talking about a couple of seconds ago, been won in the past... COLBY: We[I, I think it's still going on. That's one of the themes of the book, and a very accurate theme. But I think it is important not to panic and give up and say it's hopeless. Because we have defeated two major campaigns by the Soviets. The first was during the 1950s, an ideological campaign to take over Western Europe by subversion, through the Communist Party, through youth groups, the peace movement, and all the rest. Now, we met that with a political, ideological campaign for freedom and strength in freedom, with the Marshall Plan, with the NATO, and with the political efforts by CIA, among others, of helping with things like Radio Free Europe and other programs. Now, at the end of the 150s, that attempt by the Soviets to take over Western Europe had clearly failed. During the '60s they turned to the Third World, Khrush- chev's idea of wars of national liberation and the Soviets the natural ally of the dispossessed of the world. And they were doing pretty well at the beginning of the '60s. They had some very successful relationships in Indonesia, in Egypt, and various other parts of the world. The Cuban Revolution succeeded, and it succeeded against the efforts of the Americans to set it back. And it looked like things were rol l ing very well. By the end of the '60s, however, thanks to a program of American support of some of these small countries, helping them to develop their capability to meet this kind of a campaign, you saw some major changes in the world. The Malayan attempt to overthrow-the free government of Malaya had failed. The Com- munists were chased out of Indonesia by the Indonesians, not with any outside help. And this was happening in a variety of places. The Egyptians since have changed their orientation. And I think the point being that you have to understand this Ideological thrust that M.r. Cave-Brown is presenting in this book, and then design the appropriate tactics and weapons to meet that kind of a challenge. There's no use putting an MX system in Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500080007-1 Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500080007-1 6 the desert and think it's going to solve some problem of a guer- rilla or a traitor in some country. You have to meet it with the appropriate weapons. CRYSTAL: Then, what are the appropriate weapons? And what does the Reagan Administration look at today? CAVE-BROWN: I think there are two issues that Mr. Colby did not present which are very important, indeed. One is the question of industrial espionage, which has been a Soviet method, a Soviet tactic, a soviet strategy ever since the Com- munist International. One of the reasons why the Communist In- ternational was formed was to obtain by the cheapest possible means Western technology. That's one very, very important point. The Soviet industrial base, and especially in advanced industries, such as the aircraft industry, is almost wholly based upon Western technology which has been stolen, systematically and very cleverly stolen by keepers of the faith throughout the world. The second most Important thing is the -- in other countries, not the United States of America -- is this question of the undermining of the established governments and the estab- lished system -- established systems of those countries. And Egypt comes rapidly to mind here, Turkey, Greece, Italy to a point, France. One finds that the Communists are infiltrating not for the good of the nation In which they live, but for the furtherance of the Soviet doctrine, Soviet system. In point of fact, they are carrying out, and have been systematically car- rying out for well over 60 years, without too much impediment, the doctrines laid down for them by Lenin and Trotsky at the time of the Russian Revolution. They've been very faithful to those doctrines. And they're there, just like "Mein Kampf" told us exactly what Hitler was going to do. So Lenin's works and Trotsky's works are telling us, with great veracity, what it was that the Russians intended to do. I think, myself, that the -- and one of the things that emerges very strongly from "On a Field of Red" is -- the inquiries which went into my book -- Is that -- is this question of industrial espionage, because that Is the foundation for -- the technological foundation of the Soviet state. Without that foundation, they would not be the superpower that they are today. They might have all the manpower in the world. They might have the industrial base, but they would not have the technological base. And we are giving it to them for free. COLBY: And we saw these two fel lows arrested yester- day for exactly that kind of a thing. A Pole -- and you know his information would go on to. the Soviet Union -- was buying for $100,000 some secrets from the Hughes Aircraft Company, through an employee of It who had some access to the secret Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500080007-1 Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500080007-1 technical information of that company. CRYSTAL: Mr. Colby, you say MX missiles are not the way. Then, what is --- what are the weapons? COLBY: Well, good intelligence, so that you do under- stand this technique and who the operators are, who the people are, what the organizations are. Secondly, programs to increase the political strength of the countries that are under attack. I don't mean necessarily just the military strength, but the political cohesion and strength. When the -- the Administration has a program today for $ 1 2 5 m i l l i o n for economic assistance to E l Salvador, and about 25 million for next year for security and military assistance, I think you see the right balance: 125 for the economic and social advances for those countries, to strengthen their cohesion, and 25 for protective efforts against the guerrillas who are trying to overthrow them. That's not a bad balance in the way to ap- proach this kind of -- this level of threat. CAVE-BROWN: I was thinking of another point here, too. What has to be understood are the Soviet techniques on the ques- tion of subversion. Their methods are extremely clever. What they aim at is to undermine the confidence of ordinary people, such as you and I, in the government system, in the law, in the banks, in the insurance Industry, to peck away at the newspapers and at the television, at the publishing industry, all the things that we accept each day as part of our lives. Their technique is to try and systematically undermine our confidence in those institutions. And, of course, to a certain degree -- Sacco and Van- zetti, for example, is a very good case in point, which we dis- cuss at great length in this book here. A lot of people don't agree with us, but we think that Sacco and Vanzetti were quite rightly convicted and executed because they were guilty of murder. A lot of people in the United States do not agree with that. But all the facts and all the papers seem to us, in all fairness, to indicate that those two gentlemen were guilty of murder. And the law of the land provided the supreme penalty for that. But by clever, very clever propaganda on an interna- tional scale, beautifully manipulated from the great centers of the Communist International in Moscow and in Paris, it appeared to the American nation that their system of justice was defec- tive, that these men were apparently being made the fall guys of a defective judicial system. One of their techniques, but only one of very many -- Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500080007-1 Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500080007-1 8 the whole program is most cleverly and beautifully thought out. And it can only be resisted and beaten by a more profound of their methods and techniques. CRYSTAL: In that sense, better intelligence, as was just stated by Mr. Colby... CAVE-BROWN: Oh, I agree. I agree absolutely. CRYSTAL: ...add anything to that? CAVE-BROWN: Absolutely. Better intelligence. And I would have thought -- although probably Mr. Colby won't agree with me -- to make it possible for the Central Intelligence Agency to do its work beyond the light and the glare are of the public eye. A lot of this -- we're dealing with the dark side of the moon here, and what happens there, and it's not always desirable that the work of secret agents and that sort of thing should be ex- posed to -- exposed in Congress on the Hill and in public dis- cussion. To a certain limited extent, the laws have to be re- vised to permit the agency to do its work in such a fashion that the other side cannot always be aware of what's going on them- selves. COLBY: Well, I agree with that principle. I just think that there are ways to conduct our intelligence system under our constitutional system. We have two good committees of the Con- gress who have proved that they can know the secrets and keep the secrets for about four years now. Now, that's a pretty good re- cord. And yet they provide the congressional check-and-balance which is a fundamental element of our constitutional system. CRYSTAL: Should we go back to a stricter and tighter security system? COLBY: Oh, we certainly have to correct some of the absolute nonsense that goes on now, of people being able to write books about what they said, and then only have a squabble over royalties. Anyone who goes out of the agency and reveals the secrets he learned there, I think he ought to go to jail. And I think there's a law coming on the books that will send him to jail. And that's absolutely right. Groups who go around trying to expose our intelligence officers around .the world, they ought to go to j a i l. CAVE-BROWN: Oh, that's a crime, isn't it. COLBY: It's a crime. And it ought to be a crime. CAVE-BROWN: People who make lists and publish them in newspapers of the identities of... Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500080007-1 Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500080007-1 COLBY: I think that the Congress is going to pass this. And it's necessary that they do this to tighten the thing up. CAVE-BROWN: It's very interesting. If you look at the system -- I'm not quoting the British system to you as an example. But if anybody does this type of thing in England, you go to jail for 14 years at hard labor. CRYSTAL: Gentlemen, I would like to go on. Unfortun- ately, I cannot. But I can tell them the book is "On a Field of Red," and there It is, by Anthony Cave-Brown, Charles B. McDonald. Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500080007-1 STATINTL 91-0090, RITI~I~f INC 4701 WWVILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20015 656-4068 DATE June 30, 1981 6:10 PM CITY I Washington, DC Interview with William Colby PAT BUCHANAN: By a vote of 7 to 2, with the liberal Justices Brennan and Marshall in dissent, the court.had revoked, or at least indicated that the President of the United States and the Secretary of State have the right to revoke a passport on national security grounds. The passport belongs to Mr. Philip Agee, who's the CIA turncoat who's spent a good deal of his time abroad trying to identify American agents abroad and bringing them to public attention. Right now we're going to talk with former CIA Director Wi l l iam Colby. Have you looked at the stories on the decision about Mr. Agee and, I guess in the New York Times, the excerpts from the court opinion itself? WILLIAM COLBY: I haven't seen the opinion itself. But I think it's well-settled law that the government has a right to distinguish between free speech and action,. which is what... TOM BRADEN: Bill, that was what Burger tried to do. I must say I thought he was on a tight -- a very tight wire and fell off It. COLBY: Well, this fellow,-- this fellow did a lot more than just speaks. I mean he's conducting a campaign, and not just by speaking, but by acting... BRADEN: Well, listen., Bill', let me... COLBY: putting it out with a deliberate inten- tion, which he's quite frank to express. OFFICES M WASHTVAgNED~1" ' ie'R `Ip?P?i 19 RfVGi %I` - `t~fAC)4C3Q'M'C1A9P0?09 QAP7 aPAL CITIES Mrnnnnl sunofied by Radio 1V keoorta tnc. may be used for file and reference aupmes only. it may not be reproduced. sold or publ'ioly aemonstmted or exhibited. ~~ ALW. f v p,oelease 2001 /03 07Crito-R P91-00901 27 June 17c 1 By Ron Nessen "it would be like giving Anne Frank's address to the Nazis." With that graphic argument, NBC News correspondent Richard Valeriani urged his network not to broadcast his discovery that six American Embassy officials in Iran had avoided being taken hostage in November 1979 and were hiding at the Canadian Embassy in Tehran. - NBC executives realized that the story almost certainly would have resulted in :.the capture of the fugitive Americans by militant Iranian revolutionaries, and so the story was not broadcast. The six Amer- ican diplomats were later spirited out of Iran to safety on fake Canadian passports. "That was an easy one to decide," -'_Valeriani remembers. But the choice of whether to suppress -or broadcast a scoop on television news is not usually so clear-cut. The decision-- i,on occasion literally one of life ordeath- :-places enormous pressures on corre- spondents like Valeriani and their network =news superiors. : On the one hand, they are mindful' that -.broadcasting a -sensitive story could undermine national' security, endanger =lives (as in the case of the Tehran fugi ~tives), upset delicate diplomatic negotia- tions or provide comfort and propaganda to the Nation's adversaries. On the other hand, the networks are sensitive to their First Amendment rights and responsibili- ties, and to the need to resist pressure -from Government officials who may wish to kill a legitimate story only because it is embarrassing or politically damaging. Acting White House press secretary Larry Speakes foresees the time when the Reagan Administration "will have to ask reporters to hold back on using a story when exposure could cause an explosive crisis." Speakes says he is confident that if the White House appeals on a case-by- case basis to the "best instincts" of jour- nalists, the networks will voluntarily agree not to broadcast secrets that could harm the national interest:,. He may be wrong. The TV networks= and the news media generally--have be- come less willing to withhold news stories since their - bitter experiences with i attempted press manipulation during the Vietnam War, the Pentagon Papers case. and, most of all, Watergate. . In the never-ending controversy over what constitutes improper censorship and what constitutes proper. concern for national security; both sides cite dramatic epi- sodes to support their arguments. Yn 's hot d1a Owl -ce iP51then ? undermine 3 Iional Legislation here similar to England's Official Secrets Act-which allov,s for censorship of classified information- would, Colby believes, violate the U.S. i Constitution. The former CIA director feels that television and the press must be free from Government censorship. "That's the cost to have this kind of free country." he; Those who claim that TV should broad- cast what it knows in virtually every case point to President John Kennedy's famous lament after the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco: Kennedy expressed regret that The New York Times had bowed to his plea not to reveal in advance what they knew of the plans for the invasion of Cuba. Had the. Times blown-the operation's cover, :Ken- nedy mused later, -he might have recon- sidered the ill-fated landing. - - ? Those who argue on the other side, that the networks damage the national interest when they ignore Government requests to suppress sensitive secrets, cite the case of the Glomar Explorer, a sophisticated ship built for the CIA to raise a sunken Soviet missile submarine from the---+I floor of the Pacific Ocean. --'The-three networks and a number of newspapers learned of the Glomar and its mission in early ?1975. But they voluntarily withheld the story at the request of then CIA director William Colby while the ship,, which had already brought up halt of the Soviet sub, . prepared to grapple for the - other half,.. believed to contain valuable Says ABC's Jack Anderson: 'I have a duty to report what the Government is doing, which is ,,,not always what spokesmen say it is doirtg..~ - ::- Soviet coding equipment Then, in March 1975, Jack Anderson went on the air-and broke the Glomar Explorer story. As a result, the CIA says, it canceled efforts to bring up the rest of the submarine for fear that the Soviets-their discomfiture spotlighted on TV for all the world to see--might feel compelled to flex their muscles by interfering with, or even sinking.. the Glomar Explorer. Anderson. now with ABC, explains his role in the incident this way: "I have a duty to report what the Government is doing, which is not always what the authorized spokesmen say, it is-doing." Yet, Ander- son says, "Admittedly, reporters are not security experts and the publication of military secrets is always a thorny ques- tion." . :... Surprisingly, despite his experience in the Glomar Explorer episode. Colby is opposed to any legislation that would give the Government the power to prohibit the broadcast or-publication of informa- tion by legitimate news organizations, even it authorities consider the informa- tion inimical to the national interest. declares. in an unexpected reversal of the normal roles in this debate. NBC's Valeriani dis- agrees. "Britain has an Official Secrets Act." he. points out, "and it's still a very good, functioning democracy." It TV cor- respondents and other reporters act irre- sponsibiy-by divulging the identities of undercover intelligence operatives, for in- stance--then Valeriani thinks some re- straints may be necessary. "t don't believe in total freedom of the press." the veteran NBC correspondent explains. "I'm not a First Amendment" absolutist." Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500080007-1 t.'.rN Nv-Y CU r STATINTL Release 91~~L3qAJ41-00901 19 June 1981 Gl rf. ocrFes Mysteries surrounding the mission of the Glomar Explorer, a salvage vessel built by Howard Hughes for the Central. Intelligence Agency; mayinever be solved. A federal ap- peals court~ruled.recently that}the:CIA can .keep it:Glomarfiles'secrets *..; ' ;' Concluded the' courtr"The:~record before us:suggests ;either that the-CIA still has something to1.hide-or'1; that:it viishes'to hide from our adversaries the fact. that it has j nothing.tolhide:,;-O '? In court,papers the-CIS refused to con- - cf'cie that the Glomar's purpose-was to re- cover a sunken, Soviet, submarine in 1974. But plaintiffs in the disclosure arse;. led by a ;citizens`~grvup called= the-?Military~~ Audit Project. and, an organization supported by the American Civil. Liberties . Union, coun- tered"byiciting.:a passage=from the. French edition.4 forrner.CEk director William Col by's `autobiography',: The passage, which' doesn t the English edition of the_ book, says the 131o- mar's mission "was- to recover a Soviet sub- marine-stranded. some 15,500 feet deep at the bottom of the A -lawyer' for=the CIA says Mr." Colby's tatement ,?U' accurate; is-not.'anl official governmept;:pmnouncement;: because,-he is >no longer annagency official.': The CIA also says Mr. Colby never sub- mitted the passage' for review by the agency 'prior to'publicatiorr:` .:? :' Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500080007-1 STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIAW TdO901 ARTICLE APPFARED ON PAGE C? - From Washington NATO ou,~S, ends Warsaw P Since 1970, the NATO countries have outspent the Warsaw Pact countries by more than $200 billion, according to U.S. government figures. This fact is particularly relevant at a time when President Reagan's administration has proposed vastly increased military spending on the ground that excessive Soviet spending has led to a military imbalance. In presenting his new economic plan to Congress and to the nation early in 1981, Ronald Reagan stated: "Since 1970, the Soviet Union has invested S300 billion more in its military forces than we have. . . . To allow this imba- lance to continue is a threat to our national security." Reagan's figures are based on a CIA. report, "Soviet and U.S. Defense Activities-1970-1979: A Dollar Cost Comparison." The CIA's comparison' paints ' a"'dou- bly misleading picture of the U,S.- Year Soviet strategic balance.. First, the 1970 methodology of. the-report itself has , 1971 - 1972 been the subject. of considerable con- 1973 troversy; the CIA readily admits that its 1974 calculations. of. Soviet. defense. spend- .. 1975 1976 ing, a rough estimation. at. best, contain .1977 an upward bias. Second, in restricting, 1978 its. analysis to-only the United States 1979 and the SovietUnion, the e1Ar; has iieg lected a more'reallstic comparison;':the directly contending forces of NATO -an([ the Warsaw .Pact,_It is, clear that a true THE BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS June-July 1981 figures on Soviet defense spending are. the only official estimates available. Yet even based on these.. figures, an analysis of. total alliance defense spending shows a NATO advantage of $207 billion over' WVarsaw Pact mili- tary spending during the period, 1970-, of 4.5 million at our high volutltary 1979. army rates of pay plus upkeep (over As the table indicates, NATO has in fact outspent the Warsaw Pact coun- tries each year for the past decade, even though the margin has narrowed in recent years. According to Defense Department projections, NATO will continue to outspend the Warsaw Pact nations through 1986 at a minimum, and with a widening of the disparity. NATO VS Warsaw Pact Military Spending (in billions of 1979 dollars) Warsaw NATO NATO Pact advantage $201.8 $149.5 $52.3 192.8 153.7 39.1 195.6 159.4 36.2 190.9 166.7 24.2 193.9 173.4 20.5 190.5 178.6 11-9 186.6 186.2 .4 193.5 186.8 6.7 195.4 190.7 4.7 205.6 I94.6 11.0 1,946.6 1,739.6 207.0 Source. "World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1969-1978; U.S- Arms Con- trol and Disarmament Agency. 1979 figures from former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown's January 1981 final report to Congress. analysis of the military. balance has to compare both systems, as_ a whole. Whatever their limitations, the CtA's Edward Hay, research associate at the Council for a Livable World, is a student on leave of absence from Harvard College. In short, whatever the alarmist figures used by the President to justify an increasing U.S. military budget, if there is indeed art imbalance in defense expenditures, it is one which, favors the United States and our allies. And that $247 billion spending- gaps un- doubtedly understates the NATO advan- tage by- using a CIA approach which serves to overstate Soviet military spending, - In examining the CIA's methodology for comparing simply U.S.: and Soviet military -spending; an appraisal which removes some of the upward biases' would further tip the scales in favor of NATO: ? Measurements in dollars rather ?, than rubles tend to exaggerate Soviet expenditures, as ..the CIA .admits:' Valuing, for example, the USSR army $15,000 per soldier) adds up to almost $70 billion a year. Soviet salaries plus cost of upkeep are probably no more than one-third of ours. ? About 20 percent of total Soviet military expenditures and one-half of their recent buildup have been directed not at NATO but at China. ? Soviet expenditures in both dol- lars and rubles should be reduced still further to allow for the generally lower quality of Soviet equipment as well .as the less sophisticated technology. embodied in their weapons systems; CIA estimates insufficiently reflect these factors.. Former CIA Director William Colby has stated; "To the ex- tent that we are not able to 'Sovietize' [the method for estimating the cost of Soviet equipment when there is no direct equivalent in our owrt forces] and U.S. weapons used in the cost - estimating methodology are more com- plex, our estimates tend to overstate the costs of' producing the: Soviet, de- sign." According to Franklyn Holzman, professor of economics at Tufts Uni- versity, proper comparisons can be made between U.S. and Soviet ex- penditures, by valuing each in both dot- Jars and rubles and taking a geometric mean of the two. Comparisons of ex- I penditures in ruble prices would put both nations at approximate equality; in dollars, however, Soviet spending. appears to be 50 percent higher. Q i Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500080007-1